Castells et al (eds ) aftermath; the cultures of the economic crisis (2012)

AFTERMATH This page intentionally left blank AFTERMATH The Cultures of the Economic Crisis Edited by M A N U E L C A S T E L L S , J O A˜ O CARAC¸ A , AND GUSTAVO CARDOSO Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries # Oxford University Press 2012 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2012 Impression: All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978–0–19–965841–1 Printed in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives plc Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations List of Contributors The Cultures of the Economic Crisis: An Introduction Manuel Castells, Joa~o Carac¸a, and Gustavo Cardoso vii viii x PART ONE: PRELUDE The Rolling Apocalypse of Contemporary History Rosalind Williams 17 The Separation of Cultures and the Decline of Modernity Joa~o Carac¸a 44 PART TWO: WHICH CRISIS? WHOSE CRISIS? The Metamorphosis of a Crisis John B Thompson 59 Financial Crisis or Societal Mutation? Michel Wieviorka 82 PART THREE: DEALING WITH THE CRISIS Branding the Crisis Sarah Banet-Weiser 107 In Nationalism We Trust? Terhi Rantanen 132 Crisis, Identity, and the Welfare State Pekka Himanen 154 Contents PART FOUR: BEYOND THE CRISIS Surfing the Crisis: Cultures of Belonging and Networked Social Change 177 Gustavo Cardoso and Pedro Jacobetty Beyond the Crisis: The Emergence of Alternative Economic Practices Joana Conill, Manuel Castells, Amalia Cardenas, and Lisa Servon 210 PART FIVE: THE NON-GLOBAL GLOBAL CRISIS 10 No Crisis in China? The Rise of China’s Social Crisis You-tien Hsing 251 11 A Non-Global Crisis? Challenging the Crisis in Latin America Ernesto Ottone 278 Aftermath? 303 Index 309 vi Acknowledgments We wish to thank the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, who provided support to host the Aftermath Network meetings held between 2009 and 2011 in Lisbon, at which the contributors met, discussed the issues, and planned the book Without their contribution, this book would not have been possible Abbreviations AIG American International Group ALBA Alliance for the Peoples of Our America BBS Bulletin Board System BE bureaucratic entrepreneur BPN Banco Portugueˆs de Nego´cios BPP Banco Privado Portugueˆs BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China CCP Chinese Communist Party CDO collateralized debt obligation CDS credit default swap CEPAL Comisio´n Econo´mica para Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe CFDT Confe´deration Franc¸aise De´mocratique du Travail EB entrepreneurial bureaucrat ECB European Central Bank ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean EU European Union ICP Italian Communist Party IMF International Monetary Fund MERCOSUR Common Southern Market MNC multinational corporation NGO non-governmental organization NHS National Health Service OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PATO Plataforma Autonoma de Teatro del Oprimido PPIC Public Policy Institute of California PPP purchasing power parity SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission SIV structured investment vehicle Abbreviations SOE state-owned enterprise TVE township and village-owned collective enterprise UDIC urban development and investment company UNASUR Union of South American Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme WEF World Economic Forum ix Challenging the Crisis in Latin America not in a desperate and all-accepting manner, as if it were entering “ne la citta´ dolente” under the inscription “lasciate qui ogni speranza voi che entrate,”2 but as a region that has acquired a reforming capacity that, amongst other things, carried it intact through the previous global crisis and that has learned the hard way to appreciate the intrinsic value of democracy and the need to advance gradually This region has arrived at the conviction that the diversity of political and social actors is not an obstacle to “living together.” Latin America can, therefore, make a meaningful contribution to the creation of that new diversified cosmopolitanism that requires the globalized world to be—let it be said once more—not the best of all worlds but a better world References Castells, Manuel (2003) “Panorama de la era de la informacio´n en Ame´rica Latina ¿Es sostenible la globalizacio´n?,” in Fernando Caldero´n (ed.), ¿Es sostenible la globalizacio´n en Ame´rica Latina Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Econo´mica comScore (2010) “State of the Internet with a Focus on Latin America,” June ECLAC (1990) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Transformacio´n Productiva Equidad: La Tarea prioritaria del desarrollo de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe en los an˜os noventa Santiago: ECLAC —— (1991) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Nota sobre el desarrollo social,” Primera Cumbre Iberoamericana, Guadalajara, Me´xico Santiago: ECLAC, July 18–19 —— (2008) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, La Transformacio´n Productiva veinte an˜os despue´s: Viejos problemas, nuevas oportunidades Santiago: ECLAC —— (2010a) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panorama Social Santiago: ECLAC —— (2010b) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Las Tic para el crecimiento y la igualdad: Renovando las estrategias de la sociedad de la informacio´n Santiago: ECLAC —— (2011) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Balance Preliminar de las Economias de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe Santiago: ECLAC Fajnzylber, Fernando (1992) “Industrializacio´n en Ame´rica Latina: De la ‘Caja Negra’ al ‘Casillero Vacio’,” Santiago: ECLAC Dante Alighieri, La Divina Commedia, “Inferno,” canto II 301 Ernesto Ottone IMF (2011) World Economic Outlook 2011 International Monetary Fund Lechner, Norbert (1987) “Problemas de la democratizacio´n en el contexto de una cultura post-moderna,” quoted by J J Brunner, in Gonzalo Martner (ed.), Disen˜os para el cambio Caracas: Nueva Sociedad Le´vi Strauss, Claudes (1955) Triste Tropiques Paris: Librairie Plon Mamani, Pablo (2006) “Hacia un estado multice´ntrico construidos tecnologı´a indı´gena comunal,” interview by Juan Ibarrondo and Luis Carlos Garcia, La Paz (Sept.) Ottone, Ernesto (2010) “Izquierdas, Centro Izquierdas y progresismos en Ame´rica Latina Hoy,” Algunas distinciones Estudios Pu´blicos, 118 (Autumn) —— and Sojo, Ana (2007) “La sociabilidad de la Cohesio´n Social en Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe,” Pensamiento Iberoamericano, Segunda Epoca, 1: 5–30 —— and Vergara, Carlos (2007) “La desigualdad social en Ame´rica Latina y el caso chileno,” Revista de Estudios Pu´blicos, 108 (Spring) Perry, Guillermo, and Lo´pez, J Humberto (2008) “Determinantes y consecuencias de la desigualdad en Ame´rica Latina,” in Jose Luis Achinea and Oscar Altimir (eds), Hacia la Revisio´n de los paradigmas del Desarrollo de Ame´rica Latina Santiago: ECLAC Pinto, Anı´bal (1962) Chile: Un caso de desarrollo frustrado Santiago: Universitaria 302 Aftermath? By the time you read these words, the economic crisis that unfolded in 2008–12 may have metamorphosed again But you, and the world at large, will still be living in its aftermath, regardless of the timing and evolution of the business cycle The aftermath we are referring to is the social, economic, and institutional landscape that is emerging from the wreckage of the near collapse and patchy rescue of the global informational, financial capitalism that had transformed economies and societies since the early 1990s What the future holds, nobody knows, because, among other things, one of the features of the mighty financial system at the heart of the crisis was the privatization of the future, replaced by a futures market to be traded according to short-term gains The result, as you may know if you have read this volume, has been systemic unpredictability and the breakdown of intergenerational solidarity But if we not know the contours of the future, we know something very important: we cannot return to our recent past The virtualization of capital, the securitization of everything in a largely unregulated environment, the decoupling of the production of goods and services from the process of their valuation, the disconnection between currencies and fiscal policies, the fiction of full integration of European economies with vastly different levels of productivity and divergent public deficits, and the financing of the debt of the economies at the center of the global network by lending from capital accumulated in what used to be the periphery; all this has reached the limits of its sustainability What is being debated is not Aftermath? the need to restructure the system, but what is to be done and how to it In particular, who pays for what, and how much, who gets the benefits and who endures the suffering of the transition to a new set of institutions and rules This will be ultimately decided according to power relationships that underlie the values, interests, strategies, and policies being debated in the global networked economy, in the nation states, and within each specific network society Indeed, social systems not collapse as a result of their internal contradictions The crisis, its conflicts, and its treatment are always a social process And this social process is enacted and shaped by the interests, values, beliefs, and strategies of social actors This is to say that, when a system does not reproduce its logic automatically, there are attempts to restore it as it was, as well as projects to reorganize a new system on the basis of a new set of interests and values The ultimate outcome is often the result of conflicts and negotiations between the actors who are the standard-bearers of these different logics The financial global capitalist system that induced the crisis was the expression of a certain set of interests, as well as the manifestation of a specific economic culture These interests and this culture, which we have analyzed in this volume from different theoretical perspectives, are still dominant in the economy and society Thus, the first effort to restructure the system is characterized by the attempt to restore the same rules of the game within a tighter institutional framework, lesser redistribution of wealth, and greater vigilance in enforcing the logic of the system over the excesses of some of its unruly managers In terms of economic policies, after the financial failures of September 2008 a number of strategies were considered, and some implemented, by governments, corporations, and international institutions In the new policymaking environment, the state, both as nation state and as a network of different states, recovered its steering role to manage capitalism through the following mechanisms:  Refloating major financial institutions, and major corporations whose demise would bring havoc to the economy and society This entailed in some cases (for example, AIG, Citi Group, General Motors in the USA, Lloyds in the UK, Hypo Real Estate in Germany) de facto temporary nationalization of corporations to be transformed under the aegis of the government, and then returned to the private sector with viable business plans According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, by mid-2009, governments around the world had 304 Aftermath? invested $432 billion to recapitalize their banks, and had guaranteed bank debts for a total of $4.65 trillion State-owned banks in China, India, Brazil, and Russia increased their decisive share in overall investment and lending in the economy In the USA, two-thirds of government capital injected in the banks went to the five largest banks, which were those with the lowest capital ratios, and those that had suffered the biggest loan losses during the crisis As soon as financial institutions had been stabilized, they were returned to the private sector In some cases, they returned to the government the loans they had received, but refused to play an active role in stimulating the economy, concentrating instead in increasing their profitability The European Union (EU) created a financial stability fund destined to bail out financial institutions and governments The European Central Bank (ECB) intervened repeatedly to avoid public defaults by buying treasury bonds from Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Ireland, and EU governments arranged bailout packages for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland The ECB also became very active in the market of inter-bank lending, becoming the intermediary for most of these transactions, as banks did not trust each other and needed guarantees of liquidity provided by the ECB This strategy required major public funding, and therefore a massive transfer of money from taxpayers to corporations, and a significant indebtedness of governments vis-a`-vis global financial markets and major private and sovereign funds lenders  Enforcement of national supervision of financial institutions and lending practices The G20 countries agreed on a number of regulatory measures and recommended that all financial institutions should increase their assets to reach a level of percent of the value of all securities sold, up from 1.5 percent in 2007, although the recommendation was not followed In 2011, the EU forced a number of European banks to recapitalize, and established an increase of the capital ratio for all financial institutions, although the rule was contested and often circumvented by most of the banks Surveillance measures on offshore financial centers, and vague limitations on bonuses for financial executives, were also considered, but few were implemented The idea of a global financial regulator was never retained Instead, an attempt was made to strengthen international economic institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Bank of International Settlements, with a new power-sharing agreement in favor of those with capital in hand (China, India, Brazil, Russia, the oil producing countries) The G20 has already replaced the G-8 as the steering club of the global economy 305 Aftermath?  At the national level, fiscal stimulus to restart the economy However, the stimulus strategy included two contradictory sets of policies On the one hand, increasing public investment in some sectors, particularly industries that are particularly relevant for infrastructure and employment (for example, energy, public works) On the other hand, tax cuts Obviously, the former requires increasing public revenue, while the latter shifts public revenue into the hands of consumers, particularly those at the highest levels of income The debate between these two approaches, rooted in opposing class interests, undermined the stimulus effort by making it politicized and chaotic  Coverage of social needs in times of crisis (extending unemployment insurance, providing housing allowances, expanding health coverage, subsidizing education, overhauling public services, and so on) However, this effort lapsed when the crisis extended beyond the period of time that public spending could be sustained Underlying these measures to deal with the crisis was a growing policy debate between those who advocated restoring the financial health of the system and then letting the market play its way, and others who doubted the capacity of the market to restart itself, given the sharp fall of demand and of available credit Accordingly, they proposed a new form of temporary neo-Keynesianism, emphasizing public spending to induce massive job creation in the short term Only a few (for example, Obama, at the onset of his administration) saw the crisis as an opportunity to induce corporations to innovate and to produce differently, and also as an opportunity to provoke people to consume differently, particularly in environmental terms It was perceived also as an opportunity to gather public support for an expansion of a reformed welfare state, particularly in health and education, on the basis of public funding in innovation and new technologies Yet, in the period 2008–12 none of these strategies really worked anywhere, except for the bailout of major corporations, financial institutions, and indebted governments For the restoration approach, the problem was that the same mechanisms that provoked the crisis continued to lead to the same consequences: financial instability, market volatility, decline of investment, rising of unemployment, and shrinking of demand The new financial system that emerged slowly after the crisis was a much leaner system, with less capital and less ability to create virtual capital or avoid regulation Furthermore, some financial institutions collapsed, and most of the financial institutions had to undergo major internal restructuring; the system as a 306 Aftermath? whole does not appear to be able to provide the capital supply for bringing back the economy, beyond a few, selected profitable segments of the market The neo-Keynesian attempt, implying substantial increase in public spending, was short lived in the countries that tried to it There were fiscal limits, as the rapid increase of public debt increased the price of the strategy, and financial markets reacted, devaluing the bonds of overindebted countries, and even downgrading the ratings of entire economies There were also political limits, as conservative forces opposed both tax increases and public spending, effectively disabling any project of neoKeynesianism, and making the dream of an informational welfare state a utopian ideal Moreover, in country after country, political elites engaged in pitched battles to play the blame game, trying to take advantage of the pains of the crisis to destroy their political adversaries The result was the absence of all coherent crisis management, both at national and at international levels, and the full de-legitimation of governments in the minds of their reactive and distrustful citizenry Thus, the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis was characterized by the inability of governments to manage the crisis, inducing an aggravation of the economic crisis in 2010 and of the financial crisis in 2011 While financial corporations regained their profitability, the real-estate market collapsed; mortgage foreclosures skyrocketed almost everywhere; the lifeline of credit for small and medium business was sharply curtailed, prompting massive bankruptcies; unemployment soared; demand was depressed further; and citizens retrenched in their countries, expressing in every possible way their lack of solidarity with other people and other nations, even when their governments argued the absolute necessity of sharing the pain Indeed, the vision of the business elites indulging in their high standards of living and of the political elites maintaining their arrogance vis-a`-vis the uninformed populace deepened the distance between people and the powers that be and paved the way for uncontrollable rage, populist reactions, and alternative social movements So this is the aftermath of the crisis: the dysfunctional remnants of an economic model based on a financial system incapable of reforming itself; the shift of capital accumulation from the old centers that virtualized themselves to death to the new peripheries that own and produce the real economy without having yet the power to manage it; a political system in ruins in most of the countries embattled by internal self-destruction and external assaults from the disenfranchised masses that no longer believe in their leaders; a civil society in disarray, as old social organizations have become empty shells and the new actors of social change are still at a 307 Aftermath? nascent state; and the most important feature of this new landscape: the old economic cultures that provided certainty, such as the belief in the market and the trust in the banks, have lost their communicative power, while the new cultures based on translating the meaning of life into economic meaning are still in the process of being created 308 Index abstract trust 137–9 accelerating change 34 Adams, Henry 34 advertising see branding aftermath 24–31, 60, 105, 303–8 agro-ecological consumer cooperatives 216–17 agro-ecological farming 214–16 AIG 70–1 Albert, Michel 89 alternative cultural activities 221 alternative economic practices 210–48 culture and organization 213–21, 243, 246 communication and information technology 220–1 consumption 216–17 cultural activities 221 education 219–20 exchange 217 housing 219 production 214–16 social currency and ethical banking 217–18 focus groups 246–7 gender divisions 240–1 identity, networks, and circles 227–9 information sharing 229–30 invisible alternative economy 230–7 meaning of 221–30 organizations involved in 214, 246 post-crisis increase 241–3 socio-demographics 237–41 altruistic practices 231, 232–3, 234–5 Amamou, Slim 188 analyst systems 185 Angry Birds 165 anomie 94, 97 Anonymous 178, 190–1 Arab Spring 191–3 Argentina, GDP 282 Aspen Institute 188 Association of Professionals in Business Management 188 Attali, Jacques 85 Authers, John 143 Banco Portugueˆs de Nego´cios 10 Banco Privado Portugueˆs 10 banking 140–2 ethical 217–18 Icelandic crisis 10, 141 mistrust of 142 trust in 149 barter 217, 231, 233, 235, 236 Beck, Ulrich 133, 136 belonging 186–90 Berkeley demonstrations 18–21, 167 Black Tuesday 86 Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) 298 Bolivia, GDP 282 borrowing 3, 6, 10, 63, 66, 71, 254 Bouazizi, Mohamed 191 brand culture 111–14 branding 107–31 Chrysler 114–18, 126 of crisis 123–8 engagement 112 Levi’s 118–22, 127–8 Brazil 7, 298–9 GDP 252 government debt 253 trade balance 252 Bretton Woods 1, 67 Brown, Gordon 28, 143 Cable, Vince 144 Camic, Charles 83 Canadian MBA Oath 188 Index capitalism 65–8, 210 attitudes to 236–7, 243 emotional 123 management of 304–5 non-capitalist practices see alternative economic practices rise of 47 Caribbean countries, GDP 279 Castells, Manuel 161, 300 Catalonia, alternative economic practices 210–48 Chapin, F Stuart, Contemporary American Institutions 83–4 Chen Zhongshi 263 Chile, GDP 282 China 6, 7, 13, 251–77 Administrative Litigation Law 268–9 bureaucratic entrepreneurs 258–9 mid-tier 261–2 third-tier 262–5 economic expansion 251–6 entrepreneurial bureaucrats 258–9 mid-tier 261–2 top-tier 259–61 GDP 252, 279 Gini coefficient 265 government debt 253 inflation 255 neng-rens 263 political and economic elites 256–65 social stabilization 269–74 social unrest 265–9 Anhui Province 2004 266–7 Hebei Province 2005 267 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 258, 260 state-owned enterprises 258 township and village-owned collective enterprises 256 trade balance 252 urban development and investment companies 254 xia-hai 263 Chinese Communist Party 256–65 Chrysler 109, 111, 124 branding 114–18, 126 class 177 cloud cultures 200, 201–2 cognitive crises 51–2 310 Cohen, Daniel 91 collateralized debt obligations 70, 73 collective identity 62 collective memory 139 Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR) 298 communication 220–1 networked 198 Communist Party 124 conflict 98–101 absence/loss/insufficiency of 101–3 consequences of crisis 60–1 consumer cooperatives 216–17 cooperation and exchange 231, 233, 235, 236 copyright 203 credit 141 easy credit default swaps 5, 70 credit-rating agencies 66–7 creditworthiness 66–7 crisis see economic crisis crisis displacement 61–5 crisis-conscious 26 crisis-management 26 crisis-minded 26 crisology 95–8 cultural separation 44–55 cultures 4, 13, 17–18 alternative economic practices 213–21, 243, 246 cloud 200, 201–2 economic 12 media 199–205 networked belonging 200 openness 200, 201 piracy 200, 202–4 separation 45, 48, 49–55 social networking 200, 201 of work 223–5 Danish People’s Party 161 Davies, Howard 145 Dayan, Daniel 111 debt 63, 65–8 government 253 household 7, 184 deregulation 2, 5, 53, 90, 92, 96, 98 derivatives 5, 69–70 destructive forces 38, 96 determinism 51, 96, 97 Diamond, Peter 28 Index discursive practice 32 disembedding 138, 142 diversity 55 Dobry, Michel 98 dualism 51 Durkheim, Emile 94 Dutch Freedom Party 161 easy credit Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 279–80, 283 economic crisis 24–31, 57–8, 64, 222–3 as absence/loss/insufficiency of conflict 101–3 analytical context 95–8, 158–61 branding 123–8 characterization of 86–9 cognitive 51–2 as conflict 98–101 dealing with 105–6 Greece 59–60, 72–4, 77–8, 155–6 Keynesian view 86–7 as media event 111 metamorphosis 59–81 sociological viewpoint 89–93 as system problem 94–5 see also different types economic culture 12 economic need 224 education alternative 219–20 higher see higher education elites by objectives 187 managerial 179–82, 185 social change 186–7 emerging nations 88 GDP 279 see also individual countries Eminem, Chrysler advertising campaign 115–17 emotional capitalism 123 Empson, William 26 Enlightenment 50, 90 entrepreneurial culture ethical banking 217–18 ethical hackers 12 European Central Bank 9, 305 European Union 71, 133 bailout 157 economic crisis 154–6 financial stability fund 305 Indignants movement 155, 156, 161, 176 Occupy movement 161 Eurozone 133 bond yields 73 financial crisis 4, 9–10 GDP 279 see also individual countries exchange of goods 217, 231, 233, 235, 236 Facebook 178, 180, 197 Fajnzylber, Fernando 285 financial liberalization 2, financial services industry, profit share Finland 157, 162–3 Aalto University 167–8 political affiliation 170 by professional group 171 True Finns Party 134, 157, 161, 169–72 welfare state 162–3, 164 Finnish model 162–72 multiculturalism 164–5, 168–72 productivity growth 163–4, 165–6 welfare state reform 164, 166–8 fiscal stimulus 306 Fitch Ratings Agency 67 Ford Motor Company 109 Fordism 87 Foucault, Michel 30, 31–2, 33 Fourastie´, Jean 88 fragile democracy 290–1 France Confe´deration Franc¸aise De´mocratique du Travail 102 exposure to Greek debt 74 Le Cercle des E´conomistes 86 Free Speech Movement 18, 20 Friedman, Thomas 31 Friedmann, Milton 86, 177 futures Garcia Marquez, Gabriel 40 GDP 282 annual growth 252, 279, 282 and budget deficit 71 Gellner, Ernest 133 General Motors 109 Gerac¸a˜o a` Rasca 156, 193–5 311 Index Germany exposure to Greek debt 74 GDP 252 government debt 253 trade balance 252 Giddens, Anthony 135, 138 Gilding, Paul 31 Gilmore, Ruth Wilson 112 Gini coefficient China 265 Latin America 292 Glass–Steagel Act 89–90 global business oath 187–8 global informational capitalism 2, reform of 12 global network society 168–72 global risk society 135–7 globalization 52–3, 133–5 and banking 141 Gmail 202 Goldman Sachs 72, 109, 110 governance 51, 53, 85, 274, 290 government debt 253 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 90 Great Depression 24–5, 83, 279 Great Recession 24–5, 108–9, 110, 132, 143, 158 Greece 10, 71 economic crisis 59–60, 72–4, 77–8, 155–6 Indignant Citizens Movement 156 sovereign debt 73, 74 Green, David 145 gross domestic product see GDP Guatemala 295 Habermas, Juărgen 615 Legitimation Crisis 61, 63, 64 HackLabs 220–1 #18daysinegypt project 199–200 #spanishrevolution movement 155, 195–7 hegemony 48 Herbert, Bob 27 Hersey, John 27 higher education 18–23 accessibility to 22 as consumer commodity 22–3 desire for 36 distrust of 36 rising fees 18, 22 historicity 99 312 history 30 as lifeworld 31–7 patterns in 37–8 sense of ending 37–40 Hotmail 202 household debt 7, 184 housing cooperatives 219 Huang Yasheng 256 Husserl, Edmund 32–3 Icelandic banking crisis 10, 141 identity 55, 164–5, 168–72, 227–9 collective 62 open 294–5 identity crisis 61, 62 ideological inflation 284 Illouz, Eva 123 India GDP 252, 279 government debt 253 trade balance 252 Indignants movement 155, 156, 161, 176, 244 individualism 178–84 individuation culture Industrial Revolution 47 inflation 255 information sharing 229–30 information technology 220–1 informed consent 138 infrastructure of feeling 112 innovation-base economy 163–4, 165–6 integration 54–5 International Monetary Fund 59, 110, 133, 244, 253, 304–5 Greek loan 72–3 invisible alternative economy 230–7 Ireland 10, 71 Italy, exposure to Greek debt 74 Jahoda, Marie 84, 97 Japan exposure to Greek debt 74 GDP 252 government debt 253 trade balance 252 Jian-rong Yu 265 Kahn, Herman 26 Katz, Elihu 111 Kermode, Frank 37–8 Index Keynesianism 86–7 Khurana, Rakesh 187 King, Mervyn 144 Klein, Naomi 112, 177 knowledge 52 Korea GDP 252 government debt 253 trade balance 252 Krugman, Paul 27 Latin America 278–302 1990s 285–7 crime rate 291 GDP 279 annual variation 282 Gini coefficient 292 global crisis effects 287–9 poverty 281, 292 strategic view 289–97 fragile democracies 290–1 open identities 294–5 persistent inequalities 291–4 productive transformation 296–7 unfinished modernization 283–5 see also individual countries Lazarsfeld, Paul 84, 97 Le Pen, Marine 161 Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel 34 LeDuff, Charlie 126 Lehman Brothers 7, 60, 71, 73, 86, 109, 110, 145, 157 Levi’s 111, 124 branding 118–22, 127–8 Li Rongrong 260 lifeworld 31–7, 61–2 liquidity 59, 69, 305 excess 86 lack of 9, 102 Lordon, Fre´de´ric 91 Los Indignados 155, 195–7 Lubbock, John 37 Lynd, Robert 84 Maalouf, Amin 90 Maastricht Treaty 71 managerial elites 179–82, 185 Marchionne, Sergio 114 market economies 51 Marx, Leo 27, 32 material change 34–5 MBA Oath 188 “me first” culture media 142–7, 184–6 analyst system 185 trust in 149 media cultures 199–205 Merkel, Angela 148 Merton, Robert 94 metamorphosis 59–81 methodological nationalism 64 Mexico GDP 282 Tequila Crisis 280, 287 Microsoft 166 middle-income trap 253 mistrust 142 modernity and capitalism 47 dawn of 44–5 decline of 44–55 exhaustion of 50 money 63, 140–2 Moody’s 66–7 Moore, Alan 191 Morin, Edgar 93, 95–8 mortgages 141 multiculturalism 164–5 multinational corporations 261 Murakami, Haruki 39–40 MySpace 180 nation states 50 nationalism 132–53 abstract trust 137–9 banking 140–2 extreme 161 global risk society 135–7 media 142–7 methodological 64 politicians 147–8 nationalist movements 134 natural disasters 136 nature 48, 52 neo-Jacobean governments 290–1 neo-Keynsianism 307 neo-liberalism 68, 112 Net Impact 188 network actors 199–205 network individualism 178–84 313 Index network society networked communication 198 networked self-interest 175, 177, 178–9, 180 managerial elites 179–82 mass media coverage 184–6 networked social change 177–209 New Deal 1, 83, 92 newly industrialized countries Nohria, Nitin 187 Nokia 162, 164, 166 non-capitalist practices see alternative economic practices non-governmental organizations 136 “normal accidents” 30 Northern Rock 59, 60, 70, 142, 143–5 Norway, Progress Party 161 prehistory 37 Prigogine, Ilya 54 Principles for Responsible Management Education 188 private investors 66, 68, 75, 80 privatization 2, 21, 53, 256, 264, 284, 303 production, alternative methods 214–16 productive transformation 296–7 productivity growth 163–4, 165–6 public debt Greece 73, 74, 155–6 USA 158 Public Policy Institute of California 21 public spending 75, 76, 155, 306, 307 purchasing power parity 289 QQ 180 Oath Project 188 Obama, Barack 8, 92, 306 Occupied Social Centers 219 Occupy movement 161 Ogburn, William F 84 open identities 294–5 openness cultures 200, 201 options Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 289 overproduction 62 Rahkonen, Juho 171 Rantanen, Terhi 108, 111 rationality crisis 62 Reagan, Ronald 113–14 Reformation 45–6 religion 46, 50 return of the state 85 Rio Group 298 risk society 225–7 Rosen, Jay 189 Palmer, Richard 115 Papandreou, George 77 Paraguay, GDP 282 peripheral capitalism 13 Perrow, Charles 30 personal fulfillment 225 Peru, GDP 282 Peston, Robert 144 philosophy 46 physics 46 piracy cultures 200, 202–4 Pirate Party 178, 188–9 Plataforma Autonoma de Teatro del Oprimido 221 political crisis 9, 11, 64, 74, 78, 100 politicians 147–8 Portugal 9–11, 71 economic crisis 156–7 Gerac¸a˜o a` Rasca 156, 193–5 postnational constellation 63 “poverty porn” 118, 125 Sarkozy, Nicolas 161 Savio, Mario 20 Schudson, Michael 110 science 46, 48, 52 Searle, John, The Campus War 21 securitization 5, 7, 69–70, 85, 142 self-subsistence production 216 self-sufficiency 232, 234, 240 semantic void 27 Sennett, Richard 102 separation 45, 48, 49–55 Shelby, Richard C 28 Shih, Victor 254 slow-moving crisis 27 social change 186–90 social change elites 186–7 social crisis 64, 78, 80, 160 China 265–9 social currency 217–18 social networking cultures 200, 201 social science 50 314 Index social stability 269–74 social unrest 265–9 South America, GDP 279 South Korea see Korea sovereignty 48, 53 Spain 71 Catalonia, alternative economic practices 210–48 economic crisis 155 exposure to Greek debt 74 Los Indignados 155, 195–7 Spence, Lester K 126 “spillonomics” 29 stagflation 88 Standard & Poor’s 66–7 state alliance with private investors 65–8 state intervention 3, 256, 257, 292 state-owned enterprises 258 Stevenson, Seth 121 stress-related illness 236 structured investment vehicles 70 subprime mortgages 65, 70, 85 Sugrue, Thomas J 126 sustainability 11, 31, 38, 300, 303 Sweden, Pirate Party 178, 188–9 Sweeny, Doug 127 Swiss People’s Party 161 Switzerland, exposure to Greek debt 74 system crisis 61–2, 64 techno-science 49 technological change 34 Tequila Crisis 280, 287 Tett, Gillian 70, 143 theater groups 221 threat society 136 time 229–30 Touraine, Alain 99, 100 Beyond the crisis 93 toxic assets 29, 71, 86 trade balance 252 trade unionism 84, 100, 101, 102, 245 trust 137 abstract 137–9 in banks 149 and collective memory 139 loss of 108–9 Tunisia, Jasmine Revolution 191 Twitter 178, 197 UK banking sector assets 69 exposure to Greek debt 74 public-sector pension reforms 76–7 UN Global Compact 188 uncertainty 50 Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 298 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 284 universality 48, 52 Uruguay, GDP 282 USA Berkeley demonstrations 18–21, 167 exposure to Greek debt 74 financial crisis 5–9 GDP 252, 279 government debt 253 Great Depression 24–5, 83 household debt mortgage crisis New Deal 1, 83, 92 public debt 158 Tea Party trade balance 252 Wall Street vs Main Street divide 177–8 Vesterbacka, Peter 165 virtuous circle 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167 war debts 65 Weber, Max 63 Weinstein, Adam 125, 126 welfare state 162–3 reform 164, 166–8 Whitman, Walt 119–20, 127 Wieviorka, Michel 114 WikiLeaks 178, 189–90 Williams, Raymond 17 work ethic 223–5 World Economic Forum 188 Yahoo 202 Zeisel, Hans 84, 97 Zelizer, Viviana 108 315 ... interest are the cultures of the network society, the transformations of the notions of property, distribution, and production of cultural goods, and the role of online social networking His... logic of the global network society based on digital networking of all core human activities), together with some elements submitted to eventual change under the impact of crises arising from the. .. governments and their citizens The culture of fear rises alongside the embryos of alternative cultures of hope And yet, as the period of triumphant global informational capitalism was linked to the hegemony