Managerial economics and business strategy 8th baye

www.downloadslide.com 8e new digital Offerings for your Managerial Economics Course! McGraw-Hill’s premier online assignment and assessment tool, Connect Plus®, is now offered with the 8th edition Connect gives instructors the ability to assign and automatically grade literally hundreds of end-of-chapter problems (including algorithmic variants), and options to provide students with immediate, detailed feedback and answers Connect Plus also offers an integrated eBook, enabling anytime, anywhere access to the textbook • Available within Connect or standalone, LearnSmart is an adaptive learning tool that allows students to continually test their mastery of basic and more complex concepts within each chapter LearnSmart identifies what an individual student knows and doesn’t know, and helps students learn faster, study more efficiently, and retain more knowledge To learn more about the resources available to you, visit www.mhhe.com/baye8e Managerial Economics 8e and Business Strategy ISBN 978-0-07-352322-4 MHID 0-07-352322-4 EAN Michael R Baye • JeffRey T PRince www.mhhe.com www.ebook3000.com MD DALIM 1221829 1/2/13 CYAN MAG YELO BLACK • Each chapter contains many Demonstration Problems along with detailed answers One key Demonstration Problem in each chapter now features an accompanying video tutorial, which walks through the solutions step-by-step Students can access these videos on the text website, or through the Connect Plus eBook Managerial Economics Business Strategy New for this edition: and Baye and Prince’s Managerial Economics and Business Strategy provides a complete solution designed to help students use tools from intermediate microeconomics, game theory, and industrial organization to make sound managerial decisions A range of print and digital formats combined with frontier research, inclusion of modern topics, and balanced coverage of traditional and modern microeconomics produce a new offering that is easier to teach from and more dynamic and engaging for students Baye PRince www.downloadslide.com McGraw-Hill Connect® Plus Economics, a proven digital solution that will help you achieve your course goals of improving student readiness, enhancing student engagement, and increasing their comprehension of content, is now available with Baye and Prince’s Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, Eighth Edition! PROVEN EFFECTIVE You can utilize publisher-provided materials, or add your own materials, to design a complete course to help your students achieve higher outcomes Instructor access includes: • Simple assignment management, allowing you to spend more time teaching • Auto-graded assignments, quizzes, and tests • Detailed Visual Reporting where student and section results can be viewed and analyzed • Sophisticated online testing capability • A filtering and reporting function that allows you to easily assign and report on materials that are correlated to learning outcomes, Bloom’s taxonomy, and more • Instructor materials to help supplement your course Student access includes: • Easy online access to homework, tests, and quizzes • Immediate feedback and 24-hour tech support • Quick access to lectures, additional practice materials, an eBook, and more! The Eighth Edition of Baye and Prince includes many components specific to this product proven to increase student success McGraw-Hill’s adaptive learning component, LearnSmart™, provides assignable modules that help students master core concepts and come to class more prepared Graphing Tools allow students to complete relevant graphing exercises and problems associated with the end-of-chapter materials and then receive immediate feedback Videos for selected Demonstration Problems provide an additional method for students to learn key quantitative concepts These problems can be linked to through the ConnectPlus eBook, and also are on the text’s Online Learning Center See the next two pages for more details on LearnSmart, the graphing tool, eBooks, and Tegrity lecture capture – all available with Connect Plus Economics! www.ebook3000.com www.downloadslide.com Get Connected FEATURES LearnSmart™ McGraw-Hill LearnSmart is an adaptive learning program that identifies what an individual student knows and doesn’t know LearnSmart’s adaptive learning path helps students learn faster, study more efficiently, and retain more knowledge Reports available for both students and instructors indicate where students need to study more and assess their success rate in retaining knowledge Graphing Tool The graphing tool within Connect Economics provides opportunities for students to draw, interact with, manipulate, and analyze graphs in their online auto-graded assignments, as they would with pencil and paper The Connect graphs are identical in presentation to the graphs in the book, so students can easily relate their assignments to their reading material www.ebook3000.com www.downloadslide.com Get Engaged eBooks Connect Plus includes a media-rich eBook that allows you to share your notes with your students Your students can insert and review their own notes, highlight the text, search for specific information, and interact with media resources Using an eBook with Connect Plus gives your students a complete digital solution that allows them to access their materials from any computer Videos of key Demonstration Problems are linked next to the applicable Demonstration Problems within each of the chapters Lecture Capture Make your classes available anytime, anywhere With simple, one-click recording, students can search for a word or phrase and be taken to the exact place in your lecture that they need to review www.ebook3000.com bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/10/13 2:35 PM Page i Confirming Pages www.downloadslide.com Managerial Economics and Business Strategy www.ebook3000.com bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/10/13 2:35 PM Confirming Pages Page ii www.downloadslide.com The McGraw-Hill Series Economics ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS Brue, McConnell, and Flynn Essentials of Economics Third Edition Mandel Economics: The Basics Second Edition Schiller Essentials of Economics Eighth Edition PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS Colander Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Ninth Edition Frank and Bernanke Principles of Economics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics Fifth Edition Frank and Bernanke Brief Editions: Principles of Economics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics Second Edition McConnell, Brue, and Flynn Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Ninteenth Edition McConnell, Brue, and Flynn Brief Editions: Microeconomics and Macroeconomics Second Edition Miller Principles of Microeconomics First Edition Samuelson and Nordhaus Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Nineteenth Edition Schiller The Economy Today, The Micro Economy Today, and The Macro Economy Today Thirteenth Edition Slavin Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Tenth Edition ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL ISSUES Guell Issues in Economics Today Sixth Edition Sharp, Register, and Grimes Economics of Social Issues Twentieth Edition ECONOMETRICS Gujarati and Porter Basic Econometrics Fifth Edition Gujarati and Porter Essentials of Econometrics Fourth Edition MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS Baye and Prince Managerial Economics and Business Strategy Eighth Edition Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture Fifth Edition Thomas and Maurice Managerial Economics Eleventh Edition MONEY AND BANKING Cecchetti and Schoenholtz Money, Banking, and Financial Markets Third Edition URBAN ECONOMICS O’Sullivan Urban Economics Eighth Edition LABOR ECONOMICS Borjas Labor Economics Sixth Edition McConnell, Brue, and Macpherson Contemporary Labor Economics Tenth Edition PUBLIC FINANCE Rosen and Gayer Public Finance Ninth Edition Seidman Public Finance First Edition ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS Field and Field Environmental Economics: An Introduction Sixth Edition INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS Bernheim and Whinston Microeconomics Second Edition Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz Macroeconomics Eleventh Edition Frank Microeconomics and Behavior Eighth Edition ADVANCED ECONOMICS Romer Advanced Macroeconomics Fourth Edition www.ebook3000.com INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Appleyard, Field, and Cobb International Economics Eighth Edition King and King International Economics, Globalization, and Policy: A Reader Fifth Edition Pugel International Economics Fifteenth Edition bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/10/13 2:35 PM Page iii Confirming Pages www.downloadslide.com EIGHTH EDITION Managerial Economics and Business Strategy Michael R Baye Bert Elwert Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy Kelley School of Business Indiana University Jeffrey T Prince Associate Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy Kelley School of Business Indiana University www.ebook3000.com bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/15/13 11:59 AM Page iv www.downloadslide.com MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS STRATEGY Published by McGraw-Hill/Irwin, a business unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY, 10020 Copyright © 2014 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Previous editions © 2010, 2008, and 2006 No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the United States This book is printed on acid-free paper DOC/DOC ISBN 978-0-07-352322-4 MHID 0-07-352322-4 Senior Vice President, Products & Markets: Kurt L Strand Vice President, Content Production & Technology Services: Kimberly Meriwether David Managing Director: Douglas Reiner Executive Brand Manager: Michele Janicek Executive Director of Development: Ann Torbert Managing Development Editor: Christina Kouvelis Director of Digital Content: Doug Ruby Marketing Manager: Katie Hoenicke Content Project Manager: Marianne L Musni Buyer II: Debra R Sylvester Senior Designer: Lisa King Cover/Interior Designer: Lisa King Cover Image: ©Design Pics / Kristy-Anne Glubish Typeface: 10/12 Times Roman Compositor: Laserwords Private Limited Printer: R R Donnelley All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baye, Michael R., 1958Managerial economics and business strategy / Michael R Baye, Bert Elwert Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy Kelley, School of Business, Indiana University, Jeffrey T Prince, Associate Professor of Business Economic & Public Policy Kelly, School of Business, Indiana University.— Eighth edition pages cm.—(The McGraw-Hill series economics) Includes index ISBN-13: 978-0-07-352322-4 (alk.paper) ISBN-10: 0-07-352322-4 (alk paper) Managerial economics Strategic planning I Prince, Jeffrey T II Title HD30.22.B38 2014 338.5024'658—dc23 2012048859 The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication The inclusion of a website does not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill, and McGraw-Hill does not guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites www.mhhe.com www.ebook3000.com Rev.Confirming Pages bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/10/13 2:35 PM Confirming Pages Page v www.downloadslide.com DEDICATION To my former students —Michael R Baye To Annie and Kate —Jeffrey T Prince www.ebook3000.com bay23224_fm_i-xxxvi.qxd 1/10/13 2:35 PM Page vi Confirming Pages www.downloadslide.com ABOUT THE AUTHORS Michael R Baye is the Bert Elwert Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy at Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business, and served as the Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission from July 2007 to December 2008 He received his B.S in economics from Texas A&M University in 1980 and earned a Ph.D in economics from Purdue University in 1983 Prior to joining Indiana University, he taught graduate and undergraduate courses at The Pennsylvania State University, Texas A&M University, and the University of Kentucky He has held a variety of editorial posts in economics, marketing, and business, and currently serves as a co-editor for the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Professor Baye has won numerous awards for his outstanding teaching and research, and teaches courses in managerial economics and industrial organization at the undergraduate, M.B.A., and Ph.D levels His research has been published in the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, the Review of Economic Studies, the Economic Journal, and Management Science It has also been featured in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, the New York Times, and numerous other outlets When he is not teaching or engaged in research, Mike enjoys activities ranging from camping to shopping for electronic gadgets Jeffrey T Prince is Associate Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy at Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business He received his B.A in economics and B.S in mathematics and statistics from Miami University in 1998 and earned a Ph.D in economics from Northwestern University in 2004 Prior to joining Indiana University, he taught graduate and undergraduate courses at Cornell University Professor Prince has won top teaching honors as a faculty member at both Indiana University and Cornell, and as a graduate student at Northwestern He has a broad research agenda within applied economics, having written and published on topics that include demand in technology markets, Internet diffusion, regulation in health care, risk aversion in insurance markets, and quality competition among airlines He is one of a small number of economists to have published in both the top journal in economics (American Economic Review) and the top journal in management (Academy of Management Journal) He currently serves on the editorial board for Information Economics and Policy In his free time, Jeff enjoys activities ranging from poker and bridge to running and racquetball vi bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 623 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 623 General Index Conde Nast Publications, 572 Conduct across industries; see Industry; Structure–conduct–performance paradigm Confidence intervals, 103 Conglomerate mergers, 260 Constant returns to scale, 193 Constraints budget, 129–131, 132 identifying, 4–5 income change, 131–133 and market rate of substitution, 130–131 price changes, 133–134 types of, 128 Consumer behavior applications of indifference curve analysis, 141–145 comparative static analysis income changes, 138–139 income effect, 141 price changes, 135–137 substitution effect, 150–151 completeness, 125 constraints on, 128–134 diminishing marginal rate of substitution, 127 implications of scarcity, 134 indifference curve analysis, 125–128 marginal rate of substitution, 126 more is better, 125–126 need for model of, 124 opportunities, 124 preferences, 124, 125 risk preferences, 128 stockpiling, 43 transitivity, 127 and uncertainty chain stores, 453 consumer search, 453–456 insurance, 453 product quality, 451–453 risk aversion, 451–452 risk loving, 451 risk neutral, 451 Consumer choices; see Choices Consumer–consumer rivalry, 13 Consumer equilibrium, 134–135 effect of income changes, 138–139 effect of price changes, 135–137 and income effect, 141 and substitution effect, 140–141 Consumer expectations, 43 Consumer lock-in, 510–511 Consumer opportunities, 124 Consumer preferences, 124 and indifference curves, 125–128 ordering, 125–127 utility function, 161 Consumer–producer rivalry, 13 Consumers, 124 with asymmetric information, 462 and Bertrand duopoly, 346–348 brand loyalty, 435–436 choices, 141–145 equilibrium choice, 135 fairness of price discrimination, 417 objectives, 134 sequential bargaining game, 397 utility maximization, 161–162 Consumer search costs, 455 expected benefits, 454–455 free recall, 454 optimal strategy, 455 replacement, 454 reservation price, 454–456 rule, 455 uncertainty in, 453–456 Consumer surplus, 46–48 and industry performance, 261–262 pricing strategies to extract block pricing, 424–426 commodity bundling, 426–429 cross-subsidies, 430–431 peak-load pricing, 429–430 price discrimination, 416–422 transfer pricing, 431–433 two-part pricing, 422–424 Consumer tastes, 42 Contestable market, 351 absence of sunk costs, 351–352 conditions for, 351 equilibrium price, 351 free entry, 351 market power, 351 Continuous decisions, 22–24 Contract enforcement, 546–547 Contracts, 213 coal and natural gas, 222 General Motors and Fisher Body, 225 incentive, 228, 229–230 for optimal input procurement, 220–223 optimal length, 221–223 pay-for-performance, 233 specialized investments, 220 up-front expenditures, 220 Control variable, 20, 23 Coordination decisions, 373–374 Coordination game, 374 Copyright protection, 293 Corel, 89 Correlated value estimates, 472 Correlated values auction, optimal bidding strategy, 475–476 Cost complementarities, 195–196, 291 from cross-subsidies, 431 source of monopoly power, 291 Cost considerations, legal, 488 Cost curves, 279 Cost function, 183 algebraic forms, 190–191 average fixed cost, 186 average total cost, 187 average variable cost, 186–187 constant returns to scale, 193–194 Cournot oligopoly, 348–349 cubic, 190–191 diseconomies of scale, 193–194 economic vs accounting costs, 194 economies of scale, 193–194 estimating, 192 fixed and sunk costs, 189–190 long-run costs, 191–193 marginal, 191 marginal cost, 187–188 in monopoly, 296 multiple-output, 195–198 multiproduct, 291 in perfect competition, 280–281 relations among costs, 185–186, 188–189 short-run costs, 184–186 Stackelberg duopoly, 349 value of, 184 Costly bargaining, 216 Cost minimization, 179–181, 211–212 in acquiring inputs, 224–226 input mix, 180 Cost-minimizing input rule, 181 Costs calculus of, 207–209 economic vs accounting, 194–195 incremental, 24 Cournot duopoly, 350, 415 marginal revenue, 332–333 raising rivals' costs, 500–501 reaction functions, 333–334 spreadsheet, 350 Cournot equilibrium, 332, 339, 340–342, 348–349, 501 Cournot oligopoly, 330, 348–349 best-response function, 331 changes in marginal costs, 338–340 collusion in, 340–342 compared to other models, 348–351 compared to Sweezy oligopoly, 339–340 conditions for, 330 equilibrium, 330–335 isoprofit curves, 336–338 marginal revenue for duopoly, 332–333 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 342 pricing rule, 414–416 reaction functions, 330–335 spreadsheet, 350 Credit cards, 132 Cross-advertising elasticity of demand, 94 Cross-price elasticity of demand, 89 examples, 90 formula, 89 linear demand function, 95–96 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 624 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 624 General Index new car sales, 91 nonlinear demand function, 96–99 pricing decisions of firms, 90 and substitutes, 89 Cross-subsidy, 430–431 Crown Holdings, 246, 247 Cubic cost function, 190–191 Customers; see Consumers Cut-throat competition, 348 Dansby-Willig performance index, 262 Deadweight loss, 303 of in-kind gifts, 146 of monopoly, 302–303, 525 of price ceilings, 59 Decision making, 3–4; see also Output decisions in advertising, 310–312 with asymmetric information, 462–463 continuous decisions, 22–24 discrete decisions, 20–22 identifying goals and constraints, 4–5 incremental decisions, 24–25 by managers, 147–149 and market trends, 38 multiplant, 299–301 risk and, 451–453, 458–459 sunk costs, 189–190 timing for first movers, 504–506 by workers, 145–147 Decision nodes, 390–391 Decrease in demand, 40 Decrease in supply, 48 Decreasing marginal returns, 168 Dedicated assets, 215 Dell Inc., 11, 82, 195, 266, 506 Demand; see also Law of demand changes in, 40, 62–64 comparative static analysis, 62–64 decrease in, 40 elastic, 80 factors affecting, 38–39 increase in, 40 individual, 150 inelastic, 80 for labor, 170–172 law of, 40 linear, 95–96 log-linear, 897–899 and marginal revenue, 87 market, 151 in market economies, 38 in oligopolies, 327–328 perfectly elastic, 83 perfectly inelastic, 83 for public goods, 539–540 residual, 490–491 short- vs long-term, 86 unitary elastic, 80 varying by industry, 253–255 Demand curve to ascertain value, 46–48 graphing, 45–46 and indifference curves, 150, 151 kinked, 330 market, 39–40 in monopolistic competition, 304 for monopoly, 288–289, 292 movement along, 40 peak-load pricing, 429–430 in perfect competition, 276, 278 and price discrimination, 418 shift factors, 40–44 shifts in, 40 Sweezy oligopoly, 328–329 Demand estimation, 100–101 Demand function, 44 Cournot oligopoly, 348–349 inverse, 45–46, 295 linear, 44–45, 80–81, 95–96, 101, 295, 413 log-linear, 106–108 obtaining elasticities from, 94–99 and pricing decisions, 413 Stackelberg duopoly, 349 Demand schedule, 39 Demand shifters, 40–44, 109 advertising, 40, 42–43 consumer expectations, 43 consumer tastes, 42 income, 40, 41–42 population composition, 43 prices of related goods, 40, 42 Department of Commerce, 94 Department of Justice and American Airlines, 498 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 259, 267, 528–529, 552 and mergers, 259–260 Microsoft case, 490 Dependent variable, 104–105 Deregulation of electricity, 533 Design patent, 293 Deutsche Telekom, 567 Differentiated-product Bertrand oligopoly, 348, 361–363 Digital TV, 575 Digital video recorders, 480–481 Dilemma, 371 Diminishing marginal rate of substitution, 127 Diminishing marginal returns, 168 Direct broadcast satellite operators, 577 Direct network externality, 509 DirecTV, 577 Discounts, 417, 419 Discrete decisions, 20–22 Diseconomies of scale, 193, 289 Dish Network, 577 Disney World Theme Parks, 409, 437–438 Diversification and risk, 458–459 Dividends, 17–18 Division managers, 431–433 Dixons Group, 567 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 544 Dominant strategy, 367–369, 505 Double marginalization, 432 Dow Chemical, 247 Downstream divisions, 431–433 DreamWorks, 570 Duality theory, 192 Duopoly Bertrand, 366, 369–372 collusive, 350 Cournot, 350 pricing game, 384–387 spreadsheet for calculation, 350 Stackelberg, 350 Dutch auction, 470 expected revenues, 477–478 risk-averse bidders, 478 Earthlink, 566 eBay, 428, 470, 511 EchoStar, 577 Econometrics, 100–101, 111 Economic costs vs accounting costs, 194 Economic profit, versus accounting profit, 5–6 Economics, proficiency in, 25–26 purposes of terminology, 25 reasons for studying, Economic trade-off in acquiring inputs, 224–226 Economies of scale, 193, 289 as barrier to entry, 255 in electricity market, 192 in international companies, 194 natural monopoly, 529 source of monopoly power, 289–290 Economies of scope, 195, 290 and cost allocation, 198 from cross-subsidies, 431 and mergers, 197–198 source of monopoly power, 290–291 and subsidiaries, 197–198 Elastic demand, 80 perfectly, 83 Elasticity, 79 short- vs long-term, 86 Elasticity of demand advertising elasticity, 94 arc, 84 aspects of, 79, 80 based on regression analysis, 107 cross-advertising elasticity, 94 cross-price elasticity of demand, 89–92 demand functions for obtaining, 94–99 income elasticity, 92–93 individual firms, 256 market level, 256 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 625 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 625 General Index Elasticity of demand—Cont in monopoly, 292 own price elasticity of demand, 79–89 and price discrimination, 420 and pricing decisions, 412–413 Rothschild index, 254–255 third-degree price discrimination, 419–420 and total revenue, 80–83 unitary elastic demand, 80 varying by industry, 253–255 Electricity deregulation, 533 Electric utilities, 222 Eli Lilly Company, 291 Emerson Electric, 247 Employees; see Workers End-of-period problem applications, 389–390 contract enforcement, 546–547 nature of, 378–388 Energy Policy Act, 533 English auction, 469 expected revenues, 477 optimal bidding strategy, 473 risk-averse bidders, 478 Entry, 8–9 failure to deter, 491–492 free, 275–276 limit pricing to prevent, 489–498 in monopolistic competition, 303, 307 potential for, 255 threat in perfect competition, 285–286 Entry game, 393–395 Entry strategy, 394 Equilibrium; see also Nash equilibrium Cournot oligopoly, 330–335 Stackelberg oligopoly, 343–345 subgame perfect, 392, 493 Equilibrium choice, 135 Equilibrium price calculating, 65 and changes in supply, 64 in contestable markets, 351 in Cournot oligopoly, 335 determination of, 54–56 with price restrictions, 56–62 with simultaneous supply and demand shifts, 64–67 unpopular, 56 Equilibrium quantity, 55 with simultaneous supply and demand shifts, 64–67 ESPN, 575 European Commission, 528 European Union antitrust policy, 490, 528 online shopping, 107 Excise tariff, 550, 551 Excise taxes, 50 Ex-dividend date, 17–18 Exit free, 275–276 in monopolistic competition, 303, 307 in perfect competition, 285–286 Expected value; see Mean Expenditure share, and own price elasticity of demand, 86–87 Explicit costs, 5–6 Extensive-form game, 390, 396 External incentives, 230 Externalities, 534–538 Clean Air Act, 535–537 negative, 534 network, 509–510 ExxonMobil, 526 Factors of production fixed, 164–165 variable, 165 Fairchild Publications, 572 Fast-food industry, 303–304, 312 Federal Communications Commission, 77–78 auction of licenses, 111–112 media ownership restrictions, 564 spectrum auction, 447, 479 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 533 Federal Reserve Board, Regulation Z, 544 Federal Trade Commission merger approval, 552 and mergers, 260, 267 and truth in advertising, 545 Feedback critique, 263–264 Finitely repeated games end-of-period problem, 387–390 known final period, 376–388 uncertain final period, 384–387 Firm demand curve, 276 Firms collusion and number of, 381 contribution to public goods, 542 downstream divisions, 431–433 forces for disciplining managers, 229–230 goals in global economy, input procurement methods, 212–214 largest, 247 managerial compensation, 227–229 manager–worker principal–agent problem, 231–234 maximizing value of, 16 multiproduct, 136, 195–197, 291 number of, as supply shifter, 49 optimal input procurement, 218–227 own-price elasticity of demand, 256 pricing decisions, 90 principal–agent problem, 227–229 profit-maximization goal, 6–7 role of incentives, 11–12 separation of ownership and control, 228 specialized investments, 215–218 transaction costs, 214–218 and uncertainty producer search, 460 profit maximization, 460–461 risk aversion, 456–459 upstream divisions, 431–433 vertical integration, 213, 223–224 Firm size, 246–247 and collusion, 382 and monopoly, 288 Firm supply curve, 284–285 First-degree price discrimination, 417–418 First-mover advantage, 343 business environment, 506 definition, 504 dominant strategy, 505 due to consumer lock-in, 510–511 and eBay, 511 learning curve effects, 494 payoff, 505–506 questionable validity, 506 rationale for, 504 Stackelberg oligopoly, 504 timing of decision, 505 First-price, sealed-bid auction, 469–470 expected revenues, 477 optimal bidding strategy, 474 risk-averse bidders, 478 Fisher Body Company, 225 Five forces framework barriers to entry, 8–9 buyer power, feedback effects, 264 and industry profitability, 8–11 industry rivalry, 9–10 substitutes and complements, 10–11 supplier power, Fixed costs, 184 average, 186 and raising rivals' costs, 501–502 relation to other costs, 185–186, 188–189 and sunk costs, 189–190 Fixed factors of production, 165 Fixed-proportions production function, 172–173 Fixed salary, 242 Follower, in Stackelberg oligopoly, 343 Ford Motor Company, 261 Four-firm concentration ratio, 248 basis of, 250 limitations, 251 U.S industry, 250 France Telecom, 567 Free entry and exit in contestable markets, 351 in monopolistic competition, 303 in perfect competition, 275–276 Free recall, 454 Free-rider problem, 539, 540–541, 548 Fringe benefits, 184 F-statistic, 106, 109 Full economic price, 58 Future value, 14–15 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 626 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 626 General Index Gains to cheating, 384 Game theory; see also First-mover advantage; Limit pricing; Penetration pricing advertising game, 373 Bertrand duopoly game, 366 and cola wars, 372 coordination game, 374 dominant strategy, 367–368 finitely repeated games, 384–390 infinitely repeated games, 377–384 mixed (randomized) strategy, 375 multistage games, 390–397 Nash bargaining game, 376–377 Nash equilibrium, 369, 370 normal-form game, 366–367 one-shot games, 365 payoff, 365 product quality game, 383–384 repeated games, 365 secure strategy, 368–369 sequential-move games, 365 simultaneous-move, one-shot games, 366–377 simultaneous-move games, 365 strategy, 366–369 US Airways, 364, 399 Gasoline prices, and new car sales, 91 Gasoline retailers frequent-filler programs, 436 marginal cost, 352–353 Gateway Computer, 266 General Electric, 564 General Mills, 348 General Motors, 225 Gift certificates, 142–145 Global economy, goals of firms in, Globalization, and supply of automobiles, 64 Global markets, 251 competition in, 283 entry strategy, 394 Goals in global economy, identifying, 4–5 Golf Digest Companies, 572 Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 261 Google Inc., 210, 234, 247 Government antitrust policy, 525–529 certification policy, 543–544 contract enforcement, 545–547 dealing with externalities, 534–538 deregulation of electricity, 533 and incomplete information, 542–547 insider trading rules, 432 and market failure, 524–547 merger approval, 523 policy in international trade, 548–552 on telecommunications, 579 price regulation, 529–534 provision of public goods, 536–542 rent seeking, 547–548 truth in advertising, 545 truth in lending, 544–545 Government intervention benefits of, 524–525 to increase social welfare, 524 in markets, 13–14 price ceilings, 57–60 price floors, 61–62 Government regulation as supply shifter, 49 unintended consequences, 184 Green marketing, 309 Haas School of Business, 107, 457 Harper Collins, 573 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act, 529 Health insurance, 64 HealthNet International, 149 Hearst Magazines, 572 Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 249 in antitrust policy, 528–529 horizontal integration, 259–260 limitations, 251 for software market, 267 U.S industry concentration, 249–251 Hertz, 62 Hewlett-Packard, 11, 107, 247 Hidden action, 463 Hidden characteristics, 463 Hidden transaction costs, 214 High-definition TV, 579–580 High-speed Internet service, 576 "Hold-up problem," 217–218 Home Box Office, 563, 575 Home video distributors, 571 Horizontal integration, 259–260 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Department of Justice), 259, 267, 528–529, 552 Horizontal mergers, 259 Housing market, 84 Hubs, 508–509 Human capital, 216 Hynix Semiconductor, 37 IBM, 11, 247, 506 iid normal random variables, 103 Illinois Tool Works, 247 Implicit costs, 5–6 Incentive contracts, 228, 229–230 Incentive plans, 12 Incentives external, 230 indifference curve approach, 241–244 manager–worker principal–agent problem, 231–234 output-oriented, 149 pay for performance, 233 piece rate system, 232 for rent-seeking activities, 547–548 role in firms, 11–12 understanding, 11–12 Income decline in Japan, 41 as demand shifter, 40, 41 versus leisure, 145–147 Income changes and budget line, 131–133 and consumer behavior, 138–139 and income effect, 141 and substitution effect, 141 Income effect, 141 and business cycles, 139 Income elasticity of demand, 92 examples, 93 linear demand function, 95–96 nonlinear demand function, 96–99 normal vs inferior goods, 92–93 Income–leisure choice, 145–147 Incomplete information, 495 and asymmetric information, 542–547 certification policy, 543–544 enforcement of contracts, 545–547 limit pricing, 494 rules against insider trading, 534 truth in advertising, 545 Truth in Lending Act, 544–545 Increase in demand, 40 Increase in supply, 48 Increasing marginal returns, 168 Incremental costs, 24 in advertising, 310 Incremental decisions, 24–25 Incremental revenues, 24 in advertising, 310 Indefinitely lived assets, 16–19 Independent movie distributors, 570 Independent private values, 471 Independent private values auction bidding strategy, 473–474 expected revenues, 477 Independent research and development, 171 India automobile industry, 194 cola wars, 372 Indifference curve, 125–126 applications of choices by consumers, 141–145 choices by workers and managers, 145–147 buy one, get one free, 141–142 cash gifts, 142–144 consumer equilibrium and, 134–135 convex from the origin, 127 and demand curves, 149–151 diminishing marginal rate of substitution, 126, 135 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 627 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 627 General Index Indifference curve—Cont family of, 127 gift certificates, 142–144 income–leisure choice, 145–147 in-kind gifts, 142–144 managerial decisions, 147–149 and managerial incentives, 241–244 of managers, 148 marginal rate of substitution, 127 and risk preferences, 128 shift of consumer preferences, 127 Indirect network externality, 509 Individual behavior; see also Consumer behavior applications of indifference curve analysis choices by consumers, 141–145 choices by workers and managers, 145–149 calculus approach to, 161–162 comparative static analysis, 135–141 constraints on, 128–134 income–leisure choice, 143–144 indifference curve analysis, 125–128 labor shortage problem, 152–153, 213 relationship between indifference curves and demand curves, 149–151 thought processes, 124 Individual demand, 150 Industry changes over time, 246–247 conduct across, 257–261 decision making, 246 demand and market conditions, 253–255, 256 in five forces framework barriers to entry, 8–9 buyer power, rivalry, 9–10 substitutes and complements, 10–11 supplier power, largest firms, 247 market structure, 246–255 media companies, 564 motion pictures, 567–571 network effects, 507–513 North American Industry Classification System, 252 own-price elasticity of demand, 256 potential for entry, 255 structure–conduct–performance paradigm, 263–264 technology differences, 253 Industry classification system, 252 Industry codes, 252 Industry concentration concentration ratios, 248–250 horizontal integration, 259–260 and intensity of rivalry, 9–10 limitations of measures, 251–253 Microsoft–Intuit merger failure, 245, 267 United States, 249–251 Industry definition, 251–253 Industry performance; see also Structure– conduct–performance paradigm and consumer surplus, 261–262 Dansby-Willig performance index, 262 indicators, 261–263 and producer surplus, 261–262 Industry profitability, 8–11 Industry rivalry, 9–10 Industry supply curve, 284–285 Inelastic demand, 80 perfectly, 83 for prescription drugs, 88 short-term, 86 Inferior goods, 41–42, 44 effect of income changes, 138–139 and income elasticity of demand, 92–93 Infinitely repeated game, 377 application to product quality, 383–384 factors affecting collusion, 381–383 present value and, 378 theory, 377–381 trigger strategy, 378–380 Information; see also Incomplete information mean of random variables, 448–449 perfect, 471 perfect information assumption, 448 spectrum auctions, 447, 479 standard deviation, 450 uncertainty auctions, 468–478 consumer behavior, 451–456 and firms, 456–461 and markets, 462–468 and statistical concepts, 448–451 value in online markets, 457 variance of random variables, 449–451 Informative advertising, 42 In-kind gifts, 142–145 deadweight loss, 146 Innovation game, 394–395 Innovative firms, 171 Input prices as supply shifter, 49 Inputs algebraic analysis, 172–175 in auto industry, 227 capital, 164 cost-minimizing mix of, 180–181 cost of inefficient procurement, 218 and costs of production, 176 fixed factors of production, 164–165 and isocosts, 178–179 and isoquants, 175–178 labor, 164 nonstandard, 213 optimal mix, 209 optimal mix of labor and capital, 179–181 optimal procurement contracts, 220–223 economic trade-off, 224–227 spot exchange, 218–219 vertical integration, 223–224 optimal substitution, 181–183 procurement methods, 212–214 profit-maximizing usage, 170–172, 207–208 right level of, 169–172 transaction costs for, 213–218 variable factors of production, 165 Input substitution and fringe benefits, 184 Input suppliers, Insider trading, 543 Insurance, 453 adverse selection, 463–464 and moral hazard, 465 Integration, 258 horizontal, 259–260 vertical, 259 Interdependence in oligopolies, 326–328 Interest rates, 14–15 and limit pricing, 495–497 and usury laws, 60 International Association of Machinists, 198 International companies, economies of scale in, 194 International trade, U.S legislation, 49 International trade restrictions quotas, 548–550 tariffs, 550–552 Internet service provider marketing, 565–566 Intuit, 245, 267 Inventory management, 136 Inverse demand function, 45–46, 295 Inverse supply function, 53 Investors, 128 Isocost, 178–179 Isocost line, 178 and optimal input substitution, 181–183 slope of, 180 Isoprofit curve, 336–338, 343 Isoquant, 175–178 convex shape, 176 slope of, 180, 208 Japan decline in income, 41 Kobe earthquake, 64–65 Job mobility, 230 Kelkoo.com, 107, 347 Kelley School of Business, 107, 457 Kellogg's, 261, 348 Kentucky Fried Chicken, Kinked demand curve, 330 Kirin Brewing Company, Ltd., 41 Known final period games, 387–388 Labor average product of, 166, 173–174 optimal level of, 179–181 production input, 164 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 628 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 628 General Index substituting capital for, 182 substituting computers for, 183 value marginal product of, 169–172 Labor costs, 64, 182–183 Labor demand, 170–172 Labor–leisure choice, 145–147 Labor shortage, 123, 152–153 Lanham Act, 545 Law of demand, 39, 40 and demand function, 44 and price, 46 Law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution, 178 Law of supply, 48 Leaders, in Stackelberg oligopoly, 343 Learning curve effects, 493–494 Least squares regression, 101 Lenovo, 11 Leontief production function, 172 isoquants, 178 Lerner index, 257 for selected industries, 258 Licensing certification, 543–544 to raise rivals' costs, 501 of technology, 171 Limit pricing, 489 dynamic considerations, 495–497 effective, 492 failure to deter entry, 491–492 Microsoft, 490 and monopoly price, 489–490 necessary conditions for, 496 preentry price to postentry profits commitment mechanisms, 492–493 incomplete information, 494 learning curve effects, 493–494 reputation effects, 494–495 residual demand, 490–491 theoretical basis, 489–491 and United States Steel, 497 Linear demand function, 44–45, 80–81, 101, 413 elasticities for, 95–96 inverse, 295 Linear production function, 172, 178–179 marginal product for, 174 Linear supply curve, 52 Linear supply function, 52 Little, Brown & Company, 573 Local markets, 251 Log-linear demand, 97 Log-linear demand function, 106–108 definition, 97 elasticities for, 97–98 formula, 97 Log-linear regression line, 107 Long-run average cost curve, 192–193 Long-run competitive equilibrium, 286–287 Long-run costs, 191–193 Long-run decisions, 164–165 in perfect competition, 285–287 Long-run equilibrium in monopolistic competition, 306–309 Loss minimization, 282–285 Low-income workers, 184 Low-price guarantees, 435 Lump-sum tariff, 550–551, 552 Magazine publishing, 572–573 Magazines online, 573 Management, effective five forces framework, 8–11 identifying goals and constraints, 4–5 nature and importance of profits, 5–11 time value of money, 14–19 understanding incentives, 11–12 understanding markets, 12–14 using marginal analysis, 19–25 Managerial compensation fixed salary, 228 incentive contracts, 228 incentive plans, 12 indifference curve approach, 241–244 pay for performance, 233 and principal–agent problem, 227–230 profit sharing, 228–229 revenue sharing, 231 and shirking problem, 228–230 and takeover threat, 230 Managerial economics, for effective management identify goals and constraints, 4–5 learning, 25–26 nature and importance of profits, 5–11 time value of money, 14–19 understand incentives, 11–12 understand markets, 12–14 using marginal analysis, 19–25 and five forces framework, 8–11 headlines involving, for not-for-profit organizations, reasons for studying, Managerial preferences, 147–149 Managers, 3, 26 avoiding winner's curse, 476 brand myopic, 310 decision making, 3–4 decisions and risk-averse consumers, 451–453 decisions by, 147–149 effect of asymmetric information, 462–463 incentive contracts, 229–230 job loss, job mobility, 230 of not-for-profit organizations, production decisions, 164 risk averse, 456–459 risk neutral, 63, 456 role in production, 168–172 shirking problem, 228–230 use of producer surplus, 54 Manager–worker principal–agent problem compensation, 231–233 monitoring, 232–234 one-shot games and, 374–376 Mapquest, 566 Marginal analysis, 19 calculus alternative, 23 continuous decisions, 22–24 discrete decisions, 20–22 incremental decisions, 24–25 marginal benefit, 21 marginal cost, 21 Marginal benefit, 21 of contract length, 221 Marginal cost, 21, 187–188 changes in Cournot oligopoly, 338–340 of contract length, 221 for cubic costs, 191 derivation of, 188 gasoline retailers, 252–253 Lerner index, 257 in monopolistic competition, 304–305 in monopoly, 297–299 in perfect competition, 287 and pollution emissions, 536–537 and predatory pricing, 499 and price discrimination, 419–420 price exceeding, 303 and raising rivals' costs, 500–501 relation to average cost, 209 Sweezy oligopoly, 329 and transfer pricing, 432–433 Marginal cost function, 191 Marginal net benefits, 20–22 Marginal principle, 22 Marginal product, 166–167 for Cobb-Douglas production function, 174–175 decreasing returns, 168 increasing returns, 168 for linear production function, 174 negative returns, 168 Marginal rate of substitution, 126, 135 calculus approach, 162 diminishing, 127 Marginal rate of technical substitution, 176 and cost minimization, 180 differing production functions, 176–178 Marginal revenue, 87, 277 in collusion, 250 in Cournot oligopoly, 332–333 for firms with market power, 412–413 in monopolistic competition, 304–305 in monopoly, 292–296, 297–299 and own price elasticity of demand, 87–89 and price discrimination, 419–420 Sweezy oligopoly, 329 and transfer pricing, 432–433 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 629 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 629 General Index Marginal value curves, 22 Market(s) collusion and history of, 382–383 consumer–consumer rivalry, 13 consumer–producer rivalry, 13 geographical range, 251 government intervention in, 13–14 producer–producer rivalry, 13 rivalry in transactions, 12–13 and uncertainty adverse selection, 463–464 asymmetric information, 462–466 hidden actions, 463 hidden characteristics, 463 moral hazard, 465–466 screening, 466–468 self-selection device, 467–468 signaling, 466–468 understanding by managers, 12–14 Market conditions, varying by industry, 253–255 Market demand, 151 Market demand curve, 39–40 and equilibrium price, 54 in monopolistic competition, 305 in perfect competition, 276 and price discrimination, 417–418 Market economies, 38 Market equilibrium comparative static analysis, 62–67 competitive, 54–55 effect of price ceilings, 57–60 effect of price floors, 61–62 Market failure antitrust policy and, 525–529 from asymmetric information, 543 benefits of government intervention, 524–525 externalities, 534–538 incomplete information, 542–547 versus market power, 524–547 price regulation and, 529–534 and property rights, 535 public goods, 538–542 Marketing Internet service providers, 565–566 in monopolistic competition, 309–310 Market inverse demand curve, 349–350 Market power, 524 from horizontal integration, 259–260 lacking in perfect competition, 265 marginal revenue and, 412–413 market failure due to, 524–547 in monopolistic competition, 265 in monopoly, 265 in oligopoly, 265–267 and pricing strategies, 410 Market price in contestable markets, 351 in perfect competition, 287 Market rate of substitution, 130–131 Market shares, movie industry, 570 Market structure, 246; see also Structure– conduct–performance paradigm computer industry, 266 demand, 253–255, 256 firm size, 246–247 industry concentration, 247–253 largest firms, 247 market conditions, 253–255, 256 monopolistic competition, 265, 303–310 monopoly, 265, 287–303 oligopoly, 265–267, 325–351 optimal advertising decisions, 310–312 perfect competition, 265, 275–287 potential for entry, 255 technology differences, 253 Market supply, 48 effect of lump-sum tariff, 551, 552 Market supply curve, 48, 534 and equilibrium price, 54 in perfect competition, 276, 285 Market trends, 38 Markup Cournot oligopoly, 414–415 monopolistic competition, 413 monopoly, 413 rules of thumb, 412 for selected industries, 258 Maruti Udyog Ltd., 195 Matsushita Plasma Display Panel Company Ltd., 194 McCaw, 447 McDonald's, 274, 304, 312 MCI, 576 Mean, 448 Mean-variance analysis, 456–458 Media consolidation, 564 Media One Group, 563 Medical costs, and moral hazard, 465–466 Mergers antitrust policy, 527–529 AOL Time Warner, 490 AOL Time Warner failure, 563 conglomerate, 260 and economies of scope, 197–198 friendly vs hostile, 258 Google and Motorola Mobility, 210, 234 horizontal, 259–260 media consolidation, 564 Nestlé and Ralston, 523, 552 takeovers, 259 vertical, 259 MGM, 564, 569 Microsoft Corporation, 10, 89, 245, 247, 267, 500, 566–567 Minimum retail price, 60 Minimum wage law, 60 Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, 579 Miramax, 570 Mitsui & Company, Ltd., Mixed strategy, 375 Money-back guarantees, 453 Monitoring costs, 382 Monitoring employees, 374–376 Monopolistically competitive market, 303 Monopolistic competition, 265 brand equity, 309 brand myopic managers, 310 calculus of profit maximization, 322–323 cannibalization, 306 comparative advertising, 309 compared to monopoly, 304 compared to perfect competition, 303–304 conditions for, 303 entry and exit, 303, 307 fast-food industry, 274, 312 green marketing, 309 long-run equilibrium, 306–309 market demand curve, 305 niche marketing, 309 optimal advertising decisions, 310–312 price and average cost, 308–309 pricing rule, 411–414 product differentiation, 306, 309–310 profit maximization, 304–306 profit-maximizing rule, 305 Monopoly, 265, 287–303, 288 and antitrust policy, 525–529 calculus of profit maximization, 322–323 compared to monopolistic competition, 304 costs, revenues, and profits, 296–297 deadweight loss of, 302–303, 525 defining relevant market, 290 demand curve, 288–289 economies of scale, 289–290 economies of scope, 290–291 and government intervention, 524–525 irrelevance of rim size, 288 and limit pricing, 489–490 multiplant output rule, 300 optimal advertising decisions, 310–312 output rule, 296 and price regulation, 523 pricing rule, 298, 411–414 profit maximization absence of supply curve, 299 barriers to entry, 301–303 marginal revenue, 292–296 multiplant decisions, 299–301 output decisions, 296–299 and rent seeking, 547–548 Monopoly network, 510–511 Monopoly output rule, 296 Monopoly power irrelevance of firm size, 288 local monopolies, 288 sources of copyrights, 293 cost complementarities, 291 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 630 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 630 General Index economies of scale, 289–290 economies of scope, 290–291 legal barriers, 291 patents, 291, 293 trademarks, 293 Monopoly price, and price matching, 434 Monopoly pricing rule, 298 Monopoly profits, 301 Moral hazard, 465 hidden actions, 463, 465 in insurance, 465 in medical costs, 465–466 principal–agent problem, 465 More is better, 125–126 Morton's steakhouse, 413, 487 Motion Picture Association of America, 569 Motorola Mobility, 210, 234 Movement along a demand curve, 40 Movement along a supply curve, 48 Moviefone, 566 Movie industry antitrust ruling, 568 competition, 570–571 early Warner Brothers, 567 home video distribution, 571 market shares, 570 production and distribution, 568–570 revenues, 568–569 Time-Warner merger, 568 TV programming, 571 MRTS; see Marginal rate of technical substitution Multiplant decisions, 299–301 Multiplant monopoly, 299–301 Multiplant output rule, 300 Multiple R, 105n Multiple regressions, 108–111 Multiproduct cost function, 195, 195–197 cost complementarities, 195–198, 391 economies of scope, 195 quadratic, 196–197 Multiproduct firms, 136, 291 Multistage games applications entry game, 393–394 innovation, 394–395 sequential bargaining, 395–397 decision nodes, 390–391 extensive-form, 390–392 Nash equilibrium, 392 payoff, 391 strategy, 390–391 subgame perfect equilibrium, 392 theory, 390–392 Mutual interdependence, 267 NASDAQ, 462 Nash bargaining game, 376–377 Nash equilibrium, 369, 387, 434 Bertrand pricing game, 378 coordination decisions, 374 dilemma, 371 entry game, 393–395 film version, 370 game without, 375 multistage game, 392 Nash-equilibrium.com, 457 National Association of Realtors, 84 National Bank of Poland, 60 National markets, 251 National Rent-A-Car, 62 Natural gas contracts, 222 Natural logarithm, 97n Natural monopoly, 533 NBC Universal, 564 Negative externalities, 534 and Clean Air Act, 535–537 pollution, 534–535 Negative marginal returns, 168 Nestlé, 523, 552 Net benefits, 20 calculus of minimizing, 34–36 Net present value, 15–16 Netscape, 490, 500, 566 Network complementarities, 509 Network effects, 507–513 Network externalities bottlenecks, 509–510 consumer lock-in, 510–511 direct, 508 indirect, 508 and penetration pricing, 511–513 Networks, 508 exclusive, 510–511 first-mover advantage, 510–511 hubs, 508–509 one-way, 508 and penetration pricing, 512–513 star, 508–509 two-way, 508 New car sales, 91 New Line Cinema, 568, 570 New products, 274, 312 innovation decisions, 394–395 and predatory pricing, 498 News Corp., 564, 577 New York Stock Exchange, 462 New York Times, 77 Nextag.com, 347 Niche marketing, 309 Nike, Inc., 247 Nonexclusionary consumption, 538–539 Nonlinear demand function, elasticities for, 95–99 Nonlinear regression functions, 106–108 Nonpecuniary price, 58 Nonrival consumption, 538–539 Normal-form game, 366–367, 375 Normal goods, 41 effect of income changes, 138–139 and income elasticity of demand, 92–93 North American Free Trade Agreement, 49, 252 North American Industry Classification System, 252 Not-for-profit organizations, Observation costs, 344 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 543 Oligopoly, 265–267, 326; see also Bertrand oligopoly; Cournot oligopoly; Game theory; Stackelberg oligopoly; Sweezy oligopoly advertising, 372–373 beliefs about rivals' actions, 326–328 comparison of models, 348–351 conditions for, 326 contestable markets, 351–352 demand in, 327–328 differentiated-product Bertrand oligopoly, 361–363 gasoline retailers, 325, 352–353 management difficulties, 326 mutual interdependence, 267 profit maximization Bertrand model, 346–348 Cournot model, 330–342 Stackelberg model, 342–346 Sweezy model, 328–330 quality decisions, 372–373 spreadsheet, 250 strategic interaction, 326–328 types of, 326 Omnicon Group, 247 One-shot games, 365; see also Simultaneousmove, one-shot games price matching, 434–435 One-way network, 508 Online auctions, 511 Online shopping Bertrand oligopoly, 347 in European Union, 107 price frames, 428 price matching, 435 value of information, 457 Opie equilibrium, 370 Opportunism, 217–218 Opportunity cost, of funds, 14 and price ceilings, 59–60 of resource use, 5–6 of waiting, 15 Optimal input substitution, 181–183 Optimal mix of inputs, 209 Optimal plant size, 193 Orbitz, 435 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries cheating in, 343 and U.S laws, 526 Output average product, 166 with collusion, 349–350 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 631 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 631 General Index Output—Cont marginal product, 166–168 minimum cost of producing, 211–212 monopoly rule, 296 right level of inputs for, 169–172 and scale economies, 192 socially efficient level, 535 total cost of producing, 184 total product, 166 Output decisions Cournot oligopoly, 337–338 monopolistic competition, 307–309 in monopoly, 296–299 multiplant monopoly, 300 in perfect competition, 277–285 Stackelberg oligopoly, 343–346 Overbuilders, 577–578 Overtime pay, 123, 152–153 Own price elasticity of demand, 79, 412–413 arc elasticity of demand, 84 elastic demand, 80 factors affecting, 84–87 formula, 82 for industries and firms, 256 inelastic demand, 80 and linear demand curve, 81–83 linear demand function for, 95–96 marginal revenue and, 87–89 nonlinear demand function for, 96–99 perfectly elastic demand, 83 perfectly inelastic demand, 83 for prescription drugs, 88 short- vs long-term, 86 and total revenue, 80–83 unitary elastic demand, 80 Palm, 107 Panasonic, 194 Parameter estimates, 101 Paramount Decree of 1938, 568 Paramount Pictures Corporation, 569 Patent disclosures, 171 Patent protection, 293 Patents, 171 barrier to entry, 291 as barrier to entry, 255 types of, 293 Pay for performance, 233 Payment-based cable networks, 578 Payoff first-mover advantage, 504–506 in game theory, 365 PC Solutions, 37 Peak-load pricing, 429–430 Penetration pricing, 512 to “change the game,” 510–513 first-mover advantage, 510–511 to overcome network effects, 507–513 Yahoo! auctions, 511 PepsiCo, 42, 252 Perfect competition, 275–287 in agriculture, 276–277 algebra of supply functions, 323–324 automobile industry, 283 calculus of profit maximization, 322 compared to monopolistic competition, 303–304 competitive output rule, 279–280 conditions for, 275 definition, 265 demand at market and firm levels, 276–277 demand curve, 276 free entry and exit, 275–276 limiting Cournot oligopoly, 416 long-run competitive equilibrium, 286–287 long-run decisions, 285–287 marginal revenue, 277 optimal advertising decisions, 310–312 price determination, 276 pricing in, 275 revenues, costs, and profits, 278 short-run output decisions firm and industry supply curves, 284–285 loss minimization, 281–284 operating losses, 281–282 profit maximization, 277–281 shut-down decision, 282–284 similar transactions costs, 275 Perfect information assumption, 448 Perfectly competitive market, 275 Perfectly elastic demand, 83 Perfectly inelastic demand, 83 Perpetuity, 16 Persuasive advertising, 42 Per unit excise tax, 50 Per-unit tariff, 550 Peugeot-Citroën, 283 Pfizer, Inc., 291 Philip Morris International, 247 Physical-asset specificity, 215, 222 Physician certification, 544 Piece rate system, 232 Plant patent, 293 Plants electric utilities, 222 optimal size, 193 site specificity, 215 Point-of-sale disclosure rules, 545 Policing costs, 382 Pollution, 534–535 Pollution permits, 536–537 Population composition, as demand shifter, 43 Posted-price market, 383 Postentry profits, 492–495 Potential for entry, 255 Predatory pricing, 497–498 and antitrust policy, 498 counterstrategies, 498 legitimate, 498 and marginal cost, 499 success with, 498 Preentry price, 492–495 Prescription drugs, 88 Present value, 14 air club membership, 19 formula, 14–15 of indefinitely lived assets, 16–19 and infinitely repeated games, 378 net, 15 of perpetuity, 16 and profit maximization, 17–18 of stream of future payments, 15 value of the firm, 16–19 Price(s); see also Equilibrium price Bertrand trap, 347–348 collusion on, 371–372 consumer–consumer rivalry, 13 consumer–producer rivalry, 13 and consumer search, 453–456 with consumer surplus, 46–48 determination in perfect competition, 276 effect of shortages on, 54 effect of surplus on, 54–55 effect on demand, 39–40 exceeding marginal cost, 303 full economic, 58 haggling over, 13 Lerner index, 257 and marginal revenue, 87–89 market equilibrium, 57–62 minimum retail, 60 nonpecuniary, 58 preentry, 492–495 producer expectations, 51 producer–producer rivalry, 13 and producer search, 460 with producer surplus, 53–54 relation to supply, 48 reservation price, 454–456 Rothschild index, 265 and supply function, 51–53 tariffs and, 550–552 and usury laws, 60 Price ceilings, 57 on bank fees, 60 deadweight loss of, 59 as government intervention, 57 graphing, 58 means of rationing under, 57–58 national comparisons, 60 reason for imposing, 59–60 and scarcity, 57 shortages created by, 60 Price changes constraint on consumers, 133–134 and consumer behavior, 135–137 and income effect, 141 and inventory management, 136 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 632 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 632 General Index substitution effect, 140–141 total revenue test, 81–83, 90–92 Price competition, intense and Bertrand oligopoly, 433 inducing brand loyalty, 435–436 price matching, 434–435 randomized pricing, 436–437 Price controls on natural gas, 222 price ceilings, 57–60 price floors, 61–62 Price–cost squeeze, 503, 504 Price discrimination, 46, 416–422, 417 antitrust policy, 527 discounts, 417, 419 elasticity of demand, 420 and European Commission, 528 fairness to customers, 417 first-degree, 417–418 second-degree, 418–419 as strategic tool, 503–504 third-degree, 419–421 Price elasticity of demand; see Own price elasticity of demand Price floors, 61 minimum retail price, 60 minimum wage law, 60 national comparisons, 60 surplus from, 61–62 Price frames, 428 Price matching, 434–435 Price regulation, 529–532 and deregulation, 533 Price rigidity, 353 Prices of related goods, as demand shifter, 40, 42 Price takers, 283 Price war, 348 over colas in India, 372 Pricing game, 387–388 Pricing strategies, 409–439; see also Limit pricing; Profit maximization entries basic Cournot oligopoly, 414–416 monopolistic competition rule, 411–414 monopoly price, 411–414 profit maximization rule, 410–411 Bertrand oligopoly, 347 block pricing, 424–426 in business cycles, 139 commodity bundling, 426–429 in contestable markets, 351 and cross-price elasticity of demand, 90 cross-subsidies, 430–431 Disney World Theme Parks, 409, 437–438 double marginalization problem, 423 downstream divisions, 431 factors affecting collusion, 381–383 finitely repeated games, 384–388 to induce brand loyalty, 435–436 intense price competition, 433–437 Lerner index, 257–258 low-price guarantees, 435 markup factor, 257–258 markup rules of thumb, 412 monopolistic competition, 411–414 monopoly pricing rule, 298 in oligopolies, 326–328 one-shot games, 369–372 peak-load pricing, 429–430 penetration pricing, 507–513 in perfect competition, 275 predatory pricing, 497–500 price discrimination, 46, 416–422, 503–504 price matching, 434–435 punishment mechanisms, 383 randomized pricing, 436–437 Sweezy oligopoly, 328–330 transfer pricing, 431–433 two-part pricing, 422–424 upstream divisions, 431–432 value pricing, 46 yielding greater profits extracting surplus from consumers, 416–429 with intense competition, 433–437 special cost and demand structures, 429 Principal–agent problem, 212 managerial compensation, 228–230 manager–worker, 231–234 and moral hazard, 465 Private values, 471–472 Procter & Gamble, 247, 261, 306, 506 Prodigy Services, 506, 565 Producer expectations as supply shifter, 51 Producer–producer rivalry, 13 Producer search, 460 Producer surplus, 53–54 and industry performance, 261–262 Product classes, 251–253 Product differentiation Bertrand oligopoly, 348, 361–363 implications, 309–310 monopolistic competition, 305 and profitability, 10 toothpaste market, 306 Production calculus of, 207–209 capital input, 164 cost minimization in, 211–212 fixed factors, 164–165 of inputs internally, 213 labor input, 164 learning curve effects, 493–494 managerial decisions, 164 managerial role, 168–172 substitutes as supply shifter, 49–50 technology in, 164 variable factors, 165 Production function, 164 algebraic forms, 172, 173 Cobb-Douglas, 178 collective bargaining, 163, 198 cost minimization, 179–181 estimating, 192 fixed factors of production, 164–165 fixed-proportions, 172 isocosts, 178–179 isoquants, 175–178 law of diminishing rate of technical substitution, 178 Leontief, 177 linear, 176–177 long-run decisions, 164–165 managerial role, 168–172 marginal rate of technical substitution, 176–177, 180 operating to right point of, 169 optimal input substitution, 181 productivity measures algebraic, 173–175 average product, 166 marginal product, 166–168 total product, 166 profit-maximizing input usage, 170 right input levels, 169–172 short-run decisions, 164–165 value marginal product, 169 variable factors of production, 165 Productivity measures algebraic, 174–175 average product, 166 marginal product, 166–168 total product, 166 Product quality, 451–453 Product quality game, 383–384 Products cross-subsidies, 430–431 identical in Bertrand oligopoly, 346–348 Profit maximization, 17 advertising-to-sales ratio, 310–311 basic rule of, 410–411 Bertrand oligopoly, 346–348 calculus of, 322–323 Cournot oligopoly, 330–332 goal of firms, 6–7 input usage, 170–172 in monopolistic competition, 304–306 in monopoly absence of supply curve, 299 marginal revenue, 292–296 multiplant decisions, 299–301 output decisions, 296–299 perfect competition, 277–281 Stackelberg oligopoly, 342–346 Sweezy oligopoly, 328–330 third-degree price discrimination, 419 from transfer pricing, 431–433 and uncertainty, 460–461 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 633 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 633 General Index Profit maximization rule, 410–411 Profit-maximizing advertising-to-sales ratio, 310–311 Profit-maximizing input usage, 170–172 Profit-maximizing level of output, 412–413 Cournot oligopoly, 331–335 for monopoly, 296–299 in perfect competition, 277–281 raising rivals' costs, 500–501 Stackelberg oligopoly, 343 Sweezy oligopoly, 329 Profit-maximizing markup Cournot oligopoly, 414 monopolistic competition, 413 monopoly, 413 Profit-maximizing usage of inputs, 207–208 Profits accounting, 5–6 in Bertrand duopoly, 370–372 from block pricing, 424–426 from commodity bundling, 426–429 in computer industry, 11 determination in Cournot oligopoly, 336–338 determined by revenues, 296 economic, 5–6 from first-degree price discrimination, 417–418 in five forces framework, 8–11 and incentives, 11–12 indicator of performance, 261 interrelated forces influencing, nature and importance of, 5–8 from peak-load pricing, 439–430 perfectly competitive firms, 278–280 postentry, 492–495 from price matching, 434–435 and resource allocation, 6–7 role of, 6–7 from second-degree price discrimination, 419 as signal, 6–7, from third-degree price discrimination, 419–421 from two-part pricing, 424 and value of the firm, 17–19 Profit sharing, 231, 243 Property rights, 535 Public goods, 538 contribution by firms, 542 demand for, 539–540 free-rider problem, 539, 540–541 nonexclusionary, 538–539 nonrival, 538–539 socially efficient level of, 538–541 too much provision of, 541 Public health centers, 149 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 533 Publishers, 572–573 Punishment mechanisms in collusion, 383 "snake-oil" salesmen and, 389–390 P-values, 104 Quadratic multiproduct cost function, 196–197 Quality decisions, one-shot games, 372–373 Quantitative demand analysis elasticity concept, 78–99 advertising elasticity, 84 cross-advertising elasticity, 84 cross-price elasticity of demand, 89–92 demand functions for, 94–99 income elasticity, 92–93 own price elasticity of demand, 79–89 questions answered by, 78 regression analysis, 99–111 Quantity demanded change in, 40 and demand function, 44–46 and price ceilings, 57 and price floors, 61–63 shift factors, 40–41 Quantity supplied change in, 48 and price ceilings, 57 and price floors, 61–63 shift factors, 48–51 and supply function, 51–53 Quits, 389 Quotas, 548 impact on domestic market, 549–550 Qwest Communications, 577 Raising rivals' costs, 500 fixed cost strategies, 501–502 marginal cost strategies, 500–501 price–cost squeeze, 503 vertical foreclosure, 503 vertical integration, 502–503 Ralston, 523, 552 Random House, 573 Randomized pricing, 436 in airline industry, 437 consumer problem with, 436 problem for rivals, 436 Randomized strategy, 375 Random variables mean, 448–449 variance, 449–451 Rate-of-return regulation, 533 Reaction functions Cournot oligopoly, 330–335, 349 differentiated-product Bertrand oligopoly, 362–363 Stackelberg oligopoly, 343–345 Real income, 140 Recession, in Asia, 41 Regional markets, 251 Regression analysis, 99–111 adjusted R-square, 105–106 coefficient of determination, 104–106 confidence intervals, 103 and econometrics, 100–101 elasticities of demand based on, 107 F-statistic, 106 iid normal random variables, 103 least-squares regression, 101 log-linear regression line, 107 multiple regressions, 108–111 nonlinear functions, 106–108 overall fit of regression line, 104–106 parameter estimates, 101 P-values, 104 regression line, 101 residual degrees of freedom, 105–106 R-square, 104–106 spreadsheets, 101–102 standard error, 102–103 statistical significance of coefficients, 102–104 sum of squared errors, 101 t-statistic, 103–104 warning on, 111 Regression line, 97 graphing, 96 log-linear, 107 overall fit of, 104–106 Regulation Z, Federal Reserve Board, 544 Relationship-specific exchange, 215 Relevant market, 290 Rent seeking, 547 incentives for, 547–548 Repeated games, 365; see also Finitely repeated games; Infinitely repeated games Replacement, 454 Reputation, 230 Reputation effects, 495–496 and predatory pricing, 498 Research and development, 171 varying by industry, 260–261 Reservation price, 454–456 Residual degrees of freedom, 105–106 Residual demand, 490–491 Resignations, 389 Resource allocation, and profits, 6–7 Resources, opportunity cost of using, 5–6 Restaurant News, Returns to scale constant, 193 estimating, 192 Revenue equivalence, 477 Revenues determining profits, 296 incremental, 24 movie industry, 568–569 Revenue sharing, 231 Reverse engineering, 171 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 634 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 634 General Index Risk averse/aversion, 451 in auctions, 478 in consumer behavior, 451–453 firms and, 456–459 managerial decisions, 451–453 St Petersburg paradox, 452 Risk loving, 451 Risk neutral, 451, 454, 460–461, 463 Risk-neutral auction bidding, 472–476 Risk preferences, 128 Risky projects, 456, 459 Rivalry in industry, 9–10 in markets, 12–13 in transactions, 12–13 Robinson-Patman Act, 527 Rothschild index, 254 and monopolistic competition, 265 and monopoly, 265 for selected industries, 255 R-square, 104–105, 109 adjusted, 105–106 Rule of reason, 526–527 Rwandan Ministry of Health, 149 St Petersburg paradox, 452 Salary-plus-bonus compensation, 243–244 Sales, of largest firms, 247 Samsung Electronic Company, 37 Sapporo Breweries Ltd., 41 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 543 Satellite Glass Corporation, 233 Scarcity and competition among consumers, 13 and consumer behavior, 134–135 pervasive nature of, School certification, 544 Screening, 467 Sealed-bid auctions bidding strategy, 478 on eBay, 470 expected revenues, 477 first-price, 469–470 second-price, 470 Search costs, 455 Second-degree price discrimination, 418–419 Second-mover advantage benefits, 507 examples of success, 506 Second-price, sealed-bid auction, 470 expected revenues, 477 optimal bidding strategy, 473 Secure strategy, 368–369 Securities and Exchange Commission, 545 investigation of AOL, 563 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 543 Self-interest, 6–7 Self-selection device, 467 Separation of ownership and control, 228 Sequential bargaining game, 395–397 Sequential-move game, 365 first-mover advantage, 505 Sherman Antitrust Act, 490, 527 and predatory pricing, 498 provisions, 525–526 Shirking problem, 228–230 Shopper.com, 347 Shortages effect on price, 54 from price ceilings, 60 Short-run cost function, 185 Short-run costs, 184–186 Short-run decisions, 164–165 Short-run operating losses, 281–282 Shut-down decision, 282–284 Signaling, 466–467 Simultaneous-move, one-shot games applications advertising decisions, 372–374 coordination decisions, 373–374 mixed/randomized strategy, 375–376 monitoring employees, 374–376 Nash bargaining, 376–377 pricing decisions, 369–372 quality decisions, 372–374 dominant strategy, 367–369 Nash equilibrium, 369, 370 normal-form game, 366–367 secure strategy, 368–369 strategies, 366–369 theory, 366–369 Simultaneous-move game, 365 first-mover advantage, 504–505 Site specificity, 215, 222 "Snake-oil" salesman, 389–390 Socially efficient level of output, 535 Socially efficient level of public goods, 538–541 Socially inefficient, 370 Social welfare effect of price ceilings, 57–62 government intervention to increase, 524 indicator of performance, 261–263 and market power, 524–525 Sony Corporation, 107, 506, 564 Sony Pictures Entertainment, 569 Specialization benefit of contracts, 213 lost in vertical integration, 213 Specialized investment, 215 and contract length, 222 contracts, 220 implications, 216–218 for optimal input procurement, 219 and relationship specific exchange, 215 versus spot exchange, 225–226 types, 215–216 Spot checks, 232–234 Spot exchange, 212 for optimal input procurement, 218–219 versus specialized investments, 225–226 Spreadsheet to calculate equilibrium, 65 collusive outcomes of oligopoly, 350 multiple regression, 110 for regression analysis, 101–102, 112 Sprinkler strategy, 394 Sprint, 576 Stackelberg duopoly, 350 Stackelberg oligopoly, 342 collusive outcomes, 350–351 commitment in, 344 compared to Cournot oligopoly, 339–340 compared to other models, 348–351 conditions for, 342–343 decision making, 342 equilibrium, 343 equilibrium outputs, 344–345 first-mover advantage, 504 isoprofit curves, 343 leader vs follower, 343 observation costs, 344 profit-maximizing level of output, 343 reaction functions, 344–346 spreadsheet, 350 Standard deviation, 450 Standard error, 102–103 Standard Oil of New Jersey, 526 Standard Oil of Ohio, 526 Standard Oil Trust, 526 Staples, 11 Starbucks, 312 Star network, 508–509 Stock market and asymmetric information, 462 insider trading, 543 Stockpiling, 43 Strategic equivalence of Dutch and first-price auctions, 471 Strategy, 366 in game theory, 365 dominant, 367–369 mixed/randomized, 373–374 multistage games, 390–392 secure, 367–369 trigger, 378 for international markets, 394 for risk-neutral auction bidding, 472–476 Strike, 198 Structure–conduct–performance paradigm causal view, 263 feedback critique, 263–264 five forces framework, 264 Structure of an industry, 263 Subcontracting, 218 Subgame perfect equilibrium, 392, 396 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 493 Subsidiaries, and economies of scope, 197–198 Substitutes, 42, 44 and own price elasticity of demand, 85–86 and price changes, 137 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 635 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 635 General Index Substitutes—Cont and profitability, 10–11 as supply shifter, 49–50 Substitution diminishing marginal rate of, 127 marginal rate of, 126, 127, 135, 162 marginal rate of technical, 176–180 market rate of, 130–131 optimal input, 181–183 Substitution effect, 140 Subway, 309 Sum of squared errors, 101, 105 Sunk costs, 189 absence of, in contestable markets, 351–352 as fixed costs, 189–190 irrelevance of, 190 Supermarket Business News, Supplier power, Supply changes in, 48, 62–64 comparative static analysis, 64 decrease in, 48 increase in, 48 law of, 48 in market economies, 38 producer surplus, 53–54 spreadsheet for, 65 Supply and demand, simultaneous shifts, 64–67 Supply and demand analysis equilibrium price, 54–55 price ceilings, 57–60 price floors, 61–62 as qualitative tool, 38 Supply curve absent in monopoly, 299 graphing, 52–53 market, 48 movement along, 48 with producer surplus, 53–54 shift factors, 48–51 short-run, 284–285 and trade agreements, 49 Supply function, 51, 51–53 inverse, 53 linear, 52 perfect competition, 322–323 Supply shifters, 48 government regulation, 49 input prices, 49 number of firms, 49 producer expectations, 51 substitutes in production, 49–50 taxes, 50–51 technology, 49 Surplus effect on price, 54–55 result of price floor, 61 Sweezy oligopoly, 328 compared to Cournot oligopoly, 339–340 conditions for, 328 demand curve, 328–329 kinked demand curve, 330 marginal cost and price, 329 marginal revenue, 329 price rigidity, 353 pricing strategies, 329–330 profit-maximizing level of output, 329 Tacit collusion, 382–383 Takeover threat, 230 Tariff excise, 550–551 lump-sum, 550–551, 552 Taxes ad valorem, 50, 51 excise, 50, 51 low-income workers, 184 for public goods, 541 as supply shifter, 50–51 Technical meetings, 171 Technology digital video recorders, 580–581 HDTV, 579–580 information sources, 171 and market structures, 253 in production, 164 reverse engineering, 171 as supply shifter, 49 varying by industry, 253 Telecom India, 567 Telecommunication Act of 1996, 579 Telefonica, 567 Television programming, 571 Third-degree price discrimination, 419–422 Thought processes, 124 Time, and own price elasticity of demand, 86 Time clocks, 232–234 Time Inc., 563 Time value of money present value analysis, 14–16 present value of indefinitely lived assets, 16–19 Time Warner, 490 Time Warner Books, 573 Time Warner Cable, 563, 575 Time Warner case study AOL merger failure, 563 balance sheet, 593 basic areas for sales, 565 broadband Internet subscriptions, 597 bundling, 578–579 cable industry growth, 597 cable systems, 575–581 challenges, 580 company background, 563 competing technologies, 597 competition, 577–578, 594 consolidated statement of operations, 592 filmed entertainment, 567–572 highest grossing movies, 595 high-speed Internet service, 576 memos, 581–589 operations, 564 production costs and revenues, 596 programming networks, 574–575 publishing ventures, 571–573 regulatory considerations, 579 satellite-delivered networks, 596 technological considerations, 579–580 telephone services, 576–577 Tips, 231 Toothpaste market, 306 Toray Industries, 194 Total benefits, 20–22 Total cost, 184 average, 187 relation to other costs, 185–186, 188–189 Total product, 166 Total revenue and elasticities, 80–83 in monopoly, 292 Total revenue test, 81–83, 90–92 Total value curves, 22 Toyota Motor Corporation, 9, 195, 431 Trade Act of 2002, 49 Trademarks, 293 Trade publications, 171 Transaction costs, 214 in acquiring inputs, 214–218 hidden, 214 in perfect competition, 275 reduced by horizontal integration, 259 for specialized investments, 215–218 Transactions, two sides to, 12–13 Transfer pricing, 431 and divisions of firms, 431–432 double marginalization problem, 432 optimal, 433 and value of the firm, 432 Transitivity, 127 Trigger strategy, 378, 434 finitely repeated games, 385 and reputation effects, 495–496 to support collusion, 378–381 sustaining cooperative outcomes with, 380 in waste industry, 382 Truth in advertising, 545 Truth in Lending Act, 544–545 Truth in Lending Simplification Act, 544–545 t-statistic, 103–104, 109 Turner Broadcasting System, 568, 575 Twentieth Century Fox, 569 Two-part pricing, 422–424 compared to monopoly pricing, 423 Two-way network, 508–509 Uncertain final period games, 384–387 Uncertainty and consumer behavior consumer search, 453–456 bay23224_gidx_621-636.qxd 1/10/13 2:33 PM Page 636 Revised Pages www.downloadslide.com 636 General Index reservation price, 454–456 risk aversion, 451–453 risk loving, 451 risk neutral, 451 and firms producer search, 460 profit maximization, 460–461 risk aversion, 456–459 and markets adverse selection, 463–466 asymmetric information, 462–466 hidden actions, 463 hidden characteristics, 463 moral hazard, 465–466 screening, 466–468 self-selection device, 467–468 signaling, 466–468 Underinvestment, 216–217 Unitary elastic demand, 80 United Continental Holdings, 247 UnitedOnline, 565–566 United States industry concentration, 249–251 own price elasticities, 85 United States Copyright Office, 293 United States Patent and Trademark Office, 293 United States Steel, 497 United States Supreme Court and antitrust policy, 526–527 major cases, 526 rule of reason, 527 United States v Joint Traffic Association, 526 United States v Standard Oil of New Jersey, 526 United States vs Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 526 Universal City Studios, 569 Upstream divisions, 431–433 US Airways, 19 Usury laws, 60 Utility function, 161 Utility maximization, 161–162 Utility patent, 293 Value ascertaining, 46–48 common, 472 Value marginal product, 169 Value of the firm maximizing, present value analysis, 16–19 and profits, 17–19 St Petersburg paradox, 452 Value pricing, 46 Variable costs, 184 all costs as, 191–192 average, 186–187 relation to other costs, 185–186, 188–189 Variable factors of production, 165 Variance, 449 Verizon Communications, 247, 577 Vertical foreclosure, 503, 504 Vertical integration, 213, 213, 259 advantages, 224 at General Motors, 225 for optimal input procurement, 223–224 and raising rivals' costs, 502–503 Vertical merger, 259 Viacom, 564 Vivendi, 564 Voice over Internet Protocol, 576 Wage rate, 182 Wages, 123 overtime pay, 152–153 Wall Street Journal, 2, 37, 62, 63 Walmart, 246, 247 Walmart Connect Internet Service, 566 Walt Disney Company, 247, 564, 569 Warner Brothers, 563, 569 Warner Communications, 563 Warner Manufacturing, 563 Warner Music Group, 563 Waste industry, 382 Waterfall strategy, 394 WB Network, 575 Wealth of Nations (Smith), Wendy's, 9, 304, 312 Wholesale electricity market, 533 Winner's curse, 475–476 Wireless auction, 77–78, 111–112 Workers choices by, 145–147 compensation, 231–233 interest in working hard, 389 investment in learning, 216–217 low-income, 184 monitoring, 374–376 spot checks, 232–234 time clocks, 232–234 resignations, 389 Yahoo!, 107 Yahoo! auctions, 511 Zero economic profits, 276, 286–287, 301–302 www.downloadslide.com 8e new digital Offerings for your Managerial Economics Course! McGraw-Hill’s premier online assignment and assessment tool, Connect Plus®, is now offered with the 8th edition Connect gives instructors the ability to assign and automatically grade literally hundreds of end-of-chapter problems (including algorithmic variants), and options to provide students with immediate, detailed feedback and answers Connect Plus also offers an integrated eBook, enabling anytime, anywhere access to the textbook • Available within Connect or standalone, LearnSmart is an adaptive learning tool that allows students to continually test their mastery of basic and more complex concepts within each chapter LearnSmart identifies what an individual student knows and doesn’t know, and helps students learn faster, study more efficiently, and retain more knowledge To learn more about the resources available to you, visit www.mhhe.com/baye8e Managerial Economics 8e and Business Strategy ISBN 978-0-07-352322-4 MHID 0-07-352322-4 EAN Michael R Baye www.mhhe.com • JeffRey T PRince MD DALIM 1221829 1/2/13 CYAN MAG YELO BLACK • Each chapter contains many Demonstration Problems along with detailed answers One key Demonstration Problem in each chapter now features an accompanying video tutorial, which walks through the solutions step-by-step Students can access these videos on the text website, or through the Connect Plus eBook Managerial Economics Business Strategy New for this edition: and Baye and Prince’s Managerial Economics and Business Strategy provides a complete solution designed to help students use tools from intermediate microeconomics, game theory, and industrial organization to make sound managerial decisions A range of print and digital formats combined with frontier research, inclusion of modern topics, and balanced coverage of traditional and modern microeconomics produce a new offering that is easier to teach from and more dynamic and engaging for students Baye PRince ... MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS Baye and Prince Managerial Economics and Business Strategy Eighth Edition Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture Fifth Edition Thomas and. .. Brue, and Flynn Brief Editions: Microeconomics and Macroeconomics Second Edition Miller Principles of Microeconomics First Edition Samuelson and Nordhaus Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics... Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baye, Michael R., 195 8Managerial economics and business strategy / Michael R Baye, Bert Elwert Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy Kelley, School of Business, Indiana