Varoufakis and the weak suffer what they must; europes crisis and americas economic future (2016)

AND THE WEAK SUFFER W H AT THEY MUST? AND THE WEAK SUFFER W H AT THEY MUST? e u rop e’s c r i si s a n d a m e r ic a’s ec onom ic f u t u r e YA N I S VAROUFAKI S New York Copyright © 2016 by Yanis Varoufakis Published by Nation Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group 116 East 16th Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10003 Nation Books is a co-publishing venture of the Nation Institute and the Perseus Books Group All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews For information, address the Perseus Books Group, 250 West 57th Street, 15th Floor, New York, NY 10107 Books published by Nation Books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books Group, 2300 Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext 5000, or e-mail special.markets@perseusbooks.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Varoufakis, Yanis, author Title: And the weak suffer what they must? : Europe’s crisis and America’s economic future / Yanis Varoufakis Description: New York : Nation Books, 2016 | Includes bibliographical references and index ,GHQWLÁHUV/&&1SULQW _/&&1HERRN _,6%1 KDUGEDFN _,6%1H,6%1 _,6%1 HERRN 6XEMHFWV/&6+(XURSH(FRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVVWFHQWXU\_(XURSH(FRQRPLF integration | Financial crises Europe | Europe Politics and JRYHUQPHQWVWFHQWXU\_%,6$&%86,1(66 (&2120,&6*RYHUQPHQW %XVLQHVV_+,6725ZLOO EH WKURZQ@ RQ WKH FRXQWU\ ZKLFK LV LQ WKH debtor position on the international balance of payments; that is on the country which is (in this context) by hypothesis the weaker and above all the smaller in comparison with the other side of the scales which (for this purpose) is the rest of the world.” Keynes (1980), p 27; italics in the original 24 The Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation 25 When President Roosevelt suggested that the only thing Americans KDG†WRIHDULVIHDULWVHOI‡KHZDVDOOXGLQJWRWKHVHOIIXOÁOOLQJWHUURUWKDWSUHvents private surplus funds from being invested when most needed, and to the need for political intervention that overcomes this fear through directing investments to states and regions where the greatest debts, unemployment DQGGHÁFLWVDUHFRQFHQWUDWHG5RRVHYHOW‰VYLVLRQZDVWREHODWHUUHLQIRUFHGDIter Pearl Harbor, by his administration’s eye-opening experience of running the war economy, gathering decisive evidence, if any was needed, that there is nothing natural about high unemployment and that depression is a failure of policy, not an act of God that we ought to submit to 26 It is worthwhile comparing Nevada’s fate with that of Ireland, a member-state of that “other” currency union, the eurozone Just like Nevada, in 2008 Ireland faced a massive collapse of its real estate and banking sectors But unlike Nevada, Ireland had to fend for itself when it came to propping XSLWVEDQNVDQGSD\LQJLWVXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQHÁWV/DFNLQJDSULQWLQJSUHVV it had to go cap in hand to the money markets to borrow huge quantities of money that, in Nevada’s case, had been paid for at the federal level Naturally, the money markets, caught up in their credit crunch mentality, would 270 NOTES TO CHAPTER not cough up the money at anything below usurious interest rates Thus, Ireland ended up accepting a massive loan from European governments, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which rendered the Irish state insolvent and pushed its society into long-term negative equity Nevada, in the meantime, exited the crisis quickly and with very little debt in comparison 27 Similarly with America’s military budget that, from the early phase of the Second World War, was mobilized not only in order to win the war against Japan and Germany but also the war against the scourge of unemployment and the bane of poverty that persisted in the wake of the Great Depression To this day, when Boeing or Lockheed are awarded defense contracts, these come with conditions forcing contractors to build production IDFLOLWLHVLQGHÁFLWVWDWHVOLNH7HQQHVVHHRU0LVVRXUL6XFKVXUSOXVUHF\FOLQJ XVKHUHGLQIRUWKHÁUVWWLPHE\WKH1HZ'HDOHUVLQWKH1930s and 1940s, allowed the “dollar zone,” also known as the United States of America, a degree RISURWHFWLRQIURPUHFHVVLRQVWKDWEHJDQLQWKHGHÁFLWUHJLRQVDQGVSUHDGRXW OLNHPHQDFLQJEXVKÁUHVLQWRWKHVXUSOXVVWDWHV 28 Besides the IMF, which is still with us (performing, post-1971, a very different role to that envisaged for it at Bretton Woods), a second institution was designed at the 1944 conference It was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), today known simply as the World Bank Whereas the IMF was proposed by Keynes as the world’s central bank, to issue and manage the world currency, the IBRD’s purpose was to mobilize idle savings and turn them into productive investments in relatively XQGHUGHYHORSHGGHÁFLWQDWLRQV$QGMXVWDVWKH,0)HQGHGXSIXQFWLRQLQJ very differently, so did the World Bank Nevertheless, of these two Bretton Woods institutions, it is the World Bank that remains more faithful to Keynes’s initial intentions for it 29 In this context, the IMF had an additional role: it would provide shortterm loans to nations that needed to defend their exchange rates due to some XQH[SHFWHGWUDGHGHÁFLWRUZKLOHWKH,0)ZDVLQWKHSURFHVVRIDSSURYLQJD devaluation 30 If we add to this the speculator’s cost of borrowing from the French banks, which they would now have to fork out themselves, it is easy to see why the Bundesbank’s intervention was a scary prospect for the speculators 31 German surpluses are only recycled to the rest of Europe by means of what I earlier referred to as fair-weather recycling; that is, the kind of recycling effected by Frankfurt’s commercial banks This type of recycling, as NOTES TO CHAPTER 271 H[SODLQHGDERYHLQÀDWHGEXEEOHVGXULQJWKHJRRGWLPHVDQGGLGQRWKLQJWR aid recovery once the bubbles burst In contrast, American surpluses, during the Bretton Woods era, were directed by means of a political recycling mechDQLVPWKDWVPRRWKHGRXWFUHGLWVKRUWDJHVLQWKHGHÁFLWFRXQWULHVDWWLPHVRI crisis and prevented the buildup of bubbles during periods of growth 32 A development partly due to the increased productivity and improved technology of German and Japanese industries; improvements unlikely to have materialized without the consistent support of American policy makers 33&RPSXWHGDWWKH%UHWWRQ:RRGVÁ[HGUDWHRI35 per ounce 343ULRUWRWKH1L[RQ6KRFNWKHUHZHUHWZRPDUNHWVIRUJROGWKHRIÁFLDO market, in which large banks and governments traded their stock of gold at $35SHURXQFHDQGWKHXQRIÁFLDORUVKDGRZPDUNHWIRUH[DPSOHWKHLQIRUPDOWUDQVDFWLRQVEHWZHHQMHZHOHUVDQGSULYDWHLQGLYLGXDOVZKRWUDGHGJROG DWDVPDOOHUVFDOHEXWDWSULFHVFRQVLGHUDEO\KLJKHUWKDQWKHRIÁFLDO35 per ounce By the late 1960VWKHXQRIÁFLDOSULFHKDGULVHQWR55 per ounce, revealing the Bretton Woods’ system high stress levels However, for the specXODWRUVWRPDNHELJSURÁWVIURPWKHLUEHWVWKDWJROGZRXOGULVHIXUWKHU LW was essential that the big players (e.g., the banks and governments) were also XQOHDVKHGIURPWKHRIÁFLDO35 per ounce price 35 Exactly as the French authorities relied on the Bundesbank to keep the deutsche mark price of the French franc stable 36 In 1968 a desperate situation called for a desperate measure Central banks agreed to stick to the $35 per ounce gold price when trading the gleaming metal among themselves but allowed the commercial price of gold to rise at will, even when it came to large scale trades between banks This twin SULFH…RQHRIÁFLDORQHXQRIÁFLDO…ZDVDPDMRUGHIHDWIRUJOREDOFDSLWDOLVP The West could no longer berate the Soviets for lying about the true value RI WKH UXEOH TXRWLQJ DQ RIÁFLDO H[FKDQJH UDWH WKDW ERUH QR UHODWLRQ WR WKH ruble’s black market value Now, the dollar also had two values, in terms of JROGRQHRIÁFLDORQHXQRIÁFLDO)XUWKHUPRUHWKLV†VROXWLRQ‡GLGQRWVROYH DQ\WKLQJPXFKUHDOO\7KHJUHDWHUWKHGLYHUJHQFHRIWKHXQRIÁFLDOSULFHRI JROGIURPLWVRIÁFLDO35YDOXHWKHJUHDWHUWKHFRQÁGHQFHRIVSHFXODWRUVWKDW they would, in the end, force Washington to devalue the dollar relative to gold and to other currencies 37 The “special relationship” that Britain was proclaiming with the United States, as a replacement of its imperial reach, was interpreted by de Gaulle as evidence that, if Britain were to be admitted to the European 8QLRQLWZRXOGDFWDV:DVKLQJWRQ‰V7URMDQKRUVH 272 NOTES TO CHAPTER 38 In 1965 President de Gaulle ordered the removal of 25,900 bars of gold, weighing more than 350 tons, from the basement under the New York Federal Reserve and their transportation to Paris It was a logistical nightmare whose symbolism was made more poignant because it involved the French navy’s unfriendly return to the shores of the United States (See the New York Times, March 2, 1965, p 45) The trigger, however, for the Nixon Shock was the British government’s demand that $3 billion held by the Bank RI(QJODQGEHVZDSSHGIRU$PHULFDQKHOGJROGDWWKHRIÁFLDO35 per ounce ZKLFKZDVWUDLOLQJWKHXQRIÁFLDOSULFHE\DWOHDVW18) That announcement was made on Wednesday, August 11, 1971 It was the straw that John Connally and Paul Volcker ensured would break Bretton Woods’ back And this is what they convinced President Nixon to on the following weekend, in their Camp David meetings 39 See Stephey (2008) 40 After the Nixon Shock, the French government changed its tune inVWDQWO\ )URP RSHQ KRVWLOLW\ WR WKH LGHD RI D GROODUEDFNHG JOREDO ÁQDQFLDO system (see chapter 3), President Pompidou began demanding that the United States reconstitute Bretton Woods, even if that meant a lower dollar value (in relation to gold and other currencies) When Washington rebuffed the French president’s “demands,” Pompidou began to plead President Nixon indulged him in December 1971 with an agreement at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, in the context of a G10 meeting The idea was to give Bretton Woods another chance, with new, more “realistic” exchange rates Except that it was too late The genie was out of the bottle and it refused to JHWEDFNLQ:LWKLQHLJKWHHQPRQWKVPDMRUFXUUHQFLHVZHUHÀRDWLQJ†IUHHO\‡ and Europe was in deep trouble But more on this in the following chapter C H A P T E R 2: A N I N D E C E N T P R O P O S A L Kurt Schmücker was not atypical of the Christian Democrats that ruled West Germany uninterruptedly from 1949 until 1969 At the tender age of eighteen, in 1937KHMRLQHGWKH1D]LSDUW\DQGWKUHH\HDUVODWHUZHQWWRZDU serving in the Wehrmacht till the bitter end A year after the war had ended, KHMRLQHGWKH&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDWVDQGEHFDPHWKHSDUW\‰V\RXQJHVWPHPEHU of federal parliament in the 1949 elections In 1963, after Ludwig Erhard (an DFFRPSOLVKHGHFRQRPLVWZKRKDGEHHQPLQLVWHURIÁQDQFHVLQFH1949 and had overseen Germany’s most impressive economic reconstruction, 1949–1963) became Germany’s chancellor, Schmücker took over the Ministry of the Economy Having only completed a typography course, Schmücker nursed much NOTES TO CHAPTER 273 anxiety about his capacity to take over Erhard’s role As it turned out, both men (Erhard and Schmücker) were booted out of government in 1966, as a UHVXOWRI*HUPDQ\‰VÁUVWSRVWZDUUHFHVVLRQZKLFKZDVDUJXDEO\HQJLQHHUHG IRUSROLWLFDOSXUSRVHVE\WKHQDWLRQ‰VFHQWUDOEDQNWKHÁHUFH%XQGHVEDQN The EEC was renamed European Union in the Treaty of Maastricht, November, 1, 1993, at the same time that the rules governing the common currency, the euro, were agreed to In this book I shall be referring to the EEC as the European Union, for purposes of continuity Their conversation began with Schmücker addressing Giscard’s concerns that free trade within the European Union would create trade imbalances that would destabilize the exchange rate between the franc and the deutsche mark He suggested that EU (or EEC as it was then called) members should sign a formal contract and abide by agreed rules of contact regarding JRYHUQPHQWÁVFDODQGPRQHWDU\SROLFLHVVRWKDWWKHV\VWHPFRXOGEHVWDEOH Giscard had other thoughts (the dialogue below is quoted in Schoenborn, 2014): giscard: This is too little! We have not yet talked about it in the government, but de Gaulle has told me that dangerous developments as we are now experiencing cannot be avoided or overcome without a common currency of the EEC countries We need a single currency for the EEC! [n.b., emphasis added] schmücker: In order to achieve the same effect, the currencies can also be maintained nominally while the monetary policies of the individual Member States are put under strict discipline through contractual rules giscard: Why choose this system, which works only as long as everybody goes along? schmücker: ,DPMXVWORRNLQJIRUDVXFFHVVIXOPHWKRGZLWKRXWREOLJLQJ France to renounce her sovereignty A single EEC currency would be a supranational matter So far France has been speaking out against any kind of supranational arrangement giscard: de Gaulle has told me explicitly that he deems a single EEC currency necessary He takes the view that no other way remains If one VWDWHUHSHDWHGO\SXVKHVDQRWKHULQWRLQÀDWLRQWKHRQO\RQHVWREHQHÁW are the Socialists schmücker: :KDWGRZHGRLIWKHRWKHUIRXUZLOOQRWMRLQLQ"7KHFUHation of a monetary union is a decisive political step forward Once the monetary union is accomplished, further political consequences will automatically ensue Erhard’s attempts to advance the political union have not produced the desired response from all governments Hence 274 NOTES TO CHAPTER we can expect that the proposal will be skeptically received Or you imagine that France and Germany should forge ahead? giscard: An agreement between France and Germany should be considered only if the others not participate In this case the agreement must be drafted in such a way that others will have the option, both OHJDOO\DQGSUDFWLFDOO\WRMRLQLQDWDQ\WLPH See Gray (2007) 5†3ODQLÁFDWLRQ‡UHIHUVWRWKHSHQFKDQW)UHQFKDGPLQLVWUDWRUVKDYHKDG since the time of Napoleon for grand, large-scale planning Examples of †SODQLÁFDWLRQ‡ VSDQ XUEDQ GHYHORSPHQW HQHUJ\ SROLF\ HVSHFLDOO\ WKH SODQ that resulted in the extraordinary production of more than 95 percent of electricity by state-owned and -designed nuclear power stations), the creation of an advanced military-industrial complex, the superfast railways crisscrossing )UDQFHDQGVSLOOLQJLQWR%ULWDLQDQG%HOJLXPHYHQSURMHFWVOLNHWKHVXSHUVRQLF Concorde and the Airbus industries—the successful competitor to Boeing A full account of de Gaulle’s “designs” that Erhard frustrated, and thus became Germany’s chancellor follows See Schoenborn (2014) Giscard was a committed Keynesian who had little time for de Gaulle’s conservative views on how an economy should be managed In particular, he harbored considerable contempt for Jacques Rueff, an economist who believed strongly in the gold standard and whom de Gaulle considered his HFRQRPLFJXUX$VDUHVXOW*LVFDUG‰VWLPHDVÁQDQFHPLQLVWHULQGH*DXOOH‰V cabinet was a precarious tenure To give one such example, in 1962*HQHUDO0RWRUVÁUHG)UHQFKDXtoworkers without consulting with the French government A year later, in 1963, it purchased French automaker Simca and immediately proceeded to ÁUH D VHJPHQW RI LWV ZRUNIRUFH 0HDQZKLOH *HQHUDO (OHFWULF ZDV H\HLQJ D number of plants that Paris viewed as of strategic importance for France 10 The phrase “exorbitant privilege” is frequently, and mistakenly, attributed to de Gaulle Its rightful procreator was Giscard Here is how Jacques 5XHIIWKH)UHQFKHFRQRPLVWZKRVHHFRQRPLFWKHRULHV*LVFDUGUHMHFWHGEXW with whom he had to work, since de Gaulle considered Rueff to be his favorite economic intellect), explained what Giscard had meant by “exorbitant privilege”: >:@KHQDFRXQWU\ZLWKDNH\FXUUHQF\UXQVDEDODQFHRISD\PHQWGHÁFLW…WKDWLV to say, the United States, for example—it pays the creditor country dollars, which end up with the latter’s central bank But the dollars are of no use in Bonn or in NOTES TO CHAPTER 275 Tokyo or in Paris The very same day, they are re-loaned to the New York money market, so that they return to the place of origin Thus the debtor country does not lose what the creditor country has gained So the key-currency country never IHHOVWKHHIIHFWRIDGHÁFLWLQLWVEDODQFHRISD\PHQWV$QGWKHPDLQFRQVHTXHQFH LVWKDWWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQZKDWHYHUIRUWKHGHÁFLWWRGLVDSSHDUEHFDXVHLWGRHVQRW appear (Rueff, 1971, p 78) 11 See Ball (1982), p 271 12 Konrad Adenauer made his mark in German politics well before the Second World War, serving as Cologne’s mayor from 1917 to 1933 A devout Catholic and a committed opponent of Prussia’s dominance of Germany, he XVHGKLVRIÁFHWRDUJXHIRUDQHZ5KLQLVKVWDWHZLWKLQWKH:HLPDU5HSXEOLF liberated from Berlin’s iron rule When his efforts led nowhere, he initiated WDONVZLWK)UHQFKRIÁFLDOVZLWKDYLHZWRHVWDEOLVKLQJDQDXWRQRPRXV5KLQHland within the context of a grand Central European design that would bring forth German-French reconciliation While he was later acquiescent to the rising Nazi party, which he tried to accommodate within city hall, the Nazis considered Adenauer an “unsafe” patriot (for having come so close to the French in the 1920s) At war’s end, a bombed out Cologne found itself in the British zone and Adenauer was asked to serve again as the city’s mayor He agreed but then, in December 1945, suffered the humiliation of being dismissed by a British army general for “incompetence,” when, in reality, his dismissal was due to his public statements condemning his city’s unrestrained wartime bombing by the RAF Adenauer never forgave the British for this humiliation 13 John Wills Tuthill, at the time US ambassador to the European Economic Community 14 In 1953 the United States famously convened a conference in London WKDWZDVWR†FDMROH‡*HUPDQ\‰VFUHGLWRUVWRDFFHSWDKXJHUHGXFWLRQRIWKH defeated country’s debt to them 15 See Schoenborn (2014) 16 See NSC Meeting Memo, February 5, 1963, 4.30 p.m., FRUS, 1961– 1963, vol 13, 175–79; Memorandum of Conversation, Carstens and Rusk, February 5, 1963, p.m., ibid., 186; NSC Meeting, January 31, 1963, ibid., 162, Kennedy Library 17 The preamble emphasized “the supreme importance of transatlantic FRRSHUDWLRQ‡ DQG ZDV ÁUVW WKRXJKW RI DV D †VROXWLRQ‡ RI WKH (O\VœH 7UHDW\ †SUREOHP‡E\$PHULFDQRIÁFLDOVZKRORVWQRWLPHLQOHWWLQJ(UKDUG‰VRIÁFH know that it should be considered The preamble, in essence, annulled the treaty’s spirit of creating a Franco-German alliance independently of the 276 NOTES TO CHAPTER United States According to Erhard’s presentation of the preamble to Bonn parliamentarians, the preamble was essential in order “to liberate the Elysée Treaty from any wrong interpretation of German policy.” 18 See Schoenborn (2014) 19 From 1945 to 1958 206RÁHUFHZDVGH*DXOOH‰VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHLGHDRIDQ$PHULFDQGHsigned European economic community (that emerged formally in 1950 as the European Coal and Steel Community) that he went into the political wilderness until 1958, when the Fourth Republic’s collapse gave him an opportunity to refashion the French constitution, and France’s politics, in his image 21 American readers ought to take note that de Gaulle’s sharp criticism RIWKH86SRVWZDUJOREDOSODQZDVRQHWKDWVLJQLÁFDQW$PHULFDQSROLF\PDNers shared For example, George F Kennan (a diplomat whose Long Telegram from Moscow begat the logic of “containing” the USSR) and Robert Taft (the Senate Republican leader who opposed President’s Roosevelt’s New Deal) also deplored the prospect of a world divided into an American and a Soviet sphere, in opposition to each other Their difference from de Gaulle was that the French president had the means and the determination to make the American “bloc” unmanageable 22 See Connolly (1995), p 23 Their thinking was simple: if the French state forfeited the right to print money (either by reverting to the gold standard or by adopting the deutsche mark), prices would stop rising and the trade unions would lose all bargaining power over employers; with the government unable to boost overall demand, especially during a slump, the trade unions would have a choice between accepting high unemployment (which would destroy their power base) and accepting low wages In short, by forfeiting the printing presses the French state would ensure that organized labor became less militant, more “German.” And if this also meant a greater propensity to recession, it was considered a small price to pay Today, with France in permanent stagnation under the euro, France’s elites are simultaneously unapologetic regarding that choice of theirs, and concerned about the rising tide of discontent and anti-European, racist ultranationalism 24 “By war!” See Connolly (1995), p 25 Erhard’s rebellion against Adenauer should be placed in the context of many Germans’ fear of an American withdrawal Paul Volcker is quoted E\KLVRIÁFLDOELRJUDSKHUDVVD\LQJWKDWKH†UHFDOOHG-).‰VWKUHDWWRFXWRII military aid to Europe unless Europeans promised not to attack the dollar as the world’s currency.” See Silber (2012), p 55 NOTES TO CHAPTER 277 26 Recall the previous chapter 27 In a fascinating, and exceedingly rare, coincidence of opinions both the Wall Street Journal and PravdaWKH6RYLHW&RPPXQLVW3DUW\‰VRIÁFLDOQHZVpaper) hailed de Gaulle’s call for a return to the gold standard as “inspired.” The Wall Street Journal GLGVREHFDXVHLWQHYHUKDGOLNHGWKH1HZ'HDOHUV IROORZLQJWKHZD\WKH5RRVHYHOWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQGHDOWZLWK:DOO6WUHHWZKLOH the Soviets, as one of the planet’s primary gold producers, had every reason to see demand for gold rise 28 Quoted in Laughland (1997), p 231 29 -DFTXHV 5XHII ZDV DQ LQÀXHQWLDO HFRQRPLVW ZKRP GH *DXOOH KDG NQRZQIRU\HDUVEHIRUHWXUQLQJWRKLPLQ1958WRGLVLQÀDWHWKH)UHQFKHFRQRP\ DW WKH WLPH WKH JHQHUDO ZDV PDNLQJ KLV SROLWLFDO FRPHEDFN WKDW VDZ KLPIRXQGWKH)LIWK5HSXEOLFEHIRUHEHFRPLQJLWVÁUVWSUHVLGHQW 'H*DXOOH ZDV QXUVLQJ SDLQIXO PHPRULHV RI KRZ KH KDG ORVW SRZHU VKRUWO\ DIWHU WKH ZDUHQGHGEHFDXVHRIUXQDZD\LQÀDWLRQ6RZKHQ5XHIIVXFFHHGHGLQNLOOLQJ LQÀDWLRQRIILQ1958ZKLFKLQYROYHGHUDVLQJDQXPEHURI]HURVIURPWKHFXUUHQF\W\LQJWKHIUDQF‰VQHZYDOXHÁUPO\RQWRWKHGROODUDQGNHHSLQJVWDWH RXWOD\V XQGHU VWULFW FRQWURO  GH *DXOOH ZDV LPSUHVVHG 5XHII ZDV D †JROGbug,” a believer in tying the quantity of paper money to the quantity of gold LQ WKH VWDWH‰V SRVVHVVLRQ LQ D ELG WR SUHYHQW SROLWLFLDQV IURP PHVVLQJ ZLWK WKH FXUUHQF\‰V YDOXH 7KLV KHOSV H[SODLQ ZK\ GH 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they must t en ts preface The Red Blanket ix chapter And the Weak Suffer What They Must... Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Varoufakis, Yanis, author Title: And the weak suffer what they must? : Europe’s crisis and America’s economic future / Yanis Varoufakis Description: New York.. .AND THE WEAK SUFFER W H AT THEY MUST? AND THE WEAK SUFFER W H AT THEY MUST? e u rop e’s c r i si s a n d a m e r ic a’s ec onom