DSpace at VNU: Economic reforms and mangrove forests in central Vietnam

DSpace at VNU: Economic reforms and mangrove forests in central Vietnam tài liệu, giáo án, bài giảng , luận văn, luận án...

This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut] On: 12 October 2014, At: 13:54 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usnr20 Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests in Central Vietnam Hue Le a a Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies , Vietnam National University , Hanoi, Vietnam Published online: 22 Feb 2008 To cite this article: Hue Le (2008) Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests in Central Vietnam, Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal, 21:2, 106-119, DOI: 10.1080/08941920701617775 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920701617775 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all 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systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions Society and Natural Resources, 21:106–119 Copyright # 2008 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0894-1920 print/1521-0723 online DOI: 10.1080/08941920701617775 Economic Reforms and Mangrove Forests in Central Vietnam HUE LE Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is increasingly viewed as especially suitable for promoting the sustainable development of common-pool resources It is considered an alternative to state control or privatization because it ostensibly brings about decentralization, meaningful participation, and conservation Although attracting international attention, CBNRM has not been widely implemented in Vietnam, where the main strategies are centralized management by state agencies and assignment of management responsibility to individual households Findings are presented of a study of mangrove forest use and management in a commune in central Vietnam since the introduction of economic reforms in 1986 This article argues that the promotion of nationalization or privatization, rather than solving problems of resource degradation and overexploitation, has deprived many rural households of their livelihoods Further research is needed to define what mix of economic incentives and state and community regulation will best achieve and maintain sustainable and equitable management of local resources Keywords economic reforms, heterogeneity, land, mangroves, nationalization, privatization, property institutions, Vietnam Economic reforms (doi moi) introduced in 1986 in Vietnam included the elimination of the commune cooperative’s monopoly on agriculture and forestry, the introduction of short-term land use rights (up to 20 years for agriculture), and the encouragement of privatization and market liberalization, changing the entire makeup of the rural areas in Vietnam (Reed 1996, 267; Ngo 1993) Rural living conditions have improved greatly since then; many peasant households have brick houses, electricity, television, radio broadcasts, and other amenities Yet it has been argued that these conditions are not yet guaranteed because private land ownership, thought to be the key to further development, may lead in the longer term to land fragmentation and increased social differentiation in rural areas (Ngo 1993) Further, others argue that rising inequality is associated with nonagricultural activities, such as commercial aquaculture, in lowland coastal North Vietnam, particularly when the distribution of land is relatively equitable (Adger 1999; Lutrell 2002) Received August 2006; accepted 27 June 2007 An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASCP) in Oxaca City, Oxaca, Mexico, 9–13 August 2004 The author would like to thank two reviewers for their useful comments on previous versions of this paper Address correspondence to Hue Le, Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, 19 Le Thanh Tong Street, Hanoi, Vietnam E-mail: huetle2002@yahoo.com 106 Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 107 This article presents research on the impact of privatization on mangrove resource use and management practices of local people in Vietnam since the introduction of the economic reforms in 1986 (doi moi) This study compared one commune (Giao Lac) in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam, in which mangrove degradation has been reversed and sustainable mangrove management practices have emerged, with another in central Vietnam (Phuoc Son), where mangrove forest degradation has led to increased damage by floods and typhoons Giao Lac was chosen as a case of successful mangrove management, and Phuoc Son was selected as the unsuccessful case where degradation of mangrove forests has increased This study aims to provide new insights into the differentiating effects of national economic reforms by comparing the findings of my work in Phuoc Son with the previous work in Giao Lac The study was conducted in Phuoc Son, Tuy Phuoc District, Binh Dinh Province in central Vietnam between January 2004 and March 2006 This study examines rapid changes in local land use and resource tenure systems, patterns of mangrove utilization, and management practices in response to national policy reforms in the community Like Agrawal and Gibson (1999), I contend that decisions regarding resource use must be examined in terms of multiple interests and actors within communities (see also Leach et al 1999) Proponents of privatization contend that privatization internalizes costs and benefits, reduces uncertainty, and increases individual responsibility for environmental resources (e.g., McCay and Acheson 1987) I argue that when some individuals become the owners of a resource, they may develop its potential to maximize their own short-term net return and, in fact, may ignore sustainable practices that could provide long-term benefits The study involved both library research and ethnographic fieldwork in Phuoc Son commune Library research, conducted in order to understand the physical and social structure of Phuoc Son, focused on government records and maps and on project reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment The primary field research was carried out in Con Chim island village, which is one of 36 villages in Phuoc Son commune Con Chim was selected because it seemed representative, being of average size, average income status, and one that has been most dependent on shrimp farming as a main source of income It is an offshore island and is also close to the newly planted mangroves and the Thi Nai Lagoon At the time of the research, Con Chim had 180 households with a total population of 1,176 people Based on the results of a wealth ranking exercise, which considered annual income, household assets, and the house itself, the 180 households were stratified into groups consisting of 35 rich, 20 upper-middle-income, 105 middleincome, and 20 poor households A sample of 36 households, accounting for 20% of all households in Con Chim, was randomly selected and included rich, upper-middleincome, 22 middle-income, and poor households Semistructured interviews were conducted with the head or the wife of the head of each of 36 households sampled Discussion and unstructured interviews were also conducted with the heads of the households when appropriate The questions covered information about the house and household possessions, demography, health and nutrition, transportation and communication, household economy, social organization, cultural identity, gender relations, individual aspirations (including personal life), and environmental conditions In addition, interviews with local government and cooperative officials in Phuoc Son commune, the director and the deputy director of the Provincial Fisheries Services, and the manager of the Ecological 108 H Le Thi Nai Lagoon Project provided insights into the local implementation of national policy on land allocation, and specifically mangroves, the institutional setting, and local power relations The analysis pays explicit attention to (a) changes in access to and control over mangrove resources, (b) the resultant conflicts between those who have been able to capture nearly exclusive access and those who have lost access as a result of the privatization of coastal aquaculture resources, and (c) the different management practices of men and women It explores how differing levels of access to and control over mangrove resources have caused inequality in household incomes, despite the fact that agricultural land and shrimp ponds remain equitably distributed among households Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Managing the Commons The role of the state in managing common-pool resources has long been the subject of great debate According to Garrett Hardin’s model, such resources ‘‘for which there are multiple owners and where one or a set of users can have adverse effects upon the interests of other users’’ (Baden 1977, 137) should be either privatized or controlled by central government authority to ensure sustainable use (Hardin and Baden 1977; McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1990; see also Berkes 1989) According to Baden (1977), in such situations, where no agency has the power to coordinate, action that is individually rational can be collectively disastrous—and the result is the ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’ It is now clear that such tragedies can occur in situations of both open access and government regulation A policy where central governments control most natural resource systems is a strategy of the commons that has been followed extensively, particularly in developing countries (Ostrom 1990) The centralizing state establishes a whole new, simplified institutional nexus and imposes a novel and (from the center) legitimate property regime that has been designed by scientists who are outsiders As a result, the regime does not reflect the complexity and variability of the local system This is far more static and schematic than the actual social phenomena the scientists presume to typify (Scott 1998) Furthermore, although governments may wish to implement state property regimes and officially regulate resource use, they often lack the necessary organizational capacity and political will to so (Scott 1998; Ostrom 1990) In addition, the state neither has the administrative tools or accurate information, nor is it able to change incentives and impose sanctions correctly Moreover, it is politically too risky for the state to allow local communities to specify the commons, to work out ways to deal with overexploitation of and conflict over access to resources (McCay and Acheson 1987) In the process, the state threatens to destroy a great deal of local power and autonomy (Scott 1998), and local people proceed to use the resources in an unregulated way Consequently, where limited-access common-property resources had previously existed and operated in a functional manner, the centralized control and regulation of natural resources unintentionally create an unsustainable open access resource (see Ostrom 1990) Scott (1998) suggests that we must never assume that local practice conforms to state theory At the other end of the spectrum are those who believe that the privatization of common-pool resources is the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons They argue that privatization of the commons internalizes costs and benefits, reduces uncertainty, and thereby increases individual responsibility for the environment and rational use of resources (Hardin 1968; Johnson 1972; Grafton 1995) Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 109 Ostrom (1990) argues that the imposition of private property regimes does not stipulate how that bundle of rights is going to be defined, who will pay for the costs of excluding nonowners from access, and how conflicts over rights will be adjudicated In addition, how the residual interests of the rights holders in the resource system itself will be organized is not stated Furthermore, as this case of mangrove resources in Vietnam demonstrates, privatization often deprives a large portion of the population of their livelihood (see also Pomeroy 1992) In contrast to both privatization regimes and state control of common-pool resources, research from scholars of common-property regimes has shown common-property institutions to be sustainable alternatives to state and private management of resources, both of which aimed to exclude locals in the name of resource conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Research on common-property institutions has highlighted the flaws in Hardin’s argument In particular, it has pointed out that his analysis of the commons ignores the geographical and historical prevalence of local institutions for communally managing common property, especially those designed to prevent ‘‘free-riding,’’ and thus, in fact, is an analysis of open-access resources, rather than common property (Ruttan 1998) As common-property institutions have become better understood, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)—which has its foundations in common-property principles—is ‘‘increasingly viewed as the most appropriate arrangement for promoting sustainable development of natural resources’’ (Gibson and Koontz 1998, 621) Like common-property regimes, CBNRM is based on the premise that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of resources than the state or distant corporate managers; that local communities are more cognizant of the intricacies of local ecological processes and practices; and that they are able to manage those resources more effectively through local or ‘‘traditional’’ forms of access (Tsing et al 1999) CBNRM involves self-management where the community takes responsibility for surveillance and enforcement A property rights regime and rules of behavior for resource use are thus established CBNRM allows each community to develop a management strategy that meets its own particular needs and conditions Therefore, it allows for a sufficient degree of flexibility and can be modified easily It provides for greater participation in resource management by the community compared to centralized management and privatization Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation of management measures, a higher degree of acceptability and compliance can be expected CBNRM strives to make maximum use of local knowledge and expertise in developing management strategies (Pomeroy 1992) Many now argue that social equity, economic efficiency, and ecological sustainability can be compatible under community-based management and that livelihood improvement and forest protection can go hand in hand (National Community Forestry Center 2000) The Ford Foundation (1998) argues that CBNRM enables villagers, including marginalized groups within local communities that might otherwise be excluded from the decision-making process, to negotiate with government officials, and it provides a forum for airing the conflicting needs of those who depend on the area’s natural resources Issues of institutional arrangements, resource regimes, and property rights are at the core of CBNRM (Pomeroy 1992; Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Accepting approaches that are participatory and more decentralized, such as communitybased management, will involve a major shift in the role of national bureaucracies Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 110 H Le unaccustomed to sharing power Governments should recognize that smaller organizational units, such as villages, which are ‘‘better equipped to manage their own resources than are large authorities,’’ may be ‘‘a more effective basis for rural development and sustainable resource management than institutions imposed from outside’’ (Pomeroy 1992, 3) This shift may be necessary if natural resources are to be managed in a sustainable manner Still, CBNRM is not without its problems One emerging criticism is on the definition of community According to Agrawal and Gibson (1999), defining a community as a spatial unit, as a social structure, or as a set of shared norms seems no longer to be relevant and in fact indicates weaknesses in the concept (see also Leach et al 1997; 1999) Furthermore, the concept of ‘‘community’’ fails to explain the cause of these characteristics or spell out their effect on natural resource use (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) Leach et al (1997) provided a critical analysis of community and environment and the relationship between them, and found that communities are not ‘‘bounded, homogeneous entities, but socially differentiated and diverse’’ and divided and crosscut by ‘‘gender, caste, wealth, age, origins, and other aspects of social identity’’ (pp 5–7) McCay and Acheson (1987) point out that community itself involves conflicts between users over rights of access to the resources and over the definition of property rights and law and competition between different social groups within the community (see also Leach et al 1997; 1999) Furthermore, the concept of ‘‘community’’ can also exclude and marginalize in two ways: (1) by the way community and community membership are defined, which may exclude those defined as outsiders; and (2) by the way rights of access to resource use are unequally allocated within communities by gender, class, age, wealth, and origins Most of the time, women or poorer people are marginalized This article addresses these questions regarding the dynamic way in which power, structure, and historical social relations shape community, common-pool resource use, and collective action History of Mangrove Management in Phuoc Son Commune Phuoc Son Commune is a largely Buddhist community located in central Vietnam, and it covers an area of about 2,582 Agricultural land accounts for 1,210 (47%) and commercial shrimp farming 304 (12%) of the total commune area (Figure 1) This agricultural community supports a population of about 24,853 in 5,500 rice-farming households that also engage in animal husbandry Of which 322 households are allocated shrimp ponds and engaged in commercial shrimp farming On average, rice production is 6.1 tons per hectare per year Each person receives 50 kg rice per month from the commune’s allocated land, which the people till themselves Thi Nai Lagoon marks the eastern boundary, Phuoc Hiep Commune the western, and Phuoc Thuan Commune the southern Phuoc Son is accessible by roads and waterways and has 24 kindergartens, primary schools, middle school, secondary school, a health clinic, and main market, which is open every days Phuoc Son Commune is a community with a long and rich history Elderly people in the commune have experienced life under three regimes: the French colonial government, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam They have experienced the struggle to unify the country, the post-1975 period of collectivization, and, more recently, the period of economic reform Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 111 Figure Location and land use map of Phuoc Son Note: This map is a publication of the Phuoc Son People’s Committee and not subject to copyright The commune was established more than 100 years ago when many mangrove islands were within several kilometers of the commune According to elders, Phuoc Son is thought to have had about 300 of mangrove at that time The trees were to m tall and the dominant forest species were Avicennia marina (Forssk.) Vierh.,Rhizophora apiculata Blume,and Rhizophora mucronata Lam (Phan and Hoang 1993) At the beginning, the mangroves were open to all villagers People went there to collect firewood and marine products such as crab, fish, shrimp, and bivalves for domestic use Later, these islands were owned by and named after those who first claimed them, and these names are still used today In previous times, according to the elders, people went to the forests to catch birds and collect bird eggs, crabs, fish, shrimp, and bee honey either to eat or to sell at the local market They also collected firewood and cut mangrove trees for timber and dike construction during the rainy season They used mangrove trees to make rafts, which provided shade and food for fish, thus making them easier to catch The fishing season started in September (according to the Lunar Calendar) and ended in July the following year When the season was over, the mangrove rafts were used for firewood Those who did not own an island were not allowed to cut mangrove trees, but could collect crab, fish, and shrimp, and dry branches for firewood In addition, there were open waterfronts and an open intertidal area where villagers collected marine products In this way, the poor were not excluded from the mangrove and marine resources Elderly people questioned during the field research stated that the island owners also replanted mangroves after they had been harvested According to these accounts, local practices thus amounted to effective Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 112 H Le resource management, although there were no laws regarding forest exploitation and management During the French and American occupations, the mangroves of Phuoc Son were little used by the villagers In fact, these resources were essentially protected during these two conflicts On March 31, 1975, the commune was liberated from American occupation After liberation, the province constructed a 3.7-km-long dike and divided the area into two tracts: one for rice production and the other for shrimp farming Mangrove trees were used once more to build the dike The north’s collectivization model was then applied to the south In 1977, Phuoc Son’s first cooperative (an organization that is owned or managed jointly by villagers who use its facilities or services), an agricultural cooperative, was established Farmers were supposed to pool their land and tools and farm in common The amount each member worked for one day was measured in points After each harvest, and after a portion was set aside to pay for the use of members’ land and for production funds, members received a share of the crop according to the work points they had accumulated In 1978, the state-owned Thi Nai Lagoon Shrimp Farming Enterprise was established under the provincial Aquatic Products Department An area of 140 ha, consisting of Trang, Chim, and Gia Islands, was set aside for the enterprise The owners had been asked to donate their land, and it is said that those unwilling to give up their land were forced to so For the first time, villagers witnessed outsiders coming in to cut mangrove trees (formerly belonging to the villagers) in order to practice commercial farming using extensive shrimp aquaculture The enterprise also set rules under which villagers were not allowed to log mangrove trees or to catch any marine produce within its territory All of the land and resources that used to belong to the villagers then became the property of the state In return, the shrimp farming enterprise did not make any contributions to the development of the community at all Instead, it contributed greatly to the budget of the province simply because it was under the management of the province According to those interviewed during the field survey, villagers were not allowed to pass through the enterprise’s shrimp farming area or they would be arrested and brought before the Commune People’s Committee Many were fined for having stolen what they perceived of as their own resources This resulted in resentment between the enterprise workers and the villagers, who were not passive but found ways to resist the enterprise’s policies Since the enterprise did not have enough personnel to guard the mangroves and no one had real responsibility for guarding the forest, villagers tried their best to poach in the forests, hiding long knives and even cutting down big mangrove trees for firewood The result was a ‘‘tragedy of the commons,’’ as the mangrove forests were severely depleted Impacts of Economic Reform (Doi Moi ): New Institutions for Shrimp Management During the 1980s, a household-based economy increasingly displaced the cooperative-based economy (Le and Rambo 1999) The government of Vietnam shifted responsibility for the management of natural resources (both land and water) away from commune cooperatives and into the hands of individual farm households (Nguyen 1995) Generally speaking, rural living conditions improved greatly (Ngo 1993) Although it has been argued that the positive results of reforms are not yet Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 113 guaranteed, market liberalization has led to greater diversification of income sources and consequently in social differentiation (Adger 1999; Le 2004) In 1985, the Commune Aquaculture Cooperative was established to pool the villagers’ mangrove forests The commune’s remaining island owners or those who inherited land from their parents or grandparents were asked to pool their lands and join the cooperative Farmers then constructed ponds for shrimp farming The cooperative was leasing shrimp ponds to groups of five or six shrimp farmer households Household contractors were responsible for fry, labor, pond management, and even marketing At that time, a production quota for each pond was fixed for a period of year, and farmers had to pay for the rent of shrimp ponds (in shrimp, not in cash) Cooperative members who exceeded their production quotas kept 100% of the surplus for home consumption or to sell to private traders Conversely, in cases of natural calamities or other extenuating circumstances, they were required to make up for all production deficits This practice did not help improve the cooperative’s management During the economic reform period, countries in Asia and Europe and the United States had become the biggest importers of Vietnam’s marine products Therefore, shrimp and other marine products fetched much better prices Motivated by large export profits both the central and local governments have encouraged shrimp farming In 1991, households were able to lease shrimp ponds for a period of 20 years This policy was also applied to the Thi Nai Lagoon Shrimp Farming enterprise Its workers, who were outsiders, were allocated land to shrimp farming Conflict increased between villagers who did not have enough land for aquaculture and the enterprise’s workers In 1991 villagers’ complaints were addressed to the enterprise’s Board of Management The Provincial Party Committee Secretary was then assigned to come to the commune to solve the villagers’ problem In 1992, the enterprise had to return 54 to the commune; this land was then allocated to some households In 1993, the commune’s aquaculture reserve fund of 51 was auctioned to individuals for shrimp farming The proceeds were spent on the commune’s infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and health clinics Although the bidding process was nominally open to everyone, only the rich who had sufficient capital, management skills, and more importantly connections were able to participate in the process On December 21, 1994, the Prime Minister issued National Decree 773-TTg, which stipulated that open coastal areas and waterfronts can be used for shrimp and crab farming Households that cleared the mangroves for shrimp ponds were not supposed to pay any tax to the cooperative for the first years During this time, those who cleared the forests for shrimp pond construction were called heroes of the ‘‘uncultivated land encroachment’’ movement This policy encouraged shrimp farmers to clear all of the commune’s remaining mangrove forests for shrimp farming It also resulted in greater demand for aquaculture land in the commune Between 1996 and 1997, the modified extensive aquaculture (stocking densities of to shrimp=m2, with additional artificial stocking with crab, fish, and shrimp) was applied to Phuoc Son A one hectare pond could bring in VND 60 million (roughly US$5,000), a higher amount than could be earned from rice farming For the first time, hatcheries were established in the area, partly because natural shrimp fry were no longer available According to villagers and a commune leader, shrimp farmers tried to extend the area of their ponds by illegally encroaching on the open waterfronts where the villagers, mostly women and girls, used to collect marine Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 114 H Le products Consequently, the area of the open waterfronts has shrunk It is important to note that this process of land reclamation excluded the poor and female-headed households that did not have capital to invest in lucrative shrimp farming According to shrimp pond owners, because shrimp farming is a risky business and requires large amounts of capital, women are not allowed to participate However, in four exceptional cases (out of 322 households headed by men engaged in shrimp farming) women were engaged in shrimp farming Some women participated in clam collection in their ponds Most women are confined to the private sphere and household duties Thus, men have better opportunities to earn much more than women, who, because of the persistence of certain patriarchal norms at the village level, have been virtually excluded from the newly privatized aquaculture resources In 1999, households that received land were issued ‘‘red books,’’ documents that the head of the household signed and that provided households with the right to use their allocated lands Each household head received an allocation of shrimp ponds based on the number of members per household (0.14 per household member) In other words, men and women, young and old alike, did not receive an individual right to land, but were tied to household heads, most of whom were men It should be noted that a household member is not supposed to receive both agricultural land and a shrimp pond, although within households it was common for one or two members to receive agricultural land, while others received shrimp ponds Between 2000 and 2001, semi-intensive aquaculture (use of small 1- to 5-ha ponds, from which supplementary stocking and feeding are routine) was implemented in the commune The household surveys showed that 50% of households (161 households) that were not able to invest in commercial shrimp farming sold their ponds (117 in total) to those who had capital sources, management skills, and political power Some sold rights to their land for years and others sold rights for 10 or even 15 years, and were then willing to work for those rich shrimp farmers These men (not women) were paid no more than US$28 per month to guard the shrimp ponds of the rich Usually, two or more people share a pond In this way, they share the costs and the risks of shrimp production It is important to note that most local authorities had shrimp ponds, but this was not well known They either shared the pond with someone else or hired a poor villager to work for them For the first years, many earned large profits from shrimp farming An area of 0.8 could render VND 200 million (roughly US$13,000) Between 2002 and 2003, a white-spotdisease outbreak caused almost all shrimp farms to fail At the request of the provincial government, scientists investigated and found that loss of the mangroves was the main reason for the degraded environment for shrimps Mangroves in the pond provide food and shade for shrimps when the sun is out or space for them to escape into the cooler shaded water or to absorb the food residue in the pond The loss of mangrove cover resulted in water pollution, which in turn led to the disease outbreak (Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies 2004) The large quantity of semi-intensive shrimp ponds in the commune enabled the disease to spread As a result, many people lost huge amounts of money and therefore could not repay loans to the bank For an area of 0.8 one could now earn only US$3,000, or about one fourth of the revenue during 2000 and 2001 While a shrimp farmer’s pond would not be confiscated for defaulting on loan repayments,1 as shrimp farming became less lucrative, many local leaders sold their ponds to outside shrimp farmers Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 115 Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 New Property Dynamics: The Arrival of a Community Project As a result of this disaster, the provincial government recognized that the planting of mangroves was necessary in order to restore the environment At the end of 2002, the old shrimp farming enterprise was dissolved because of continued mismanagement While waiting for the legal documents, the manager and vice-managers of the enterprise decided to rent its land to outside shrimp farmers for months in order to earn some extra income This once again created resentment between the enterprise and the villagers, who again sent their complaints to the leaders of the district and the province The villagers asked the province to give them the enterprise’s land that had been rented to outsiders This time, the province told the villagers that they did not have the right to ask for the enterprise’s land According to an official of the Fisheries Service, the director of the service was criticized for allowing the enterprise leaders to act as they did, and the enterprise leaders were asked to retire In 2002, the management committee of the ecological Thi Nai Lagoon Project, which is under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Fisheries Service, was established by the Provincial People’s Committee of Binh Dinh The total area of the project is 480 The project is aimed at maintaining the ecological stability of the Thi Nai Lagoon and making contributions to local sustainable economic development based on wise use of natural resources Its headquarters were based on Con Chim Island In June 2003, of intertidal mudflats was set aside for planting mangroves Although the director of the Fisheries Service promised the villagers that they would be informed when the planting took place, they were not informed when outsiders were then hired to plant the mangroves Villagers were furious: Not only had the land where the mangroves were planted formerly belonged to their parents and grandparents, but, more importantly, outsiders were hired to plant mangrove trees, while the villagers were not hired at all In addition, they were not allowed to participate in the decision-making process Despite the fact that villagers are supportive of the project, since they will benefit from the newly planted mangroves, on July 28, villagers from Con Chim protested by burning the headquarters of the management committee Many newly planted mangroves were uprooted After that, the provincial and district officials came to meetings with the villagers An agreement was reached by which the villagers would be involved in the decision-making process and would be hired by the project The conflict was resolved In January 2004, the villagers of Con Chim replanted the mangroves they had uprooted Alternatives for Phuoc Son’s Mangrove Resource Management As yet, no one knows who will manage the mangroves At present, the project has four guards, who are outsiders, to protect the mangroves Each guard is paid US$31.50 per month In total, the cost of protecting of mangroves is US$380 per year, which is much higher than the price set by the government (US$10 per per year) According to the villagers of Phuoc Son, it is impossible to allocate the newly planted mangroves to households as is done elsewhere in the country With a total area of only ha, it is impossible to allocate the mangroves equally to all households in the commune All Phuoc Son villagers want to manage the mangroves According to those who were interviewed during the field research, they would like to be the guardians of the mangroves and have the project pay their salaries as it Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 116 H Le does for the current guards According to the project manager and the Provincial Fisheries Service officials, it would be risky to hire the villagers as guards because there is no guarantee that they would a good job They think it is likely that the villagers would log the mangrove forests for shrimp ponds, and as a result the mangroves would be gone very quickly Nevertheless, the villagers said that they have a greater interest in the sustainable use of the mangrove resources than the Provincial Fisheries Service officials or any outsiders In addition, they said they knew better than any others about the mangrove forests and their ecosystems and the condition of the waters They all agreed that the rules for using the mangroves and a system of fines for violators should be drafted, and that the villagers should be involved in the drafting process According to these proposed rules, only those who graduated from high school should be selected for guarding the mangroves, and if someone did not work well, s=he would be replaced immediately Further, in order to make the rules effective, a mangrove protection committee should be established, and the Phuoc Son People’s Committee and the Provincial Fisheries Service should become members They should also be included in the drafting process, and later would play a very important role in implementing the rules In this way, the forests would be protected while bringing benefits to the local people, who in turn would help manage the resources in a sustainable manner The poor, female-headed households, and marginalized groups of people would be included in the process and have a voice in the management and decision-making as well In other words, the mechanism would ensure social equity, productivity, and sustainability Nevertheless, villagers still face a long process of negotiations before such an approach is accepted by provincial and national governments Although CBNRM attracts international attention, it has not yet been widely implemented in Vietnam The most pressing issue facing CBNRM is tenure rights A 1999 government circular guides the elaboration of the convention on protecting and developing forests in populated communities and in hamlets and villages in the plains and mountain areas The revised Forest Protection and Development Law, passed by the National Assembly in late 2004, acknowledged residential communities as legal entities to which forests are allocated It is hoped that Phuoc Son will soon gain the means to effectively manage its tenure and resource access issues in a sustainable manner Conclusions As the case of Phuoc Son Commune illustrates, the promotion of nationalization and privatization does not solve the problem of resource degradation and overexploitation This is especially true for the mangrove resources in Vietnam, where present management strategies have not been successful in reversing the trend of resource degradation (mangrove degradation has led to increased damage by floods and typhoons) and overexploitation Furthermore, the doi moi economic reforms, while opening up economic opportunities for many, have not benefited the entire community The rich earn more from the mangrove resources because of their greater control of capital, management skills, and political power The poor benefit the least, yet have traditionally depended more on the mangrove forests to compensate for their reduced access to other resources As a result of doi moi, low-income and female-headed households have been increasingly marginalized, while other households have more successfully maintained the capacity to buffer uncertainty in a more robust manner Nevertheless, Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 Economic Reforms and Vietnam Mangrove Forests 117 although the commune is stratified and members have responded individually and differently to market demands, they acted collectively to exclude outsiders—the ecological Thi Nai Lagoon Project and the outside guards—who threatened to abolish their rights over their local resources The present total area of mangrove forest in the environs of Phuoc Son Commune remains much smaller than it was during the war period However, the mangrove forests still serve as ecological and social buffers during the period of doi moi reform Since Vietnam started its doi moi policies, market incentives have led people to harvest a larger portion of the resources In order to manage the mangroves in a way that benefits the most adversely affected, including the poor, female-headed households, women, and girls, more equitable and appropriate policies are needed at the commune and district levels Such policies should be suitable for the local cultural and geographical conditions of Phuoc Son, benefiting the majority of the villagers, and not just a small of group of rich people These policies would necessarily take into account such factors as political power, economic heterogeneity within the commune, institutional arrangements for allocating resources, the implementation of property regimes, conflict resolution, economic and social incentives, and cultural, historical, and geographical specificity of local communities Institutional arrangements of resource use in Phuoc Son remain highly complex Neither state control nor private-sector control alone can provide a viable solution to mangrove resource degradation Likewise, it does not make sense to propose only ‘‘community-based resource management,’’ because the local community itself is highly heterogeneous and outsiders also use the resources A combination of national control, private ownership, and community-based comanagement therefore appears to be the most suitable strategy to promote in the context of Phuoc Son The province would manage the dike system because a breach in the dike system can cause damage to many communities Households would continue to manage the auctioned shrimp ponds according to private-sector principals, and the proceeds from the bidding process can be spent on the commune’s infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and health clinics And the community and the Fisheries Service would comanage the mangrove forests and be granted the right to require shrimp pond farmers to pay into a local fund that would be used to offset loss of income to other villagers as a result of mangrove habitat destruction They also would be required to provide a fund to be used to reclaim abandoned shrimp farms for mangrove or some other productive and communally owned habitat The Fisheries Service would also pay the salaries of local guards and at the same time provide technical assistance and capacity building for the commune and village leaders as well as community members through training courses, workshops, and experience sharing.2 The present study is a first step toward understanding changes in local mangrove resource management practices and how improvements in management can be initiated Further research is needed to define what mix of economic incentives and state and community regulation will best achieve and maintain sustainable and equitable management of local mangrove resources Notes Somewhat surprisingly, shrimp ponds generate more income, but are poorly managed; and rice paddies generate less income, yet are managed much better Every farmer has to pay irrigation fees to the cooperative for the paddies on which they grow rice If a household owes the cooperative VND 100,000 (US$6) for irrigation fees, its land will be auctioned 118 H Le Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 13:54 12 October 2014 or the household could take the land back if the loan is paid According to a commune leader, in 2004, the Phuoc Son shrimp farmers owed the banks VND billion (US$506,329) and it would be very difficult for them to pay back their debt The author intends to work with the Provincial Fisheries Service, the District People’s Committee, and the Commune People’s Committee to test the institutional arrangements proposed in this article In August 2006 the mangrove forests were allocated to the villagers of Con Chim for management and development Regulations on mangrove forest resource management and developments were developed by the villagers themselves and the Provincial Fisheries Service, according to which the 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