63 Chapter Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership: Causes and Solutions Ross H Paul University of British Columbia, Canada ABSTRACT There is growing concern in Canada about the increasing failure rate of university presidents Institutional boards invest significant time and money into presidential recruitment, engaging professional search firms and consulting with a vast array of stakeholders Given this intense scrutiny, why are more and more Canadian university leaders failing? What changes can be made to reverse this trend? Based on his almost 20 years of experience as university president, a longitudinal study of presidencies in 47 Canadian universities and other current research, the author provides an overview of the issues involved, explores them in more detail through mini-case studies and identifies “institutional fit” as the key variable in presidential success The chapter concludes with suggestions to Boards and prospective presidential candidates as to how they can increase the likelihood of success in such crucial appointments INTRODUCTION There have been several recent high profile cases in Canada where a highly touted new president of a major university suddenly departed after only a year or two in office Most recently (August, 2015), Arvind Gupta “resigned” as president of UBC after just over a year in the position In 2014, Ilene Busch-Vishniac was forced to leave the presidency of the University of Saskatchewan after fewer than two years on the job Earlier, successive Concordia University presidents Claude Lajeunesse and Judith Woodsworth, both of whom had been successful presidents elsewhere, left their posts under a cloud part way through their first terms of office The author’s own research across 47 leading Canadian universities (Paul, 2015) and more extensive studies by David Turpin (July 2014, December 2014) and Julie Cafley (2015) have found that more than 27% of presidents appointed since 2000 have left their position prematurely Perhaps most startlingly, this DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-0672-0.ch004 Copyright © 2017, IGI Global Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership has included several (Lajeunesse, Woodsworth, former Brock University David Atkinson at Carleton) who were apparently successful in a previous position as president of another Canadian university This trend contrasts significantly with previous decades when the “failure” rate was below 10% The impact of a failed presidency1 can be huge, not only in the ensuing confusion about priorities and direction for the institution during the inevitable interim period following a derailment but also in the accompanying damages to an institution’s profile and reputation and its compromised ability to recruit a more successful successor Why have presidential failure rates increased so significantly? What has changed in recent years? Most importantly, what can be done to reduce the failure rate? BACKGROUND The role of Canadian university president has evolved considerably in recent years In the early 1960’s, especially in smaller and regional universities, a university president typically “presided over the academy” (Paul, 2015, p 11) He (and it was almost always a “he”) spent most of the time on campus, knew most of the faculty and many of the students and probably taught a course or two Only about three per cent of the age cohort (18–22 years of age) attended university and, except perhaps in the largest urban institutions, most students were full-time and living on campus Universities were much smaller and they really were ivory towers, significantly displaced from the communities in which they were located, and seldom in the news A university president of that era was more apt to have moral than ascribed line authority and faced significantly fewer challenges than are the norm for today’s leaders2 Contrast that with today’s much larger and more publicly accountable university No longer elite institutions for the privileged few, they endeavour to meet the aspirations of the majority of the age cohort for enhanced employment opportunities and are seen as prominent instruments of economic development by local, provincial, and national governments Research has displaced teaching at the centre of the university’s mission and there is increased competition for scarce resources, both human and physical The impact on the expectations for and responsibilities of the university president are profound Now CEO of large and complex organizations, today’s president is expected to be a fund-raiser, negotiator, marketer, government and community relations expert, financial wizard and the university’s face to a wide and diverse array of stakeholders At the same time, he or she must continue to have academic credibility with the faculty and to know how to work effectively through the collaborative and sometimes cumbersome instruments of academic governance and to deal with increasingly demanding and often impatient boards of governors Faculty now are almost always unionized and students have a much greater sense of entitlement as fee payers than did their earlier, more privileged counterparts Small wonder that there is little time left over to “preside over the academy.” It would be easy to conclude that, given the extent of these changes and the demands they make of institutional leaders, the presidential selection processes would be significantly different from those of an earlier era This is categorically not the case Notwithstanding the growing demands on presidents to lead and manage across a complex array of issues and for a plethora of stakeholders, there are few significant signs of change in the ways they are recruited and (not) trained (Paul, 2015, p ix) 64 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership While the great majority of institutions hire their president from elsewhere (consistently at almost 90% according to a longitudinal study of presidencies in 47 Canadian universities (Paul, 2015, p 30)), almost everyone (85%) has been hired from an academic position (provost, vice-president research, dean) at another Canadian university (p 31) While the search processes are more formal and often more private and confidential than in an earlier age, the make-up of the search committee (chaired by the board chair with other board, faculty, student and perhaps alumni representation) is little changed from the earlier era There are two key components to a successful presidential search – finding the “right” candidate at the given time and then doing everything possible to help the appointee succeed Both deserve rigourous attention An enormous amount of time and money is invested in the search process Almost universally now, there are three key players – the search committee, the executive search firm and the board of governors The board establishes the search committee which is usually chaired by the board chair (or, in some cases, the chancellor or other senior board member) It is populated by external members of the board, faculty members usually appointed by Senate, a student and perhaps an alumnus It usually has strongest representation from lay board members, but faculty members of the committee often have disproportionate power because of their knowledge of the institution, its politics and academic culture Unlike earlier eras, when such processes were more open and everyone on campus tended to know who was on short lists and how individual committee members voted, most such searches are veiled in a cloud of secrecy, primarily so as not to discourage candidates holding senior positions elsewhere who will not allow their names to be considered unless the process is confidential This contrasts somewhat with many American jurisdictions where “sunshine laws” in many states require public universities to disclose search lists and procedures openly The search committee has a great deal of discretion in how it handles the process, usually working closely with one of a handful of executive search firms that specialize in higher education The search firm is usually directly involved in developing the consultation process, including preparation of the job description and selection criteria The company will also have a source list of potential candidates which is developed further for the particular institution The consultant may even conduct preliminary interviews and play a key role in the development of short lists and, as the search committee closes in on its preferred choice(s), the bulk of the reference checking Once the search committee, with the assistance of the search firm, has identified a final candidate or candidates, one or more names are taken to the board for consideration and ratification At least in theory, the process is pretty standard, logical and appropriate However, there are many ways that it can go off the rails The search committee can be dominated by one or more faculty members who not necessarily represent a broader academic consensus on campus Everyone might rely too much on the search firm which, notwithstanding its experience and expertise, is the player the most removed from the day-today campus operation and, hence, institutional culture When the board is ultimately asked to approve a candidate’s appointment, its knowledge of the incumbent may be limited to the opinions of the search committee and, hence, its ability to judge the fit of the nominee may be more limited than it should be The search firm can be an invaluable and even essential asset but care must be taken in its selection to ensure that it is the right one for the particular institution and that its role is facilitation, not domination However effective or ineffective the connections among these three players, by far the most heavily weighted activity in presidential selection is the formal interview with short-listed candidates, a notoriously unreliable instrument for assessing competence and fit Even more problematically, once the new 65 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership leader has been chosen, there is an overwhelming tendency for everyone to sit back and let the president get on with the job It is not surprising that the new recruit often struggles during his or her first year in the role Given the continuing importance placed on academic credentials and familiarity with academia and its governance by presidential search committees, it is understandable why the profile of short-listed candidates is unchanged from an earlier era The vast majority have served as a dean, vice-president or perhaps president in another Canadian university They are seen to have functioned comfortably within the academic environment and to be ready for the top job in the institution It is incredibly risky to assume that someone who has been a teacher and researcher for most of their career, and only laterally a dean or a provost, will be equally skilled and experienced in all the facets of the CEO role – financial management, fund-raising, government and community relations, collective bargaining, institutional promotion and forging international and business partnerships As the profile of the role has expanded, so have the expectations of a broad range of stakeholders – students, parents, governments, taxpayers, donors, special interest groups – all of whom look to the president to respond to their needs and concerns Globalization, the explosion of communications technologies and increasingly instrumental expectations for the institution have contributed immensely to the complexity of the role and make demands on incumbents for which they often have little training and experience Upholding academic freedom and the integrity of the academy in the face of all these pressures has significantly raised the profile and expectations for accountability of the president In short, while the candidate profile has not changed very much in 50 years, the job is dramatically different and it is not enough simply to anoint a strong academic with good interpersonal skills and expect him or her to thrive in such a high profile and complex position Nothing illustrates this as clearly as the increasing number of failed presidencies MAIN FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER In an effort to understand better the prevailing causes of the significantly increased instances of failed university presidencies in Canada, the chapter focuses on case studies in three Canadian universities in the context of the case study based research of Cafley (2015) in Canada and Trachtenberg, Kauvar & Bogue (2013) in the US The results are then used to suggest improvements in presidential recruitment and support, with a particular emphasis on the role of boards of governors in Canadian universities Issues, Controversies, and Problems It is a major media event when a university president is publicly seen to have been deposed early in his or her first term as president While this is most evident in the institution’s home town, when it involves a major Canadian university such as UBC, it becomes a national news story as well As Trachtenberg et al (2013) have noted in the American context, the problem is that much of the media coverage is speculative and not always well informed, mainly because the facts of the case are shrouded in confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements 66 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership Neither board members nor the derailed president wants the details of the failure or the cost of the settlement paraded through the press The institution needs to move on from the crisis The ex-president needs to get on with his or her professional life In the immediate aftermath of a presidential derailment, full public disclosure appears in no one’s best interest (Trachetenberg et al., p vii) And, yet, learning from such experiences is crucial to increasing the likelihood of success in future presidential searches That is why Trachtenberg et al placed such a high premium on case studies and why this approach was taken in the first Canadian effort to focus on failed presidencies by Cafley (2015), who identified no fewer than 16 Canadian cases in the past 10 years where presidents of AUCC3 member institutions failed to complete their first terms of office (p 2) In both cases, the authors delved into the details of some of the derailed presidencies, notably by interviewing those deposed presidents who were able and willing to speak out, notwithstanding confidentiality agreements The consequent case studies provide plenty of data for reasonable conclusions about what went wrong in a given instance Cafley’s (2015) ground-breaking work has contributed significantly to our knowledge of recent failed presidencies in Canada, although her analysis reflects only the perspectives of deposed university presidents, not their boards or board chairs Notwithstanding this limitation, her analysis suggests that university boards are often at least as culpable as the presidents they displace in the responsibility for the failed “marriage” Without divulging the details or breaking any confidentiality agreements, Cafley was able to interview six recently derailed Canadian university presidents to get their perspectives on why they had left their jobs early during the first terms at the respective institutions As is the Canadian norm, all six were hired as external candidates with leadership experience in another Canadian university Notwithstanding the variation in details, there were strong commonalities across the six institutional cases (Cafley, 2015, pp 100-101) Most notably, all six derailed presidents… Experienced communications challenges with some members of the board Experienced a significant level of distrust with at least one member of the executive team Felt that board members were misinformed or unaware of their role and responsibilities Found that vital information was not disclosed or was possibly hidden during the recruitment process Found their predecessor to be not particularly helpful with the transition process and five out of the six felt they received little transitional support from the board While these perspectives may not constitute proof that the boards in each case abrogated their responsibilities for a successful presidential appointment (because the board chairs and others were not interviewed), they strongly corroborate the findings of Trachtenberg et al (2013) in the US and Paul (2015) in Canada that they, with such high stakes in the success of those whom they have appointed, are usually at least as responsible as the appointee for the ultimate failure of a given presidency This analysis is upheld by the apparent circumstances of recent derailments at Concordia University (two), Saskatchewan and UBC A brief analysis of each underlines significant concerns about the way the boards handled the respective circumstances 67 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec To experience two “spectacularly unsuccessful” presidential recruitments in a row, as noted by the external review committee for its governance (Shapiro, Coté & Jones, 2011, p 23), badly hurt the profile and reputation of Montreal’s Concordia University What made this case even more disturbing was that both presidents, Claude Lajeunesse and Judith Woodsworth, had previously successfully served as president of another Canadian university (Ryerson and Laurentian, respectively), so that a key arguments as to why presidents fail (inadequate preparation for the complexities of the job) presumably did not apply These were experienced university leaders for whom the challenges at Concordia would closely mirror their previous presidencies and yet they left early in their first terms, “apparently as a result of irreconcilable differences between each of them and the Board” (Shapiro et al., 2011, p 3) Considerable insight into the background conditions affecting these presidencies can be gained from the Report of the External Governance Review Committee which was commissioned by Concordia after the second (Woodsworth) resignation late in December of 2010 Chaired by former McGill Principal, Bernard Shapiro, the review team included former Laval University Dean of Law and Secretary-General, André Côté, and OISE’s Canada Research Chair on Post-Secondary Education Policy and Measurement, Glen Jones The panel identified a number of shortcomings in governance at Concordia that reinforces the notion that the institution, and notably its board of governors, played a significant and perhaps even the dominant role in the failure of the respective presidents Without divulging any specific issues, the review team’s concern about the prevailing culture and many of its manifestations make one wonder how any president could survive, let alone thrive, in such an environment Indeed, one does not have to know the specific challenges faced by Lajeunesse and, then, Woodsworth, in their presidencies because many of them can be readily deduced from such recommendations from the Review Committee (Shapiro et al., 2011, pp 11-28) as the following: • • • • • • • • • • • The need for a much smaller board That limits on terms of board members be ensconced in the bylaws and enforced That there be a smaller Executive Committee including the President That all committees report regularly to the Board That the practice of extending board meetings for in camera meetings without the President be discontinued That the policy of having the President as the sole “face” of the University be upheld That the Senate be strengthened and chaired by the President to ensure a truly bicameral governance structure That Concordia immediately develop an academic mission and academic plan That the practice of having presidential candidates subjected to public presentations be discontinued That the President be the only decision-maker for senior administrative participation at Board meetings That the President be solely responsible for the appointment of all senior administrators It is easy to surmise from these recommendations that both Lajeunesse and Woodsworth were hired into an institution that was almost designed to frustrate their ability to carry out their presidential responsibilities, that limited their power and authority in ways that seriously compromised their ability to carry out their responsibilities and that perpetuated a weak Senate and often dysfunctional Board Some Board 68 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership members were staying on too long as the supposed limits on terms of office were ignored Some Board members appear to have been influenced unduly by members of the senior team other than the president without the latter’s knowledge Consequently, the Review Committee focused on strengthening the power and authority of the President and underlined the Board’s key role in ensuring and supporting this However, the strongest message of all came from the Review Committee’s observations about the prevailing culture at Concordia which it described as adversarial and “a culture of contempt” Everyone seemed quite willing, in some cases even anxious, to think the worst of someone in some cases, everyone else It seemed almost as if by projecting experienced difficulties on some other person or on some other group, one was relieved of any responsibility to question one’s own motives and behaviour We are convinced that all of those participating in Concordia’s governance bear a heavy responsibility to find a way to work together in order to gradually achieve a climate characterized by mutual respect and understanding (Shapiro et al., 2011, p 10) This personalized and negative culture, above all other influences, must be the primary reason that two very different individuals, both previously successful, faced similar derailments at Concordia After the demise of Lajeunesse and Woodsworth, the university and especially its Board had to examine thoroughly its governance policies and practices and work hard to improve them before subjecting yet another president to what the others had experienced To Concordia’s credit, and with the consistent leadership of previous president, Fred Lowy, the University appears to have done that and the present incumbent in the President’s post, Alan Shephard, is in his fourth year at the helm However, as the Review Committee pointed out, cultural change is not easy and it is not achieved quickly Changes in climate take time and the modification of an institutional culture is notoriously difficult to achieve Moreover, such changes need to occur within the minds of those committed to and/or working and studying at Concordia It involves a painstaking and gradual “learning by doing differently” process rooted in a renewed mutual presumption of good faith between the actors (Shapiro et al., 2011, p 10) It remains to be seen if President Shephard can exorcise the “culture of contempt” and develop Concordia’s governance processes so that decisions are debated and made in a climate of personal respect in the best long term interests of the university Although obviously restricted by a non-disclosure agreement, in writing about her experiences as president of Laurentian and Concordia universities respectively, Judith Woodsworth (2013) emphasizes the importance of board relations for a president and discusses the clash of cultures between boards and academia Especially external board members used to more top-down corporate decision-making and direct accountability to shareholders may be frustrated by the relative ambiguity of accountability in an environment of multi-stakeholders “who have an interest in maintaining quality of education and upholding a range of seemingly vague academic and ethical values (p 132).” She concludes: In this context, it is critical to allow management – that is, the president and his or her executive team – to actually run the university, while steadfastly asking probing questions and providing responsible oversight and valuable guidance (Woodsworth, 2013, p 132) 69 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership In the case of Concordia, it seems that she was not always given this authority and support One of her conclusions is to strongly advocate board education to assist volunteers from the community and newcomers to governance on campus better understand both the responsibilities of university boards and the difference between management and governance Woodsworth (2013) also raises the issue of the underrepresentation of women at the helm of universities and speculates about the particular skills and values that women bring to the position that may be underrated (p 129) To the extent that women may be more team-oriented, consultative and consensus building, they would appear to be ideally suited to what Woodsworth describes as an essential component of the presidential role – communicating across cultures Like the translator, the president is a go-between, communicating between cultures and across borders, conveying the sense of the academic enterprise to external stakeholders and board members, and interpreting the business-related concerns and preoccupations of a responsible board to the internal community (p 133) On the supposition that women are at least as capable of playing this role as men, it is fair to ask why a disproportionate number of female presidents have not succeeded in recent years in Canada (although, at the same time, some of the country’s most successful presidents have been women) This question is interesting to contemplate, ironically in connection with the UBC case study discussed below, that of a male president who left office early in his first term The University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan In May of 2014, the University of Saskatchewan dismissed its president, Ilene Busch-Vishniac, after she had been on the job for less than two years Unlike the other cases examined in this chapter, her dismissal was directly related to a specific decision: to fire the Executive Director of the University’s School of Public Health, Robert Buckingham This was ostensibly because he disagreed with the administration’s plans for the school and the expectation that he would support these plans whether he agreed with them or not The specific context was a controversial academic plan, TransformUS, brought in by the senior administration to cut and reallocate monies in response to major financial shortfalls The difficulty was that not only was Buckingham fired from his position as Executive Director but also as a tenured faculty member This seemed to confound Buckingham’s responsibilities as a member of the administration with his freedom of speech as a tenured faculty member While it may have been appropriate to ask him to step down as Executive Director, the decision to also fire him as a faculty member appeared to violate his academic freedom to be critical of the administration’s plans and it would probably not have stood up against the University’s collective agreement and Canadian law and practice around the provisions of tenure The impact on the university was dramatic The provost resigned, Buckingham was reinstated as a professor and Busch-Vishniac was removed as President She has now sued the university and its board for unfair dismissal, and included Saskatchewan’s Minister of Advanced Education and the Premier for inappropriate involvement in the affair.As her predecessor in the role, Peter MacKinnon (2014), has stated it, 70 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership The administration overreacted in dismissing him [Buckingham] from both his administrative and academic posts The ensuing controversy over both academic freedom and freedom of speech was understandable and predictable in extent and severity, and it embarrassed the university at home and abroad The university backtracked on Buckingham’s dismissal from his academic post and restored his professorship in public health The president paid for the imbroglio with her job (p 152) Subsequent to his resignation and Busch-Vishniac’s demise, former Provost Brett Fairbairn publicized a written account of the event that had originally been intended only for the University’s leadership (Levy, 2014) He took the decision to dismiss Buckingham from both his deanship and faculty position on the advice of the Human Resources and university counsel He discussed it with President Busch-Vishniac on the telephone because she was out of the country and she told him to proceed The Board does not seem to have been consulted at the time of the decision even though it would obviously be a very public and controversial action The University and its reputation suffered significantly from this series of events The aftermath of a single decision has been the loss of its top two administrative leaders, the president and the provost, and a rescinding of most of the elements of TransformUS As with all such cases, the University of Saskatchewan was left with a lot of hand-wringing and rethinking its governance and decision-making mechanisms and practices It had to conduct another presidential search for an institution that had lost some of its confidence with a residual culture of division and bitterness Perhaps not surprisingly, after a year-long search, it looked inside for its new president – Dr Peter Stoicheff, the Dean of its College of Arts and Science His knowledge of the academic culture of the institution and its key players may be significant assets in his efforts to rebuild trust and confidence across the institution The University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, British Columbia UBC is one of Canada’s most renowned universities Exactly 100 years old in 2015, the university is routinely ranked in the top three in Canada and top 30-40 in the world After a series of successful presidencies, UBC hired computer scientist Arvind Gupta to great fanfare in the summer of 2014 In contrast to all of the other case studies cited in this paper, Gupta was an “internal” candidate at UBC, coming to the presidency from his leadership role in MITACS, a highly successful and innovative research and development organization that bridged the gap between universities and industry As someone with a good track record in raising funds for the operation and who was equally comfortable in the halls of academia and business, Gupta seemed an ideal choice for UBC and its research ambitions However, while a professor at UBC, Gupta did not have any significant experience in academic administration as a dean or vice-president, and he quickly came into conflict with some of those in such positions at UBC He made some significant changes, including the apparent dismissal of a popular provost that may not have endeared him to some deans and faculty Nevertheless, his sudden resignation, announced late on an August Friday afternoon after barely a year on the job, took the institution and the country by storm The ensuing responses made the matter worse The day of the announcement, Jennifer Berdahl, a prominent UBC researcher in power, gender and diversity, published a blog in which she speculated that President Gupta may have been deposed because of his “soft” management style, that he had “lost the masculinity contest among the leadership at UBC, as most women and minorities at institutions dominated by white men” (Berdahl, 2015a) 71 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership The chair of the board, ironically the donor for the post held by Dr Berdahl (The Montalbano Professor of Leadership Studies: Women and Diversity), telephoned her to express his dismay with her blog post In a follow-up post a week later (Berdahl, 2015b), she described the phone call and related representations from the leadership of her faculty as attempts to limit her academic freedom UBC subsequently commissioned retired B.C Supreme Court justice Lynn Smith to conduct an independent inquiry into whether or not Professor Berdahl’s academic freedom had been upheld The Justice concluded that the university as a whole had failed to uphold the professor’s academic freedom She further wrote that, while the board chair’s action in calling Dr Berdahl was inappropriate, it did not infringe the collective agreement or other relevant policies (Smith, 2015) Subsequent to this judgment, which he interpreted as vindication, the board chair nevertheless resigned This incident and its aftermath are further examples of how a failed presidency can bring significant collateral damage In response to a failed presidency, it is increasingly apparent that boards need not only be to be very clear about strategic directions and the kind of leadership that is most appropriate to their particular institution, but also to look inward at their own operations to ensure that policies, practices and communications are all in sync with the aspirations they hold for excellence and integrity Closely related issues are the openness and transparency with which the board operates Applying Badaracco and Ellsworth’s (1989) “value-driven leadership” and Duke’s (2002) description of the university as a learning organization, Paul (1990) defines “open management” as a prerequisite to success in university leadership, where process is often as important as product and where the search for truth defines effective governance A true university must not only tolerate but also celebrate dissent, always in the search for truth In this context, a president may often lead from behind, nurturing rather than directing, challenging rather than telling, and encouraging rather than criticizing (Paul, 2015, p 236) The whole case epitomizes the downside of confidentiality agreements Neither the board nor Gupta would say anything about why he had “resigned” even though the admittance that he had received a compensation package indicated that he did not leave on his own accord The lack of information about why he was removed from the position after such a short time period led to all sorts of speculation around the university and in the media without leading to any proven cause Why had the board lost confidence so quickly in the star they had lauded only a year earlier? Was there evidence of any impropriety on Gupta’s part? Right at the deadline for the final submission of this paper and almost six months after the resignation, there was a significant development in the case Through freedom of information requests, the media had obtained e-mails and attachments of correspondence between the president and board chair While the initial information was severely redacted, an error by UBC officials resulted in clean copies of the various texts being attached, effectively violating the confidentiality imposed by the non-disclosure agreements The resulting information reinforced the above speculation that the chair had lost confidence in the president within a few months of the latter’s engagement The resulting information did not flatter either side While the board chair had expressed the desire to help Professor Gupta improve his performance, he worked with a very small group (including one non-board member) to put pressure on the new president to change his management style, suggesting that he was responsible for the “low morale” in the institution It was evident that the chair had been 72 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership strongly influenced by representations from some deans and others about the personnel changes Gupta was making, especially in the removal of the long-serving provost The unintended public exposure of this information was interpreted by Gupta as releasing him from the non-confidentiality agreement and he gave several interviews to the press Most pointedly, he stated that he regretted agreeing to resign and that he should have fought against the board chair’s efforts to remove him even though there had been no formal performance evaluation or opportunity for him to address the board He also cited his extensive consultations with faculty and that he ensured that he had a mandate for the changes from the board before he made them He admitted to his relative lack of management experience and had suggested that he have an executive coach but he also noted that there will always be resistance to change in a university setting and that the president needs and deserves full board support in order to carry them out successfully When a board apparently loses confidence in its appointee so soon after engagement, one wonders at how committed it was in the first place If there were those opposed to the appointment at the outset, did they just wait for an opportunity to act on their dissatisfaction? Were some board members unduly influenced by representations from deans and other faculty unhappy with some of the actions of the new president? Had the board chair allowed end run representations to the board without the president’s knowledge? Did the board try to meddle too much in the management of the institution? The documentation released to date appears to confirm that the board lost confidence in their appointee very quickly and that it did not provide the requisite support for the president when he encountered the inevitable resistance to the changes he understood he had a mandate to undertake Notwithstanding their merits, confidentiality agreements seriously limit our ability to divine the truth in a given situation In at least some of the cases, there may be huge irony in these attempts to shield the public from the truth of the matter Just as the cover-up so often becomes a bigger scandal than the original events in politics, non-disclosure agreements may actually more harm to both the institution and the derailed president than a decision to be more forthcoming about why a president was deposed They also render it much more difficult for potential presidential candidates to discern what really happened and, hence, to decide on their own candidacies And, as is now being shown at UBC, the details often come out anyway, forcing the institution and the deposed president to relive the stress of the original decision, often long after the fact At Concordia, the governance review and subsequent actions have, tacitly, at least, acknowledged the Board’s culpability in the failure of two consecutive presidencies Had this been more directly understood and acknowledged earlier, it might also have lessened the negative impact on the reputation of the two deposed presidents Months after the event, UBC has visibly been having difficulty dealing with the aftermath of the Gupta resignation, leaving a considerable cloud over the current process to find his successor From each case study, it is evident that the problem does not go away once the initial shock of a departing president is felt Each institution is left with divided camps, those sympathetic to and against the president or board There can be an extensive period of blaming and finger-pointing, none of which contributes to the healing that is essential to a subsequently successful search Longer term plans are often left in tatters, especially if the new president was forging significant change, and many will have questions about how the board handled the situation Division and a collective loss of confidence can seriously frustrate the next search Strong candidates may decide that they are no longer interested in the particular institution and even those willing to be 73 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership considered will have serious questions about whether they want to work in such an environment As with the break-up of a marriage, there are seldom any winners after a failed presidency From these four cases in three Canadian universities, there is considerable evidence of the need for more care and concern, both by the new presidents and by the boards that so quickly lost confidence in them What is most important from these studies is a fair degree of consensus about how presidential selection and opportunities for success can be improved, both by the candidates and by the boards that hire them SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS It follows from the above analysis that many boards need to a much better job at ensuring a thorough search process, one that defines very clear roles for the search committee, search consultants and the board itself and excellent communications among them However, the focus of this paper is very much on what happens after a president has been recruited These case studies and the growing literature on unsuccessful appointments reinforce notions of the importance of institutional fit The challenge is not so much to find a candidate who has the most spectacular qualifications for the post as it is to identify the one who best fits the local organizational culture (or who has the best capacity to learn to adapt to it) This is not a consideration that ends with the selection but one that has significant implications for how the newcomer is introduced to the community and supported throughout his or her tenure Boards of Governors invest huge amounts of time and money to find the “right” president and then have a tendency to sit back and expect the new recruit to know exactly what to and how to it As noted earlier, in the great majority of cases, the president has been hired from outside the specific university, although almost always from Canada and usually from a senior academic position in another Canadian university This increases the pressure on the individual to learn quickly how things are done in his/her new institution and, too often, the fit turns out to be far less appropriate than originally thought at the time of the appointment A case can be made for a pan-Canadian academic culture that is significantly different from that in many American universities Canadian universities are more homogeneous, with fewer institutions serving large geographic areas and academic standards much more consistently high than the wide range of American institutions from some of the best in the world to those with much lower standards than exist anywhere in Canada Indeed, there may be significant cross-border differences in perception as to the whole notion of what a president is, epitomized by some key political differences between the two countries In the US, the president is also the head of state whereas these roles are bifurcated in Canada between the political leader (prime minister) and head of state (the Governor-General as the representative of the Queen) Consequently, it may well be that Canadians are more reticent to ascribe power to the presidency than Americans, who often celebrate the “hero” notion of leadership as represented in Arthur Padilla’s book, Portraits in Leadership: Six Extraordinary University Presidents (2005) Americans, on the other hand, are often surprised at the lack of deference for a Canadian prime minister in the House of Commons, something that seldom happens in the US Congress where even the most unpopular president is treated with ceremonial respect 74 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership These cultural differences may explain the high failure rate among the very few presidents who have come to a Canadian presidency directly from the US They may expect more ascribed power and be less practiced in the sort of consensus building that has long characterized Canadian academic culture At the same time, Americans who have come to a Canadian presidency after considerable experience as a dean or vice-president in Canada have been among Canada’s most illustrious leaders – Paul Davenport at Alberta and Western and Martha Piper at UBC are two recent examples One can conclude that they were well socialized into the Canadian academic culture before they took on the presidential reins Whatever the merits of a claim to a pan-Canadian academic culture, there clearly are important differences among campus cultures across the country It may well be the best explanation for the difficulties experienced by previously successful presidents Atkinson, Lajeunesse and Woodsworth at Carleton and Concordia respectively What was right for Brock might not work as well at Carleton; what was right for Ryerson or Laurentian might be less effective at Concordia Even in a university culture as homogeneous as Canada’s, it is dangerous for new presidents, the vast majority of whom come from outside the institution, to assume that they understand the cultural mix on a given campus Indeed, learning the new culture quickly enough to capitalize on his or her position as a newcomer is one of the first and greatest challenges for an externally appointed president Edgar Schein (1999) notes that an organizational culture is a product of an institution’s history, the values and beliefs of its key leaders and the extent to which an institution has been successful Culture is the sum total of all the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has learned throughout its history It is the residue of success (p 19) In the university context, Bergquist and Pawlak (2008) have identified six cultures that interplay in any academic institution – collegial, managerial, developmental, advocacy, virtual and tangible The particular mix on a given campus will help define its distinct organizational culture While new presidents are frequently brought in to change the institution’s culture, a prerequisite to such change is to learn as much as possible about the existing culture and, only then, to begin the process of organizational change When presidents move too quickly at the beginning of their tenure, they are often bewildered by the on-campus reaction and the strength of the resistance to change When the fit is right and the board is supportive, an individual president can achieve wonders for his or her institution Sheldon Levy brought experience from both college and university leadership positions to his post as President of Ryerson University and he has transformed the institution into one of Canada’s most exciting and innovative institutions Michael Goldbloom understood the strengths and potential of Bishop’s University as primarily an undergraduate teaching institution after succeeding a derailed president less able to understand and adapt to its prevailing culture Indira Samarasekera was apparently the right person to lead the research intensive University of Alberta for many years It is important to ensure that a preferred candidate is well informed from the outset, not only about institutional challenges and concerns, but also about the expectations held for the president In turn, the candidate should be very clear about his or her expectations Organizational culture derives from a long history of shared experiences The customs, practices, value, and attitudes that evolve among constituents of a particular university must be recognized and respected by the chief executive officer of the organization Only after demonstrating an understanding and appreciation of the institution should a president attempt significant organizational changes (Trachtenberg et al., 2013, p 57) 75 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership Many a president or dean has been run out of town for tackling directly the culture of the academy Instead, our message is to start with the issue(s) the organization faces, refocus the agenda, use the considerable extant change knowledge, and then shape and leverage the strength of existing cultures and their leaders (Fullan & Scott, 2009, p 41) One of the most immediate challenges for a new president is determining to whom to listen Especially if the institution is in some turmoil, many individuals and groups will race to influence the new leader before he or she is unduly influenced by others with different perspectives A smart newcomer will listen to all stakeholders and take some time to arrive at a decision while recognizing that taking too long can reduce the confidence the community has in its latest recruit This is an obvious area where the Board can be of assistance Presidential finalists should be especially well briefed, not only on the strengths and opportunities but also on the threats and problems facing the institution The potential for a truncated presidency is significantly increased if the board withholds critical information which the new president discovers only after arrival on campus Frequent examples include the true financial state of the institution or knowledge that a key member of the senior team was an unsuccessful candidate for the job, new presidents should be made aware of such challenges before they sign their contract Ultimately, it is a critical joint responsibility, a presidential nominee who is astute and well advised and a board that is open and clear about its expectations and challenges In the United Kingdom, the university secretary or academic registrar plays an important linking role between the office of the president and the board When staffed with a discrete and credible person, this position can be invaluable in connecting board members and others from both inside and outside the university with the office of the president There are several Canadian examples of very successful employment of such a position While institutional cultures are like icebergs, with most of their elements hidden under the surface, there are many obvious and significant differences in practice and expectations across campuses that can be readily discerned A presidential aspirant should be sure to be well informed in advance about such issues as the local campus’s labour-management history, the institution’s proudest achievements and most recent crises, the power and style of recent presidents, the role and powers of Board and Senate committees, who chairs Senate, the role (if any) of the presidential spouse and countless other issues of importance to understand how the institute operates (or fails to operate) in various areas For example, a candidate looking at one of the many Canadian universities with a proud history of consultation and consensus decision-making should consider carefully whether his or her own style will work in such an environment before seriously considering the presidency This should also include paying close attention to such crucial components that help craft an institutional culture as approaches to admissions (elitist versus open), balance between teaching and research, the extent of the institution’s investment in and success with educational technology, expectations for the visibility of senior administrators on campus, the history of relationships with student government, the extent of the commitment to internationalism, the influence of alumni and prominent community leaders and donors, the role of intercollegiate athletics, and many other vestiges of Canadian university life where the particular institution stands out from the norm In the same way, search committees and boards need to everything they can to find the presidential candidate best suited to the local campus culture even if, as noted earlier, they are looking for someone to change it While there may be occasions when someone with a leadership style starkly contrary to what has previously prevailed is preferred (usually at a time of financial crisis), it is very risky for a board to 76 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership hire a president whose style is not well suited to the prevailing way of doing things on the campus An autocratic leader may quickly become frustrated in a collegial environment or a more collaborative president may ultimately lose the support of the board if the anticipated changes are deemed too slowly made Of course, it is not always easy to determine beforehand how a particular individual’s style will fit into the organization It cannot be discerned solely from interviews and formal reference checks Perhaps the best indicator comes from an individual’s previous performance in a leadership position What were his or her greatest strengths as a person and what got him or her into trouble? Vital information about past performance needs as much informal networking as possible, although boards should also be careful not to overrate opinions that may be uninformed gossip or those of individuals with a particular grudge against the candidate Having done everything possible to find the right candidate and to ensure that he or she is well suited to the organizational culture, the board then has just as important a job to to help the new appointee succeed This is where many board chairs and members fall down, so celebrating the arrival of the exciting new leader that they forget that his or her success will depend at least as much on ongoing board support as it does on the appointee’s personal credentials In the corporate sector, a lot of attention has been paid to executive on-boarding recently as the failure rate of chief executive officers has reached alarming levels In a review of the literature, Williams (psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201005/ceo-failures-how-boarding-can-help) cites figures as high as 40-60% As an advocate for a thorough and long-term on-boarding strategy for a new CEO, he also underlines the appointee’s responsibility to take the time to learn the organizational culture before embarking on any significant change initiatives It is time that more universities developed thorough on-boarding programs for their new presidents Once a candidate has been chosen, the following steps are critical (and some should be concluded as part of the contractual process so that there are no surprises on either side post-appointment): • • • • • • Having an agreed-upon evaluation process with the new president that is very clear on performance objectives, the criteria for their assessment and the details of the process Initiatives by the board chair and others to ensure regular and informal communications with the president and regular and clear communications of these to the entire board Working with the president from the outset to identify his or her areas of relative inexperience and hence to develop an effective tailor-made on-boarding program Orienting the president to the new community and especially to influential people who can contribute positively to the university’s development A program of ongoing board development which works with the president and team to ensure that everyone understands their respective roles and the crucial differences between management and governance A clear and public understanding that the board holds the president accountable for the management of the institution and that all communications with the board are through his or her office Ultimately, a university has much more potential for success if it is recognized that a successful president means a successful institution and hence that everyone has responsibility for that success An obvious corollary is that a president who always works for the long-term best interests of the institution and who is generous in sharing achievement with others will be much more successful than someone more concerned with their own personal credibility and recognition 77 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership There is always the danger that boards and search committees will be seduced by someone who gives a sparkling interview or has impressive credentials from highly rated universities The more important consideration is in the individual’s suitability at the particular time and for the particular culture of the institution As Trachtenberg et al (2013) conclude, it is not so much about finding the “best” candidate as it is finding “a very good person, an excellent fit for the institution, and a president of wonderful potential” (p 97) This may mean less hype at the outset but more success in the long-run The search process will always be imprecise and unpredictable and institutions will not always get it right Even the “right” president may be undone by poor decision-making or overcome by too many challenges at once, many of which may not have been predictable But a failure rate of over 25% is unacceptable and very costly to the affected institutions and university development more generally More scrutiny of case studies like those outlined above, more care and attention to the individual’s fit, both before and after appointment, and a protracted program of professional development and personal support will go a long way to improving a president’s and, hence, an institution’s success in the future FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS While there is anecdotal evidence of similar trends to more failed presidencies in countries other than Canada and the USA, there is still very little formal research into this growing phenomenon National and cross-national studies would add considerably to the literature and understanding of the complexities both of the job and finding the best person for the particular institution As both Cafley (2015) and Trachtenberg et al (2013) have noted, it is not always easy to determine exactly what happened when a president leaves a university after an incomplete first term of office In both cases, they have contributed significantly to our understanding of common underlying causes of failed presidencies, primarily by interviewing a number of presidents willing and able to talk about the circumstances that led to their premature demise Primarily because the phenomenon of failed presidencies has increased so significantly recently, such studies are very new While every case has its unique characteristics, research like that of Cafley and Trachtenberg indicates that there are many common elements across institutions and jurisdictions and their studies could, with value, be replicated in other countries and in different kinds of institution of higher education More importantly, their research and the case studies cited above have underlined the crucial role of boards of governors in presidential success or failure While it may be even more difficult to persuade board chairs and others to speak out about a recent derailed presidency at their own institution, such research is essential as a counter-balance to the findings of Cafley and Trachtenberg et al Findings from interviews from both sides of a failed presidency will always be somewhat speculative and anecdotal and each case will have its unique elements Nevertheless, the more that is known about the underlying causes of such failures, conflicting cultures and expectations for the president, the better that boards can prepare for presidential searches and presidential support Only through such in-depth research can universities begin to reverse the trend to shorter and fewer successful presidencies Ongoing research into leadership and organizational cultures is of particular relevance to the university sector Issues of gender and diversity are increasingly prominent and the sorts of issues raised by Jennifer Berdahl in the UBC context are central to understanding university cultures and the leadership values and skills most appropriate to their successful leadership 78 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership CONCLUSION In addition to the usual reference checking and thorough scrutiny, university search committees and the boards they report to need to pay particular attention to their own institutional culture in their efforts to find not just the best qualified but the most appropriate candidate for president Once the individual who best fits the institution’s needs has been identified and appointed, then an equally important onboarding process must be initiated which includes mutual agreement between the president and board on job priorities, the process and timing of performance evaluation and identifying areas for professional development and mentorship Careful attention to both dimensions of search and on-boarding by all Canadian universities and their boards of governors should contribute significantly to a much higher success rate in subsequent presidencies REFERENCES Badaracco, J L., & Ellsworth, R R (1989) Leadership and the Quest for Integrity Boston: Harvard Business School Press Berdahl, J (2015a) Did president Arvind Gupta lose the masculinity contest? Retrieved from http:// jberdahl.blogspot.ca/2015/08/did-president-arvind-gupta-lose.html Berdahl, J (2015b) Academic Freedom and UBC Retrieved from /08 http://jberdahl.blogspot.ca/2015/ academic-freedom-and-ubc.html Bergquist, W H., & Pawlak, K (2008) Engaging the Six Cultures of the Academy Revised and expanded edition of The Four Cultures of the Academy San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, John Wiley & Sons Cafley, J M (2015) Leadership in Higher Education: Case Study Research of Canadian University Presidents with Unfinished Mandates [Unpublished doctoral dissertation] University of Ottawa: Ottawa, Ontario Duke, C (2002) Managing the Learning University Buckingham, UK: Society for Research into Higher Education, Open University Fullan, M., & Scott, G (2009) Turnaround Leadership for Higher Education San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Levy, B (2014, July 15) Memo on controversial U of S firing leaked News Talk 650 CKOM Retrieved from www.ckom.com/article/192893/memo-controversial-u-s-firing-leaked MacKinnon, P (2014) University Leadership and Public Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A President’s Perspective Toronto: University of Toronto Press Padilla, A (2005) Portraits in Leadership: Six Extraordinary University Presidents Westport, CT: Praeger Paul, R H (1990) Open Learning and Open Management: Leadership and Integrity in Distance Education London: Kogan Page Paul, R H (2015) Leadership under Fire: The Challenging Role of the Canadian University President (2nd ed.) Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press 79 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership Schein, E (1999) The Corporate Culture Survival Guide San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Shapiro, B J., Cote, A C., & Jones, G A (2011, June15) Strengthening Governance at Concordia: A Collective Challenge In Report of the External Governance Review Committee Montreal: Concordia University Smith, L (2015, October 15) Summary of the fact-finding process and conclusions regarding alleged breaches of academic freedom and other university policies at the University of British Columbia Retrieved from http://president.ubc.ca/files/2015/10/Summary-of-Process-and-Conclusions-Final.pdf Tractenberg, S J., Kauvar, G B., & Bogue, E G (2013) Presidencies Derailed: Why University Leaders Fail and How to Prevent it Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press Turpin, D H (2014, July) The President’s Leadership Dilemma: Exploring the Tensions between University Autonomy and Public Accountability Paper presented at the meeting of the AASCU, Vancouver, Canada Turpin, D H., De Decker, L., & Boyd, B (2014, December) Historical changes in the Canadian university presidency: An empirical analysis of changes in length of service and experience since 1840 Canadian Journal of Public Administration, 57(4), 573–588 doi:10.1111/capa.12087 Woodsworth, J (2013) Setting Strategic Directions from the Presidential Suite: Hurdles and Successes In P Axelrod, R D Trilokekar, T Shanahan, & R Wellen (Eds.), Making Policy in Turbulent Times: Challenges and Prospects for Higher Education (pp 117–136) Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press ENDNOTES 80 It is important to recognize that “failed presidency” refers to the whole institution and not necessarily to the incumbent in the position Whatever the case, any such failure is clearly that of the institution as a whole, either for selecting someone ultimately inappropriate to the task and/or failing to provide the individual with the requisite mentorship and support For a more detailed account of recent changes in the role of a Canadian university president, see Leadership Under Fire, 10-13u AUCC, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada recently changed its name to Universities Canada While not an accrediting agency, membership in AUCC has always been considered a mark of legitimacy among the country’s degree-granting institutions ... Education and the Premier for inappropriate involvement in the affair.As her predecessor in the role, Peter MacKinnon (2014), has stated it, 70 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University. .. Challenging Role of the Canadian University President (2nd ed.) Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press 79 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University Leadership Schein, E (1999)... speculative and not always well informed, mainly because the facts of the case are shrouded in confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements 66 Increasing Failure Rates in Canadian University