Crisis narratives in political discourse in singapore

CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1. 1 STUDYING SINGAPORE In many ways and from different academic perspectives, Singapore presents a challenging case for analysis. In barely forty years of its independence, Singapore has produced, by many accounts, a sterling record of economic growth and development, providing, in the process, jobs, education, homes and healthcare assistance to a population once wanting in all these needs. It has received wide recognition and praise from the Developed World and equally, admiration and respect from many lessdeveloped nations. In 1996, only 31 years after proclaiming independence, Singapore had earned the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development classification of “an advanced developing economy”. Where it was once a politically, economically and socially unviable nation-state, Singapore is today an advanced industrialized country, accomplishing developmental feats that have often made it the object of international envy. The question on every political analyst’s lips is: how did it accomplish this, — “it” being the smallest state in Southeast Asia, with only a geographically strategic location, but having neither a hinterland nor other natural resources, and only a nonindigenous, racially divided, migrant population. As Rodan (1993a: xi) put it summarily, much of the attention Singapore has attracted is due to the fact that it had managed to survive as an independent sovereign nation, against almost incredible odds, and transformed itself so successfully: [1/1] … along with the other newly industrialising countries (NICs) of East Asia, [Singapore] achieved industrialisation when so many other developing countries languished. Added interest stems from the fact that in the 1960s the island’s political status was precarious, with grave doubts both inside and outside Singapore about its viability as a separate nation. 1 While political analysts may be divided over the gains and losses to the polity of the political system that has evolved in Singapore and the form in which governance has been constituted here, they do not disagree on the main factor that has led Singapore out of the political and economic doldrums of the 1960s: the postcolonial government which has, since Singapore achieved independence in 1965, been led by the incumbent People’s Action Party (PAP). In trying to understand the PAP’s successful management of Singapore, we look at the strategies of control that have arguably been employed in governing the republic, thereby bringing about Singapore’s successful growth and development. To some political analysts, the PAP’s exercise of control operates through a principle of “authoritarianism”. Rodan (1993b: 77) for instance, argues that the system of political government here is one that can be described as “authoritarian”. Noting that while “ government has been determined in Singapore by popular elections since 1959, with parliament and political parties, rather than military juntas, prevailing”, these are merely “democratic appearances”, and in reality, “an authoritarian regime has managed to successfully coexist with these [democratic appearances] in Singapore” (Rodan 1993b: 77). Hence, state power based in a system of restrictive rules and regulations, including the use of various repressive mechanisms, the co-optation of groups, the implementation of legislation and policies etc, has been the over-arching mechanism through which effective control of the republic is constituted. Others, however, see the situation in less critically opposed terms. For them, the focus shifts from the initial premise of an authoritarian-type political system, to how the particular system operates, regardless of what system it is. In Chan (1975: 51), for instance, one finds the argument that the effective development of the republic – its economic growth – is spurred on by the gradual and ultimate depoliticisation of the 2 citizenry. Arguing that the first decade since independence has seen the “steady and systematic depoliticisation of a politically active and aggressive citizenry” in Singapore, Chan proposes that the state has increasingly become “administrative”. With depoliticisation, the “rough and tumble of politics is reduced and the allocation of resources and values is a matter to be programmed and scheduled by the political leadership and its administrators”. While this meant, among other things, that policies and plans may be swiftly implemented by the leadership and its administrators, in the process, avenues for political participation and articulation necessarily also become increasingly limited – a consequence Chan notes is in keeping with the philosophy of the “administrative state”, which believes that time spent by groups and countergroups “ to lobby, influence and change policy outcomes are a waste of time”. As a result, there is an inevitable ceding of control of the citizenry to the state, and it is herein that the state’s control over the citizenry is effected. The control acquired by the administrative state over the citizenry meant that it could then proceed expeditiously with its policies pertaining to economic development, thereby enabling the growth and development of Singapore. What Rodan (1993b), Chan (1975) and other studies in this area address is the fundamental question of how the republic has enabled its growth and development. Put another way, what mechanism and tools, or strategies of control, have been utilised in the development of the republic? While the question begs a comprehensive study of all elite-utilised methods of control for the management and development of the economic, social and political spheres of the republic, this would require far more space than the constraints on this thesis would allow, and interest in this question must, for the moment, be unfulfilled. But even as the broader question remains unanswered, this thesis seeks to provide at 3 least some insight into it by focussing on the development of the social sphere, more specifically, the creation of order and harmony among disparate ethnic groups. The question it thus asks is: what has been/is the strategy of control utilised by the political leadership in enabling the creation and continuity of a socially harmonious and relatively conflict-free society, even as primordial, atavistic ties threaten to tear it apart? 1.2 AIMS OF THESIS This thesis sets out to show that among the strategies of control utilised in, and by the state, is the (recurrent) construction of, and reliance on a discourse of crisis. As a precursorial note, this thesis allies itself with the following quote: [1/4] The discourse of crisis has been one of the most conspicuous and constant strategies of control in Singapore 1 . This is used to create a climate of domestic uncertainty and even a sense of fragility about the state and the economy. (Rodan 1993a: xv) As we will see in Chapter Two, the discourse of crisis is constituted by the packaging of social, economic and political issues in terms that suggest the potential of these issues erupting into veritable crises. In the literature, studies in the discourse of crisis pertaining to female reproduction rates, religion, immigration policies 2 and the erosion of Asian values3 have been attempted and two of these are discussed in that chapter. As a contribution to this area of research, I look specifically at one particular discourse of crisis that attends Singapore society, namely the discourse of racial crisis. In addition, as the abovementioned discourse(s) of crisis appear to have been studied in exclusively sociological or political terms, this thesis attempts to illustrate the construction and manifestation of the discourse of racial crisis by an appeal to language research, in particular the discourse-analytic approach and narrative analysis. 1 Emphasis mine. See Birch, David. (1993). 3 See Clammer, John. (1993). 2 4 As the discourse of racial crisis is one instance of the strategic construction of the discourse of crisis in the Singapore state, a description of the over-arching discourse of crisis will be attempted with reference to its constituent discourses, of which the discourse of racial crisis is but one. The thesis will conclude with a discussion of the function of the discourse of (racial) crisis as a means of effective social control. 1.3 DAT A My data consist of newspaper articles – reports and opinion pieces – culled from the national broadsheet The Straits Times, as well as ministerial statements, speeches and government press releases, sourced from various governmental websites. Keeping in mind that the topic is a highly sensitive one and therefore demands strong supporting documents that only a diachronic understanding of the issues can provide, and in order that the exposition given here is as comprehensive as possible, the notion of having a fixed time frame in which the data is to be culled from is rejected. Included in the data set are various documents ranging from 1965 to 2002. However, to be working within space constraints is, regrettably, to be working with the knowledge that only a very diminished sample of the data can be presented and imp lied as representative, to some extent, of the entire set of data that cannot possibly be cited here. In terms of the texts that have been chosen, I have found that whole speeches are not only unwieldy, but unnecessary data, and in its place, is rather, a selection of texts in which matters pertaining to “race” were touched on. 1.4 M ETHOD As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of this thesis is to show that among the strategies of control used by the state in enabling the creation and continuity of society 5 (in particular, a socially harmonious and relatively conflict-free society that will function in the direction of the elite political will) is the (recurrent) construction of and reliance on a discourse of crisis. For this project, I will adopt a language discourse-analytic approach in the exploration of the discursive phenomenon that attends Singapore society. This phenomenon presents itself recurrently in official messages and has been described as creating in the Singaporean a “siege mentality”. I hope to explicate in this thesis, the notion of a discourse of crisis, and further, examine in greater detail one discursive construction of crisis, namely, the racial crisis. 1.4.1 The linguistic approach4 The link between language/discourse analysis and the understanding of social phenomena may be understood in the following statements on the study of discourse: [1/2] …the study of discourse is the study of any aspect of language use. (Fasold 1990: 65) [1/3] the analysis of discourse, is necessarily, the analysis of language in use. As such it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs. (Brown and Yule 1983: 1) In another statement of this view, Fairclough (1989: 23) advocates a “dialectical conception of language and society”: “language is a part of society; linguistic phenomena are social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena are (in part) linguistic phenomena”. Following from this view, Schiffrin (1994: 31) reiterates that “the analysis of language as an independent (autonomous) system would be a contradiction in terms”, and that as “discourse is assumed to be interdependent with 4 I am aware that some linguistic approaches are also constructivist in nature. While I discuss the m under the “linguistic approach” (rather than the “social constructionist approach”, see later), I do not mean to suggest that they are NOT constructivist. I have separated this discussion on method into the linguistic and social constructionist approaches only so that I may give to each a fuller description. 6 social life, [such that] its analysis necessarily intersects with meanings, activities and systems outside of itself”. Notwithstanding the fact that Fasold, Brown and Yule, and Schiffrin’s approaches, while discourse analytic, are largely focussed on the micro issues of faceto-face interactions, while Fairclough’s, on the other hand, tends towards a macro perspective of discourse analysis involving societal ideologies, the underlying shared view is of the study of discourse as the study of language in use in society, and the necessary construal of language’s purposes and functions in its service of human affairs, and of agents and subjects within society. But what does it mean to carry out a discourse analysis? One broad underlying description of the discourse-analytic tradition in linguistics is the notion of studying “the organisation of language above the sentence or above the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units, such as conversational exchanges or written texts” (Stubbs, 1983: 1). What follows is then that “discourse analysis is [also] concerned with language use in social contexts and in particular with interaction or dialogue between speakers”. Proceeding from this, Stubbs distils three possible approaches to discourse analysis. In the first, discourse analysis involves looking at transcripts of conversational data, inspecting them thoroughly for the kinds of surface organisation and patterns they show. A second way of conducting discourse analysis looks at data collected through recording and observation, but to neglect the surface forms of utterances, and only to pay attention to their underlying functions. Finally, the third approach rests on paying particular attention to aspects of language which syntax and semantics have had difficulties in explaining. 7 In these three approaches, highly technical linguistic analyses are carried out, involving the use of methods and tools found in for instance, conversation analysis, as famously propounded by Schegloff and Sacks (1973), involving concepts such as structures of talk and discourse organisation; the anthropologically-rooted ethnography of communication (Saville-Troike 1982; Hymes 1972) with attendant concepts of language/speech functions; and lastly, in finding that there are certain lexical and syntactic characteristics of English which cannot be accounted for within sentence grammars, and that extra-sentential phenomena are relevant to phenomena within a clause, the argument is made for studying larger linguistic units above the sentence or clause. In the final, Stubbs’ suggests that discourse analysis is the study of syntagmatic organisation and of the relationship between form and function which thus distinguishes discourse analysis from other sorts of study. Extrapolating from Stubbs’ approaches and his conclusions on what discourse analysis is, we may describe the task as this: discourse analysis of texts is an examination of the means by which language affords producers of texts to express messages and communicative acts, through the organisation and manipulation of language units. This then necessitates a close consideration of the relationship between what is/has been said/written and the functions these utterances/texts serve. In this project, we analyse the texts produced by, and in, society which constructs a discourse of (racial) crisis, and seek to determine how language has been put to use, made to function and the purposes it serves producers and consumers of those texts. 8 1.4.2 The social constructionist approach Further, it is not merely the language we are interested in, per se. It is the interactions language makes with society, the ways in which it has been put to use in society, that are of primary concern in this project. For the purpose of examining the construction of a discourse of crisis in a society, we look at the texts that inhere and proliferate that society and hence the messages that are handed down through time, and attempt to decipher holistically how these messages engage and draw its recipients into absorbing a certain reality, to create certain notions of life in society, and finally, to motivate responses so that life persists in that society. What the examination requires is, apart from an appeal to language research – which offers the lens through which to “see” our data –, a grounding of this language analysis in wider, social terms in order to explore language’s enabling powers of maintaining or transforming society – the knowledge, structures and actions within. As proposed, I attempt in this project to illuminate the construction of a discourse of crisis in a particular society. As such, we look at how language has been used and indeed manipulated, to serve the construction of a particular kind of discourse. In this, we find a similar vein of thought within social constructionist approaches to discourse. As a preliminary definition of discourse, social constructionist approaches see it as a “particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)”. They share the starting point that “our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations, but rather, play an active role in creating and changing them.” It has been proposed that all social constructionist approaches embrace four basic premises (Burr 1995: 2-5). 9  A critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge  Historical and cultural specificity  Link between knowledge and social processes  Link between knowledge and social action Briefly, the social constructionist approach is based on the notion that our knowledge and representations of the world are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’, but rather are products of our ways of perceiving the world, or in discursive analytical terms, products of discourse (Burr 1995: 3). Our views of, and knowledge about the world are the ‘products of historically situated interchanges between people’ (Gergen 1985: 267). Our understanding and representations of the world, hence, are ‘historically and culturally specific and contingent5’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2003: 5), and the outcomes of existing prevailing discourses as well as, in a way, ‘hand-me-downs’ of previous triumphant discourses in history. Discourse is the social action that produces the social world – including knowledge, identities and social relations – as we know it, and key in maintaining specific social patterns. These so-called ‘products of discourse’ are created and maintained by social processes (Burr 1985: 268). Knowledge is created through social interaction and competitions over which products of discourse persist and which do not. Finally, the social constructionist understands that within a particular worldview, some forms of action are natural and others unthinkable. Because ‘different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions, [and therefore] the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences’ (Burr 1995: 5; Gergen 1985: 268 – 269). 5 Emphasis in original. 10 Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (or discourse theory), articulated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), is one such social constructionist approach. Phillips and Jorgensen (2002: 6) describe Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory hence: Discourse theory has its starting point in the poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs the social world in meaning, and that, owing to the fundamental instability of language, meaning can never be permanently fixed. No discourse is a closed entity: it is, rather, constantly being transformed through contact with other discourses. … Different discourses are engaged in a constant struggle with one another to achieve hegemony, that is, to fix the meanings of language in their own way. Hegemony then can provisionally be understood as the dominance of one particular perspective. Discourse theory “aims at an understanding of the social as a discursive construction whereby, in principle, all social phenomena can be analysed using discourse analytical tools” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 24). This project is an attempt to study the discursive construction, in Singapore society, of crisis, in particular, the racial crisis. 1.4.3 Combining the approaches But while Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory offers a strong theoretical foundation for discourse analysis, their aim at theory development means practical tools for discourse analysis are lacking. Discourse theory is unlike Fairclough’s (1995a, 1995b), for example, whose toolbox might provide an analysis in which features of texts could be identified that would go unnoticed in an ordinary reading. Hence, while adopting Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory’s strong theoretical basis for discourse analysis in the understanding of a (social) construction of discourse, it is necessary to supplement it with methods from other approaches. In this thesis, the method of analysis is a synthesis of the social constructionist and the linguistic approaches, where the former provides the theoretical basis and the latter provides the tools to carry out the study. Proceeding closely in the tradition of discourse theory, my analysis and discussion in this project will define Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts of ‘identity’, 11 ‘antagonism’ and ‘hegemony’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) in the construction of a crisis discourse in Singapore society, together with a language approach to discourse analysis. In using the social constructionist discourse-analytic approach, I am seeking to understand the discursively constructed identity/reality of society through an examination of the texts produced, or the social discourses that proliferate that society, which manifest naturally, language as it is used and being used in society for the furtherance of dominant ideologies and elite ideals. With the concept of ‘identity’, we examine the construction of the identity/ reality foisted on the Singapore citizenry by dint of the island-republic’s size and location (in this project, known as the ‘geographical aspect’ in crisis construction), its history of bloody racial conflicts (‘historical aspect’), and finally, the alternative ‘identities’ of individuals within the discourse (‘human aspect’), and the consequences entailed and functions served by these constructions (Chapter Three). In addition, the analysis compares the construction of the discourses of the racial, religious and reproductive crises, to further the notion of crisis-discourse construction in Singapore society (Chapter Four). With the notions of ‘antagonism’ and ‘hegemony’, we examine and discuss how the dominant and prevailing social discourses define the parameters and restrict the participation of competing discourses (Chapter Five). The discourse-analytic approach is hence augmented by narrative analysis that is based on the work of Linde (2001). Abstracting from Linde’s analytical framework for how narratives work for and within institutions (see Chapter Five), it becomes possible to describe how producers of the discourse limit boundaries of articulation and hence suppress alternative, 12 competing discourses and occasions in which the dominant discourse asserts itself, excluding all others. This then allows the successful orchestration, management and concretisation of an enduring crisis discourse in society and affords a social control mechanism for a harmonious, conflict-free society (Chapter Six). Simply stated, given language’s all-pervasive role in human activity and the insights offered by a discourse-analytic approach, perhaps some of the questions explored in the existing research on Singapore may also be answered, to some extent, when approached from a linguistic perspective.. 13 CHAPTER T WO The Discourse of Crisis 2.1 THE CONCEPT OF ‘CR ISIS ’ Definitions of ‘crisis’ include the following: [2/1] - A crucial or decisive point or situation; a turning point. - An unstable condition, as in political, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending, abrupt or decisive change. - The point of time when it is to be decided whether any affair or course of action must go on, or to be modified or terminated; the decisive moment; the turning point. - An unstable situation of extreme danger or difficulty. - A crucial stage or turning point in the course of something. (www.dictionary.com www.dictionary.com) [2/2] A point or moment of great danger, difficulty or uncertainty. (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English) [2/3] A decisive moment, a time of danger or difficulty (calamity, disaster, catastrophe, danger, emergency). (Oxford Complete Wordfinder) While not exhaustive, the three sources cited here should be sufficient to give a general idea of the semantic composition of the concept “crisis”. Broadly speaking, the concept may be understood in association with (i) “danger” and “difficulty”; and involving (ii) a “decisive moment”. In order to understand “crisis” in the Singaporean context however, it is necessary to reinterpret these concepts in terms of the subjective Singaporean reality. To do this, we must begin with a look at Singapore’s early history. It is common to find, in works detailing the history of modern Singapore, the discursive representation of the country cast in the light of its extreme perilousness upon independence, and descriptions of its subsequent development made in the light of its hard-fought, hard-won victory over great adversity. Overwhelmingly, references 14 to the early development of Singapore are replete with phrases and descriptions surrounding such notions as “the struggle for survival”, “challenges to overcome”, “the nation’s extreme vulnerability”, “the nation’s openness to external threat” etc., all of which, it may be said, belong quite unquestionably, within the semantic possibilities of a Singaporean “crisis”. In the annals of Singapore history, moments of “danger” and “difficulty” that had befallen post-independent Singapore requiring “decisive” action by its leaders are well-documented, and irrelevant for my purposes to elaborate in detail here. The brief survey of Singapore history that follows is thus neither comprehensive nor intricately detailed, but it is hoped, is suffice for elucidating the Singaporean concept of “crisis”. History had begun for independent Singapore in an abrupt separation from the Federation of Malaysia, and had unfolded through traumatic and testing times. In 1963, Singapore achieved independence from her British colonial masters as part of the then-new Federation of Malaysia. This political union was, however, fraught with much bitterness and hostility between Singapore’s incumbent ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) of Malaya. The intense acrimony came to a head in 1965, and Singapore became now a new independent republic 6 . For the state leadership at that time, independent Singapore was thought to be a “foolish and absurd proposition” (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Drysdale 1984: 249), and Singapore was presented with a veritable crisis with the separation from Malaysia. As Chua (1988: 29) describes, politically, demographically, culturally and ideologically, Singapore’s continued existence could only be ensured as part of the Federation of Malaysia. The leadership had felt that it was only through the merger with Malaya that 6 See Turnbull. (1977). esp. chapter 8. 15 the problems created by Singapore’s small size, immigrant population and lack of natural resources were resolvable. But its greatest challenge lay in the economic realm, and post-independence, the continued survival of the republic hung in the balance. As Lee Kuan Yew argued, in his advocacy for the merging of Singapore and Malaya, in a political radio broadcast in 1961: [2/4] [Malaya] is the hinterland which produces the rubber and tin that kept our shop-window economy going. … Without this economic base, Singapore would not survive. Post-independent Singapore thus found itself riddled with a range of economic and social problems. Prospects of a common market with Malaysia were shattered, with Singapore facing the possibility of losing her former role as the financial, banking and shipping centre for the Malay peninsula (see Turnbull 1977: 303). Singapore’s entrepot trade, which had hitherto been the main lifeline of her economy, showed a pattern of decline. Crucial events taking place around that time, such as the Indonesian Confrontation during 1963-6, the abovementioned separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, as well as the complete withdrawal of the British military in 1968, also severely affected her economy (see Chen 1983: 7). On the other hand, the differences among Singapore’s immigrant population, comprising peoples of different race, colour, religion, language and culture, were potentially divisive, making the creation of a feeling of shared nationhood especially difficult (see Turnbull 1977: 300-302). And this is how “danger” and “difficulty” and “decisive moment”— terms that designate “crisis”— may be understood in relation to the Singaporean reality 7 . All at 7 The crisis discourse did not of course begin with the separation of Malaysia and Singapore. Instances of crises with the PAP in power or as an aspiring political party abound, but it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore these other crises. The brief history of the founding o f sovereign Singapore is given here, not as a starting point from which to demarcate the beginnings of the crisis discourse, but as an illustration of how the crisis discourse, could, and indeed did, manifest itself. It appeared that the separation of Malaysia and Singapore gave the producers/ engineers of the discourse the grounds for the 16 once, upon independence and beyond, the Singapore leadership and population found itself beset with crisis issues that threatened the republic’s very existence. ‘Crisis’ in post-independent Singapore was a notion encompassing the varied economic, political and social problems faced by the new republic. In the Singaporean sense, “crisis” manifested itself in these early years as problems that threatened the state’s survival and continuity. 2.2 CRISIS CONSTRUCTION But the notion of crisis, which had its beginnings in these traumatic and critical times in Singapore’s past, had, over the years, and in the process of Singapore's development, taken on a larger role. It became no longer, and not merely, a concept to describe the troubled conditions of the republic’s beginnings and early development, nor a mere framework in terms of which an understanding of the republic’s past is possible. In fact, as the political leadership became increasingly adept at turning adversities into opportunities, the notion that is ‘crisis’ soon became a recurrent theme in the Singapore political landscape. Indeed, Barr, in his book, Lee Kuan Yew: the Beliefs behind the Man, was thus prompted to remark that, [2/5] [I]t is the hallmark of an ideological approach to politics for a leader to make conscious use of problems and crises to drive the political situation towards an ideologically preferred end. (Barr 2000: 79) Hence, while some crises, such as the premature closure of the British bases in 1968 and the oil crisis of the 1970s were genuine, and needed no exaggeration of the problems they posed to Singapore, others were less so – but were nonetheless, arguably, coated with the ‘veneer’ of crisis. We find, therefore, that in many cases, both real and perceived threats, and ordinary developments in the course of statecreation of the belief that the Republic was thrown into a sudden “crisis’, being as it was, suddenly left to fend for itself. 17 building, were equally packaged and presented as crises, and events and conditions that came in the natural course of development were sometimes disproportionately, sometimes subjectively, rendered potentially and fatally destructive to Singapore’s political, economic and social development. It was, as Barr (2000) termed it, a “crisisdriven” model of development, where a whole range of issues faced by the new republic came to be dressed up as ‘crises’ and for which the state was impelled to deal with accordingly. These included: [2/6] [The need for] a defence force … because Singapore was ‘an Israel in a MalayMuslim sea’. … [The] fear that dysgenic fertility trends threatened to turn Singapore into an ‘anaemic’ society, [thus] necessitating the Abortion and Sterilisation Bills [in 1969] … The challenge posed by Chinese chauvinism, communist infiltration and ‘black operations’ justified strict controls on the press in 1971. [The uncovering of] more communist ‘black operations’ in 1976. …In 1978 the bilingual education system was deemed a failure which placed the future of the country at risk. In 1979 the trade union empire of Phey Yew Kok had to be dismantled because it was becoming too powerful and threatened the well-being of Singapore. Throughout 1980 trade unionists were told that they faced a leadership crisis which threatened their special relationship with the [People’s Action Party], and therefore endangered the stability and prosperity of Singapore. In 1982 an all-pervasive campaign was initiated to introduce Confucian ethics into schools and most aspects of public and private life as an antidote to the threat posed by Western values. … (Barr 2000: 84) The propensity of the state for declaring a crisis ever so often has been described, in terms of the consequences of such an action, as “[giving] Singaporean politics a neurotic character’ (Barr 2000: 85), as well as giving Singaporeans the ‘feeling that there is a permanent8 sense of crisis’: [2/7] 8 [P]olitically Singapore is threatened with subversion from within and without; economically, the situation is always precarious; the education system is constantly changed at all levels; expensive projects are begun and … rendered obsolete two years hence … [C]hange, construction, urgency are the keywords. But why? What is the ultimate purpose of all this activity, all this energy spent changing what has just been finished? Nobody quite knows, for the system seems to require that today’s solution is tomorrow’s problem. (Clammer 1985: 27) Emphasis mine. 18 Perhaps it is important to ask then, what are the motivations behind imposing this ‘neurotic’ character on the Singapore state? It is obvious that the recurrent declaration of crisis on the Singapore polity must serve some function. That the ultimate end must surely be to ensure and secure Singapore’s continued independent existence, even if only in order to keep the incumbent ruling party in power longer9 , rather than for dubious reasons, is beyond question. In terms of the processes of construction and the intended objectives, the technique of crisis construction has been compared to that of ‘moral panics’ (Hill 2001), which refers to the situation(s) where society is subjected to conditions or events that threaten its moral fabric. In both, the element of consensus-building stands out as the key attribute and as Hill argues, the orchestration of crisis was a precursor to the orchestration of consent. Hill’s argument finds some resonance in S. Rajaratnam’s private statement (cited in Betts 1975: 141), as the-then minister addresses the issue of how the PAP intended to realise its objectives with respect to ensuring Singapore’s future. The statement hints at the construction of crisis (‘raising the spectre of total disaster’) in order to effect an intended result (‘they will change’): [2/8] And one of the things we can do to get a little further down the road a little faster is to raise the spectre of total disaster as the alternative. …Within this context, sooner or later, they will change. Additionally too, the repeated administration of ‘crises’ may be traced to, as the account in Barr (2000) suggests, the political thought of Singapore’s first prime 9 While this is not a position I wish to advance nor defend, it must be an obvious fact that political parties aim to, a mong other things, secure power in government, and on having achieved this, maintain their presence in government. To understand the PAP, Shee’s (1971) study of the political party is illuminative. The following quote is taken from his book, The People’s Action Party of Singapore 1954 – 1970: A Study in Survivalism: “The theme of survival … has been the central concern for the PAP from its inception. … the patterns of the Party’s struggle for survival since 1954 can be discerned. … Second, from 1959 until the Separation (1965), the struggle for survival included not only the Party but also the government leadership. Third, after the Separation, survival not only included the Party, but it also encompassed the entire Republic of Singapore” (Shee 1971: 23). 19 min ister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who had, together with his political party—the PAP—led the country as the ruling party in government since Singapore’s independence. In Barr’s study, the prime minister’s political technique may be attributed to his close reading of Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History, a commonly read extra-curricular text during Lee’s time at Law School. In particular, Toynbee’s concept of Challenge and Response had great appeal for the leader, and Barr posits that this concept had motivated much of Lee’s political decisions, especially to those pertaining to crisis construction. Essentially, Toynbee maintained that ‘civilisations are created and then continually evolve in response to a series of internal and external challenges’ and ‘saw progress as being driven by challenges to which a society must respond successfully, while an inadequate or erroneous response spells temporary or permanent stagnation, or even the death of the civilisation’ (as explained in Barr 2000: 71). If Barr’s analysis is accurate and credible, then the state’s recurrent use of crisis construction – the motivations behind this, and the intended consequences of this action – may be, at least in some part, explained. An illustration of the influence of Toynbee’s concept is given as follows. Based on Lee’s alignment of thought to Toynbee’s thesis as well as his own later revelations on the subject, a different perspective on the circumstances leading to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia may be given. In Barr’s account, it is apparent that Singapore was not so much ‘booted out’ of Malaysia, as the official version of the event recounts, than that Singapore itself wanted ‘out’. As it was later revealed, Lee had attempted successfully to ‘deceive’ his colleagues into believing that the-then Tunku “had unilaterally decided that Singapore must leave Malaysia” and that the Tunku’s decision was final, when in fact, Lee had, in the weeks before, prepared a proposal to secure Singapore’s secession from Malaysia. Lee had put up this 20 ‘deception’ in order to circumvent opposition from some of the strongest advocates of the Singapore-Malaya merger in his Cabinet. The successful ‘deception’ was intended to prepare the ground for the separation from Malaysia (see Barr 2000: 79-80), and subsequently also to prepare it for the ‘politics of survival’ – “whereby Lee could present Singapore’s existence as a challenge of the highest order” (Barr 2000: 80). This episode, as analysed by Barr, [2/9] [the reference to Singapore being ‘booted out’ of Malaysia] enabled Lee to base the ‘survival’ motif on an external challenge: the threat of being ‘squeezed’. The emotional power of such a message converted a mere exercise in economics into a nation-building challenge. Lee was able to use the situation as an orchestrated Toynbeean exercise whereby a challenge purportedly threatened the country’s survival and required an effective response. and in Lee’s own words: [2/10] Human beings always respond to a challenge. Where there is no challenge, there is very seldom more than ordinary performance. - Lee Kuan Yew, speech at the Delegates’ Conference of the National Trades Un ion Congress, 2nd October 1966, in Prime Minister’s Speeches (as cited in Barr 2000: 82). For Lee then, if the population could interpret their new-found situation as a challenge, it was his belief that this would spur the country on to progress and economic development. The ‘emotional power’ stemming from the ‘survival’ motif would rally and mobilise both the rulers and the ruled into accepting ‘draconian restrictions and drastic changes in their lives’—which Lee believed were very much needed if Singapore were to survive—all in the name of the struggle for survival. Among the range of governance strategies employed by the state in Singapore, it can be said then, is the recurrent use of the technique of crisis construction – its production, orchestration and management. In addition, it has also been argued that plausibly, the application of such a technique orchestrates consent and directs society’s actions in the direction desired by its governors. We look now at how this particular technique manifests itself in society. 21 2.3 M ANIFESTING THE CRISIS The technique of crisis construction – crisis production, orchestration and then, management – manifests itself in state narratives of national crises. In the narrative of reproductive crisis for example, graduate mothers were targeted and had their patriotism tied to their inclination towards reproduction (see Heng and Devan 1995); in the narrative of religious crisis, presented, as Hill (2001) argues, in the form of a ‘moral panic’, people were made to feel the threat of political, economic or social instability, even chaos, brought about by particular, designated “condition(s), episode(s), person(s) or group(s) of persons” (see Cohen ([1972] 1987). The ‘panic’ then culminates in a series of policy initiatives aimed at countering the perceived threat posed by ardent religiosity. In what follows, I review these two studies of Singapore’s state narratives of crisis as a precursor to a related study of my own. T HE REPRODUCTIVE CRISIS In their examination of the state’s problematization of the level of reproduction among Singapore graduate mothers, Heng and Devan (1995) hold that, [2/11] [p]ostcolonial governments are inclined, with some predictability, to generate narratives of national crisis. (Heng and Devan 1995: 196) and that such narratives of national crisis serve, among other things, certain stateratifying objectives: [2/12] Typically, however, such narratives of crisis serve more than one category of reassurance: by repeatedly focusing anxiety on the fragility of the new nation, its ostensible vulnerability to every kind of exigency, the state's originating agency is periodically reinvoked and ratified, its access to wide-ranging instruments of power in the service of national protection continually consolidated.10 (ibid.) 10 Emphasis mine. 22 Such narratives therefore, not only create in the governed the specific emotions – feelings of anxiety and powerlessness (both politically and otherwise) – intended by their production (and hence, as discussed above, spurring people on to action in the direction set out by the state), but also, in addition, give to the governing a certain legitimising of their power, where only they can, and in fact must, do something to right the situation: [2/13] they who successfully define and superintend a crisis, furnishing its lexicon and discursive parameters, successfully confirm themselves the owners of power, the administration of crisis operating to revitalize ownership of the instruments of power even as it vindicates the necessity of their use. (ibid.) Hence, with reference to the narrative of the reproductive crisis, [2/14] Crisis is unerringly discovered—threats to the survival and continuity of the nation, failures in nationalism—when a distortion in the replication or scale of a composition deemed ideal is fearfully imagined. (ibid.) In Heng and Devan’s argument, the narrative of crisis played out as follows. The narrative was first cast, as Heng and Devan report, “[I]n an aggressive exposition of paternal distress in August 1983”, when then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had “levelled an extraordinary charge against the nation's mothers, incipient and actual— accusing them of imperiling the country's f uture11 by wilfully distorting patterns of biological reproduction”. The charge was based on the claim that highly educated women were failing to produce babies at a sufficiently high rate, compared to poorly educated women who were perceived as reproducing “too freely”, and the issue was conveyed as a national crisis in becoming tied to the nation’s destiny (‘imperiling the nation’s future’). The imbalance in reproductive rates between the two groups of women was a problem to the state and Lee because it was perceived that “graduate mothers produced 23 genetically superior offspring, the ability to complete a university education attesting to superior mental faculties, which would be naturally transmitted to offspring through genetic inheritance”. If not rectified, the imbalance would mean that “[w]ithin a few generations, the quality of Singapore's population would measurably decline, with a tiny minority of intelligent persons being increasingly swamped by a seething, proliferating mass of the unintelligent, untalented, and genetically inferior: industry would suffer, technology deteriorate, leadership disappear, and Singapore lose its competitive edge in the world”. Hence, measures must be taken “ immediately” to “counteract the downhill slide” caused by “ ‘lopsided’ female reproductive sexuality”, or a “catastrophe of major proportions was imminent a scant few generations down the line”. According to Heng and Devan however, closer examination of the statistics alluded to by the-then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew revealed that the two groups of women – the “graduate” mothers and their converse, the “non-graduate” mothers – comprised respectively, largely Chinese, upper- and middle-class professionals; and in a “stunning coincidence”, in the latter case, working-class Malay and Indian women – members, that is, of Singapore's minority racial groups. While the Chinese majority was shrinking, both the Malay and Indian ethnic minorities were expanding. Underlying the narrative of reproductive crisis formulated in terms of “graduate”mothers-not-reproducing/“non-graduate”-mothers-reproducing-too-freely is, really, “[t]he threat of impending collapse in the social and economic order … [which] was covertly located at the intersecting registers of race and class”. In other words, the reproductive crisis narrative was designed to not only redress reproductive imbalances 11 Emphasis mine. 24 between graduate and non-graduate mothers, but more crucially, racial and class imbalances in the country’s demographics. Regardless of whether the distinction that underscores the narrative of the reproductive crisis was between graduate mothers/non-graduate mothers or Chinese mothers/non-Chinese mothers, the narrative of crisis, so generated, ineluctably invokes and ratifies the state’s role in managing the situation. Whether or not public opinion agreed with the Prime Minister’s assessment of the situation is a matter of irresolvable speculation – as, in Heng and Devan’s words, “access to popular opinion through media uninflected by state control was, and still remains, unavailable” – but doubts to the contrary are surely raised by the fact that the ST published only 31 of the 101 letters received on the issue12 . In an apparently “concerted drive to overwhelm public opinion” (which must seem now, very plausibly, negative public opinion), government speeches and statements repeated and expatiated at length the PM’s arguments, as the state went ahead with a proposed range of policies and incentives aimed at effecting the favoured demographic change. Hence it was that in the months following the pronouncement of the crisis, “the government moved with characteristic pre-emptive speed to launch a comprehensive system of incentives and threats, together with major changes of social policy, to bend the population in the direction of the Prime Minister's will”. These included offering “cash awards of S$10,000 to working-class women, under careful conditions of educational and low-income eligibility, to restrict their childbearing to two children, after which they would ‘volunteer’ themselves for tubal As cited in Heng and Devan (1995), The Straits Times “defended its decision not to publish the remaining 71 letters” thus: “Sifting through the pile, one can detect some misunderstanding of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's message. Most of the correspondents did not address their thoughts to the main issue: The better-educated segment of the population should be encouraged to have more children (than what they are having now) to bring about a more balanced reproduction rate. Instead, they interpreted the speech as one more setback for the less intelligent in our society” (A. S. Yeong, “What 12 25 ligation”, as well as “increasing maternity charges in public hospital wards most frequently used by working-class mothers for those who had already given birth to their state-preferred quota of two children”. On the other hand, graduate women were enticed to have more children through “generous tax breaks, medical insurance privileges, and admission for their children to the best schools in the country”. Alongside these measures, “[C]abinet ministers began to exhort graduate women to marry and bear children as a patriotic duty”, and “two women's organizations accordingly proposed that women be required to bear children as a form of National Service”. Other ‘narratives’ attending to the reproductive crisis include advertisements encouraging singles to marry and set up families, and even, getting right down to a possible cause for women in their 30s still being single, a campaign to get people to express their feelings for each other (ST, Oct 6). By extending the state’s purview into matters as private as these, these efforts have prompted disgruntled letter-writers to the Forum Page of The Straits Times. Implicit in these letters is the issue of crisis construction as felt by the common man-in-the-street, and extracts from two such letters given below show this. They offer a glimpse at the extent to which the issue of (low) reproductive rates among women becomes a national crisis by reference to the fact that the issue is ‘intertwined with the destiny of a nation’, or that it constitutes a serious enough ‘problem’ for the Government to want to mount a campaign to ‘solve’ it, even though the ‘problem’ was defined on the basis of the results of only one survey. the Others Said: An Analysis of Unpublished Letters on the PM's National Day Rally Speech,” The Straits Times [Singapore], August 29, 1983). 26 [2/15] The personal and private affair of settling down with a loved one is now intertwined with the destiny of a nation and we, the singles, have to bear the brunt of social stigmatisation. What is wrong with being single? (ST, 7th Oct, 2002) [2/16] We seem like a society obsessed with statistics and surveys. A survey on single women in their 30s was all it took for the Government to mount a campaign to get people to express their feelings for each other. There is always this obsessive need to solve every problem, perceived or real. … Are we so used to being told when, where and how we should express our feelings that we need external prods to do so? (ST, 7th Oct, 2002) T HE RELIGIOUS CRISIS Agreeing with Heng and Devan that crisis-production appears to be a strategy of political governance in the Singapore state, but proceeding from sociological approaches to the study of deviance, Hill (2001) introduces the concept of ‘moral panic’ to the study of political governance in Singapore with respect to the management of religion in the multireligious city-state. The concept of ‘moral panic’ was proposed by Cohen ([1972] 1987) in his book, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. In his study of the inappropriate and disproportionate social reaction generated over the conflict between the Mods and the Rockers in 1960s Britain, Cohen’s analysis of the reactions of five broad segments of society—the press, the public, the agents of social control, or law enforcement, lawmakers and politicians and action groups—showed how, through their intervention, the youthful disturbances caused by rival factions at a seaside resort in Clacton, had turned from a relatively minor event (one mere speck in the ocean of youth violence cases) into one of immense proportions, (and thus) constituting a ‘panic’. Of the various theories of moral panics developed since Cohen’s time, it is the elite-engineered model that finds particular signif icance in Hill’s (2001) study. In this model, moral panics originate from an/the elite group in society which has immense power over all other groups (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 124). This model was however, Hill argues, better articulated as the elite-sponsored model, thereby 27 eschewing the problem of determining deliberate manipulation and conspiracy on the part of the elite for which, it is no doubt, difficult to establish. Contrary to Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s assertion that “the elite-engineered model does not seem to work for most moral panics” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 142), Hill sought to show that, with the revised form of the model, this last model may well serve the concept of moral panics yet. In Hill’s analysis, the Singapore government’s management of religion in the late 1980s is understood as an exercise in the elite-sponsored construction of moral panics. A number of core features of moral panics appear to feature prominently in the Singapore government’s handling of religious matters in this period. In the context of this religious moral panic, Islamic fundamentalists, on the one hand, and Christians using the Catholic church and other religious organisations to form a ‘Marxist Conspiracy’, on the other hand, were first identified as the sources of panic. This was then followed by a series of moves to build consensus and support for this view. These included: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) the raising of spectres as a predictive device – which alerts the public to impending disruption, the recurrent emphasis, in such periods, of the state’s precariousness and vulnerability, the pre-emptive strike – the potentially draconian measures taken up by the government for the protection of its citizens’ security in light of the potential dangers posed by the threat, the validation through expert discourse – where the source and extent of the threat is demonstrably and decisively concluded, the search for consensus among the leaders and representatives of groups deemed to be involved on an agreement that a problem exists and needs to be addressed, and one might add, the subsequent dissemination of the unanimous, consolidated views of these groups and of the experts (mentioned in (iv)), and lastly, legislation and policy outcomes to contain the problem are mooted, on the basis of expert analysis of the problem and consensus over its necessity, and enacted. 28 This is the process by which the religious crisis in Singapore brought about by ardent religiosity in the late 1980s is constructed. In so doing, as Hill argues, the aim is to “legitimate political policy and to mobilise social action, especially with the goal of creating consensus”. With the construction of the moral panic over religion and thus the creation of consensus over the sphere of influence with in which religion may rightfully reside, policy formation on religion then culminated in the passing of legislation to constrain the activities of religious groups in order to prevent their penetration into off-limit areas, such as the political sphere and the ethnically sensitive dimensions of religion13 . It is thus, Hill contends, that the state’s establishment of a specialised and contained sphere of competence for religion was accomplished – in large part as the product of the intense moral panic over religion. 2.4 THE DISCOURSE OF RACIAL CRIS IS Having looked at two instances of the construction of crises – the reproductive and religious crises, we turn now to the construction of the racial crisis in Singapore society. To understand the potential for racial strife, and correspondingly, the discourse of racial crisis in Singapore, an appreciation of the racial context from her colonial past to the present day is necessary. 2.4.1 Singapore’s racial composition Singapore society comprises, almost entirely, an immigrant population, most of whom come from diverse places of origin. From an initial estimated population of about 150 persons on the island in 1819, it had risen to 97, 111 when the first Census of Population was taken in 1871, a figure that was boosted by colonial policies that welcomed and encouraged migrants to Singapore. Where once the racial composition of Singapore comprised a Malay majority, the influx of ethnic Chinese migrants soon 13 Religious Knowledge was also, thereafter, introduced into the secondary school syllabus and students of every ethnic group and religion underwent two years of classes that familiarised them and inculcated 29 altered the statistics. Singapore has since then had a sizeable Chinese majority, a Malay minority (who has always constituted a fairly substantial figure, and to the present-day, has remained the second largest ethnic group in the state), a small Indian minority, and small groups of Europeans, Arabs, Jews, Japanese etc, or people of mixed descent, such as the Eurasians. Singapore is thus one of the most ethnically plural societies. Apart from their highly distinct ethnic origins, the Singapore population is further differentiated in their cultural backgrounds, traditions, practices, languages and religious faiths. These differences exist not only among the various ethnic groups, but also within the same ethnic group. The ethnic Chinese community for instance, comprises Hokkiens, Teochews, Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka, and Shanghainese. It practises a range of religious faiths, from none to folk religion, Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity, and possesses different mother-tongues. Given the highly pluralist context, one might expect Singapore society to be constantly besieged by racial strife and thus, become one of the most unstable societies. The fact is, however, that the opposite is true. Having experienced only a handful of racial riots in its history, the republic has managed successfully to avert itself from the kinds of racial conflict that have caused turmoil in other societies. This is no doubt due to the success of efforts aimed at integrating the various races. These efforts include pursuing the principles of multiracialism, cultural democracy and meritocracy, thereby implementing policy initiatives such as imposing an ethnic quota on public housing estates; the introduction of National Education in the school syllabus; the programme of National Service, which brings together males of all ethnicities in national defence; the creation of GRCs where at least one of the members in them an understanding, tolerance and respect for other religions. 30 running on the group ticket must be of an ethnic minority—thus ensuring minority representation in Parliament, the institution of ideologies which aims at “deracialising” the ethnic groups, such as seeking their subscription to a set of “Asian Values, thus subsuming the various and varied groups under the “Asian” label, rather than encouraging their overt identification with their supposed ethnicities etc. These are eminently rational moves made by the incumbent government to prevent racial fragmentation, divide and strife, in accordance with its ideologies of survival and pragmatism in order to hoist the country from the economic doldrums in the 1960s, and ensure future prosperity and progress for the city-state. But beyond these grand political and sociological designs that have stayed the boat on its course, how is the official discourse on ethnicity constructed? Given that, as mentioned above, the country has enjoyed relative racial harmony in the years since the racial riots of the 50s and 60s, how is a “racial crisis” in any sense of the term to be understood? In other words, what is a “crisis” if not that it involves danger to and even loss of, potential or not, life and limb, both in the literal and figurative sense, i.e. to man and society at large, as the three racial riots in the past attest to? As discussed in Chapter One, “crisis” in this paper is to be understood as an idea encompassing notions of “danger” and “decisive actions”. In this sense, a “racial crisis” is to be understood as the condition to which society is subject to when problems relating to issues of race jeopardise the stability of the state. The construction of the discourse of racial crisis necessarily involves aspects that may cause panic, fear, or insecurity within society, thereby legitimising and warranting state concern and action. With this background to the idea of “racial crisis”, and more importantly, the discourse of racial crisis, we proceed now to fleshing out the aspects underlying the construction of the discourse. 31 2.4.2 Discourse of Racial Crisis: Aspects of its Construction The following chapter describes the strategies employed in the construction of a sense of crisis that attends Singapore society and which together form the primary bases for such a discourse. These strategies are the different aspects in the construction of the crisis. I will use “aspects” in this thesis to denote the various means that afford the construction of crises, that is, in this case, the historical, geographical and human, that together lead to the overall discursive construction of the racial crisis. For the sake of clarity, this analysis is organised in terms of distinct aspects, but this is not to suggest that any one aspect manifests itself singly in any one material instance of the discourse, or that, in and of itself alone gives rise to the racial crisis. Rather, it is the case that these features function together, often playing and replaying themselves in every textual instantiation of the discourse, and that it is through their occurrence and recurrence that the notion of a racial crisis is continually and forcefully reinforced. In a way, these aspects are also factors in that they come together in leading to the consequences of their effect. In other words, an aspect (as factor) on its own does not a crisis create; it is only through their coming together, each intimating, to some extent, potential danger but together, accentuating this potential even further, that the crisis, of which they are aspects/factors, is constructed. The discourse of racial crisis as explored in this thesis is seen as constituted by three main aspects, which are discussed in the following chapter. These are namely, the geographical, historical and human aspects. These aspects appear to manifest the chief resources in the discourse of racial crisis, and we look at each of these in turn for 32 the potential they afford to the production, orchestration and management of the racial crisis. Summarily stated, these aspects provide ways of persuading the populace of the existence of the racial crisis (albeit without explicit mention of such a crisis (see section 4.3.2)), ways of justifying the need for careful ethnic management, and ways of highlighting the potency of danger and threat to racial harmony in Singapore, should the racial crisis escalate to undesirable proportions. 33 CHAPTER T HREE The Discourse of Racial Crisis: Main Aspects 3.1 THE GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECT 3.1.1 Size The republic’s physical size of some 640 km2 of territory was a factor of considerable concern for the republic’s rulers, upon Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, and takes its place as almost the most objective and basic element that constitutes the discourse of crisis. On the basis of this physical factor, it was not immediately or naturally thought that Singapore, small as she is, could establish itself as a sovereign-independent entity, function and survive. As the PAP leaders themselves had said, in arguing for merger with Malaya, an independent Singapore would not, and in fact could not “be viable politically, economically or militarily”14 . Echoing the views of many a first-generation Singapore leader at that time, Vasil (1995: 18) writes: [3/1] [Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia] represented a cruel twist of fate for Singaporeans, … [as they] had fully subscribed to the view that the future of their minuscule15 island was irrevocably tied with Malaysia. They did not contemplate an independent Singapore as an even remotely viable and realistic proposition. Whatever other reasons there might be for the belief in her unviability, it was the fact of her smallness (‘minuscule’ in [3/1] above), as cited in Vasil above, and as we shall see below, in other instantiations of the discourse that appears to be the most formidable obstacle to her existence. “The Fixed Political Objectives of Our Party,” a 1960 policy statement of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP, cited in Appendix 6 of Lee, Battle for Merger, p. 171, (cited in Betts, 1975: 123). 15 Emphasis mine. 14 34 Within the discourse, the republic’s physical size implies an inevitable vulnerability that would always threaten the survival and continuity of the city-state. And perhaps no one knows this better than the republic’s first Prime Minister – now Senior Minister in the Prime Min ister’s Office – in whom, by virtue of his office, rested the responsibility of ensuring the republic’s continuity post-independence. In reply to a question posed by an undergraduate on the “siege mentality” after his talk at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), the Senior Minister said, [3/2] Singapore’s small size and location mean[s] that it would never quite be able to abolish or reduce its sense of vulnerability. … It is in the nature of our geography… [There] are shock absorbers. But your basic data has not changed. (ST, 18th March 1996) Here in [3/2], the republic’s physical properties of size and location are relationally attributed (“meant”) to the impossibility of eradicating the sense of vulnerability – as long as these properties exist, the sense of vulnerability cannot be removed. In addition, in the second sentence, the inevitability of this sense of vulnerability, expressed through the relationally identifying (circumstantial) “is”, is pressed home. In identifying the sense of vulnerability as being within the nature of our geography, a coexistent relationship is set up between the two entities, where both exists and must exist together, never one without the other. This being the case, the sense of vulnerability expressed thus encourages the interpretation of Singapore’s survival as always tied to very delicate, very fragile, very perilous conditions and hence, creating in the Singaporean the “siege mentality”, as referred to by the NTU undergraduate. In another reference, in [3/3] below, to ‘size does matter’, an MP sets up a direct semantic relationship between Singapore’s small size and her inevitable vulnerability with the use of the conjunction ‘because’, constructing the two entities as a single structural unit, and implicating a cause-and-effect relationship between the two: 35 [3/3] What are the lessons we can draw from [these] events? In a nutshell, it is this: that Singapore, because of the smallness of her size16, is highly vulnerable to the external circumstances and happenings around us. When others catch a cold, we may end up with a serious bout of influenza. - Mr Peter Chen, then-Senior Minister of State for Education, keynote speech at the launch of the Singapore Polytechnic National Education Lecture, 15th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html In a very small state that already, by dint of its size, is vulnerable, its ethnic diversity appeared to only compound the problems the newly-independent republic faced. In these early years, the germination of a discourse of racial crisis may be approximated thus: it is founded upon the problems posed by the ethnic diversity of the population, interacting and potentially conflicting in a small space and the urgent need to formulate public policy so that the divergences in language, culture, religion and loyalties of the varied groups can be, to an extent at least, alleviated. The following statement from Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo is telling in this regard: [3/4] The [other big] challenge is the clash of cultures in Singapore. Badly managed, this clash can destroy us. … In practice, however, there is always friction. When different cultures are in close proximity, there is invariably a lot of grinding and scraping, however much one lubricates the points of contact. - Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore International Chamber of Commerce's Annual General Meeting Luncheon, 4 th June 1993. Speeches, 17(3), pp.50-56. 3.1.2 Location Singapore, composed of a Chinese majority and a Malay minority is situated in a region where Malays are the ‘indigenous’ majority and Chinese the ‘immigrant’ minority. Located at the centre of the Malay world in Southeast Asia – Malaysia to the North, Indonesia to the West and South, and Brunei and Borneo to the East – Singapore’s geographical location thus also contributes to the sense of vulnerability felt by the state. This vulnerability is briefly hinted at in the following statement by then-Minister Mr Ong Teng Cheong, in September 1979: 16 Emphasis mine. 36 [3/5] With the attainment of independence, Singaporeans were conscious of being on our own in an island without any natural resources and situated in what, after all, is not a very tranquil region of the world. In more explicit terms, as Vasil (1995: 21) documents, problems posed by a Chinese majority-Malay minority composition in a region of indigenous Malays were manifold, and had caused great concern among the PAP leadership: [3/6] There was acute fear among Singaporeans and their leaders of their large and powerful Malay neighbours. … Singapore [thus] felt strongly threatened. The PAP rulers knew that their policies … especially on ethnic issues, were being watched closely. … They could not afford to pursue policies or take state action relating both to domestic issues and to their international relationships which were likely to incur the wrath of their neighbours. They had to take into account the special sensitivities of their Malay neighbours … As then-Prime Minister had said, [3/7] Singapore may find itself surrounded by a hostile sea of obscurantist and xenophobic forces which will necessitate very dramatic measures for survival. - Lee Kuan Yew, as cited in Regnier (1987: 231) Hence, if not managed properly, Singapore’s multiracial composition in such a region could have meant, in the early years of her independence, that Singapore’s status as an independent sovereign republic could be easily undermined. Public policy-making, it appears, had always therefore borne this in mind. In the same vein, even after Singapore’s initial years of struggle were over, Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo warns: [3/8] If democracy is the tyranny of the majority, which in Singapore would mean the tyranny of the Chinese over the Malays and the Indians, society would come asunder and Singapore would immediately be in conflict with Indonesia and Malaysia. - Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Africa Leadership Forum, 10th November 1993. “Feeding the Flame: Civic Society”, Speeches, 17(6), pp. 5061. In addition, the possibility of the population harbouring strong atavistic ethnic identification with, allegiance to, and bonds with ethnic groups of similar origins in the region cannot be dismissed. In the early years for instance, the loyalties of its majority 37 ethnic group, the Chinese, and its second largest ethnic group, the Malays, were called into question. In the case of the Malay community, Singapore’s location within a Malay world and her proximity to Malaysia whose population composition was a mirror image of hers led to a sense of vulnerability stemming from the fear that the local Malays could very easily be influenced by events that occurred in these neighbouring territories and react in a way that would sharply divide pluralist Singapore society further. The incident of the Israeli president, Herzog’s visit to Singapore in 1986 is a case in point, where Malaysian disapproval of the invitation generated, to some extent, similar hostility among Singaporean Malays to the event. As was feared, a Singapore government-commissioned opinion poll thereafter showed at least some degree of disaffection among the Malay section of the population (O’Grady 1990: 26, cited in Hill 2001). To put the point across more clearly, Brig-Gen George Yeo’s illustration of how the different ethnic groups reacted to external events involving members of their ethnic group is illuminating: [3/9] …our multi-racialism also means that we do not always react in the same way to external events and foreign pressures. Take for example the way the local newspapers reported on the anti-Chinese rioting in Indonesia. The Chinese press gave it full coverage. The English press took a relatively detached approach. The Malay press, in contrast, was awkward and played down the racial aspects. This is to be expected because ethnic feelings run deep in any society. Similarly, when many Muslims were raped and killed in Bosnia, the Chinese press did not take a strong stand even though its coverage of the atrocities was extensive. When the new BJP government in India exploded five nuclear bombs, Hindus and Muslims in Singapore reacted in different ways. When Pakistan then exploded six bombs in response, the emotions of Hindus and Muslims in Singapore were again different. Some Muslims were pleased that a Muslim country had finally produced the bomb. Till today, the storming of the Golden Temple by the Indian Army in 1984 is still remembered with outrage by Sikh communities all over the world including Sikhs in Singapore. - George Yeo, Minister for Information & the Arts, and Second Minister for Trade & Industry, speech at Sikh Community National Day Dinner, 22nd 38 August 1998. National stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html Archives of Singapore, http: For the PAP leadership, Singapore, already vulnerable because of its size and location, becomes more so when her racial diversity is considered. Racial matters appear to always bear the potential of danger and difficulty, and must therefore be closely monitored. This point is evident as shown in the need for “eternal vigilance”: [3/10] I have been asked many times … how we in Singapore have been able to maintain racial and religious harmony. There seems to be no major problems. My answer to them is: eternal vigilance. We know the problems are never very far below the surface. We have always to be careful. - Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Opening of the United Indian Muslim Association Literary and Cultural Conference, 25th July 1992. “Unity in Diversity”, Speeches, 16(4) pp. 105-108. and constant “worrying” with respect to issues of race (and language and religion): [3/11] … in Singapore, we spend a lot of our time and energy worrying about problems of race, language and religion and finding solutions to them. [This is why] I call it an obsession. - Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Africa Leadership Forum, 10th November 1993. “Feeding the Flame: Civic Society”, Speeches, 17(6), pp.5061. 3.1.3 The Discourse Begins With respect to the geographical aspect, Singapore’s size and location were important elements to consider in public policy-making. And it is here that the discourse of racial crisis arguably unfolds. As has been defined, “crisis” is an “unstable situation” of “great danger” and “difficulty” (see section 2.1). For our purposes in this section, given that the designation of such a situation first receives attention by virtue of Singapore’s geographical size and location, it is in these geographical facts that the racial “crisis” finds its first roots. The racial crisis in Singapore thus finds its “beginnings” in the aspects of geography and the discourse of racial crisis “begins” the moment these 39 aspects are considered, if for the sake of argument, the point at which the discourse first unfolds is to be located. Further, following from the above definition of “crisis”, the racial “crisis” is thus the apt description of racial diversity and the resultant tensions (thus the “unstable situation”) that the PAP leadership has to manage both within the republic and without. This is so in two ways. Firstly, the fact that an “unstable situation” has been created by virtue of its size and location, and with respect to its pluralist composition is evident, as the data above showed. And secondly, the objective geographical aspects that form the basis of the crisis necessitates that the ‘problem’ would always remain, and a natural, immediate or final response to the ‘problem’ would be impossible to envisage, so that the problem is really an ever-present crisis. As Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo acknowledges: the issue of racial diversity and the resultant tensions must be tackled on a “continuing basis”, [3/12] [To summarize], I have discussed the two big challenges which we have to respond to on a continuing basis. They are challenges we cannot avoid, the challenge of physical smallness and the challenge of cultural diversity. - Brig-Gen (Res) George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Africa Leadership Forum, 10th November 1993. “Feeding the Flame: Civic Society”, Speeches, 17(6), pp.5061. And hence it is that the geographical aspects, coupled with the republic’s racial diversity, and the vulnerabilities accruing from these aspects, lay the foundation (the “beginnings”) for the discourse of racial crisis. Because the racial crisis can never be resolved, as aspects of geography are inescapable and immutable, they must at least be managed, to some extent. In order to 40 manage this racial crisis 17, a founding principle of multiracialism was adopted, and the notion of Singaporean multi-racialism 18 is formed. In the words of the-then Minister of Law and National Development: [3/13] …one of the cornerstones of the policy of the government is a multi-racial Singapore. We are a nation comprising people of various races who constitute her citizens, and our citizens are equal regardless of differences of race, language, culture and religion. … Whilst a multi-racial secular society is an ideal espoused by many, it is a dire necessity for our survival… (cited in Vasil, 1995: 27) The discourse of racial crisis is highlighted here as the minister raises the exigency that informs the formulation of the concept of multiracialism – a formulation that gives equal and unprivileged treatment to all races. In stating the concept as a “cornerstone”, the metaphor is drawn for multiracialism as an indispensable, and key idea that must (and indeed appears to) underlie public policy. The metaphor is reinforced by further construing the concept as “necessary” to the republic’s “survival”, and more emphatically, “dire(-ly)” so. Thus constructed, the adoption of multi-racialism in governing Singapore becomes a life-and-death issue: the dire necessity of embracing the concept for one’s survival makes the rejection of it portend sure death. In instituting multiracialism, a set of laws were made to ensure the same rights and obligations for all the ethnic, linguistic and religious elements in Singaporean society, with no special privileges for any one of them (Regnier 1987: 249, in Hill 2001). A strict equality of all citizens thus prevails over racial discrimination, intended to minimize dangerous sources of tension among ethnic groups. In addition, direct 17 For my purposes, I discuss here only the problematics of ethnic diversity as the reason for the formulation of a policy of cultural democracy. Other contributive aspects are discussed in Vasil (1995). 18 Emphasis mine, to indicate that the principle of multi-racialism in Singapore encompasses more than the ordinary literal sense of the word, i.e. it denotes more than a pluralist society or the fact of many races co-residing in one place. Rather, in speaking of multi-racialism as a principle of public policy formulation, we are in fact more interested in the connotations of the principle. For more, see Vasil (1995, esp. chapter 3). 41 threats to the security and stability of Singapore society in the form of communalist agitation are discouraged through severe penalties under the Sedition Ordinance19 . In summary then, state discourse makes it obvious that due to the geographical aspects surrounding the republic, the republic faces innumerable vulnerabilities. It is precisely because of its size and location that the sense of vulnerability can be felt and allows its construction with some measure of importance. In other words, Singapore’s size and location is the basis for the sense of vulnerability: in a small republic, many races living together can give rise to racial conflict; in a location surrounded by Malay neighbours, ethnic sensitivities must be borne in mind when making public policy. And it is this sense of vulnerability that then leads to the concerted effort to manage the republic’s ethnic affairs as effectively and sensitively as possible. Therefore, as we have seen, the geographical aspects of size and location, insofar as they perpetuate a general sense of crisis by furthering the notion of the republic’s vulnerability, perilousness and fragility, and as was argued, manifesting the “beginnings” of the racial crisis, are an important aspect of the construction of the discourse of (racial) crisis; and, in additionally laying the basis for the necessary adoption of the principle of multiracialism, the geographical elements of size and location are also important aspects motivating the discourse of racial crisis. 3.2 THE H ISTORICAL ASPECT 3.2.1 History Retold Apart from references to the geography of the republic, the events of history are also constantly evoked in the official discourse, in what appears to be an attempt at giving the discourse a sense of real-ness. 19 Sedition Ordinance, Singapore Gazette (Acts) Act No. 3, sec. 4, 14 Jan 1966. (as cited in Regnier 1987: 249). 42 Whenever historical events are evoked in the discourse, reference is more often than not made to the racial riots that occurred in 1950s and 1960s Singapore. These are namely, the Maria Hertogh riots in December 1950, and the inter-communal riot between Chinese and Malays in July 1964 and May 1969, which was a spillover of the riot that occurred in Malaysia. Official discourse is replete with such evocations and here, to prove the repetitious nature of such evocations, I present a sampling of extracts from speeches made by Singapore parliamentarians, and let the extracts tell the story of communal riots. Following that, I present my analysis. [3/14] We in Singapore live in a multi-racial society and we have made the choice to make this feature of our society an asset. Not everyone shows tolerance of, respect for and acceptance of racial differences, and examples abound around the world to show this. We however, from past experience, are well aware that if we allow racial politics to rule, we will only court danger. The older generation need only recall the racial riots in 1950s Singapore. - RAdm Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence, at Racial Harmony Day event, 18th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html But what exactly were these “racial riots in 1950s Singapore”? Mr Sidek Saniff explains: [3/15] Our racial diversity and the pluralistic composition have sometimes been exploited to cause social friction, racial and ethnic disharmony. Those of you who are in the older generation will remember the Maria Hertogh riots of the decade of the fifties which arose from the judgement given by the High Court to invalidate the marriage between a minor and a Muslim. … Singaporeans who are slightly older will remember the racial riots in the early days of the formation of Malaysia. The May 13 racial riot in 1969 for example, is a reminder of how racial sentiments can be exploited by anti-national elements to create havoc and social anarchy in society. - Mr Sidek Saniff, Senior Minister of State for the Environment, at seminar for grassroots leaders, 18th May 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html Besides the Hertogh riots mentioned by Mr Saniff, there was also that which occurred on 21st July 1964: 43 [3/16] Less than a fortnight ago, school children throughout Singapore commemorated Racial Harmony Day for the first time. It was to remember the events that occurred on 21 July 1964, and to make sure that we will never see a repeat of those events. 21 July 1964 was a day like this, when Muslims gathered to celebrate Prophet Muhammad's birthday. However, racial riots took place instead on that day, resulting in more than 20 people dead and nearly 500 injured. - then-President Ong Teng Cheong, at MUIS Tea Reception, 2nd August 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html To recapitulate and describe in greater detail, the Senior Minister himself: [3/17] For those too young to remember let me recall that in 1964 we had two big communal riots. On Prophet Mohammed’s birthday 21 July riots broke out and went on for about 10 days. 23 were killed and 454 injured. The victims were about equal between Chinese and Malays. On 2 September, the riots recurred and lasted for three days. 13 were killed and 109 injured. … The young may not believe it, but those over 50 will remember and know that communalreligious feelings could be worked up again. There are deep fault-lines in our multi-racial, mu lti-religious society. … On 13 May 1969 communal riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur on a larger scale. The emotional ties between Singapore and Malaysia were so close that the riots spread to Singapore, despite our tightest controls and went on for a week. 1 Chinese and 3 Malays had been killed, 11 Chinese and 49 Malays injured. … Since then, we have had no communal riots. However, it will be a grave mistake to believe that these dangerous primeval forces, driven by religious and racial feelings, cannot erupt again. If we ever forget this, we put our future in peril. - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, speech to NUS/NTU students, 5th Dec 1996. “Our Past Has Shaped our Present – Our Present is the Base of our Future”, Prime Minister’s Office – Senior Minister’s Speeches. (1996). No.18. Summarily, this is the general picture of Singapore’s history of racial and communal riots. For why it was necessary to recount these troubled times ad infinitum in official discourse, the Prime Minister himself explains: [3/18] These riots were painful episodes in our history. The damage they did to race relations took a long time to heal. But the generation that lived through them became convinced of the overriding importance of racial tolerance and harmony. This helped to bring about the Singapore we know today. This is why all Singaporeans should know about the riots, and know how they happened. Otherwise they will never appreciate why we constantly emphasize racial harmony, and insist that the majority Chinese community should never make the minorities feel oppressed. It is an integral part of our Singapore Story, and Singaporeans of all races must find in it a communion of both their hearts and minds. 44 - Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, at the official opening of the National Education Exhibition, 7th July 1998. “The Singapore Story”, Speeches, 22(4), pp. 1-4. Hence, painful as these events might be, they bear recounting. For those who had experienced those tragic times, the message is a reminder to them to appreciate the peaceful relations between races in Singapore at present; for those others who had not gone through those times, i.e. the younger generation of Singaporeans, the message almost shouts an imperative to them to embrace the multi-racial principles that the republic bases herself on, lest history repeats itself. 3.2.2 The Lessons of History Apart from re-telling Singapore’s turbulent past with respect to the communal clashes, these extracts can be further explored for the insights that can be yielded for an understanding of the construction of the discourse of racial crisis. Firstly, the discourse addresses, with the use of the pronoun “we” (see [3/14], [3/16], [3/17] and [3/18]), all Singaporeans, and engineers a shared sense of danger among the polity. The discourse of racial crisis here overlaps with that of national unity, which can be elicited and felt in, for instance, the national pledge, anthem and celebratory songs of nationhood often heard during the month of August as Singapore celebrates her independence. The merging of the two discourses brings one and all together in a common fate and a common objective of minimizing the danger or threat that certain characteristics of the society, like its multiracial population composition, can give rise to. This merging of discourses is established through the use of the inclusive “we” that one finds in the above texts – (“we in Singapore”) in [3/14]; (”we will never see a repeat”) in [3/16]; (“we had two big riots”), (“we have had no communal riots), (“If we ever forget this, we put our future in peril”) in [3/17]; (“the Singapore we know today”) in [3/18]. In merging the discourses, thus drawing together 45 disparate communities into one national whole, the sense of a common destiny is evoked. The use of the pronoun “we” in [3/14] however yields another insight into this sense of shared-ness as constructed through the inclusive “we”. Here, there appears to be an apparent slippage, or a sliding in the referential possibilities of the inclusive “we” used. While the first “we” (“we in Singapore”) refers to all Singaporeans, the second “we” (“we have made the choice”) refers primarily to the governors of Singapore – those who made the decision to embrace the principle of multiracialism and make it “an asset” – and only secondarily, by their acceptance of the state precepts, to the people of Singapore. The rest of the use of the pronoun “ we” is ambiguous in its referents i.e. they can refer either to the governors themselves per se, just like that used in [3/18] (“why we constantly emphasize racial harmony”), or the governors and the people both. By blurring the boundaries between the reference to the rulers and the ruled, the rulers and the ruled are constructed as having equal responsibilities and obligations in the matter of racial harmony. Not only must the governors do their part, but the people themselves too, in order to ensure that the crisis can only threaten to erupt, but will always be kept at bay. Hence, apart from their sharing the same fate, in addition, the people and their governors share a like duty in managing this fate. This shared-ness of fate is further perpetuated through the possessive pronoun “our” – “our society’ in [3/14], “our racial diversity” in [3/15], “our multi-racial, multireligious society” and “our future” in [3/17], and “our history” in [3/18], and functions towards the same ends as the personal pronoun “we” and taken together, the sense of shared-ness is established. Secondly, the texts also highlight, and to some extent, exaggerate, the fatality of a racial crisis. While admittedly, ethnic diversity poses problems, the way by which 46 this diversity is discussed is packaged in almost alarmist terms. Consider for instance the differences among the ethnic groups – these are “deep fault-lines in our society” (see [3/17]), hence always capable of violent upheaval. As George (2000: 163) observes, [3/19] Certainly, it would be unwise to take ethnic peace for granted. But it is equally unwise to exaggerate the risks, as if Singapore is on the brink of internecine strife of the kind seen in Kosovo and Ambon. Discussions of race on Singapore are quick to raise the specter of mass riots. And this, it appears, is exactly how the discourse of racial crisis is constituted. Semantic choices for the description of the sorts of consequence entailed by a failed management of ethnicity range from “court(-ing) danger” in [3/14], to the “creat(-ion) [of] havoc”, and “social anarchy” in [3/15], to putting “our future in peril” in [3/17]. These descriptions dress up the notion of a racial crisis in catastrophic terms, thus making it an outcome that must be categorically avoided. The extreme circumstances of liv ing amidst ethnic diversity is also frequently talked into existence by the use of phrases such as “ the dangerous primeval forces” in [3/17] and, “painful episodes in our history” and “damage (due to the riots)” in [3/18]. By the use of these phrases, which bear the indelible tinge of catastrophe, the illusion of danger and threat is thus created in a society that has not for at least the past three decades experienced any kind of serious inter-communal strife. In addition, in terms of the historical aspect, the discourse of racial crisis is also constituted by the raising of the specter of racial riots that had occurred in Singapore’s history. By squarely placing the riots within the Singaporean historical context, and frequently trotting them out, a sense of the potential, the reality of the situation is brought into sharp focus. That the races could wreak violence on one another in the past is testimony to the underlying strains that a pluralist society is consistently subject 47 to. Nevermind then that policy-making involves careful consideration based in the tenets of multiracialism (“fairness and equality to all races”), or that official decisions strenuously preclude the privileging of any one race, or even all the other political instruments that are in place to ensure harmonious inter-ethnic relations. The effect of the evocation of history, by its emphasis on the potential for racial conflict to recur in Singapore, instills the fear that in spite of the measures in place, the worst and most undesired scenario may still take place. As the Senior Minister said in [3/17] above, reproduced below, However, it will be a grave mistake to believe that these dangerous primeval forces, driven by religious and racial feelings, cannot erupt again. If we ever forget this, we put our future in peril. - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, speech to NUS/NTU students, 5th Dec 1996. “Our Past Has Shaped our Present – Our Present is the Base of our Future”, Prime Minister’s Office – Senior Minister’s Speeches. (1996). No.18. In other words, while we have enjoyed peaceful ethnic relations in at least three decades, the issue of the potentiality of racial conflict erupting cannot be carelessly dismissed from mind. The created sense of real-ness, of near-tangibility of racial strife can only serve to amplify the feelings of fear and threat. This is a typicality of the discourse of crisis (see Chapter Four), and in the discourse of racial crisis, th is point of ever-watchfulness and ever-vigilance is again raised, so that an almost paranoid fascination with ‘watching our backs’ takes root in society. In all likelihood, regardless of how well we guard ourselves against danger, the unpredictable can happen, and the “debris of history” unearthed within the discourse of racial crisis appears to drive home this fact. But lest it be thought that this strategy springs from a morbid desire to impose a neurotic character on Singapore society, a view given by the Senior Minister, speaking 48 in a different context, as he defends what appears to be one of the guiding precepts in the governance of Singapore, should put those suspicions to rest: [3/20] It is a sound government to plan on the basis that the worst will happen. In fact it is not often that the worst does happen. So we find ourselves better off for having made the maximum effort to meet maximum difficulties when less than the maximum troubles us. - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, (then-Prime Minister) National Day Rally, 16th August 1969. “Brighter Prospects for Regional Stability and Growth”, Speeches, 20(4), pp. 13-17. I conclude this section with a note. This sense of real-ness created by reference to events in history and employed in the discourse might be perceived as neutralizing somewhat the idea of a constructed discourse of racial crisis, if one understands, by that term, a deliberate manipulation of instruments for the service of some end. This way of understanding the discourse as constructed however, imagines that a penetration into the minds of the republic’s leaders is possible, which it is not. In this thesis, the discourse of racial crisis is constructed in the sense that the possibility of a coherence in the strategies, and cohesion in their use can be entertained, and understood as having come together in the form of a particular discourse. With this point in mind then, the strategic creation of a sense of real-ness as perpetuated by an evocation of the past is a legitimate fit into the puzzle of how the discourse of racial crisis is constructed, as the high incidence of its recurrence and the official explanation of its function evidences. Being as they are, objective facts that are beyond dispute, both the circumstances of geography and history bestow on the discourse a certain concreteness and irrefutability. For both the dominant discourse of crisis and the discourse of racial crisis, these aspects give added credibility and weight to the discursive construction of a sense of crisis—and the need to manage the problem effectively so that the dire consequences envisaged in the discourse can be avoided or at least 49 contained. The possibility of persuading consensus on the notion of a crisis is thus enhanced by reference to these facts, and their occurrence in the construction of the discourse is but a fair expectation. Quite apart from simply citing the objective facts in both the geography and history of the republic and relying on its persuasive-ness, the discourse of racial crisis additionally involves a human aspect/element, which brings an added dimension to the discourse by its focus on living, breathing individuals who, though very much like the ordinary man-in-the-street, are the urban legend’s “folk devils”, and who purportedly embody and express (volubly) the dangers that the discourse of racial crisis so far only describes. For the discursive construction, these individuals are the physical manifestation of the crisis, the live, animate and articulating representation of the abstract concept of crisis. In the following section, we take a closer look at how these individuals “breathe life” into the otherwise still discourse, and the imp lications they bring to it. 3.3 THE H UMAN ASP ECT As I have done with the geographical and historical aspects, I look at the human aspect with a view to describing it as a contributing aspect of the construction of the discourse of racial crisis. While the features of the discourse arising from the republic’s geography and history – the constructed senses of vulnerability and shared-ness of fate respectively – apply equally to both the overall sense of crisis and the (sub)-discourse of racial crisis, the human aspect, on the other hand, appears to be a distinctive element of the discourse of racial crisis. While not the purpose of this project to hypothesize on the reason for this being the case, it is not difficult to imagine that the human aspect quite obviously plays a part in the discourse of racial crisis, or of race, for that matter, because racial affairs are 50 after all, human issues, with the chief premise of such a crisis being the interactions between people, and their cultures, languages, religions. Following from this, racial issues are social issues for which economic or political methods of control can only go a certain distance in remedying. What it requires, or as the official discourse repeatedly encourages, is for collective society (re: every human subject of the society) to feel and appreciate as the leaders themselves do, the problem(s), the extent of it and its drastic consequences, in order that its recurrence or even existence, can be prevented and eradicated. But complete and total consensus is hardly ever achieved, and silent acquiescence and obeisance do not allegiance make. When digits of that society break from the general consensual mould of the society that believes as their leaders do, and articulate alternative ways of organizing or construing society, it is not unimaginable that elite and dominant discourse will move to quash the opposing camp, silent the disruptive voices and return society to the original equilibrium. In pluralist and racially-sensitive Singapore, the human aspect in the discourse is a necessary and ultimately useful element in the construction of the racial crisis. W ith expert management, the occurrence of the human aspect has become, for Singapore society and its leadership, rather less of a problem than ultimately, a useful mechanism in the discourse of racial crisis, as it offers the means of accentuating the prominence of, and distilling the social threats within, the racial crisis. In doing so, the human aspect serves as a deterring measure that controls and manages the development and spread of views that run counter to the officially endorsed view on racial matters. A note before we proceed. As the data in the following discussion is culled wholly, or at least mostly, from the national broadsheet, The Straits Times, the discourse of racial crisis now appears to involve too the many implications of media 51 discourse, not least of which the notion of ambiguous authorship: whose voice is it that speaks these statements? Here, we bear in mind the distinctions Goffman (1981: 144) makes between the animator (the person who acts as a mouthpiece), the author (the person who encodes or composes the utterance) and the principal (the person whose position [including ideology presumably] is established in the utterance). What is ambiguous at times in the newspaper reports is whether the reporters function as animators or principals (even when it is the dominant ideologies they are producing), or even shifts between these positions, so that it becomes unclear in those instances of the data when we encounter reported speech whether some statement that was made was indeed made in the vein that finally appeared in the reports. Having said that, while aware and mindful of this conundrum, the following discussion will proceed with the assured knowledge, given that The Straits Times is a highly acclaimed and reputable broadsheet newspaper, that what was reported is, if not a verbatim word-forword report, to a larger than necessary extent, an accurate account of what was said. The Faces of Threat Two individuals in particular, Jufrie Mahmood and Tang Liang Hong, are the subjects of this inquiry into the human aspect leading to the construction of the racial crisis. Both achieved prominence in the Singaporean consciousness by their appearance on the political scene. Both members of the Workers’ Party (WP), Mr Jufrie Mahmood and Mr Tang Liang Hong campaigned for seats in Parliament in the 1991 20 and 1997 2 1 General Elections (GE) respectively. Running on GRC (Group Representation Constituency) tickets, both eventually lost out to the incumbent ruling party’s candidates. For an account of the 1991 General Elections, see Bilveer Singh. (1992). Whither PAP’s dominance? An analysis of Singapore’s 1991 General Elections. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications. 21 For an account of the 1997 General Elections, see da Cunha, Derek. (1997). The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Elections and Beyond. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 20 52 3.3.1 The Case of Jufrie Mahmood In what may have seemed to Mr Jufrie Mahmood to be mere appeals to the Malay community for their votes in the 1991 GE soon turned out to be a national talking point of enormous proportions. By the time the GE was over, Mahmood was more than the average political candidate running for office. In the state discourse, Mahmood is held up as the symbol of extremist politics and represented great danger, as the following description of him by members of the ruling party will show. He was “an extremist” who dabbled in “communal politics”, and “agitated on racial issues”; voting for him meant voting for “communalism, for street agitation, for separating and dividing the races” (ST, 28th /29th August 1991). The controversy had begun when Mahmood “accused” (a term used in the newspaper report) his rival Malay-Muslim PAP candidate running in the same constituency, Mr Sidek Saniff, of having ‘sold out’ his community to please the PAP (ST, 25th August 1991). In his view, Mr Sidek had “supported the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill separating religion from politics, hence sacrificing his Islamic principles; ‘not [said] one word of protest against R-rated movies, although he was a religious man’; and had helped the Government get Mendaki to take over the granting of subsidies for Malay tertiary students following which he was promoted to Minister of State for Education” (ST, 25th/26 th August 1991). For the ruling party, these comments were ‘accusations’ and constituted an ‘attack’ on Mr Sidek that was “below the belt” (ST, 26th August 1991). Eight days after Mahmood made his first ‘offensive’ statements against his political rival, the controversy he had thus ignited became for Singaporean society a crisis of sorts, where they were urged to reject the “communal politics” Mr Jufrie was engaging in (ST, 29th 53 August 1991), or “go back to the 1950s, where communal politics will be the politics of the day” (ST, 27th August 1991). Always wary of divisive elements in Singapore society, the Singapore state hardly tolerates individuals like Mr Jufrie Mahmood. It was feared that the line that Mahmood appeared to be pursuing (“communal politics”), could tear the multi-racial society apart and cause great damage to the social fabric. Whether or not Mahmood’s comments should be interpreted in the way the ruling party has done is not the issue here and thus will not be pursued. What is relevant for our purposes is how the impact of Mahmood being the so-called “extremist” contributes to the construction of the discourse of racial crisis. We look now at the construction of Mahmood as an element of danger to Singapore’s multi-racial society. The following table details how Mr Jufrie Mahmood has been described. Table (1) Describing Jufrie Mahmood Describing Mr Jufrie Mahmood Data Source PM Goh Chok Tong, ST, 26th August 1991 Unfair [3/21] For Jufrie to say that Sidek has sold out his community to get a promotion, I think that’s hitting way below the belt. UnMalay [3/22] It’s very unMalay. Undeserving of Malay support [3/23] Now, for a Malay to do that, I think, is undeserving of any support from members of the Malay community. Makes wild allegations [3/24] Sidek was going to hit back PM Goh Chok Tong, and I told him ‘No. Don’t do it. ST, 26th August 1991 The man is just hitting all over the place, allow him to do it. Undeserving of [3/25] Members of the Malay PM Goh Chok Tong, ST, 26th August 1991 54 Chinese support community and Chinese voters can see the man for what he is. Lacks conviction [3/26] Lacks credibility [3/27] Jufrie moves from the PM Goh Chok Tong, Workers’ Party to the SDP and ST, 26th August 1991 back to the Workers’ Party. That’s not a man of conviction. [Mr Jufrie Mahmood] had ST, 30th August 1991 announced …that he would stop speaking about Malay and racial issues. But last night, he devoted a substantial portion of his half-hour speech to communal politics…. Mr Jufrie had declared that he would stay clear of racial and Malay issues after he received warnings from Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong not to indulge in extremist politics. Although he spoke about [other issues] in the latter part of his speech, he dwelt quite extensively on the subject of communal politics. Malay chauvinist [3/28] From speeches Mr Jufrie had made as far back as 1988, it was evident that he would only represent chauvinist Malay interests if he were elected. (engages in) extremist politics [3/29a] If you give [the PAP] your PM Goh Chok Tong, vote, you are telling us that ST, 27th August 1991 you support this policy of moderation, that you prefer moderate Malays, moderate Chinese making speeches in Parliament. … [3/29b] If you give your vote to the Opposition, you are signalling to me that you are going for extremist politics. [3/30] If you vote him in, I am PM Goh Chok Tong, prepared to bet you my last ST, 27th August 1991 dollar that there will be other (engages in) communal politics ST, 27th August 1991 55 bolder Jufries along. And then, you are going back to the 1950s, where communal politics will be the politics of the day. Note:  indicates reporter’s voice.  indicates ambiguous authorship (i.e. reported (indirect) speech or reporter’s voice?). We leave aside for the moment the descriptions made of Mr Jufrie Mahmood pertaining to the depiction of his personal character (in statements [3/21] to [3/26]) – these will be dealt with later. What is perhaps more pertinent to us are the descriptions of him as engaging in “extremist” and “communal politics” (in [3/29] and [3/30]). In [3/29a], the “if…then” conditional is employed to equate voting for PAP with supporting a policy of moderation. Likewise in [3/29b], the conditional sets up a similar relationship between the two clauses, but here, the conditional equates voting for the opposition with supporting extremist politics. The use of the conjunctive adjunct makes a causal relationship of the two clauses in the clause complex (doing X causes Y), and in this case, the people’s choice of who to vote for – doing X, will indicate their support of a policy of moderation or extremism – causing Y. In its formulation, this statement carries an underlying implication that one cannot support the policy of moderation, and not vote for the PAP, or that voting for the opposition does not represent support for extremism – the causal relationship that is set up by the use of the conditional dismisses that possibility (if X, then Y). What this indicates for the voters is thus this. Their votes now not only represent their own viewpoints, as it must have been assumed, but additionally, these votes now, in the manner that they will be viewed by the ruling party, represent a stand on moderate or extremist politics. Reality is constructed for the voter in which, 56 whether they agree to or not, their vote can and will be viewed within the context of the ruling party’s reality: the voter’s reality is /becomes subject to the ruling party’s. More generally, the use of the “if…then” conditional has other implications too. Is the causal relationship set up by the use of the “if…then” conditional here as unproblematic as it appears to be? As the conditional sets up a causal relationship between two clauses, it creates an unambiguous and unproblematic connection between voting for X and supporting Y, so that in [3/29a], it appears to be that a vote for the PAP is a vote for moderate policies; and by the same token, in [3/29b], a vote for the opposition is a vote for extremist politics. But the question of whether or not there is indeed a direct connection between the two perhaps needs to be answered – is there, say, uniform social consensus that the actions of the opposition parties constitute ‘extremist politics’, or for that matter, that people unanimously agree that the ruling party practises ‘moderate politics’? Even if it is the case that the situation is widely viewed as such, it is still not yet a logical connection that can be assumed across the board, or all sections of society. Nevertheless, the connection becomes assumed in the conditional, as given in the statement from the ruling party. This then encourages the construal of an unproblematic assumption, and link, between the PAP and its moderate policy on one hand, and that between the opposition and extremist politics on the other – a construal of the situation that is decidedly based on one political party’s viewpoint, and the authority of the principal author of these statements can only lend weight to this position. Within the elite discourse, there is little doubt as to what the opposition, or Jufrie Mahmood, in our case, (purportedly) represents: Jufrie Mahmood and extremist politics become but synonymous, and it is this construction of the situation that is foisted on the larger society by means of the “if…then” conditional. 57 Additionally, the rhetorically-stylistic recurrence of the “if…then” conditional in the immediately following statement [3/29b] reinforces the contrast between the two apparently opposed political platforms. Viewed in congruence with the content of the message, and especially in the context of what “moderate politics” and extremist politics” mean for society, the double use of the conditional further elevates the one and downgrades the other. Hence, the point is made that the two positions are not only diametrically opposed but additionally that one should be favoured over the other. In [3/30], the “if…then” conditional is put to even bolder use in order, presumably, to emphasize the problem that Mahmood will pose to society. The state assumption that allowing Mahmood into Parliament will create a precedence, encouraging “more Jufries” to come along is inserted within a conditional where the Prime Minister himself is willing to “bet his last dollar” on the potential of that assumption turning into reality. While the conditional only sets up a hypothetical state of affairs – “ if” indicating, by definition, only a potentiality, the main clause in the clause complex makes reference to what appears to be a very real state of affairs. Hence, at least in the minds of the elite, voting for Jufrie Mahmood will encourage similar others to appear on the scene (“there will be other bolder Jufries along”) – the modal operator “will” expressing a strong belief on the speaker’s part of the event occurring. In [3/30] then, a bold statement is made where a dependent clause expressing a hypothetical situation actually functions as the background of a very real expression of a future event – that the speaker believes that that event would occur as he envisaged. And indeed, in a separate statement, the PM again made the point that it was “dangerous to allow such candidates to win an election as it would encourage ‘more Jufries’ to come forward” (ST, 28th August 1991). In so doing, the statement extrapolates from a single instance of one potentially harmful individual in society to 58 the assumption of more to come – (the success of) a single Jufrie Mahmood in 1991 can mean more Jufries in the years ahead. Not only does this idea function as an explicit mention in the elite discourse, but it is also yet another instance of how one episode of crisis is and can be manipulated in a way that harks of recurrent episodes in the future (see section 5.2). We also see a highly negative depiction of Mr Jufrie Mahmood, the person, in the data. The statements made in [3/21] to [3/26] portray Mahmood as a less than honourable man (lacking conviction and credibility) and an even less worthy political candidate (undeserving of both Chinese and Malay support – the two major ethnic groups in Singapore) and PAP adversary (taking wild pot-shots at his rival PAP candidate – “hitting way below the belt”). The construction of Mahmood as such depicts a person with high ly undesirable qualities, not only with respect to society at large, but more crucially, even to his own Malay community. Descriptions of Mahmood in these statements centre on him as an individual and what he said and did as an individual. As the events unfolded, mere personal descriptions of Mahmood gradually gave way to a construal of his statements as representing dangerous political ideology. As we see in [3/29] and [3/30], Mahmood already presented as dubious in character, is further portrayed as detrimental to society as the implications of what he represented becomes clear: that he was pursuing a socially destructive and divisive line of politics (“extremist politics” [3/29] and “communal politics [3/30]). With this shift in the discourse with Jufrie Mahmood as topic, Mahmood was now not only a very ignoble character to have in society at large and unto his own Malay community, he came to be the physical embodiment of the sort of political ideology that can only do harm to society (“extremist” and “communal politics”). He is 59 thus presented as the emblem that represents, by way of the political line he was pursuing, the forces that will tear society asunder. Quite obviously, extremist and communal politics bear the much-feared potential of creating social chaos in pluralist Singapore, and must not be allowed to develop. Jufrie Mahmood came to be apparently perceived as both the physical manifestation of such a potential and the instrument through which this destructive potential can be realised. To a leadership that is ever-vigilant and aware of the racial crisis that Singapore society can never be rid of, Mahmood represents the greatest danger, for which attempts must be made to prevent him, as it was in the GE, from assuming a national platform from which to make and circulate his “extremist” and “communalist” political ideas. Stressing that it was “dangerous to allow such candidates to win an election as it would encourage ‘more Jufries’ to come forward and make more radical and fiery speeches in Parliament’, which would then trigger Chinese and Indian MPs to counter-argue with their own chauvinistic lines, and hence “go back to the Fifties22 ”, PM Goh urged voters “to go for moderate multi-racial politics instead of extremist, radical racial politics” (ST, 28th August 1991). Quite apart from it being the case that Mahmood is the political victim of the PAP in its campaign for votes, the negative construction of Jufrie Mahmood, more crucially and pertinently in view of the discourse of racial crisis here, reflects the perceived need felt by the ruling party to expose elements that could potentially destroy the racial fabric of Singapore society, and the only-negative descriptions of Jufrie Mahmood may be accounted for by this. The movement from negatively depicting Mahmood as a person to the eventual construal of his association with divisive politics, and the overall negative construction of Jufrie Mahmood serve to 22 This is another instance of an evocation of the past, as discussed above, and in section 5.2. 60 emphasize and reinforce what initial negative impressions there might already have been of him as a person (as seen in the earlier-dated reports), and hence encourage a general alienation of him as a person, a political representative of the people, and a political opponent. As the dominant (read: elite) discourse reveals, the grounds for believing Mr Jufrie Mahmood to be engaging in communal politics are sufficiently proven in the rally speeches he had made since the third day of the election campaign. Mahmood was a danger to society because of the issues he discussed at these rallies23 and the way in which he discussed them (“the passion and fire”, ST, 28th August 1991), including his use of the Malay language. In a report (ST, 28th August 1991), PM Goh was quoted as saying, “ In cold print, the way I read it, it hasn’t got the passion and fire. But when he spoke in Malay, the passion and fire was there”. PM Goh also added that a Malay listening to Mr Jufrie would be emotionally aroused, and that this was Mr Jufrie’s intention. By making these comments in Malay, PM Goh said that Mr Jufrie was taking on a racial line. For the ruling party, there was little doubt that Mr Jufrie Mahmood was espousing a dangerous line and thus had to be exposed. In the end, constructing Mahmood in this way exposed the threat that he was, creating in society an awareness about the threat that he can pose, and encouraged, if not their consensus on Mahmood being a threat, then at least a rejection of him and his ideas (which was reflected in the eventual loss by Mahmood and his team to the PAP’s team in Eunos GRC in the GE). Whether a deliberate political move or not, ultimately, the negative construction of Mahmood made him the physical embodiment of the abstract but drastic consequences of the racial crisis, and the subsequent re-packaging of him (re-)created him as a symbol of threat and danger to social harmony. 23 “Jufrie’s speeches ‘show he is into communal politics’”, ST, 29th August 1991. 61 3.3.2 The Case of Tang Liang Hong In 1991, The Straits Times published a profile on a Chinese lawyer Mr Tang Liang Hong, the man “behind a group of Chinese intellectuals trying to help arrest the decline of the standard of the Chinese language in Singapore” (ST, 3rd Nov, 1991). Inside the Chinese cultural scene, Tang appeared to be a prominent figure, having sat on the management committees of premier institutions such as the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts, Hwa Chong Junior College, the Chinese High School and River Valley High School – the latter two schools being SAP (Special Assistance Plan) schools where able Chinese students24 studied Chinese at the level of a first language. Outside the Chinese cultural scene, he was relatively little known until he appeared in the news for rallying a group of Chinese-educated intellectuals to tackle issues facing the Chinese community, and subsequently submitting a memorandum to the Prime Minister, suggesting ways to improve Chinese language teaching. Deluged thereafter with invitations to address schools and public forums, Tang’s position as a champion of Chinese culture and language appeared to gain influence even among those outside the Chinese cultural scene. By all accounts, a positive picture was painted of Tang’s determined character and his obvious passion for Chinese culture and language, which had culminated in his attempt to “help arrest the decline of the standard of Chinese language in Singapore” – the verb “help” being significant for its positive connotations. Six years later however, Tang was to find his passionate comments on Chinese culture and language too provocative and discomfiting for sections of Singapore society. While these views might have been valuable in the move to “arrest the decline” of the standard of 24 Non-Chinese students are accepted by SAP schools as well. Being able to provide almost the best education in the country, SAP schools have attracted and increasingly admitted a fair number of bright Malay and Indian students. 62 Chinese language in Singapore, they proved ultimately to be detrimental to Tang’s political fate. Running in the 1997 GE as a Workers’ Party candidate in the Cheng San GRC, Tang Liang Hong’s passion for Chinese culture and language soon embroiled him in a controversy in which he was charged for holding “dangerous views on Chinese language and culture” (ST, 29th Dec 1996), and hence was unfit for Parliament in a multi-racial society. As it did in the 1991 GE when it tackled the issue of communal politics and the threat posed by Jufrie Mahmood, the PAP in 1997 once again proceeded to launch an “all-out effort to alert voters to the dangers of giving a man known to hold radical views a national platform” (ST, 29th Dec 1996). We examine now the contents of this “effort” in seeking an understanding to the construction of Tang as a symbol of threat in the discourse of racial crisis. As the ST editorial noted, the PAP’s “all-out effort” was focused on “alerting” voters to the “dangers” they will face. In saying this, the editorial expresses and supports the notion of there being some imminent “danger” to society and that the ruling elite, already privy to this knowledge, is moving to “alert” society of it. Such a construction takes for granted, and beyond that, assumes the position and terms of the elite discourse, and reproduces it in a seemingly-neutral observation of the situation at hand. But what the situation at hand is, is really, a political election campaign where candidates seek to persuade support from the masses in the best way they can, and the ostensibly neutral observation in the editorial looks like, on closer examination, a subscription, unwittingly perhaps, to the dominant discourse of the day – that of the ruling party. Because in much the same way that Jufrie Mahmood was singled out among other opposition candidates (who incidentally, also eventually came to be “lumped” together as representing harmful politics), and constructed (whether one 63 construes this as a deliberate effort or just a mere presentation of the facts of the matter) as a threat to racial peace, Tang Liang Hong, for what he represented, was equally constructed and presented as such – in the terms of the state discourse. In the discourse, the elite impression and views on Tang were repeatedly stressed and hence an elite-prescribed construal of Tang came to be established and foisted on society. We look now at the construction of Tang as threat and symbol of danger. In Tang’s case, the governing elite appeared to employ a strategy of “exposing” the threat – both the exposing of the man (“his true intentions in standing for election”, ST, 29th Dec 1996) and the exposing to Singapore society of the threat in their midst, in their move to “alert” Singapore society. The underlying implication of such “exposures” is that Tang has something to hide, and this should then generate a fear in society – as it apparently already had in the elite – so that something must be done to deny Tang of a political platform. Society at large must be warned of Tang’s “false appearances”. The series of exposures then culminates in Tang being labeled a “Chinese chauvinist” (ST, 27th Dec 1996/ 1st Jan 1997) and described as “anti-English educated” and “anti-Christian” (ST, 3rd Jan 1997), and consequently (whether directly or not) a PAP victory in the constituency for whose votes both parties courted. In the ruling party’s move to alert Singaporeans and expose Tang, Singaporeans are told that the Singapore leadership had already been aware and wary of the threat Tang posed from as early as four years before, in 1992, when five MPs had expressed their reservations about Tang’s application to be a Nominated MP. In these letters, the MPs expressed concern in what they felt were highly extreme views on Chinese culture and language that Tang indulged in making. They believed that these views could do harm to multiracial, multilingual and multireligious Singapore 64 society (ST, 29 Dec 1996). The report, titled “PM releases documents, explains why he must be firm with Tang”, opened with the paragraph: [3/31] Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong last night released documents which showed that Workers’ Party candidate Tang Liang Hong held dangerous views on Chinese language and culture. The act of making information publicly or generally available and known, here referred to by the verb choice “release”, suggests that this information had once been concealed from the public and now only presented to it. This verb choice parallels the PAP technique of “exposing” Tang, and sets the stage for the further exposé of the man and what the ruling elite perceives him as representing. What is of course also significant in [3/31] is the subordinating clause beginning with “which showed that”, which only encourages the view that these documents were conclusive evidence – the final, most damning proof for the conclusions the ruling party had reached on Tang, for why Tang should be perceived in the way the ruling party perceived him. In looking at the “released documents”, we find the MPs had written the following responses to Tang’s application to be a Nominated MP: [3/32] There are two reservations about him; (i) he has taken extreme positions on some issues such as Chinese language, culture and civilization, and (ii) he is emotional and temperamental. – Dr Ow Chin Hock (ST, 29th Dec 1996) [3/33] Based on my experiences and observations in coming into contact with Tang, I find his views and opinions on ethnic and cultural issues rather extreme and insensitive. He is inclined to speak like a “Chinese chauvinist” to the discomfort of other races. In the interest of maintaining our racial harmony, it may not be prudent to allow him any opportunity for free expression of his chauvinistic views on ethnic and cultural issues in Parliament. – Mr Ch’ng Jit Koon (ST, 29th Dec 1996) [3/34] I know Tang Liang Hong. He tends to be chauvinistic about Chinese culture. – Dr Tay Eng Soon (ST, 29th Dec 1996) 65 [3/35] Mr Tang holds radical views on the promotion of Chinese language and culture. – Mr Ker Sin Tze (ST, 29th Dec 1996) In [3/32], [3/33], [3/34] and [3/35], the concern for Tang being a threat is based on the opinions of four MPs, and if this is the cited evidence, it carries considerable weight in persuading support for the elite construction of Tang as a racial threat, in view of the following aspects. Firstly, the opinions of these MPs enjoy the authority conferred by their status as MPs and additionally, their opinions are expressed as based on their contact and familiarity with Tang; and secondly, despite the fact that they too are Chinese-educated, they do not support Tang’s position and views on Chinese language and culture, and in fact, construe his position and views as “extreme” (in [3/32]), “extreme and insensitive” (in [3/33]), “chauvinistic” (in [3/34]) and “radical” (in [3/35]). In doing so, the attempt is made to show up the extremist undertones in Tang’s views. The elite construction of Tang as a racial threat is also furthered by other documents which report on what Tang had previously said; in these press clippings (ST, 30 th Dec, 1996), Tang was reported as having said that, [3/36] …English-educated Chinese who did not have a good grasp of their culture, and who did not feel embarrassed about it, were likely to lack respect for their own kind and confidence in themselves. [3/37] … 70 per cent of the Singaporeans who were non-English speaking were not entitled to fair competition and that the Chinese did not even have a chance to be spectators. [3/38] …the political power in Singapore was concentrated in the English-educated elite while the Chinese-educated were left out of the mainstream. [3/39] …that politicians and senior civil servants were dominated by Christians. … that due to their language and religious backgrounds, policies made by these people might not be in the interest of the majority. 66 [3/40] …there was no need for the Chinese-educated to feel inferior and added: “Why then are we the ones carrying the sedan chair for others. We should be sitting on the sedan chair.” A past episode was also cited to further establish the ruling party’s cause for concern – a dinner function in 1994 where Mr Tang’s comments and behavior appeared to the ruling party as intemperate. For them, the comments made by Mr Tang at this dinner “had implied that there were too many English-educated people and Christians in Government” and that this was not good” (ST, 27th Dec 1996). As recalled by MP Rear-Admiral Teo Chee Hean, Mr Tang had spoken in a “forceful way”, and “used his oratorical skills to work people up over language and religion”. The MP noted that while “some in the audience were perturbed by what was said and the way it was said, [but] there were others who were clearly swayed by the content and tone of the speech”. PM Goh had said that Tang, in doing so, was “plugging a dangerous line” and hence, “it is [the PAP’s] duty to expose such people”. Whether or not the comments made by Tang were damning enough, or clearly proved the Chinese chauvinistic, anti-Christian, anti-English educated import of Tang’s messages, they were sufficient for the ruling party to be concerned over Tang’s presence in multiracial Singapore and were presented as evidence to justify their stand against Tang. It was clear that the PAP considered Mr Tang a dangerous threat to society if elected into Parliament and had to be “exposed”, hence their “release” of the supposedly incriminating documents against Tang. With their exposé of Tang, and the construction of him as an over-zealous champion of Chinese supremacy, the ruling party proceeded to warn Singaporeans that Tang was a “dangerous character” (ST, 27th Dec 1996), whose views “would undermine Singapore’s racial peace” (ST, 27th Dec 1996). In addition, a contrast is made between the ruling party and Tang, when the PAP urged Singaporeans to “reject 67 the politics of extremism and opt for the PAP’s politics of consensus, moderation and multi-racialism” (ST, 2nd Jan 1997), thereby linking Tang and his views with socially divisive and hence undesirable “politics of extremism” on one hand, and the PAP with socially cohesive and hence desirable “politics of consensus, moderation and multiracialism” on the other. Not only does the dichotomous contrast set up as such constitute a technique that elevates the self (positive self-presentation), and downs the other (a “ negative other-ing”) (see Richardson 2001), it also establishes an explicit (elite-motivated) link between Tang and racial politics. Tang and his comments now constitute a dangerous political stance. And indeed, even after the conclusion of the GE, PM Goh of the PAP had said that “the PAP’s victory … showed that voters had rejected the racial politics advocated25 by Workers’ Party candidate Tang Liang Hong” and “had signalled that they wanted a continuation of the PAP’s policy of a multiracial, multi-lingual society”, adding that Tang “must not be allowed to practise divisive racial politics” (ST, 3rd Jan 1997). The construction of Tang as a symbol of threat lies in the PAP’s effort in “exposing” him for his Chinese chauvinist views. Unlike the Jufrie Mahmood affair, where we can see a clear progression of how he was described from focusing on him as a person, and then to construing his speech and actions as amounting to extremist communalist politics, the Tang Liang Hong affair offered the option of clearly depicting him as a threat from the outset because of the views the latter had made known publicly. Hence constructing Tang as a symbol of threat was a relatively straightforward matter of “releasing” to the public the comments Tang had made. By citing these comments, Tang’s association with supporting Chinese supremacy came to be established. Coupled with the fact that even the Chinese-educated MPs could not 25 Emphasis mine. 68 condone Tang’s Chinese chauvinistic tendencies, it is evident that for the ruling party Tang’s views bordered too unhealthily on the extreme and could only be detrimental to a society that seeks to be racially harmonious. But this, the elite-prescribed construction of Tang as a threat is not of course the only way to view the matter. Having a passion for Chinese language and culture is not necessarily a bad thing, and Tang’s passion in itself certainly was not. As a young man, that passion had seen him help raise funds in an effort to build the Chinese community’s Nanyang University. He had also, in 1991, as was mentioned, rallied a group of like-minded Chinese to discuss issues pertaining to the Chinese community, subsequently submitting a memorandum to arrest the decline of the standard of Chinese language teaching – this, in a country that had once identified as a problem the declining standard of Mandarin amongst its Chinese population. Tang’s fervour and passion for Chinese language and culture, directed as it was into resolving issues troubling those in the Chinese community, and to a certain extent, the Singapore leadership too, could hardly be said to be problematic or that he was a dangerous person by virtue of his passion. Had the circumstances been different, Tang’s active interest in promoting Chinese language and culture might even have been encouraged and lauded, given the leadership’s concern over its polity’s unhealthy consumption of Western values and ideas. In the end, Tang’s passion came to be interpreted in the terms of the elite discourse, and was presented to the public in precisely those terms, which, just as was the case with Jufrie Mahmood, only proved to be highly prejudicial to Tang. An alternative view to the threat that Tang posed is found in George (2000). As he argued, the trouble with Tang, and therein the threat posed by Tang, lay not so much in his promotion of the Chinese cause, but in the fact that he might have been 69 “more Chinese than the PAP”, a fact that could undermine the PAP’s efforts at ethnic management. Given that the PAP’s strategy was “to give its own MPs the job of representing and shepherding the different ethnic communities”, as these MPs’ interests “would be balanced off the under the safe umbrella of the party”, then for the strategy to work, there must not be anyone in the public sphere who tries to portray himself as “more Chinese” than the PAP’s Chinese MPs, in order that these Chinese MPs get the relevant voter support – anyone who tries to court the same constituency with “stronger views can pull the rug out from under the PAP’s attempts at providing moderate representation” (George 2000: 112). George suggests that the “real danger” Tang represented was not so much due to his “willingness to question the PAP’s ability to represent Chinese interests”, nor that his doing so would cause race riots, but that Tang’s comments and actions “ would certainly have embarrassed the PAP MPs, and perhaps forced them to turn up the volume on their own Chinese-ness”. And as George reports, indeed, this notion stirred up enough interest within the Chinese community after Tang was rejected in his application for Nominated MP position in 1992 for the Chinese daily Lianhe Zaobao to ask the prime minister about it: was it true that Tang was not selected because Chinese MPs saw the candidate as a potential rival in speaking up on issues affecting the community? PM Goh had however dismissed the notion as mere speculation. Ultimately, it remains uncertain whether Tang’s entry into parliament may or may not bring about the consequences envisioned by the PAP, or that he may or may not be as “dangerous” as the PAP believes, but, in line with its position to always assume and prepare for the worst, the PAP’s construction of Tang as a threat to Singapore’s multi-racial peace, based on its construal of the import of Tang’s messages, can only serve to shield Singaporeans from the worst. 70 As was previously mentioned, this section on the human aspect of the racial crisis seeks to examine the potential afforded by individuals in society to wreak havoc on ethnic management. In our discussion, we have seen the construction of Jufrie Mahmood and Tang Liang Hong as epitomizing great threat to Singapore’s racial peace. In both cases, the threat that these individuals posed was too dangerous for the leaders of a pluralist society to tolerate and it is this that led to the move to disempower them as spokesmen for the people. In the discourse of racial crisis, these two individuals stand out in recent memory as the symbols of danger and harm for the leadership’s management of ethnic sensitivities. They are symbols to the extent that the elite-shaped discourse gradually saw the gradual transition of them as individuals to something more – through their comments, Mahmood and Tang represent the sum total of the notion of communal and extremist politics, and become the physical embodiment and manifestation of great threat to racial cohesion. For the leadership clearly, the racial crisis that permanently hangs over a pluralist society can easily tear society apart and it is only with the removal, or destruction, of the likes of Jufrie Mahmood and Tang Liang Hong, who serve as too-conspicuous emblems of racial politics, that society can maintain a racially equal status quo. 71 CHAPTER F OUR The Discourse of Racial Crisis and Other Crises 4.1 I NTRODUCTION In the preceding chapter, the discourse of racial crisis, in terms of its three major aspects, was defined and described. In this chapter, we move on to a comparison of the discourse of racial crisis to other discourses of crisis: how is the discourse of racial crisis similar to, and different from, other crisis discourses? In attempting this comparison, the aim is to explicate how the discourse of racial crisis is related to the other crisis discourses. The comparison of similar features will show the discourse of racial crisis to be a constituent of the larger discourse of crisis, alongside the other crisis discourses, while the elucidation of differences between the discourse of racial crisis and the other discourses, which brings out the greater criticality of the racial crisis, would show how the racial crisis is a rather more significant crisis than its counterparts in the discourse of crisis. 4.2 S IMILAR FEATUR ES To proceed, we consider first how the treatment of the racial crisis is characteristic of the treatment of other crises, and which thereby qualifies the racial crisis as one instantiation of the discourse of crisis. In what follows, I discuss the features that are common to the discourse of racial crisis and other crises. 4.2.1 Feature: A/an (repeated) articulation of the state’s vulnerabilities. Within the discourse of racial crisis, the notion of the state’s vulnerabilities was created with reference to the geographical aspect of size and location and her diverse ethnic composition. This can be summarised as follows. The geographical aspect lays greatest claim as an important element in the construction of racial crisis by virtue of the fact that when geographical aspects are cited in the discourse, they have been cited 72 in a manner that raises and reinforces the republic’s awareness of her inherent vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities accrue from the geographical aspect of size and location of the republic. Her small physical size and diverse ethnic composition had meant to the republic’s leaders that racial strife as a result of different cultures interacting and living together in a small space was always a possibility. As Brig-Gen George Yeo had said, [4/1] In practice, there is always friction. When different cultures are in close proximity, there is invariably a lot of grinding and scraping, however much one lubricates the points of contact. Equally, her location and diverse ethnic composition, not to mention uniquely Chinese-majority population amidst predominantly Malay neighbours, meant to the republic’s leaders that her pursuit of policies and state action relating both to domestic and international issues must take into account the sensitivities of her immediate neighbours in the region. One obvious result of this was the adoption of a principle of multiracialism, where all races were given equal and fair treatment, even though the republic boasted an overwhelmingly Chinese majority. In the words of Brig-Gen George Yeo again, [4/2] If democracy is the tyranny of the majority, which in Singapore would mean the tyranny of the Chinese over the Malays and the Indians, society would come asunder and Singapore would immediately be in conflict with Indonesia and Malaysia. Within the discourse of racial crisis, the geographical aspect described Singapore’s vulnerabilities with respect to her size and location and a non-homogeneous ethnic composition that could in the first instance, bring about racial strife as a result of the different races constantly being in close proximity and practising different cultures, and in the second instance, create deep stresses in inter-racial relationships as a result of influence from her immediate and Malay neighbours. 73 In other crises, likewise, a focus on Singapore’s vulnerabilities figures just as prominently. In the religious crisis for instance, Hill (2001: 19) argues that a core feature of moral panics is equally shared in the elite-sponsored moral panic over religion, where “ genuine danger is emphasized by reminders in the media of the state’s short history, its turbulent origins, and its weakness and vulnerability as an island state in a volatile region”. 4.2.2 Feature: A concerted effort made by persons of authority to generate consensus for the perceived problem. Within the discourse of racial crisis, we have seen in the human aspect the demonisation of individuals who held purportedly racially-divisive views, a process that involved collective effort by government officials to denounce and hence aid in the construction of the individuals as symbols of destructive racial politics. In the period in which the furore raged over the comments made by these supposedly “dangerous” individuals, government officials tirelessly expressed and reinforced the official position with respect to these individuals. In this consensus-building exercise, the social and political positions, and authority of these officials, as well as the concerted effort made to proliferate public discourse with the official interpretation of what these dangerous individuals represented, lent much weight to the elite-proscribed problem that these individuals posed to racial affairs in the state. Similarly, in the reproductive crisis, following the then Prime Minister’s pronouncement of the problem, “ [C]abinet ministers began to exhort graduate women to marry and bear children as a patriotic duty” and “… speeches and pronouncements from government cohorts of every description, … [repeated and expatiated ] at length on the Prime Minister's arguments in a concerted drive to overwhelm public opinion”. Representatives of organisations with some affiliation got into the act too, such as, in 74 this case, those from women’s organisations: “[O]bediently taking their cue from the government, two (nonfeminist) women's organizations accordingly proposed, in a disturbing collusion with state patriarchy, that women be required to bear children as a form of National Service”. In the religious crisis examined by Hill, this feature was termed “consensus building”, and described as “ a search for consensus – an agreement that a problem exists and needs to be addressed – among the leaders and representatives of groups deemed to be involved” (Hill 2001: 19). In the light of the religious crisis, the possibility of legislation to preserve religious harmony was mooted and consensus sought in conference between government members, religious leaders and Singaporeans. The search for consensus was also facilitated by the Singapore media, which as Hill notes, has an important function in not only reporting, but “construct[ing] consensus in relation to major policy outcomes”. 4.2.3 Feature: The implementation of a series of measures in order to manage the perceived problem. In terms of the discourse of racial crisis, the crisis was managed through education, legislation, policies protecting minority rights and policies for racial integration2 6. Education In order to create greater awareness among Singaporeans of their traumatic and turbulent history of political and economic struggle and racial strife, and to educate them on the lessons learnt, National Education was introduced into the secondary school syllabus in 1998. Alongside this, schools in Singapore also commemorate Racial Harmony Day every year on 21 st July, which marks the day in 26 The following should not be read as an exhaustive list, but a general sample of measures taken. 75 1964 when racial riots broke out, in order to “remind students of the importance and fragility of racial harmony”27. Legislation Legislation was made for the prevention of the kind of riots and public disturbances that had occurred in the past, of which the Maria Hertogh case is of iconic significance. In 1990, a Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill was passed in Parliament. In addition, the Sedition Act, which acts against those who promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population, and the Internal Security Act passed in 1985, which allows for the detention without trial of persons found to threaten the internal security of Singapore, are instances of legislative measures for the prevention of racial or religious extremism. Policies protecting minority rights The most obvious of these was the formation of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, aimed at protecting the rights of minority ethnic groups in Singapore. In Parliament, minority representation was ensured by the creation of Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) where at least one of the members running on a group ticket for election into Parliament must be of an ethnic minority. Policies of racial integration These policies include the programme of National Service which brings together Singaporean males of all ethnicities, for at least a period of two and a half years, in national defence; and the imposition of an ethnic quota on public housing estates so that the formation of isolated enclaves of Malays, Chinese or other ethnic groups was discouraged and inter-mixing of the races was possible. Additionally, in 2002, the Prime Minister mooted the idea of Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCCs) “to provide a regular platform for leaders of the various racial and religious communities to interact and get to know one another”, in order to “build 27 DPM Lee Hsien Loong, at the launch of National Education, 17th May 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 76 confidence, friendship and trust among them” 28 . In addition, the Prime Minister’s proposal also included the following: [4/3] We will set up an IRCC Steering Committee at the national level. We will set up one IRCC in each constituency at the CCC level. In addition, I would also encourage the formation of similar circles in schools, work places and other social organizations. These are informal circles, like Quality Circles in companies and factories. I will call them “Harmony Circles” to distinguish them from the constituency-level IRCC. This will help spread the movement of inter-racial confidence-building more extensively at the ground level. Likewise, in the reproductive crisis, upon the pronouncement of the crisis, the government had “moved with characteristic pre-emptive speed to launch a comprehensive system of incentives and threats, together with major changes of social policy” (Heng and Devan 1995). This series of measures to rectify the perceived reproductive imbalance among graduate and non-graduate women included, for example, offering working-class women, under conditions of educational and lowincome eligibility, cash awards of S$10,000, to restrict their child-bearing to two children, “after which they would “volunteer” themselves for tubal ligation” and increasing maternity charges in government-run hospital wards most frequently used by working-class mothers who had already given birth to the state-preferred quota of two children. On the other hand, to entice graduate women to have more children, “generous tax breaks, medical insurance privileges, and admission for their children to the best schools in the country were promised”. In addition, other transformations in social policy followed, which included “altered entrance criteria to the country's only existing university to favour men over women applicants, since it had been suggested to the Prime Minister that male more than female university graduates tended to marry and have children; and a revised family planning program that now urged all who 28 Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong, at a dialogue with Young Malay/Muslim Professionals, 2nd February 2002. “Give and Take Needed in Multiracial Society”, Speeches, 26(1). pp. 5-12. 77 could afford it to have at least three children”; and, more recently, the suggestion that certain restrictions be placed on legalized abortion. The swift and decisive implementation of series of measures for the correction of a problem, or crisis, is also typified in the religious crisis, where legislation was made to control religious activities. In this crisis, following a consensus over the issue among religious leaders, it was felt necessary that laws be implemented. Hence, a White Paper on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony, after going through the formal stages of a parliamentary Bill, was passed into law as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in November 1990 (Hill 2001: 33). In the above comparison of crises, a set of common features was elicited as typifying the various narratives of crises. Together, these common features qualify the racial crisis as one instance of a category of narratives that pervades Singapore society. This category of narratives forms a larger discourse – “the discourse of crisis”. The discourses of racial crisis and other crises are instantiations of this larger discourse of crisis, which has as its defining features, the set of common features we have elucidated from our discussion of the similar features among the crises. 4.3 DISSIMILAR FEATURES Our discussion of the racial crisis would not be complete, however, without a further consideration of other features of the discourse of racial crisis, which may not be apparent in other crises, but which give added weight to the argument of the existence of the racial crisis. In the following section therefore, I describe how the discourse of racial crisis is different from the other crises, and argues that perhaps these differences make the discourse of racial crisis more of a “crisis” than the others. 78 4.3.1 Feature: The Racial Crisis is a Permanent Crisis Within the geographical aspect of the discourse of racial crisis, one finds an almostnatural, almost-neutral ideology of race and understands the foreboding presence and permanence of the racial crisis that hangs over Singapore society. This is achieved through the use of the republic’s physical attributes in the discursive construction of the sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis “crisis”, and makes the (potentiality of) crisis almost palpable. The almost-palpable sense of crisis as derived from the aspect of geography is constructed in two ways. Firstly, being geographical facts, they are real, objective and inescapable. In recounting over and over again these physical attributes of size and location, the discourse bespeaks the fact that man is not a free agent in a free world choosing, as he wishes, the size of his territory, nor where he wishes it to be located. These are repeatedly stressed as inherent, and hence inescapable, limitations of the island-state, with which its population has no choice but to work, and live, within. In terms of the discourse of racial crisis, the inescapability of this fate bestows on the discourse thus constituted a common-sensical, almost-natural, almost-neutral sense. And it is this sense of the limiting realities of the island-state that gives the discourse of racial crisis the attribute of permanence. When considered in relation with Singapore’s ethnic composition, the limitations of space mean that religiously-, linguistically-, and culturally-different races are constantly in close proximity; and those of location mean that the republic’s management of ethnic relations has to be attuned to, if not at least aware of, the sensitivities of her neighbours in the region. The geographical aspect thus, in comprising real, objective and inescapable facts, ensures that the discourse of racial crisis has a certain permanence, one that will continue to exist as long as the geographical attributes of the island-state remain the same. 79 Secondly, not only are such facts inescapable, they are inherent and immutable. Again for Singaporeans, the discourse emphasizes the fact that the choice is not theirs to make to remove the problems that their size and location may cause them. Hence, the leaders can neither disregard nor dismiss these aspects in policy-making, nor ignore the possibility of threat, racial or otherwise, that can wreak serious havoc in a small republic. These concerns manifest themselves in the formulation of public policy, and whether they agree with the leadership’s argument or not, Singaporeans are thus presented with a legitimate argument to persuade their acceptance of the statepreferred view on public policy formulation. In couching the discourse of racial crisis in these terms, of which the emphasis on the inescapability and immutability of the geographical attributes is significant, the discourse of racial crisis becomes grounded in real and redoubtable terms. Inevitably, a foreboding presence and permanence of the crisis is thus created and perpetuated. Furthermore, the recurrent messages in official statements and speeches urging racial harmony reinforce the sense of a persistent, and permanent, crisis. As explored in the historical aspect of the discourse of racial crisis, there is an evident strategy of re-hashing past racial riots in Singapore in order to warn against their recurrence in the present or the future. In regularly bringing these racial riots and the issue of racial pluralism into focus, the notion that there is an ever-present threat in society is repeatedly raised and reinforced. Singaporeans are then exhorted to work conscientiously towards racial harmony and be constantly vigilant against threats to racial peace. In addition, that there is an intense need for constant vigilance also suggests that the racial crisis is a constant feature in Singapore society. Not only is this need conveyed through public statements, it is also reflected visibly in the state’s quick 80 response to decimate the threats posed by Mr Jufrie Mahmood and Mr Tang Liang Hong, as examined in the human aspect. Describing the consequences of what could happen, otherwise, one senior minister said, [4/4] The government has taken a pretty hard stand because we know that [issues related to ethnic and religious differences], if exploited, can ruin the very foundations on which our society is built up. If every minority member in our community feels he is discriminated because of his racial, religious or educational background, Singaporeans will start to become disenchanted with their nation. This will spread like a disease and before long our society will be polarised due to people's perceptions of racial, religious or socio-economic status differences. This can result in the country being torn with political strives and social anarchy. - Mr Sidek Saniff, Senior Minister of State for the Environment and MP for Aljunied GRC (Eunos Division), at a Seminar for Grassroots Leaders, 18th May 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html Because the state is ever conscious and convinced of the destructive potential of racial conflict, it becomes thus also constantly vigilant against perceived racially-divisive elements, culminating therefore in its comprehensive move to demonise and characterise these two individuals for their dangerous and detrimental statements to Singapore society. These episodes lend credence to the sense of a permanent crisis as they manifest the fact that the racial crisis is constantly being carefully monitored and managed, so that as soon as elements that pose a threat to Singapore society appear, their existence is immediately identified and are then removed. Because it is a permanent crisis, constant vigilance and monitoring of the racial situation is a crucially necessary project of the state leadership, and this is indeed professedly so, as the leadership has repeatedly stressed. Right at the start, awareness of the crisis brought about the adoption of a multiracial principle in governance. It is a move that not only deflected the fears of the republic’s neighbours of its emergence as a Third China, but also successfully contained the issue of races contesting over privileges and perceived rights, so that anyone, regardless of race, had equal and fair opportunities to achieve his best. Appreciation of the crisis then manifested itself over 81 the years in public policy-making in social and economic management, where the ideals of racial integration and harmony are consistently prioritised and relentlessly pursued. Not infrequently, new policies and programmes are initiated to build upon the foundations of a socially cohesive society, accompanied by official reminders and exhortations of the values of racial harmony. The many persistent efforts by the state leadership to create and sustain a racially harmonious Singapore reflect an intimate cognizance of the permanence, and criticality, of the racial crisis and the need therefore to (regularly) ameliorate racial tensions, smoothen over the racial divide, and ultimately to eradicate any possibility of the racial crisis of tearing Singapore society apart. 4.3.2 Feature: The Racial Crisis Is Never/Has Never Been Explicitly Declared But perhaps one of the most conspicuous and salient points to be made about the discourse of racial crisis is the fact that unlike other crises, the notion of the racial crisis is not supported by documented evidence of there ever having been one. Despite the fact that there were in fact racial riots in Singapore’s past, or that the data supports the view of the racial crisis being persistent and permanent, hence “always there”, or that the state leadership is intensely concerned over how the different races can be encouraged to live and work harmoniously in the country – all of which legitimate the declaration, at one point or another, of a “racial crisis” – there has never been an explicit pronouncement of this particular crisis as having set in in Singapore society. The absence of any explicit declaration of the problem as “crisis” even when it involved death and injury (in the racial riots), and even though the problem appears to be a rather significant one (given its persistence, and frequent ministerial exhortations of pursuing the racially harmonious ideal) is a conspicuous one. This is in contrast to the reproductive crisis (see Heng and Devan 1995) where then Prime Minister 82 explicitly announced in a speech that the imbalance in reproductive rates among certain groups of mothers was a problem to be worked out; and the religious crisis (see Hill 2001) where ardent religiosity became the centre of attention in a widely publicised “acute crisis”. The lack of an explicit declaration of a racial crisis is presumably because racial matters in Singapore society have never erupted into conflict of major proportions, which would then perhaps have warranted explicit announcement and characterisation of the problem as “crisis”. This is a fact reflected in the history of relative racial harmony in Singapore since her independence. With respect to racial matters, Singapore has enjoyed relative racial harmony – no communal riots, no racial strife, nor minor racial skirmishes. In this time, there never was a government-issued declaration of “racial crisis”, nor reports of surveys and statistics that showed any presence, or even potential for racial disharmony. In fact, in a national survey on Singaporeans’ attitudes towards race and religion, almost all the respondents were both happy to let their offspring play with children of other races, and had felt it was good to have different races living in the same neighbourhood, with seven in ten saying they shared their personal problems with close friends from other races (ST, 25th Oct 2002). While racial harmony in the strictest sense may not be evident – that people could and do reside together without conflict does not necessarily mean they actually enjoyed one another’s company – for what it is worth, the survey at least showed that the different races harboured little or no animosity towards other races. Should the fact of peaceful co-existing conditions among the different races and the lack of serious, if any at all, racial strife in Singapore constitute sufficient explanation for why the racial crisis has never been declared – precisely because there is no crisis to be declared? 83 In considering the admissibility of the above explanation, it must be recalled, however, that history has also revealed that Singapore had encountered at least three violent and destructive racial riots in her past. Yet, none of these episodes were described or declared as “racial crises”. In the official discourse, they were “racial riots” (see Chapter Three). Significantly, these racial riots had in fact resulted in a bloody loss of lives and injury. The July 1964 racial riot which had gone on for about 10 days saw 23 people killed and 454 others injured. In the same year, on 2nd September, the riots recurred, and another 13 were killed and 109 injured. In the spillover communal riots from Malaysia on 13th May 1969, four people were killed and 60 were wounded. These destructive events had not, however, resulted in a declaration of “racial crisis”. If even the loss of life and limb in these inter-racial clashes2 9 did not constitute a “racial crisis”, or motivate the need to classify and declare the events as crisis-type situations, then the question of what could be meant by a “crisis”, never mind a “racial” one, is puzzling. Understood by the argument forwarded in Chapter Two, the question of the lack of an explicit declaration of crisis becomes even more perplexing. In Chapter Two, I had argued, alongside similar arguments made by Barr (2000), Heng and Devan (1995) and Hill (2001), for a certain propensity of the state in declaring crises on the Singapore citizenry. Hence it was that with problems big and small, and issues that naturally arose in the course of a country’s development were construed, described and presented as “crises”, and additionally, had to be handled with great care by a competent and efficient political leadership in order that the calamitous consequences of the crises may be averted. Yet, even on account of the racial riots, which 29 That these clashes were motivated by inter-racial conflict is not in doubt, and not to be disputed, no less because official accounts profess them to be such, terming them “racial” riots. 84 presumably give good grounds for the declaration of crisis, the state had not declared a “racial crisis”. The question is, why not? Seen against the background, however, of the state’s persistent efforts in managing the racial crisis, the absence of any explicit declaration of the crisis, it may be argued, was itself a way of containing the crisis. When problems or crises are explicitly declared, people are not only alerted to the issue at hand, they also become, among other things, more conscious of it, and engage themselves with it. For example, when the state announced that female reproductive rates showed an imbalance between graduate and non-graduate mothers, and presented this as a crisis, critical as it supposedly was in re-generating a subsequent equilibrium of quality genes, a Great Marriage Debate was sparked off as people became keenly engaged in a discussion of the crisis. Notwithstanding the informal discussions that Singaporeans indulged in over the issue, the overwhelming response received by The Straits Times Forum page (and this in a country whose population has often been viewed as disinclined, disinterested or afraid to express their opinions in public) following the pronouncement of the crisis indicated a fair amount of popular involvement in the issue. Whether they had interpreted the Prime Minister’s message in the vein he had intended or not, and whether the Prime Minister himself had intended such diverse and immense response or not, his message had opened up a national debate on the matter. Whether in support or not, people had nevertheless reacted to what they had heard and read on the issue. Lines were drawn between members of the community over where they stood on the matter. While some, as evinced from the letters that were published, clearly took the side of the Prime Minister – one even went so far as to suggest that in order that government is ensured of truly competent persons, should there come a day when increasing numbers of incompetent people abound, then a “weightage factor” 85 should be introduced for every vote that comes from a ‘qualified’ person, arguing that “the principle of ‘one person one vote’ is fast becoming a menace to society” –, others did not. These others, whose letters were not published because as The Straits Times claimed, they had “misunderstood” the Prime Minister’s message, and “had not addressed their thoughts to the main issue”, had however interpreted the minister’s message as yet another setback for the less intelligent in society. The different responses do not, as suggested by The Straits Times Forum editor, (only) show an understanding or lack of, of the Prime Minister’s message, they reflect a popular engagement with the issues of the day. In this case, popular engagement was expressed in written form to The Straits Times. Popular reaction and engagement do, in fact, also come in other forms, and it is here that one hypothesis of the absence of any explicit declaration of the racial crisis may be formulated. For instance, what would the explicit declaration of a racial crisis bring to bear on the citizenry? Would their sensitivities to the differences between themselves of one race and others of another race be heightened, if it were after all a racial crisis, the issue of race being the cause of the problem? If they had not viewed one another in overtly racial terms, would they do so now? Would this then lead to members of each ethnic group overemphasizing or asserting themselves? In the extreme case, would the end result then be a disintegration of social (racial) harmony and ultimately, chaos and disorder? Given that the state expends great effort in managing what is a permanent racial crisis, its lack of any explicit declaration of the racial crisis to the Singaporean polity may be seen as a further feature of the state’s management of the racial crisis. On account of its greater potential of dividing rather than integrating races when a racial crisis is announced, and differences become highlighted, it appears that management of the racial crisis has inadvertently to be conducted as such – without 86 explicit declarations of the racial crisis. That the racial crisis is not explicitly announced in view of the much-feared repercussions of such a move, and that this stands in stark contrast to other crises, the management of which often involving explicitly stated problems and solutions, shows how the racial crisis must be differentially treated. This is indicative of the criticality of the crisis because it suggests a kind of deep-seated problem that ordinary and usual methods of resolution cannot be applied, with ease or success. It becomes addressed as a different kettle of fish, and demands of the state leadership continued efforts to manage it well. Hence, in its treatment of the racial crisis, unlike the other crises, while the political leadership takes explicit steps to manage the problem, it is notably silent on declaring the crisis as a problem as such. In relation to this, if one considers the differential treatment of the racial crisis and other crises, apart from this ‘silent’ approach described above, a second strategy emphasizing the pre-emption of the problem and its consequences appears also to be adopted. This approach will be discussed in Chapter Five (section 5.2). 4.4 S UMMARY In this chapter, we have discussed both the similarities and differences between the racial crisis and other crises. This attempt has been made based on a consideration of how the three major aspects of the discourse of racial crisis inter-relate with the discourses of other crises. It has been argued that at least three similar features of the various discourses of crisis can be singled out. These features qualify the ranking of the discourse of racial crisis within the larger domain of the discourse of crisis. It also made possible the elucidation of certain features as important constituents of the discourse of crisis, based on the common features among the crises we have look at. The construction of the discourse of crisis thus relies on the following mechanisms: 87 repeated articulations of the island-state’s vulnerabilities, concerted efforts of officials and other persons of authority in generating consensus for the perceived problem, and finally, the implementation of measures to manage the problem. I have also discussed two features of the discourse of racial crisis that differentiates it from other crises, and argued for the significance these differences contribute to the discourse of racial crisis. Thus, while the similarities among the various crises show the racial crisis to be one instance of the larger discourse of crisis, the differences between the racial crisis and the other crises show the racial crisis to be a rather more significant instance of the discourse of crisis. It is through these differences, constituted by the features of permanence and absence of explicit declaration of the racial crisis, that one senses the criticality of the racial crisis. The preceding discussion thus illustrates the following point: that these various discourses of crisis may rightfully be said to form a particular category of social discourse, which has been termed the discourse of crisis. The similarities among the discourses of crises proves as much, and the differences only reflect the degree of severity, or criticality of the racial crisis. We will move on in the next chapter to a further understanding of the discourse in terms of a partial narrative analysis, which would provide for an understanding of other facets of the discourse not previously discussed. In so doing, we may approach the question of crisis construction and strategies of control in better detail, and which will be discussed in the penultimate chapter of this thesis. 88 CHAPTER FIVE The Discourse of Racial Crisis: A Narrative Overview 5.1 NAR RATIVES AND INSTITUTIONS Having examined the discourse of racial crisis in terms of its most prominent aspects, and then discussed it in comparison with other crisis d iscourses, I will proceed in this chapter to give a macrostructural description of the discourse as it functions within Singapore society. As argued by Linde (2001), there is important work done by narratives for and within institutions in which they are found. Studying these narratives, we study the “effect on the forms of narrative of their locations within institutions and the work that narratives do within and for these institutions” (Linde 2001: 518). This question, Linde argues, is important for linguistics, and for discourse analysis, in particular, because “institutional constraints have a strong shaping effect on the narratives told within them, and reciprocally, narratives have a strong part in the creation and reproduction of institutions”. Linde defines “institutions” as, [representing] any social group which has a continued existence over time, whatever its degree of reification or formal status may be. Thus an institution may be a nation, a corporation, the practice of medicine, a family, a gang, a regular Tuesday night poker game, or the class of ’75. Linde proposes two basic approaches to the study of narratives in institutions. The first examines how narrative is used to carry out the daily work of the institutions, including how members of the institution use narrative to do the daily work of the institution, and the attempts of non-members to use narrative in professional settings in order to assimilate the sorts of professional use in specialized, privileged forms of discourse. 89 The second approach studies the work that narrative performs in institutions to reproduce the institution, reproduce or challenge its power structure, induct (or equally possible, alienate) new members, adapt to change and deal with contested or contradictory versions of the past, i.e. “the ways an institution uses narrative to create and reproduce its identity by the creation and maintenance of an institutional memory”. This latter approach informs the discussion in this chapter of the thesis. Recalling our aim to examine (how) the discursive construction of crisis engineers effects on society, Linde’s proposed framework for studying narrative in institutions provides a macrostructural grounding of the analyses in preceding chapters. It offers an overview of the ways in which the construction of crisis acts to engender a collective sense of the perilous and vulnerable condition of the nation, thereby directing the submission of society to the elite political will, in other words, to see how this narrative – the discourse of crisis construction – serves the producers of the narrative, and also, the effect on the recipients of the narrative/ discourse. As illustration, we consider Linde’s study of the work done by narrative in Midwest Insurance, an American insurance company. Starting on the premise that questions relating to institutional power may be understood by way of the analysis of the prevalent narratives in that institution. Linde explores the forms and media for the narratives maintained in MidWest, the relations between the forms, the events and evaluation of those narratives, and the identity of preferred and dispreferred speakers for given speakers. Such an analysis, in addressing institutional concerns such as “maintaining identity and continuity, negotiating power relations, managing change, and marking membership, as well as transacting the daily business of the 90 organisation”, revealingly provides empirical bases of primary processes of social reproduction. I will proceed in the same vein as Linde’s proposed analytical framework (see Linde 2001: 518-35) in my exploration of the work that the discourse of racial crisis does for and within, in our case, the institution that is Singapore. Abstracting from Linde’s study, my analysis in this chapter considers the following points: topics within the discourse (“evaluative points”, Linde (2001: 521)), producers of the discourse (the holders of “story-telling rights”, Linde (2001: 531)), and the occasions on which the discourse is instantiated (“occasions for narrative remembering”, Linde (2001: 526)). In the following analysis, I hope to explicate these facets of the discourse of racial crisis that, together with our discussion of the main aspects (see Chapter Three) and features of the discourse (see Chapter Four) enable us to better understand the question posed earlier in the thesis, that of crisis construction as a strategy of control in state development (see Chapter Six). 5.2 TOP ICS WITHIN THE DISCOURSE OF RACIAL CRIS IS AND THE CRE ATION OF A S OCIAL I DENTITY Just as the class of repeated and long-term narratives are the most useful in understanding the work of stories in institutions, the class of crisis narratives within the discourse of crisis, which has, as a collective feature their sustained recurrence, in one form or another, in official discourse through the years, is valuable in understanding the functions of the discourse of crisis in Singapore. As was already mentioned, many problems that were encountered in the course of developing the republic, as well as issues of lesser criticality, have both been given the veneer of crisis in the Singapore state, where their immediate and decisive resolution was in order. 91 In the racial crisis, repeated references are made in the discourse to the issue of race and possible racial tensions. These references range from the need for careful racial management, the implementation of government policies and their objectives, to potential areas of conflict among the races, the consequences that can follow from these conflicts, and how they may be prevented etc., and they invariably involve the reiteration of one or more of the following topics3 0:  the non-homogeneity of the population (and therefore the attendant potential for conflict), [5/1] “…we are not a homogeneous society. We come from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. … Singapore will never be a homogeneous society. We have to acknowledge and accept this, and turn this diversity to our advantage. … one consequence of our diversity is that from time to time our different communities see events around us with different eyes31.” and, as an example, the following quote from the Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, on a separate occasion, is illustrative: [5/2] “…we cannot assume that over time different communities will naturally and effortlessly come closer together. … It is difficult for Singaporeans to be completely unaffected by events in our neighbourhood. For example, during the Indonesian riots in May 1988, some Indonesians took refuge in Singapore, to stay in hotels or with relatives. At the time, some Malay Singaporeans felt uncomfortable, concerned that Chinese Singaporeans would hold against them what was happening in Indonesia32.”  the (persistent) existence of differences/ faultlines, and the need for Singaporeans to accept the differences, 30 The data presented here is only a sample, and not the exhaustive set, of the official statements tha t exemplify the topics of the discourse. All emphasis mine. 31 Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister, speech at the Onam Festival, 20 th September 1998. “Maintaining Social Cohesion and Racial Harmony”, Speeches, 22(5). pp. 42-47. 32 Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister, speech at Nanyang Technological University Ministerial Forum, 30 th January 2001. “One Singapore – Together on the Next Lap”, Speeches, 25(1), pp. 18-30. 92 [5/3] “It is a fact of life. Under certain circumstances we are different. These differences will not go away even with time. … We have to recognise them, and learn to live with them to make our multi-racial society work33 .” [5/4] “The fault lines in our multi-racial, multi-religious society will narrow further as we progress in nation building, but they will never disappear altogether … even a minor incident could upset race relations if we are not careful3 4.” [5/5] “ … as Senior Minister never ceases to remind us, while the pieces in the mosaic may have gotten smaller, Singapore remains a mosaic nonetheless and is never all of a piece. We ignore our tribal faultlines at our peril35.”  government “obsession” with the problem, [5/6] “It is only by acknowledging potential conflicts that we minimise them. We will never be able to stop worrying about problems of race, language and religion…36” [5/7] “… there are three areas affecting inter-tribal relations in Singapore which obsess us. They are race, language and religion … Thus in Singapore, we spend a lot of our time and energy worrying about problems of race, language and religion and finding solutions to them. This is why I call it an obsession37.”  the record of hard work put into the management of the problem, [5/8] “We have [racial] harmony only because we work hard to maintain it38 .” 33 Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister, speech at celebration dinner organised by the Joint Malay/Muslim Organisations, 7th February 1991. “Take the Initiative”, Speeches, 15(1), pp. 11-16. 34 Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister, speech at the Majlis Pusat 30th Anniversary Dinner, 30 th October 1999. “Role of Malay Community Organizations in Nation-Building”, Speeches, 23(5), pp. 1-6. 35 George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at the Africa Leadership Forum, 10 th November 1993. “Feeding the Flame: Civic Society”, Speeches, 17(6), pp. 50-61. 36 George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at The Association of Muslim Professionals Inauguration Dinner, 31st October 1991. “The Malay/Muslim Community in the Next Lap”, Speeches, 15(5), pp. 95-101. 37 George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at the Africa Leadership Forum 10 th November 1993. “Feeding the Flame: Civic Society”, Speeches, 17(6), pp. 50-61. 38 George Yeo, Minister for Information & the Arts, and Second Minister for Trade and Industry, speech at the Sikh Community National Day Dinner, 22nd August 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 93 [5/9] “We have seen how disastrous racial or religious strife is, not just for the minority community, but for all Singaporeans. So we have worked strenuously to get the different groups to live together harmoniously in a multi-racial, multi-religious society…39” [5/10] “So far, we have kept our house in order, with no upheavals. It is not a stroke of good luck. We have worked very hard to maintain the racial and religious harmony and social cohesion all these years. And we will have to continue working on it40.” [5/11] “The peace and stability that we enjoy today is the result of years of efforts in strengthening our tolerance and understanding of the various races. We will have to continue to work hard on it41 .”  the recurrent nature of the problem, [5/12] “Like all human relations, inter-communal relations have to be worked at. And however hard we work at inter-communal relations in Singapore, problems will still crop up from time to time. … Groups which have lived in harmony with one another for many years can suddenly turn against each other. We must never assume that such flareups will never take place in Singapore. … Even after many generations, the divisions of race, language and religion will remain. We can neither make them disappear nor legislate them away4 2.”  the need for constant vigilance, [5/13] “In a country of different races, languages and dialects, there will always be some need for continued vigilance43 .” [5/14] “there are underlying tensions in every society. … such tensions can worsen. It becomes easy then for racial, language or religious issues to be exploited and used to rally the masses for disastrous and tragic results. It has happened in many countries. Given our multi-racial and 39 Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister, speech at the Onam Festival, 20 th September 1998. “Maintaining Social Cohesion and Racial Harmony”, Speeches, 22(5), pp. 42-47. 40 Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education, and Second Minister for Defence, speech at the National Day Observance Ceremony, 8th August 2002. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 41 Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence, speech at the Racial Harmony Games Day, 20 th July 2002. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 42 George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Minister for Health, speech at the Crosscultural Seminar for Youths, 15 th January 1994. “Managing Singapore’s Cultural Diversity”, Speeches, 18(1), pp. 56-59. 43 Ong Teng Cheong, Minister for Communications and Acting Minister for Culture, speech at the Cultural Show organised by the Tamils’ Representative Council, 10 th September 1979. “Why Singaporeans Stay United”, Speeches, 3(4), pp. 39-41. 94 multi-religious setting, we have to be even more vigilant to ensure that the same fate does not befall Singapore44.” [5/15] “… we must constantly be on our guard against those who try to undermine our social harmony based on diversity of ethnic, religious tolerance and respect for individual’s beliefs45.” [5/16] “If we lose our vigilance and pretend that our racial and religious differences do not exist, we may have to pay such a heavy price that all we have built and consolidated over the decades would be destroyed46 .”  and finally, the need for Singaporeans not to take things for granted. [5/17] “Of all the issues that could trip us up internally, the most serious potential threat would be our failure to preserve our racial harmony. … racial harmony is an issue that we can never take for granted…4 7” [5/18] “This peaceful co-existence of the different races, nurtured painstakingly over the years, is fragile and should never be taken for granted. The recent racial and religious tensions which affected some countries around us and farther afield serve as grim reminders of this fragile peace4 8.” [5/19] “Having been spared the racial riots or civil disturbances that have plagued many countries in the world, we sometimes become complacent and take the peace and harmony we enjoy for granted. This should never be so. We should continue to consciously promote racial harmony and social cohesion… 49 ” [5/20] “The events in the past year have shown that we cannot take our peace and harmony for granted. Our sense of social commitment and cohesion will make the difference between whether Singapore remains a safe, peaceful and secure home, or a place torn apart by racial or religious strife5 0.” 44 Ong Teng C heong, President, speech at MUIS Tea Reception, 2nd August 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 45 Sidek Saniff, Senior Minister of S tate for the Environment, speech at Seminar for Grassroots Leaders, 18 th May 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 46 Peter Chen, Senior Minister of State for Education, speech at the Launch of Singapore Polytechnic National Education Lecture Series, 15 th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 47 Peter Chen, Senior Minister of State for Education, speech at the Launch of Singapore Polytechnic National Education Lecture Series, 15 th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 48 Peter Chen, Senior Minister of State for Education, speech at the Official Opening of the Heritage Exhibition, 11 th February 1999. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 49 Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home A ffairs, 10 th June 2000. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 50 Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education, and Second Minister for Defence, speech at the National Day Observance Ceremony, 8th August 2002. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 95 The list of topics given above is not of course exhaustive. Other topics include the construal of race in economic terms, such as descriptions of racial harmony as a “precious asset” or the construal of race relations with respect to projected future outcomes of a failed management of the racial situation. By the occurrence of these topics, the racial crisis narrative produces a racially-conscious identity that must be aware, cautious and sensitive to racial matters, and encourages the self-internalisation of socially-cohesive values such as the preservation of racial harmony, racial tolerance, the acceptance of racial differences and ultimately, the ideal integration of the various races. As is evident from the official messages, there is an invariable emphasis on the almost imminent potential of the racial crisis erupting in such proportions as to cause disaster to the social fabric of Singapore society. The narrative of the racial crisis thus inspires a “prevention better than cure” reading, and without even erupting into undesired proportions, the crisis of race already presents a tense and uneasy climate of racial co-existence. Consider for instance the repetitive topics of the differences between races (construed as “deep faultlines”), the impossibility of eradicating these differences, the need therefore for the rulers and the ruled to be constantly vigilant against threat, for the rulers to be obsessed with the problem, the notion that the problems are recurrent or that they will never go away, and the need for Singaporeans to keep up their guard and never be complacent and take things for granted. The racial crisis narrative underlies an approach that sees the pre-emption of problems as crucial to maintaining the peaceful equilibrium among the races. This approach is exemplified in a variety of ways. It is, as was discussed in Chapter Two, conducted first of all through the evocation of events in the region (“In the recent past, 96 we have witnessed a number of inter-racial and inter-religious conflicts, both in the region and beyond. They are grim reminders of how … crucial it is to build and sustain a harmonious society out of diversity.51”); and the evocation of episodes in the past (“We, … from past experience, are well aware that if we allow racial politics to rule, we will only court danger52”). It is also exemplified by a constitution of possible future outcomes (“If [minority members] feel [they] are discriminated because of [their] racial, religious or educational background, Singaporeans will start to become disenchanted with their nation. This will spread like a disease and before long our society will be polarised due to people’s perceptions of racial, religious, or socioeconomic differences. This can result in the country being torn with political strives and social anarchy.5 3”). Management of the racial crisis is thus conducted through the use of the pre-emptive approach in forestalling the undesired consequences of racial disharmony. Hence, it is in pre-empting the events that have occurred in other countries from occurring in Singapore, pre-empting the recurrence of episodes of the past, and pre-empting possible strife in the future that the racial crisis is to be managed. In other words, the discourse of racial crisis is constructed by portraying the crisis as hanging like Damocles’ sword over society, the members of which avoid the signs of impending disaster at their peril. The discourse of racial crisis thus promotes and instils a certain sense of social identity in the Singaporean which is based on an awareness and sensitivity to racial matters, a commitment to the prevention of racial strife and a pursuit of the racially 51 Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education and Second Minister for Defence, speech at the Racial Harmony Games Day, 20 th July 2002. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 52 Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education, and Second Minister for Defence, speech at the Racial Harmony Day Celebrations, 18th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 53 Sidek Saniff, Senior Minister of S tate for the Environment, speech at Seminar for Grassroots Leaders, 18 th May 1997. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 97 harmonious ideal. The absence of racial disharmony shows to some extent, the successful assimilation of the citizenry to this elite-endorsed ideological5 4 system. The discourse of racial crisis is constructed to effectively mediate the level of racial (social?) conflict in society, and prevent the onset of chaos and disorder. 5.3 P RODUCERS OF THE DIS COURSE AN D T HE LIMITS OF ARTICULATION To explore further the ideological system that informs the body of beliefs pertaining to racial matters, we consider the producers of the discourse and the role they play in producing and sustaining the life of the discourse. As the cited statements above show, the producers of the discourse are the holders of the highest authority and power in the country. Their very positions of power lend weight and credence to the ideological stance they espouse. They have the “storytelling rights”: they may speak for the institution – being representatives of it, and having been vested with the right to; and, their account is the officially sanctioned one – and hence is the account to be taken up, repeated, stored in the official memory. For example, the racial riots are not mere episodes in Singapore’s history. They are frequently cited in Aesop fable-like contexts to point out the lessons to be learnt (the preservation of racial harmony, for instance), and used to advise against undesired consequences (racial discord, for instance). This point finds some resonance in Hong and Yap (1993). In their analysis, they show that there is a constructive assembling of Singapore’s history, the result of which is the reproduction and validation for general consumption those events that contribute to the shaping of a certain reality. Hence, as Hong and Yap report, as it held no “ worthwhile or discernible purpose for the future”, the first one and a half decades of history after self-government in 1959 did not merit preservation. This contrasts however to the history of the 1960s and after, where the I use “ideology” here in the rather layman sense of that body of beliefs which inform action, and which is seen to justify and account for it. 54 98 relevant episodes and lessons to be learned (such as “the experience of an earlier period of a Communist-dominated and riot-ridden society”, and the idea that “ if the PAP were to let its guard down, the state would sink into chaos and disorder”) could be discerned, and thus constituted the state-endorsed version of the past. To the extent then that history reveals lessons to be taught and learnt, it is deemed relevant and worthy of reproduction, and it is thus that the episodes of racial riots are signif icant for the discourse of racial crisis, and hence bear repetition in the discourse. Yet, it also appears that more important for the discourse than the actual cause 55 of the riots is the fact that they occurred, and by their very occurrence, they are held up as dangerous examples of the consequences of racial conflict. Indeed it appears to be the case, as both first-generation and second-generation leaders, i.e. both those who have experienced first-hand the trauma of those occasions and those who did not, routinely muster these lessons from history in the establishment of the ideological system of racially-integrative values that the citizenry are to assimilate to. In addition too, as the political leaders are the ones officially sanctioned to present their accounts and it must follow that, as such, the accounts they produce are the ones to be followed, they (re-)confirm the authority of their stand, and the legitimacy of their leadership. As they highlight state-endorsed episodes, and emphasise the state-endorsed aspects of those episodes, they effectively delineate the boundaries of the discourse so that they delimit alternative perceptions of the situation at hand. For example, in the discourse of racial crisis, the need for constant vigilance is undisputed for the very authority of the producers of the discourse ensures the validity of the proposition. On an individual level, the proposition might not mean much, but 55 It is significant, in this context, to mention that although the 1964 riots have frequently been construed and presented as “racial” in nature, at least one eminent Singaporean does not think so. In Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s own account, the riots were as much a result of divisions in politics and class, than of race alone. 99 on a society-wide scale, such a proposition leads verily to the rational acceptance of measures that could impeach on personal and individual freedoms and rights – albeit this latter is not a notion that the official ideology of pragmatism accommodates very well. In any case, in its ever-watchful vigilance, the leadership has never shied away from detaining indefinitely, without trial, perceived threats to the peace and stability of the country56 , or hesitated to remove, with sometimes drastic measures, aspirations to the political platform of perceivedly dangerous individuals with certain ethnic biases. The need for constant vigilance, one parameter of the discourse of racial crisis, thus delimits the active existence of threat, both in terms of the individuals expressing racially divisive sentiments, and the alternative perspectives on the discourse as expressed by these individuals. Finally, and in relation to the above, in understanding the significance of officially sanctioned accounts by producers officially vested with storytelling rights, we may consider for instance, how counter-accounts, or counter-discourses to the state-endorsed one are treated. In a review article published in The Straits Times (5th September 1999), ST writer Cherian George re-examined the notion of an “affective divide” between the rulers and the ruled in Singapore, as proposed five years earlier by popular fiction writer Catherine Lim and which described the scenario where Singaporeans, while having respect and gratitude to the People’s Action Party Government, felt relatively little affection to it. In his article, George identified two areas in which he believed the “Government’s policies lag behind the higher aspirations of a significant number of Singaporeans”, and hence could lead possibly to an “affective divide” between the rulers and the ruled. One of these areas lay in race relations. Calling to mind one of the frequently-repeated topics in the discourse of I refer here to the Internal Security Act, whose purpose it is to “counter security threats and subversion”. (ST, 9th September 1999). 56 100 racial crisis we have explored in the previous section, George argued that the Government’s declaration of “ethnic fault-lines as an immutable fact of life” perpetuated “an attitude of suspicion between the races”. Perhaps. But George’s position was however a counter-account to the stateendorsed one. In the latter account, the issue of ethnic fault-lines was brought up within discursive parameters advocating the awareness and acceptance of difference, in order to, as the rebuttal from the Prime Min ister’s office four days later indicated, prevent the notion that Singaporeans of all races were being “forced together” and made to “ lose their distinct characteristics” (ST, 9th September 1999). This notion is consistent with the Government’s management of ethnicity which rejects the “meltingpot” approach in favour of the “separate-but-equal” approach which, instead of insisting that racial differences be submerged (“The more ethnic differences are denied, the more they assert themselves, often with a vengeance 57 ”), supports rather the appreciation of differences among the races and emphasising their equality before the state. In the official account, the topic of ethnic faultlines is to be seen in the context of extant and persistent differences between races, and the need for awareness and acceptance of these differences. In addition, their reiteration in the discourse comfortingly states and re-states the official position on race management to the various races, reminding them that the Government endorses the preservation and pursuit of diverse cultures and accords equality to one and all. George’s position however recasts the discourse in an alternative light, in terms that the discursive parameters of the state-endorsed account does not prescribe, no matter how insightful his observation of the matter is. In its construction, George’s proposed model on this 101 matter and the other concerning democracy is perceivedly a counter-discourse to the officially sanctioned one, and is met with a disapproving reply from the Prime Minister’s Office (“This model is against Singapore’s interests”). In addition, the reply suggests that, unless it is to be pursued as a political question in which case a political platform should be adopted, nothing more should be said about the matter. This represents a closure of sorts, and the state-endorsed discourse resumes its dominance. This episode shows quite apparently in whom it is that power over story-telling rights is vested, and from whom it is that the officially sanctioned accounts issue, and hence are to be taken up, repeated and stored in institutional memory. As the examples from the discourse of racial crisis suggest, control over the construction of the discourse, over its discursive parameters, and over the definition of the OB markers on the discourse is vested in the hands of the governing elite, the producers of the discourse. By virtue of its authority and position, its storytelling rights are confirmed. Hence, they set not only the tone and direction in which topics within the discourse are to be pursued, but also define the boundaries of what may be articulated within in our case, the context of race. In a country where racial sensitivities must be borne in mind, discursive parameters of any discourse of race must understandably be adhered to. Counter-discourses that misinterpret the dominant ideological stance are hence not condoned, and quickly set right. Hence the role played by the producers of the discourse of racial crisis lies in the control they are able to exert over how the discourse unfolds. With this control, they determine the processes of construction and the limits of the discourse. In terms of serving as a strategy of control, the discourse of racial crisis, in delimiting the range and kinds of opinions that can be expressed within the officially sanctioned parameters of the discourse, effectively also delimits then the 57 George Yeo, Minister for Information & the Arts, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, speech at the Association of Muslim Professionals Inauguration Dinner, 31st October 1991. “The Malay/Muslim 102 proliferation of subversive and counter-productive ideas and their expression. That it is not the case that people wilfully engage in such expression is indicative of the success of the control manifested by the discourse of racial crisis. In providing the parameters within which the discourse may be engaged, and having the right to conclusively disapprove counter-accounts, the governing elite vis-àvis producers of the discourse, not only disambiguate their position as the dominant group in society, but also impose a monopoly on the constitution of the Singaporean social reality. Extrapolating from our discussion about elite control and definitions of discursive boundaries, it is obvious that it is the elite definition of what can be said or done, and what sorts of behaviour, attitudes and values to uphold that must be adhered to and practised. While this is not uncommon among other societies in general, the extent to which the citizenry itself accepts and follows these guidelines is rather exceptional, for the fact is that social control over these terms of engagement with the dominant reality is not exercised through coercive apparatus. While it is arguably plausible that the population is persuaded to adopt and adapt to the official model because it has served their own interests well 58 – promoting material gain, and providing basic infrastructure (housing) etc., an equally convincing non-economic argument is that the population is persuaded to follow in the state-endorsed direction as a result of the elite’s success in establishing and maintaining an ideological hegemony59 in the republic. As described in Chua (1997: 310), ideological hegemony “designates a condition in which the system of ideas of the ruling group is loosely accepted and reproduced in the governed as part of the latter’s ‘natural reality of everyday life’”. In other words, to the extent that “ individual members take up the ruling group’s ideas as Community in the Next Lap”, Speeches, 15(5), pp. 95 -101. See Clammer, John (1985: 166). 58 103 the rational conceptual template with which to organise the everyday world into a loosely coherent and meaningful entity within which one acts and responds to others and events”, then ideological hegemony is conceivably established. Ideological hegemony in Singapore is established and maintained through the successful perpetuation of a system of ideas that, among other things, encourages the acceptance of strong paternalism of the state. This notion of paternalism is ostensibly justified by the need for “pragmatism” as an important governing strategy. In the name of “pragmatism” therefore, the ruling group presides over and defines what is best for the development of the country, and what is not, what the people have to do, what they cannot do, the values they must possess and those they must reject, the definition of social reality they are to embrace, the boundaries they must not over-step etc. As the results of developmental progress of Singapore show, the governing strategy of “pragmatism” has indeed borne fruit, and while the paternalism of the state has invited criticism from many quarters, major sections of the population have nonetheless come to accept the rationality behind the extensive intervention of the state, so much so that the pragmatism that informs paternalistic intervention has even been considered as non-ideological. Indeed, Chua (1983: 33), for example, argues that it is testimony to the success of ideological hegemony that the PAP government’s governing strategy of “pragmatism” is perceived, “even by academics and intellectuals”, as “nonideological”, or as “but the logic of the needs of a developing Singapore”, and “not based on any ideological canons”. Within the discourse of racial crisis, ideological hegemony manifests itself to the extent that people willingly abide by the ideological guidelines set by the ruling group. Hence, at least insofar as the discourse of racial crisis is concerned, the absence 59 Or, as Chua (1997) notes, in the Government’s own language, “ideological consensus”. 104 of racial strife and disharmony in a racially plural society empirically verifies an apparent assimilation to the terms of the discourse as provided by the ruling group, and as circulated in official discourse as acceptable ideological currency. Social control is exercised thus by “the production of an ideology which represents itself as legitimating this control by having a monopology on reasonableness and the correct definition of reality” (Clammer 1985: 167). The production of the ideology rests in the hands of the producers of the discourse – the governing elite, the terms of the ideology are those defined by this elite, whose authority and position legitimate their control and whose “monopoly on reasonableness and the correct definition of reality” is based, in part, on the people’s acceptance of the paternalism of the state. 5.4 WHEN IS THE DISCOURSE M ANIFESTED ? In this section on the work that the discourse of racial crisis does for the institution Singapore, we look at the occasions by which the discourse is instantiated. In looking at the occasions of its instantiation, we look at both the types of occasions that occur on a regular basis, for example anniversaries, as well as those that occur on an irregular basis, for example, official launches of exhibitions and campaigns (see Linde 2001: 525). 5.4.1 Occasions: Regular Occurrences In terms of occasions that occur on a regular basis, a survey of official speeches which have been made that raise the issue of the racial crisis reveals the instantiations of the discourse on such occasions as annual National Day celebrations, as well as at the celebrations of the traditional festivals of the various races, such as the Lunar New Year celebrations of the Chinese, or the Hari Raya celebrations of the Malays etc. In spite of the celebratory mood of these events, public officials invariably pepper their 105 speeches with implicit messages of the racial crisis, reiterating typically the topics of the discourse, as discussed above (see section 5.2). A more recent event on the Singapore calendar that makes regular occurrences is the occasion of Racial Harmony Day on 21 st July every year. Unlike the occasions mentioned above, which while allowing opportunities for instantiations of the discourse of racial crisis were not primarily intended as such, Racial Harmony Day is an occasion specifically designed to address the racial crisis (“so that the younger generation is not ignorant of the perils faced by a society divided along ethnic lines, … Racial Harmony Day is now commemorated by schools …”60). The official hope is that in celebrating Racial Harmony Day, society is encouraged to appreciate and pursue the racial harmony ideal. 5.4.2 Occasions: Irregular Occurrences There are numerous irregularly occurring occasions in which the discourse of racial crisis is instantiated. These include for example, the inauguration dinner of the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) 61 , the opening of the United Indian Muslim Association Literary and Cultural Conference62 , the Launch of the Singapore Polytechnic National Education Lecture Series63 etc. The list goes on. Sign ificantly, in our survey of the occasions of irregular occurrences, it was found that while it is relatively easy to determine the occasions of regular occurrences in which instantiations of the discourse of racial crisis can be found, the task is somewhat complicated in terms of the irregularly occurring occasions. It is in fact the 60 RAdm Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Education, and Second Minister for Defence, at the Racial Harmony Day Celebrations organized by the Pasir Ris Zone ‘11’ Residents’ Committee, 18 th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 61 Speech made by George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 31st October 1991. “The Malay/Muslim Community in the Next Lap”, Speeches, 15(5), pp. 95 -101. 62 Speech made by George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 25 th July 1992. “Unity in Diversity”, Speeches, 16(4), pp. 105-108. 63 Speech made by Peter Chen, Senior Minister of State for Education, 15th July 1998. National Archives of Singapore, http: stars.nhb.gov.sg/public/index.html 106 case that in almost all public speeches made by government officials, some aspect or other of the racial crisis would be mentioned, and the many occasions of irregular occurrences of the discursive instantiations of the discourse simply cannot possibly be cited here. What the above discussion of the occasions of discursive instantiations of the discourse of racial crisis shows is this. First of all, the issue is evidently an important one for the ruling group and the fact that the discourse of racial crisis is repeatedly instantiated on occasions that are designed as well as those that are not designed for the specific purpose, or that the discourse finds some form of mention on almost all occasions, regular or irregular, attests to this. And secondly, it brings us back to the notion of the permanence of the crisis (see section 4.3.1). If it is the case that on as many occasions as there are in wh ich public speeches are made that the discourse of racial crisis is instantiated, and that this is the case over a span of thirty years or so, then it supports the view of the crisis as persistent and permanent. And this is indeed the case that can be made from our survey of the occasions in which the discourse of racial crisis is instantiated. 5.5 S UMMARY In the above analysis, we explored the discourse of racial crisis in terms of the topics that frequently recur in instantiations of the discourse, the producers of the discourse and what they contribute to the discourse and finally, the occasions in which instantiations of the discourse of racial crisis may be noted. With respect to the discourse of racial crisis, our analysis showed first of all that there are recurrent topics in the discourse and that these topics showed an invariable emphasis on the eruptive potential of the racial crisis. Given this, the 107 government’s strategy to the management of the crisis, premised on a principle of preemption, saw the frequent exhortations of min istry officials to the population to maintain a peaceful equilibrium among races. These exhortations manifest the ruling group’s constant efforts to promote and instil a sense of social identity in the Singaporean which is based on, as the range of topics show, (a) an awareness and sensitivity to racial matters, (b) a commitment to the prevention of racial strife, and (c) the pursuit of the racially harmonious ideal. In the subsequent discussion of the producers of the discourse, we saw the discourse as articulated by officially sanctioned individuals, who by virtue of their office, guarantees their storytelling rights. In this discussion, it was clear not only that the discourse ‘belonged’ to the ruling group, but also that its possession of exclusive rights to the discourse meant that it also governed the terms of the discourse, and the boundaries within which the terms of the discourse are to be articulated. This suggests an implicit prohibition on the espousal of the discourse on counter-terms. And indeed, when an opinion is expressed on the issue of racial management that while not ostensibly racially destructive, was however alternative, it was met with a stern admonishment from the Prime Minister’s Office. This episode re-stated who the officially sanctioned producers of the discourse are, and whom by their office, are the legitimate and legitimising holders of the rights to tell the story. Finally, the ubiquitous instantiations of the discourse of racial crisis in our survey of public speeches showed that the issue of race and its management was eminently important to the ruling group, hence their determination in managing it well. The ubiquity of its mention also showed the racial crisis to be somewhat different from other crises. It appeared to be permanent and persistent, as evinced through the frequent messages by ministry officials on the issue. 108 In the following chapter, we will return to the question of crisis construction and strategies of control with the above discussion in mind, as well as the discussions on the main aspects of the discourse (in Chapter Three), and the features of the discourse (in Chapter Four). 109 CHAPTER SIX Crisis Construction and Strategies of Control 6.1 CRISIS CONSTRUCTION IN THE REP UBLIC In this chapter, I want to discuss the discourse of crisis, or more specifically, the construction of such discourses as a strategy of control by the state. In terms of a social theoretical approach that provides a consolidated interpretation of the foregoing discussion, I will draw relevantly upon Chua’s (1983) discussion of ideology to inform the discussion in this chapter. As has been shown by the argument forwarded in Chapter Two, there is a sense of the recurrent packaging of problems in terms that suggest almost critical proportions. This has been done right at the outset of developing an independent sovereign Singapore, when the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia gave cause to the application of a crisis discourse built around the notions of the ‘survival’ motif and the challenges that must be overcome in ensuring Singapore’s continued existence. The success of the survival ideology drove the engines of economic development, so that the population and the government single-mindedly worked at propelling the small and resource-poor island-state out of abject poverty and political oblivion. Over the years too, the technique of crisis construction has been usefully applied on such occasions when it was felt some form of justification, or at least explanation, was due to the citizenry, for the pursuit of certain state-building objectives64 . For example, the need for a defence force was constructed in terms that highlighted the insecurities that attended the island-state as ‘an Israel in a MalayMuslim sea’. While the need for a defence force may be properly justified as a 110 fundamental concern of any independent, sovereign state, and hence required no further embellishment of its necessity, it was nonetheless conveyed to the Singapore citizenry in a sense that problematized the need in extra-critical terms. For example, by its construal in metaphorical terms, the expression receives semantic extensions in meaning and can connote far greater deleterious consequences should the project of establishing the defence force be neglected. These deleterious consequences rest on the individual’s perceptions of what the expression might mean to him/her, and the use of metaphorical speech in this instance, bolstered by whatever else was related in espousing the need, must convey the sense of crucial urgency in getting the project on track. As one instance of the recurrence of the crisis motif in the Singapore state, and as a brief illustration, the need for a defence force is thus justified/explained, in some way, by the constructed sense of apocalyptic crisis. In much the same way, other problems and issues that arose in the course of developing the republic were constructed on similar terms (see Chapter Two). The success achieved by the political leadership in overcoming these problems is arguably due in part to the success with which citizen consensus has been achieved in the perception of the problem in the terms designed by their political leaders, and ultimately, the desire to address it in the direction advocated by the political leadership. In understanding the construction of the discourse of crisis as a strategy of control therefore, we need to consider on one hand, the application of the technique of repeated administration of crises on the Singapore polity, and on the other, the fact that the citizenry regularly responds, without apparent protest, to calls by the government to adopt such and such a course of action and behaviour as response to the crisis at hand. In other words, in trying to understand the 64 See Barr, Michael (2000). 111 discourse of crisis in its role as a strategy of control, we are attempting both to understand the work that the discourse does for and within the society it has developed from; as well as how the discourse, in doing the work that it does, might reflect or reveal government strategies of control. In understanding the discursive construction of crises as a strategy of control in state development, one needs to bear in mind the distinction between overt and implicit (or, direct and indirect) mechanisms of control. While the distinctions are many, the one most relevant for our purposes here is that between the overt expression of control, for example, the use of legislation to control the practise of certain activities, and the imp licit expression of control, for example, as manifested in the self-censorship of newspaper agencies in Singapore in response to legislation that governs the renewal or revocation of their printing licences. As a strategy of control, the discourse of crisis is less similar to the direct, explicit and conspicuous application of government policies introduced for the resolution of problems and issues, such as the imposition of an ethnic quota in public housing to encourage racial integration, but more dissimilar to the application of government measures to (re-)direct popular attitudes, values, beliefs etc. onto the state-endorsed path, such as the establishment of a national ideology in the form of a set of Shared Values as an auxiliary strategy of control over the development of a national value system. With this in mind, we now explore the question of the discursive construction of crises as a strategy of control in state development in Singapore. 6.2 CRISIS CONSTRUCTION AND THE O RCHES TRATION OF CONSENT As mentioned in Chapter One, Rodan (1993) noted that the “discourse of crisis has been one of the most conspicuous and constant strategies of control in Singapore. This is used to create a climate of domestic uncertainty and even a sense of fragility about 112 the state and the economy”. The question is, how is this strategy of control manifested? More specific to our purposes, how is (the construction of) the discourse of crisis a strategy of control? We may find some preliminary answers in McRobbie (1994: 206), who sees the orchestration of crisis as a precursor to the orchestration of consent. Hill (2001) puts this notion under examination in his analysis of the moral panic over religion in Singapore. Arguing that crisis orchestration and management in the republic is a central component of the nation-building project, Hill suggests that one way to gain citizens’ dependence on the state is to create periodic crises which can subsequently be employed to draw attention to the state’s key arbitrating role. Taking the discourse of racial crisis as an example of the discourse of crisis, our analysis shows that the facets of crisis construction as a strategy of control is first of all based on the construction of particular notions and feelings towards the existence of the state, and which then informs the elite adoption of a particular approach to the management of the crisis. Recalling our discussion of the aspects of the discourse of racial crisis, we have seen how crisis construction is based on the construction of the precarious and perilous state of the republic. Comprising a racially plural society, not only is the republic always vulnerable to racial upheaval in terms both of its small-ness in size and geographical location, it is also vulnerable to threats posed by individuals who could very well hijack the project of careful state management. But in order that the sense of vulnerability is to be commonly felt by the population, the masses have to be persuaded to collectively view the situation as vulnerable. This, the discourse of racial crisis does, when it creates a sense of sharedness of fate among the population, and more crucially, between the rulers and the ruled. Thus crisis construction, at least in terms of the discourse of crisis, creates and perpetuates feelings of threat and 113 vulnerability and inclusively inducts members of the community into a shared sense of destiny and hence the responsibilities that their positions demand. In doing so, crisis construction in the first instance persuades allegiance to the elite-construed instability of the republic, and motivates hence a collective responsibility in preventing the escalation of the crisis. Given then this state of precariousness, the population is provided with guidelines on how the situation is to be managed. These come in the form of frequent exhortations by ministry officials as recurrent topics in the discourse that urge the formation of a collective social identity based on the awareness and sensitivity to racial matters in Singapore, a commitment to the prevention of racial strife and a pursuit of the racially harmonious ideals. That these exhortations are frequently made in numerous public speeches over the years attests to the determination of the governing elite to control the “vulnerable” situation, and undoubtedly reinforces the sense of criticality of the matter. In terms of presenting their opinions on a public platform, the Singaporean infers from official consternation over alternative views, especially in racially-sensitive areas, the officially sanctioned limits or boundaries that must not be over-stepped in the discourse. In the end, it is the producers of the discourse who hold the exclusive rights to determine how the discourse should unfold and on what terms it is legitimated, and these serve as the guidelines on the management of the crisis. In crisis construction therefore, it is apparent that it proceeds first in establishing a sense of vulnerability, and then a sense of sharedness of fate, and finally to the reification of the office of governing elite as the key authority in the state. This last point then underlies the potential functions afforded by crisis construction. By constructing crises, the governing elite perpetuates and encourages certain desired responses in the governed, and provides instruction not only on how the situation is to 114 be managed, but also how it may be managed well. The (constructed) existence of a crisis raises alarm and feelings of anxiety over how the crisis may be contained. As afforded by the criticality of the crisis, the governing elite designs a situation that presents no other alternative to the containment of the crisis than those proposed in its programmes and policies. Hence, it legitimates itself as the rightful rulers of the population and establishes a necessary subordination and acquiesance of the ruled. On its part, the population is persuaded to adopt the elite-engineered perspective and conduct themselves in the ways they are urged to by the elite. A co-operative framework is hence set up in the relationship between the rulers and the ruled where both parties are seen to consent to the roles designed for them and perform the functions designated by their roles. Such a relationship is however a complicated one, for while it may be the intention of the elite to establish and persuade consensus to its point of view, the population cannot be assumed to desire similar convictions. That there are potential consensus-building gains in crisis construction is without doubt, as it obviously reifies the authority of the governing elite for the management of the crisis, and persuades support to its policies and programmes. Yet, to imagine that crisis construction on its own terms orchestrates consent in the population and support for government policies is to imagine only half the picture. While we have established a theoretical link between crisis construction and the manufacture of consent (the design of the crisis encourages allegiance and obedience in the elite-preferred direction), we need to consider this link in terms of the processes that underlie it. In other words, I am suggesting that the link between crisis construction and consent orchestration is not straightforward – not a matter of one party constructing the crisis, and the other simply doing as the policies of crisis 115 aversion dictate. Rather, it is the case that the link between the two is one aspect and one product of the production and imposition of a dominant ideological system of beliefs, values, and attitudes, in Singapore society. Within this ideological system, the part played by the technique of crisis construction establishes the need for social control, while on the other hand, it is the success of the ideological system that mass consensus over government policies is achieved. We consider this in the following section. 6.3 I DEOLOG ICAL HEGE MONY AND CITIZEN COMPLIANCE In the previous section, we explored almost exclusively the role of the ruling group in constructing crises as a strategy of control over the ruled. This is of course not yet a complete picture for it is as much the role of the ruling group in bringing about the state of affairs as it is the role played by the citizenry that allows this state of affairs to pass. In this section therefore, we consider the question of how the ruling group effectively persuades citizens’ acceptance of its rule, including of course its policies and programmes without any apparent protest. In order not to have our discussion veer irrelevantly off the linguistic tangent, I am offering the following discussion only because, based on the analysis undertaken in this thesis, it gives some theoretical balance to the argument and provides clues to the understanding of crisis construction as a strategy of social control. In the previous chapter, I drew attention to the notion of ideological hegemony as the explanatory mechanism by which the population is persuaded to adopt and adapt to the parameters of the officially-designated model of reality. Here I want to explain the notion in a little more detail in order to argue that it is the mechanism by which strategies of control are realised, and by which the construction of crises orchestrates consent. 116 While it is sometimes argued that strict measures against opposition in the republic have silenced many a dissatisfied citizen, or at least kept individual instances of non-consent and discontent in check, it is equally plausible that the elite-engineered model of reality is often readily accepted because of the potential gains inherent in it for the subservient citizen, such as material gain and basic infrastructure like housing for instance 65 . From this latter point of view, the citizenry is seen as having been socialised into, or having assimilated to an elite-engineered model of reality (which of course contains little criticism against it), which explains why the citizenry unproblematically accepts the ideologies of the state. When then the ideologies of the state are no longer perceived as political or power-based, but become instead “naturalised” in the individual, informing his “common sense” reality of the way things are and should be, a condition of “ideological hegemony” is said to have been reached. As illustration, Chua (1983) writes, [6/1] Under conditions of ideological hegemony, … the ideological system speci[fies] the social organisation of the society, [and is the system of ideas] taken up by its individual members as the rational conceptual template with which to organise the mundane world into a coherent and meaningful entity within which one acts and responds to others. Chua objects, for example, to the depoliticisation thesis which argues that there is no politics in Singapore – that an “administrative state” has replaced it, and that there is a consequent depoliticisation of issues and of the bulk of the population –, and that the PAP’s governing strategy of “pragmatism” is “non-ideological”. On the contrary, he asserts that it is the hallmark of ideological success that this particular “nonideological” reading that the PAP was proposing for all its strategies had received wide acceptance and convinced even academics and intellectuals that the situation is indeed so. 65 See Clammer, John. (1985). 117 The above example indicates to some extent the ideological hegemony of the state as it indicates an unproblematic easy acceptance and possibly support of that body of ideas propagated by the state. Also indicative of this ideological hegemony is the fact that there is a minimum (negligible?) level of civic protestations and rebellion against the dominant ideological system that pervades Singapore society, almost as if the larger majority of the population are willing, or at least not-unwilling, recipients of the dominant ideological system. 6.3.1 The Dominant Ideological System and the Paternalism of the State An important characteristic of the dominant ideological system, it is often argued, is the excessive paternalism of the state at every level of the individual’s life. For example, Nair (1993) laments that “People are told what to like, who to marry, how many children they should have, how to behave themselves…” This lament finds some substantiation in the long series of campaigns run in the republic so far, which range from language (Speak Mandarin), to family planning (‘stop at two’, ‘have as many as you can afford’) to more mundane activities like the anti-litter campaign, to that which encourages the flushing of the toilet, and more recently, the Romancing Singapore campaign. But more than running campaigns to influence people’s lives, the paternalism of the state is exerted through defining the correct social reality the people are to organise themselves within. In the definition of the correct social reality, people are thus not only to be taught occupational skills necessary for material production (as prompted by the demands of economic growth), but also the cultural competence to conduct socially acceptable behaviour, which is elaborated within the confines of the dominant ideas of the dominant group (see Chua 1983). In other words, it is the 118 dominant ideas of the dominant group that builds the form and substance of the model of reality that people are to organise their beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviour in. But just as the paternalism of the state informs the construction of a certain ideological model of reality, it is within that model of reality that the paternalism of the state finds its expression. In terms of the ideological hegemony of the state and the preferred system of beliefs to hold, paternalism and the acceptance of it becomes part and parcel of the everyday life-world of the ordinary citizen. This is so on the one hand, because of the power and influence of the state, and on the other hand because the elite-engineered model of reality permits no real alternatives (it is the model of reality, the one to be adopted, any other model cannot apparently be imagined) – it presents its own version of reality, which predicated as it is upon its dominance and power as the ruling group, allows little room for alternative models to surface. Clammer (1985) sees the situation in these terms: [6/2] Ideologies express the specific interests of those who produce and attempt to legitimate them. Those who compete for the monopology of symbolic power (as well as physical power) are the “specialists” – the politicians. The “nonspecialists” are all the rest of the population, since there are no major secondary ideologies which can be used by people (except in a totally privatised way) to express alternatives. Indeed the dominant ideology contains amongst its essential characteristics the belief that such alternatives are subversive, unrealistic or disloyal, whereas only 6 6 the dominant ideology is “realistic”, “hard-headed” etc. – in fact is the only alternative to economic, political, social and cultural chaos. For the non-elite then, they “are expected to accept this definition of reality and indeed are encouraged to embrace it by incorporating themselves into the dominant system”, which as was mentioned, “many do since that is where all the material and symbolic rewards are” (ibid.). 66 Emphasis in original. 119 But the paternalism of the state and its place in the dominant ideological system may also be explained, to some extent, with reference to the dominant ideologies of the state. Given that the central concern of the PAP’s ideological system is the survival of the independent republic, the PAP saw the need to pursue what it describes as “pragmatic” developmentalist strategies (often defined as “necessary”, realistic”, and “natural”, hence “pragmatic”) (see Chua 1997: 312). In the name of “pragmatism”, the ruling group presides over and defines what is best for the development of the country, and what is not, what the people have to do, what they cannot do, the values they must possess and those they must reject, the definition of social reality they are to embrace, the boundaries they must not over-step etc. In accordance with this, it had justified its extensive intervention and paternalism by emphasizing that political stability and the demands of economic growth require a high degree of central planning and control, and that that, of course, was the “pragmatic” strategy to adopt. Rodan (1989: 88) describes the implications of this ideology: [6/3] This ‘ideology of survival’ … insisted on the inseparability of economic and political survival and the necessary subservience of all other considerations. Above all else, survival demanded the internalisation of an entirely new set of social attitudes and beliefs which embodied self-sacrifice for the ‘national interest’. An important aspect of the new ideology was the acceptance of the PAP’s sole right to determine this interest and the belief that the PAP’s own political survival was paramount to Singapore’s survival. And the monumental progress made by the republic under its political leadership afforded the PAP justification for its paternalistic influence. As one-time Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had said, [6/4] I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yet, if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn’t be here today. And I say without the slightest remorse, that we wouldn’t be here, we would not have made economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think. That’s another problem. 120 - then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at National Day Rally, ST, 20th April 1987. At the intersection of the central ideology of survival and the governing principle of pragmatism lies therefore, the notion of paternalism. And it is this paternalism and its mass acceptance that guarantees that the construction of crisis allows the orchestration of consent. Within the dominant ideological system, paternalism and its mass acceptance have already been imbibed as the natural order of things, a way of conducting and organising life for the ordinary Singaporean. The orchestration of consent in the construction of crises, apart from being related via a direct link (as explained in section 6.2), is thus also established as a function of the twin workings of the paternalism of the state and the corollary mass acceptance of it by the citizenry. 6.4 S UMMARY As the above discussion shows, crisis construction functions as a strategy of control in the possibilities it offers of orchestrating consent. In the first, consent is orchestrated through the creation of certain identities – the (elite-engineered) sense of the vulnerabilities of the republic, and the ‘fact’ that it constantly faces threat, both within and without. In addition, it also creates a sense of shared-ness in this ostensibly doomed fate. These identities form the basis of the ideological structure of crisis construction. The successful creation of these identities naturalizes the concepts of political obedience, the goal of social harmony and the resistance against ‘harmful’ social elements. Moreover, internalising these identities also lead to the desire to adhere and keep to the instructions of the elite political rulers, who have apparently proven their abilities to lead. This then enables the reinvoking and ratifying of these political rulers as the key arbitrating agency in the republic. 121 Secondly, consent is orchestrated in crisis construction as a corollary of the ideological hegemony of the state. In terms of the successful hegemony of the state, the citizenry’s willing socialisation and assimilation to the dominant ideological system, and its concomitant characteristic of paternalism and the mass acceptance of it, further guarantees the orchestration of consent. As a strategy of control therefore, the production of crises may be seen as the instrument by which consent is orchestrated, and hence, through the successful orchestration of consent, the means that afford the exercise of effective social control. 122 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion In this concluding chapter, I recap key points from the preceding chapters and discuss the discursive construction of crises in Singapore society. While it must be true that social order is a desired attribute of any modern-day society, or indeed, any society at all, it is less true that social order is an achievable state of affairs for any given society, and even far less true that it has often been achieved as efficiently, effectively and smoothly as in the case of Singapore society, and in this, the management of Singapore society is a hallmark case in social engineering and discipline. Born of traumatic circumstances, and having neither been propitiously endowed with natural resources of any type for which a thriving economy could easily be built upon, nor blessed with a population that could be expected to relate to and trust one another, the political leadership had striven hard to overcome the disadvantages and obstacles that stood in the way of building a thriving economy and successful nation. Admittedly, its success at developing nationhood amongst disparate peoples with only a short history to speak of pales in comparison to the success of the economy, but the efforts made in the direction are laudable and have gone at least some way in creating a socially harmonious and cohesive society. In every sense of the term, social order has been concretely established in the Singaporean society, and this is the underlying idea that this thesis is based upon. This thesis had asked, at the beginning, what strategies of control had enabled the political leadership to carry out its plans for social development in the republic, or more specifically, what has been/is the strategy of control utilised by the political leadership in enabling the creation and 123 continuity of a socially harmonious and relatively conflict-free society, even as primordial, atavistic ties threaten to tear it apart? 7.1 O RDER THROUGH CHAOS In Singapore, it appears that there is a sense of the quite paradoxical achievement of order through a construction of potential chaos, and this is the strategy of control that this thesis had sought to explicate and elaborate upon. In Chapter Two, I argued, alongside Hill (2001) and Heng and Devan (1995), for a propensity of the Singapore state for the repeated administration of crises on the Singapore citizenry. This process of crisis construction was argued as a precursor for the orchestration of consent (see Hill 2001) and its regularity serves to (re-)invoke and ratify the state’s authority and ownership of power (see Heng and Devan 1995). Likewise, in this thesis, the strategy of control employed by the state in order that the course of development could proceed at the rate and in the direction intended by the state is seen as, and argued as, achieved through crisis construction and in conjunction with the ends argued by these scholars. That crisis construction is a central mechanism of the state’s resources in the development of the republic is an issue that is reflected through the way in which the state regularly issues a problem, proposes and implements the solutions, and produces expectations on how the people should respond to the crises. Examples of crisis construction, and proposed solutions to the ‘problem’ include “the challenge posed by Chinese chauvinism, communist infiltration and ‘black operations’ “ which “justified strict controls on the press in 1971”, the failure of the bilingual education system which “placed the future of the country at risk”, the “leadership crisis” faced by the trade unionists throughout 1980 “which threatened their special relationship with the [People’s Action Party], and therefore endangered the stability and prosperity of 124 Singapore” as well as the religious crisis as described in Hill (2001) and the reproductive crisis (Heng and Devan 1995) etc. Evident in these crises are the notions of “danger”, “difficulty” and “decisive moment”, all requiring immediate and urgent attention. For the ruling elite, it legitimises their strong involvement and the adoption of sometimes unpopular decisions, and for the ruled, it encourages acquiescence and participation in the direction of the elite will. In this thesis, I looked at one such elite-constructed crisis, namely that pertaining to the issue of ethnicity, or in Singaporean terms, “ race”, and examined how its construction contributed to the development of social order and harmony in Singapore. The population of Singapore comprises distinct ethnic groups, which speak different languages, embrace different religions, and have different traditional and cultural practises. The non-homogeneity of the population was perceived as composing an always-imminent threat to social integration and harmony. With the construction of a racial crisis, a by-product construction of a larger notion of national unity and solidarity was enabled, where ethnic feelings, however strong, are discouraged from interfering with the larger picture of national development. This then allowed to some extent, the generating of a collective sense of awareness and national resolve to avert the calamitous consequences of the crisis. In its construction therefore, the threat of an irretrievable collapse of Singapore society, bringing with it its successes, potential and realised, is writ large and prominent. People are thus enjoined to pursue the racially harmonious ideal and co-operate with the government and its policies in order that the calamity so envisaged does not present itself. 125 But in addition, in repeatedly administering crises on Singapore society, the state also repeatedly (re-)states its position and authority as the highest powers in the republic and persuades the view of them as the only people able and fit to re-dress the problems. So that the crisis at hand may be successfully managed, it becomes crucial therefore that people, if not fully consenting, at least support state plans and policies, however unpopular these may be, as long as these measures bring about the desired stability and peace to the republic. The construction of racial crisis, therefore, not only creates support and builds legitimacy for the ruling elite, but also as a result, facilitates the development of social order and peace. The success of ethnic management and the non-incidence of racial strife thus far in Singapore society is testimony to the success achieved by the political leadership in this regard. 7.2 CRISIS THROUG H DISCOURSE In order to examine crisis construction from a different perspective from the sociological and political studies of the issue one usually finds in the existing literature, I have appealed to language research, in particular the discourse-analytic approach, to illustrate the construction and manifestation of the discourse of racial crisis in this thesis. The approach, based on a textual examination of the political statements and speeches (or segments of) produced by the political leadership, allowed an elicitation and elucidation of important nuances of the language as used by the producers of the texts. Crisis construction and the discourse of racial crisis is analyzed as comprising three major aspects (in Chapter Three), which allow the engendering of feelings of fear and threat, danger and difficulty, and which together create the sense of crisis. The geographical aspect pertains to the republic’s geographical size and location, which when deployed in the discourse of racial crisis, creates a sense of vulnerability of the 126 republic to external influences that could incite racial tensions in the city-state. By virtue of their being inevitable and immutable, these aspects are powerful in their suasion. And they underscore the presence and permanence of the racial crisis that persists in Singapore society, much like a known dormant volcano could erupt without warning. The historical aspect relates to the evocation of the history of racial riots in Singapore which serves not only to remind the populace of their troubled past, but also, by its ability to lend a near-tangibility to the present time of the racial strife of yester-years, both creates and perpetuates a deep sense of fear and threat of the potentiality of these events recurring, as well as encourages a sense of shared-ness of fate in the recipients of the discourse. Both this and the geographical aspect impose a sense of genuine danger that can befall Singapore society, by reference to the state’s vulnerability as a small island in a not-always friendly region and to the state’s turbulent history of racial strife. And finally, the human aspect elicits those elements within the discourse of racial crisis that have come/came to be singled out by the governing elite as potentially destructive to racial peace in Singapore. The significance of the human aspect lies in how individuals and their comments, rather than function(-ing) as individuated and equal discourses among the competing discourses in society, ultimately end up as subsumed within the terms of the elite discourse, so that their statements, actions and attitudes are to be interpreted in the realm of the elite-constructed discourse space designated for them. These individuals and their comments are felicitously packaged and presented within the terms of this discourse, and they are demonized as symbols of threat and danger to society in view of what their comments are perceived by the elite as representing. To some extent, it may be argued that more signif icance is usually 127 made and attributed to these comments than may have been intended by their producers. However, for the ruling elite, perhaps what is more important than what was said is how these comments (may) come to be interpreted within the sensitivities of a pluralist society. Individuals functioning beyond these elite-determined and constructed boundaries are thus hardly tolerated by the elite for fear that the everpresent racial crisis, inherent as it is in pluralist societies, blows over as a result, to create in small and vulnerable Singapore, a fatal social anarchy. 7.2.1 The Discourse of Crisis, Generally Speaking The analysis of the discourse of racial crisis thus far however provides a rather limited picture of crisis construction. The discourse of racial crisis is of course, and as was mentioned, not a stand-alone instance of crisis construction. Thus in Chapter Four, I looked at the similarities and differences between the discourse of racial crisis and other discourses of crisis within the larger rubric of crisis construction. In that analysis, I described three features shared between the discourse of racial crisis and other crises, and which qualify the ranking of the discourse of racial crisis within the larger domain of the discourse of crisis. Based on the common features among the crises, one may conclude the important constituents of the discourse of crisis. The construction of the discourse of crisis apparently relies on the following mechanisms: repeated articulations of the island-state’s vulnerabilities, concerted efforts of officials and other persons of authority in generating consensus for the perceived problem, and finally, the imp lementation of measures to manage the problem. But the racial crisis is also different from other crises, and these differences between the racial crisis and the other crises show the racial crisis to be a rather more significant instance of the discourse of crisis. It is through these differences, 128 constituted by the features of permanence and absence of explicit declaration of the racial crisis, that one senses the criticality of the racial crisis. Firstly, unlike the other crises, the discourse of racial crisis expresses the racial crisis as a permanent crisis. Already, the geographical size and location of the islandrepublic was a source of concern for the political leaders of the overall development and sustainability of the nation-state which was not only tiny in size, but was also situated in a region where its immediate neighbours were not only larger in size, but also comprised predominantly Malay-Muslim populations in inverse relation to its predominantly Chinese population. This had meant, at the beginning stages of national development, that intense care had to be taken in minding the sensitivities of its neighbours. Problems with its neighbours had to be categorically avoided. What complicated matters in this context in Singapore was that due to its small physical size, many and different ethnic groups were in constant contact with one another, and conflict between them had to be managed well, in order that it does not erupt into proportions that could not only threaten internal development and security, but worse, generate pressure from the neighbouring outside on its sovereign rule. As the features of size and location are inherent, inescapable and immutable, and that its population composition is not likely to be greatly altered, even over time, this combination of aspects ensured that the crisis was therefore both persistent and permanent. In view of this, perhaps, a second difference between the racial crisis and other crises thus arises. It is of notable conspicuousness that the racial crisis, unlike the other crises, has never been explicitly declared in Singapore’s history. It has not been declared in the way other crises have been declared, through public discourses, press statements, or ministerial speeches. Where a crisis, such as the reproductive crisis, was declared, a member of government typically describes the problem, proposes the 129 solution, and attempts to persuade nation-wide allegiance, unity and resolve to counter and manage the problem. Perhaps, there is no racial crisis. But the racial crisis has exerted its presence. It has not only claimed lives in the history of its existence, but is of enough concern to the political leadership to want to take steps to prevent potential consequences of the crisis. These steps include the pursuit of the principles of multiracialism, meritocracy and cultural democracy, the imp lementation of policies such as imposing an ethnic quota on public housing estates, the introduction of National Education in the school syllabus, the programme of National Service, which brings together males of all ethnicities in national defence; the creation of GRCs where at least one of the members running on the group ticket must be of an ethnic minority—thus ensuring minority representation in Parliament, the institution of ideologies which aims at “deracialising” the ethnic groups, such as seeking their subscription to a set of “Asian Values, thus subsuming the various and varied groups under the “Asian” label, rather than encouraging their overt identification with their supposed ethnicities, frequent min isterial exhortations to pursue the racially harmonious ideal etc. It is significant thus, in view of these measures to manage the racial crisis, that the racial crisis has an existence, persistence, and permanence in the republic, and as was proposed in Chapter Four, the absence of any declaration of it in the state’s management of the crisis, could, perhaps constitute a differential treatment of this sticky problem. Hence, rather than highlight the problem and heighten the sensitivities of the ethnic groups towards the differences between themselves and others, the strategy of managing the problem lay in not explicitly declaring the crisis as such, and as a problem seeking a solution. 130 7.2.2 The Discourse of Racial Crisis, Narratively Speaking To reinforce the analysis, I have also analysed the discourse of racial crisis in terms of a (partial) narrative framework which provides an overview of the discourse in general. In the analysis in Chapter Five, I considered the topics within the discourse of racial crisis, the producers of the discourse and the types of occasions on which the discourse is instantiated. In the discourse of racial crisis, one finds frequent references to the issue of race and the attendant possibility of racial tensions. These references range from definitions of potential areas of conflict among the races, the consequences that can follow from these conflicts, and how they may be prevented, the need for careful racial management, the implementation of government policies and their objectives, etc. Invariably, official discourse abounds with topics such as the following: (a) the nonhomogeneity of the population (and therefore the attendant potential for conflict); (b) the (persistent) existence of differences/ faultlines, and the need for Singaporeans to accept the differences; (c) the government “obsession” with the problem; (d) the record of hard work put into the management of the problem; (e) the recurrent nature of the problem; (f) the need for constant vigilance; and, (g) the need for Singaporeans not to take things for granted. With these topics, the racial crisis narrative attempts to highlight the dangers of the racial crisis, and the potential of social (racial) chaos and disorder. The discourse, thus constructed, also aims to promote a racially-conscious identity that must be aware, cautious and sensitive to racial matters, and to encourage the self-internalisation of socially-cohesive values such as the preservation of racial harmony, racial tolerance, the acceptance of racial differences and ultimately, the ideal integration of the various races. The absence of racial disharmony shows to some 131 extent, the successful assimilation of the citizenry to this elite-endorsed ideological67 system. Equally as important to the construction of the discourse is of course the producers of the discourse – those who are vested with the right to speak for the institution. Depending on who they are, the producers of the discourse legitimate the discourse. In addition, they may also delimit the boundaries of participation in the discourse, whether in terms of who may say what, or in terms of just what may be said, and how. The producers of the discourse therefore play an important role in sustaining the life of the discourse and determining the direction and extent of its development. In the racial crisis narrative, the producers of the discourse are the members of parliament and ministers of the state – holders of the highest political office in the country. Their very positions of power and authority lend weight and credence to the ideological stance they espouse, and their accounts of the discourse are the officially sanctioned ones, and hence, the ones to be taken up, repeated and stored in the official memory. In terms of the official recounting of past episodes of racial strife in Singapore, there is an apparent intention to speak of these only within Aesop fable-like contexts in order to point out the lessons to be learnt and to advise against undesired consequences. For the official memory, these episodes are recounted for their potential in advising caution against threat, and are an example of the “constructive assembling of Singapore’s history” argued by Hong and Yap (1993), where the only events that are reproduced and validated for general consumption are those events that contribute to the shaping of a certain reality. Thus, official accounts of racial strife in Singapore are constituted by the events that actually occurred and the lessons to be learnt for the future prevention of like occurrences. These accounts then construct a I use “ideology” here in the rather layman sense of that body of beliefs which inform action, and which is seen to justify and account for it. 67 132 certain reality in relation to racial matters – one that sees it always as a potential threat and which must thus be handled with great caution and care. In addition, as they highlight state-endorsed episodes, and emphasise the stateendorsed aspects of those episodes, the producers of the racial crisis narrative effectively delineate the boundaries of the discourse and delimit alternative perceptions of the situation at hand. For example, in the discourse of racial crisis, one journalist’s commentary in The Straits Times on government-people relations was seen as an attempt to recast the discourse in a different light, and was naturally met with a stiff disapproval from none other than the Prime Minister’s Office itself. And finally, in looking at the occasions, and types of occasions on which the discourse of racial crisis is instantiated, there appears to be an ubiquity to its mention. With every instantiation, and hence every official exhortation to bear in mind the fragility of the racial situation and the potentiality of danger, the message of interethnic sensitivity and harmony is conveyed and reinforced. And hence, the fact of its ubiquity, perhaps more than anything else, shows the importance that the ruling group attributes to the issue of race and its management, as well as their determination to manage it well. 7.3 CONTROL THROUGH CRISIS Following the above analysis and description, we may return now to the question that began this thesis: by what means of control was the political leadership able to create and ensure continuity of a socially harmonious and relatively conflict-free society? As was argued, one means of control utilised by the state appeared to be the repeated administration of crises upon the citizenry. Crisis construction was the technique Hill (2001: 15) argued for as the means with which citizens’ dependence on the state is gained and which can be employed to draw attention to the state’s 133 arbitrating role. Likewise, Heng and Devan (1995: 196) contend that crisis construction allowed those in power to “confirm themselves the owners of power”, as the administration of crisis operates to revitalise ownership of the instruments of power…” In this thesis, crisis construction has come to be understood as the technique that offers possibilities of state control because it crucially facilitates the generation of consent and support for government decisions and policies. As the preceding chapter has shown, crisis construction and the orchestration of consent go somewhat hand-inhand. In producing crises, the political leadership constructs situations of danger and threat and advises on the proper and crisis-averting route that the population must take. Set against the background of the success of the political leadership in lifting the country out of its economic and political doldrums in the 1960s, and the great strides it has made in bringing about peace and stability to the country, the ruling group reinforces the notion of itself being the fittest and ablest in leadership, and possessing the necessary expertise to lead and guide the country to further successes. In terms of addressing crises therefore, the ruling group is to be seen as the pre-eminent agency in the process. The fact that many citizens of the country agree, or do not apparently disagree, and have, more importantly, proceeded in the direction of the state’s political will is testimony to the extent to which the political leadership has indeed won their consent and support. With the construction of periodic crises therefore, the political leadership increasingly gains the dependence and compliance of the citizenry and may effectively steer the people towards the achievement of national objectives and goals. Taking the discourse of racial crisis as an example of the discourse of crisis, the analysis had shown that the facets of crisis construction as a strategy of control is first of all based in the construction of particular notions and feelings towards the existence 134 and continuity of the state, and which then informs the elite adoption of a particular approach to the management of the crisis. Crisis construction in the first instance thus persuades allegiance and support for the elite, by drawing attention to the (eliteconstrued) instability of the republic, motivating hence a collective responsibility (of the rulers and the ruled) in preventing the escalation of the crisis. As the state proceeds to address the crisis, and as the citizenry willingly follow the directions of the state will, the state reinvokes and ratifies itself as the key arbitrating agency in the republic. Secondly, consent is orchestrated in crisis construction as a corollary of the ideological hegemony of the state over the citizenry. The successful hegemony of the state – constituted by the citizenry’s willing socialisation and assimilation to the dominant ideological system –, the concomitant characteristic of paternalism in the ideological system and the mass acceptance of it, further guarantees the orchestration of consent. As a strategy of control therefore, the production of crises may be seen as the instrument by which consent is orchestrated. The successful orchestration of consent, in the end, is that which, for the state, facilitates the exercise of effective social control. 135 REFERENCES Barr, Michael D. (2000). Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man. 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Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language. England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited. Turnbull, C.M. (1977). A History of Singapore 1819 – 1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vasil, R. (1995). Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity. Singapore: Heinemann Asia. 138 [...]... existence Crisis in post-independent Singapore was a notion encompassing the varied economic, political and social problems faced by the new republic In the Singaporean sense, crisis manifested itself in these early years as problems that threatened the state’s survival and continuity 2.2 CRISIS CONSTRUCTION But the notion of crisis, which had its beginnings in these traumatic and critical times in Singapore s... Singapore facing the possibility of losing her former role as the financial, banking and shipping centre for the Malay peninsula (see Turnbull 1977: 303) Singapore s entrepot trade, which had hitherto been the main lifeline of her economy, showed a pattern of decline Crucial events taking place around that time, such as the Indonesian Confrontation during 1963-6, the abovementioned separation of Singapore. .. post-independence, the continued survival of the republic hung in the balance As Lee Kuan Yew argued, in his advocacy for the merging of Singapore and Malaya, in a political radio broadcast in 1961: [2/4] [Malaya] is the hinterland which produces the rubber and tin that kept our shop-window economy going … Without this economic base, Singapore would not survive Post-independent Singapore thus found itself... starting point from which to demarcate the beginnings of the crisis discourse, but as an illustration of how the crisis discourse, could, and indeed did, manifest itself It appeared that the separation of Malaysia and Singapore gave the producers/ engineers of the discourse the grounds for the 16 once, upon independence and beyond, the Singapore leadership and population found itself beset with crisis. .. designate crisis — may be understood in relation to the Singaporean reality 7 All at 7 The crisis discourse did not of course begin with the separation of Malaysia and Singapore Instances of crises with the PAP in power or as an aspiring political party abound, but it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore these other crises The brief history of the founding o f sovereign Singapore is... Indian women – members, that is, of Singapore' s minority racial groups While the Chinese majority was shrinking, both the Malay and Indian ethnic minorities were expanding Underlying the narrative of reproductive crisis formulated in terms of “graduate”mothers-not-reproducing/“non-graduate”-mothers-reproducing-too-freely is, really, “[t]he threat of impending collapse in the social and economic order... approached from a linguistic perspective 13 CHAPTER T WO The Discourse of Crisis 2.1 THE CONCEPT OF ‘CR ISIS ’ Definitions of crisis include the following: [2/1] - A crucial or decisive point or situation; a turning point - An unstable condition, as in political, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending, abrupt or decisive change - The point of time when it is to be decided whether any affair... Separation, survival not only included the Party, but it also encompassed the entire Republic of Singapore (Shee 1971: 23) 19 min ister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who had, together with his political party—the PAP—led the country as the ruling party in government since Singapore s independence In Barr’s study, the prime minister’s political technique may be attributed to his close reading of Arnold Toynbee’s A... offspring, the ability to complete a university education attesting to superior mental faculties, which would be naturally transmitted to offspring through genetic inheritance” If not rectified, the imbalance would mean that “[w]ithin a few generations, the quality of Singapore' s population would measurably decline, with a tiny minority of intelligent persons being increasingly swamped by a seething,... of crisis History had begun for independent Singapore in an abrupt separation from the Federation of Malaysia, and had unfolded through traumatic and testing times In 1963, Singapore achieved independence from her British colonial masters as part of the then-new Federation of Malaysia This political union was, however, fraught with much bitterness and hostility between Singapore s incumbent ruling ... of Singapore s geographical size and location, it is in these geographical facts that the racial crisis finds its first roots The racial crisis in Singapore thus finds its “beginnings” in the... “[w]ithin a few generations, the quality of Singapore' s population would measurably decline, with a tiny minority of intelligent persons being increasingly swamped by a seething, proliferating mass... existence Crisis in post-independent Singapore was a notion encompassing the varied economic, political and social problems faced by the new republic In the Singaporean sense, crisis manifested