The work of the maritime and coastguard agency

House of Commons Transport Committee The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency Fourteenth Report of Session 2003–04 Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 30 June 2004 HC 500 Published on 18 July 2004 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £14.50 The Transport Committee The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies Current membership Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Labour, Crewe) (Chairman) Mr Jeffrey M Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr Brian H Donohoe MP (Labour, Cunninghame South) Clive Efford MP (Labour, Eltham) Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) Mr Ian Lucas MP (Labour, Wrexham) Miss Anne McIntosh MP (Conservative, Vale of York) Mr Paul Marsden MP (Liberal Democrat, Shrewsbury and Atcham) Mr John Randall MP (Conservative, Uxbridge) Mr George Stevenson MP (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South) Mr Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152 These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/transport.cfm A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Eve Samson (Clerk), David Bates (Second Clerk), Clare Maltby (Committee Specialist), Philippa Carling (Inquiry Manager), Miss Frances Allingham (Committee Assistant), Diane Sutherland (Secretary) and Henry Ayi-Hyde (Senior Office Clerk) All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, Millbank, London SW1P 3JA The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is transcom@parliament.uk The Work of the Maritime Coastguard Agency Contents Report Page Summary Introduction The Maritime and Coastguard Agency Role of the MCA Scrutiny of the MCA in the previous Parliament Safety Incidents, accidents and deaths Closure of rescue co-ordination centres Time taken to respond to incidents Watch Staffing Levels 10 Incidents, Accidents and Deaths: Conclusions 14 Implementation of Integrated Coastguard Communication System and Incident Management System 15 Staff issues 16 Qualifications and competencies 16 Administration 17 Tackling pollution 18 Policy formulation 18 Justification for policy 20 Future of the Agency 23 Rescue co-ordination centres Agency’s Remit 23 23 Conclusions and recommendations 25 Formal minutes 28 List of witnesses 29 List of written evidence 29 Reports from the Transport Committee 2002 30 The Work of the Maritime Coastguard Agency Summary The Maritime and Coastal Agency has a vital role in preserving life It does this through its work on ship safety, and through its Coastguard work Forerunners to this Committee have examined the Agency in the past, and expressed grave concerns about its management of Coastguard operations We are concerned the problems still continue Since 1998, the number of incidents, accidents and deaths in the United Kingdom search and rescue region has risen The Agency has no clear analysis of the reasons for this The number of rescue coordination centres has been cut; the Agency has no clear analysis of the effect that this has had on response times We are so concerned at the apparent absence of any strategic analysis that we believe an independent review is necessary to establish whether the Agency’s actions have contributed to the increase in fatalities around our coast Individual coastguard officers may perform heroically, but individual effort will not compensate for insufficient staff on duty, or for staff expected to undertake tasks for which they are not qualified Our inquiry revealed a routine acceptance that coastguard stations will frequently be staffed at, or even below, the minimum complement The Agency has defined staff competences, but has no system for ensuring that underqualified staff are not called on to provide cover for long periods Moreover, the Agency is failing in its duty to give a clear lead when Government policy may have implications for safety at sea Far too often, it is left responding to developments, rather than taking the initiative We believe there are still serious problems within the Agency, which its new Chief Executive will have to address The Work of the Maritime Coastguard Agency Introduction As part of our ongoing inquiry into Department for Transport-related Executive Agencies and Non-Departmental Bodies, we took oral evidence from Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive, and Mr Neil Goodall, Finance Director, of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) on 31 March 2004 Our predecessor Committee reported on the MCA in 1999 and again, as part of a broader inquiry into a number of Executive Agencies, in 2001.1 Those Reports identified a number of concerns we wished to revisit; we also wished to hear Captain Bligh’s views—as the relatively recently appointed Chief Executive of the Agency 2—on the priorities for, and challenges facing, the MCA On the basis of a single evidence session, this Report does not cover every aspect of the MCA’s activities, but focuses on the areas about which we are concerned and where we seek improvements We are grateful to the MCA for their oral evidence and follow-up written memoranda We are also grateful to the following organisations for their written evidence: the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds; the Royal Yachting Association; the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS); the Inland Waterways Association; and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) We have also been greatly assisted in this inquiry by our Specialist Adviser, Professor James McConville Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 1998-99, The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, HC 31; and Seventh Report of Session 2000-01, The Transport-Related Executive Agencies of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, HC 1224 Appointed September 2003 The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency The Maritime and Coastguard Agency Role of the MCA The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) and the Coastguard Agency merged on April 1998 to form the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) The Agency “is responsible throughout the UK for implementing the Government’s maritime safety policy That includes co-ordinating search and rescue at sea through Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and checking that ships meet UK and international safety rules… [The Agency] works to prevent the loss of lives at the coast and at sea, to ensure that ships are safe, and to prevent coastal pollution… [It is] putting increasing effort into prevention work and a measure of [its] success is when accidents not happen, or where [it] intervenes to minimise their impact.”3 The Agency’s slogan is Safer Lives, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas The Agency, which in 2002-03 employed 1,100 staff and had a net operating cost of £105, 095, 000,4 seeks to achieve four outcomes: x A reduced rate of accidents, and accident related deaths, involving UK Registered merchant ships and fishing vessels x A reduced number of accidents, and deaths resulting from accidents, within the UK Search and Rescue Region and Coastline x A reduced number of incidents of pollution from shipping activities in the UK pollution control zone x An enhanced safety record for the Red Ensign Fleet.5 Scrutiny of the MCA in the previous Parliament Our predecessor Committee’s Report into the MCA in February 1999 expressed concern that the Agency was planning to close four (out of 21) maritime rescue co-ordination centres (Oban, Pentland, Tyne Tees and Liverpool) and that Portland and Solent centres were to be co-located The Committee recommended that all 21 stations remain open Subsequently, the decision to close the Liverpool station and co-locate Portland and Solent was rescinded When it looked at the Agency again in 2001 as part of its inquiry into the Department’s Executive Agencies, the Committee: urged the Agency to modernise management structures; noted the need for adequate numbers of suitably qualified staff to be on duty at Coastguard stations; re-iterated the Committee’s opposition to the closure programme; and expressed concern about the introduction and operation of the new digital Integrated Coastguard Communications System (ICCS) We revisit these issues in this Report www.mcga.gov.uk Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03, HC 863, pp 50 and 63 Ibid., p The Work of the Maritime Coastguard Agency Safety Incidents, accidents and deaths As noted above, one of the principal outcomes the MCA strives to achieve is “a reduced number of accidents, and deaths resulting from accidents in the UK search and rescue region” However, the number of incidents, accidents and deaths increased significantly between 1998 and 2002: Table1: Incidents, Accidents and Deaths, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % increase 1998 - 2002 Incidents 11, 553 12, 220 12, 016 12, 514 13, 395 15.9% Accidents 6, 480 6, 581 6, 703 7, 242 7, 604 17.3% 249 251 236 284 319 28.1% Deaths Data Source: MCA Annual Report 2002-03, p 91; percentages inserted by Transport Committee It is particularly alarming that the numbers of deaths has risen more sharply than those of incidents and accidents The MCA’s Annual Report states that “this is a worrying trend and supports our strategic objective to redirect our coastguard expertise into a more coherent and sustained accident prevention strategy based on education, information and advice It is accidents to people swimming, and walking on beaches and cliffs that has increased, whilst accidents involving vessels has decreased We are planning to undertake a series of quarterly sample surveys of potential customers, to gain a better understanding of their safety awareness and how best to promote our safety messages.”6 We pressed Captain Bligh to explain why the number of incidents, accidents and deaths has been increasing He said that greater analysis was needed but noted that: there might be some double-reporting of incidents and accidents;7 not all the deaths were related to maritime incidents;8 and that statistics on the exposure of the public to coastal areas were not available.9 These responses were not wholly convincing: double-counting of incidents and accidents would not account for the increase in deaths, as Captain Bligh conceded; and the fact that not all the deaths were related to marine incidents was presumably also the case in 1998, and so does not explain the increase Finally, the MCA does not know if more people are engaging in activities on or near the coast: such an increase – if it has occurred – might be a factor in the increased numbers of incidents and accidents, but would not explain why deaths had increased at an even greater rate There was a clear increase in the number of incidents in 1999; by 2000, the increase in the number of accidents was marked; although the significant increase in deaths in 2001 might have been considered a statistical quirk, by 2002 it should have given cause for concern We are shocked that when we took evidence in 2004 the Agency was unable to demonstrate that it had already analysed the reasons for the increases in incidents, accidents and deaths since 1998 This displays a Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03, HC 863, p Q 29 Q 32 Q 43 The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency worrying inability to note trends, and to take the necessary action to make sure the Agency understands them 10 Given that the MCA were unable to provide a convincing explanation, we asked whether three important aspects of the Agency’s performance – the reduced number of rescue co-ordination centres, the time taken to respond to incidents, and staffing levels – were factors in the increasing numbers of incidents, accidents and deaths We now turn to each of those factors Closure of rescue co-ordination centres 11 Asked about the consequences of the closure of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees Centres, Captain Bligh said “I am not aware of any consequences of the closure of those three stations.”10 However, this is perhaps not surprising - or confidence-inspiring - given that he was also unaware of any assessment of the impact of the closures having been carried out by the MCA.11 12 In its subsequent written evidence to the Committee, the MCA stated that Since the closure of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees, regular exercises have been carried out to ensure the operation integrity of the areas taken over by other coordination centres Moreover, the search and rescue (SAR) resources and response are discussed at the local SAR committees and marine safety groups for the areas in question In addition, the SAR levels of activity are frequently and regularly risk appraised In short, the operational integrity of all Agency areas of responsibility is kept under review There has been no reduction of Coastguard Rescue Teams on the ground locally, and there has been absolutely no evidence of safety being jeopardised.12 We note the MCA’s assertion that the closure of three rescue co-ordination centres has not resulted in safety being jeopardised We would have greater confidence in such an assertion if it were based on a full assessment of the impact of the closures The risk appraisals already undertaken not constitute such an assessment; otherwise the Agency’s Chief Executive would have referred to them in his oral evidence 13 The MCA should carry out a full assessment of the impact of the closures of Oban, Pentland and Tyne Tees rescue co-ordination centres This assessment should cover, as a minimum, any impact of the closures on: x Time taken to decide on appropriate search and rescue responses and to initiate action; x Time taken for Coastguard Response Units to arrive at the scene of an incident; and x The prevalence of incidents, accidents and deaths 10 Q 60 11 Qq 70-71 12 Ev 27 9666631009 Ev 30 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence There is also the Inland Waters Small Passenger Boat Code One of the waterways trusts raised a complaint because no RIA had been produced for this Code The reasons for that were: (a) it is not legislation, but simply sets national benchmark standard for implementation through existing legislation; (b) it is designed to reflect existing best practice; and (c) the vessels it applies to are very diverse and operate in a huge range of conditions and circumstances, so any RIA can only be indicative However as a result of the complaint, we are now inviting a small number of operators to assess their operation and provide us with an estimate of any additional costs arising Question 250—Coastguard Competence and Complement (a) Number of fully trained Coastguard Watch Assistants As at 31 March 2004 the Agency had 172.7 Coastguard Watch Assistants (Operations) who had passed their qualifying examinations Another 12 completed their exams on the April and all of them passed (b) Number of vacancies that are fully trained Coastguard OYcers The 18 vacancies I mentioned to the Committee is the number of vacancies we have been authorised to fill via national campaigns within Operations The figure is made up of # District Operations Managers (DOM), # Watch Managers (WM), and # Watch OYcers (WO) This also includes # Sector Managers (SM) who are not part of an Operations Room The recruitment of Coastguard Watch Assistants (Operations) (CWA(O)s) is delegated to the District and there are currently 6.7 vacancies These posts are normally filled very quickly and I know that some of these people will be joining within the next few weeks It is worth noting that the vacancy situation within HM Coastguard can be very fluid—the failure of a Watch OYcer at examination could result in their demotion to CWA, failure for a CWA(O) is dismissal The filling of DOM/WM/SM posts have a knock on eVect at WO level and so on and in the interim we carry a vacancy We have a Succession Planning process in place for WOs which essentially trains WO ahead of vacancy needs, but it is fairly new and we will not see the full benefit of it until October 2004 when CWA(O)s who are being trained as WOs take their exams This follows 18 months of investment in the process This group will be followed in January 2005 by another 10 CWA(O)s being trained as WOs (c) Method by which we independently assess competencies The HM Coastguard technical competencies are modelled on the structure used by National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) in terms of design and level statements The content was designed in-house as there is no external Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) organisation with a competency framework against which to benchmark This content design was carried out by a working group made up of operational Coastguard OYcers of all levels, the Agency Head of Search and Rescue, the Agency Training Centre staV and a Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) representative This working group is re-convened every 18 months to re-examine and update the competencies as required and review the level statements set against each Coastguard role profile The next of these reviews is due during the second quarter of this year Question 207—Reasons why the Annual Report and Accounts for 2002–03 shows a 10% increase in administrative staV and a decrease in Coastguards/Surveyors Reasons for the above are as follows: — about 13 Coastguard Watch Assistants (Admin) (CWA(A)) were re-classified as Administrative Assistants This was considered appropriate when some Coastguard premises were co-located with Marine OYces The CWA(A)s were basically administrators anyway, and their change of classification reflected their broadened role of supporting Marine OYce as well as Coastguard functions This obviously resulted in a corresponding “reduction” in Coastguard staV, although they remained within the operational complement and continued to support front-line delivery; and 9666631009 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 31 — there was an increase in administrative staV mainly within Seafarer’s Certification and Ship Registration functions, in order to ensure we met our seafarer and shipowner customer needs These alone accounted for some 18.5 staV and are again customer facing front line delivery people Captain Stephen Bligh Chief Executive 19 April 2004 Supplementary memorandum by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA 08A) Thank you for the letter of 21 April, which crossed in the post with my letter of 19 April My letter addressed many of the points raised in yours and I am now writing to cover the outstanding points Cross-cutting Work in the Agency You asked for examples of where a more cross-cutting approach to our work would be helpful in terms of the way in which the Agency is organised and how it operates I would highlight two areas in particular The first is in relation to our approach to work on the human element of shipping We know from MAIB investigations that the causes of around 80% of accidents can be traced back to human error or misjudgement, rather than failings in ship construction or equipment A positive impact on shipping safety is therefore dependent on the Agency having a strong focus on policies and activity that address human factors The Agency has been active on that front in a number of ways through its seafarer health and safety work, seafarer training and certification services, and the implementation of the International Safety Management Code But we can more in this important area not only in terms of policy and regulation, but also in our practical ship survey and inspection activity, which should increasingly focus less on hardware issues and more on ships’ operations We are developing a practical guide to support our marine surveyors in their eVorts Another area of activity in which I am pursuing more of a pan-Agency approach, is in relation to our incident prevention work The Agency has always been involved in actively preventing shipping accidents, both through the development and implementation of new safety requirements and through international negotiations Until recently, we have been less proactive in coastal incident prevention, having considered that to be an operational search and rescue function However, I see this as requiring a similar approach to that already taken in relation to shipping: identifying the root causes of an accident, determining what can be done to address that cause, balancing the risks and the costs, and taking appropriate action on the basis of that analysis We have therefore brought our risk analysis and prevention co-ordination functions together This will allow us to make the best use of the available skills, by enabling us to take a more strategic approach to incident prevention, rather than requiring shipping standards and operational activities to be considered separately as in the past For example, we might usefully build on the work we have already done to train our coastguard sector managers to inspect small fishing vessels With their knowledge of an area and the good working relationships that they have already established with local fishermen, they are often well-placed to discuss safety issues Input to Departmental Policies Your letter asks for examples of Departmental policies that MCA has influenced or changed However, our relationship with the Department works on a diVerent basis In line with the recommendations in the OYce of Public Services Reform report “Better Government Services—Executive Agencies in the 21st Century”, the Agency works collaboratively and collectively with its parent Department and respects the principle of a two-way, “no surprises” rule In addition, our Framework Document spells out our relationship with our sponsoring Division in DfT In practice, this means that there is regular formal and informal contact with DfT at all levels At senior level, there is the Agency’s Advisory Board, which considers our strategic direction and management issues Approaches to shipping safety issues are discussed within the Maritime Policy Group (MPG), which is made up of the senior players in both the Agency and the Department As well as regular business meetings, MPG reserves two meetings a year for longer-term thinking and planning, both about the delivery of Ministers’ strategic priorities and as a contribution to the Agency’s own forward business planning More importantly, I encourage everyone in the Agency to keep in touch informally with their colleagues in the Department on a daily basis For example, whenever I or others from the Agency are in London we make a point of catching up with our colleagues, and the same is true in reverse In short, there is excellent day-to-day contact, discussion and liaison at all levels on all aspects of maritime safety policy development Recent examples of specific policy issues on which we have been collaborating include 9666631010 Ev 32 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence implementing European requirements on the safety of oil tankers (in the light of the ERIKA and PRESTIGE incidents), ship-to-ship oil transfer operations, port waste reception facilities, ship security, and the implementation of seafarer working time regulations Competencies Required for each Type of Post, Including an Indication of which Competencies Rest on Examination or External Qualification The Agency’s Competency Framework includes Technical, Non-Technical and Behavioural competencies Technical and Non-Technical competencies use a system of levels (0–4) which determine the level of knowledge and skills for eVective performance The specific descriptions are shown below: No knowledge required Overview knowledge, an appreciation of the subject Basic knowledge & experience, a good grasp of the fundamentals but needs to refer to other sources for details supervision and guidance from more experienced colleagues is expected Detailed knowledge & more experience, needs to have built on basic knowledge and experience of a range of applications and deal with the majority of situations on own initiative Specialist, needs to consistently apply a detailed knowledge and experience and is an acknowledged source of advice and guidance in the most diYcult and complex areas The Behavioural competencies underpin and support the Agency’s values and are set at levels: standard, higher & advanced The level is set not against the grade of the post but in accordance with the relative importance of that behaviour for the job role Each role within the Agency has a job profile made up of all of the above competencies These job profiles are used for recruitment, promotion, staV appraisal and for identifying training & development needs The content of each job profile is devised by the line management chain in discussion with the Recruitment Manager and are reviewed at least once per year but more frequently if the job role changes 10 For Surveyor posts and all Coastguard posts excluding Coastguard Watch Assistants (Operations) (CWA(O)) there is a requirement to have some relevant, externally assessed qualification(s), that demonstrates and confirms technical competence As an example, for a Surveyor post there is a requirement to have a Master’s Certificate of Competence Class (The recruitment process includes the checking and verification of all qualifications.) The holder of such a qualification is deemed to have the majority of technical competencies and in-house training and coaching from more experienced Surveyors will develop the other competencies to the required level In addition to the external qualifications described above a Marine Surveyor must pass an internally assessed examination before being able to conduct International Safety Management (ISM) Audits 11 The CWA(O) post requires a specific level of numeracy and literacy at the recruitment stage, all Coastguard technical competencies are developed by attending formal in-house training courses During the year-long training programme the individual works through a competency based task book and is coached and supported by their line manager All Coastguard Watch Assistants and Watch oYcers must pass internally assessed examinations It is the intention to have these internal examinations externally accredited 12 The Personal Development Plan (PDP) contained within the performance management system, provides the jobholder and their line manager with the mechanism to ensure, through the use of both on and oV-the-job training and development opportunities, to build/maintain the required level of competence 13 The behavioural competencies required for each job role are assessed by the jobholder and their line manager at the twice yearly reviews required of the Agency’s performance management system Initial recruitment and selection for promotion use a competency-based Assessment Centre approach A variety of activities are used throughout a full day’s assessment The job profile is key to determining what type of activities would be most suitable for assessing behaviours and both the line manager and the recruitment adviser work closely to agree the content of the Assessment Centre Activities include the use of presentations, written papers, psychometrics, group discussions, chairing discussions and every event includes a Board interview 14 The PDP is used by jobholders to build/maintain behavioural competencies The Agency’s Training Centre in addition to procuring, developing and delivering technical training also provides interpersonal and management skills, development training programmes Included within these programmes are externally accredited (Oxford, Cambridge & RSA (OCR)) Certificate and Diploma in Management programmes The provision of excellent training and development opportunities and the support and guidance provided to staV by their managers has enabled the Agency to retain recognition as an Investors In People (IIP) organisation 9666631011 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 33 Which Posts Can Only be Staffed by People with a Qualification which is either Examination Based or Externally Assessed? 15 In line with the Civil Service Reform Agenda, the Agency is keen to recruit, retain and “bring on” talented staV We also recognise the importance placed upon marketable qualifications in the provision of eVective and eYcient delivery of business targets and excellent customer service All operational posts within the Marine Survey field and HMCG can only be staVed by people with relevant qualifications As described above there is a combination of externally recognised qualifications and some internally assessed examinations There are also some positions within other Directorates (Finance, IT and HR) that require individuals to hold external qualifications Under the Agency’s Further Education (FE) and Continuing Professional Development (CPD) policy the Agency will fund/support individuals to gain such qualifications The Degree to which People Without Externally or Examination Based Competencies are Able to Fill Posts on a Temporary Basis 16 The holding of a qualification and/or pass at examination demonstrates competence in a particular skill or field of knowledge An individual without these will not easily be able to demonstrate the same degree of competence The requirement for our operational staV to have qualifications/examinations reduces the risk to the Agency and our customers of inferior and poor quality work And it enables us to deliver our vision of Safer Lives, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas If, for operational reasons, it is necessary for a person without formal qualifications to carry out some aspects of a post for a short time, it would be on the basis that they have very strong and eVective support and guidance from a formally qualified colleague Systems in Place to Ensure that those Without Relevant Validated Competencies Allowed to Fill Posts on a Temporary Basis can Gain the Validation they Require Within a Set Period? 17 There is no specific system or process in place Rather, the line manager must carry out a risk assessment in accordance with Operational Advice Notes (OAN) 122 & 150 and, in discussion with local management (including, where necessary, Area/Regional Management) determine who is suitable to fill a post on a temporary basis Individuals’ Personal Development Plans reflect on and oV job training needs which are prioritised with the Agency’s other training needs However, line managers are responsible for ensuring suitable on job training is provided in these and other situations Reason for Opinion that the Agency Would Not be Able to Draw from its Traditional Sources of Professionally Qualified Personnel in the Future 18 Posts for certain categories of professionally qualified marine surveyor are already diYcult to fill with suitably qualified personnel Within the last month we have needed to re-trawl three posts because, despite many applications, no suitable candidates were found The decade or so leading up to the mid nineties had seen a decline in the UK shipping industry and fewer graduates choosing seafaring as a career Consequently, the pool of potential marine surveyors shrunk In the future we will need to replace existing marine surveyors with home-grown professionals We are already recruiting marine technicians who can acquire specialist skills in a surveyor development programme and over several years become fully competent as marine surveyors We are also actively considering the merits of a graduate entry programme Total Labour Force for the Last Five Years, Broken into Category 19 I set out below details of the Agency’s average staV in post for each of the last five years broken down by category The Committee will appreciate that the figures for 2003–04 have yet to be published in our Annual Report and Accounts and are indicative at this stage AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED DURING THE YEAR Board Members Uniformed Coastguard and Professional Marine Managerial and Administrative staV TOTAL Auxiliary CG* 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 indicative 5.00 767.50 5.00 756.70 4.00 745.40 5.60 736.30 7.1 737.4 272.50 309.50 326.00 357.70 390.6 1,045.00 3,150 1,071.20 3,285 1,075.40 3,306 1,099.60 3,359 1,135.1 3,427 *Figures are those as at December each year based on monthly returns from CG stations 9666631011 Ev 34 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence 20 On the face of it, the figures show an increase in Managerial/Administrative staV To some extent this increase in 2003–04 is accounted for by the re-classification of non-operational CG staV to mainstream administrative traditional Civil Service grades We have also taken on additional security work for which 14 administrative posts were created, as well as some new marine surveyors It should also be noted that the Agency Vacancy rate has dropped by approximately 2.5% over the past year, as around 25–30 vacant posts have now been filled Number of qualified Coastguard OYcers available for watchkeeping duties 21 The table below shows the average number of qualified staV employed on watchkeeping duties Number of experienced Watch Managers (WM) available for watchkeeping duties 22 All Watch Managers (WMs) are available for watchkeeping duties All of our Watch Managers are experienced in watchkeeping, as they have all been Watch OYcers and possibly Watch Assistants before being promoted to Watch OYcer 23 In addition to the above, members of the District Management Team (numbering 2/3 per Station) could be employed on watchkeeping duties in an emergency, should the need arise FIGURES FOR QUALIFIED COASTGUARDS AND EXPERIENCED WATCH MANAGERS AVAILABLE FOR WATCHKEEPING DUTIES CWA(O) WO TOTAL WMs GRAND TOTAL 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 129.50 152.12 281.62 82.06 363.68 176.97 138.12 315.09 80.41 395.50 147.49 149.21 296.70 75.92 372.62 150.85 154.71 305.56 78.54 384.10 157.75 138.23 295.98 78.20 374.18 Timetable and Process for Reviewing Operational Advice Note (OAN) 122 on Manning Levels in Coastguard Stations 24 The review of Operational Advice Note (OAN) 122 was initiated as part of the Directorate of Operations strategy A trial of flanking arrangements between Aberdeen and Forth Coastguard Stations was undertaken on 10–11 March this year, and following this an interim OAN was issued which stressed the need for risk assessment, but also allowed a relaxation of the existing arrangements A full review is in progress with a joint working group which is considering British Airport Authority’s (BAA) approach and is currently in discussion with Trade Unions Unfortunately I am not in a position to be able to give a timetable for the remainder of the review as this is dependent on the outcome of the current talks Reviewing Recommended Watch Levels 25 Agency oYcials met with the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) on 16 April to discuss the revision of Operational Advice Note (OAN) 122 It was agreed that the revision will be undertaken in two stages Stage 1, which is currently being established, is an interim arrangement which will use the OAN as guidance and involve watch levels being set on the basis of risk assessment by district operations managers and watch managers trained for the task The interim arrangements will be endorsed by regional joint working groups comprising representatives from the PCS, watchkeeping staV, local and regional management 26 Stage will be full consideration of the future requirements for watch levels over the next five to 10 years This will take into account, amongst other things, the requirements of the Working Time Regulations, a revision of staV complements at Coastguard co-ordination centres and the use of modern technology No specific time frame has yet been set for this work but it is expected to last at least 12 months 9666631011 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 35 Number of Cases of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency Being Found Guilty of Maladministration in Relation to Ship Surveys Systems in Place to Ensure When Problems Have Been Found With a Surveyor’s Work, Other Work Done by That Surveyor Has Been Checked 27 The following table lists cases requiring financial redress COMPLAINANTS REQUIRING FINANCIAL REDRESS Surname Ship Name Complaint Received via Reeman CORNELIUS JOHANNA N/A Incorrect FV survey 1986 PCA 1999–2001 Maladministration: small commercial vessel certificate exemption Incorrect FV survey PCA 2000–01 PCA 2000–02 Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect Incorrect PCA Independent report IOM MP FV Review FV Review FV Review Direct complaint 2000–02 2000–present 2001–present 2002 2002 2003–present 2003 Birks Charlton Rogers Hendrikson Spadoni Wills Hatton OUR DEO VOLENTE JELLE SARA LENA SUZANNA D MATTANJA OUR HAZEL WILCO NATALIE B FV FV FV FV FV FV FV survey survey survey survey survey survey survey 1988 1990 1999 1988 1991 28 Instances of maladministration are considered exceptional There are however some cases, examined with the benefit of hindsight, where the Agency considers the surveyor did not act in the best or most appropriate manner In such cases lessons can be learnt and appropriate action taken Below are some examples of the various control measures which are in place: Line Management Review Peer Review Incident—follow up action Port State Control detention cases in foreign ports—follow up inspections Random or Targeted Maritime and Coastguard Agency inspections Line Management Review 29 (a) Surveys are allocated by the Line Management (normally assigned by surveyor in charge at the Marine OYce to individuals with the required qualification and experience) Following renewal surveys, the surveyor must complete a declaration of survey which is passed to the line manager for signature and issue of the certificate Any problems encountered by the surveyor would be discussed with the line manager If the line manager (surveyor in charge) receives a complaint they will investigate the situation and take appropriate action For any serious issues, these would be raised through their own line management Line management and other surveyors will on occasions accompany individual surveyors and although not formalised could give an indication of survey maladministration Peer Review (b) Following the National Audit OYce audit, a system of Peer Review has been introduced Initially this started as a trial conducted by the Quality Assurance Branch in MCA HQ This involved Peer Reviews of eight oYces and 28 individual surveyors It is designed to verify compliance with existing procedures and to identify Best Practice More recently the Peer Review system has been rolled out to the Regional Management to undertake The first of these has been completed and meetings are planned to review the results and decide appropriate follow up action There has been no incidence of maladministration identified, but areas of Best Practice which could be adopted in other areas Incident—follow up action (c) Incident Follow-up: For example, incident may include a casualty which has been investigated independently by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch Their remit is not to apportion blame but to identify why accidents may have happened and they make recommendations for improvements in safety Very often they identify areas where the Agency is given recommendations, but these usually involve introducing new regulations Occasionally there may be implications for the quality of surveys and again the Agency would investigate and take appropriate action For example a few years ago there was a higher than normal incidence of fishing vessels sinking reported as due to defective pipe work in engine rooms This resulted in more detailed advice being given to surveyors in Instructions for Surveyors 9666631011 Ev 36 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Port State Control detention cases in foreign ports—follow up inspections (d) Port State Control—Detentions: UK ships are inspected in foreign ports As a result, serious deficiencies can be identified The ships are prevented from leaving port until the defect is put right The Agency have a policy to follow these up by carrying out their own inspection of the vessel within six weeks As well as covering the area of immediate concern the inspection with cover other areas of the ship Detentions are also discussed with the Classification Society involved as part of the regular review of the survey work delegated to Recognised Organisations Random or Targeted Maritime and Coastguard Agency inspections (e) Random or Targeted Inspections: The Agency carry out inspections of UK ships when in UK ports between surveyors If a specific problem is identified then a targeted inspection campaign is undertaken For example a few years ago a fishing vessel was lost and serious short comings were found, not due to the survey quality, but by the maintenance carried out subsequent to survey An inspection campaign was undertaken for vessels operated by the same or similar owners and this resulted in a number of similar problems with other vessels being detained There was no maladministration on MCA part, but mis-management on the owners part Consultants 30 In this respect we understand this to mean “certifying authorities” (CA) who have been given authorisation to carry out surveys on behalf of MCA This is mostly through Recognised Organisations (Class Societies), but for smaller domestic work and fishing vessels some work is delegated to other respected organisations This work is controlled through the MCA Quality Assurance Branch Authorisation involves the following procedures: (a) Application received by CA to undertake work Decision made if this is appropriate CA must satisfy criteria for management within the CA, qualification of surveyors and monitoring of their work including a documented Quality Assurance/Control System (b) Written Agreement between MCA and CA (c) Initial Audit to verify the competence of the organisation and surveyors to undertake the work (d) Regular and continuous monitoring Eg Follow-up after incidents and port state control detentions (e) Formalised regular British Committee meetings to review individual Classification Society performance to ensure agreed standards are being maintained Programme of on-board ship audits to verify Classification Society surveyors meet the agreed standards using Formal safety Assessment (FSA) to identify high risk ships (f) Regular meetings with all authorised Classification Societies to discuss issues of common interest and concern 31 There are various sanctions available to the Agency For example, ranging from a request to the CA to deal with the matter in their own QA system, to withdrawal of MCA authorisation Measurement of Effectiveness of Our Work on Prevention 32 During the 2003–04 business year we had a target to direct at least 5% of available Coastguard time being spent on prevention activity This was intended to increase our prevention activity in an area where we felt there was scope for improvement to capitalise on the Government’s investment in modern communications technology Our 2004–05 target on prevention is to put a system in place, which will allow us to measure the impact of our prevention activity This will enable us to have a more meaningful, outcome based target in the future, instead of relying upon input based targets like time spent on prevention Explanation of the Way in which the Agency Monitors and Comments on Emerging European Laws, and in Particular Whether the Agency has a Presence in Brussels or Works Through the UK Representation There 33 (a) Monitoring The Agency’s International Liaison Branch (ILB) co-ordinates MCA’s contributions to UK maritime policy, as pursued in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), similar UN bodies and the EU It has a full-time co-ordinator and representative for EU business The ILB works closely with the Department’s policy divisions on EU business, taking the UK seat on some categories of business, or supporting the Department’s lead (mainly on European Council business) with 9666631011 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 37 technical advice New business is allocated by the department, often deploying joint teams, while the ILB co-ordinator continuously trawls oYcial EU websites for background information, signs of new proposals and progress with existing dossiers The Agency makes full use of a wide range of personal contacts in the maritime industries, other Member States and the EU institutions in support of this joint eVort Progress with EU business is regularly reviewed with the Department at MPG meetings (b) Commenting The MCA plays an important part in contributing UK experience to the development of EU maritime legislation and are in a position to comment as necessary at any stage of the process We consult and liaise with UK stakeholders Our experts play an active part in the processes of briefing, negotiating and lobbying to achieve an outcome which is satisfactory to the UK This includes extensive discussion with Commission oYcials and in Council working groups, as well as with members of the maritime administrations in other Member States (c) Presence in Brussels Our EU co-ordinator and other Agency staV with expert knowledge frequently attend meetings in Brussels to promote the UK line (eg comitology committees and working parties) However, like our parent Department, we rely on the UK Permanent Representation for a full-time presence there We attempt to strike a balance between the necessity for face-to-face meetings of Member States in Brussels and the exploitation of modern information and communication technologies to meet our obligations (d) The UK Permanent Representation (UKRep) The Agency maintains close links with the transport section of UKRep, providing specialist advice and, when required, a supporting presence at meetings in Brussels UKRep in its turn supplies intelligence and updates to the Agency so that we can keep on top of developments in the EU Reasons Budget Allocation was only Finalised in February 2003, and Explanation of Reclassification of Some Expenditure 34 It has been standard practice to start the financial year (FY) with a set of budget allocations, agreed with DfT, for administration, programme and capital expenditure, which support the Agency’s internal budget During the FY the Agency may identify pressures, or other adjustments, not known at the start of the year, and can negotiate with DfT to adjust its annual allocations Any such adjustments are confirmed by DfT to HMT through the Winter or Spring Supplementary exercises, completed in October/November and January/February of the FY These exercises update the HMT/DfT Financial Information System (FIS) database, which is the ultimate source of the MCA’s budget allocations 35 At the start of FY 2002–03, MCA’s agreed budget allocation for administration expenditure was some £46 million During the FY a number of pressures and other adjustments were accepted by DfT as valid revisions to the Agency’s original budget allocation, and these were to be reflected in the Spring Supplementary exercise in early 2003 36 In the meantime, in October 2002, HMT asked DfT/MCA to submit a paper supporting reclassification of the cost of delivering MCA’s frontline services from administration to programme expenditure This was discussed at a meeting with HMT on December, when it was explained that the new reclassifications would come into place from April 2003 (ie for FY 2003–04) HMT confirmed the amount involved in a letter to DfT dated 20 December 2002, which was emailed to MCA in early January 2003 HMT, at that point, also asked that the reclassification exercise should be done retrospectively, covering all the FYs from 1998–99 (when MCA was formed) to 2002–03, and that these changes should be reflected in the HMT/DfT FIS database as part of the Spring Supplementary exercise The upshot of this was that MCA’s administration allocation for FY 2002–03 was not finalised until February 2003, hence the comment at the TSC meeting 37 One side eVect of these very late changes to the FIS database, was that a number of the pressures and other adjustments already accepted by DfT were not input to the FIS database The items not input totalled £759k of administration expenditure, and it was this shortfall in MCA’s budget allocation, which only came to light in February 2003, that led to the breach of the administration limit of £458k in FY 2002–03 38 The specific reasons for the breach were given to our external auditors for review as part of their final audit, and they accepted that the reasons for the breach lay outside the control of the Agency Similarly, the independent chair of our Audit Committee also reviewed the circumstances of the breach, including telephone conversations with the (then) acting DfT Finance Director, and concluded that “the breach of the cost control limit should not be regarded as a failure on internal control [by MCA]” Details of Communications Failures at Coastguard Stations Within the Last Year List of telecoms failures in the last year and relations to the Integrated Coastguard Communications System (ICCS) 39 The following table lists all fault reports from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency related to ICCS faults that had a major impact on the service levels of the UK maritime distress and safety communications agreements It is ICCS specific and does not cover third party faults such as higher order BT failures, which may also impact on Agency maritime distress and safety communications 9666631011 Ev 38 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence 40 Included in the table are comments on the eVects to the Agency service for each fault 41 It should be noted that the NTL date and times are those of the actual duration of the fault Agency staV initiates each fault by opening an incident and will leave the fault open for a period following rectification to ensure that the symptoms not return Top level breakdown of faults: Total of 10 ICCS major faults over 12 month period x major lightning strike, main damage to BT interfaces Temporary loss of distress & safety service x local telephone exchange failure (PABX) All 999 and external Direct lines were still operational No loss of distress & safety service x fault caused by system generated noise on Channel 16 No loss of distress & safety service x 999 line fails All calls were transferred to adjacent station No loss of distress & safety service x system failure All services were transferred to adjacent station No loss of distress & safety service x radio system failures All sites defaulted to Channel 16 No loss of distress & safety service Top level conclusion 42 During the previous 12 month period there was only one major loss of distress and safety coverage due to direct lightning strike Services were completely restored within three days The Emergency Plan was invoked and distress and safety coverage was restored by local manning of radio sites and diversion of 999 calls within hours of outage This was also the only fault which exceeded our service level agreement with the maintenance contractor, but this was attributed to the extent of damage to all Agency systems at the site not just the ICCS Item No Fault Grade Location Initial Comment NTL Engineer diagnosis A Falmouth Lightning strike at Falmouth MRCC All communications through ICCS lost Confirmed lightning strike damage Replaced damaged modules Escalated for SIS support A London Reset SNP and standby server A Thames ICCS—unable to change radio channels—Error message on monitor (a serious error has occurred while writing to drive C) system locked and unable to change over servers ICCS server-B LAN failure Unable to change channels on any aerial site in the district A Holyhead ICCS unable to change radio channel and MSI services unavailable Confirmed failure of server A Server replaced and system restarted and tested ok Server B reset and system tested ok MCA Comment ntl date and time Opened ntl Engineer Cleared ntl duration Direct lightning 01/03/2003 strike on the MRCC 05:03 District invoked their emergency plan to man hilltop sites and handed control to their Flank station at Brixham Spares were brought to site and services systematically rebuilt during the period of the fault; returning critical services first NTL closed the fault following the completion of fault rectification of ALL the MRCC services Server lock-up 10/03/2003 Radios automatically 13:48 default to Channel 16 to ensure that distress and safety communications are maintained 03/03/2003 20:24 63:20 10/03/2003 16:00 2:11 Radios automatically 16/03/2003 default to Channel 16 02:24 to ensure that distress and safety communications are maintained Radios automatically 14/04/2003 default to Ch16 to 20:53 maintain distress coverage MSI broadcast would be broadcast manually without eVect to service 16/03/2003 05:30 3:05 15/04/2003 09:00 12:06 9666631012 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Item No Fault Grade Location A London A A A A 10 A Initial Comment ICCS fault No telephones in or out of the building BT have checked lines and not a BT fault Port of London phones also out of service NTL Engineer diagnosis Found index switching locked up Index engineer reset their equipment and all tested ok MCA Comment ntl date and time Opened Telephone system 30/06/2003 failure London has 21:23 ability to call flank station via radio and mobile phones Radio circuits unaVected; Thames Coastguard is able to control London’s radios via flanking and 999 call would automatically be diverted to Thames by the 999 call handling centres Humber Both “999” and one Investigating loss of 999 calls are 13/08/2003 ex directory telephone both 999 lines Full automatically diverted 16:50 line lost system reset of ICCS to the flank station by the 999 call handling centres Brixham ICCS spurious Ch16 A number of Ch16 Fault on one radio 24/09/2003 transmissions from base stations had Action taken to reset 15:00 several RRS—unable locked up on radio No loss of to determine which permanent TX service sites Believed to be following an MSI broadcast All Ch16 base stations and facilities server re-set Fault cleared Swansea When taking 999 Checked 999 system No 999 calls lost due 08/02/2004 telephone calls the audio very poor to this fault No loss 18:58 line is very distorted Tested lines using of service on all desks fallback mode lines working ok DTIC card reset and operation restored London— Thames Barrier Found both SNPs All services passed 10/02/2004 Woolwich Navigational to have “failed lights” to Thames MRSC 09:14 Centre—loss of displaying Reset No loss of service sound all VHF both SNPs Reset and phones facility server as startup services were not running Checked audio on system all ok Aberdeen ICCS screens Reported intermittent Intermittent fault No 12/02/2004 continually faulting alarms checked 2MB distress or safety 14:57 —hampering use to Forth Flanking services lost faulty—alarms gradually cleared ntl Engineer Cleared Ev 39 ntl duration 01/07/2003 04:30 7:07 13/08/2003 16:51 0:00 24/09/2003 15:15 0:14 08/02/2004 21:20 2:21 10/02/2004 14:45 5:30 12/02/2004 16:30 1:32 Sasser b Computer Virus Attack—4 May 2004 43 The Agency’s network was infected on May 2004 by the Sasser b virus The infection was highlighted in the media: — the infection did not aVect primary search and rescue communications facilities; — prompt action was taken to minimise the impact of the virus; and — all networks were fully restored by the end of the day 44 The BBC and other media picked up on the virus infection We issued a Press Notice explaining that Coastguard services were largely unaVected and contingency arrangements designed for this kind of event had come into play Background 45 The infection aVected access to the Coastguard’s Incident Management System (IMS), but not the system data The infection did not aVect primary search and rescue communications facilities including the Integrated Coastguard Communications System (ICCS), the radio-based GMDSS Digital Selective Calling (DSC) system and NAVTEX transmission service (used for issuing navigational and weather information to shipping), nor the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) operated from Dover Maritime Rescue Co-Ordination Centre 9666631013 Ev 40 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence 46 Protective measures were taken to minimise impact by logging all machines out of the network An identified fix was implemented and rolled out to all our locations via the network and users were reconnected in a controlled manner 47 Coastguard oYces fell back on established contingency arrangements in the interim Early investigation indicates that the infection was introduced through a breach of our IT Security Policy That investigation is continuing Stephen Bligh Chief Executive 18 May 2004 Further note by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA 08B) INFORMATION ON STAFF RECLASSIFICATION Thank you for the letter of 10 June, requesting further information on the reclassification of Agency staV During 2003–04 a total of five non-operational Coastguard Trainers were re-classified as mainstream managerial/administrative staV During the same period, a total of 12 new surveyor posts were created and filled, although this is not immediately apparent from staV in post figures due to normal frictional leaving and joining movements The increase in managerial/administrative staV in 2003–04 was due to a number of factors Five staV were re-classified (as outlined in paragraph above) an additional eight staV were recruited specifically for security work and a further four posts were created to take forward our Inland Waterways safety work The remainder can be attributed to on-going recruitment activity The 12 additional surveyor posts relate directly to the Inland Waterways and Security initiatives referred to above Stephen Bligh Chief Executive 15 June 2004 Further note by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA 08C) CLARIFICATION ON REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL STAFF Thank you for the letter of 21 June requesting further clarification on the matter of requests for additional staV There have been no recorded requests through District Operations Managers for additions to the complement of Rescue Centres during the last 12 months Records of such requests would have been kept— in the case of written requests copies of these would have been retained, and in the case of verbal requests these would have been recorded at management meetings Stephen Bligh Chief Executive 25 June 2004 Supplementary memorandum by the PCS (MCA 03A) MINUTES OF EVIDENCE—MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY MCA 08 Questions 30 and 31—Breakdown of deaths around the UK Coastline: The comments that not all the deaths we deal with are related to maritime incidents could be seen as disingenuous The remit of the MCA with regard to Search and Rescue Response is that the MCA must have an eVective 24 hours search and rescue capability for the whole of the UK coast and our internationally agreed search and rescue region This includes the “mobilisation, organisation and tasking of resources to respond to people in distress at sea, or at risk of injury or death on the UK’s cliVs or shoreline” 9666631015 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 41 Of the 103 who were recovered dead, it states that the cause was not known Does that mean the reasons for the death or the cause of death were not known? Surely all causes of deaths have to be certified by a Doctor? Another point worth mentioning is that as the recovery of these bodies were coordinated by the Coastguard using their own assets, or the assets of other rescue agencies, then they must have been marine related, ie on the coastline or out to sea and therefore are the responsibility of the MCA And after further investigation PCS has established that MCA had 16 deaths for 2003 and the agency have only asked for the following— — Suicides, recovered bodies — Deceased at the scene PCS have checked through the actual incidents and the breakdown is as follows— — The five suicides as reported are incorrect, one was a drunk who fell from a bridge — The 11 other deaths were reported as either recovered bodies/deceased at the scene which they were, however, further investigations show that four of the 11 reported were stated as being alive when reported to CG, one angler swept oV the pier, one young lad slipped and fell into river, one child swept into the sea and one swimmer in diYculties — Of the stats reported one was man overboard from fishing vessel, two deaths were from the fishing vessel Northern Star who died after being hit by a larger vessel and the last a woman who fell from a cliV So in actual fact eight of the 12 were maritime incidents and only four unexplained If you discount the suicides then there were 12 deaths of which eight can be explained (as above and maritime incidents) which leave four that we don’t know what the cause was Question 62 In his reply, the Chief Exec states that “The Agency does not hold records of how much outside our exacting standard time of 30 minutes these occurrences were” This statement is incorrect, every Coastguard Operations room has a computerised command and control system, in some stations it is the old ADAS system and in others it is the new ICCS/Vision equipment Whatever system is used, they all have a logging system that indicates when the first call came into the operations room, when a rescue asset was alerted, despatched, on scene, when these assets were returned or released and the time when the incident was closed Therefore the information is available, only the willingness to publish this information is not apparent Another point that is made in this answer is how they know if safety was not aVected or if on scene target times met if they “do not hold records of how much outside our exacting standard time of 30 minutes these occurrences were” Questions 60 and 64 One promise made by the MCA was that the numbers of operational Coastguards in Scotland would not reduce after the closure of Pentland and Oban This promise has not been kept It might be worthwhile for the Select Committee to ask for details of these regular exercises, what were the outcome and conclusions and which Coastguard operations centres where involved It is also worth pointing out that it states in this reply that SAR levels of activity are frequently and regularly risk appraised To be able to undertake a risk appraisal or risk assessment, a person first of all needs to have adequate training to be aware of all the risks inherent in Coastguard Operations To date, noone in any Coastguard Operations Room has received any training in Risk Appraisal, and it is only recently after being badgered by the PCS for quite some time (1998) that the MCA has agreed to give risk assessment training to District Operations Managers (DOMs) Watch Mangers (WMs) and deputising Watch OYcers (WOs) As for the throw away comment that there has been absolutely no evidence of safety being jeopardised, in the recently published MAIB report into the fatalities in Loch Ryan, it cites the lack of adequate staYng and the routine use of unqualified staV as one of the main factors as why the search and rescue response was less than satisfactory This is why the MCA undertook a series of peer reviews into competencies of those on duty and why all operational staV are required to undertake every five years a review into the SAR skills with all being required to sit an examination to revalidate the SAR qualifications 9666631015 Ev 42 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Question 50 These figures highlight our serious concerns over the abuse and misuse of minimum and below minimum levels of staYng By closer inspection the Select committee will find that staYng to the minimum or below minimum levels is becoming the accepted normal and is regularly averaging out at 25% of all watches, even in the high season where Coastguard Operations Rooms workloads are already at extremely high levels of activity However, what these figures not show, are the number of watches where the competency levels were inadequate which meant that not all calls for assistance could be dealt with eVectively as the staV on duty were not adequately trained or qualified Once again the MAIB report into Loch Ryan shows just what the lack of adequately trained and qualified staV could mean in a real life distress situation Question 160 Whilst the MCA statement is factually correct, the normal route for requesting additional staV is through District Management and not through HR or Regional Management Prior to each watch, the WM will undertake a “formal risk appraisal” This looks at the level of marine related activity both at sea or on the coastline, weather, tides etc They will then look at the adequacy of the existing staYng level, the competencies of those on watch and other factors that may be relevant This risk appraisal is then entered onto a specially devised form and will then remain on file so it can be updated as and when necessary It was on such an occasion, when watch managers at Great Yarmouth Coastguard determined through their risk appraisal methodology, that additional staYng was necessary to cover the enhanced risk expected during their watches They then approached their District Operations Manager (DOM) for additional staYng; the DOM then refused them the authority to employ the additional staV This meant that the watches during this time at Great Yarmouth fell below what the Watch Managers considered necessary Question 250 Whilst the MCA say there are 18 vacancies that the MCA has been authorised to fill, from comments from our members at the sharp end of the business show that there are more fully trained Watch OYcers (WO) needed to cope with the ever increasing workload It is also worth pointing out that a recent secret stress survey, undertaken by Consultants employed by the MCA into Coastguard Operations Rooms, show that morale is exceptionally low, some of the reasons cited in this survey is the lack of communication within the organisation, the increasing amount of work that they are expected to do, the recognition that they are being treated as second class citizens compared to other similar grades within the organisation and the continual threat of reorganisation from the Chief Executive I will comment later on the competencies required Question 207 Although the MCA has explained their reasons for the reduction in the number of Coastguards employed, there is no similar explanation for the reduction in the number of Surveyors even though their workload has increased due to European Marine Legislation It might be worthwhile for the Select Committee to ask for a fuller breakdown in these figures I not feel qualified to make any comments on the RIPA, so I will refrain and suggest someone else more experienced in these matters responds MCA 08A Whilst the MAIB can investigate marine related accidents, their remit does not include accidents to persons on the coastline of the UK According to the latest statistics released by the MCA the vast majority of incidents are related to persons reported to be in trouble on the coast ie cut oV by the tide, inflatable toy drifting out to sea with a person on it, cliV accidents etc Competency Framework The current competency based recruiting system used by the MCA is flawed Recent examples show of a current Senior Regional OYcer who is supposed to be the main source of guidance for junior staV in Marine Search and Rescue was appointed without having any of the competencies that would be required for him to undertake this very demanding role Furthermore, an external candidate has just been appointed to another high profile Coastguard post as a District Operations Manger This person also does not have either the technical or non technical competencies required for the post, so why was he appointed 9666631015 Page Type [O] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 43 There are further examples of direct entry candidates appointed as Sector Managers (SM) without having any SAR qualifications This is indicative of a separation of the Operational Coastguard role and that of the Sector Manager, in the past it was considered essential that before becoming a Sector Manger, a person had to spend some time as a member of an operations room to gain experience Any direct entry SM would not be able to cope in the high pressure environment of an operations room Any Post holder that is employed by the MCA to undertake SAR duties must have from day one, a comprehensive knowledge and experience of SAR These post-holders are required to provide detailed and comprehensive advice to junior oYcers such as Watch Managers during major incidents To put things in perspective, it takes on average five years for a Coastguard OYcer to obtain the necessary training and experience before they can apply for promotion to a Watch Manager Once they get promoted above the WM grade, they become part of an area management team, giving advice to junior staV whenever required and by having come up through the operations room; they retain the confidence of their junior staV However, when you get a direct entry without this experience, and have never worked in a Coastguard Operations Room and is unable to use the equipment, who is going to have confidence in their abilities to handle the pressure I would suggest that they would be a liability and wouldn’t have the confidence of more experienced, but junior staV In any case the MCA states quite specifically in paragraph 15 the “All operational posts within the Marine Survey field and HMCG can only be staVed by people with relevant qualifications” I would suggest it is more important for a Coastguard operational post to have the qualifications before being appointed, it is degrading the importance of HMCG within the organisation, I would ask the question, would they have done the same if the vacancy was a surveying post? I think not It must be remembered that even the basic CWA (O) grade has to undertake a year long training programme and pass the qualifying exams at the end of this period before they are considered competent Yet the MCA can and does support direct entry candidates to what can only be described as senior search and rescue mission co-ordinators position with having undertaken any relevant training courses before that are appointed Paragraph 12 PDP’s on the job training requirements are not being met and the MCA is failing to ensure that training needs that have been highlighted are undertaken Currently all training requirements are on hold and the training budget has been reduced by a considerable amount (in the order of 2.5M I am told) Paragraph 17 How can line managers risk assess when they haven’t received any training in risk assessment Paragraph 18 It is noticeable that whilst recruiting Surveying grades they maintain the rigorous standards; on the Coastguard side they quietly reduce them Paragraph 19 To make any sense of these totals, we would need to see a breakdown in the numbers of the Uniformed Coastguard and Professional Marine personnel It is worth mentioning that Board Members have risen by nearly 50%, why? Paragraph 21 When the closures were announced of Pentland, Oban and Tyne Tees by the Minister, the MCA promised that there would be no reduction in the numbers of Coastguard staV in Scotland; we believe that is no longer the case The figures show a reduction of 12 WOs and WMs Figures for SMs are not shown but we believe that they would show a similar reduction as well Paragraph 23 This statement is incorrect, there is only one member of the area management team available at each Coastguard rescue centre and even then with a newly appointed direct entry DOM appointed to Milford Haven, he or she would not be able to be employed on watch keeping duties in an emergency as they would not have any experience of operating this equipment 9666631015 Ev 44 Page Type [E] 12-07-04 21:03:55 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG2 Transport Committee: Evidence Paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 Negotiations are still ongoing so it would be unfair to comment at the moment We have noticed that whilst going through the list of outages and other faults submitted by the MCA, it omits any details of a major failure at Humber early in 2004 when the entire system failed which meant there were unable to communicate with anyone either by telephone, radio etc If this has been omitted, how many other faults have not been recorded? Other Comments Whilst the MCA has promised that there would be no station closures, it is apparent that there are cut backs being applied elsewhere For example, Hartlepool Coastguard Sector Base has closed, without any consultations with the PCS and the workload has been split between adjacent Sector Managers Coastguards have to take on other duties as well as their own They are being given work from the marine oYces without any agreement or consultations with their union and they feel that they are being treated as second class citizens There is short notice disruption to Coastguard staV, because of the number of vacancies in the watch-bill, staV are being shuttled around the watch system and being expected at short notice (often less than 24 hours) to change shifts, either from days to nights, or nights to days This is causing uncertainty and lowering of morale, one consequence is that staV are refusing to work overtime, even in emergencies which have the eVect of increasing stress levels to worrying high levels Even though the MCA admits to 18 vacancies, we believe that the true figure is higher and only hidden by the continuous abuse of minimum staYng levels Take Great Yarmouth for example; despite the minimum staYng levels being agreed at four, it is not uncommon for the staYng level to fall to three on a regular basis At Milford Haven in West Wales some time this month (June) the watch will consist of a WM and CWA (O)s with no WO, this means that the competency levels during those time will be below the minimum required with only one person on watch qualified to act as Search & Rescue Mission Coordinator What happens when he has a meal break? We must take issue with the Chief Executive when he states that the balance of local knowledge lies with the Auxilary teams Even Lord Donaldson admitted that local knowledge in a Coastguard Operations room was an essential component for the smooth and eVective running of the districts There is another problem in today’s industrial climate is the fact that more and more employers are becoming more and more reluctant to release staV to enable them to carry out what they perceive to be voluntary work This means that at times the MCA is unable to get suYcient resources (manpower) on scene to deal with an incident The MCA’s definition of an on-scene presence is one that is where there is a Coastguard on scene but requires more resources before a rescue can be attempted This is solely to meet the criteria laid down by the NAO Dave Clempson PCS Group President Graham Belchamber National OYcer 15 June 2004 Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery OYce Limited 7/2004 966663 19585 ... The Maritime and Coastguard Agency Role of the MCA The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) and the Coastguard Agency merged on April 1998 to form the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) The Agency “is... The Transport-Related Executive Agencies of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, HC 1224 Appointed September 2003 The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency The Maritime. .. 6263; the Committee’s email address is transcom@parliament.uk The Work of the Maritime Coastguard Agency Contents Report Page Summary Introduction The Maritime and Coastguard Agency Role of the