Book review henry kissingers world order

CORNELL UNIVERSITY GOVT 6847 BOOK REVIEW: HENRY KISSINGER’S WORLD ORDER Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Book Review: Henry Kissinger’s World Order Between May and August 1963, a major series of civil unrest swept through South Vietnam, pitting elements of the majority Buddhist population against the government led by a Catholic, President Ngo Dinh Diem On September 6, American President John F Kennedy dispatched two men – U.S Marine Corps Major General Victor Krulak and State Department officer Joseph Mendenhall – to undertake an emergency fact-finding mission to determine the impact of this unrest on American counterinsurgency efforts in the region Reporting back to Kennedy on September 10, Krulak was generally optimistic, believing that the Vietnamese army had maintained its loyalty to the government Mendenhall disputed Krulak’s account, painting a much bleaker picture of the failures of counterinsurgency and of the Diem government and magnifying the threat of a Communist takeover At one point, a bemused (and often misquoted) Kennedy interjected their testimonies, asking, “You both went to the same country?”1 Those who have not quite had the chance to peruse Henry Kissinger’s latest volume would experience Kennedy’s state of puzzlement if they went in the meantime to consult a selection of the many book reviews that came out in the wake of World Order’s publication In The Telegraph, Jonathan Powell contextualizes the book as Kissinger’s swansong, characterizing it as “an attempt to justify all that he has done… or argued, over nearly seven decades” Writing in The Guardian, famous Oxford historian of China Rana Mitter chooses to focus more on Kissinger’s description of the three contending conceptions of world order, opining that “this may sound like Samuel Huntington's idea of the ‘clash of “Meetings: Tape 109 Meeting on Vietnam, 10 September 1963,” accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-MTG-109-004.aspx Jonathan Powell, “Henry Kissinger’s World Order, Review,” September 13, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/11092958/Henry-Kissingers-World-Order-review.html Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 civilisations’, but actually it is more like a bracing mixture of Metternichian pragmatism and – more unexpectedly – Edward Said's critique of ‘Orientalism’.” Mitter’s mention of Metternich is a firm nod to the book’s reemphasis of the need for a legitimate order, first expounded in Kissinger’s doctoral dissertation at Harvard and eventually published in 1957 as his first major work, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 By contrast, writing for The New Republic, Princeton Professor and former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department under the first Obama Administration Anne-Marie Slaughter reveals her ignorance of Kissinger’s oeuvre when she labels his argument for legitimacy to be “an apparent conversion” from power politics For Slaughter, the book is “a salvo in the ongoing foreign policy struggle for Barack Obama’s soul.” Even former Secretary of State and lately Democratic frontrunner for the 2016 Presidential elections Hillary Rodham Clinton weighed in, arguing in the Washington Post that “[Kissinger’s] analysis, despite some differences over specific policies, largely fits with the broad strategy behind the Obama administration’s effort over the past six years to build a global architecture of security and cooperation for the 21st century.” Did they all read the same book? In a way, no Like South Vietnam in the early 1960s, World Order is a very complex and nuanced work that fits many narratives in one Like Krulak and Mendenhall, reviewers of Kissinger’s book come with preconceived notions and personal motives, and their takeaways are greatly influenced by these cognitive factors This long essay seeks to address the many issues raised in World Order and highlighted by the reviewers in three parts First, I reconstruct the broad Rana Mitter, “World Order by Henry Kissinger – Review,” The Guardian, accessed May 3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/oct/01/world-order-by-henry-kissinger-review-account Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957) Anne-Marie Slaughter, “How to Fix America’s Foreign Policy,” The New Republic, November 18, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120030/world-order-review-what-obama-should-learn-kissingers-book Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Hillary Clinton Reviews Henry Kissinger’s ‘World Order,’” The Washington Post, September 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hillary-clinton-reviews-henry-kissingers-worldorder/2014/09/04/b280c654-31ea-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 sweep of the book’s arguments, point out its various strengths, and explore the overall purpose of the book in the context of Kissinger’s work, life, and times Second, I explore Kissinger’s descriptions of the three international orders – the Westphalian, the Asian, and the Islamic, arguing that they are somewhat removed from the contemporary academic debates, and ponder over how this should influence the way we read Kissinger’s project Third, I point out certain flaws in Kissinger’s historical narrative, and contextualize his project from a historian’s perspective I conclude that while World Order often fails to engage with many of the major academic debates of our time, it remains an important work in the canon of Realism for successfully summarizing Kissinger’s oeuvre in the service of the busy policy practitioner and the interested public Context, content, and target audience World Order is likely to be Henry Kissinger’s final work for several reasons At 92 this year, even the seemingly indefatigable American elder statesman must no doubt be feeling the effects of old age While nothing precludes the publication of a few more essays and reviews, as well as media appearances, it is unlikely that Kissinger’s health will allow any new project approaching the scale of World Order or even more monumental works in the past But even more tellingly, World Order’s overarching argument for a legitimate order backed by the balance of power is so reminiscent of that first outlined in A World Restored that we must view the two as bookends for Kissinger’s oeuvre, serving much the same purpose that Genesis and Revelation for the Holy Bible Like in A World Restored, Kissinger starts out defining his terms precisely: World order describes the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world An international order is the practical application of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe – large enough to affect the global balance of power Regional orders involve the same principles applied to a defined geo-graphic area Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Any one of these systems of order bases itself on two components: a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating all others.7 While according to Kissinger “no truly global ‘world order’ has ever existed,” there are today three major contenders for that status First is the European order established in 1648 at the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Year’s War, which serves as the foundation for the West’s conception of international relations It recognizes “a multiplicity of political units, none powerful enough to defeat all others, many adhering to contradictory philosophies and internal practices, in search of neutral rules to regulate their conduct and mitigate conflict.” Kissinger then gives a shortened version of his grand narrative in Diplomacy to describe the evolution of this system from Cardinal Richelieu’s emphasis on raison d’état to Russia’s integration into the European order, from the Congress of Vienna to its breakdown under Bismarck’s Germany and the two World Wars, and the nascent European Union that threatens this Westphalian order altogether Second is the Islamic order, which distinguishes between the dar al-Islam (the House of Islam and realm of peace) with the dar al-Harb (the realm of war beyond Islamic control) The Islamic order is defined by expanding faith through struggle (jihad) to incorporate the dar al-Harb into dar al-Islam and thus bring about universal peace 10 Finally, out of a mulplicity of systems in Asia, Kissinger focuses on those of China, Japan, and India, all of which form their present-day policies based on a traditional hierarchical view of international relations 11 China’s hierarchical tradition, Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), Ibid., 2–3 Ibid., 11–95; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) 10 Kissinger, World Order, 99–102 11 Ibid., 211 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 in particular, is singled out as making it an ambivalent participant in the Westphalian system it is now supposed to help anchor.12 The latter half of World Order is dedicated to an updating of his arguments on American foreign policy as found in Diplomacy Kissinger charts America’s path from isolationism to superpower engagement, and the ever-present tension between this latent isolationism and the belief that its liberal principles should apply to the wider world As in Diplomacy, the general trend is that those leaders who seek to impose a liberal vision upon the world almost inevitably end up pursuing policies that backfire Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations was too weak to stand up to Hitler’s rise Franklin Roosevelt’s New World Order relied too much on his personal relationship with Stalin and allowed the Soviets to impose Communism upon Eastern Europe Douglas McArthur’s attempt to go beyond the 50 th parallel in Korea turned victory into near-defeat Lyndon B Johnson’s conviction of the need of “defending a free people against the advance of totalitarianism” led him into the quagmire of Vietnam And though Kissinger professed personal friendship with George W Bush, he castigated the moralistic terms of the 2002 National Security Strategy that led to the Second Gulf War On the other hand, practitioners of Realpolitik including Theodore Roosevelt, George Kennan, Richard Nixon, and himself (Kissinger) have generally been met with success.13 Citing nuclear proliferation and information technology as the two areas of potentially disruptive technological change, Kissinger ends by identifying “a reconstruction of the international system [as] the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time.” 14 While pessimistic at the beginning of the book about the prospects of success, by its end Kissinger offers a more sanguine reminder that: 12 Ibid., 212–33 13 Ibid., 234–329 14 Ibid., 330–60; 371 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 The Westphalian system was drafted by some two hundred delegates, none of whom has entered the annals of history as a major figure, who met in two provincial German towns forty miles apart (a significant distance in the seventeenth century) in two separate groups They overcame their obstacles because they shared the devastating experience of the Thirty Years’ War, and they were determined to prevent its recurrence Our time, facing even graver prospects, needs to act on its necessities before it is engulfed by them.15 Considering that it had been 37 years since Henry Kissinger left office when World Order came out, it was a testament to the public’s enduring fascination with the man and his ideas that his swansong stayed on the New York Times non-fiction bestseller list for four straight weeks, peaking at number 16 A major strength is the clear and simple prose, with the notes tucked away at the back without resort to in-line numerical citations Instead of having to plough through Kissinger’s very substantial oeuvre, the uninitiated reader can derive his main tenets from the very reasonable 377-page World Order (excluding index) For the interested public or professional politicians less well-versed in international relations theory and history, World Order does a good job of summarizing the major developments in international relations and American foreign policy in an accessible way It covers the history of international relations from ancient times to 2014’s headlines of the Ukraine conflict, the Syrian Civil War, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Unlike Kissinger’s earlier theoretical works, World Order also boasts a global perspective in branching out from the Westphalian order and exploring the Asian and Islamic worldviews It is little wonder that a number of policy-makers and big-name academics want to weigh in on the book and, in the case of Hillary Clinton, to use World Order as verification for her and President Obama’s policies Clearly, the book appeals most greatly to aspiring foreign policy makers and the interested public, with John Micklethwait quipping in the New York Times that “it is a book that 15 Ibid., 373 16 “Best Sellers: Combined Print & E-Book Nonfiction,” The New York Times, October 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2014-10-19/combined-print-and-e-book-nonfiction/list.html Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 every member of Congress should be locked in a room with — and forced to read before taking the oath of office.”17 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Jonathan Powell, and Rana Mitter all see World Order as Kissinger’s grudging acceptance of the role of justice and legitimacy in foreign policy, following widespread criticisms of Kissinger’s actions while in office 18 As National Security Adviser for Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford (1969-1975) and Secretary of State (1973-1977), Kissinger had been a leading proponent of an amoral Realist approach to foreign policy This approach led to several spectacular triumphs, including the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union, and the 1975 Helsinki Agreements with its Basket III on Human Rights that became a rallying point for several Eastern European democratic movements 19 But it also led to many controversial policies in the Third World Kissinger’s role in the 1968 Nixon Presidential Campaign’s sabotage of peace talks in Vietnam; the Nixon Administration’s expansion of the Vietnam War before forcing South Vietnam to sign a peace agreement that doomed their state; his support of Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladeshi War of Independence, of Chilean General Augusto Pinochet’s bloody 1973 coup against the popularly elected Allende government, of Indonesia’s 1975 annexation of East Timor; and several other episodes have opened Kissinger and his brand of politics to widespread criticism 20 But Slaughter, Powell, and Mitter might have fundamentally misunderstood Kissinger’s use of the word “just” Justice and legitimacy for Kissinger are merely “commonly accepted rules” and not absolute moral standards Even though Kissinger does acknowledge that the spread of liberty is one of the core 17 John Micklethwait, “Henry Kissinger’s ‘World Order,’” The New York Times, September 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/henry-kissingers-world-order.html 18 Slaughter, “How to Fix America’s Foreign Policy”; Powell, “Henry Kissinger’s World Order, Review”; Mitter, “World Order by Henry Kissinger – Review.” 19 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 316–54 20 Christopher Hitchens and Ariel Dorfman, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Reprint edition (New York: Twelve, 2012) Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 American values, he often highlights how this zeal has led American policy makers to unwise decisions In fact, World Order is a step back from Kissinger’s position in 2001, when he had acknowledged that, “The real challenge is to merge [Idealism and Realism]; no serious American maker of foreign policy can be oblivious to the traditions of exceptionalism by which American democracy has defined itself.” 21 No such clear affirmation of a role for Idealism is present in World Order And while there was certainly some explaining of his actions while in office, it was confined to just seven pages on the Nixon and Ford Administrations as part of an overview of the evolution of American foreign policy 22 This is dwarfed by Kissinger’s far more concentrated efforts to rehabilitate his image in his three massive memoirs and elsewhere.23 So Slaughter, Powell, and Mitter are right in a way: Kissinger has at various times in his career tried to fix the damage sustained during his days in office, but World Order is not a key part of that project Rather, the main purpose of this final book is to sum up much of Kissinger’s previous theoretical and historical work on the Western order and places them into the broader context, i.e the search for a truly global world order It does not offer anything radically new and is certainly not an apology Problems of theory A number of reviewers, including Rana Mitter, James Traub for the Wall Street Journal, and Tom Rogan for the Washington Times treat World Order as a serious academic study.24 They have good reason to so: World Order does indeed have many elements of a serious academic work Kissinger advances 21 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 20 22 Kissinger, World Order, 302–9 23 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 1st ed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999); Jussi M Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 a coherent and compelling thesis for the necessity of a global order His positioning of the acknowledgements at the back, sparse citations, and choice of rather informal endnotes without in-text numeration and a bibliography are all quite unusual in academia, but is not unprecedented, especially among scholars advanced in distinction and age (see Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Extremes, for example).25 While relatively free of academic jargon, Kissinger’s language is sufficiently formal and academic to distinguish itself from just an opinion piece This is an extremely ambitious book in scope and it would, on balance, be unfair to criticize Kissinger too much for his rather simplistic accounts of the three world orders, or his very brief and not too critical treatment of major episodes in history None of these features disqualify World Order from being a serious addition to Kissinger’s academic oeuvre Nevertheless, I am still not wholly convinced that World Order is meant to be a substantial addition to the academic literature, because it systematically shirks the major academic debates on many of the subjects which it touches This is despite the fact that Kissinger’s notes draw from a veritable wealth of primary and secondary sources from many perspectives, not just the European ones Rather than dispute the quality of Kissinger’s sources, his encyclopedic knowledge, or his extensive first-hand experience, my uneasiness stems from World Order’s tendency to sweep often acrimonious academic disagreements under the rug in the interest of a coherent and flowing narrative This becomes evident as soon as Kissinger launches into analysis of the three world orders His arguments for the importance of both legitimacy and balance of power, as well as the prioritization of stability over justice have a lot of affinity to the English School of International Relations, sometimes 24 Mitter, “World Order by Henry Kissinger – Review”; James Traub, “Book Review: ‘World Order’ by Henry Kissinger,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2014, sec Life and Style, http://www.wsj.com/articles/book-reviewworld-order-by-henry-kissinger-1409952751; Tom Rogan, “World Order by Henry Kissinger,” The Washington Times, October 13, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/13/book-review-cultivating-order-in-achanging-world/?page=all 25 E J Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991, 1st American ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994) 10 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Another major academic debate that Kissinger completely ignores is that over the importance of the Treaty of Westphalia World Order rehashes an old dictum taught in IR101 classes around the world that the principle of sovereignty – non-interference in other states’ affairs – was affirmed for the first time in 1648 in the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War This narrative is central to Kissinger’s book, not least because Westphalia is supposed to have vindicated the raison d’état approach of the French chief minister Cardinal Richelieu during the war Westphalia is also cited at the end of the book to show decision-makers today that it is possible if improbable to construct a global order from a great diversity of views as the delegates at Westphalia did three and a half centuries ago 30 While this was a compelling argument in 1994 when he wrote Diplomacy, by 2014 the academic consensus had left Kissinger behind In 2001, Andreas Osiander published an important article challenging what he calls the “myth of Westphalia” Osiander points out that the famous treaty (or rather, two near-identical treaties) only applied to the Holy Roman Empire, and was therefore not at all consequential since “never before or during the war was the emperor in a position to threaten the longestablished independence of actors outside the Holy Roman Empire” and that “there is no indication that, even at the height of his military power in the late 1620s, the emperor intended to change that.” Osiander traces scholars’ obsession with Westphalia to their “nineteenth- and twentieth-century fixation on the concept of sovereignty.”31 Meanwhile, Stephen Krasner has published another influential challenge of the concept of sovereignty in IR, arguing that states have never been truly sovereign and that the concept was peddled by the “organized hypocrisy” of powerful states 32 Osiander’s paper is sufficiently well-known and well-cited, its critique having entered several mainstream IR textbooks, that it is once again very unlikely that a scholar of Kissinger’s caliber would not be at least aware of its 30 Kissinger, World Order, 20–35; 373 31 Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no 02 (March 2001): 251–87, doi:10.1162/00208180151140577 32 Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999) 13 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 existence and the resultant shift in the academic consensus regarding the subject And Kissinger is himself such a routine violator of the concept of sovereignty while in office that he must be well aware of its hypocrisy as described by Krasner His conscious choice to paper over these two important debates on sovereignty, instead painting a very traditional and largely uncritical account of the Westphalian order is a failure to engage in serious academic debate Another major development which ought to concern Kissinger and any other defender of the Westphalian order greatly is the rise of supranational organizations, with the European Union by far the most advanced There is a great body of academic literature on regional integration, including David Mitrany’s Functionalism which argues for the creation of supranational regulatory bodies for technocratic aims that would eventually develop towards a robust framework of international governance; Ernst Haas’s expansion of that concept into a more predictive and prescriptive framework of “ever closer union” that has become the unofficial motto for supporters of European integration; Andrew Moravcsik’s pushback in the form of Intergovernmentalism, a theory of integration based on agreements between states rather than the machinations of Eurocrats; and most recently Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’s Postfunctionalism which seeks to rationalize the rise of Euro-skepticism 33 Kissinger deals with none of this literature In fact, his entire section on “The Future of Europe” is confined to four pages and has no citations whatsoever, filled instead with sixteen largely unanswered questions and his rather incoherent musings on the subject 34 It is perhaps the most disappointing section of the entire book 33 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System; an Argument for the Functional Developmental of International Organization, 4th ed, NPC Pamphlet, no 40 (London: National Peace Council, 1946); Ernst B Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Contemporary European Politics and Society (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998); Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no 01 (January 2009): 1–23, doi:10.1017/S0007123408000409 34 Kissinger, World Order, 91–5 14 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Even the chapters on Asian conceptions of world order dodge some important academic debates While Kissinger’s studies of India and Japan are interesting and backed by impressive scholarship, there is little hiding that the centerpiece of his analysis rests on China He has good reason to so: China is now the emerging giant that is posing many questions for Asian security, and its vision of world order is, if unlikely to ever be universally adopted in full, is at least the most likely among the Asian powers to be placated in part Kissinger is a renowned expert on China and the Chinese psyche, having engineered the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s and produced a celebrated study On China in 2011.35 Unfortunately, as Kissinger does not himself read Chinese, much of his sources on China come from personal experience and secondary sources, and he misses out on many of the important research being carried out in Chinese or other Asian think-tanks Like many other authors, Kissinger presents the standard narrative of China’s imperial past and its traditional self-conception as the Middle Kingdom endowed with a heavenly mandate to govern over others.36 This narrative ignores certain complexities such as that introduced in Jonathan Spence’s classic The Search for Modern China, which Kissinger cites but does not seem to have read very closely One of Spence’s important arguments early in the book is that because its Manchu worldview differed from that of the Han-race dynasties that preceded it, the Qing Dynasty had felt the need to conquer and hold physical territory rather than just collect tribute from its periphery long before the Europeans supposedly forced the Westphalian order upon the Chinese 37 While a sad omission in academic terms, that might not on balance be a great deficiency in policy analysis terms, as Chinese policy makers today largely subscribe to Kissinger’s version of events 35 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011) 36 Kissinger, World Order, 213–20 37 Jonathan D Spence, The Search for Modern China, 1st Paperback edition (New York: W W Norton & Company, 1991), 26–73 15 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Simplistic narrative aside, Kissinger’s analysis of the effects of this heritage on present-day policy is very nuanced and accurate: To speed up this dramatic [economic] transformation – if not necessarily by conviction – China entered international institutions and accepted the established rule of world order Yet China’s participation in aspects of the Westphalian structure carried with it an ambivalence born of the history that brought it to enter into the international state system China has not forgotten that it was originally forced to engage with the existing international order in a manner utterly at odds with its historical image of itself or, for that matter, with the avowed principles of the Westphalian system When urged to adhere to the international system’s “rules of the game” and “responsibilities,” the visceral reaction of many Chinese – including senior leaders – has been profoundly affected by the awareness that China has not participated in making the rules of the system… But they expect – and sooner or later will act on this expectation – the international order to evolve in a way that enables China to become centrally involved in further international rule making, even to the point of revising some of the rules that prevail.38 Unfortunately, Kissinger fails to follow up with analysis of China’s ongoing attempts to shape the rules of the game, through the 1982 U.N Convention on the Law of the Sea; forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G20, and the BRICS grouping; and new institutions such as the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Free Trade Area of the AsiaPacific His recommendation for a partnership backed by a balance of power between the U.S and China is a welcome alternative to John Mearsheimer’s strident call for aggressive policies to delay the rise of China by any means possible.39 Yet, despite his insights on China and his appreciation of “a concept of partnership,” or rather because of them, Kissinger’s analysis of the East Asian order is overly U.S.- and 38 Kissinger, World Order, 225 39 John J Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” Text, The National Interest, accessed May 11, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 16 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 China-centric and ignores the role of international organizations in building common norms and values The issue of nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula is treated exclusively in terms of Sino-U.S bilateral relations, with the U.N merely a meeting place for them to play out their political battles, and the positive role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entirely ignored 40 Kissinger also only mentions the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) once in his entire book, comparing it unfavorably to the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) For Kissinger, ASEAN and other Asian institutions “deal with security and economic issues on a case-by-case basis, not as an expression of formal rules of regional order.”41 As a result, he describes the present-day East Asian order as particularly ambiguous and fragile: In East Asia, something approaching a balance of power exists between China, Korea, Japan, and the United States, with Russia and Vietnam peripheral participants But it differs from the historical balances of power in that one of the key participants, the United States, has its center of gravity located far from the geographic center of East Asia – and, above all, because the leaders of both countries whose military forces conceive themselves as adversaries in their military journals and pronouncements also proclaim partnership as a goal on political and economic issues So it comes about that the United States is an ally of Japan and a proclaimed partner of China – a situation comparable to Bismarck’s when he made an alliance with Austria balanced by a treaty with Russia… Order always requires a subtle balance of restraint, force, and legitimacy In Asia, it must combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership [between the U.S and China].42 This analysis of the Asian order is generally sound and fits well with Kissinger’s warning that a global order must be arrived at soon, or “disaster beckons.” 43 But his dismissive attitude towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regrettable consequence of his book’s disconnect 40 Kissinger, World Order, 230–1 41 Ibid., 210 42 Ibid., 232–3 43 Ibid 17 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 from academics Several leading scholars of Asian security have in their latest works shone the spotlight on critical role of ASEAN in hosting the bulk of the regional security infrastructure through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, and East Asia Summit (EAS) 44 Unlike the directionless organization which Kissinger describes, ASEAN has a very clear set of core values that broadly adhere to an idealized Westphalian order, as enshrined in the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, the 1976 Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, and the 2007 ASEAN Charter 45 Driven by this very clear vision of the equality of states, mutual non-interference, and preservation of the territorial status quo, ASEAN-sponsored forums are currently some of the only places where external powers including China and the U.S can discuss important issues of Asian security and trade on a multilateral basis Kissinger’s dismissal of this organization when speaking about Asian security is but a continuation of his general disdain for international organizations that are not backed by power But it is one thing to deride ASEAN for being a talking shop without teeth, a statement of justifiable opinion; an altogether different thing to accuse it of lacking in direction, which is simply false Kissinger’s failure to engage with the security literature on the region and his dismissive attitude towards international organizations leads him to confuse the two and exaggerate the degree of anarchy in the Asian security sphere 44 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (Routledge, 2013); Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2014); Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN’s Leadership in East Asian Region-Building: Strength in Weakness,” The Pacific Review 27, no (August 8, 2014): 523–41, doi:10.1080/09512748.2014.924229 45 “1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration Signed on 27 November 1971 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia by the Foreign Ministers | Centre for International Law,” accessed April 20, 2015, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1971/1971-zone-of-peace-freedom-and-neutrality-declaration-signed-on-27-november-1971in-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-by-the-foreign-ministers/; “1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord Signed on 24 February 1976 in Bali, Indonesia by the Heads of State/Government | Centre for International Law,” accessed April 20, 2015, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1976/1976-declaration-of-asean-concord-signed-on-24-february-1976-in-bali-indonesia-bythe-heads-of-stategovernment/; “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea” (ASEAN, November 4, 2002), http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-ofparties-in-the-south-china-sea; “The ASEAN Charter,” November 20, 2007, http://www.asean.org/asean/aseancharter/asean-charter 18 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Perhaps because of Kissinger’s clout as an expert on Europe and Asia, my above criticisms have not found many echoes in the reviews Much of the rare criticisms leveled against World Order have more predictably targeted Kissinger’s treatment of issues relating to the Islamic world, the region with which he has the least (but still very substantial) experience among the three Kissinger characterizes the struggle between Iran and the U.S as over a fundamentally different view of world order Iran’s vision is a combination of its imperial legacy stretching back to the Archaemenid Empire and the Islamic call for jihad to expand the dar al-Islam, which is fundamentally opposed to America’s promotion of the Westphalian order Rana Mitter takes issue with Kissinger’s pessimism over Iran, especially World Order’s dismissal of the parallel between China in the 1970s and Iran in the 2010s because Iran does not face such a threat to its survival as China did from the Soviet Union 46 Mitter argues that fast-moving events in the Middle East in the summer of 2014 and the Iranian regime’s capacity for change through elections make the prospects for a lasting agreement more likely than Kissinger makes it out to be 47 While it is still too early to tell whether the agreement achieved on April 2, 2015 would stand the test of time, as things stand I am more inclined to agree with Mitter’s optimism For Tom Rogan, Kissinger’s discussion of Sunni-Shia dynamics is inadequate for explaining the problems the U.S faced in Iraq Both Rogan and John Micklethwait charge Kissinger for being too soft on present-day policy makers, with Micklethwait postulating that Kissinger values his position as an insider and is unwilling to burn bridges.48 They are right: it is obvious from Kissinger’s analysis of the Iraq War that he found American policy makers at grievous fault for believing that they can impose their liberal system by force upon a people with no prior experience in democracy – this is actually a main argument of World Order.49 But Kissinger’s opting to pull his punches is a trade-off which we must accept in 46 Kissinger, World Order, 165–6 47 Mitter, “World Order by Henry Kissinger – Review.” 48 Tom Rogan, “World Order by Henry Kissinger”; Micklethwait, “Henry Kissinger’s ‘World Order.’” 49 Kissinger, World Order, 322–7 19 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 exchange for the book’s wider readership in policy circles, and for the continuation of Kissinger’s generally positive influence on policy makers in recent years This consideration does, however, drive home my overall point that Kissinger is not the average academic, and World Order not the most typical example of a purely academic publication Kissinger’s other major omissions should rightly have come in the section “Technology, Equilibrium, and Human Consciousness.” Here, Kissinger identifies only two major issues – nuclear proliferation and the digital revolution – as the main challenges of the 21 st century requiring a global order to resolve While these are clearly serious challenges, it is baffling why climate change, civil wars, refugees, financial crises, natural disasters, piracy, trans-national crime, genocide, or even terrorism not make the list These are all hot-button topics in the 2000s, all requiring united global action for both prevention and mitigation Perhaps the omissions are more telling than the inclusions Kissinger here reveals himself as Metternich incarnate, an old soul who wishes for a return to 19 th century diplomacy and dedicates his attention solely to questions of high politics Indeed, technology only makes the list because of its implications for cyber warfare 50 This narrow view of diplomacy would seem to some at odds with his rather radical call for a truly global and legitimate world order, which is perhaps the cause for some reviewers’ confusion of World Order as a sort of apology Kissinger’s loyal readers would realize, however, that all of this is entirely consistent with his past works In the end, though, Kissinger’s choice to fixate on a very narrow narrative and avoid engaging in the major academic debates has proven detrimental to the scholarly value of World Order Problems of history 50 Ibid., 330–60 20 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 As a diplomatic historian who has often had to defend his subfield’s ambitions to influence policy against certain purists in the department who prefer that history remain exclusively an art, Henry Kissinger’s generally successful integration of history and theory to produce a coherent call for action is an inspiration World Order has come out at a moment of great soul-searching for the history profession, with a particularly heated debate surrounding two prominent historians’ publication of The History Manifesto in the American Historical Review Worried that historians are becoming overly-specialized in ever more narrow areas of interest, and thus are ceding ground in the great debates of our time to the universally reviled economists, David Armitage and Jo Guldi call for historians to combine a knowledge of the longue durée with big data to regain a convincing prescriptive voice in policy Their Manifesto has encountered fierce and very public criticism from Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler, who allege quite rightly that Armitage and Guldi’s call to action cannot apply to the great diversity of historical work, and that Armitage and Guldi have not followed their own prescription to use big data and as a consequence have severely exaggerated the problem of over-specialization 51 That being said, The History Manifesto remains a compelling work Any young historian heeding its call and looking for a model would view World Order and Diplomacy as successful examples of the use of longue durée history, if not the use of big data, to construct a persuasive policy recommendation But World Order also highlights an inevitable tradeoff between detailed and considered history and a broad scope In the course of my discussions, a number of historical problems have been raised, Osiander’s challenge to the Westphalian myth and the question of the Qing’s imperial conception among them Kissinger’s penchant for clichéd accounts of the past extends to Russia as well: 51 Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler, “The History Manifesto: A Critique,” The American Historical Review 120, no (April 1, 2015): 530–42, doi:10.1093/ahr/120.2.530; David Armitage and Jo Guldi, “The History Manifesto: A Reply to Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler,” The American Historical Review 120, no (April 1, 2015): 543–54, doi:10.1093/ahr/120.2.543 21 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Its policy has pursued a special rhythm of its own over the centuries, expanding over a land-mass spanning nearly every climate and civilization, interrupted occasionally for a time by the need to adjust its domestic structure to the vastness of the enterprise – only to return again, like a tide crossing a beach From Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, circumstances have changed, but the rhythm has remained extraordinarily consistent 52 This narrative of the ever-expansionist and ever-autocratic Russia may well be true, but Kissinger again does not entertain the contrary arguments from those who might dispute his account George Kennan, one of Kissinger’s professed heroes and seasoned Russia hand, does not see totalitarian government as inherent in the Russian character 53 As for the question of Russian expansionism, there is a wealth of scholarship on the origins of the Cold War in Europe that deals with this issue Whereas the Traditionalists argued that Soviet aggression led to containment from the West in response, Revisionists have pushed back against this narrative and argued that Stalin merely sought a legitimate defensive buffer against a potential third invasion coming from the West 54 The battle lines in this debate are being revived today over the question of EU and NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and the conflicts in the Caucasus and the Ukraine Given the prominence of these events in the recent news, and Kissinger’s own extensive experience with Russia, it is puzzling why he fails to engage with this important debate It is also a strange choice, given these civilizations’ relative powers, to exclude Russia’s conception of world order from the triumvirate of 21st century contenders while including Islam’s Many issues pepper Kissinger’s overly coherent account of the evolution of American foreign policy as well Theodore Roosevelt is presented as the consummate Realist trying unsuccessfully to herd his flock of hard-headed Liberals.55 In fact, Teddy Roosevelt always maintained that morality is as 52 Kissinger, World Order, 50 53 George F Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Charles R Walgreen Foundation Lectures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 112 54 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 7, no (July 1, 1983): 171–90, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00389.x 55 Kissinger, World Order, 247–56 22 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 important as raison d’état, and behind his hard-nosed actions is the ideology of the civilizing mission 56 Kissinger’s Franklin Roosevelt is a man too blinded by his personal friendship with Stalin to sense the postwar Soviet danger.57 But historian Robert Dallek’s Roosevelt, as derived from an extensive study of primary sources, is far more ambiguous, at once idealistic, at once attuned to the relevance of power in his conduct of World War II.58 American involvements in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq are written off by Kissinger as liberal civilizing projects gone awry 59 But in reality, strategic and Realpolitik principles were much more prominently cited as justifications for these wars 60 As a specialized historian, I am well aware of how messy and contingent history can be, and thus of the magnitude of the challenge of distilling millennia of numerous civilizations’ histories into a coherent narrative in a short space Combined with the context of the crisis of the history profession I have earlier outlined, I am inclined to read World Order charitably as far as historical accuracy goes While it would be amiss to not point out a few of the more problematic historical narratives in World Order, I so while reminding the reader that the context and purpose of the book are extenuating circumstances that partially absolve Kissinger from my nitpicking Conclusion 56 Frank Ninkovich, “Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” Diplomatic History 10, no (July 1, 1986): 221– 45, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1986.tb00459.x 57 Kissinger, World Order, 269–75 58 Robert Dallek, Franklin D Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword (Oxford University Press, 1995), 317–528 59 Kissinger, World Order, 295–329 60 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Jane K Cramer and A Trevor Thrall, eds., Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, Routledge Global Security Studies (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012) 23 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Long reviews like this are often more critical than they need to be In the preceding pages, I have pointed out a great number of theoretical and historical problems in World Order Mostly, they are not errors of fact, but rather a consistent failure to deal with the academic debate We should keep in mind, however, that Kissinger is an accomplished scholar and statesman who probably has a far better grasp of all of this literature and then some than a graduate student like myself At the end of the day, it was his conscious choice to dispense with cumbersome debates on every point in the interest of a smoother, more coherent narrative for a target audience of policy makers, the interested public, and academics, in that order That Kissinger made this choice does not mean that the theoretical and historical problems go away, thus validating my quest to identify them in this essay It is my hope that this review will be a useful reading companion to critical readers of World Order Perhaps discussions of the book’s merit have been spread too thinly over the course of this long essay to have made much of an impression Overall, I must emphasize, Kissinger had done an extremely good job of aggregating an impressive amount of events and viewpoints over vast spans of time and space into a cogent argument His argument for a legitimate world order backed by a balance of power is as compelling today as when Kissinger first wrote it as a wide-eyed graduate student not too unlike myself tonight Word count: 8060 24 Hoang Minh Vu GOVT 6847 May 8, 2015 Bibliography “1971 Zone of 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