The effect of foreign ownership on dividend policy the case of listed companies on hose

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY – HO CHI MINH CITY INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP ON DIVIDEND POLICY: THE CASE OF LISTED COMPANIES ON HOSE In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement of the Degree of Master of Business Administration In the School of Business Administration Student Name and ID: DONG QUANG VINH – MBA05053 Advisor: NGUYEN KIM THU, Ph.D. Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam August 2014 INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SCHOOL OF BUSINESS Independence - Freedom - Happiness ASSURANCE QUALIFIED THESIS Student’s Name: DONG QUANG VINH Student ID: MBA05053 Title of Thesis: The effect of Foreign Ownership on Dividend payout policy: The case of listed companies on HOSE Advisor: Ph.D. NGUYEN KIM THU I assure that the content of this thesis has been qualified all requirements for a research paper and able to participate in the final thesis defense. Approved by The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Dividend Policy The case of listed companies on HOSE In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In Finance by Mr: DONG QUANG VINH ID: MBA05053 International University - Vietnam National University HCMC August 2014 Under the guidance and approval of the committee, and approved by all its members, this thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree. Approved: ---------------------------------------------Chairperson ---------------------------------------------Committee member ---------------------------------------------Committee member --------------------------------------------Committee member --------------------------------------------Committee member --------------------------------------------Committee member ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Nguyen Kim Thu for the continuous support of my study and research, for her patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. Her guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank to all of my lecturers in the MBA course. I have learned so much knowledge not only in my major but also related skills to carry out this thesis. Moreover, I would like to express my sincere thank to the members of the Committee for giving valuable comments to improve the research. I thank to my fellow classmate for the stimulating discussions, for the sleepless nights we were working together. Last but not the least, I would like to thank to my family: my parent and my wife for their support and encouragement. Plagiarism Statements I would like to declare that, apart from the acknowledged references, this thesis either does not use language, ideas, or other original material from anyone; or has not been previously submitted to any other educational and research programs or institutions. I fully understand that any writings in this thesis contradicted to the above statement will automatically lead to the rejection from the MBA program at the International University – Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City. Copyright Statement This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognize that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author‟s prior consent. © DONG QUANG VINH/ MBA05053/2014-2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………. i CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1. Background of the Study……………………………………………………………..1 1.2. Problem Statement ………………………………………………………………2 1.3. Rationale of the Research…………………………………………………………….3 1.4. Research Question of the study……………………………………………………… 4 1.5. Research Objectives………………………………………………………………….. 4 1.6. Scope and Limitation of the Research ……………………………………………… 4 1.7. Research Methodology ………………………………………………………………. 4 1.8. Thesis Structure ……………………………………………………………………… 5 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………….. 6 2.1 Definition of Dividend…………………………………………………………………. 6 2.2 Dividend policy theories………………………………………………………………. 7 2.2.1Clienteles theory…………………………………………………………… 7 2.2.2 Bird in hand ………………………………………………………………… 8 2.2.3 Signaling theory ……………………………………………………………. 9 2.2.4Pecking order theory ………………………………………………………. 10 2.2.5 Transaction cost theory ……………………………………………………. 11 2.2.6 Agency cost theory …………………………………………………………. 12 2.2.7 Adverse Selection theory…………………………………………………… 14 2.3 Determinants of Dividend payout ratio……………………………………………… 16 2.3.1 Dividend and Return on Assets …………………………………………… 16 2.3.2 Dividend and Leverage ……………………………………………………. 16 2.3.3 Dividend and Firm size ……………………………………………………. 17 2.3.4 Dividend and Growth of sales …………………………………………….. 18 2.3.5 Dividend and Profitability ………………………………………………… 18 2.3.6 Dividend and free cash flow ………………………………………………. 19 2.4 Agency theory empirical studies on the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy: 2.4.1 Agency theory and Expectation of Investors..…………………………….. 21 2.4.2 Empirical studies on the relationship between dividend payout policy and foreign ownership………………………………………………………………………….. 23 CHAPTER 3 –FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LISTED COMPANIES IN HO CHI MINH STOCK EXCHANGE FROM 2008-2012………………………………………………………… 25 3.1Top holdings of foreign investors, in companies………………………………………25 3.2 Top holding of foreign investors, in industries…………………………………….. 26 CHAPTER 4–RESEARCH METHODOLOGY…………………………………………29 4.1 Data Collection ………………………………………………………………………. 29 4.2Model .………………………………………………………………………………….29 4.2.1 Control variables ……………………………………………………………………29 4.2.2 Independent variable …………………..……………………………………………31 4.2.3 Dependent variable………….………….……………………………………………32 4.2.4 Model…………………………………………………………………………………. 32 4.3 Descriptive Methods…………………..……………………………………………….. 32 4.3.1 Descriptive Statistic………….………………………………………………. 32 4.3.2 Pearson Correlation test…………………………………………………….. 32 4.3.3 Regression Model…………….……………………………………………… 33 CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS …….…………………………………………………38 5.1 Descriptive Statistic……………………..………………………………………………38 5.2 Pearson Correlation …………………………………………………………………. 41 5.3 Analysis of the results………………………………………………………………….. 43 5.3.1 Pooled OLS ………………………………………………………………… 43 5.3.2 Fix effect Model ..…………………..……………………………………….45 5.3.3 Random effects model…….……………………………………………….. 45 5.4 Specification Test………………….…………………………………………………. 45 5.4.1 F test………………………………………………………………………… 46 5.4.2 Hausman test………….……………………………………………………… 47 5.4.3 Random effect model without independent variables …………………….. 48 5.4.4 Heteroskedascity……………….…………………………………………….. 49 5.4.5 Heteroskedascity robust F statistic..……………………………………….. 50 5.5 Discussion of result……………………………………………………………………. 52 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION…………………………. 54 6.1. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………54 6.2. Recommendation ……….……………………………………………………………..55 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Meaning HOSE Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange DPR Dividend payout ratio FEM Fixed effect model REM Random Effects model Pooled OLS Pooled Ordinary Least Square LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Summary of expected relationship of DPR with independent variables Table 2: Summary of foreign ownership in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, by Company Table 3: Summary of foreign ownership in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, by Industry Table 4: Descriptive Statistic Table 5: Companies that pay cash dividend even though they have negative EPS Table 6: Company that maintain cash dividend as EPS declines Table 7: Pearson correlation among variables. Table 8: Pooled OLS Table 9: Fixed effect model Table 10: Random effect model Table 11: F-test Table 12: Hausman test Table 13: Random Effects after eliminating unnecessary independent variables Table 14: Breusch - Pagan test for heteroskedasticity Table 15: Heteroskedasticity robust F statistic ABSTRACT The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between foreign ownership and cash dividend payout policy of listed companies on HOSE that have more than 5 percent foreign ownership on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) The data is collected from Vietstock.vn consisting of 95 companies with 5% to 49% foreign ownership on HOSE during the period of 2008-2012. After conducting some tests and models to find out which ones are the most suitable, the study comes up with the Random Effects model , which is used to test hypothesis. The result has showed that the foreign ownership has no significant relationship with cash dividend payout ratio. The study also reveals thatfirm‟s size and profitability have negative relationship with dividend payout ratio. The result is inconsistent with the transaction cost theory and agency cost theory. It may be due to the unique features of Vietnamese market in the recession period from 2008 to 2012. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This chapter provides a general picture of the issue that will be examined in this research. Besides, objectives, rationale, scope and limitation will be mentioned in this chapter. 1.1 Background of the study: Dividend payout policy of a company has been a controversial topic for academics and practitioners. It is proved that there is a connection between ownership structures, especially foreign ownership and payout policy. In Viet Nam, foreign ownership is gaining momentum because the Vietnamese government is loosening the room of foreign investors. Currently, the room for foreign investor in a listed company is 49% of total ownership of a company. It is projected to increase to 60% for the foreign ownership limit in non-banking businesses in the 01/2014/NĐ-CP, according to VietstockFinance. Furthermore, the strategic investors can own up to 20% of a bank‟s total outstanding shares, an increase from the current level of 15%. Viet Nam is becoming more attractive to foreign investors. According to theWorld Bank, the market capitalization of Vietnamese stock marketwas $32 billion USDin 2012 and the foreign investors accounts for $2.9 billion USD. In 2012, while emerging market equities have struggled due to financial crisis, Vietnamese stocks have surged 20 percent to become Asia‟s best performing market, according to CNBC (2012). In the article, the author also mentioned about the capital foreign investors pumped into Vietnamese stock market. It was 325 million dollar. Therefore, the impact of foreign ownership is increasingly more important. Foreign investors gradually play a role in ownership structure in listed companies. This argument is also supported by other previous studies in the world. Globally, ownership in equity markets is increasingly being dominated 1 by foreign ownership which may affect the corporate dividend and capital structure policy. For example, Yanvin and Roni (2005) document an increase in foreign ownership of US equities from 35% in 1980's to more than 50% in 1990's. Short et al. (2002) indicates that the ownership of equity in UK was dominated by foreign investors and they influenced the dividend payout ratios. Some previous studies suggest that there are positive and significant associations between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio (Short, Zhan, and Keasey (2002)). Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) show that firms that increase payouts have significantly higher foreign ownership than firms keeping or decreasing payouts. We pay more attention to foreign ownership as they are becoming increasingly popular and important players in the Vietnamese stock market, an emerging economy with stable political system and potential high growth. We believe that the result from this research will be interesting and helpful to both foreign investors and domestic investors. It is really crucial to conduct this research about how foreign ownership has impact on dividend payout ratio. 1.2 Problem Statement: There are two arguments so far regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) did not find any evidence that foreign ownership are attracted tohigh dividend-paying firms, or evidence that they cause firms to increase dividend payouts. On the other hand, other studies found that there is a positive linkage between foreign ownership and payout policy. First, the dividend clientle theory developed by Black and Scholes (1974), Allen Bernardo, and Welch (2000), etc.) suggests that foreign investors who have institutional charters and relative tax advantage prefer dividends. It predicts that foreign investors will increase their shareholdings of firms that pay high dividends. 2 Moreover, foreign investors who maintain large shares may serve as an effective monitor of firms in emerging market, because they retain global standards and practices and have a long term investment style (Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986)). Companies that have higher foreign ownership are more likely to pay dividends. Finally, foreign investors prefer cash dividends to reduce the information asymmetry and agency cost. Therefore, there is a relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio, in which dividend is a tool to reduce the asymmetric information. Hence, the study is conduct to investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio. Although there are not many empirical studies about this subject in Viet Nam, this study hopes to provide an empirical analysis on the relationship between dividend payout policy and foreign ownership during the period of 2008-2012. 1.3. Rationale of the Research Since foreign ownership is becoming increasingly common in Vietnamese listed companies, examining the impact of foreign ownership on dividend payout policy will help to understand the relationship of foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio. Moreover, the study helps investors to have the best glance about how foreign ownership reacts in an emerging market as Viet Nam. The study also aims to find out if the companies with higher dividend payout policy attracts foreign investors or foreign investors will influence the company to pay more dividends. 1.4 Research Questions: This research is conducted to mainly answer the only one question: " Is there any relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy of listed companies on HOSE in the 2008-2012 period? Is it a positive or negative relationship". 1.5 Research Objectives: 3 This paper will examine the impact of foreign ownership ondividend payout policy. Data will be collected from listed companies on HOSE from 2008-2012 period. The study will also clarify the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy is positive or negative. 1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Research Data is collected from listed companies on HOSE, which is the largest stock exchange in Viet Nam. The data is synthesized and analyzed on public figures and information from securities company. Due to lacking of transparency and reliability of some companies, the data may not show accurate values. Moreover, because of limited ability to fully understand the statistical techniques and quantitative methods, the study has difficulties in setting up models in softwares. 1.7 Research Methodology This research will mainly use quantitative method to run model. Eview and Stata softwares are used to analyze the data.The study applies literature review, empirical studies to support investigation and results. 1.8 Thesis Structure The thesis consists of 6 chapters: Chapter 1: Introduction This chapter gives a general picture about the research purpose, rationale why the topic is chosen and benefits from the result. It also suggests the research method as well as the scope and limitation. Chapter 2: Literature Review This chapter will review previous empirical studies and theories related to the topic that have been done in the past. It also presents definitions and arguments around the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio. Chapter 3: Overview of foreign ownership of listed companies on HOSE: 4 This chapter will give the situation of foreign ownership of listed companies on HOSE from 2008-2012 period. It has a summary of companies and industries, which have large portion of foreign ownership. Chapter 4: Research Methodology In this chapter, research methodology will be applied to carry out models for this study. It includes data collection, variables process, research design, hypothesis and data analysis tools. Chapter 5: Data Analysis Some tests, multiple linear regression, descriptive statistic will be conducted to examine the relationship among variables. Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendation: Discussion about result, conclusion of the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio is given. The recommendation for later research is also mentioned in this chapter. 5 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter provides literature review on the topic in this research: dividend and dividend payout policy. The chapter also covers some previous empirical studies and determinants of dividend payout policy as well as the impact of foreign ownership on dividend payout policy 2.1 Definitions of dividend: A dividend is a payment made by a corporation to its shareholders. It is decided by the board of directors. Dividend encourages investors to hold stocks in stable paying dividend companies though they do not have much growth. However, not every company pays dividends, and companies can change their dividend policies at any time. Usually these dividend payouts are made in cash (called "cash dividends"), but sometimes companies will also distribute stock dividends, whereby additional stock shares are distributed to shareholders. It is paid each quarter, or four times per year. Dividend payout policy is a managerial policy for a company to determine how much companies will contribute to shareholders in dividend and how much they are to retain for growth and reinvestment. To fully understand the relationship between the foreign ownership and dividend payout policy, the thesis will review the literature on dividend payout policy, the foreign ownership and its effects to the dividend. 2.2 Dividend policy theories: Dividend is always a controversial issues, as Black (1976) and P.L.Bernsteins (1996) stated about their findings: "The harder one looks at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don‟t fit together". Researchers spent time conducting a lot 6 of empirical researches, theoretical studies and theories which lead to three main contradictory views: 1. A positive change in dividend payout can increase firm's value. (agency theory, bird in hand) 2. Adecrease in dividend payouts can reduce the firm's value. (tax preference, transaction cost theory) 3. Dividend policy has no effect on the market value of the firm. (dividend irrelevance hypothesis) 2.2.1Dividend Clienteles theory: (Dividend Irrelevance Hypothesis) Clienteles theory suggests that different groups of investors will have different preferences for what they want to invest in since each group will encounter different kinds of tax brackets for dividend, capital gains and transaction costs. Miller and Modigliani (1961) pointed out that firm valuation is irrelevant to dividend policy in the perfect and complete market, observe that with personal taxation, investors will form clienteles with preference for the specific level of dividends. The so-called idealized theoretical world of perfect markets and rationale investors includes: 1. No tax difference between dividends and capital gains 2. No transaction costs on securities trading 3. Investors have the equal and costless access to the same information. 4. No transactions is large enough to affect the price With those assumptions, the firm's dividend payout policy has no effect on either its market value or its cost of capital in the M&M's perfect market. However, the existence of a perfect capital market in the real world is impossible. M&M neglected the effects of taxes, transaction and floatation costs, asymmetric information and agency problem. The idea was also extended by Black and Scholes (1974) who acknowledged that certain investors prefer high dividend yields, while others favor low dividends yields. They 7 extended the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which was developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), to test the long term dividend yield effects based on 25 portfolios of common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The result is that there is no influence of high yield or low yield pay out policy on stock price. There are also some other studies that support the Dividend Irrelevance Hypothesis: Miller&Scholes (1978, 1982), Hess (1981), Miller (1986), Bernstein (1996). As presented earlier, there are two different views on the effects of dividend policy on firm's value: they are high and low dividend yields that increase the firm's value. Below is the theories that argue whether higher dividend payout will increase the market value of firms, beginning with bird-in-hand theory. 2.2.2 Bird in hand theory: The basic argument for this theory about the consequences of dividend policy is that dividendsincrease firm value. Gordon and Walter (1963) supported this theory by stating that - “bird in the hand is worth more than two in the bush”. Clearly, the investors and shareholders are asrisk-averse and theyprefercurrent cash dividend to be more stable rather than a promise of high-risk income and capital gains in the future. Thus, as cash payout in term of dividend will reduce uncertainty of future cash flow, costs of capital resulting in increasing share value.Basedon the Gordon‟s growth model (1959), increase of firm value required lower rate of return and risk of future cash flow cooperated by the higher current dividend.This model presented that dividend yield is a more critical measure of the total return to the equity investor than the future growth rate of the dividends. In contrast, M &M (1961) have criticized the “bird in hand” theorythat the firm‟s risk is determined by the riskiness of its operating cash flows, not by profit distributions as dividends. That is, the riskiness of a firm‟s cash flow influences its dividend payments, but increases in dividends will not reduce the risk of the firm. In empirical evidence, however, 8 Rozeff (1982) found a negative relationship between dividends and firm risk. That is, as the risk of a firm‟s operations increases, the dividend payments decrease. 2.2.3 Signaling theory: According to this theory, inside managers have confidential information about current performance and future growth of the firms while outside investors don‟t. Therefore, dividend is a tool that contains the confidential information and can be used to signal that firm‟s future cash flows are sufficient to cover debt payments and dividend payment without increasing the probability of bankruptcy (Weston 1993). A declaration of increasing dividend will be a good news and the stock price will react favorably, and vice versa. (Bhattacharya, 1979). Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) developed the dividend signaling model basedon institutional tax clienteles. They relied on two assumptions. First, there were just two clienteles, untaxed-institutions and taxed individuals. Second, institutions are moreeffective at monitoring management and detecting firm quality than retail investors. Under these assumptions, they showed that firms may be able to signal their quality by initiating dividends and attracting institutional investors who have the relative tax advantages. In particular, only high quality firms are able to bear the tax-based costs of dividends to attract better informed investors, while low quality firms cannot mimic this action, because they do not want their true type to be revealed. As a result, there is separating to equilibrium in which firms signal higher quality by paying dividends to attract better informed institutional investors. In the view of investors, due to the fact that stocks are riskier than bonds, dividends are considered as a return of their investment. Dividends is a signal to tell the growth potential and future earnings of the firms. Any positive announcement about dividend is a good news and the stock price will move favorably. (Brealey and Myer, 1996) 9 In the side of managers, they have responsibility to pay satisfactory dividend to shareholders but protecting and developing the firms are important as well. In some cases, they have to retain earnings for the future growth demand of the companies. With the mission of maximizing the value of shareholders, managers have to consider carefully on their investment and financing decision or dividend payout policy to reduce the agency problem. 2.2.4 Pecking order theory: Firms raise capital for growth demand by different ways. Pecking order appears if the cost of issuing new securities exceeds other costs and benefits of dividend and debt. The financing cost includes transaction costs and agency cost which arise due to information asymmetry. It is assumed that managers know much better about company‟s performance and future prospect, as well as risky securities. In order to minimize the cost, firms try not to fund by external capital. Instead, they take advantage of the available amount of internal fund such as retain earnings. As a result, firms diminish the amount of dividends paid to shareholders. Result from some studies points out if firms are reducing their dividend payment, then the firms should cut the amount of debt financing they use to fund their operation, according to Fama and French (2010). However, firms are abandoning the pecking order theory. Companies no longer retain significant amount of earnings, they start to increase the dividend paid to shareholder instead. Moreover, the payout ratio is negatively related to the growth of companies since they need money to invest in future plan. The payout ratio is also negatively associated with leverage, but positively with the profitability, said Myers. The reason behind is the firm finds it is expensive to finance investment with new risky debt, dividend become less attractive for firm with low profitability, large expected investment and high leverage. 2.2.5 Transaction cost theory: Beside tax preference hypothesis, transaction cost theory also explained for why 10 low dividend payout was implemented. Whenever people deal with shorting securities, this cost is incurred. In fact, the firm with low transaction cost on issuing new securities is more likely to pay high dividend than the firm with high transaction cost. This is considered as a negative relationship between dividend payout and transaction cost. Studies by Higgins (1972) and Fama (1974) supposed that the dividend payment‟s ratio is influenced by the firm‟s requirements for financing debt and other investment‟s purposes. In their theoretical framework, they work in pioneer to examine the effect of transaction costs on dividend policy. Higher dividend payment will strengthen the dependency on external financing and raising actual transaction costs. To argue Higgins‟s and Fama‟s, Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) suggested on agency cost that this cost might decrease the stock value as increasing dividend payout ratio. As a result, the firm would adopt optimal dividend policy within attempting to minimize the sum of those two costs. In general, the transaction cost theory is partly based on information asymmetry and other market imperfections. Likely in emerging economies‟ capital markets, the transaction cost theory rationalizes effectively on the dividend policies which relying on imperfect capital market. Capital markets in emerging economies are often differentiated from developed economies due to high risk of high transaction costs, lack of liquidity, and asymmetric information. Those issues are characteristically resulted by lack of tolerable disclosure and poor financial intermediates. According to Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995), dividend levels in developing countries are considerably lower than developed nations. They also criticized that lower dividend level probably was an evidence of inefficient markets that mostly depending on internal finance. Moreover, in their research‟s results, there was a positive relationship between total investment financed by retained earnings in the developing markets and dividend payout ratios. Rozeff (1982) showed that firms, depending on external finance, for example high leverage, risky and high potential growth, could take up lower dividend payout policy. The 11 transaction cost also results in the investors‟ preference in the form of receiving income from dividend or capital gains. For those risk-averse investors, they would prefer cash payments for dividends as a stable source of income. This is explained that the need of funds for shortterm goals or help investors to avoid having to sell securities and bear brokerage fees too costly. 2.2.6 Agency cost theory: Another explanation on the relationship between foreign ownership and payouts is based on the incomplete contracts, causing the conflict of interest between management and shareholders. According to M&M theory of perfect capital market assumptions, there are no conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. However, in reality when managers and owners of a company are separated, it may cause problems. Managers may invest in unprofitable projects of which costs are borne by shareholders if doing so enhances their own status and bring them private benefits (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Payout policy is one aspect of corporate decisions that can solve this problem. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that the solution to agency conflicts is to increase the level of payout because managers prefer to retain earnings to increase private consumption or reduce the risk on their human capital. Jensen (1986) argues that dividend payments can discipline managers to return cash to shareholders rather than over-investing and wasting firm resources, called the free cash flow problem. Thus, agency hypothesis agree that paying high dividends provides a cost effective substitute to shareholder monitoring and, so, would increase firm value by reducing the overinvestment problem. Consistent with this notion, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) examined the relation between investor protection and dividend policy across 33 countries. They find that shareholders are able to force managers to pay out free cash flow in common law countries where legal systems protect investors, while they cannot do this in civil law countries. Thus, La Porta et al. support for the agency models that an effective legal 12 system allows investors to reduce agency costs by forcing management to pay out cash. Prior literature suggests that large shareholders play a vital role in corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), for example, suggests that large shareholders are motivated to monitor firm activities, thereby, reducing agency problems between shareholders and managers. Thus, the importance of the institutional investors as good monitors has been emphasized in various areas including submitting shareholder proposals (Del Guercio and Hawkins(1999), Gillan and Starks (2000)), executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2002)), M&A(Agrawal and Mandelker(1990), Qiu(2006), Chen, Harford, and Li(2006)) and R&D(Bushee 1998), CEO turnover (Parrino, Sias, and Stark (2003)) and payout policies (Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002), Grinstein and Michaely (2005)). Short et al. find the significant and positive relationship between foreign ownership and the level of dividends using a UK data set. Grinstein and Michaely (2005)hypothesized that assuming foreign investors to be better monitors of management with their significant stakes and superior information, they may increase dividends, thereby, reducing free cash flow problems. However, they find no evidence supporting for their hypothesis using U.S industrial firm data. In emerging market, literature reports find that foreign institutional investors who maintain global standards and practice complement the monitoring role of domestic investors who may be unable to conduct a full monitoring role. Khanna and Palepu (1999), for example, find that domestic institutions are poor monitors, while foreign institutions serve a valuable monitoring function in India as emerging markets integrate with the global economy. To summarize, the agency model predicts that firms are likely to pay out more cash through either dividends or repurchases, with enhanced monitoring by foreign investors. The impact of domestic investors, however, would be relatively insignificant due to a lack of their monitoring incentives. 13 2.2.7 Adverse Selection Hypothesis: In contrast of dividend clientele hypothesis, the adverse selection suggests that institutional investors, who are better informed than retail investors, prefer share repurchases to dividend payment. The stock price information is asymmetric among managers, informed and uninformed shareholders. The adverse selection occurs when managers and informed shareholders long for stock only if the tender price is lower than the true value. Consequently, the uninformed shareholder will get the most of their orders when the stock is overvalued. Internally, managers have opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, according to Barclay and Smith (1988). Brennan and Thakor (1990) offered a theoretical model which is based on an information asymmetry not between managers and shareholders but between informed and uninformed shareholders. As there is a fixed cost of obtaining information, more shareholders have an incentive to be informed when the larger cash distribution is intended. When the small amount is payout, most of shareholders do not want to get informed. For the given level of distribution, large shareholders are willing to get informed. Consequently, better informed shareholders prefer stock repurchases while less-informed shareholders have a preference for cash dividends. There is a large and growing literature examining whether foreign investors have information disadvantages over domestic traders, however empirical evidence is mixed. On one hand, foreign investors usually have a significant amount of global investment experience and use well developed technology, suggesting that they are in a better position to evaluate a firm‟s prospect. One the other hand, foreign investors may possess inferior information due to geological, cultural, and political distances. Recent researches by Hau (2001) using German data, Dvorak (2005) using Indonesian data, and Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005) using Korean data find that foreign investors are at a disadvantage, while Seaholes (2000) who uses Taiwanese data documents contrary findings. For example, Choe et al. argue 14 that institutional investors and even retail investors have advantages in trading Korean stocks over foreign investors by showing that prices move against foreign investors than against domestic investors before trades. In conclusion, adverse selection hypothesis, assuming foreign investors have information disadvantages over domestic investors in trading local securities (e.g.Choe et al.(2005)), foreign ownership has a positive effect on cash but have insignificant effect on repurchases activities of domestic corporations. 2.2.8 Empirical Issue in Viet Nam: The research uses Vietnamese market data to investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy. Since the foreign ownership in Vietnamese market has experienced an increase, we can analyze the joint relationship between the change in foreign ownership and the change in financial policies. The foreign ownership holds 17% of total market capitalization and up to 40% in certain industries. For example, the 35 companies in Food and Beverage accounts for roughly 40% of the total market capitalization on HOSE, while the next two big industries Real Estate and Manufacturing have 25% and 7,8% respectively. It is interesting to examine if the foreign ownership really has impact on dividend payout as it is increasing in Vietnamese market. It is also important to find out the behavior of foreign investors on financial policies of firms. Are they really want to prefer cash dividend to reduce agency problem or they will only get return from firms‟ profit in the long term? This research will aim to figure out the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy in listed companies on HOSE. 2.3 Determinants of Dividend Payout policy 2.3.1 Dividend and return on assets: 15 Return on assets is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. Generally, ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Lintner (1956) found that the anticipated level of future earnings is the determinant of dividend payment. It means that if the companies make earnings well based on the assets that they have, they are willing to increase the dividend payout ratio. The result from the study of Amidu (2007) also supports this argument since it found out the return on assets is one of the key performance indicator associated with positive changes in earnings. 2.3.2 Dividend and leverage: The assets of a company can be financed either by increasing equity, debt or both. The creditor's claim increases when company borrows. In the capital structure of the firms, debt and equity both play an important role in determining cost of the capital. Due to cash crunching, most of the firm‟s depend on debt because all time, retained earning can‟t fulfill the firm‟s financial need. The pecking order theory showed a correlation between debt level and dividend payment. There are opposite opinions about this relationship. Due to debt in capital structure, company is liable to pay interest to debt provider but it is also provide benefit to the firm‟s as interest tax shield. High leverage increases profitability of the firm in favorable economic condition but more risk associate with high leverage. Due to positive impact of leverage in favourable condition, companies earning potential shoot up and may decide to give more dividend as compare to firm‟s have less leverage. (Panday, p.209). On the other hand, Jensen et al (1992) believed that financing from equity is still more attractive to investors and companies with high leverage ratio are unlikely to reimburse dividend payment to its shareholders. In this study, the financial leverage with the proxy as of level of debt to equity ratio will be examined to figure out how the leverage affects the dividend payout ratio. 16 2.3.3 Dividend and firm size Previous studies have shown that firm size is one of the factors that have significant impact on the dividend payout ratio. According to Smith (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1967), larger firms tend to have easier access to the capital markets with fewer constraints, lower issuing costs and higher agency costs. It is also supported by the transaction cost theory. Jensen et al (1992), Alli et al. (1993), Redding (1997), and Fama and French (2000) point out that large firms are willing to distribute a higher amount of their net profits as cash dividends, than do small firms. Moreover, according to the agency theory, large firms will offer high dividends to diminish agency costs. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between dividend payout ratio and firm size. Basically, there are two approaches to calculate the firm size. One of them is the natural logarithm of total assets. This measurement was used by Al-Kuwari (2009). The other one that was used by some other researchers such as: Lloyd (1985), Holder (1998) is natural logarithm of sales. According to Lloyd (1985), it has no significant difference in measuring profitability in terms of sales or market value of equity. 2.3.4 Dividend and growth of sales: It has been studied that the growth of sales has the relationship with dividend payout ratio. Sales growth is the amount by which the average sales volume of a company's products and services has grown, typically from year to year. Therefore, the companies always have plan to meet the growth of the company for the next year. Indeed, Rozeff (1982) has showed that if the past or anticipated future growth of a company soars rapidly, then the managers are more likely to maintain the capital for reinvestment by establishing a lower payout ratio. Companies with high growth rate tend to seek more capital by external financing. In this study, the sales growth rate is a proxy for transaction cost theory of external 17 financing, according to Alli et al (1993) and Collins et al. (1996). Thus, the growth of sale is allegedly negative to the dividend payout ratio. 2.3.5 Dividend and profitability: Profitability is certainly one of the most important indicators that have effects on dividend payout ratio. The ratio "Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets" is the proxy of profitability in this study. It was also used by other researchers such as Gill (2006), and Amidu & Abor (2006) to examine the relationship between the profitability and the dividend payout ratio. As revealed by the Pecking order theory, the dividend payout ratio has the positive relationship with profitability. Since it is expensive and difficult to finance investment with new securities, companies with low profit are not likely to pay dividend while high profit companies pay more dividend. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between profitability and dividends. However, as discussed earlier, the companies with high growth rate, may keep their profit for the expansion or growth plan in next year. They are not going to pay more dividend. Thus, depending on the situation of the market and the company, companies will choose to maintain dividend for later use or distribute dividends to shareholders. 2.3.6 Dividend and free cash flow: Some previous studies have showed that the free cash flow has relationship with dividend payout ratio. Free cash flow is a measurement of financial performance calculated as operating cash flow minus capital expenditures. Free cash flow represents the cash that a company is able to generate after laying out the money required to maintain or expand its assets. According to agency theory, free cash flow hypothesis suggests that firms with less growth opportunities and more free cash flow should pay higher dividend payout ratio. 18 Amidu and Abor (2006) pointed out that in order to improve the transparency and reduce the agency costs, the investors want the companies to pay more dividends to prevent managers from investing excess cash at below cost of capital or spending it on wasteful activities. The following table is a summary of the relationship between the dividend payout ratio and independent variables: Table 1 Summary of expected relationship of DPR with independent variables No Independent Proxy Variables Expected Supporting theory sign 1 Return on assets EBIT/Total Assets (+) Pecking-order theory 2 Firm size Log of sales or total (+) Transaction cost theory assets Agency cost theory 3 Growth of sales Sales growth (-) Transaction cost 4 Profitability EBIT/total assets (+) Pecking order theory 5 Financial Debt/Equity (-) Pecking order theory Transaction cost theory Leverage Agency cost theory 6 Free cash flow Operating cash flow - (+) Agency theory capital expenditures 7 Foreign ownership Number of common (+) stock/Total outstanding shares Agency theory 19 2.4 Agency theory and empirical studies on the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy: 2.4.1 Agency theory and Expectation of Investors: The agency theory defines firm as a group of individuals with conflict, contradictory interests and self-seeking motives. The separation of ownership from management of a firm creates differences in management/principal and shareholders/agent priorities. This matter causes individuals to maximize their own benefit rather than maximizing the firm‟s wealth. Therefore, this conflict brings to firm huge costs in the agency. Agency problems are the consequences of information asymmetries. Insiders like managers know much about the current performance while outsiders don‟t. There are two types of agency costs: the agency cost of equity and the agency cost of debt. According to Jensen - Meckling (1976), the agency cost of equitycomes from conflicts of interests between insiders and outside equity holders; while the other arises between equity holders and debt holders. Jensen- Meckling also pointed out the better informed shareholders have more benefits than the uninformed shareholders. Hence, increasing managerial ownership reduce agency problem by decreasing the information asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders. They argue that agency cost is negatively related to the proportions of inside ownership. Besides, as manager increase their ownership in firms, they are more responsible for maximizing the benefits of shareholders (Crutchley-Hansen, 1989). According to Bathala (1990), there are two ways that dividend payout ratio is distributed. The first method is reaching the firm‟s optimal payout ratio through a trade-off between a lessening in the agency costs of external equity and an increase in the transaction costs related with outside financing resulting from the increase of dividend payout ratio. The second opinion holds that inside ownership and external debt are substitute devices in reducing agency costs in a firm. 20 In supporting the agency theory point of view of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) study the firm‟s first method and builds a model in which dividends are effective tool to lower agency costs by increasing more expensive external capital and increasing the dividend payout ratio. To be more clearly, in the absence of active monitoring of a firm‟s management by its shareholders, dividends provide indirect control benefits. Distributing cash dividends causes the firms‟ internal funds insufficient. As a result, managers have to seek external finance which is more effective than internal finance with respect to monitoring and disciplining management (Easterbrook, 1984). Rozeff also argues that managers and shareholders have opposite view regarding to dividend payments. Managers are reluctant to pay out dividends. They prefer maintain capital under their control to preserve their own interest (Jensen 1986). On the other hand, the external shareholders who have the conflicting view of dividends can force the firm to pay out dividends and prevent the managers from excessively retaining cash flow with their voting power (Easterbrook, 1984). Bhattacharya, 1979 and Miller and Rock 1985 also support the role of dividend in reducing agency costs and information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, once firms pay dividend, firms have to go through audit process, which forces managers to disclose information and hence, reduce the agency cost. There are some models that have built as a tool to protect shareholders‟ benefits. La Porta (2000)‟s model recognizes the relationship between dividend payment and cost of equity. In this model, dividend is a factor that have impact on corporate management to reduce cash available in firms and it is considered as an effective legal protection of shareholders. 21 2.4.2 Empirical studies on the relationship between dividend payout policy and foreign ownership: Foreign investors always try to secure their investment by investing in firms that they are better informed to reduce the asymmetric information costs. Kang and Stulz (1997) have studied the preferences of institutional investors in Japan. Similarly, Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) found out evidence that foreign investors of Swedish companies prefer large size firm with high business transparency, firms pay lower dividends and cash position on balance sheet. Another important factor for foreign investors to invest in companies is ownership structure. It is considered as the heart of the companies. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership structure includes internal investors (managers), and external investors (debt holder and equity shareholders). Abel Ebel and Okafor (2010) classified ownership structure as the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, state ownership, foreign ownership, family ownership and so on. Many existing empirical evidence regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and payout policy is mixed. Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2003) report that firms that pay more dividends tends to attract institutions that hold portfolios of higher dividend yield stocks. They also find that stock returns to announcements of dividend increases depend on the dividend preference of institutional investors who hold the stocks. Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) study dividend policy in UK industrial firms. Using various dividend models proposed byLintener (1956), Waud (1996), and Fama and Babiak (1968), they find a significantassociation between foreign ownership and dividend changes. Grinsten and Michaely (2005) report that foreign investors prefer dividend-paying firms, but among dividend-paying firms, they actually prefer firms that pay lower dividends. They also find that, consistent with a notion that foreign investors are better informed, they 22 prefer firms that repurchase stocks. Their evidence, however, does not support the agency theory that firms are more likely to increase dividends with enhanced monitoring by foreign investors. Finally, using surveys and field interviews, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) report that corporate managers believe that foreign investors are indifferent between dividends and repurchases. They also find no evidence that firms pay dividends to attract foreign investors or that firms pay dividends so that investors will monitor them. 23 CHAPTER 3 FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LISTED COMPANIES ON HOSE (2008-2012) This chapter will give a summary of top holdings of foreign ownership in listed companies and industries from the period 2008-2012 3.1 Foreign ownership of listed companies in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange from 2008-2012 Based on the data provided by Vietstock.vn, there are 277 non-financial listed companies on HOSE from the period 2008-2012. Overall, the foreign ownership is diversified in companies in different industries. The portion of foreign ownership ranges from 0% to 49%. Most of the companies have the foreign ownership portion from 0%-5%. Here are the top holdings of foreign investors in 2012: 24 Table 2 Summary of foreign ownership in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, by Company Code Company Industry Foreign MCAP Ownership KDC Kinh Do Corp DHG DHG Pharmaceutical Joint Chemical FPT Food and Beverage Foreign MCAP 49% 6237 3120 - 49% 4750 2330 9524 4723 37.89% 8820 3356 36.48% 7856 2754 49% 48938 23980 33,25% 11607 3859 27,18% 13604 3698 21,52% 70103 15086 12,09% 56037 6775 Stock company Pharmaceutical products FPT Corp Technology and 49% Communication HPG Hoa Phat Group Joint Stock Manufacturing Company PVD Petro Vietnam Drilling and Services Well Services Joint Stock Company VNM Vietnam Dairy Products Food and Beverage Joint Stock Company HAG HAGL Company Joint Stock Real estate DPM PetroVietnam Fertilizer and Chemical and fertilizer Chemical Corporation MSN Masan Group Corp VIC Vingroup Company Joint Food and beverage Stock Real estate The table provides a summary of top ten holdings of foreign ownership in 2012. The first three columns present the company and industry it is doing business in. The next three 25 columns shows the firm's foreign ownership, total market capitalization (MCAP) and foreign ownership's market capitalization. Kinh Do Corp, DHG JSC, FPT Corp, and Vinamilk are the largest companies in the portfolio held by foreign investors. They control 49% of the company with a high corresponding investment. As seen in the table, all top ten holdings are very large companies. It indicates that foreign investors seem to hold more shares in large firms. 3.2 Foreign Ownership on HOSE, by Industry: Foreign ownership also diversified in Vietnam industry. The data of 277 companies on HOSE is presented in 14 industries by market capitalization at the end of the year 2012. This following table give a glance of top industries that have foreign ownership: Table 3 Summary of foreign ownership in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, by Industry Industry Firms in Industry Firms with foreign ownership in Industry N0 Food Beverage and 35 MCAP (%) N0 MCAP (%) 144430.432 (39.283%) 34 43921.955 (48.256%) Manufacturing 42 28345.879 (7.710%) 41 7258.789 (7.958%) Real estate 38 90154.440 (24.236%) 38 14456.922 (15.420%) Commerce 31 6868.541 (1.855%) 30 725.486 (0.799%) 15679.283 (4.256%) 16 5211.771 (5.67%) Technology and 16 telecommunication 26 They are the top 5 holding industries with high proportion of foreign ownership. The biggest industries on HOSE is “Food and Beverage” with the market capitalization up to 144430.432 billion VND, which accounts for 39.283% the total market. Moreover, the industry also has the highest foreign ownership by market capitalization, which is 43921.955 billion VND, as of 48.256% of total market capitalization of foreign ownership companies on HOSE. Furthermore, the foreign investors have preference of investing in Manufacturing, Real Estate, Commerce and Technology and Telecommunication. These industries also have high portion of foreign ownership. 27 CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In this chapter, the study applies quantitative method with Stata and Eview softwares. This chapter also reviews models and tests that have been used by previous researchers. 4.1 Data Collection: The study covers mostly the secondary data of listed companies on HOSE from Vietstock.vn of Tai Viet joint stock company. Data includes shareholder, ownership structure, cash dividend payment, percentage of foreign ownership. However, the study exclude financial companies such as banks, insurance companies.. to avoid the lack of information from those companies. Therefore, this study only collected data from 277 non financial listed companies on HOSE. The period that the thesis working on is from 2008 to 2012, in which we had an increase of FDI (roughly 64$ billion) into Viet Nam market even though the market was going under the economic recession period. Moreover, the study only focuses on companies that have foreign ownership from 5% to 49% and completed data from 2008 to 2012. Hence, the study only examines the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio of 95 non financial companies in the period 2008-2012. 4.2 Model: 4.2.1 Control variables: 28 Firm size: There are some approaches that were used by other authors to measure the firm size such as Azhagaiah and Veeramuthu (2010) and Kowalewski (2006). They applied a natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size by computing the average of total asset value and take the logarithm of this value. The total assets are takenfrom the 2008-2012 financial reports of HOSE listed companies. Leverage: The financial leverage is the degree to which a company uses fixed-income securities such as debt and preferred equity. It measures the long term financial distress of companies. The more debt financing a company uses, the higher its financial leverage. A high degree of financial leverage means high interest payment, which negatively affects the company‟s earnings per share. Debt level can be determined by the total debt to total equity ratio. This information is gathered from the balance sheets of firms on HOSE. Growth of Sales: Growth of sales is the amount by which the average sales volume of a company‟s products or services has grown. The ratio measures the valuation of the firm. Valued firms have low ration while growth firms have lower ratio Profitability: Profitability is measured as the Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to the total equity. Anil and Kapoor (2006) indicated that profitability has always been considered as a primary indicator of dividend payout ratio. In other words, once companies ' profitability increases, it is more likely that they will disperse dividend to shareholders. 29 Return on assets (ROAs) It is calculated by dividing net profit after tax and depreciation before interest by total assets. It is marked as the primary indication of firms to pay dividends. Lintner (1956) found that the anticipated level of future earnings is the determinant of dividend payment. Free Cash Flow: The level of the free cash flow of a firm is an important determinant of dividend payments. A poor liquidity position means fewer dividends due to shortage of cash. Amidu and Abor (2006) found a positive relationship between cash flow and dividend payouts. 4.2.2 Independent Variable Foreign ownership: This is the percentage of shares that are owned by foreign investors. This research only focuses on the firms which have more than 5% foreign ownership. According to the Law on securities, chapter 1, and an article 6: "Majority shareholders mean a shareholder directly or indirectly owning at least five percent or more of voting stocks of an issuing organization”. Therefore, foreign investors that hold more than 5% ownership will have more significant impact on the dividend payout policy of the firms. 4.2.3 Dependent Variable: Dividend payout ratio is measured by: DIV per share / earnings per share: ratio of cash dividends per share divided by earnings per share 30 4.2.4 Model: 𝑫PR = 𝜷𝟎+ 𝜷𝟏. SIZ𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐. 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑. 𝑮𝑶𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒. 𝑹𝑶𝑨S𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷5. FCF𝒊𝒕 + + 𝜷6. Prof𝒊𝒕 +𝜷7. 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + e𝒊𝒕 (1) 𝜷𝟎: the intercept 𝜷1, 𝜷2, 𝜷3, 𝜷4, 𝜷5, 𝜷6, 𝜷7: the regression coefficient e𝒊𝒕: the error term 4.3 Descriptive Method: 4.3.1 Descriptive Statistic: First of all, the descriptive statistics is conducted as the discipline of quantitatively describing the main features of a collection of information. It provides simple summaries about the samples and about the observations that have been made. That includes: mean, median, minimum and maximum value, skewness, kurtosis and standard deviation. 4.3.2 Pearson correlation test Correlation is a technique for investigating the relationship between two quantitative, continuous variables. The most common method to measure correlation is the Pearson Correlation. Pearson „s correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of the strength of a linear relationship between paired data. It is usually denoted by r and is by design constrained as follows: -1 ≤ r ≤ 1 Furthermore:  Positive values denote positive linear correlation 31  Negative values denote negative linear correlation  A value of 0 denotes no linear correlation  The closer the value is to 1 or -1, the stronger the linear correlation. Table Rule of Interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient Size of Correlation Interpretation 0.90 to 1.00 (-0.90 to -1.00) Very High Correlation 0.70 to 0.9 (-0.70 to -1.00) High Correlation 0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) Moderate Correlation 0.30 to 0.50 (-0.30 to -0.50) Low Correlation 0.00 to 0.30 (0.00 to -0.30) Negligible Correlation Source: Hinkle (1998) 4.3.3 Regression methods:  Pooled Ordinary Least Square Regression: Pooled regression is usually carried out on Times Series Cross-sectional data that has observation overtime for several different units or cross-sections. However, the model does not distinguish the difference among the various companies that we have. It assumes that the intercept value are the same for all cross-sectional units and the slope coefficient of the independent variables are identical for all individuals.  Fixed effects model: The fixed effect models measure differences in intercepts for each groups. It is appropriate to apply when the sample reflects the entire population (Brooks, 2008). In this 32 model, the intercept may vary across companies, but not over time. According to Brooks, we can define the formula of the fixed effects model based on the original one: 𝑫PR = 𝜷𝟏. SIZ𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐. 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑. 𝑮𝑶𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒. 𝑹𝑶𝑨S𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷5. FCF𝒊𝒕 +𝜷6. Prof𝒊𝒕 +𝜷7. 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + u𝒊𝒕 (2) u𝒊𝒕 = v𝒊𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊 𝝁𝒊is the individual specific of all individuals affecting the dependent variable that cannot be entirely explained by the independent variables. It is measured by dummy variables with cross-sectional variation in least squares dummy variable approach with the following equation: 𝜇𝑖=𝜇1𝐷1𝑖+𝜇2𝐷2𝑖+𝜇3𝐷3𝑖+⋯+𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖(3) D1i: Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for the first firm and 0 for the rest. DNi: Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for the Nth firm and 0 for the rest. Moreover, Brooks suggests that the thesis should eliminate the 𝜷o and replaced by u𝒊𝒕 to avoid the multicollinearity between 𝜷o and other dummy variables  The random effects model: By contrast, when the researcher is accumulating data from a series of studies that had been performed by researchers operating independently, it would be unlikely that all the studies were functionally equivalent. Typically, the subjects or inter-ventions in these studies would have differed in ways that would have impacted on the results, and therefore we should not assume a common effect size. Therefore, in these cases the random-effects model is more easily justified than the fixed-effect model. 33 Additionally, the goal of this analysis is usually to generalize to a range of scenarios. Therefore, if one did make the argument that all the studies used an identical, narrowly defined population, then it would not be possible to extrapolate from this population to others, and the utility of the analysis would be severely limited. (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, Rothstein, 2009) Furthermore, Brooks (2008) said that the random effects model is more appropriate when the sample is randomly collected from the population. It also has different intercepts that doesn‟t vary over time and expressed in the following equation: 𝑫PR = 𝜷𝟎+ 𝜷𝟏. SIZ𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐. 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑. 𝑮𝑶𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒. 𝑹𝑶𝑨S𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷5. FCF𝒊𝒕 + + 𝜷6. Prof𝒊𝒕 +𝜷7. 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + u𝒊𝒕 (4) in which 𝝎𝒊𝒕 = 𝒗𝒊𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊 𝜺𝒊measures the random deviation of each firm‟s intercept term from the common intercept �0. The difference of 𝜺𝒊in this model and the u𝒊𝒕in the fixed-effect model is that 𝜺𝒊is not modeled by dummy variables and hence the common intercept is kept (Wooldrigde, 2002).  F test for fixed effect: The F test is used to test if all the dummy variables in fixed effect model have different parameters. According to Park (2011), the null hypothesis of F-test is that all dummy parameters in equation (3) above except one are equal to zero. Alternative hypothesis is stating that at least one parameter is equal to zero. 𝐻0:𝜇1=𝜇2=𝜇3=⋯=𝜇𝑁−1=0 𝐻1:𝜇1≠0 𝑜𝑟𝜇1≠0 𝑜𝑟𝜇1≠0 𝑜𝑟… 𝜇𝑁−1≠0 If the null hypothesis is rejected, then we need to use the fixed effect model. It is better than the pooled OLS, otherwise the Pooled OLS is more appropriated. 34  Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) The LM test help to decide between a random effects regression and a simple OLS regression. The LM test, developed by Breusch-Pagan (1980), is based on foundation of the Lagrange multiplier principle. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities are zero. This is, no significant difference across units (no panel effect) : 𝐻0:𝜎2u=0 𝐻1:𝜎2u≠0 The null hypothesis is in favor of the pooled OLS mode while the alternative prefers the random effect model. If the LM test is below 0.05 at 5% level of significant, the null hypothesis is rejected and the random effects are more appropriated in this study. Otherwise, we need to use the Pooled OLS, which is more appropriate for data set.  Hausman Test: The Hausman test (also called Wu-Hausmant test) is applied to decide between fixed and random effects where the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effect vs. the alternative the fixed effect (Green 2008, chapter 9). It basically tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not. In the thesis, firstly, we test the LM test to figure out the Pooled OLS and random effects. Then, if the random effects are chosen, we continue to test the Hausman to choose between Random effects and Fixed effects  Heteroskedasticity The OLS makes the assumption that the variance of the error term need to be constant. Heteroskedasticity is the situation when the error terms do not have constant variance. It 35 doesn‟t result the biased parameter estimates but the OLS is no longer provide the estimate with smallest variance. In other words, the OLS estimates are not BLUE. One method to detect the heteroskedasticity is using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. The ideal of this test is that the variance of error terms should be constant under the null hypothesis. If the p value is smaller than 5 percent significance level, then the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. Then, if the heteroskedasticy exist, we can deal with this problem by using the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The heteroskedasticity robust F statistic is a method for computing F statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 36 CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS This chapter explains the whole process of analyzing collected data. Firstly, the variables are calculated in Excels and then inputted into Stata to run tests such as: descriptive statistic, Pearson Correlation, Pooled OLS, Random effect, Fixed Effect and Robust regression model. 5.1 Descriptive Statistic: The following is the table providing the descriptive statistic of total 475 observations for the period of 5 years from 2008-2012. Furthermore, the table show the features such as: the mean, the standard deviation, the maximum, the minimum for the dependent variables and independent variable. The result indicates that the Dividend payout ratio ranges from 1.06888 to 10.37344 with mean value is 0.426458 and the standard deviation is 0.660856. The gap between minimum value and the maximum value of the DPR represents the fluctuation in the dividend payment of foreign ownership listed companies on HOSE: 37 Table 4 Descriptive Statistic DPR FCF FO Mean 0.426458 309535.3 7.64E+11 0.493813 2.098511 0.277708 0.121808 27.84327 Median 0.366838 84089 9.91E+10 0.146791 0.852929 0.200774 0.101529 27.76685 Maximum 10.37344 8310458 9.71E+13 59.25915 52.64417 3.352693 0.609005 31.07415 Minimum -1.06888 -2068246 0 Std. Dev. 0.660856 861056.4 4.84E+12 3.409237 4.436475 0.360093 0.096426 1.100948 Skewness 8.929472 4.523531 17.24684 14.32298 6.532777 2.736676 0.419098 0.371459 Kurtosis 119.5281 30.99457 335.5763 225.8013 59.75775 28.07719 8.64251 Jarque-Bera 275059.5 17130.59 2212645 998707.8 67136.32 13039.2 644.0305 11.53481 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 Sum 202.5677 1.47E+08 3.63E+14 234.5611 996.7927 131.9113 57.85886 13225.55 207.0101 3.51E+14 1.11E+28 5509.252 9329.417 61.46226 4.407281 574.5288 Sum Dev. GOS -0.91075 LEV PROF 0.000406 -2.09364 0 0 ROAS -0.51011 SIZ 25.60315 2.824262 0.003128 Sq. Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 Even though the market had been suffering the economic crisis, some companies still tried to maintain cash dividend payment to their shareholders. They even kept the amount of 38 the cash dividend payout at the same level of the year they had high earnings per share. Based on the collected data and the calculated variables, it is shown that there are 2 companies that maintain paying cash dividend: Nam Viet Corporation (ANV) and Kinh Do Corporation (KDC) as the following table: Table 5: Companies that pay cash dividend even though they have negative EPS Code Year Cash dividend EPS DPR ANV 2008 1800 1487 1.21 ANV 2009 500 -1947 -0.25 KDC 2007 1800 6687 0.26 KDC 2008 1800 -1684 -1.07 For the case of ANV, in 2009 they had significant negative EPS at -1947 and DPR at 0.25. Consequently, they dropped the amount of cash dividend from 1800 to 500 VND. Comparing with other listed companies on HOSE, the ANV still paid the dividend to its shareholders. In other hand, the case of KDC is more interesting. They had negative EPS at -1684 and DPR at -1.07 but they kept the same cash dividend amount (1800VND) that they dispersed to shareholders. Both cases can be explained by the signaling theory. It relates to the psychology of investors. They consider dividends is a factor to predict the future earnings of company and how well it performed in the year. Therefore, stop paying the dividend or reducing dividend is taken as bad news and the stock prices will move unfavorably. Hence, managers are unlikely to reduce or stop paying dividend to shareholders since it will affect value of company. They tried to keep the same cash dividend over years even though the EPS is negative. 39 Minh Phu seafood corporation (MPC) is the company that paid highest dividend payout ratio at 10.37. It means the MPC company paid cash dividend more than ten times earnings per share. A sharp decline in EPS is the reason for this high dividend payout ratio. Table 6 Company that maintain cash dividend as EPS declines Code Year Cash dividend EPS DPR MPC 2011 2500 3934 0.64 MPC 2012 2500 241 10.37 This is one more example to explain the company remains the cash dividend as the previous year even though the EPS declined or got negative. The MPC's EPS in 2012 dropped down from 3934 in 2011 to 241 in 2012. However, they still retained the cash dividend at 2500 paid to shareholders. Therefore, in 2012 MPC is the company that had the highest DPR among HOSE listed companies. 5.2 Pearson Correlation: Table 4 shows the result of Pearson correlations for pair of variables to check the strength of linear relationship (multicollinearity) 40 Table 7 Correlation between variables The result of the Pearson's correlation tests represents the correlation coefficient between dividend payout ratio (dpr), return on asset (roas), size (siz), leverage (lev), growth of sale (gos), profit (prof), free cash flow (fcf) and foreign ownership (fo) In general, the variables have negative correlation with DPR, except two variables: lev and prof have positive correlation with DPR. The variable that has strongest correlation with DPR is leverage (lev): 0.32 and the weakest correlation is gos (-0.02). However, correlation coefficients only show basic the relationship between variables but not enough to give conclusion about the relationship between variables. Therefore, in order to evaluate the relationship between variables, more tests need to be conducted. Moreover, there is no high correlation coefficients since all of absolute value of the correlation coefficients are less than 0.7. Hence, there is no multicollinearity in this model. The next part of the thesis is the analysis of the regression model. 41 5.3 Analysis of the result: Regression model First of all, the thesis conducts the tests: Pooled OLS and fixed effect and Random to find out if there is any different between coefficients among companies (F test) Ho: There is NO difference in coefficients among companies H1: There is difference in coefficients among companies In case, the H0 is accepted (p-value is more than 0.05), the Pooled OLS is taken as the appropriate approach for this thesis to analyze the data. On the other hand, if the H0 is rejected and H1 accepted (p-value is less than 0.05), the Pooled OLS is no longer suitable for the model. Then, the thesis needs to conduct Fixed effect or Random effect. After that, the Hausman test has to be run to figure out which one is more appropriate: H0: Random effects model is appropriate H1: Fixed effects model is appropriate If the hypothesis H0 is accepted (p-value is greater than 0.05 - alpha at 5%), then the Random effects model is appropriate. In contrast, the fixed effect model is appropriate if the hypothesis H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted (p-value is less than 0.05). 5.3.1 Pooled OLS: T he result shows the negative relationship between dividend payout ratio and return on assets, size, growth of sales, profit, and foreign ownership. The leverage, and the free cash flow have positive correlation with dpr. However, there is no significant relationship between foreign ownership and dpr. 42 Moreover, at the Confidence interval 5%, only 3 variables that have correlation with the DPR: size, leverage, profit (since p-values are less than 0.05). Meanwhile, the other variables are not correlated with DPR (p-values are greater than 0.05) The coefficent of the firm size variable is -0.0797. It means that as long as the firm size increases 1 unit, the dividend payout ratio reduces by 0.0797 units. The coefficient of leverage is 0.162. Similarly, when the leverage increases 1 unit, the dpr increases by 0.162 units. It also happens to profit when it increases 1 unit, the dpr will reduce by 1.146 units. Furthermore, the R-squared of 22.32% can predict 22.32% the variation in of the dependent variables. Table 8 Pooled OLS Source SS df MS Model Residual 20.221128 70.3630073 7 357 2.88873257 .197095259 Total 90.5841353 364 .248857514 dpr Coef. roas siz lev gos prof fcf fo _cons -.1196564 -.079732 .1624887 -.0057423 -1.145584 1.93e-08 -8.66e-15 2.84667 Std. Err. .3451795 .0270893 .0202739 .0061116 .1926337 3.50e-08 5.33e-14 .7558149 t -0.35 -2.94 8.01 -0.94 -5.95 0.55 -0.16 3.77 Number of obs F( 7, 357) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE P>|t| 0.729 0.003 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.582 0.871 0.000 = = = = = = 365 14.66 0.0000 0.2232 0.2080 .44395 [95% Conf. Interval] -.7984972 -.1330067 .1226175 -.0177615 -1.524423 -4.95e-08 -1.14e-13 1.360261 .5591843 -.0264574 .2023599 .006277 -.7667443 8.80e-08 9.62e-14 4.333079 43 5.3.2 Fixed Effect model: The result of fixed effect model shows that only 2 variables: leverage and profitability have impact on the DPR since the p-value is less than 0.05 at the significance level 5%. The remaining variables do not have any impact on the dependent variable DPR. Table 9 Fixed effect model 5.3.3 Random Effects Model: In the random effect model, at the significance level 5%, only 3 variables: size, leverage and profit have impact on the DPR since the p-values are less than 0.05. The other variables do not have impact on DPR (p-value > 0.05) The coefficient of the firm size variable is -0.0786. It means that as long as the firm size increases 1 unit, the dividend payout ratio reduces by 0.0786 units. The coefficient of 44 leverage is 0.162. Similarly, when the leverage increases 1 unit, the dpr increases by 0.162 units. It also happens to profit when it increases 1 unit, the dpr will reduce by 1.185 units. Table 10 Random Effect model Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: firm1 Number of obs Number of groups = = 365 88 R-sq: Obs per group: min = avg = max = 2 4.1 5 within = 0.1820 between = 0.2461 overall = 0.2228 corr(u_i, X) Wald chi2(6) Prob > chi2 = 0 (assumed) dpr Coef. roas siz lev gos prof fcf fo _cons -.0585074 -.0786307 .1621589 -.0043018 -1.184564 1.50e-08 -4.31e-15 2.816387 Std. Err. .3583939 .0306433 .0202926 .0059157 .1864393 3.71e-08 5.14e-14 .8525868 z -0.16 -2.57 7.99 -0.73 -6.35 0.40 -0.08 3.30 P>|z| 0.870 0.010 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.686 0.933 0.001 = = . . [95% Conf. Interval] -.7609466 -.1386903 .1223861 -.0158963 -1.549978 -5.77e-08 -1.05e-13 1.145347 .6439318 -.018571 .2019317 .0072928 -.8191498 8.77e-08 9.63e-14 4.487426 5.4 Specification tests: 5.4.1 F-test After the thesis conducted the Pooled OLS, the fixed effect and random effects, the Ftest will be carried out to find out if there is difference between coefficients of companies. In this case the F-test result shows that the p-value = 0.0003 (Fixed Effect model), which is less than 0.05, the hypothesis H0 is rejected. Therefore, the Pooled OLS is not appropriate to be used. 45 Table 11 F-test Estimated results: Var dpr e u Test: sd = sqrt(Var) .2488575 .1657942 .0267437 .4988562 .4071783 .1635349 Var(u) = 0 chibar2(01) = Prob > chibar2 = 21.59 0.0000 After we find out the model Pooled OLS is not suitable, we continue to conduct the Hausman test to decide which one is the most appropriate between fixed and random effects model. 5.4.2 Hausman test: The result of the Hausman test has the p-value equal 0.4963 at 5% level of significance, which is greater than 0.05. It means that the Hypothesis H0 is accepted and the random effects model is more preferable than the fixed effect model in this research. 46 Table 12 Hausman Test Coefficients (b) (B) fe re roas siz lev gos prof fcf fo .1868831 -.0150546 .1622933 -.0021157 -1.355964 1.74e-08 6.50e-15 -.0585074 -.0786307 .1621589 -.0043018 -1.184564 1.50e-08 -4.31e-15 (b-B) Difference sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E. .2453905 .0635761 .0001344 .0021861 -.1713997 2.43e-09 1.08e-14 .3184207 .0785698 .0153534 .0023952 .0951321 3.83e-08 2.36e-14 b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 4.38 Prob>chi2 = 0.4963 Therefore, the final model the thesis finds it most appropriate is the random effects model 5.4.3 Random effects model after eliminating unnecessary independent variables: The final model eliminates the independent variables that have p-value greater than 0.05 and is conducted with the following result: 47 Table 13 Random Effects after eliminating unnecessary independent variables Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: firm1 Number of obs Number of groups = = 368 88 R-sq: Obs per group: min = avg = max = 2 4.2 5 within = 0.1805 between = 0.2253 overall = 0.2056 corr(u_i, X) Wald chi2(3) Prob > chi2 = 0 (assumed) dpr Coef. Std. Err. z siz lev prof _cons -.069994 .1547358 -1.160359 2.574505 .0254332 .016807 .1639765 .7084729 sigma_u sigma_e rho .16904419 .40289793 .14968852 (fraction of variance due to u_i) -2.75 9.21 -7.08 3.63 P>|z| 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 = = 88.08 0.0000 [95% Conf. Interval] -.1198422 .1217948 -1.481747 1.185924 -.0201459 .1876769 -.8389713 3.963087 The result shows that there are only 3 variables that have impact on DPR: siz, lev and prof 5.4.4 Heteroskedasticity: The Breusch - Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity is conducted to check for the heteroskedasticity in the chosen model. The p-value is less than 0.05 at 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected. 48 Table 14 Breusch - Pagan test for heteroskedasticity Since the heteroskedasticity exists in the model, the thesis can deal with this problem by using the heteroskedasticity robust F statistic. 49 Table 15 Heteroskedasticity robust F statistic . xtreg dpr siz lev prof,re robust Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: firm1 Number of obs Number of groups = = 368 88 R-sq: Obs per group: min = avg = max = 2 4.2 5 within = 0.1805 between = 0.2253 overall = 0.2056 corr(u_i, X) Wald chi2(3) Prob > chi2 = 0 (assumed) = = 43.53 0.0000 (Std. Err. adjusted for 88 clusters in firm1) Robust Std. Err. dpr Coef. z siz lev prof _cons -.069994 .1547358 -1.160359 2.574505 .016906 .0359563 .3639339 .4858553 sigma_u sigma_e rho .16904419 .40289793 .14968852 (fraction of variance due to u_i) -4.14 4.30 -3.19 5.30 P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 [95% Conf. Interval] -.1031292 .0842627 -1.873657 1.622246 -.0368589 .2252089 -.447062 3.526764 After we use the Heteroskedasticity robust F statistic to eliminate the heteroskedasticity problem, the final regression is: DPR= 2.57 – 0.069*SIZ + 0.15*LEV – 1.16*PROF Therefore, there are only 3 variables that have significant relationship with the DPR. The other independent variables do not have significant relationship with the DPR. The R-squared is 20.56%, means the model can explain 20.56% the change of DPR through the 3 independent variables: Size, Leverage and Profit. 50 5.5 Discussion of the result The random effect model is chosen to explain the relationship between the dependent variable (DPR) and the independent variables ( foreign ownership, growth of sales, return on assets, profitability, leverage, size and free cash flow). The value of R-squared in model of 20.56% indicates that the independent variables can explain 20.56% the dividend payout ratio. Thus, beside the independent and control variables, there may have other factors that have impact on dividend payout ratio. Based on the result from the model, the foreign ownership has no significant relationship with the dividend payout ratio. The result is different from what we expect with the relationship between the foreign ownership and the dividend payout ratio. As discussed in the literature review, when the foreign investors want to invest in Vietnamese companies, they consider a lot of factors. One of them is the information symmetry. To be certain about their investment, they want to minimize the asymmetric information and agency cost. As as result, in order to attract the capital from foreign investors, Vietnamese companies are willing to increase the dividend payout ratio. This argument has been stated by the agency theory and models of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982), La Porta (2000). However, the result of investigating 95 companies with 5%-49% foreign ownership, shows that the foreign ownership does not have significant relationship with the dividend payout ratio. This may be explained by the downturn of the world economy in general and of Vietnam economy in specific. During the period from 2008 to 2012, companies were struggling with high inflation, slow growth and decreased export. They found it more expensive to reduce the asymmetric information as well as agency cost to protect the shareholders by paying cash dividend. However, Vietnamese financial system generally, and Vietnamese listed companies particularly do not have a strong protection for shareholders‟benefits . Since the protection is weak, firms hesitate to use dividend as an 51 effective tool to solve the agency problem and the information asymmetry. In addition, in the study period, the economy was on a downward trend, making it costly to use dividend as a tool to solve those problem and attract foreign investors. To support this argument, Nicolas Audier, a member of the Executive Board of the European Chamber of Commerce said that Vietnam lacked of shareholders' protection policy, "in the global economic recession, the corruption and lack of transparency are the major problems when investing in Vietnam". Furthermore, the variable firm size is significant with the coefficient -0.0699, which means the dividend payout ratio will decline by 0.0699 units when the firm size increases by 1 unit. The coefficient of leverage and profitability is 0.155 and -1.16 has This regression result is not supported by the transaction cost and the agency cost theory. In the period 20082012, the downturn of economy affected the stock market negatively. Investors, to be safe, preferred investing in big and reputated companies. However, in the point of view of the big companies, they want to retain the earning in those years since they do not know for sure how the market will be in the recession period. Therefore, they do not pay or reduce the dividend payout ratio to maintain the earnings for a later use when the market gets worse. However, some othercompanies with high leverage attracts foreign investors by increasing the cash dividend. 52 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION This chapter gives a summary of results and findings for the research. Moreover, it suggests some other research directions which may be conducted in the future with larger samples and in different time frame in the Vietnamese stock market 6.1 Conclusion: The study is conducted to investigate the relationship between the foreign ownership and the dividend payout ratio of listed companies on HOSE. The data includes 95 firms that have the portion of foreign ownership from 5% to 49% during the period 20082012. The data is provided by Vietstock.vn of Tai Viet Joint Stock company. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of foreign ownership on the dividend payment ratio of companies. The result shows that the foreign ownership has no significant relationship on the dividend payout ratio, which is different from the result of previous studies conducted in other countries. The result may be due to the characteristics of Viet Nam market during the period 2008-2012. In the recession period, companies were struggling and found it expensive to reduce asymmetric information by paying cash dividend to its shareholders. Therefore, companies are unwilling to pay cash dividend even though it is a powerful tool to improve the transparency of Viet Nam companies and eliminate agency cost for foreign investors. However, the result points out the negative relationship between firm's size, profitability and the dividend payout ratio. As explained earlier, it may be due to the economic crisis. When the stock market plunged, it was harder for companies to maintain or increase the earning. Especially, large firms tend to suffer more than small firms.Consequently, large firms had to retain more earnings by not distributing dividends to 53 shareholders. That is a backup source for them to manage when the business gets worse. In contrast, small firms using their leverage to pay dividends to shareholders in order to attract foreign investors. 6.2 Recommendation: The study covered only 95 listed companies on HOSE from the period 2008-2012. This was also the time that Vietnamese companies went through the economic crisis with high inflation, decreased export and slow growth. Therefore, the study does not really reflect the accurate impact of the foreign ownership on the dividend payment ratio. 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Walter, James E., 1963, Dividend Policy: Its Influence on the Value of the Enterprise, Journal of Finance 18, 280-291. 58 APPENDIX Sample of the research YEAR COMP ROAS SIZ LEV GOS PROF FCF FO 2008 ABT 0,074494 26,67953 0,221882 0,497547 0,146152 76825 62040808341 2009 ABT 0,19395 27,00927 0,247661 0,194357 0,247274 68972 80955602520 2010 ABT 0,180213 27,1234 0,269432 -0,19863 0,185393 98271 91271130490 2011 ABT 0,237962 26,8931 0,184371 0,685612 0,244478 132027 42800581800 2012 ABT 0,174552 26,96963 0,227611 -0,35839 0,155786 72672 41580222790 2008 ACL 0,2327 26,69518 1,266375 -0,02708 0,497157 25647 32552280000 2009 ACL 0,112772 27,14317 1,776112 0,337869 0,277722 35040 15825841000 2010 ACL 0,136758 27,31093 1,682235 -0,15607 0,33558 -53602 13128329800 2011 ACL 0,207472 27,39957 1,565001 1,417634 0,520118 141436 13731052400 2012 ACL 0,053838 27,4468 2,400527 -0,17235 0,193154 -12332 13353748128 2008 AGF 0,042423 27,92907 3,690177 0,115925 0,296305 -101871 45791924568 2009 AGF 0,047248 27,82159 1,373762 -0,1569 0,133905 -16999 32678597984 2010 AGF 0,073824 27,93455 2,418927 -0,04497 0,330927 -74188 15828850820 2011 AGF 0,088767 28,17156 3,85748 0,039383 0,553827 -210100 11287237400 2012 AGF 0,06541 28,0789 3,277734 -0,43982 0,370251 105525 8073061006 2008 ALP 0,048032 27,58296 0,624416 0,094256 0,116217 124531 49237493688 2009 ALP 0,054128 27,80969 0,961846 0,730434 0,131553 10075 31525754414 2010 ALP 0,083804 28,07009 1,036929 -0,12991 0,193902 218711 38535223518 2011 ALP 0,061646 28,0676 1,222627 0,380295 0,196933 -161048 22485682500 2012 ALP -0,02478 28,87907 0,76537 0,948804 -0,04982 1232097 25985395755 2008 ANV 0,073461 28,60929 0,865879 0,011455 0,157474 -706182 2,4543E+11 2009 ANV -0,0699 28,41952 0,646058 0,579221 -0,13391 218175 79328809800 2010 ANV 0,052149 28,29012 0,447255 0,165388 0,108324 457504 41374151700 2011 ANV 0,044004 28,39813 1,332725 0,130532 0,194027 -18256 8696161800 2012 ANV 0,036644 28,5223 1,577805 0,096046 0,138135 -455327 10801560000 2008 ASP 0,076097 27,06279 2,674343 0,299499 0,371903 -35930 16425864000 59 2009 ASP 0,077491 27,61658 2,198456 0,174293 0,238971 -1727 41451760560 2010 ASP 0,062367 27,71304 4,179165 0,005146 0,344803 -129701 26498466544 2011 ASP 0,063462 27,56657 8,623299 0,199227 0,744647 47608 10649138500 2012 ASP 0,087436 27,43999 5,383572 0,151602 0,703091 60122 13458282642 2008 BBC 0,048074 27,13042 0,522822 0,806793 0,133079 238601 1,04933E+11 2009 BBC 0,089718 27,32559 0,489724 -0,72799 0,150412 156527 2,15351E+11 2010 BBC 0,066255 27,35506 0,640309 -0,08015 0,150246 55098 1,63969E+11 2011 BBC 0,078933 27,39047 1,237892 0,273387 0,362545 -6655 83873598000 2012 BBC 0,042755 27,36755 0,726467 -0,06974 0,126058 -30465 1,27699E+11 2008 BCI 0,074985 28,53535 0,362247 0,685251 0,056026 -261634 6,83392E+11 2009 BCI 0,084401 28,7378 0,499118 0,279421 0,077212 53227 9,66606E+11 2010 BCI 0,09732 28,97947 0,852929 0,187015 0,165707 48476 6,82003E+11 2011 BCI 0,024323 29,08827 2,202139 0,038885 0,096998 -186965 3,16421E+11 2012 BCI 0,094179 28,90373 1,515637 -0,18574 0,30215 -18670 3,64701E+11 2008 BHS -0,11832 27,11773 0,864247 0,239431 -0,22883 -32297 13245660711 2009 BHS 0,164934 27,50856 0,854595 0,289064 0,271528 79074 22119570200 2010 BHS 0,205086 27,6461 0,866259 0,035218 0,347832 217993 32464917340 2011 BHS 0,181166 27,87924 1,404784 0,27821 0,444877 216508 27742890600 2012 BHS 0,10289 28,37668 3,198406 0,477868 0,451861 -428536 30381549024 2008 BMC 0,389239 25,60315 0,015071 0,50205 0,089867 72648 78840069714 2009 BMC 0,169294 25,74673 0,056917 0,484226 0,046124 13103 72688711500 2010 BMC 0,17617 25,85669 0,233789 0,153425 0,143508 30344 29065196160 2011 BMC 0,448133 26,2745 0,287353 0,223565 0,543586 183653 28570535800 2012 BMC 0,41294 26,32554 0,111962 -0,06631 0,185833 60358 74140891796 2008 BMP 0,219729 27,06188 0,168547 0,412204 0,244368 161433 2,3106E+11 2009 BMP 0,348672 27,43774 0,138929 0,206201 0,262084 432751 5,29114E+11 2010 BMP 0,320582 27,61301 0,07999 -0,00637 0,19424 264052 7,94282E+11 2011 BMP 0,330163 27,78502 0,095683 0,114587 0,31454 368528 5,99968E+11 2012 BMP 0,337563 27,98356 0,095434 0,143014 0,308485 645146 7,62816E+11 60 2008 BT6 0,090292 27,20069 0,512754 0,307223 0,090489 -26309 3,06268E+11 2009 BT6 0,131566 27,44585 0,601249 0,142614 0,160333 345414 65256953000 2010 BT6 0,125777 27,84674 0,955854 0,045135 0,204172 75254 71791380250 2011 BT6 0,080046 28,2139 6,379425 -0,22261 0,700904 -186541 19167988200 2012 BT6 0,088754 28,15738 5,862012 -0,29656 0,73445 -15054 19433200950 2008 CII 0,090139 28,32981 1,064187 3,650171 0,167868 211785 5,15592E+11 2009 CII 0,156495 28,54903 0,434646 1,211251 0,132707 467441 9,3654E+11 2010 CII 0,160958 28,89472 0,768197 -0,44562 0,210715 292809 1,04859E+12 2011 CII 0,05954 29,2404 2,309866 0,00407 0,183556 124687 4,8239E+11 2012 CII 0,11742 29,52379 1,895513 0,146024 0,296546 228162 1,04027E+12 2008 CNT 0,076851 27,77041 11,71412 0,081458 1,07216 -112674 0 2009 CNT 0,06543 28,04518 5,559674 0,083042 0,420927 87874 40728702000 2010 CNT 0,061668 28,26198 8,507941 0,041034 0,606806 -187996 51659292500 2011 CNT 0,095179 28,28775 20,05018 0,355979 2,181831 84154 22634278800 2012 CNT 0,070835 28,1825 25,49613 0,076316 2,080898 35300 15894916010 2008 CSM 0,101975 27,77183 0,539929 0,399311 0,071889 33640 0 2009 CSM 0,326236 27,78147 0,330588 -0,1699 0,206369 539924 1,85705E+11 2010 CSM 0,188649 27,79763 0,374121 -0,18387 0,16483 265914 2,22839E+11 2011 CSM 0,083496 28,05163 2,403987 0,648822 0,338157 -264804 38002305800 2012 CSM 0,224573 28,24461 0,648413 -0,03455 0,305535 516968 55390558600 2008 CYC 0,061338 26,52421 11,02144 0,51635 1,072394 9799 4472223278 2009 CYC 0,024655 26,5764 12,92318 0,826823 0,484767 -14917 3280546230 2010 CYC 0,031914 26,50555 16,80986 0,489432 0,788278 51318 2573806620 2011 CYC 0,030565 26,65291 43,9556 0,331273 1,862529 -29623 1248463000 2012 CYC 0,043507 26,54472 52,64417 0,207914 3,352693 52387 885905281,8 2008 D2D 0,127336 27,06532 0,514434 -0,02797 0,116536 162272 0 2009 D2D 0,081829 27,36469 0,809944 0,129863 0,102797 186597 7798512000 2010 D2D 0,165536 27,43608 1,193015 -0,02886 0,322293 44363 43915152000 2011 D2D 0,081601 27,30264 2,300635 0,251285 0,345383 16676 17643371400 61 2012 D2D 0,067846 27,44979 2,775935 0,591404 0,314864 73225 18766944000 2008 DCL 0,122381 27,03575 0,920281 0,226892 0,220415 220055 21829079803 2009 DCL 0,125715 27,18586 0,612296 -0,07123 0,140465 177962 1,26443E+11 2010 DCL 0,067632 27,39802 1,476433 -0,01584 0,154404 -110171 83996187800 2011 DCL 0,052988 27,45877 3,958878 0,184365 0,288412 -118749 28796040000 2012 DCL 0,123592 27,2244 4,198407 0,116102 0,830165 176388 14731746312 2008 DHA 0,163161 26,42219 0,103382 0,165234 0,256544 98798 60133031193 2009 DHA 0,236723 26,57629 0,063101 0,224305 0,18553 97054 1,54435E+11 2010 DHA 0,186946 26,6557 0,180565 0,176723 0,217859 22358 1,22316E+11 2011 DHA 0,144457 26,66775 0,499727 -0,07123 0,42897 51631 32605345500 2012 DHA 0,062432 26,62642 0,368486 -0,01584 0,155881 21259 35873886279 2008 DHG 0,138883 27,70963 0,158596 0,53109 0,063126 263683 9,82226E+11 2009 DHG 0,271345 28,05103 0,165752 -0,08253 0,135867 667728 1,23496E+12 2010 DHG 0,23968 28,22971 0,164325 0,160892 0,135051 529106 1,51617E+12 2011 DHG 0,247021 28,32202 0,165005 0,901932 0,135068 367865 1,78253E+12 2012 DHG 0,246986 28,49739 0,141393 1,494993 0,12308 780396 2,33851E+12 2008 DIG 0,136833 28,61782 0,381492 -0,0229 0,070591 1021118 4,0768E+11 2009 DIG 0,195711 28,91335 0,247024 0,084928 0,133499 1153887 8,67283E+11 2010 DIG 0,145275 29,07252 0,424132 0,113488 0,149776 -158380 1,02189E+12 2011 DIG 0,038747 29,20292 1,701693 2,99935 0,138016 -489541 3,11797E+11 2012 DIG 0,012084 29,25848 1,523772 0,023889 0,036971 -174122 4,76395E+11 2008 DMC 0,129549 27,14151 0,203969 0,586311 0,114187 23569 3,00406E+11 2009 DMC 0,165277 27,28849 0,199069 0,78643 0,109813 31658 4,2406E+11 2010 DMC 0,166171 27,3655 0,393976 -0,25052 0,227858 61826 2,10722E+11 2011 DMC 0,154714 27,44949 0,694701 -0,66073 0,346657 124523 1,67488E+11 2012 DMC 0,151555 27,46726 0,537932 0,224765 0,249118 99809 2,53071E+11 2008 DPM 0,295022 29,27821 0,034397 0,252496 0,116847 1012936 2,32834E+12 2009 DPM 0,241733 29,47967 0,065157 0,051121 0,118831 3954764 2,60657E+12 2010 DPM 0,260157 29,63501 0,082296 0,028476 0,133656 3662045 3,47284E+12 62 2011 DPM 0,380643 29,86052 0,097657 0,103213 0,391214 4306402 2,17472E+12 2012 DPM 0,334917 29,99003 0,104015 0,406444 0,260482 4033076 3,69757E+12 2008 DPR 0,229015 27,67133 0,325132 0,190132 0,196082 85729 1,74253E+11 2009 DPR 0,189393 27,85121 0,172515 0,220614 0,101742 363181 5,15282E+11 2010 DPR 0,263896 28,14746 0,144123 0,056221 0,151265 869182 9,30088E+11 2011 DPR 0,359559 28,51894 0,24665 -0,53071 0,438875 1509242 7,00054E+11 2012 DPR 0,209764 28,66817 0,239862 4,902485 0,254857 707701 8,51942E+11 2008 DQC 0,032766 28,08512 3,779885 2,132168 0,214304 167243 33731933040 2009 DQC 0,042799 28,10307 1,435312 0,645426 0,109654 62474 88155132000 2010 DQC 0,064265 28,181 2,052736 1,28833 0,240655 169153 21366050000 2011 DQC 0,059773 28,23645 3,816768 0,051949 0,403915 325171 11742523500 2012 DQC 0,060969 28,17104 2,078316 0,038612 0,232803 242129 24987423604 2008 DRC 0,15725 27,1441 1,539233 -0,21387 0,373877 99994 62289265651 2009 DRC 0,520003 27,38901 0,121445 0,34146 0,217498 669837 2,60526E+11 2010 DRC 0,253653 27,69324 0,27019 0,188849 0,219323 221487 2,62786E+11 2011 DRC 0,172311 28,11443 0,942487 0,203819 0,354037 187626 1,40074E+11 2012 DRC 0,171869 28,53851 0,735511 -0,17583 0,239384 845962 3,99783E+11 2008 EVE 0,285972 26,1626 0,121348 0,462451 0,115083 171000 5,7225E+11 2009 EVE 0,262742 26,75581 0,11794 1,547472 0,160035 210815 3,22829E+11 2010 EVE 0,194265 27,22976 0,13741 0,102949 0,188553 219534 3,11226E+11 2011 EVE 0,228254 27,46813 0,378903 0,321653 0,46822 108377 2,02965E+11 2012 EVE 0,109795 27,52489 0,271846 0,109615 0,15142 216291 3,19979E+11 2008 FMC 0,096535 26,53776 1,923719 0,69508 0,341255 84089 11707800000 2009 FMC 0,056384 27,15847 3,698487 0,338167 0,274609 3274 10402608000 2010 FMC 0,092222 26,94181 3,25376 0,063478 0,448576 -52893 6564874500 2011 FMC 0,0831 27,38006 7,655283 0,208411 0,816364 -133647 5350900500 2012 FMC 0,078255 26,85223 3,707034 0,077758 0,440147 216921 4944960000 2008 FPT 0,21561 29,44337 0,45288 0,004298 0,18894 2105282 1,92278E+12 2009 FPT 0,173848 29,97239 0,592539 0,255221 0,160367 1281714 4,39741E+12 63 2010 FPT 0,183781 30,14099 0,582906 0,052798 0,181676 1816624 5,46678E+12 2011 FPT 0,184101 30,33527 0,812106 0,018236 0,256289 3023365 5,09149E+12 2012 FPT 0,185459 30,28491 0,738102 0,230173 0,273378 3278789 4,72334E+12 2008 GIL 0,111666 26,64972 0,427691 0,210127 0,286397 -29556 46853573206 2009 GIL 0,163921 26,80969 0,28323 0,109305 0,200424 116140 1,05007E+11 2010 GIL 0,096599 27,03123 0,601763 0,083309 0,173678 43137 68135963168 2011 GIL 0,130283 27,35929 1,090602 0,745709 0,250707 85877 46200664000 2012 GIL 0,082364 27,51326 1,243906 0,369081 0,164309 -132774 45182503142 2008 GMC 0,133473 25,94877 1,144345 0,845956 0,37432 8965 5642713565 2009 GMC 0,206232 26,07478 0,345406 0,82251 0,17332 25648 19730329557 2010 GMC 0,144646 26,46016 1,059925 -0,00251 0,270468 -10975 14905616473 2011 GMC 0,148231 26,70578 1,795799 0,19893 0,450755 53245 12223329300 2012 GMC 0,147973 26,86711 1,713792 0,787255 0,409085 35838 22747884615 2008 GMD -0,02403 28,89632 1,046355 0,375468 -0,05976 103950 6,59205E+11 2009 GMD 0,093226 29,1376 0,496524 0,146714 0,112866 909347 9,91049E+11 2010 GMD 0,05641 29,50942 0,725607 0,179857 0,111663 1679367 9,53681E+11 2011 GMD 0,02795 29,55803 1,332271 0,109169 0,10773 253355 4,90116E+11 2012 GMD 0,042739 29,55123 1,110427 -0,06154 0,147786 259091 4,00327E+11 2008 HAG 0,12339 29,81387 0,414088 0,264438 0,09663 19994 1,92808E+12 2009 HAG 0,159963 30,13215 0,335848 -0,00449 0,092478 2013743 4,67455E+12 2010 HAG 0,156146 30,57773 0,433095 0,004927 0,125495 3964656 7,5151E+12 2011 HAG 0,084716 30,8727 1,700322 -0,20616 0,237791 308171 3,01688E+12 2012 HAG 0,0326 31,07415 1,762805 0,395739 0,087867 1680795 3,8594E+12 2008 HAP -0,07744 27,23645 1,229018 -0,03438 -0,26754 11575 59443627563 2009 HAP 0,084859 27,26267 0,561429 -0,29382 0,162258 9857 88927897068 2010 HAP 0,095922 27,18962 0,430787 1,214922 0,236252 50851 56656925080 2011 HAP 0,028229 27,25658 1,907105 0,186543 0,240726 -38389 8505192300 2012 HAP 0,025867 27,35388 1,602234 1,316861 0,142518 35460 14926212511 2008 HAS 0,06413 26,30668 1,730672 0,002672 0,266044 17360 14098535385 64 2009 HAS 0,034359 26,20824 0,842225 0,727946 0,077838 -16170 23543566900 2010 HAS 0,028883 26,19057 1,121333 0,330441 0,089063 -1619 13283097600 2011 HAS 0,020802 26,09289 1,937766 0,19929 0,126932 -10242 6623540000 2012 HAS 0,031599 26,05155 1,367021 0,017744 0,1628 8669 8288000000 2008 HAX 0,120524 25,88488 1,247135 0,460113 0,359578 77677 16483073142 2009 HAX 0,11955 26,17727 0,857828 -0,09828 0,205209 -3092 27023227426 2010 HAX 0,086293 26,45988 1,681875 -0,28327 0,238908 24453 8076435706 2011 HAX -0,00177 26,43089 3,594432 -0,14473 -0,00999 -31992 4985721600 2012 HAX -0,04093 26,17083 3,87999 1,179776 -0,25146 -42280 1235895669 2008 HBC 0,023425 27,78228 2,35049 0,200024 0,111253 -29507 45411235999 2009 HBC 0,062055 27,93551 1,413507 0,189005 0,164163 155243 46988606940 2010 HBC 0,122198 28,27967 1,73604 -0,14006 0,332657 108704 54959119740 2011 HBC 0,100785 28,82051 5,372789 0,728315 0,695554 -78557 31877097700 2012 HBC 0,068868 29,15281 7,077606 40,09874 0,587445 -319609 86561134410 2008 HDC 0,081304 27,05992 2,517329 0,163336 0,261607 44664 11007912960 2009 HDC 0,128212 27,3863 1,190345 -0,08731 0,204131 59818 32146070000 2010 HDC 0,123962 27,74163 0,768889 -0,26069 0,16682 64203 2,15918E+11 2011 HDC 0,082806 27,85792 1,628582 0,785566 0,249838 -62903 1,09298E+11 2012 HDC 0,056089 27,89273 1,82479 0,386815 0,185907 -1736 1,04418E+11 2008 HPG 0,193828 29,36079 0,215748 1,03213 0,176715 1724501 1,47029E+12 2009 HPG 0,154849 29,95764 0,450784 0,671708 0,138079 678040 3,53804E+12 2010 HPG 0,132668 30,33263 0,663833 -0,28171 0,160741 2071251 4,40564E+12 2011 HPG 0,12866 30,49463 1,718881 0,019524 0,405353 1529835 1,97954E+12 2012 HPG 0,091775 30,57629 1,186146 0,377789 0,198313 2883304 3,33436E+12 2008 HRC 0,227144 26,68338 0,172376 -0,05504 0,209069 24298 99690421668 2009 HRC 0,162425 26,80262 0,117588 0,16459 0,109887 76122 1,24668E+11 2010 HRC 0,212456 26,94209 0,088519 0,075045 0,103004 52132 1,06346E+11 2011 HRC 0,230182 27,15371 0,207427 0,156804 0,18105 53990 69695699000 2012 HRC 0,169814 27,2107 0,270074 0,110398 0,174648 26951 34231967603 65 2008 HSG 0,135237 28,40116 1,249817 0,509205 0,270977 72541 34820293095 2009 HSG 0,115111 28,52252 0,527877 0,242157 0,09883 554851 1,71176E+11 2010 HSG 0,09189 29,14595 1,436399 0,102877 0,211602 314931 3,8109E+11 2011 HSG 0,077176 29,40864 4,94048 0,003784 0,545749 320722 1,62479E+11 2012 HSG 0,141265 29,30305 1,707545 0,096827 0,388566 688098 5,71073E+11 2008 HSI 0,101712 27,49099 6,35978 0,263241 0,755735 -216869 2632500000 2009 HSI 0,083178 27,35603 5,560247 -0,10048 0,559115 64710 2949978000 2010 HSI 0,113018 27,13256 4,186901 -0,05607 0,624127 132764 5955950000 2011 HSI 0,092342 27,44374 7,571317 2,66133 0,850789 -131215 7908390000 2012 HSI 0,078443 27,44037 9,8945 0,039486 0,9261 -33471 6230000000 2008 HTL 0,381137 25,72597 0,811979 0,077168 0,630211 1685 23031000000 2009 HTL 0,197183 25,74809 0,802292 0,577867 0,380952 2157 20152125000 2010 HTL 0,095872 25,64222 0,617941 -0,52116 0,182236 37542 18424800000 2011 HTL 0,061199 25,65177 0,739319 -0,35351 0,125833 3812 17268829200 2012 HTL 0,035207 25,6816 1,608701 0,918941 0,149167 -12560 8631840000 2008 HTV 0,029797 25,9785 0,094901 0,052111 0,062919 -8724 12537504000 2009 HTV 0,130752 26,10983 0,08401 0,385118 0,12939 52402 14023227000 2010 HTV 0,08905 26,23405 0,165793 -0,50674 0,143758 27721 3149896000 2011 HTV 0,120253 26,26852 0,40537 0,954032 0,484804 -59449 1120644000 2012 HTV 0,179127 26,41607 0,314386 0,034312 0,411947 -1076 7831756800 2008 IJC 0,123216 27,63737 0,000406 1,089185 0,000118 -164394 9,71179E+13 2009 IJC 0,136663 27,66602 0,347822 -0,85212 0,134407 168312 92769300000 2010 IJC 78665826060 2011 0,103811 29,01605 3,102522 -0,90245 0,402259 2068246 IJC 0,097949 29,10943 0,53988 -0,26959 0,186522 2252632 2,17776E+11 2012 IJC 0,056652 29,15927 0,632548 0,222971 0,103533 41762 2,39646E+11 2008 IMP 0,119559 27,1142 0,095871 0,211629 0,08154 79739 3,77603E+11 2009 IMP 0,112548 27,31832 0,196638 -0,79869 0,083557 10289 4,11202E+11 2010 IMP 0,133907 27,34467 0,225555 -0,16276 0,140241 102380 3,35893E+11 2011 IMP 0,134362 27,4419 0,201548 0,013819 0,188875 117778 2,85808E+11 66 2012 IMP 0,120896 27,48207 0,249999 0,416653 0,176636 121496 2,89137E+11 2008 ITA 0,063118 29,43415 0,418229 -0,14868 0,107675 -42065 1,17785E+12 2009 ITA 0,075611 29,60906 0,305694 0,148952 0,076608 -590225 1,97992E+12 2010 ITA 0,092562 29,82852 0,566169 -0,111 0,147089 -137192 9,67878E+11 2011 ITA 0,022655 29,83538 1,434758 -0,83695 0,092227 468787 3,31662E+11 2012 ITA 0,01427 29,93425 1,961312 0,297208 0,068248 -180007 3,87062E+11 2008 KDC -0,00313 28,72409 0,486242 -0,2752 -0,00542 66580 6,32134E+11 2009 KDC 0,145039 29,07738 0,368273 -0,20204 0,128013 1241417 1,36227E+12 2010 KDC 0,142157 29,2484 0,227283 -0,23472 0,137363 558627 1,60304E+12 2011 KDC 0,080282 29,3905 0,63057 0,110305 0,150088 928646 1,20416E+12 2012 KDC 0,105953 29,33844 0,229695 0,217677 0,091341 845775 3,13446E+12 2008 KDH 0,028416 27,70844 0,017878 0,177128 0,01345 319345 3,4242E+11 2009 KDH 0,05571 27,78547 0,07752 0,284302 0,032911 -46059 2,96325E+11 2010 KDH 0,1252 28,60462 0,546109 0,225063 0,17641 413394 4,83827E+11 2011 KDH 0,027804 28,51352 1,145797 0,294244 0,079314 -319989 2,18572E+11 2012 KDH -0,01432 28,37484 2,342331 0,116116 -0,07626 -410481 1,29158E+11 2008 KMR 0,08372 26,31795 2,042565 0,445156 0,555688 26465 48631632 2009 KMR 0,07867 26,97711 1,653719 0,112182 0,431517 181429 10419877550 2010 KMR 0,099943 27,1422 0,883469 0,028134 0,298771 35701 79508321496 2011 KMR 0,038272 27,15876 2,379329 5,051363 0,314067 -4090 29476029000 2012 KMR -0,00712 27,12571 2,097105 0,636829 -0,05161 53915 26094030610 2008 LAF 0,077138 26,10371 2,26037 0,983497 0,297746 49738 5124314847 2009 LAF 0,155197 26,09557 0,750823 0,492409 0,229997 218670 8298514464 2010 LAF 0,351524 26,5936 0,345109 -0,54312 0,411661 277008 21021025236 2011 LAF 0,068603 27,30756 2,316407 -0,00475 0,234078 -521129 48770568000 2012 LAF -0,51011 26,18602 2,685209 0,002542 -2,09364 129508 8661842534 2008 LCG 0,167756 27,74659 1,094365 0,429448 0,329671 7767 1,55823E+11 2009 LCG 0,164879 28,16861 0,36272 -0,17594 0,147583 686526 2,8925E+11 2010 LCG 0,145582 28,34892 0,669247 -0,19782 0,23204 94057 1,79051E+11 67 2011 LCG 0,125942 28,43469 2,146144 0,627246 0,59538 201954 50664390000 2012 LCG 0,022752 28,33325 1,943054 0,112289 0,103336 93325 43993090588 2008 LHG 0,29928 27,08241 0,23588 0,119675 0,183817 272182 1,60947E+11 2009 LHG 0,225371 27,6096 0,631864 0,068798 0,255318 82006 1,57853E+11 2010 LHG 0,151333 28,08741 1,138732 0,758827 0,263061 16688 1,61731E+11 2011 LHG 0,091291 28,23139 4,117298 0,188965 0,566003 219165 52552794000 2012 LHG 0,073451 28,14013 2,821505 -0,02844 0,334673 117197 65290031906 2008 LSS 0,126861 27,48866 0,633274 0,345111 0,232124 -35090 8295000000 2009 LSS 0,22827 27,62895 0,251968 0,406686 0,180791 289444 85025640000 2010 LSS 0,260754 28,0692 0,33742 -0,11081 0,379471 654205 1,66719E+11 2011 LSS 0,245463 28,41569 0,774574 0,513688 0,530025 301308 1,42044E+11 2012 LSS 0,052422 28,61537 1,761812 0,146791 0,17646 -32643 1,44213E+11 2008 MPC 0,063948 28,44944 1,615703 1,125032 0,180078 224060 1,02235E+11 2009 MPC 0,153452 28,4296 0,474916 0,051425 0,147185 516173 3,16924E+11 2010 MPC 0,132699 28,99066 1,189454 -0,15854 0,246935 3990 3,28733E+11 2011 MPC 0,107244 29,4756 4,606509 -0,16741 0,663765 -514785 1,84147E+11 2012 MPC 0,071331 29,46679 2,343791 -0,19095 0,214402 -245432 2,49903E+11 2008 NBB 0,081293 27,56544 0,441788 0,209256 0,065915 -160242 1,27281E+11 2009 NBB 0,072466 28,15448 0,990485 0,148275 0,113462 -23538 1,96052E+11 2010 NBB 0,074258 28,48766 1,161939 0,174909 0,129054 -433651 3,19359E+11 2011 NBB 0,04472 28,56433 2,024374 0,252362 0,151008 -113757 2,6215E+11 2012 NBB 0,088936 28,69804 4,121811 1,917937 0,64812 16001 1,41595E+11 2008 NSC 0,140178 26,0378 0,456992 0,698789 0,219634 110823 15152916600 2009 NSC 0,163856 26,23242 0,257814 -0,70309 0,134638 34621 55112958375 2010 NSC 0,1905 26,43695 0,348667 0,239345 0,206365 32361 56788473461 2011 NSC 0,176945 26,61642 0,41483 1,904181 0,184562 49258 1,00721E+11 2012 NSC 0,203747 26,69747 0,323272 59,25915 0,213238 133835 1,13824E+11 2008 NTL 0,082466 27,59637 1,294895 0,1648 0,145423 -148483 72742528000 2009 NTL 0,609005 27,78925 0,264331 -0,25062 0,306342 768664 4,62403E+11 68 2010 NTL 0,365957 28,38949 0,557656 0,174449 0,372199 990194 4,86915E+11 2011 NTL 0,060407 28,34855 1,473525 -0,58735 0,153266 -511987 1,63515E+11 2012 NTL 0,062574 28,15538 0,760501 0,212235 0,1026 -158369 1,71651E+11 2008 PAC 0,191159 26,94967 0,35704 0,156991 0,172904 264165 1,29545E+11 2009 PAC 0,272308 27,23038 0,174416 0,298905 0,120042 197357 4,48605E+11 2010 PAC 0,150545 27,72945 0,511386 0,409837 0,136418 -7777 4,39901E+11 2011 PAC 0,117472 27,80253 1,553914 1,145823 0,339946 135983 1,49988E+11 2012 PAC 0,093412 27,76685 1,520018 12,63962 0,264324 240193 1,43346E+11 2008 PET 0,104307 28,09961 1,483971 0,723361 0,243221 -113749 46730619540 2009 PET 0,077505 28,7604 1,763347 0,57397 0,187936 68996 1,26905E+11 2010 PET 0,083094 29,10829 2,716071 0,641901 0,303037 -224056 1,15059E+11 2011 PET 0,137156 29,04453 3,370277 -0,00525 0,672664 588811 60870816000 2012 PET 0,095874 29,08185 3,363293 -0,02174 0,468557 431775 91056507500 2008 PGC 0,012374 27,34153 0,946865 0,901119 0,037056 -90405 34925000000 2009 PGC 0,081478 27,63509 0,793885 0,272443 0,146312 114375 64607804797 2010 PGC 0,055279 27,83098 1,64936 -0,14302 0,169853 61008 29838394050 2011 PGC 0,059897 27,76393 3,307236 0,090977 0,405305 65679 12872177500 2012 PGC 0,07738 28,04218 2,412661 -0,27993 0,316708 134833 14522039364 2008 PNC 0,034802 26,39369 2,843808 0,485906 0,170719 -17838 27794585000 2009 PNC 0,029042 26,46384 1,751811 0,07074 0,093605 9193 13112207424 2010 PNC 0,050102 26,59941 2,429296 -0,02063 0,199477 -59608 11656142566 2011 PNC 0,040377 26,7068 7,267453 0,01966 0,442477 -27867 3104596800 2012 PNC 0,001128 26,68467 7,099233 0,138858 0,011459 -17375 3283428097 2008 PPC -0,02752 30,01032 1,207312 0,207799 -0,0487 979660 1,09201E+12 2009 PPC 0,090681 30,09175 1,207884 0,084056 0,172269 2707371 1,08544E+12 2010 PPC 0,018128 30,07696 2,047098 -0,02568 0,054814 411456 6,26252E+11 2011 PPC 0,020546 30,09871 3,859793 -0,19392 0,106122 423930 3,17684E+11 2012 PPC 0,081717 30,12195 2,030111 -0,07069 0,254115 1922824 4,4257E+11 2008 PVD 0,116703 29,7866 0,536581 0,578719 0,089679 2021820 3,27141E+12 69 2009 PVD 0,080662 30,14616 0,7628 -0,029 0,093614 2902845 2,88896E+12 2010 PVD 0,090939 30,31476 0,842239 -0,48773 0,119327 2237124 3,56033E+12 2011 PVD 0,080752 30,5507 1,761907 0,216432 0,214166 3320711 2,36369E+12 2012 PVD 0,104758 30,57985 1,528552 0,295155 0,253249 3485945 2,87975E+12 2008 RAL 0,101446 27,52027 2,173385 0,539631 0,402884 -41259 79746520000 2009 RAL 0,076584 27,67916 1,933111 0,001431 0,244333 115539 30664862800 2010 RAL 0,083834 27,78803 2,978442 0,323226 0,396712 -113060 24708724500 2011 RAL 0,131751 27,96746 3,866295 -0,06918 0,756542 78923 12739461600 2012 RAL 0,124481 28,0571 3,587567 0,207952 0,65513 124407 13791030000 2008 REE -0,04754 28,5897 0,306025 0,884527 -0,07436 -75738 7,7234E+11 2009 REE 0,145565 28,84947 0,248181 -0,08911 0,136505 810744 1,37642E+12 2010 REE 0,101529 29,23282 0,644132 0,226356 0,159637 503330 1,19807E+12 2011 REE 0,132729 29,29822 0,534999 0,21496 0,262936 1051970 1,17396E+12 2012 REE 0,126934 29,51421 0,580754 -0,19791 0,205492 855102 1,92373E+12 2008 RIC 0,020558 27,57321 0,840606 -0,0276 0,094907 167160 97927648258 2009 RIC 0,051085 27,70496 0,399794 0,177787 0,096519 151675 2,78503E+11 2010 RIC 0,049792 27,77016 0,891129 0,186233 0,223498 152402 1,25461E+11 2011 RIC 0,037698 27,87795 2,444268 0,950842 0,484325 180094 48822444600 2012 RIC 0,021218 27,88799 2,287702 0,06613 0,253017 61714 52459065262 2008 SAM -0,02552 28,45482 0,077953 4,234058 -0,06397 793414 1,50629E+11 2009 SAM 0,097953 28,61221 0,103917 0,431248 0,139701 192004 2,13427E+11 2010 SAM 0,053455 28,59275 0,138656 -0,16689 0,114354 -45176 1,5916E+11 2011 SAM -0,06356 28,60097 0,640179 0,389088 -0,2981 -258429 31012894300 2012 SAM 0,056092 28,64488 0,381189 0,131665 0,159729 108581 45588485489 2008 SAV 0,053342 27,07899 2,002393 0,227063 0,215564 -32361 56264299592 2009 SAV 0,043616 27,09581 0,705379 0,323056 0,062672 -10667 1,2286E+11 2010 SAV 0,035593 27,00841 0,685086 0,151205 0,05384 -39346 1,20434E+11 2011 SAV 0,025687 27,17157 1,721942 -0,16531 0,081018 -42353 67461127500 2012 SAV 0,017599 27,24866 5,675614 0,369243 0,172158 6052 20832577605 70 2008 SBT 0,048868 28,19979 0,842949 0,176558 0,226519 69648 41834399728 2009 SBT 0,126547 28,24405 0,393762 0,122456 0,465324 147853 33649171136 2010 SBT 0,199463 28,30237 0,276437 -0,20362 0,645032 534793 0 2011 SBT 0,266751 28,47386 0,307969 0,19783 0,36088 439604 99143711827 2012 SBT 0,188892 28,59967 0,413406 0,045003 0,219167 -210666 2,67464E+11 2008 SCD 0,17853 25,86491 0,329367 0,318009 0,224471 13643 1890400000 2009 SCD 0,213584 25,9996 0,231411 0,228366 0,18276 60939 13390282000 2010 SCD 0,153651 26,03835 0,212753 0,167764 0,131303 13254 19570320000 2011 SCD 0,129484 26,16933 0,616367 0,23249 0,294314 45611 8652960000 2012 SCD 0,142057 26,17278 0,656587 0,02566 0,388812 9493 7658500000 2008 SGT 0,062412 27,8289 0,333641 0,736332 0,046774 149402 3,129E+11 2009 SGT 0,044001 28,33315 0,722033 12,27882 0,050961 480784 2,58004E+11 2010 SGT 0,029929 28,47941 1,647532 0,94699 0,077436 -198920 1,22096E+11 2011 SGT 2,48E-05 28,53241 3,180173 -0,00536 0,000107 206825 76060199600 2012 SGT -0,03954 28,33995 4,880773 0,170225 -0,24126 -256194 42858208493 2008 SJD 0,115671 27,7622 1,799083 -0,00743 0,308454 165125 1,39087E+11 2009 SJD 0,14648 27,69403 1,045513 -0,02317 0,267572 226812 1,93949E+11 2010 SJD 0,116013 27,66482 1,100351 0,102344 0,257276 174547 1,47303E+11 2011 SJD 0,169379 27,63738 1,303843 0,405272 0,489786 133174 1,11481E+11 2012 SJD 0,184162 27,6454 0,711854 0,249146 0,371941 271769 1,36929E+11 2008 SJS 0,110639 28,09548 0,206236 0,302873 0,081502 -203095 6,28344E+11 2009 SJS 0,290751 28,72913 0,19281 0,303574 0,136221 890229 1,47981E+12 2010 SJS 0,137273 29,12783 0,370908 0,002674 0,099716 1172287 1,89818E+12 2011 SJS -0,01646 29,24718 1,383936 0,081092 -0,03634 -356333 7,21959E+11 2012 SJS -0,05468 29,33817 1,813564 0,199345 -0,13828 -524353 3,9785E+11 2008 SMC 0,14458 27,34502 2,147061 0,054085 0,474864 312934 35064763013 2009 SMC 0,068975 28,07771 2,798734 0,052269 0,241138 -324775 57843917035 2010 SMC 0,072076 28,53307 3,512616 -0,10229 0,325277 69439 42934299390 2011 SMC 0,077621 28,49613 9,627737 -0,0188 0,986148 275109 10827340000 71 2012 SMC 0,066497 28,39196 4,203995 0,015798 0,385718 118705 42174358279 2008 SSC 0,203538 25,85656 0,173653 0,382589 0,19175 45445 63540000000 2009 SSC 0,243554 26,17385 0,110478 -0,04323 0,104077 65088 2,07083E+11 2010 SSC 0,242689 26,28437 0,134721 -0,01991 0,162569 45870 1,42515E+11 2011 SSC 0,231769 26,47768 0,202925 0,206216 0,174236 65319 1,07105E+11 2012 SSC 0,191693 26,77304 0,313798 -0,03823 0,164288 23606 1,36204E+11 2008 ST8 0,29126 26,2995 0,518578 0,122418 0,437374 24692 86169541185 2009 ST8 0,282489 26,508 0,231661 -0,16358 0,283847 151463 1,58631E+11 2010 ST8 0,191092 26,58909 0,324397 0,092753 0,245106 53625 1,34766E+11 2011 ST8 0,153535 26,50954 0,382665 0,213745 0,370185 79532 66210903600 2012 ST8 0,208236 26,46007 0,276115 0,454002 0,438993 19866 72070275354 2008 SVC 0,091829 27,94089 3,528156 0,293336 0,548956 124235 35301156710 2009 SVC 0,088532 28,21455 1,08972 0,016249 0,176343 327320 76981167720 2010 SVC 0,073507 28,48855 2,363934 -0,67192 0,277299 -82115 53627144250 2011 SVC 0,087353 28,63336 4,17926 -0,07187 0,54411 463741 36790285000 2012 SVC 0,077998 28,62966 5,330701 -0,65951 0,622854 58583 17064977599 2008 TCM 0,057773 27,89941 5,202097 0,292915 0,418159 240018 16479349700 2009 TCM 0,065138 28,1649 1,701638 0,19329 0,164858 145224 2,14876E+11 2010 TCM 0,156572 28,28014 1,205412 0,161624 0,293549 286377 4,81325E+11 2011 TCM 0,090336 28,35049 3,526324 0,551758 0,493596 -111816 1,82842E+11 2012 TCM 0,01904 28,30692 5,150462 0,041905 0,144244 2129 1,20372E+11 2008 TCR 0,058672 27,7756 8,728903 0,157687 1,069781 132935 31054483824 2009 TCR 0,026117 27,78802 7,863608 -0,04356 0,415648 64489 28941253221 2010 TCR 0,082906 27,73605 6,06425 -0,62486 1,177384 222589 31712359761 2011 TCR 0,072743 28,08811 18,08082 0,226087 2,371968 287565 21874023600 2012 TCR 0,022994 28,12919 22,17686 0,168094 0,871031 -20190 21288072344 2008 TDH 0,196922 27,99078 0,587501 0,084501 0,389395 454374 2,61898E+11 2009 TDH 0,195173 28,23722 0,326641 0,039748 0,211519 201956 6,7868E+11 2010 TDH 0,144884 28,48027 0,649674 0,121372 0,259223 103980 4,35383E+11 72 2011 TDH 0,0546 28,44889 1,969606 0,108122 0,286503 -52935 1,2588E+11 2012 TDH 0,037055 28,42691 1,74791 -0,21942 0,179208 4844 1,25204E+11 2008 TDW 0,046627 26,21789 1,463334 -0,00922 0,111255 32589 30600000000 2009 TDW 0,058349 26,29622 2,005176 0,198256 0,190192 34199 30466975000 2010 TDW 0,090995 26,42314 2,453877 0,289665 0,359445 74636 22785780000 2011 TDW 0,085159 26,5324 3,32456 -0,47833 0,439412 87307 20115376000 2012 TDW 0,090074 26,50377 1,358337 0,008091 0,199569 89206 46403880000 2008 TIX 0,030444 27,79174 1,000368 0,281158 0,045836 84128 1,34316E+11 2009 TIX 0,066467 27,70526 0,86728 -0,01319 0,094694 21807 1,33367E+11 2010 TIX 0,097122 27,76303 1,212915 -0,04762 0,200774 255510 1,14414E+11 2011 TIX 0,151831 27,69549 1,35243 1,175084 0,390031 251512 91054536400 2012 TIX 0,140696 27,63212 1,054317 0,288739 0,308882 174276 1,02919E+11 2008 TMS 0,163251 26,145 0,140548 0,531708 0,146206 37597 1,23799E+11 2009 TMS 0,098176 26,85281 0,364458 0,241165 0,135233 153627 1,37484E+11 2010 TMS 0,105427 27,12242 0,388187 0,130126 0,128816 70362 1,87124E+11 2011 TMS 0,114692 27,19762 0,360043 0,096913 0,150684 106354 1,93815E+11 2012 TMS 0,116296 27,35088 0,321898 -0,05598 0,157386 169916 2,18888E+11 2008 TRA 0,174068 26,60748 0,318121 0,310399 0,186149 2971 35044800000 2009 TRA 0,182087 26,73299 0,192701 0,707682 0,117316 -3575 81319231000 2010 TRA 0,174945 27,08434 0,354193 -0,08503 0,156136 90669 1,54686E+11 2011 TRA 0,174112 27,45481 0,905579 0,88362 0,327707 188702 1,61471E+11 2012 TRA 0,215307 27,599 0,425103 -0,03919 0,194232 185827 4,79991E+11 2008 TRC 0,306575 27,21652 0,249426 -0,01178 0,277841 56296 1,59651E+11 2009 TRC 0,208495 27,39637 0,106063 0,046772 0,094763 250679 4,51678E+11 2010 TRC 0,291642 27,68451 0,134999 -0,08909 0,144445 510922 6,98556E+11 2011 TRC 0,387549 28,01714 0,338445 0,144606 0,560654 625042 3,21713E+11 2012 TRC 0,263616 28,0263 0,138867 1,754638 0,309175 79549 3,83345E+11 2008 TS4 0,055041 26,22311 1,113457 0,139926 0,172802 25308 22458624804 2009 TS4 0,084527 26,62794 0,579707 0,383442 0,092654 7488 60878802250 73 2010 TS4 0,094886 27,03187 1,207665 -0,12622 0,205072 23456 31938654800 2011 TS4 0,099131 27,28462 4,866216 0,219349 0,7345 -55152 12034120200 2012 TS4 0,067971 27,54294 6,533103 0,003149 0,608109 -163645 12537875000 2008 TTF 0,066028 28,18918 5,244171 0,008763 0,569783 -146984 64921500000 2009 TTF 0,051448 28,40865 2,714846 0,019327 0,205068 -481187 87390876300 2010 TTF 0,086847 28,60581 3,421339 -0,03924 0,427776 -117066 55842711925 2011 TTF 0,077834 28,8361 14,02279 -0,13929 1,433023 -328184 14614115000 2012 TTF 0,071141 28,82426 12,2315 -0,36475 1,145848 51050 6326551012 2008 TTP 0,162662 26,90613 0,276278 0,456922 0,307174 199666 58610242185 2009 TTP 0,1814 27,00989 0,133718 0,201807 0,154719 94988 2,22977E+11 2010 TTP 0,151273 27,20852 0,30891 -0,30675 0,196716 41005 1,78848E+11 2011 TTP 0,118896 27,19498 0,297817 -0,16121 0,183041 161915 65516668000 2012 TTP 0,083441 27,22889 0,245921 -0,21045 0,097918 29419 73985990135 2008 TYA -0,1276 27,21642 7,813876 0,063669 -1,42552 157177 12311287772 2009 TYA 0,045306 27,13869 8,394312 0,288244 0,551543 125178 10299866130 2010 TYA 0,03655 27,38904 17,0981 0,23007 0,857281 97201 7487079420 2011 TYA 0,055981 27,23259 28,41729 0,393413 2,495298 11952 2549774700 2012 TYA 0,069877 27,17503 17,7316 0,182676 2,205345 144048 3229278028 2008 VHC 0,108675 27,8259 1,408744 0,961553 0,231681 -173296 58995000000 2009 VHC 0,190852 28,04727 0,518126 -0,40259 0,17863 563070 3,19891E+11 2010 VHC 0,174335 28,231 0,601721 2,416319 0,228369 418464 3,17671E+11 2011 VHC 0,22866 28,50966 0,822051 0,260053 0,411118 400236 3,39592E+11 2012 VHC 0,107259 28,75386 1,421139 0,163951 0,28079 278061 3,05023E+11 2008 VNM 0,234338 29,41726 0,085966 0,403472 0,096116 1725823 6,48545E+12 2009 VNM 0,322801 29,76897 0,075582 0,097544 0,10393 4871014 1,16185E+13 2010 VNM 0,395189 30,00807 0,092497 -0,18863 0,14021 3492370 1,39675E+13 2011 VNM 0,320415 30,37718 0,064557 0,0021 0,103795 6923939 2,35709E+13 2012 VNM 0,351956 30,61153 0,08592 1,872639 0,141664 8310458 2,39797E+13 2008 VNS 0,121503 27,57288 1,357682 -0,91075 0,37885 134060 25267100000 74 2009 VNS 0,137692 27,90075 0,682601 0,071532 0,203066 330059 41173896000 2010 VNS 0,181907 28,19733 1,027281 0,279162 0,352558 374311 1,78332E+11 2011 VNS 0,169319 28,21207 1,453184 0,156994 0,475989 266439 1,28881E+11 2012 VNS 0,177815 28,20883 1,113536 -0,10317 0,419167 498597 2,31412E+11 2008 VSC 0,272478 26,80599 0,347754 0,025791 0,271473 141962 83218768524 2009 VSC 0,27186 27,19615 0,288039 0,023932 0,225743 263443 2,06277E+11 2010 VSC 0,265205 27,42224 0,357609 -0,37067 0,283978 349482 3,71383E+11 2011 VSC 0,280788 27,47663 0,340542 0,516382 0,38289 185482 3,07928E+11 2012 VSC 0,276171 27,68414 0,36792 -0,39915 0,360581 233780 3,9577E+11 2008 VSH 0,153358 28,54059 0,088708 0,505601 0,09892 553359 1,07949E+12 2009 VSH 0,152525 28,57918 0,092461 -0,03888 0,114295 534881 8,35429E+11 2010 VSH 0,108321 28,7392 0,234155 -0,18508 0,128289 437818 4,89935E+11 2011 VSH 0,109936 28,83871 0,58475 -0,57797 0,214872 200093 3,65224E+11 2012 VSH 0,079753 28,84961 0,438718 0,402055 0,126987 362369 5,29797E+11 75 [...]... 3.1 Foreign ownership of listed companies in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange from 2008-2012 Based on the data provided by Vietstock.vn, there are 277 non-financial listed companies on HOSE from the period 2008-2012 Overall, the foreign ownership is diversified in companies in different industries The portion of foreign ownership ranges from 0% to 49% Most of the companies have the foreign ownership portion... influence the company to pay more dividends 1.4 Research Questions: This research is conducted to mainly answer the only one question: " Is there any relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy of listed companies on HOSE in the 2008-2012 period? Is it a positive or negative relationship" 1.5 Research Objectives: 3 This paper will examine the impact of foreign ownership ondividend... between foreign ownership and cash dividend payout policy of listed companies on HOSE that have more than 5 percent foreign ownership on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) The data is collected from Vietstock.vn consisting of 95 companies with 5% to 49% foreign ownership on HOSE during the period of 2008-2012 After conducting some tests and models to find out which ones are the most suitable, the study... year Dividend payout policy is a managerial policy for a company to determine how much companies will contribute to shareholders in dividend and how much they are to retain for growth and reinvestment To fully understand the relationship between the foreign ownership and dividend payout policy, the thesis will review the literature on dividend payout policy, the foreign ownership and its effects to the. .. limitation Chapter 2: Literature Review This chapter will review previous empirical studies and theories related to the topic that have been done in the past It also presents definitions and arguments around the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio Chapter 3: Overview of foreign ownership of listed companies on HOSE: 4 This chapter will give the situation of foreign ownership of. .. the impact of foreign ownership on dividend payout policy will help to understand the relationship of foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio Moreover, the study helps investors to have the best glance about how foreign ownership reacts in an emerging market as Viet Nam The study also aims to find out if the companies with higher dividend payout policy attracts foreign investors or foreign investors... that there is a connection between ownership structures, especially foreign ownership and payout policy In Viet Nam, foreign ownership is gaining momentum because the Vietnamese government is loosening the room of foreign investors Currently, the room for foreign investor in a listed company is 49% of total ownership of a company It is projected to increase to 60% for the foreign ownership limit in non-banking... order theory Transaction cost theory Leverage Agency cost theory 6 Free cash flow Operating cash flow - (+) Agency theory capital expenditures 7 Foreign ownership Number of common (+) stock/Total outstanding shares Agency theory 19 2.4 Agency theory and empirical studies on the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy: 2.4.1 Agency theory and Expectation of Investors: The agency theory... ondividend payout policy Data will be collected from listed companies on HOSE from 2008-2012 period The study will also clarify the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy is positive or negative 1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Research Data is collected from listed companies on HOSE, which is the largest stock exchange in Viet Nam The data is synthesized and analyzed on public figures... Companies that have higher foreign ownership are more likely to pay dividends Finally, foreign investors prefer cash dividends to reduce the information asymmetry and agency cost Therefore, there is a relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payout ratio, in which dividend is a tool to reduce the asymmetric information Hence, the study is conduct to investigate the relationship between foreign ... participate in the final thesis defense Approved by The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Dividend Policy The case of listed companies on HOSE In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of MASTER... Overview of foreign ownership of listed companies on HOSE: This chapter will give the situation of foreign ownership of listed companies on HOSE from 2008-2012 period It has a summary of companies. .. Title of Thesis: The effect of Foreign Ownership on Dividend payout policy: The case of listed companies on HOSE Advisor: Ph.D NGUYEN KIM THU I assure that the content of this thesis has been