Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: SYRIA Volume SYRIA UNDER ASSAD Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 SYRIA UNDER ASSAD Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks Edited by MOSHE MA‘OZ AND AVNER YANIV I Routledge ^ Taylor & Francis Group LO N D O N AN D NEW YORK First published in 1986 This edition first published in 2014 by Routledge Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1986 Moshe Ma‘oz and Avner Yaniv All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-415-83882-5 (Set) eISBN: 978-0-203-77927-9 (Set) ISBN: 978-0-415-73500-1 (Volume 4) eISBN: 978-1-315-81894-8 (Volume 4) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 c U F SYRIA UNO U N D EER R ASSAD M D Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks Edited by MOSHE MA'OZ and AVNER YANIV CROOM HELM London & Sydney in association with The Gustav Heinemann Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 ©1986 Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenharn, Kent BR3 1AT Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, Suite 4, 6th Floor, 64-76 Kippax Street, Surry Hills, NSW 2010, Australia British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Syria under Assad: domestic constraints and regional risk Syria - Politics and government I Ma'oz, Moshe II Yaniv, Avner 956.91-042 DS98.2 ISBN 0-7099-2910-2 Printed and bound in Great Britain by BiddIes Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn CONTENTS Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Preface The Study of Syria Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv Part I: The Elements of Syrian Power The Emergence of Modem Syria M oshe M a 'OZ The Syrian Economy under the Assad Regime Kais Firro 36 The Evolution of Syrian Power, 1948-1984 Zeev M a'oz 69 Part II: Syria and its Neighbours Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish-Syrian Relations David Kushner 85 The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran Yair Hirschfeld 105 Ideology and Power Politics in Syrian-Iraqi Relations 1968-1984 Amazia Baram 125 Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion Joseph Nevo 140 Syria and Israel: The Politics of Escalation A vner Yaniv 157 10 The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue and an Instrument ltamar Rabinovich 179 11 On a Short Leash: Syria and the PLO Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv 191 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Part III: Syria and the Superpowers 12 Washington, Damascus and the Lebanon Crisis Yair Evron 209 13 Moscow, Damascus and the Lebanon Crisis Robert O Freedman 224 Part IV: The Syrian Paradox 14 The Syrian Paradox Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv 251 Index 264 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 PREFACE This collection ofstudies is the harvest of a one-day symposium held at the University of Haifa in January 1984 The initiative came from the University's Institute of Middle Eastern Studies Bearing the name of Gustav Heinemann, the late President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the IMESH is an interdisciplinary meeting ground for researches in Islamic studies, Arab history and culture, politics and international relations in the Middle East, ethnic relations, the social psychology ofinternational conflicts, the political geography ofconflict and problems of education in a conflict environment Every year, and occasionally more than once a year, the IMESH holds a large symposium In 1984 it was the turn of the political scientists and area specialists to design a meeting And since Syria was in the news and there was tremendous public interest in its history, domestic problems and, above all, role as an actor on the Middle Eastern scene, a symposium on it appeared to be a timely and promising idea Initially the objectives were rather modest No one, to put it bluntly, had any intention of going beyond a learned exchange of views for the benefit of the campus audience But once the conference was held it turned out that the quality of the presentations, the main recurrent themes and the uniquely synoptic panorama ofthe Syrian scene which the presentations offered had the potential of an interesting book Concerned to avoid quick outdating of the papers,we requested the contributors to add onto the bones oftheir analyses as much factual flesh as they could without presenting the publisher with an over-long manuscript Most of the contributors responded to the challenge with such enthusiasm that we found ourselves inundated with enough material for two volumes Consequently, we had no alternative but to cut many of the articles to almost halftheir size in the original form This was a painful phase and it is a tribute to the patience and generosity of the contributors that we succeeded in completing the task in the same spirit of co-operation and good will which had characterised the enterprise at the very beginning But while the creative enthusiasm of scholars is a sine qua non for a good book, it is not at all a sufficient condition, especially when the book holds many articles by different authors coming from various scholarly traditions, teaching at different universities, writing in a variety of languages, and either living in three different continents or, worse still, Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 T'he S,vrian Paradox 259 1970s the Israeli invasion of that country in June 1982, the EgyptianIsraeli peace and Israel's traditional (though tacit) understanding with the Hashemites add up for Syria to a ubiquitous menace It is not that Israel has at any time threatened Syria directly; rather it is that these Israeli activities can contribute, and have done so significantly, to the creation of the kind of regional order that the Assad regime wishes to prevent A permanent Israeli role in Lebanon threatens Syria's strategic underbelly The Israeli-Egyptian peace bestowed on Egypt evidence of success in its retrieving of lost territories, and thus restored, at least potentially, Egypt's freedom of action and influence in the Arab world, which Nasser's policies had lost Turned to a position of pre-eminence in Arab councils but anxious to preserve close relations with the United States and a modus vivendi with Israel, Egypt cannot but be impelled to extend the zone ofpeace created by its separate agreement Specifically this implies that Egypt has a vested interest in drawing Jordan and perhaps other Arab actors into the settlement with Israel The United States has a similar interest, and so does Israel Ultimately all this could lead to an overall Middle Eastern settlement from which Syria would be excluded, unless ofcourse it accepts what from its own point ofview are most humiliating terms Preventing the realisation ofthis scenario entails, as has been said, a policy designed to keep Jordan, the PLO and Lebanon under varying degrees of Syrian control The other side of the coin is Syria's need to maintain, and further enhance, a position of strength vis-a-vis Israel Syria, in short, has to build the most formidable military force that its war potential permits Paradoxically such a goal leads in the short run to a relatively low Syrian profile in the context of the conflict with Israel, for achieving a significant strengthening of the Syrian army will take several years, during which time Syria cannot afford major hostilities with the Jewish state Therefore, although anxious to see Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanon, Syria has been exceedingly careful to avoid any military confrontation, not only on the Golan but also in Lebanon An interesting question is: what will Syria once strategic parity with Israel, at least quantitatively, becomes a reality? Will Syria then go to war, and ifnot what else can it do? If the regime promises to carry on the struggle but advocates restraint until such time as it is 'ready', then once it is ready' it cannot afford not to act The cautious, pragmatic style ofAssad's regime suggests, however, that Syria will not initiate war, certainly not alone, against Israel in the foreseeable I Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 260 The Syrian Paradox future A more likely strategy is that Syria will cash in on its military might in terms of its position in the region If it succeeds in building a wider coalition, Syria would not only reduce the risks inevitably involved in a war with Israel, but also ipsofacto lessen Egypt's influence In addition, such a strategy might present Syria with opportunities for engaging Israel in wars of attrition along a wide front in which Israel's civilian hinterland would be exposed If Israel then tried to escalate such a war in order to force Syria to de-escalate, the very occurrence ofhostilities might strain Egypt's ability to maintain its cold peace with Israel Alternatively, but less likely, Syria might attempt to use a position of comparable strength vis-a-vis Israel as a basis for a negotiated settlement The Soviet Union, on whose support Syria depends, would not necessarily be adverse to the idea (provided, of course, that it does not lead to the exclusion of the Soviets from the picture) A Syrian-Israeli understanding would lessen the dangers from the Soviet point of view On the other hand, a Syrian move towards detente with Israel might turn the Soviets into a liability; at the least, they would cease to be an asset from the Syrian point of view Indeed, as Sadat discovered a decade and a halfago, the key to a settlement with Israel is Washington, and not Moscow Differently stated, a Syrian about-face vis-ii-vis Israel will require, simultaneously, a significant modification of Syrian rhetoric, domestic positions and posture vis-ii-vis the Arab world and a renversement des alliances with the superpowers This entails a change of colossal magnitude, which Sadat could manage because of the different domestic setting in which he operated but which no Syrian leader to date, and apparently not even Assad, can hope to carry out The alternative scenario - namely, building up strength, forming a solid bloc ofsupport in the Arab world and then engaging Israel in limited but irritating hostilities - appears more likely, at least as a prelude to a quest for detente with Israel Whereas the dilemmas outlined above concern the long-term future, the situation in Lebanon presents Syria with far more pressing problems Syria's strategy there appears to be the following Syria does not wish to become more deeply entangled than it already is, but it cannot simply extricate itself, concerned as it is with preventing the penetration of Lebanon by others and, just as much, with obviating Lebanon's transformation into a hostile factor towards Syria itself The maximum Syria can realistically hope for is the creation of an equilibrium more or less, among the Phalangists, the Druzes and the Shi'ites that would facilitate a modicum of stability under vicarious Syrian influence The S.vrian Parado.x 261 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Hence, while supporting the Druzes and the Shi'ites in their struggle with the Phalangists, Syria has not allowed, and will not allow, these two parts of the Lebanese equation to vanquish the third factor altogether Syria has in the past, and will again so in the future, played off any two ofthese forces against the third, while it acts more as a final arbiter than as an occupying force (except for small parts of Lebanon that are immediately adjacent to Syria itself) Accomplishments Every article presented in this volume underlines important Syrian accomplishments Moshe Ma'oz is impressed with the regime's success in arresting internal power struggles and with its governing ability Kais Firro shows how substantially the Syrian economy has grown in the years of Assad's rule Zeev Ma'oz demonstrates that Syria's power has increased on the whole more substantially than that of its reference group David Kushner points out that Syrian-Turkish relations have completely recovered from the tensions that marred them until two and a halfdecades ago Yair Hirschfeld shows how Syria has succeeded in collecting the greater pay-ofTs from its alliance with Iran Amazia Baram provides a clear picture of Syria's success in managing the ideological and political feud with Iraq Joseph Nevo underlines the fact that Syrian-Jordanian relations have undergone a virtual reversal, from intimidation by an ambitious Hashemite monarch to Jordanian fears of subversion by Syria Avner Yaniv emphasises how prudent and meticulously controlled the Syrian strategic posture has been vis-a-vis Israel Itamar Rabinovich argues convincingly that for Syria, the crisis in Lebanon has offered an opportunity for demonstrating power, influence and control Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv stress the ruthless, consistent manner in which Syria has controlled the PLO Yair Evron points out how Syria has succeeded in implanting in the Americans a great deal of respect towards it and Robert O Freedman shows Syria's succeess in managing a most beneficial alliance with the Soviet Union Until less than a decade ago, Syria was hardly considered a pivotal Middle Eastern power What this summarised catalogue of Syrian accomplishments very clearly suggests is that Syria's position in the region has been altered beyond recognition Bluntly, it is no longer possible to ignore Syria or to treat it as a secondary or passive bystander in a larger scene Syria has become the key to any solution in Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 262 The Syrian Paradox Lebanon and a dead-weight on the Arab-Israeli peace process It may not be an established fact that Syria can prevent any serious move towards an Arab-Israeli settlement, but it is no longer a fantasy to argue that this is so And yet, this assessment does not represent the overall balance sheet of Syria's accomplishments, which is far from being decidedly favourable An important lesson that emerges from the chapters ofthis volume is that the Syrian regime has to perform a heroic balancing act among numerous constraints The extent to which it can succeed in all these diverse tasks depends, in the final analysis, on the continuation of stability within the Syrian state itself If a leadership like Assad's continues to hold the reins ofpower, Syria can be expected to achieve a high proportion ofits goals It can continue to enhance its position as a countervailing force to Egypt and Iraq It can continue to hold at bay both the Jordanians and the PLO and certainly the Lebanese It can continue to derive significant benefits from its alliance with the Soviet Union without necessarily damaging its dialogue with the United States Finally, and most important of all, this leadership can continue the internal process of nation-building But is this a realistic forecast? An unequivocal answer is impossible because everything hinges so much on personalities No one knows how long Hafez aI-Assad will live No one outside the ruling circle in Damascus can really tell whether a successor has already been chosen No one, indeed, can really say whether Assad's successor, even if he gains the approval of all his rivals, will be as astute as Assad In this sense, the accomplishments of Assad's reign remain quite inadequate The greatest success this regime could claim would be continuity in stability, in goals and in the ability to attain them And since this attainment remains so unclear, it would be premature to declare the Alawi Ba'ath a success story Indeed, if continuity is not maintained and if everything depends on the presence of Assad himself, Syria's future is highly uncertain Assad's pending departure could well trigger off a power struggle at the top that would quickly spill over into the wider Syrian scene and possibly lead, not just to the diminution of Syria's power, but conceivably even to an internal war and, ultimately, the break-up of Syria's fragile political superstructure into its ethnic and religious component parts From the Syrian point of view, such a 'Lebanese' scenario is probably a haunting nightmare, a worst-case anlaysis that should be avoided almost at all costs Even if such a cataclysm does not materialise, however, Syria's achievements would still remain mixed Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 The Syn·an Paradox 263 The Syrian state may have exhibited a dramatic ascent in its international stature, but the thrust ofits domestic politics and foreign policy alike leads in a direction that seems out of step with the rest of the Middle East For all its military power and for all its subversive capacities, Syria may be ultimately incapable of preventing Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, the Gulf states and even the PLO from heading towards amicable relations with the West and some accommodation with Israel None of these powers would move in these directions if it were not in its interests Ifit were in its interests, on the other hand, none ofthem would stop entirely simply because Syria objected Can Syriajoin such a throng? The answer seems to be negative The stem" militant stance vis-iI-vis Israel, the deepening reliance on the Soviet Union and the pervasively repressive nature of the regime all seem to be so solidly woven into the fabric of the Syrian system that it will take a long while before a change in course becomes a realistic proposition Assad's Syria, then, presents an intriguing paradox If it were not for its staunchly realistic operational goals and a robust pragmatism in execution, Syria would not have risen to its present status Yet the same realism has also forced the regime to perpetuate a loud commitment to aspirations that turn Syria into a menace to its neighbours and, ultimately" into its own worst enemy INDEX Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Note: References are to Syria unless otherwise stated Sub-entries are in alphabetical order except where chronological order is significant Abdallah, King 141-2, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151,153 Abu Mussa rebellion 203 accomplishments and Syrian paradox 261-3 administrative institutions, lack of 41 Afghanistan 225 invaded 228,229 Aflag, Michel 23,24, 228, 126, 127-8 agriculture 37, 38, 45-50, 62, 72, 132 see aIso irrigation; land aid, foreign 44-5, 51, 54, 58, 62, 210 see also under military air space, Jordan's use of Syria's 149-50 AI-Ghab valley project 46-7, 95 Alawi-Ba'athist rule consolidated 25 -30 Muslim opposition to 30-4 see also Ba'athist Alawis 1, 10, 11, 19,253 army members 23-5, 28 controlled 21, 22 migration 38 politics and 22-3, 32-3 Shi'ites and 180 Alexandretta (Hatay) problem 15, 85, 87,99, 102-3 Algeria 228, 230 Iran and 110, 118 Iraq and 133 PLO in 203 Algiers agreement ( 1975) 120 Allon, Yigal 166, 169 Ammam summit conference 109-10 anarchists, Turkish 93, 97-8 see also terrorists Andropov, Yuri 234, 235 "anti-imperialist bloc' 226-7, 229, 230 Arab League 151, 164, 172, 228 Arab Parliamentary Union conference 119 Arab Socialist Resurrection Party 18, 29 see also Ba'ath 264 Arab Union 108-10 Arabic language 12, 13 Arafat, Yassir Assad and 147,182,195,198-200, 234,242-3 Hussein and 146, 187, 204, 234 Israel and 202 Jedid and 194 Maronites and 182 revolt against 239-40 Suwydani and 192 trail 173 West and 201, 233, 235 Arens, Moshe 157, 236, 237 Arif, Abd ai-Salam 127 Armenians 38, 98-9 arms see army; military; missiles army, Syrian Ba'athist regime and 127-8 Border disputes and 93 elite units 27, 28 French rule in 11 officers 18, 19, 23 powers of 24-5 see also military; wars Asi (Orontes) river 46-7, 95-6 Assad, Hafez al- 3, 9, 127,251-63 and Egypt 134, 228 and Iran 118-19, 122 and Iraq 132-4 and Israel 157, 166, 171, 175 and Jordan 145, 147,152 and Lebanon 179-85, 188-9, 23840,242 and PLO 192, 194-6, 198-201,235 and religion 116 and Soviet Union 227, 229-30, 235 and Turkey 89-90, 97 and USA 209, 218 in power 25-32,37, 128 personality 26 role 31 see also Syria under Assad Assad, Rif'at 3, 27-8,33, 145, 157, 256 Index Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 Assaf, Amin Abu 23 Aswan dam 225 Atasi, Hashim al- 16-17 Atrash, Sultan al- 22 axis, Teheran-Riyadh-Cairo 119 Azam, Khalid al- 160-71 Aziz, Tariq 118, 137 Ba'ath regime beginnings of 4,9, 18-19,23-4,86, 126-8, 227, 253-6, 262 in Iraq 127-8, 136 in Jordan 127, 152 in Lebanon 127 See also Assad, Hafez alBaghdad Pacts 87, 92.101 Baghdad Summit ( 1978) 62 137 Bahrain 110 Bakr, Ahmad Hassan al- 127, 128, 134, 135 balance of payments difficulties 49, 5962 Baqdash, Khalid 23 Baram Amazia 4, 228, 261 on Iraq and Syria 125-39 Barazani 130 Barazi Mushin al- 23 Baytar Salah aI-Din al- 23, 24, 126, 127 Bayulken, Haluk 89, 95 Bedouins 38, 148 Begin, Menachem 157, 174, 175, 184, 228, 240 Beirut agreement (1982) 218, 219 Belayev Igor 239 Ben Gurion, David 164, 166, 169 Ben-Meir, Yehuda 240 Beqaa valley 237.239.240 Berri, Nabih 241 border disputes Iran 120 Iraq 120, 126 Israel 160-5, 172 Jordan 150 Syria 93, 94-5, 126 150, 160-5 Turkey 93, 94-5 see aIso disputes: wars Brezhnev Leonid 4,232.233-4 Britain Iran and 109 Israel and 172 Jordan and 143 149 Brown L Dean 173, 174, 213 Bulgaria 59 265 Bunche, Ralph 161 Bustani, Butrus al-13 Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri 88, 95, 103 Cairo summit conference (1976) 200 Camp David accord (1978) 120, 130, 131,133,202,214,216,228 Canada 51 Carter, J 183,201,213-14,215 cement industry 54, 55-6 ~centrists' 229 chemicals industry 54, 55-6, 57 China 226 Christians in Lebanon 169, 172, 181-4, 198, 212,228 in Syria 11, 13, 14, 16, 21-3 Churchill, Winston 141, 147 Civil Wars see under Jordan; Lebanon communications see media; transport Communist Parties 225 Syrian 17-18,29 community, national obstacles to 1217 comparisons of power 77-80 constitutions, Syrian 15-16, 22 Pennanent(1973) 26-7, 30,32 constraints and Syrian paradox 253-6 contention with Turkey, continued 92-9 co-operation with Turkey, towards 8692 co-operatives, agricultural 20 costs see expenditure cotton 48, 49-50 Covenant of Joint Pan-Arab Action 134 current accounts 62 Cyprus 87 89-90 Czechoslovakia 59 dams 37.48, 53, 95-7, 225 see also irrigation; water Dayan, Moshe 164, 166, 169 de Gaulle, Charles death rate 40, 44, 71 defence see anny; disputes: military: wars "Defence Companies' 27, 28 demilitarised zones (DMZs) 161-3 Demirel, Sulayman 129 demography see population developing country, Syria as 71 dimensions of Syria's power 70-6 disputes see border disputes: water disputes 266 Index Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 distribution of population 37-9 Druzes in Israel 169 in Lebanon 11 7, 220-1, 241, 261 migration 38 in Syria 1, 10, 11, 19, 21-5, 33 East Gennany 59 economic aid see aid dependence of Jordan on Syria 15 dimensions of Syria's power 71,72, 73 liabilities of Iran-Syria alliance 11213 pressure against Iran 112 pressure against Iraq 107-8 economy of Syria 36-68 fmance and balance of payments 5964 growth 44-5 population and manpower 37-44 transport and communications 46, 58-9 see aIso agriculture; industry; oil education 15, 30, 32, 41, 44 Egypt 9, 231 Gee and 110 Iran and 116 Iraq and 119, 126, 133, 137 Israel and see under Israel Jordan and 121, 143-4, 145, 14950,151,189,194 Lebanon and 132, 200, 228 media 137 PLO and 193,201 population 38, 71 reference group member 77, 80 Saudi Arabia and 151 Soviet Union and 225,229 Suez Canal 150, 162 Syria and 10,72,126-7,183,192 228, 258; see also United Arab Republic United Arab front against 134 USA and 217 Eitan, Raphael 236 Elazar, David 165, 169 electricity 53, 96 Elrom, Ephraim 98 emergence of modern Syria 9-35 historical background 10-11 obstacles to national community 1217 ° socio-political changes since independence 17-21 integration and ascendancy of minorities 21-5 Alawi-Ba'athist rule, consolidated 25-30; Muslim opposition to 30-4 emigration 41 see aIso migration energy production see hydro-electricity; natural gas; oil engineering industry 54, 55-6 Erim, Nihat 98 escalation, politics of see Israel, Syria and Eshkol, Levi 164, 165-6, 169 Ethiopia 225 Euphrates river 47, 48, 53, 96, 97, 132,235 Evron, Yair 5,261 on USA, Lebanon and Syria 209-23 expenditure military 63, 64, 71, 74, 76, 78 social welfare 41, 74, 76 Fahd, King 118 Faranjiyan, sulayman 117, 182, 198, 212,220,239,241 Fares, Louis 189 Fatah 98, 165, 191 see also PLO Faysal, amir 14-16, 141, 147 fertilizer industry 54, 56, 57 Fez summit meeting (1982) 118, 2323 finance and balance of payments 59-64 Firro, Kais 4,261 on economy 36-68 five year plans 54, 62 food 46, 48, 54 see also agriculture foreign aid see aid; military policy see disputes; wars and individual countries France Jordan and 141, 147 Lebanon and 105, 180 Soviet Union and 226 Syria and 51, 59; mandatory administration of 10-11, 14-1 7, 85, 180 Freedman, Robert 5, 261 on USSR, Lebanon and Syria 22447 Downloaded by [Utrecht University] at 02:21 02 March 2016 lnde:x: Galile~ area 161 165-6,169,175-6 G alili, Israel 166 G D P see gross domestic product Geneva Conference 225 GibriL Ahmad 194 Glubb, John B 143 GNP see Gross National Product goals and Syrian paradox 251-3 Golan 131 160,165,169-71,200, 215.230,237-8 'Greater Syria' scheme 141-2 146-8, 251-2 Gromyko Andrei 236 gross domestic product 4, 45-6 71-3 gross national product 76, 78 Gulf C