The Potential Role Of Cyber-Liability Insurance In Data Breach Litigation

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE COLLEGE OF INFORMATION SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF CYBER-LIABILITY INSURANCE IN DATA BREACH LITIGATION ERIC S MCCOY SPRING 2016 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a baccalaureate degree in Information Sciences and Technology with honors in Security and Risk Analysis Reviewed and approved* by the following: John Bagby Professor of Information Sciences and Technology Thesis Supervisor Marc Friedenberg Lecturer of Information Sciences and Technology Honors Adviser * Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College i ABSTRACT This paper aims to illuminate cyber-liability insurance’s potential to alleviate the information asymmetry of the information security market, and to decrease defendants’ liability in data breach litigation To accomplish this end the paper elaborates the economic research undergirding the nature of the information asymmetry problem The paper also discusses the precedential background of data breach litigation and the current cyber-liability insurance market to explore how innovations in cyber-liability insurance stand to take advantage of the existing legal landscape Finally, the issues of relying on cyber-liability insurance to set standards are presented and the paper concludes with a balanced assessment of cyber-liability insurance’s potential ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii LIST OF FIGURES iii Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: The Information Asymmetry Problem Chapter 3: The Precedential Background of Data Breach Litigation 6 Building the Increased Risk Standard 7 Pisciotta and Krottner 10 Reilly v Ceridian 13 Distinguishing Defective Medical Device Litigation 13 The Clapper Standard 15 The Certainly Impending Standard 17 Substantially Increased Risk 18 Chapter 4: Gaps in Traditional Insurance Coverage 20 Cyber Liability Insurance Explained 21 Issues with the Cyber Liability Insurance Market 22 Chapter 5: Application to Litigation and Information Security Benefits 24 What are Data Breach Notification Laws? 26 The Problem with Data Breach Notification Laws 29 Chapter 6: Potential Problems With Cyber-Liablity Insurance 32 Chapter 7: Conclusions 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY 40 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: STIX Excerpt…………………………………………………………………………31 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to thank my family for their support, and my thesis advisors Professor Bagby and Professor Friedenberg for providing guidance Chapter Introduction The threat of data breaches poses an unavoidable problem for any company utilizing personal information An industry report noted that the average cost to companies dealing with the legal fallout of data breaches increased from $1.6 million to $1.64 million from 2014-2015 This sobering figure includes expenses such as compliance with state and federal data breach notification laws as well as lawsuits against the breached company by the owners of the breached personal information.1 The claims that plaintiffs make against the breached parties vary from negligence, breach of implied contract, and violation of various federal statutes, but few claims succeed Commonly, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant subjected them to an increased risk of identity theft via the breach, and thus owe the plaintiffs compensation for their credit monitoring expenses These allegations rarely survive an analysis of whether the plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing, unless the plaintiff proves that they suffered an instance of identity theft as a result of the breach.2 Regardless of the legal standard applied to determine whether mitigation expenses produce standing, mandating increased security measures promises to reduce the defendant’s liability in data breach cases The issue remains of how to set standards which ensure a uniform level of information security across various businesses Government standards for information security exist in the form of federal laws, state laws and the provisions of various standards Ponemon Inst., 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, (2015) See In Re Hannaford Bros Co Customer Data Sec Breach Litig., 613 F Supp 2d 108 (D Me 2009) 2 setting bodies; however, applying these standards to a variety of organizations fails to guarantee uniform levels of information security This arises from the fact that standards setting bodies suffer from a lack of information on cyber-attacks, due to the legal, reputational and competitive risks that sharing cyber-attack information poses.3 The burgeoning cyber-liability insurance industry potentially provides a third party able to aggregate and analyze cyber-risk information to mandate standards customized to the individual risk of each industry This enables insurers to price risks accurately and security solution providers to design more effective security countermeasures If cyber-liability insurers choose to fill this role they could incentivize companies to forfeit their cyber-risk information, because the insurers could make this condition of their contract for data breach insurance coverage, and their clients would benefit from the robust standards proposed by the cyberliability insurers Cyber-insurers would take on the cost of defending their clients in data breach litigation, so naturally they would aim to reduce their clients’ liability for data breaches and offer incentives for clients to practice increased information security The cyber-liability industry falls short of offering holistic information security, but further development of the industry in cooperation with government standard setting authorities or private voluntary consensus based standard setting bodies promises to increase information security while decreasing defendants’ data breach liability Eric Weiss, Cong Research Serv., Legislation to Facilitate Cyber Security Information Sharing: Economic Analysis, 4-5 (2015) Chapter The Information Asymmetry Problem The importance of research during the purchase of a used car highlights the basic concept behind the information asymmetry problem Prudent consumers research information relevant to the car’s value before stepping on the lot, to help them gain a conception of the car’s monetary worth Consumer word of mouth incentivizes the honesty of the car salesman, because if a consumer reports that a lot sold them a lemon, this forces the vendor to reduce the price on all cars, to compensate for the lost consumer trust.4 Information security vendors enjoy immunity from this accountability, because consumers of information security solutions often lack the expertise to distinguish effective security solutions from ineffective ones This lack of information enables vendors to sell sub-par solutions with impunity, because little risk exists of it besmirching their reputation if their customers are unable to discern that the vendors sold them an inferior product The inability to discern the quality of a product is referred to as the information asymmetry problem and it hinders consumers’ ability to make informed investments in information security While substantive efforts have been made by economists such as Gordon Loeb to develop models which prescribe the level of investment for adequate information security,5 researchers lament the lack of information to prove the efficacy of specific information security solutions.6 This asymmetric information market also promotes the purchase of security solutions on the basis of brand recognition instead of actual quality Purchase of popular brands Paulo Tilles et al A Markovian Model Market—Akerlof’s Lemons and the Asymmetry of Information, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 2562, 2562-2563 (2011) Lawrence A Gordon & Martin P Loeb, The Economics of Information Security Investment, ACM Transactions on Info and Sys Sec 438, 438-457 (2002) Ranjan Pal, Cyber-Insurance in Internet Security A Dig into the Information Asymmetry Problem, Cornell U Libr 1, (2012) gives the appearance that a business practiced due diligence in information security when in reality, the countermeasures may or may not have had any preventative effect.7 The fact that customers often fixate on irrelevant attributes of security software in determining its level of security means that solutions that appear to give adequate information security compete just as well as solutions which actually offer exemplary information security.8 Information security’s asymmetric information market depresses innovations through allowing the survival of solutions, which give the mere appearance of providing adequate security This is because without sufficient information regarding the efficacy of cyber-security solutions customers are incentivized to pick security solutions based on brand recognition instead of their actual effectiveness in mitigating computer system breaches Therefore, those wishing to develop new information security systems have little incentive to enter the market because it is unlikely that customers will abandon their preferred brand of security solution Cyber-liability insurance’s interest in reducing its clients’ liability incentivizes it to remedy this information asymmetry, and to create a market which encourages real innovation Cyber-liability insurance promises to enable a more innovative market because it will act as a method of relieving individuals and corporations from accountability for non-diversifiable risk, and reduce their susceptibility to diversifiable risk.9 Non-diversifiable risks include the vulnerability to data breaches which a company might experience as a result of vulnerability in a Ross Anderson, Why Information Security Is Hard, Annual Computer Security Applications Conf 1, 5-6 (2001) Cho Byong Kim, & Park Yong Wan, Security versus Convenience? An Experimental Study of User Misperceptions of Wireless Internet Service Quality, Decision Support Sys 1, (2012) Symposium, Should Cyber-Insurance Providers Invest in Software Security? Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 483 (2015) widely used operating system or other issues which remain outside the company’s capability to control In contrast, diversifiable risks consist of risks within the company’s ability to control such as software configuration, security policies and other risk mitigating countermeasures.10 The cyber-liability insurers primarily promise to help companies reduce diversifiable risk as they can incentivize companies to improve their practices through lower premiums Unfortunately this means that the cyber liability insurers would be left with responsibility for the nondiversifiable risk, thus making their policies less profitable because of the need to retain money to compensate their clients for the unpredictable occurrence of a non-diversifiable risk.11 However, without protection from liability for non-diversifiable risk companies may be less incentivized to purchase cyber-liability insurance, as there would be less benefit in paying a third party to cover risks which one can control on their own Thus the insurers’ willingness to cover non-diversifiable risk incentivizes companies to adopt cyber-liability insurance, as without it they have little protection against instances of non-diversifiable risk 10 11 Id Id 30 On the other hand Massachusetts defines encryption as a “processes which assign a low probability to the likelihood of an unauthorized party assigning meaning to the acquired information” 93 These definitions’ vagueness confer companies in both states the ability to use sub-standard security practices In Nevada plaintext information accessible only if one enters a five digit employee ID number fulfills the definition of encrypted information because the ID number constitutes a measure which makes the data “unintelligible or unusable” and “delays access to…data” This provides sub-par security because any hacker with an automated script possesses the ability to easily foil this security measure.94 Massachusetts’s definition of encrypted also leaves room for sub-par security because it potentially classifies, plaintext PII accessible only after entering a lengthy password, as having a “low likelihood of an unauthorized party assigning meaning to the acquired information” Although a lengthy password decreases the likelihood of someone cracking the password via automated software with enough computing power, little stands between them and the plaintext PII.95 Data breach notification statutes adequately ensure that companies notify breached parties of their situation; however, they fail to ensure data security beyond compliance with the safe harbor requirement The safe harbor they provide suffers from a bias for encryption, which poses merely one of the many information security practices available to companies.96 Massachusetts’s data breach notification statute 93 Id Aaron L.-F Han, Derek F Wong & Lidia S Chao, Password Cracking and Countermeasures in Computer Security: A Survey, Cornell U Libr., http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1411/1411.7803.pdf (last visited February 22, 2016) 95 Id 96 Justin C Pierce, Shifting Data Breach Liability: A Congressional Approach, 57 Wm & Mary L Rev 975, 987 (2016) (Article argues that Congressional legislation poses the best method of 94 31 acknowledges this reality through requiring companies to maintain comprehensive information security plans which establish minimum standards and practices.97 Other states fall short of requiring such stringent security countermeasures; however, cyber-liability-insurers may increase information security, while simultaneously decreasing their client’s liability through mandating compliance with these safe-harbors as a condition of coverage Data breach victims primarily gain awareness of their plight, from the data breach notification notices companies produce to comply with data breach notification statutes.98 Therefore cyber-liability insurers stand to defray expenses from a significant amount of data breach cases if they mandate compliance with these standards as a condition of coverage allocating liability for data breaches, also references stagnating effect which encryption safe harbor of data breach notification statutes have on security) 97 Thomas J Shaw et al., Information Security and Privacy: A Practical Guide for Global Executives, Lawyers and Technologists, 110 (Thomas J Shaw., 1st ed 2012) 98 Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman &Alessandro Acquisti Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation J Empirical Legal Stud 1, 1-27 (2013) (An empirical analysis of the common causes for data breach litigation and common outcomes) 32 Chapter Potential Problems with Cyber-Liability Insurance Although cyber liability insurance holds potential as a liability reducing tool, it potentially suffers from some legal vulnerability resulting from the sharing of cyber-risk information Companies could claim that cyber-liability insurers cannot access certain security information due to intellectual property concerns For example, an insurance firm with a cyberliability policy understandably might shirk from sharing a customer list protected as a trade secret due to this sharing’s ability to dilute the trade secret’s value On the policy drafting side the insurer must also ensure that they employ warranties wisely to achieve the maximum risk reducing effect for their clients, as otherwise clients may be improperly incentivized to reduce risk Cyber-liability insurers should employ promissory warranties to mandate standards with the greatest potential to reduce risk and exclusions to address less dangerous risk categories.99 If one fails to comply with promissory warranties insurers not have to prove a connection between the breaking of the promise and the loss for which the insured makes a claim.100 Thus promissory warranties are appropriate means to incentivize companies to strictly comply with conditions which dramatically decrease the risk of a cyber incident occurring Cyber-liability insurers should use the conditions of exclusions to mandate standards which not reduce risk as dramatically as those mandated in promissory warranties Exclusions are more forgiving than promissory warranties because if the insured fails to honor its conditions they risk losing 99 A promissory warranty “is a statement about future facts or about facts that will continue to be true throughout the term of the policy.” (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/warranty (last visited Apr 4, 2016)) 100 Travis Wall, How Not to Void Your Cyberinsurance Policy, Risk Management (Mar 2, 2015, 9:29pm) http://www.rmmagazine.com/2015/03/02/how-not-to-void-your-cyberinsurance-policy/ 33 coverage for that particular risk and not the whole policy.101 This potentially poses a problem to the insurer if insured chooses not to comply with an exclusion whose conditions substantially increase the probability of other covered risks occurring On the upside, exclusions may allow insurers to appeal to a wider range of clients by allowing them to choose to not comply some conditions without risking losing coverage on the whole policy Therefore, it is important cyberinsurers to carefully choose how they cover risk so that they can exert the maximum amount of pressure to incentivize clients to adopt risk reducing countermeasures, while appealing to the widest audience Cyber-liability insurers to accurately assess the risk their clients face they will likely need to maintain databases of their clients’ security information Unfortunately, this means that a breach of a cyber-insurer entails devastating consequences as it could expose their clients to increased risk of attack by hackers and the insurers to the threat of expensive lawsuits This makes it of paramount importance that the cyber-liability insurers also employ state of the art information security countermeasures, and that they notify their customers immediately after a breach The cyber-liability-insurers should consider adopting data retention and destruction policies which ensure that the insurer retains no security information for longer than needed for analysis These conventional methods of reducing liability may help cyber-liability insurers; however, developments in sharing technology also promise to reduce all parties sharing liability The Parallel between Cyber-Liability Insurers and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) 101 Id 34 The legal risks of information sharing pose one of the greatest hurdles for cyber-liability insurers Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) s which facilitate information sharing among critical infrastructure sectors, exemplify the legal issues which cyber-liability insurers may face.102 The ISACs “are private sector, nonprofit entities that collect analyze and share information on cybersecurity threats and best practices”.103 Private organizations purchase subscription levels which confer various services aimed at increasing their information security Both ISACs and cyber-liability insurers share the mission of quantitatively measuring and reducing their client’s risk.104 ISACs also suffer from a lack of cyber-threat information because legal and business concerns increase the temptation for companies to reap the rewards of the ISAC’s analysis without contributing their cyber-threat information ISACs lack information because they fail to require their members to share it; however, cyber-liability insurers can require their clients to share information as a condition of coverage, and use specialized sharing technology to reduce the risk of sharing related legal battles Relief from Liability One of the simplest legal hurdles which face cyber-liability insurers are negligence based lawsuits Negligence generally occurs if the court proves, that the defendant had a duty which they breached causing the plaintiff actual damages.105 The foreseeability of something happening 102 Id Eric Weiss, Cong Research Serv., Legislation to Facilitate Cyber Security Information Sharing: Economic Analysis., (2015) 104 For example, for five thousand dollars annually, the Financial Services ISAC’s allows access to a trusted email registry, a listing of industry security practices, and various other services meant to help members increase their cybersecurity (Id.) 105 Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/negligence (last visited Mar 2016) 103 35 generally determines the scope of the defendant’s liability If the court finds that defendants knew of a risk and its preventative measures before the injury, this generally increases their liability Therefore, companies are incentivized against voluntarily sharing attack information with cyber-liability insurers or ISACs, because of the act’s potential to inflict them with increased negligence liability.106 Cyber-liability insurers and ISACs also face the prospect of lawsuits alleging that the analysis they produce, based on their members’ information, breached the member’s confidentiality or intellectual property.107 Finally, both organizations likely fear their liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act which outlaws “every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade” ISACs and cyber-liability insurers dole out their analysis exclusively to their members, which possibly compete with each other Therefore, a plaintiff might issue a claim that an ISAC or cyber-liability insurers’ analysis indirectly revealed competitive information about their organization thus restraining their ability to compete.108 This prospect discourages cyber-liability insurers from providing their clients with the benefits of their information because of the risk of anti-trust lawsuits While some of these issues require legislative resolution, cyber-liability insurers stand to minimize the risk of legal action if they employ methods of information sharing which only relay relevant cyber-threat information Technical Minimization of Sharing Liability 106 Robert Palmer, Critical Infrastructure: Legislative Factors for Preventing a “Cyber-Pearl Harbor.” Virginia Journal of Law & Technology, 318, 319 (2014) 107 ITI Council, ITI Recommendation: Addressing Liability Concerns Impeding More Effective Cybersecurity Information Sharing, (2012) 108 Id 3-4 36 Cyber-liability insurers can minimize their sharing liability through adopting the intelligence community’s XML markup languages theoretically unable to accept any information but cyber-threat data A lexicon of languages exists to accomplish this end; however, the MITRE Corporation’s Structured Threat Information Expression language (STIX) serves as an apt example STIX’s design communicates technical information solely related to the assets the security incident affected, and the nature of the threat arising from the incident STIX generates this information automatically after the security software employing STIX detects the incident STIX defines the incident element and its attributes using the variant of XML schema shown below Figure 1: STIX Excerpt (MITRE Corp., Assets Affected in an Incident, STIX (2012), http://stixproject.github.io/documentation/idioms/affected-assets/) The “