Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law Gert Straetmans Editor Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law Volume 33 Series Editors Katharina Boele-Woelki, Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany Diego P Fernández Arroyo, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), Paris, France Founding Series Editors Jürgen Basedow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany George A Bermann, Columbia University, New York, USA Editorial Board Joost Blom, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Vivian Curran, University of Pittsburgh, USA Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy Makane Moïse Mbengue, Université de Genève, Switzerland Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, Universidade Estado Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Ulrich Sieber, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany Dan Wei, University of Macau, China As globalization proceeds, the significance of the comparative approach in legal scholarship increases The IACL / AIDC with almost 800 members is the major universal organization promoting comparative research in law and organizing congresses with hundreds of participants in all parts of the world The results of those congresses should be disseminated and be available for legal scholars in a single book series which would make both the Academy and its contribution to comparative law more visible The series aims to publish the scholarship emerging from the congresses of IACL / AIDC, including: of the General Congresses of Comparative Law, which take place every years (Brisbane 2002; Utrecht 2006, Washington 2010, Vienna 2014, Fukuoka 2018 etc.) and which generate (a) one volume of General Reports edited by the local organizers of the Congress; (b) up to 30 volumes of selected thematic reports dealing with the topics of the single sections of the congress and containing the General Report as well as the National Reports of that section; these volumes would be edited by the General Reporters of the respective sections; the volumes containing selected contributions to the smaller (2-3 days) thematic congresses which take place between the International Congresses (Mexico 2008; Taipei 2012; Montevideo 2016 etc.); these congresses have a general theme such as “Codification” or “The Enforcement of Law” and will be edited by the local organizers of the respective Congress All publications may contain contributions in English and French, the official languages of the Academy More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11943 Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé International Academy of Comparative Law Gert Straetmans Editor Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers Editor Gert Straetmans Faculty of Law University of Antwerp Antwerp, Belgium ISSN 2214-6881 ISSN 2214-689X (electronic) Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law ISBN 978-3-030-18053-9 ISBN 978-3-030-18054-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18054-6 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Preface To combat market inefficiencies resulting from the information asymmetry that exists between businesses and consumers, an increasing number of mandated information disclosures are imposed on businesses to give consumers the means to protect their own interests by making autonomous, informed choices Prohibiting misleading information and informing consumers with correct information lies at the core of the so-called information paradigm which resulted in consumer information models across the world In those models, consumers are often perceived as benefit-maximising creatures Information requirements allow consumers to make decisions themselves, decisions which are supposedly better than anyone else can make for them According to the economic theories underlying those models, informed consumer decisions are efficient It follows that if consumers are given full information, they will consistently make decisions that maximise their welfare As a consequence, the disclosure of correct information and information in general cannot have a negative impact on the purchase decision of consumers Being rational creatures consumers are supposed to ignore information that is ineffective or irrelevant Pre-contractual information duties and labelling requirements for foodstuffs range among the earliest information obligations that have been adopted in view of protecting consumers Together with the prohibition of misleading commercial practices and transparency requirements for contract terms, these measures seek respectively to prevent and to combat the deception of consumers The last decade models based on mandatory disclosures increasingly became the subject of criticism not in the least by behavioural economists More particularly, the continuous accumulation of information requirements begs the question whether the ‘inundation’ of information does not risk to disinform the consumer rather than inform Furthermore, the benchmark of the rational consumer which serves as the basis for the design of protective measures is increasingly criticised Also, new communication technologies pose new threats to consumers and might cause new forms of information asymmetries v vi Preface This book focuses on these recent developments in consumer law and specifically addresses mandatory disclosures and the topical problem of information overload It provides an in-depth comparative analysis based on national reports from countries with common law and civil law traditions in Asia, America and Europe More in particular, it bundles contributions originating in founding countries of the European Union (France, Germany and Italy), in member states that at a later stage acceded to the European Union (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic), in the United Kingdom that initiated the process to leave the European Union, in countries of the Asian continent (China, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan) and furthermore in Brazil, Canada (Québec province) and Turkey which echo views from respectively the North- and South-American and the Euro-Asian region The book further benefits from the Belgian experience with consumer information rules The national reports follow the structure of the questionnaire which is annexed in English and in French to this book It allows readers in a user-friendly manner to compare the subparts of the chapters of their preference Also, the general report in this book applies the same order of treatment as the questionnaire It offers comparative insights based on the national reports in the most relevant developments of consumer information law The main themes dealt with in the book are the following At first the main characteristics of the current consumer protection models and the basic assumptions underlying those models such as the information paradigm and the average consumer benchmark are examined The analysed legal systems start traditionally from the assumption that contracting parties are more or less in an equal bargaining position and enjoy the freedom of contract As is well known, new market circumstances (mass products, standardised contracts) made increasingly clear that market failures occurred and consumers could no longer be considered in an equal position with traders Hence, consumer protection rules responded in the first place to failures in the market economy like increasing information asymmetries and provided for corrections to restore real equality between traders and consumers Besides increased information requirements in line with the economic pace of the market, the conviction gradually grew that consumers must be considered weaker parties in some circumstances, deserving extended protection for instance in the context of distance selling, off-premises contracts and e-commerce The characterisation as a weaker party justified more intrusive consumer protection measures like withdrawal rights, rules on delivery in conformity with the contract and consumer guarantees More recently, consumers are increasingly approached as the weaker party by definition, especially when concluding standard or adhesion contracts As a consequence, the fairness of contract terms is enforced by a multitude of measures among which are the nullity of unfair contract terms, the impact of pre-contractual information on the fairness of a contract term, the transparency of core contract terms and terms in general, the duty to explain contract terms, etc It follows that consumer models in markets that become more global can no longer be reduced to pure corrections of the information asymmetry that occurs Market fairness towards consumers is no longer necessarily linked to a demonstrated Preface vii inferior information or even bargaining position of the consumer, but increasingly connected with the assumption that the consumer is a weaker party as such given the economic environment in which he makes transactional decisions It is further examined in this book how consumer models adapt to the new market circumstances and whether consumer models tend anew towards consumerist approaches as experienced in the 1970s or retain, albeit maybe with varying degrees of intensity, their overall economic orientation In the same vein, the analysis seeks to investigate whether the consumer seen as a rational, benefit-maximising creature still holds as the benchmark of consumer protection measures and whether the information paradigm is there to last as foundation of consumer protection models In the second part of this book, the information obligations themselves are the subject of analysis, starting with the general pre-contractual information rules and the role of good faith in contracting A grand variety of rules exist as regards pre-contractual information with countries imposing a general pre-contractual information duty and countries where such a duty is absent The book highlights the existing differences in this regard and focuses more particularly on countries with a general pre-contractual information duty Countries with such a duty almost always also impose transparency requirements It follows that pre-contractual information must be clear, intelligible and comprehensible These transparency requirements incorporate in general two obligations The first relates to the form and the presentation of the information which must be easy to read The second refers to the content of the information and its comprehensibility Transparency measures often lack clarity due to the absence of further guidance by legislators The book studies whether that is the case and if such a lack of clarity would occur, how courts cope with that shortcoming It is further analysed whether common rules on transparency can be deduced from the existing national systems In this regard also the heavy regulated field of food labelling is briefly analysed in view of extracting overall rules on the readability and intelligibility of information With these analyses as background, the focus of the book in the third part shifts towards the relationship of the transparency requirement in general information obligations and the prohibition of misleading commercial practices on the one hand and the fairness of (standard) contract terms on the other hand With regard to the misleading character and comprehensibility of the information, a remarkable evolution takes place in the European Union Recent case law of the European Court of Justice seems to suggest that an average consumer who is provided with correct and comprehensive information in advertisements, nevertheless, may have a mistaken perception of the offer due to the presentation of that information taken as a whole The Court’s approach first took place in a case relating to food labelling but was extended later to misleading commercial practices cases Although the European Court of Justice does not as such renounce that the average consumer serves as a benchmark for the assessment of misleading practices in labelling and in advertising, it clearly mitigates the consumer’s obligation to internalise the information which is disclosed in the market for his benefit It follows that even when the trader satisfies the information requirements imposed by the law, that does not automatically rule out that the information may be presented in such a viii Preface manner that the average consumer remains misled, notwithstanding the correct and comprehensive information he received Hence, the Court accepts that in some circumstances correct and comprehensive information may no longer be capable of correcting the consumer’s erroneous or misleading impressions based on other informational elements This will be especially so in the case of price information provided to consumers in TV advertising for rather complex products and in the case of advertising for or information on the package of a daily product In those circumstances, the European Court of Justice seems to accept that the level of attention of consumers may be lower and hence their capability to absorb the disclosed information due to either the reduced time to internalise the information (e.g in the case of a TV ad) or the fact that the consumer (sometimes hastily) buys a daily product (e.g products from the range of basic consumables in supermarkets) With regard to contract terms, the European Court of Justice has given some very strong guidance on what is required for terms to be plain and intelligible In doing so, the Court strengthened the bond between pre-contractual information on the one hand and the unfairness of contract terms on the other hand, which it considers as closely intertwined In its recent case law, the European Court of Justice held that the requirement of transparency should not be restricted to mere formal and grammatical intelligibility but should extend to the precise content of the terms According to the Court, the consumer must be informed in such a manner that he is in a position to evaluate on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria the economic consequences for him which derive from a term More specifically, the consumer must be provided with all the information likely to have a bearing on the extent of his commitment so that he is enabled to estimate in particular the total cost of his contract Furthermore, consumers must be expressly informed of their rights that flow from mandatory national law of which they are beneficiaries, even though they are deemed to know their national legislation Hereby the fundamental importance of pre-contractual information for consumers is emphasised since consumers decide on that basis to be bound by a contract The book specifically analyses these new developments in food labelling, commercial practices and unfair contract terms law and examines whether similar traits of these developments can be found in non-European jurisdictions The analysis in this book is further complemented with a fourth part wherein sector-specific information rules are analysed Two sectors were selected to that aim: the financial services sector and the e-commerce sector, the first because legislatures increasingly impose specific information obligations on businesses in the financial services sector due to the often complex, sophisticated and highly technical nature of those services and the latter because new communication technologies pose new threats to consumers in terms of information and consequently force legislatures to enact specific rules to protect the digital consumer Especially the fact that legislators are experimenting with different forms of summary disclosures in the financial services sector retained attention Also, recent initiatives to make use of the new technological environment with the aim of presenting information in a more digestible way for consumers are highlighted in this part of the book It is more particularly Preface ix examined whether the tendency towards rationalisation of information in this domain also has led to simplification of the information The analysis in the preceding parts gives the reader the necessary background to understand that consumer protection models based on mandatory disclosures are not free of criticism As was pointed out above, they increasingly became the subject of criticism the last decade, not least by behavioural economists Especially the excessively detailed rules on advertising and information are increasingly criticised as counterproductive if they lead to constantly extended lists of information catalogues This part of the book particularly focuses on the topical problem of information overload that results from the continuous accumulation of information requirements Here, the question is raised whether this evolution risks to disinform rather than inform the consumer? The book examines how countries with different legal backgrounds respond to this emerging problem More in particular, the focus of the analysis is placed on the impact, if any, of those criticisms on the national consumer information policies in the reporting countries and whether legislatures react to the highlighted critiques and drawbacks of the information models Also, the degree to which countries address more particular problems relating to overload of information is discussed in this part of the book The concluding and final part of the book provides a critical appraisal of the recent developments in consumer protection models based on information obligations More in particular, the question is addressed whether the multiple criticisms on the existing consumer information models necessitate the abandonment of those models in favour of new forms of more adequate and thus better consumer protection In this context also the multiple initiatives to educate consumers will be taken into account Finally, the book concludes with some suggestions on how consumer law could/ should evolve in the future, based on the comparative analysis of the national reports originating in different continents Antwerp, Belgium February 2019 Gert Straetmans Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: Brazilian Law Report 547 da Cunha Brokamp EDG (2010) A Necessidade de proteỗóo da crianỗa diante mercado de consumo: conito entre liberdade e intervenỗóo In: Martins GM (Coord.) Temas de Direito Consumidor Lumen Juris, Rio de Janeiro, p 177 da Silva RA (2003) Os fundos de investimento financeiro luz Código de Defesa Consumidor: a proteỗóo jurớdica investidor Revista de Direito Privado 13:187249 de Almeida Santos FM (2016) Informaỗóo como instrumento para amenizar riscos na sociedade de consumo Revista de Direito Consumidor 107:363–384 de Azevedo CEM (2010) O direito de arrependimento consumidor nas contrataỗừes eletrụnicas In: Martins GM (Coord.) Temas de Direito Consumidor Lumen Juris, Rio de Janeiro, p 112 de Carvalho DF, de Souza Oliveira T (2010) A proteỗóo consumidor-crianỗa frente publicidade no Brasil Revista de Direito Consumidor 94:181–211 de Magalhães Dias LAL (2015) Publicidade e hipervulneráveis: limitar, proibir ou regular? Revista de Direito Consumidor 99:285–305 Doneda D (2010) A Proteỗóo de Dados Pessoais nas Relaỗừes de Consumo: Para Alộm da Informaỗóo Creditớcia SDE/DPCD, Brasớlia Eng AC, Polewka G, Oyague OW (2015) A crise econômica brasileira e o superendividamento da populaỗóo emergờncia aprimoramento legislativo para a tutela social - Emergência aprimoramento legislativo para a tutela social Revista de Direito Consumidor 101:387–433 Fachin LE (2006) O Giro repersonalizante: singrar, a viagem redescobrimento In: Estatuto jurídico patrimơnio mínimo: luz novo Código Civil brasileiro e da Constituiỗóo Federal Renovar, Rio de Janeiro Franco MB (2010) O superendividamento consumidor: fenômeno social que merece regulamentaỗóo legal Revista de Direito Consumidor 74:227242 Laeber MRS (2007) Proteỗóo de dados pessoais: o direito autodeterminaỗóo informativa Revista de Direito Bancário e Mercado de Capitais 37:59–80 Lewicki B (2003) A privacidade da pessoa humana no ambiente de trabalho Renovar, Rio de Janeiro Marques CL (2001) Sociedade de Informaỗóo e Serviỗos Bancỏrios: Primeiras Observaỗừes Revista de Direito Consumidor 39:49–74 Marques CL (2016) Contratos no código de defesa consumidor Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo Marques CL, Miragem B (2014) O Novo Direito Privado e a Proteỗóo dos Vulnerỏveis Revista dos Tribunais, Sóo Paulo Marques CL, Benjamin AHV, Miragem B (2004) Comentários ao código de defesa consumidor: arts 1 a 74 : aspectos materiais Revista dos Tribunais, Sóo Paulo Martins GM (2015) A regulamentaỗóo da publicidade infantil no brasil A proteỗóo consumidor e da infância Revista de Direito Consumidor 102:297–320 Miragem B (2012) Curso de Direito Consumidor Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo Miragem B (2014) Proteỗóo da crianỗa e adolescente consumidores possibilidade de explicitaỗóo de critộrios de interpretaỗóo conceito legal de publicidade abusiva e prática abusiva em razão de ofensa a direitos da crianỗa e adolescente por resoluỗóo conselho nacional da crianỗa e adolescente - CONANDA Revista de Direito Consumidor 95:459–495 Moreira CRB (1997) Notas sobre a inversão ơnus da prova em benefício consumidor Revista de Direito Consumidor 22:135–149 Mulholland C (2012) O Direito de não saber como decorrência direito intimidade – Comentário ao REsp 1.195.995 Revista Civilistica.com 1:1–11 Nery N (1992) Os princípios gerais código brasileiro de defesa consumidor Revista de Direito Consumidor 3:44–77 Oliva MD (2015) Patrimụnio Separado e Proteỗóo Consumidor na Incorporaỗóo Imobiliỏria In: de Oliveira AJG, Xavier LP (Org.) Repensando o direito consumidor III: 25 anos de CDC: conquistas e desafios OAB/PR, Curitiba, pp 276–299 548 M D Oliva Pasqualotto A (2010) O destinatário final e o ‘consumidor intermediário’ Revista de Direito Consumidor 74:1122 Pfeiffer RAC (2007) Aplicaỗóo Cúdigo de Defesa Consumidor aos Administradores de Fundos de Investimento Revista de Direito Consumidor 61:190–202 Pierri D (2014) Políticas públicas e privadas em prol dos consumidores hipervulneráveis - idosos e deficientes Revista de Direito Consumidor 92:221–298 Rodotà S (2008) A vida na sociedade de vigilância: privacidade hoje Renovar, Rio de Janeiro Schreiber A (2014) Contratos Eletrônicos e Consumo Revista Brasileira de Direito Civil 1:5 Siqueira RL, Bianco DD (2011) A publicidade comparativa no brasil e no direito comparado In: Nery Junior N, de Andrade Nery RM (Org.) Doutrinas Essenciais: Responsabilidade Civil, vol Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, pp 1.114–1.115 Tepedino G (2000) Editorial: Do sujeito de direito pessoa humana Revista Trimestral de Direito Civil 1:V–VI Tepedino G, Oliva MD (2017) Controle de Abusividade da Clỏusula de Eleiỗóo de Foro Revista de Direito Consumidor 109:187–205 IACL Questionnaire: Information/ Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation Introduction Consumers deserve legal protection on account of their inferior position This is the well-known rationale for adopting special rules for consumers Prohibiting misleading information and informing consumers with correct information lies at the core of the so-called information paradigm which resulted in consumer information models across the world To combat the market inefficiencies resulting from the information asymmetry that exists between businesses and consumers, an increasing number of mandated information disclosures are imposed on businesses Consequently protective measures of consumers have frequently sought to give consumers the means to protect their own interests by making autonomous, informed choices In those models consumers are often perceived as benefit maximizing creatures Information requirements allow consumers to make decisions themselves, decisions which are supposedly better than anyone else can make for them It follows that if consumers are given full information, they will consistently make decisions that maximise their welfare Hence informed consumer decisions are efficient decisions Pre-contractual information duties and labelling requirements for foodstuffs are well-known illustrations of such mandatory information obligations In a number of legal systems they range among the earliest information obligations that have been adopted in view of protecting consumers Together with the prohibition of misleading commercial practices these measures seek to respectively forestall and to combat the deception of consumers Therefore they will be the subject of this questionnaire The last decade models based on mandatory disclosures increasingly become the subject of criticism not in the least by behavioural economists Without going into too much details behavioural economics scholars mark as major critiques on consumer information policies based on disclosures, the bounded rationality of consumers, the fact that consumers often lack the time to read information, the absence © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 G Straetmans (ed.), Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers, Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18054-6 549 550 IACL Questionnaire: Information/Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation of rules on the presentation of the information, the length of the information and the understandability of information for consumers in general and for vulnerable consumers in particular More particularly the continuous accumulation of information requirements gives rise to the question whether the ‘inundation’ of information does not risk to dis-inform the consumer rather than inform In this debate also the so-called digital consumer and consumer of financial services must be given specific attention The first because of the communication medium that poses new threats to consumers, the latter because the financial services sector is characterised as a complex area with specific technicalities Consumer law is often also characterised by more intrusive measures to party autonomy In those areas in which the consumer is not able to make a rationale choice on the basis of adequate information or a cooling-off period would not have much effect, more intrusive measures such as the control of contract terms may be introduced Bans of unfair contract terms are the result These prohibitions are often paired with specific transparency requirements These transparency requirements are complementary to the general pre-contractual information requirements and hence also dealt with in this questionnaire On a more general account the position of the consumer vis-à-vis businesses is analysed in view of obtaining deeper insights on how party autonomy, negotiation capacities and bargaining power of consumers function in the legal systems Questionnaire General Characteristics of the Consumer Information Model a What are the main features of your national consumer model? Is it based on the economic market model and the inherent ‘homo economicus’ or is it (also) characterised by other features? b Which consumer (e.g the reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect consumer who is capable of processing information which is disclosed to him and value it in view of his purchase decisions) serves as the general benchmark for your national consumer legislation? Are there specific types of consumers, e.g types of vulnerable consumers, that have an impact on what information must be provided to consumers and how it is provided? Please specify briefly whether different benchmarks are used in relation to pre-contractual information, labelling, misleading practices, unfair terms, financial services and online sales Pre-contractual Information Requirements General information obligation a Is there a general obligation imposed on businesses to provide consumers with pre-contractual information? When (before conclusion of the contract etc ) and IACL Questionnaire: Information/Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation 551 how (durable medium etc .) must this information be given? What information must be given to the consumer? b Are businesses allowed to add voluntarily information to the information particulars, if any, imposed by law? c Can the lack of pre-contractual information give rise to sanctions, and if yes, what sanctions? Can it give rise to a culpa in contrahendo? How does it relate to party autonomy and negotiation powers in your legal system? Is there a benchmark of reasonable consumer expectations applied in this respect? Please explain In some legal systems rules about the presentation of information include transparency requirements like: the information must be clear, unambiguous, understandable, comprehensible, intelligible etc for consumers d Are there rules in your jurisdiction which impose transparency requirements and how the information must be presented to the consumer? e If some of the abovementioned requirements exist in your legal system, how are these requirements then handled by courts? Please explain f Is there any sanction when a business omits to provide an obligatory information particular to consumers? Please explain Specific food information requirements for consumers a What general features characterise your legal system’s food labelling requirements (e.g list of ingredients, no deception .)? b Are manipulative marketing techniques that exploit the fact that consumers are easier to persuade when they have not engaged their conscious decisionmaking faculties, for instance the use of specific packaging colors, addressed in your legal system? If yes, in what way? Please explain Some legal systems require mandatory food information to be marked in a conspicuous place in such a way as to be easily visible, clearly legible and, where appropriate, indelible It is sometimes also stated that food information may not in any way be hidden, obscured, detracted from or interrupted by any other written or pictorial matter or any other intervening material Some legal systems further contain rules as regards font size and characters of mandatory particulars c Are there rules in your legal system on how food information must be presented to consumers? Please explain d Is there any sanction in case a business omits to provide certain mandatory particulars in accordance with the presentation requirements? Please explain Misleading Commercial Practices For the purposes of this subsection commercial practice is taken in its broadest meaning, namely any act, conduct, omission, commercial communication, advertising, marketing that directly or indirectly is related to the promotion, sales or supply of goods, services, etc How is the consumer protected against misleading commercial practices in your jurisdiction? The following questions may serve as guidelines for your answer: 552 IACL Questionnaire: Information/Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation Is there a provision that prohibits misleading actions and omissions? What benchmark is used to assess the misleading character of commercial practices? Are there specific rules for the protection of groups of particularly vulnerable consumers against misleading practices? Are there specific rules for information that is provided to consumers through specific media, e.g comparison websites? Is the assessment of the misleading character of a commercial practice influenced by the way in which pre-contractual information was provided to consumers? Please explain Unfair Contract Terms—Bargaining Power The prohibition of unfair contract terms rests upon the assumption that consumers are less experienced than businesses and lack the legal knowledge and the bargaining power to negotiate pre-drafted standard terms Hence bans on unfair terms are often restricted to terms that have not been the subject of individual negotiation a Are standard terms treated differently from individually negotiated terms in your legal system? If yes, in what way? b How is in this respect the bargaining power of consumers characterised vis-à-vis businesses in your legal system? Please explain c Who bears the burden of proof that a term has been individually negotiated? How can it be proven? Please explain d If parties have a dispute about whether a term was individually negotiated or not, how is this dealt with in court practice? Please explain e Are so-called core contract terms excluded from the unfairness test? Please explain Transparency of (core) contract terms a If the use of written standard terms (or the exclusion of core contract terms from the unfairness test) is subject to a transparency requirement: how is this transparency requirement then defined and how is it applied in practice? Please explain The following questions may serve as guidelines for your answer: Do requirements like for instance ‘contract terms have to be clear and comprehensible’ solely refer to the formal or grammatical correctness of the terms or does it also include the obligation to inform the consumer about the economic or other consequences of a term? Is the (more) vulnerable consumer offered a higher level of protection in terms of transparency? If the exclusion from the unfairness test of core contract terms is subject to a transparency requirement, is it then also subject to the obligation to bring core contract terms to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would be aware of the term? Can pre-contractual information have a bearing on the interpretation of the precise content of a contract term? Are individually negotiated terms dealt with differently than standard terms as regards their transparency? If yes, in what way? Is there any sanction for not complying with the transparency requirement? IACL Questionnaire: Information/Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation 553 Sector Specific Rules: The Financial Consumer Financial services are for the purposes of this questionnaire defined broadly including banking, insurance and investment services In most legal systems specific information requirements exist as regards financial services, e.g in terms of the comprehensibility, reliability, transparency and comparability of the information, bans on specific unfair terms a In what way these specific measures in your legal system deviate from the requirements imposed in other consumer sectors? Please explain b Does the critique from legal and other scholars that the information disclosed to consumers in this field is too expansive play a role in recent legislative developments? For instance is there discussion in your jurisdiction about forms of ‘smart’ or ‘more targeted’, simplified information, e.g key information documents, the use of icons or the use of scores ¼ one dimensional summaries of product features like e.g the annual percentage rate in consumer credit? Please explain Sector Specific Rules: The Digital Consumer In most legal systems specific information requirements exist concerning online consumer sales/distance sales a In what way these specific measures deviate from the requirements imposed on off line sales to consumers? Please explain b Consumer information can shape the reasonable expectations of consumers, and consequently also the level of protection consumers can reasonably expect Does the legislation make use of a benchmark of reasonable consumer expectations? Please explain Most legal orders require that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purposes of the processing c The fact that consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data begs the question how the consumer must be informed about to what exactly he consents? The following questions may serve as guidelines for your answers: Are there specific rules in your jurisdiction in this respect? Is the use of default options allowed? How can a trader proof that e.g the consumer consented to the cookies policy of the business and was aware of how they function? How is the bargaining power or negotiation capacity of the consumer in this area dealt with in your legal system; does it correspond to reality or have consumers no choice but to agree with the proposed use of data? Please explain 554 IACL Questionnaire: Information/Disinformation Consumers Including Negotiation The Information Model Under Pressure and the Problem of Disinformation a Does the legislature take recent outcomes of studies criticizing mandatory information models into account? If so, how does this discussion affect your current legislation? For instance is the streamlining or regrouping of information debated in your jurisdiction or the fact that information in the pre-contractual stage must focus on essentials whilst more detailed information should be required only at the moment before the contract is concluded? Is it debated that consumer information should become more accessible, accurate, comprehensive, and timely, and should allow consumers to fairly compare material product features to those of competing products available on the market? Please explain b Is there specific legislation that deals with the problem of disinformation of consumers as a result of an overload of information? For instance, can an overload of information be characterised as a misleading commercial practice? If so, under what circumstances (e.g in consequence of voluntary information that confuses consumers when it is added by a business to mandatory information disclosures or could there also be a case of disinformation of consumers which results from mandatory information alone that is complied with by the business)? Please explain Other Relevant Topics Do measures relating to the education of consumers (improvement of illiteracy in certain fields) complement the measures studied above and are they effective? Please explain Are there other relevant topics related to (dis)information/negotiation capacities of consumers that are debated in your legal system but might have been overlooked in the preceding parts? Questionnaire AIDC: Information/ désinformation des consommateurs, y compris le pouvoir de négociation des consommateurs Introduction Les consommateurs méritent une protection juridique en raison de leur position inférieure C’est la raison d’être bien connu des règles protectrices pour les consommateurs L’interdiction des informations trompeuses et l’obligation d’informer d’une manière adéquate les consommateurs se trouvent au cœur du prétendu paradigme d’information aboutissant des modèles d’information des consommateurs travers le monde La lutte contre l’inefficacité du marché résultant de l’asymétrie de l’information qui existe entre les entreprises et les consommateurs, fait imposer aux entreprises un nombre croissant d’informations obligatoires Par conséquent, des mesures de protection des consommateurs ont souvent visé donner aux consommateurs les moyens de protéger leurs propres intérêts en faisant des choix autonomes et informés Dans ces modèles, les consommateurs sont souvent perỗus comme des personnes rationnelles qui maximisent leurs propres intérêts Les obligations d’information permettent aux consommateurs de prendre leurs propres décisions, des décisions qui sont supposés être mieux que quiconque puisse le faire pour eux Il s’ensuit que si les consommateurs reỗoivent des informations complốtes, ils prendront constamment des décisions qui maximisent leur bien-être De même il en résulte que des décisions informées des consommateurs sont des décisions efficaces Les obligations précontractuelles d’information et d’étiquetage des denrées alimentaires sont des illustrations bien connues de cette politique d’information Dans un certain nombre de systèmes juridiques, les obligations d’information sont parmi les mesures les plus anciennes qui ont été adoptées en vue de la protection des consommateurs Conjointement avec l’interdiction des pratiques commerciales trompeuses, ces mesures visent respectivement prévenir et lutter contre la tromperie des consommateurs Dès lors elles feront l’objet de ce questionnaire © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 G Straetmans (ed.), Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers, Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18054-6 555 556 Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs Au cours de la dernière décennie, des modèles basés sur des informations obligatoires sont de plus en plus devenus l’objet de critiques, entre autre par des économistes comportementaux Sans entrer dans trop de détails, les critiques principales des spécialistes en économie comportementale sur les modèles d’information des consommateurs sont les suivantes: la rationalité limitée des consommateurs, le fait que les consommateurs manquent souvent du temps pour lire les informations, l’absence de règles sur la présentation de l’information, la longueur de l’information et la clarté des informations pour les consommateurs en général et pour les consommateurs vulnérables en particulier Plus particulièrement, l’accumulation continue des obligations d’information donne lieu la question si «l’inondation» de l’information ne risque pas de désinformer le consommateur plutôt que de l’informer Dans ce débat une attention particulière doit aussi être accordée au consommateur dit numérique et au consommateur de services financiers Le premier en raison du moyen de communication qui constitue une menace nouvelle pour les consommateurs, le dernier au motif que le secteur des services financiers est caractérisé comme complexe consistant d’aspects techniques spécifiques Le droit de la consommation se caractérise aussi par des mesures plus intrusives l’autonomie des parties et la liberté contractuelle Il y a notamment des situations dans lesquelles le consommateur n’est pas dans une position de prendre une décision informée et qu’aussi un délai de réflexion n’aurait pas beaucoup d’effet Dans ces situations des mesures plus envahissantes telles que le contrôle des clauses contractuelles sont plus appropriées L’interdiction des clauses contractuelles abusives en est le résultat Ces interdictions sont souvent jumelées avec des exigences de transparence spécifiques Ces obligations de transparence sont complémentaires l’information précontractuelle générale et sont dès lors également l’objet de ce questionnaire Plus généralement encore, la position des consommateurs vis-à-vis des entreprises est analysée en vue d’obtenir une compréhension plus approfondie du fonctionnement de l’autonomie contractuelle des parties, la capacité de négociation des consommateurs et son pouvoir de négociation vis-à-vis des entreprises dans les systèmes juridiques Questionnaire Caractéristiques générales du modèle d’information du consommateur a Quelles sont les caractéristiques principales de votre système national de protection des consommateurs ? Est-ce que ce système repose sur les paramètres du marché économique et son «homo economicus» ou est-ce qu’il est caractérisé par d’autres éléments? b Quel consommateur (p.ex le consommateur moyen, normalement informé, raisonnablement attentif et avisé qui est présumé d’internaliser l’information divulguée par le marché et d’en bénéficier) est le point de repère dans votre Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs 557 législation nationale? Est-ce que la législation utilise des différentes images des consommateurs, par exemple une typologie des consommateurs vulnérables afin de modeler les obligations d’information et de préciser comment cette information devrait être fournie aux consommateurs? Veuillez préciser brièvement s’il existe des différentes typologies de consommateurs selon le domaine, notamment par rapport l’information précontractuelle, l’étiquetage, les pratiques trompeuses, les clauses abusives, les services financiers et les ventes en ligne Obligations précontractuelles d’information Obligations d’information générales : a Existe-t-il une obligation générale imposée aux entreprises de fournir certaines informations précontractuelles aux consommateurs? Quand (avant la conclusion du contrat etc.) et comment (un support durable etc .) doit-on donner cette information? Quelles informations doivent être fournies au consommateur? b Est-ce que les entreprises sont autorisés ajouter de plein gré des informations aux informations, s’il y en a, obligatoires? c Est-ce que l’absence d’information précontractuelle donne lieu des sanctions et, dans l’affirmative, auxquelles sanctions? Est-ce que votre système juridique applique la théorie du culpa in contrahendo? Quelle est la relation entre l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, la liberté contractuelle et le pouvoir de négociation des consommateurs dans votre système juridique? Est-ce que le législateur applique une norme basée sur les attentes raisonnables des consommateurs cet égard? Veuillez expliquer svp Dans certains systèmes juridiques, des règles concernant la présentation de l’information comprennent des exigences de transparence, par exemple que l’information doit être claire, sans ambiguïté, compréhensible, intelligible pour le consommateur moyen etc d Existe-t-il une telle obligation de transparence dans votre juridiction et des règles comment l’information doit être présentée au consommateur ? e Si certaines de ces exigences précitées existent dans votre système juridique, comment est-ce qu’elles sont ensuite appliquées par les tribunaux? Veuillez expliquer svp f Est-ce que la loi prévoit une sanction lorsqu’une entreprise omet de fournir l’information obligatoire aux consommateurs? Veuillez expliquer svp Obligation d’informer les consommateurs sur les denrées alimentaires a Quelles sont les caractéristiques générales de votre système d’étiquetage des denrées alimentaires (p ex liste des ingrédients, interdiction de tromperie .)? b Est-ce que votre système juridique prend en compte les divers techniques manipulatrices et persuasives de commercialisation qui sont utiliser par rapport aux denrées alimentaires comme par exemple l’utilisation des couleurs spécifique pour l’emballage de certains produits? Dans l’affirmative, de quelle manière sont ces techniques prises en compte dans la loi? Veuillez expliquer svp 558 Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs Certains systèmes juridiques demandent que les informations sur les denrées alimentaires doivent ờtre apposộes dune faỗon bien visible, clairement lisible et, le cas échéant, indélébile Dans certains cas la loi exige aussi que l’information sur les denrées alimentaires ne peut en aucun cas être dissimulée, voilée, tronquée ou interrompue par toute autre élément écrit ou pictural ou tout autre élément interférant En outre, certains systèmes juridiques contiennent des règles en ce qui concerne la taille des caractères des mentions obligatoires c Est-ce que votre système juridique contient des règles concernant la présentation aux consommateurs des informations sur les denrées alimentaires? Veuillez expliquer svp d Est-ce qu’il y a une sanction dans le cas où une entreprise omet de fournir certaines mentions obligatoires conformément aux exigences de présentation ? Veuillez expliquer svp Pratiques commerciales trompeuses En vue de cette partie du questionnaire, une pratique commerciale est interprétée dans le sens le plus large, savoir: toute action, omission, conduite, démarche ou communication commerciale, y compris la publicité et le marketing, de la part d’un professionnel, en relation directe avec la promotion, la vente ou la fourniture d’un produit aux consommateurs Comment est-ce que le consommateur est protégé contre les pratiques commerciales trompeuses dans votre juridiction? Les questions suivantes peuvent servir de guide pour votre réponse: Existe-t-il une disposition qui interdit toutes actions et/ou omissions trompeuses? A la lumière de quel image du consommateur doit-on évaluer la nature trompeuse des pratiques commerciales? Est-ce qu’il y a des règles spécifiques relatives aux pratiques trompeuses qui visent la protection des groupes de consommateurs particulièrement vulnérables? Est-ce qu’il existe des règles spécifiques d’information relatives aux médias particulières, par exemple les sites de comparaison? Est-ce que l’évaluation de la nature trompeuse d’une pratique commerciale est influencée par la faỗon dont laquelle linformation prộcontractuelle a ộtộ fournie aux consommateurs? Veuillez expliquer svp Les clauses contractuelles abusives – pouvoir de négociation L’interdiction des clauses contractuelles abusives repose sur l’idée que le consommateur se trouve dans une situation d’infériorité l’égard du professionnel en ce qui concerne tant le pouvoir de négociation que le niveau d’information, situation qui le conduit adhérer aux conditions rédigées préalablement par le professionnel sans pouvoir exercer une influence sur le contenu de celles-ci C’est ainsi que l’interdiction des clauses contractuelles abusives vise notamment les contrats d’adhésion a Est-ce que dans votre système juridique les clauses standardisées sont traitées d’une manière différente que les clauses individuellement négociées? Si votre Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs b c d e 559 réponse est affirmative, dans quelle manière est-ce que cette différente approche se manifeste? Comment est-ce que votre système juridique apprécie, cet effet, le pouvoir de négociation des consommateurs vis-à-vis de ce pouvoir des entreprises? Veuillez expliquer svp Qui porte la charge de la preuve qu’une clause a été négocié individuellement? Comment est-ce qu’on peut prouver qu’une clause est individuellement négociée? Veuillez expliquer svp Quelle est la pratique judiciaire en cas qu’il existe un litige sur le caractère négocié d’une clause ? Veuillez expliquer svp Est-ce que les clauses qui définissent l’objet principal du contrat sont exclues de l’appréciation de leurs caractères abusifs? Veuillez expliquer svp Transparence des conditions contractuelles qui définissent l’objet principal du contrat : a Dans le cas où l’exclusion de l’appréciation du caractère abusif des clauses qui définissent l’objet principal du contrat est soumise une exigence de transparence, comment est-elle alors appliquée dans la pratique et quelles sont ces parties constitutives ? Veuillez expliquer svp Les questions suivantes peuvent servir de guide pour votre réponse: Est-ce que la loi impose des exigences comme par exemple « les conditions contractuelles doivent être claires et compréhensibles » et est-ce que ces exigences se rapportent uniquement l’exactitude formelle ou grammaticale des termes, ou est-ce qu’elles ont trait aussi l’obligation d’informer le consommateur sur les conséquences économiques ou autres dune clause? Est-ce que le consommateur (le plus) vulnộrable reỗoit un niveau plus élevé de protection en matière de transparence? Si l’exclusion de l’appréciation du caractère abusif des ‘conditions essentielles’ du contrat est soumise une obligation de transparence, est-ce que cette obligation exige aussi d’apporter ces conditions l’attention du consommateur de tel manière qu’un consommateur moyen serait en position de comprendre leurs contenues? Est-ce que l’information précontractuelle pourrait avoir une influence sur l’interprétation de la teneur précise d’une clause contractuelle? Est-ce que les clauses négociées individuellement sont traitées différemment vis-à-vis des clauses standardisées (d’adhésion) en terme de transparence? Si votre réponse est affirmative, veuillez expliquer dans quelle mesure cette distinction se manifeste? Existe-t-il une sanction pour le non-respect de l’exigence de transparence? Règles sectorielles spécifiques : le consommateur financier En vue du présent questionnaire, les services financiers sont définis au sens large, y compris les services bancaires, d’assurance et d’investissement Dans la plupart des systèmes juridiques il existe des exigences d’information spécifiques dans le domaine des services financiers, par exemple des règles portant sur la 560 Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs compréhensibilité, la fiabilité, la transparence et la comparabilité de l’information, ainsi que des interdictions des clauses abusives spécifiques a Quelles sont les différences principales du système protecteur dans le domaine des services financiers en comparaison avec les autres secteurs de protection de consommateur? Veuillez expliquer svp b Est-ce que la critique des spécialistes juridiques et d’autres spécialistes que les informations obligatoirement communiquées aux consommateurs dans ce domaine soient trop vastes joue un rôle significatif au niveau législatif? Y-at-il par exemple des débats dans votre juridiction sur des types d’information simplifiée ou plus ciblée donner aux consommateurs, p ex des débats sur les documents-clés d’information ou l’utilisation d’icơnes ou des ‘scores’ (¼ résumés unidimensionnels des caractéristiques principales d’un produit/d’une service comme par exemple le taux annuel effectif global d’un crédit la consommation)? Veuillez expliquer svp Règles sectorielles spécifiques : le consommateur numérique Dans la plupart des systèmes juridiques des obligations d’information spécifiques sont imposées en cas de ventes aux consommateurs en ligne ou distance a De quelle manière est-ce que ces mesures spécifiques s’écartent des exigences imposées sur les ventes hors ligne aux consommateurs? Veuillez expliquer svp b L’information donnée aux consommateurs peut créer des attentes raisonnables spécifiques dans le chef des consommateurs, et par conséquent influencer le niveau de protection offert aux consommateurs Comment est-ce que ces attentes sont évaluées ? Est-ce que la législation fait emploi d’un type de consommateur moyen raisonnable la lumière duquel les attentes raisonnables sont testées? Veuillez expliquer svp La plupart des ordres juridiques exige que le stockage des données personnelles, ou l’accès aux données personnelles déjà stockées dans un équipement de terminal d’un abonné ou d’un utilisateur ne soit autorisé qu’à condition que l’abonné ou l’utilisateur concerné ait donné son consentement, après avoir reỗu des informations claires et dộtaillộes sur les nalitộs du traitement de ses données personnelles c Le fait que ce consentement autorise presque toute forme de collecter, d’utiliser ou de divulguer des données personnelles pose la question si le consommateur ne doit pas être informé plus précisément sur quoi il donne exactement son consentement? Les questions suivantes peuvent servir de guide pour vos réponses: Y-a-t-il des règles spécifiques dans votre juridiction cet égard? Est-ce que l’utilisation des options par dộfaut est autorisộe? Comment est-ce quun commerỗant peut prouver que par exemple, le consommateur a consenti la politique de cookies de l’entreprise et était au courant de leur fonctionnement? Comment sont le pouvoir de négociation et la capacité de négociation du consommateur pris en compte dans ce domaine ; est-ce que votre système correspond la réalité ou est-ce que les Questionnaire AIDC: Information/désinformation des consommateurs 561 consommateurs n’ont dans la plupart des cas pas d’autre choix que d’accepter l’utilisation des données personnelles proposée? Veuillez expliquer svp Le modèle traditionnel d’information sous pression et le problème de la désinformation a Est-ce le législateur prend en compte les résultats récents d’études critiquant les modèles d’information obligatoire? Dans l’affirmative, comment est-ce que cette discussion affecte-t-elle votre législation actuelle? Par exemple sont la simplification, l’alignement ou le regroupement d’information débattus dans votre juridiction ainsi que le fait que l’information dans la phase précontractuelle doit mieux se concentrer sur l’essentiel alors que l’information plus détaillée soit requise plutôt au moment juste avant la conclusion du contrat? Est-ce que un des thèmes suivants est débattu dans votre juridiction : le fait qu’il faut avoir de l’information qui soit plus accessible pour le consommateur, plus précise, plus complète, plus temps et plus comparables afin de permettre le consommateur de prendre une décision plus informée? Veuillez expliquer svp b Est-ce que le problème de la désinformation des consommateurs en raison d’une surcharge informationnelle est réglé par une législation spécifique? Par exemple, est-ce que la surcharge informationnelle (l’infobésité) peut être caractérisée comme une pratique commerciale trompeuse ou déloyale? Dans l’affirmative, quelles circonstances justifient la conclusion qu’un problème de désinformation du consommateur existe (par exemple par suite des renseignements complémentaires (en surplus des obligations d’informations imposées par la loi)/facultatifs qui confondent le consommateur ou suffit-il qu’une l’entreprise se conforme aux (remplisse les) informations législatives obligatoires pour conclure qu’il existe néanmoins une situation de désinformation des consommateurs? Veuillez expliquer svp Autres sujets pertinents Est-ce que des mesures relatives l’éducation des consommateurs (l’amélioration de l’analphabétisme dans certains domaines) complètent les mesures ci-dessus étudiés et sont-elles efficaces? Veuillez expliquer svp Y-a-t-il d’autres sujets pertinents liés au pouvoir (dés)informé ou celui de négociation des consommateurs qui sont débattus dans votre système juridique, mais pas repris dans les parties précédentes du questionnaire? ... General Report Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers Gert Straetmans Part II National Reports: European Union Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: ... Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: Irish Law Report Cliona Kelly 365 Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: ... Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: Quebec Law Report Marie-Eve Arbour 485 Information Obligations and Disinformation of Consumers: