Japan and the great divergence a short guide (palgrave studies in economic history)

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY Series Editor: K Deng JAPAN AND THE GREAT DIVERGENCE A Short Guide Penelope Francks Palgrave Studies in Economic History Series Editor Kent Deng London School of Economics London, United Kingdom Aim of the series Palgrave Studies in Economic History is designed to illuminate and enrich our understanding of economies and economic phenomena of the past The series covers a vast range of topics including financial history, labour history, development economics, commercialisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, modernisation, globalisation, and changes in world economic orders More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14632 Penelope Francks Japan and the Great Divergence A Short Guide Penelope Francks East Asian Studies University of Leeds Leeds, United Kingdom Palgrave Studies in Economic History ISBN 978-1-137-57672-9 ISBN 978-1-137-57673-6 DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57673-6 (eBook) Library of Congress Control Number: 2016955184 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd London Note: for clarity, Japanese personal names are presented in Western order (family name last) Macrons are used to indicate long vowel sounds in Japanese, but are omitted in place names and other words typically written without them in English v CONTENTS Introduction Part I The Great Divergence and Japan So Far The Great Divergence Debate Explaining the Great Divergence 15 Japan in the Great Divergence Debate: The Quantitative Story 31 Part II The Japanese Case 39 Introduction: Interpreting the Tokugawa Economy 41 Resources, Trade, and Globalisation 45 Institutions and the Market 57 vii viii CONTENTS The Role of the State 79 Knowledge, Technology, and Culture 89 10 Consumption and the Industrious Revolution 99 11 Conclusion 111 Glossary of Japanese Terms 117 Index 119 CHAPTER Introduction Abstract The publication in 2000 of Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence presented a seminal challenge to the prevailing, largely Eurocentric, view of the path taken by global economic development from the early-modern period onwards Its argument that the conditions for economic growth in advanced regions of China and other parts of Asia were not significantly different from those of their counterparts in Europe on the eve of the Industrial Revolution stimulated a debate that has brought global history to life, while initiating a considerable reassessment of, in particular, Chinese economic history However, it has yet to exert much influence over those who study the only country outside ‘the West’ that did achieve significant industrialisation before the Second World War, that is, Japan Keywords The Great Divergence • Economic history of Japan Economic history of China • It was in the year 2000 that Kenneth Pomeranz, then a professor at the University of California, unleashed upon the somewhat staid world of economic history his book The Great Divergence (Pomeranz 2000) As historians—not just economic ones, as it turned out—began to absorb the detailed arguments and evidence that the book contained, it became clear © The Author(s) 2016 P Francks, Japan and the Great Divergence, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57673-6_1 P FRANCKS that a seminal challenge had been posed to a very longstanding consensus view of the path that global economic history had taken from earlymodern times This consensus maintained that the unprecedented leap into sustained economic growth brought about by the Industrial Revolution was rooted in a pattern of development that had prevailed in Europe since at least the sixteenth century It was therefore this ‘superiority’ that explained the economic, political, and military dominance that Europe, and in due course the USA, came to be able to exercise in the world from the eighteenth century onwards, and hence the inequality in living standards between the ‘West and the rest’ that only began to narrow in the later twentieth century, as major Asian countries started to ‘catch up’ Against this, Pomeranz essentially argued that this long-term European ‘superiority’ that was assumed to have brought about the Industrial Revolution could not be demonstrated on the ground, and that in fact significant parts of Asia could be shown to have been as developed, from the point of view of the factors that determine economic output and living standards, as much of Europe up to the eighteenth century It was only thereafter, he maintained, as a result of the Industrial Revolution itself, that the divergence in fortunes across Eurasia set in Consequently, the industrialisation that had made Europe and the USA the dominant forces in the world economy by the nineteenth century could not be explained as the outcome of particular long-term features of the economies, societies, or cultures of the West If eighteenth-century China was as well placed as England to achieve sustained economic development, then the fact that the Industrial Revolution occurred when and where it did can only have been the result of particular contingent factors that came to operate on one place but not the other Pomeranz’s clear challenge to the Eurocentric picture of global economic change in the early-modern and modern eras has given rise to an explosion of debate that has brought the whole field of world history to life As we shall see, by no means all of Pomeranz’s contentions have withstood the testing to which they have been subjected, but The Great Divergence has forced global comparison on to the agenda of historical analysis and shaken historians out of their Eurocentric assumptions, giving rise to what Eric Vanhaute deems the ‘single most important debate in recent global history’ (Vanhaute 2015: 7) Although, where possible, The Great Divergence does include evidence from various parts of Asia, including India and Japan, given Pomeranz’s interests and expertise, the focus is predominantly on the comparison 108 P FRANCKS 10 For more detail and sources on the pre-industrial growth of the retail and service sectors, see Francks 2009b: 15–26, 66–9 11 For more detail and sources, see Francks 2012 12 Tamura 2001, 2004, unfortunately not published in English 13 On the distinctive development of cotton fabric production in earlymodern Japan and its impact on both the production and consumption activities of rural households, see Tanimoto 2009 REFERENCES Braudel, F (1981) The structures of everyday life (trans: Reynolds, S.) London: Collins Broadberry, S (2013) Accounting for the great divergence, London School of Economics, Department of Economic History, Working Papers No 184 http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/workingPapers/2013/WP184.pdf Accessed March 2016 De Vries, J (1993) Between purchasing power and the world of goods: Understanding the household economy in early modern Europe In J. Brewer & R. Porter (Eds.), Consumption and the world of goods (pp. 85–132) London: Routledge Francks, P (2006) Rural economic development in Japan: From the nineteenth century to the Pacific War London/New York: Routledge Francks, P (2009a) Inconspicuous consumption: Sake, beer, and the birth of the consumer in Japan The Journal of Asian Studies, 68(1), 135–164 Francks, P (2009b) The Japanese consumer: An alternative economic history of modern Japan Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Francks, P (2012) Kimono fashion: The consumer and the growth of the textile industry in pre-war Japan In P. Francks & J. Hunter (Eds.), The historical consumer: Consumption and everyday life in Japan, 1850–2000 (pp.  151–175) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Francks, P (2013) Simple pleasures: Food consumption in Japan and the global comparison of living standards Journal of Global History, 8, 95–116 Hanley, S (1983) A high standard of living in nineteenth-century Japan: Fact or fantasy? Journal of Economic History, 43(1), 183–192 Hanley, S (1997) Everyday things in premodern Japan Berkeley: University of California Press Hanley, S., & Yamamura, K (1977) Economic and demographic change in preindustrial Japan, 1600–1868 Princeton: Princeton University Press Hayami, A (2009) Population, family and society in pre-modern Japan Folkestone: Global Oriental CONSUMPTION AND THE INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION 109 Ohkawa, K., & Rosovsky, H (1961) The indigenous components in the modern Japanese economy Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9(3), 476–501 Saitō , O (2002) The frequency of famines as demographic correctives in the Japanese past In T.  Dyson & C Ó Gráda (Eds.), Famine demography: Perspectives from the past and present (pp. 218–239) Oxford: Oxford University Press Saitō , O (2010) An industrious revolution in an East Asian market economy? Tokugawa Japan and implications for the great divergence Australian Economic History Review, 50(3), 240–261 Shively, D (1964) Sumptuary regulation and status in early Tokugawa Japan Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25, 123–164 Tamura, H (2001) ‘Zairai orimonogyō no gijutsukakushin to ryūkō shijō ’ (Technical change in the textile industry and the fashion market) Shakai Keizai Shigaku, 67(4), 23–48 Tamura, H (2004) Fuasshion no Shakai Keizai Shi (The socio-economic history of fashion) Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyō ronsha Tanimoto, M (2009) Cotton and the peasant economy: A foreign fibre in early modern Japan In G. Riello & P. Parthasarathi (Eds.), The spinning world: A global history of cotton textiles, 1200–1850 (pp.  376–386) Oxford: Oxford University Press Yasuba, Y (1986) Standards of living in Japan before industrialization: From what level did Japan begin? A comment Journal of Economic History, 46(1), 217–224 CHAPTER 11 Conclusion Abstract Global quantitative comparisons continue to conclude that, by the early-modern period, Japan, like China, already lagged behind northern Europe in terms of the conditions for sustained economic growth, so that Japanese industrialisation must be interpreted as ‘catching up’ on the basis of ‘borrowing’ from the West However, when viewed in a Great Divergence light, the research brought together in this book can be seen as showing how the development of Japan’s pre-industrial economy achieved similar ends to its European counterparts, if along a different and not entirely commensurable path This involved the intensified utilisation of labour resources to overcome limitations to Smithian growth and prepared the ground for a form of industrialisation in which small-scale labour-intensive production, based on indigenous forms of organisation and technology, played a major role As a result, in comparison with Europe, markets functioned in different ways, consumption patterns differed, and the institutional structure of government and economy was distinctive Nonetheless, while this may make quantitative comparison of the conditions for growth difficult, it did not prevent Japan from initiating a path to industrialisation which was eventually, as it spread through Asia, to transform the world economy Keywords ‘Smithian’ growth in Japan • ‘Catch-up’ industrialisation • Labour-intensive industrialisation • Comparative development paths © The Author(s) 2016 P Francks, Japan and the Great Divergence, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57673-6_11 111 112 P FRANCKS What, then, can we conclude, from all the evidence summarised here, as to Japan’s position within the Eurasian Great Divergence and the light that the Japanese case might throw on the many issues raised by the academic debate emanating from Pomeranz’s seminal work? While historical research on China has been in many ways revolutionised as a result of the challenge thrown down by the California School, historians of Japan, with some notable exceptions, have largely ignored it, carrying on with their detailed historical research outside any comparative framework Meanwhile, despite the fact that Japan, as the only country on the eastern side of Eurasia to initiate modern industrialisation before the Second World War, ought to be central to any analysis of the Divergence, global historians have had little option but to treat it as just another example on the Asian side of the divide This book has attempted to demonstrate that in fact analysis of the Japanese case can shift the focus of debate onwards and open up new angles for understanding the global pattern of industrialisation However, if we start from the quantitative efforts to test Pomeranz’s hypothesis, it seems clear that, on the basis of the conceptual categories standardly used to compare economic conditions and performance, Japan was unquestionably on the wrong side of a divergence that began well before the Industrial Revolution The per capita output of the economy, along with the living standards reflected in indicators such as real wage rates and calorie consumption, appears already to have been significantly below that of England and the Netherlands by the beginning of the seventeenth century and continued to fall behind, as Smithian economic growth took hold in northern Europe The implied conclusion is that, in Tokugawa Japan, labour productivity remained low, in comparative terms, as a result of the less marked development of capital accumulation, technological resources, and the division of labour, in an economy where the spread of the market continued to be inhibited by a non-commercial institutional structure Hence, although Japan may have emerged as the pre-industrial leader of the Little Divergence within Asia, quantitatively speaking she did not exhibit the conditions that can be held to explain why the Industrial Revolution occurred when and where it did Although population growth had been brought under control and high-yielding, labour-intensive rice cultivation meant there was generally, though not always, enough to eat, nothing was going to lead to the invention of the steam engine or the release of rural wage-workers into the factory This conclusion clearly fits in with the conventional interpretation of Japan’s subsequent industrialisation as the result of the ‘borrowing’ from CONCLUSION 113 the West made possible by the opening to trade and the establishment of the Meiji government Of course, it cannot be denied that Japan did benefit from being able to ‘catch up’ with the technology that had underpinned the Industrial Revolution in Europe, even if the key ‘borrowings’ were not necessarily capital- and resource-using inventions such as the steam engine, but rather the electric motor, chemical dyes, the Jacquard loom, and German agricultural science However, as this book has sought to show, this borrowing took place against a background of prior economic development and commercialisation that, while not necessarily conducive to the forms of technology and business organisation characteristic of the European Industrial Revolution, nonetheless resulted in sustained growth, technical change, and the spread of the market Moreover, it was on this basis that the ‘traditional’ sector of small-scale producers, with its roots in the rural economy and its labour-intensive but by no means necessarily backward technology or unskilled labour force, continued to meet a large part of the growing domestic demand for consumer goods, as well as a significant share of exports, through to the Second World War and indeed up to the present There are now those who argue that the capital-intensive sectors of the economy epitomised by the steam engine and the factory were not the main driving force behind industrial growth even in Europe, but the Japanese case demonstrates even more clearly that the path to industrialisation may not have to follow the direction laid down in the standard model of the Industrial Revolution If this is so, it throws a different light on some of the doubts that have been raised as to the meaning of the quantitative estimates on which the argument for an early divergence is based (over and above the fact that they have to be based on limited data collected for quite other purposes) As we have seen, the use of real wage rates as indicators of incomes and general living standards is problematic where most households rely on multiple sources of income derived from land ownership and entrepreneurship, as well as wage-labour This pattern reflects Japan’s version of Smithian growth, which depended on the increasingly intensive labour of members of rural households who also cultivated land and produced some at least of their own food Such households are difficult to fit into the categories on which the model of the capitalist economy, with its specialist suppliers of land, labour, and capital, is based, making it difficult to assess and compare the living standards they were able to achieve through their combinations of market-based and subsistence activities This difficulty is complicated by the prevalence of a diet, and associated dietary preferences, very different from those of northern Europe, that make measures of calorie consumption and food diversification 114 P FRANCKS problematic, as indicators of living standards Meanwhile, the institutional structure governing economic activity and the operation of the market, centring as it did on networks of small-scale producers able to flourish under the aegis of mercantilist regional governments, is likely to have generated a more equal distribution of income, and therefore higher overall living standards for any given level of GDP per capita, than was the case in Europe It is within this context, therefore, that we need to view the ‘surprising resemblances’ that Pomeranz did indeed find between his Asian cases and northern Europe Even if measured wage rates and GDP per capita in Japan appear to have lagged behind their European equivalents, preindustrial Japanese people seem to have been able, for the most part, to consume more of the rice-based diet they enjoyed, to dress in increasingly comfortable and attractive clothing, to increase their purchases of sugar, sake, and tobacco, to accumulate better-quality household goods, and to engage in a growing range of travel and leisure pursuits The goods and services that Japanese households demanded, as their productive capacity increased, were for the most part those that they themselves, or similar small-scale enterprises, were able to produce in greater quantities, to the extent that technological and resource conditions enabled them to make more intensive use of their own labour-time In the process, more and more were drawn into relationships with the commercial economy, mediated by local entrepreneurs and village leaders and often with the encouragement and assistance of regional feudal authorities Of course, just as in Europe, the Japanese version of Smithian growth was eventually bound to run up against resource constraints, especially given that the country was largely cut off from international trade However, given the institutional structure of the economy and the polity, the pattern of available resources, and the particular accumulation of skills and knowledge that pre-industrial growth had generated, overcoming these constraints was not going to follow the land- and capital-intensive path pursued in IndustrialRevolution Europe, with its coal, colonies, and capital accumulation Instead, the way was paved for the ‘labour-intensive path’ that Sugihara sees as an alternative route to industrialisation, eventually incorporating elements of the European Industrial Revolution where these were useful, but nonetheless achieving sustained industrial growth through a different combination of resources, technology, and institutional structures.1 It now seems clear that this path to industrialisation had its roots in pre-industrial developments, just as its European alternative did The economic growth of the Tokugawa period bequeathed to its Meiji successor CONCLUSION 115 a skilled and hard-working labour force, even if not completely in the form of wage-labour; a widespread commercial economy and market for consumer goods; networks of entrepreneurs with accumulated mercantile and technical knowledge, and a class of largely local government officials already grappling with the question of the role of the state in promoting economic welfare The Restoration enabled state officials and business leaders to learn more about, and take advantage of, Europe’s earlier industrialisation, but it did not change the domestic economic realities that Japan’s pre-industrial growth had formed Hence, we might conclude that Japan and Europe did begin to diverge long before the Industrial Revolution, and that this is reflected in some of the comparative indicators that chart progress towards the European form of industrialisation, but that the divergence was more fundamentally one of development paths What is significant about the Japanese case is that the divergent path of the pre-industrial period did eventually lead to sustained growth and the overcoming of the resource problems that it generated While it might be possible to argue that abundant labour and low wages removed the incentive to invest in mechanical development and new energy sources and so blocked off industrialisation in India and China, it is not possible to follow the same logic in the case of Japan There, as we have seen, significant innovations in technology and economic organisation that enabled an admittedly abundant population (relative to land and natural resources) to produce more were already in effect by the eighteenth century, taking forms that, far from blocking industrialisation, continued to facilitate its progress, even as Western industrial techniques became available to ‘borrow’ To the extent that pre-industrial growth in other parts of Asia followed a similar course to Japan’s—in some cases even more successfully—the Japanese case might hint at where eighteenth-century China or India could have been heading (and indeed did head, in Japan’s footsteps, in the later twentieth century), had internal collapse, foreign interference or, following Parthasarathi (2011), Western imperialism not intervened to block the path If we follow this line, the Great Divergence debate thus merges into that over ‘alternative paths of development’, but what remains is its huge achievement in placing Asia, and indeed other ‘peripheral’ parts of the world, within a global-historical, comparative framework that does not hinge on the assumed superiority, or at least necessity, of the European model of industrialisation and modernisation.2 The Japanese case ought to present crucial evidence within this framework, and the literature surveyed 116 P FRANCKS in Part II of this book demonstrates that scholars of Japan have in fact built up a body of knowledge highly relevant to it.3 Much of this confirms the view that, in parts of Asia as in parts of Europe, prior to the Industrial Revolution, the conditions for sustained economic growth were being built up, if to differing degrees or following different paths If nothing else, therefore, the Great Divergence debate has outmoded an approach to the economic (and other) history of Japan (or China or India) which foregrounds ‘failure’ to resemble Europe and views industrialisation as necessarily a process of ‘catch-up’, in favour of long-term analysis of historical systems in their own terms, as more-or-less successful means to overcome resource limitations and improve living standards and economic welfare It has been the contention of this book that, in this process, global historians and scholars of Japan have much to offer each other, as we seek to understand how and why industrialisation, the central economic force shaping our lives today, arose as and when it did throughout the world NOTES For Sugihara’s model in more detail, see Sugihara 2003 or Sugihara 2013a For Sugihara’s discussion of this point, in the context of global history, see Sugihara 2013b This is so even without taking account of the much greater volume of work published only in Japanese REFERENCES Parthasarathi, P (2011) Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not: Global economic divergence, 1600–1850 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Sugihara, K (2003) The East Asian path of development In G.  Arrighi, T. Hamashita, & M. Seldon (Eds.), The resurgence of East Asia (pp. 78–123) London: Routledge Sugihara, K (2013a) Labour-intensive industrialization in global history: An interpretation of East Asian experiences In G.  Austin & K.  Sugihara (Eds.), Labour-intensive industrialization in global history (pp.  20–64) London: Routledge Sugihara, K (2013b) The European miracle in global history: An East Asian perspective In Berg, M (Ed.), Writing the history of the global: Challenges for the 21st century (pp. 129–144) Oxford: Oxford University Press GLOSSARY OF JAPANESE TERMS PERIODISATION Tokugawa/Edo period Meiji period 1603–1867 Period of national governance by Shoguns of the Tokugawa family; generally regarded as Japan’s feudal or early-modern period 1868–1911 Reign of the Emperor Meiji, established following the overthrow of the Tokugawa regime at the Meiji Restoration (1868) Era of ‘modernisation’ and openness to ‘borrowing’ from the West, and of the first stages of Japan’s modern industrialisation GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS Bakufu Bakuhan system daimyō han the central government of the Tokugawa Shoguns (sometimes Shogunate), based in Edo (Tokyo) governance structure made up of han (domains) owing allegiance to Bakufu (central government) hereditary feudal lord governing individual domain (han) one of approximately 260 domains into which Tokugawa Japan was divided Unit of local government, administration, and taxation © The Author(s) 2016 P Francks, Japan and the Great Divergence, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57673-6 117 118 GLOSSARY OF JAPANESE TERMS sakoku sankin kōtai policy of ‘seclusion’ regulating trade and other contact with the outside world throughout most of the Tokugawa period, until overthrown by the Western powers in the 1850s system whereby daimyō were required to spend every other year in Edo and to maintain residences there, travelling to and from them with substantial retinues along established routes INDEX1 A Acemoglu, D., 17, 21, 49 agriculture and European growth, 62 growth in China, 20 growth in England, 75n10 growth in Japan, 42, 63 technical change in, 63 Allen, R., 16, 33 Angeles, L., 96n3 Arrighi, G., Atlantic economy, 17 Atlantic trade, 46 and state institutions, 21 B Bakufu, 41 and money supply, 68 banking in Tokugawa Japan, 72 Bassino, J-P GDP estimates by, 34, 42 Berg, M., Berry, M.E., 92, 96n3 books in Tokugawa Japan, 92 borrowing technology, 11, 112 bourgeois values, 94 Braudel, F., 105 Brenner, R., 19, 62 Broadberry, S., 35, 62, 101 C California School, 10, 57, 112 capital provision of in Japan, 73 capitalism emergence of in Europe, 19 in Europe and Asia, 24 catch-up model, 3, 11, 22, 32, 116 Note: Page number followed by ‘n’ refers to endnotes © The Author(s) 2016 P Francks, Japan and the Great Divergence, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57673-6 119 120 INDEX catch-up model (cont.) and the Meiji state, 80 Chang, H-J., 21 China agriculture in, 62 and Asian trade network, 18 consumption growth in, 26 early-modern economy of, 11 early-modern superiority of, and globalisation, 17 institutions in, 19 population growth in, 19, 59 state institutions in, 22 technology in, 23 Clulow, A., 47, 49 coal, 16, 17 in Japan, 50, 52 Confucianism, 24 consumer revolution, 26, 99 consumption and economic growth in Japan, 102 consumption clusters, 104 cotton and Japanese clothing, 106 Crafts/Harley estimates, 96n7 credit in Tokugawa Japan, 72 cultivating landlord, 66 D daimyō, 41 expenditure by, 81 in feudal system, 80 and forestry, 50 of Hirado, 47 and sankin kōtai, 81 Dejima, 46, 49 demographic transition, 62 demography and comparative growth, 58 developmental state, 85 de Vries, J., 26, 100 diet, 62 in Japan, 101 distribution of income, in Japan, 67, 85 domains See han Drixler, F., 60, 61 Dutch language, 91 Dutch merchants, 49 E early globalisation and Japan, 48, 49 Edo (Tokyo), 41, 81 education in Tokugawa Japan, 91 electricity, use in Japan, 52 England consumer revolution in, 26 in the Great Divergence, state institutions in, 21 wages in, 16 Eurocentrism, 2, 9, 18 European marriage pattern, 19, 58, 60, 61 F factories, 24 famine, in Japan, 59, 102 Farris, W., 59 fashion and Japanese clothing, 105 fertiliser, 51, 63 feudal lords See daimyō feudal system in Europe, 19 in Japan, 41, 57, 80 financial institutions in early-modern China, 20 Flynn, D., 53n2 food and living standards in Japan, 101 INDEX forestry, sustainable techniques of, 50–1 forests, and resources in Japan, 50 Frank, A.G., G GDP growth in Japan, 32, 34, 42 globalisation, 46 ‘early’, 17 hard and soft, 53n9 and Japan, 46, 52 Goldstone, J., 36 The Great Divergence, 1, 7, 9, 16 Japan in, 31 Greif, A., 20 Griffin, E., 95 H han, 41 borrowing by, 83 economic schemes of, 83 Hanley, S., 60, 100 Hayami, A., 59, 100 Higuchi, T., 51 Hirado, 47–9 Hokkaidō, 51 I ie, 60 import substitution, in Tokugawa Japan, 48, 49 India, 9, 10 in Great Divergence, industrial districts, 24 and textile production, 106 Industrial Revolution causes of, 2, 8, and coal, 17 industrious revolution, 99 in China, 27 de Vries model of, 26 in Japan, 100 infanticide, 60, 61 Inikori, J., 17 involution, 19 irrigation investment in, 65 in Japan, 63 Isset, C., 19, 62 K kō (rotating savings organisation), 73, 94 Kaitokudō Academy, 93 keizai thought, 93 kimono, 105 kokueki thought, 85 Kuroda, A., 73 Kyoto silk weaving in, 47 L labour-intensive path, 114 and small-scale cultivators, 67 labour market female, 71 in Tokugawa Japan, 71 land, market in, 66 Lemire, B., literacy, 92 Little Divergence, 33, 35, 112 living standards comparative estimates for Japan, 34 Europe/Asia comparisons of, 26 in pre-modern Japan, 100 and wage-rate comparisons, 33 local notables, 85 121 122 INDEX M Maddison, A critique of, 32 GDP estimates of, 32 Malthusian pressures, 10, 59 market, spread of, 68, 74 Marxist theories, 17, 19, 62 McCloskey, D., 23 Meiji Restoration, 11, 42 mercantilism of feudal domains, 84 merchant class, in Japan, 58 education of, 93 merchant houses, 92 and domain borrowing, 83 micro-inventions, 28n11 Miyamoto, M., 42 Mokyr, J., 24, 90 money, use of in Japan, 68 Moriguchi, C., 86 N Najita, T., 93, 94 Nakamura, J., 82 Needham, J., 8, 23, 92 Nishijin, weavers from, 106 numeracy in Tokugawa Japan, 92 O O’Rourke, K., 52 Osaka, 69 Osaka rice exchange (Dojima market), 69 Ottoman Empire, P Parthasarathi, P., 3, 22, 24, 115 peasant uprisings, 73 pirates (wako), 46 Pomeranz, K., 1, 8, 11 population growth in Japan, 58, 59 printing, 96n3 prostitution, 71 and contracts, 93 proto-industrialisation, 68, 70 putting-out system, 70 R resources limitations of, 16 retail system in pre-modern Japan, 104 rice in Japanese diet, 101 national market in, 70 and technical change, 64 trade in, 52 Roberts, L., 83, 84 Rubinger, R., 91 rural-centred growth, 36 rural households, 70 rural industries, 70 and domain policies, 84 S Saitō, O., 34–36, 42, 50, 51, 59, 60, 67, 72, 85, 101 sake consumption of, 103 sakoku, 46, 48, 80 samurai and the market, 69 and science, 90 sankin kōtai, 81 and domain expenditure, 83 and technology, 90 scale of cultivation, 66 INDEX Scientific Revolution, and industrial inventions, 24 scientists in Tokugawa Japan, 90 Segal, E., 68 Shogun See Bakufu; Tokugawa Shogun silk Japanese imports from China, 47 silver, 9, 17, 18, 48, 81 Japanese exports of, 47 and sakoku, 48 Smith, T.C., 60, 64 Smithian growth, 8, 9, 11, 67 in China and England, 16 in Japan, 70, 113 Sng, T-H., 86 soy sauce, 103 specialisation, in local goods, 84 Stanley, A., 71 state capacity, in China and Japan, 86 steam power, 16, 17 subsistence basket, 33 sugar consumption of, 103 Sugihara, K., 51, 67, 72, 114 sumptuary laws, 103 T Tabellini, G., 20 Taiwan forestry resources of, 51 Takashima, M., 35, 36, 42 Tamura, H., 106 taxation by feudal domains, 82 of rice, 65 under Tokugawa system, 42, 82 tenancy, 66 in China, 20 textile industry, 70, 106 textiles imported Indian, 25 123 tobacco, 103 Toby, R., 46 Tokugawa Shoguns, 41 economic policies of, 80 and establishment of state system, 80 Tosa domain, 84 Totman, C., 50 trade (international) and Great Divergence, 45 traditional sector role of in Japanese growth, 113 and technology, 95 V Vanhaute, E., villages, 73 and irrigation, 65 and taxation, 81 voyages of discovery, 17 Vries, P., 21 W wage rates comparison of, 32 and labour market in Asia, 33 and technological innovation, 18 war and the Great Divergence, 22 water power, in Japan, 50 Weber, M., 23 welfare ratio, 33 Williamson, J., 52 wood, as resource in Japan, 50 Y Yamamura, K., 60 Yangzi Delta, 8, 19 Yasuba, Y., 51 ... without them in English v CONTENTS Introduction Part I The Great Divergence and Japan So Far The Great Divergence Debate Explaining the Great Divergence 15 Japan in the Great Divergence Debate: The Quantitative... regions—for example, Holland on the European side and Moghul India and Tokugawa Japan, as well as other areas of China, on the Asian side—are brought in from time to time, but one of Pomeranz’s innovations... economies and that sophisticated market systems operated in China as in England Local, national, and international trade were highly developed in both regions, and the institutional bases for market activity,