Grave new world the end of globalization, the return of history

GRAVE NEW WORLD Copyright © 2017 Stephen D King All rights reserved This book may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press) without written permission from the publishers For information about this and other Yale University Press publications, please contact: U.S Office: sales.press@yale.edu yalebooks.com Europe Office: sales@yaleup.co.uk yalebooks.co.uk Set in Minion Pro by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd Printed in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall Library of Congress Control Number: 2017936404 ISBN 978-0-300-21804-6 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 To Yvonne, Helena, Olivia and Sophie CONTENTS Prologue: A Victorian Perspective on Globalization Introduction: The Andalucían Shock Part One Paradise Lost False Prophets, Harsh Truths The New Imperium Relative Success Pride and the Fall Part Two States, Elites, Communities Globalization and Nation States The Spirit of Elitism Competing Communities, Competing Histories Part Three Twenty-First-Century Challenges 10 People and Places The Dark Side of Technology Debasing the Coinage Part Four Globalization in Crisis 11 Obligations and Impossible Solutions Epilogue: A 2044 Republican Fundraiser Notes Bibliography Acknowledgements Index PROLOGUE A Victorian Perspective on Globalization … we have now reached the third stage in our history, and the true conception of our Empire What is that conception? As regards the self-governing colonies we no longer talk of them as dependencies The sense of possession has given place to the sense of kinship We think and speak of them as part of ourselves, as part of the British Empire, united to us, although they may be dispersed throughout the world, by ties of kindred, of religion, of history, and of language, and joined to us by the seas that formerly seemed to divide us But the British Empire is not confined to the self-governing colonies and the United Kingdom It includes a much greater area, a much more numerous population in tropical climes, where no considerable European settlement is possible, and where the native population must always outnumber the white inhabitants … Here also the sense of possession has given way to a different sentiment – the sense of obligation We feel now that our rule over these territories can only be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and prosperity of the people … In carrying out this work of civilization we are fulfilling what I believe to be our national mission, and we are finding scope for the exercise of those faculties and qualities which have made us a great governing race … No doubt, in the first instance, when those conquests have been made, there has been bloodshed, there has been loss of life among the native populations, loss of still more precious lives among those who have been sent out to bring these countries into some kind of disciplined order [but] … You cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs; you cannot destroy the practices of barbarism, of slavery, of superstition, which for centuries have desolated the interior of Africa, without the use of force … Great is the task, great is the responsibility, but great is the honour: and I am convinced that the conscience and the spirit of the country will rise to the height of its obligations, and that we shall have the strength to fulfil the mission which our history and our national character have imposed upon us … the tendency of the time is to throw all power into the hands of the greater empires … But, if Greater Britain remains united, no empire in the world can ever surpass it in area, in population, in wealth, or in the diversity of its resources … Extracts from a speech by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, at the annual dinner of the Royal Colonial Institute, 31 March 1897 INTRODUCTION The Andalucían Shock ONE-WAY TRAFFIC Globalization is often regarded as ‘one-way traffic’ In the modern age, we think of extraordinary advances in technology that allow us to connect in so many remarkable – and increasingly inexpensive – ways We can communicate verbally and pictorially through WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook We can talk to each other via FaceTime and Skype We can search for recipes and the structure of the human brain through Google We can purchase chicken madras and salmon nigiri over the internet and have them brought to our homes via local delivery services We can stream music for free thanks to Spotify and watch our favourite artists and cat videos on YouTube or Vevo We can download television programmes and movies to watch at our convenience We can more easily pry into the affairs of the rest of the world (and, equally, the rest of the world can more easily pry into our affairs) Seen through these technological advances, it is easy to believe that globalization is inevitable; that distances are becoming ever shorter; that national borders are slowly dissolving; and that, whether we like it or not, we live in a single global marketplace for goods, services, capital and labour IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT TECHNOLOGY Technology alone, however, does not determine globalization, and nor does it rule out competing versions of globalization at any one moment in time If technology was the only thing that mattered, the Western Roman Empire – among other things, an incredibly sophisticated technological and logistical infrastructure – would never have come to an ignominious end in ad 476; the Chinese, with their superior naval technologies, would have been busily colonizing the Americas in the early sixteenth century, preventing Spain and, by implication, the rest of Western Europe from gaining a foothold; the British Empire would today still be thriving, thanks to the huge advantages it gained from the Industrial Revolution; the Cold War – which ultimately offered two competing versions of globalization associated with an uneasy nuclear stand-off – would never have happened; and today’s ‘failed states’ – suffering from disconnections both internally and with the rest of the world – would be a contradiction in terms Globalization is driven not just by technological advance, but also by the development – and demise – of the ideas and institutions that form our politics, frame our economies and fashion our financial systems both locally and globally When existing ideas are undermined and institutional infrastructures implode, no amount of new technology is likely to save the day Our ideas and institutions shift with alarming regularity Spanish conquistadors of the early sixteenth century – bounty-hunters hell bent on extracting silver from the New World, regardless of the human cost – would have been surprised to discover that Spain, at one point Europe’s superpower, is now one of the poorer Western European nations The Ottomans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – who had threatened to conquer Vienna and, by implication, much of the rest of Europe – would have been amazed to see how their empire, which had stretched from the Balkans into the Middle East and North Africa, completely imploded after the First World War (even if the seeds of its downfall were sown many years before) Victorians would be shocked to find that their beloved British Empire – which provided the essential foundations for nineteenth-century globalization – had more or less disappeared by the late 1940s, by which time the UK itself was on the brink of bankruptcy Those many fans of the Soviet economic system during the 1930s Depression years would doubtless be astonished to discover that the entire edifice began to crumble following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 SOUTHERN SPAIN Even when patterns of globalization endure for many centuries, they can break down remarkably quickly, leading to dramatic changes in fortune Consider, for example, the history of Andalucía in southern Spain, a story that veered from one seemingly permanent political structure (Islam) to another (Christianity) within just a handful of years In AD 711, a Muslim Berber force travelled from North Africa across the Mediterranean to reach southern Spain Six years later, and thanks to the Berbers’ defeat of the hitherto-ruling Christian Visigoths, Córdoba had become the capital of what was known as al-Andalus The conquering Moors then set about building their symbols of power In 784, construction began on the Grand Mosque of Córdoba By 987 – and following three further development stages – the mosque was complete A truly remarkable building, it was designed above all to be a symbol of lasting Islamic dominance Yet, following the defeat of the Almoravids by the Almohads, the centre of Islamic power later transferred from Córdoba to Seville, just under a hundred miles away Inevitably, a new mosque was required and, in 1171, it was provided: topped off by its minaret, known today as the Giralda, Seville’s Almohad Mosque was a marvel of the Moorish world For the citizens of southern Spain, it would have been easy to believe that medieval ‘globalization’ was ultimately dependent on the spread of Islam, a way of life which appeared to be intellectually, technologically and culturally much more advanced than anything Christian Europe had to offer Yet within a handful of years, Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula had descended into chaos In 1213, following the death of the ruling caliph, his 10-year-old son took over This inevitably triggered infighting among the grown-ups, each of whom jockeyed for power Worse, the young caliph died a decade or so later without leaving a single heir: at a stroke, the ruling conventions of Moorish Spain had been totally undermined For the northern Christian kings, this was too good an opportunity to miss By 1236, they had taken control of Córdoba Twelve years later, they had their hands on Seville Córdoba’s mosque was ‘converted’ into a cathedral, while Seville’s mosque was demolished (apart from the Giralda, which became a bell tower), to be replaced by what to this day remains the world’s largest cathedral The ultimate irony, perhaps, is that Seville Cathedral – or, to give it its full Spanish name, Catedral de Santa María de la Sede – houses the remains of Christopher Columbus In 1492, the year in which Columbus discovered the New World, the Moors were finally expelled from the Iberian Peninsula, following the start of the Inquisition in 1478 (doubtless a surprise to the remaining Moors: after all, nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition…) By then, Islamic power was being consolidated farther east AFTER COLUMBUS Columbus had inadvertently discovered a new Western European-led and mostly Christian path towards global political and economic expansion The next five hundred years witnessed the increasing dominance of so-called Western powers: either those based in Europe or those whose new populations were mostly sourced from Europe And while these powers were often in conflict with each other, they all ultimately shared the same view of the rest of the world: it was there to be discovered, exploited and colonized for their individual and collective benefit It was the beginning of what might loosely be described as ‘post-Columbus’ globalization Yet while there were attempts to create lasting stability – ranging from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 through to the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 – post-Columbus globalization was always vulnerable to imperial rivalries For a while, the British Empire, in all its pomp, appeared to provide an answer: its enthusiasm for free trade – enforced by the long arm of the Royal Navy – opened up a remarkable web of commercial connections worldwide Other nations, however, understandably wanted their share of the spoils, most obviously the Russians in the nineteenth century and the Germans in the first half of the twentieth Eventually – and, in hindsight, inevitably – post-Columbus globalization collapsed, to be replaced by war, revolution and isolationism Only after the Second World War was it able to re-emerge, albeit under the shadow of the Cold War This time the US was, in effect, both globalization’s leading architect and its main sponsor, even if Washington now rejected the empire-building it had partly sponsored during the nineteenth century The emergence of the US as the world’s dominant superpower was, in many ways, the apotheosis of post-Columbus globalization, signalling the triumph of Western liberal democratic values and free-market capitalism At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, post-Columbus globalization is in serious trouble Economic power is shifting eastwards and, as it does so, new alliances are being created, typically between countries that are not natural cheerleaders for Western political and economic values There are signs that pre-Columbus versions of globalization – in which power was centred on Eurasia, not the West – are making a tentative reappearance The US is no longer sure whether its priorities lie across the Atlantic, on the other side of the Pacific or, following the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016, at home rather than abroad Indeed, President Trump confirmed as much in his January 2017 inauguration speech, stating that ‘From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first.’ Free markets have been found wanting, particularly following the global financial crisis Support and respect for the international organizations that provided the foundations and set the ‘rules’ for post-war globalization – most obviously, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the United Nations Security Council (whose permanent members anachronistically include the UK and France, but not Germany, Japan, India or Indonesia) – are rapidly fading Political narratives are becoming increasingly protectionist It is easier, it seems, for politicians of both left and right to blame ‘the other’ – the immigrant, the foreigner, the stranger in their midst – for a nation’s problems Voters, meanwhile, no longer fit into neat political boxes Neglected by the mainstream left and right, many have opted instead to vote for populist and nativist politicians typically opposed to globalization Isolationism is, once again, becoming a credible political alternative Without it, there would have been no Brexit and no Trump THE END OF POST-COLUMBUS GLOBALIZATION In combination, these political and economic forces suggest that globalization, at least of the postColumbus kind, is simply not inevitable In this book – a deliberate mixture of economics, history, geography and political philosophy – I make six key claims: • First, economic progress that reaches beyond borders is not, in any way, an inescapable truth Globalization can all too easily go into ... to the sense of kinship We think and speak of them as part of ourselves, as part of the British Empire, united to us, although they may be dispersed throughout the world, by ties of kindred, of. .. enough, the success of the industrialized nations in the decades following the end of the Second World War could be seen merely as a return to business as usual Constant fighting in the first half of. .. each other, they all ultimately shared the same view of the rest of the world: it was there to be discovered, exploited and colonized for their individual and collective benefit It was the beginning