The pitfalls of a state in transition myanmar 1974 2000

i MISUNDERSTOOD MYANMAR: AN INTROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE VICISSITUDES OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATE IN TRANSITION ( 1974 – 2000 ) KOH KIM SENG A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2009 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of contents i Acknowledgement iv Preface xi Summary xviii List of tables xxiii Chapter I : Introduction: Toward An “In-Sense” Of Myanmar Chapter II : Misunderstood Myanmar 11 Chapter III : Zenith and Nadir 11 Social Lens 18 International Brickbats 22 On Press Freedom 26 On Narcotics: Victim or Aggressor 34 The Milieu Interieur (Part 1) 45 Facts of History 45 Impressions of a Former First Lady, A Seasoned Academic’s Tale 57 “A perspective from the General’s Aide” 74 Independence First and Last 78 The Tatmadaw 97 En-route to Democratizing Myanmar 120 Oversight of Governance 125 Chapter IV : The Milieu Interieur (Part 2) 134 Autocracy and the Myanmar Junta 134 The Junta and the International Pressure 145 Eight-Eight-Eight-Eight 155 ii Conflagration: The Role of the Universities and Religious Sector 175 The Great Political Divide, Myanmar-style 177 Fear of Anarchy over Tyranny 187 “Hpon, Awza and Ana,” and the Sangha Order 190 Politics and the Sangha Order 197 In Recent Times 206 Chapter V : The Milieu Exterieur 211 On the Other Side of the Free World 211 On the Doctrine of Isolation 212 On International Aid 218 Chapter VI : Reeling Under a Colonial Past Myanmar in the Early Years:Autocracy and the Struggle 223 223 British Annexation: Diarchy, Alienation and More Struggle 230 Japanese as colonizers: Friend or Foe - more struggle 239 Narcotics Problem in Myanmar: A British Implant and added Struggle Chapter VII : Myanmar: International Relations Calculus 242 250 Myanmar and China 250 US – China : Myanmar Equation 259 US Policy on “Burma” 262 Relations with Japan 267 Asean “Non Interference” an Exception 269 Prognosis for Intending “Predators” – Quo Vadis Myanmar 272 The Way Forward 275 iii Chapter VIII: Epilogue 278 Bibliography 290 Annexes: Annex A Stone inscription 299 Annex B Letters from David O Abel 300 Annex C Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 2003 308 Annex D The Panglong Agreement, 1947 320 Annex E Excerpt from International Narcotics Strategy Report 323 Annex F Report on US trade sanctions against Burma 335 Annex G Overview of Burmese sanctions regulations 345 Annex H EU trade sanctions against Burma 352 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Government of Myanmar, considering the many “distortions” contained in foreign accounts, in recuperating its history set up the Myanmar Historical Commission in the 1950s to delve into the past by way of what is commonly known in Myanmar as “living history”. To this end, those who have had the opportunity to work closely with the past power or stakeholders and who can faithfully narrate the actions and the raison d’etre thereof of such power or stakeholders based on interviews, are the most likely to reveal the “inside story”. Oral history becomes even more crucial because access to the National Archives in the sanctums of which lie the most secret of State documents which are extremely difficult if not impossible for locals to get access into not to mention for foreigners. There are “layers of safeguard and control” according to one of my key respondents, whom I shall call Brother, a former government Minister in charge of the National Archives in which documents such as the ‘Side Letter’ pertaining to the “dispensation” of the 10-year Secession Clause sought by the Minorities during the Panglong Talks over the formulation of the 1947 Constitution for presentation to the British for Independence, are kept”. Brother mentioned that he saw the ‘Side Letter’ once when the then Senior General Saw Maung in the course of discussion over an issue with him, instructed the then Chief of the Archives, Ltc. Than Maung, a historian formerly from the History Department of the Defense Services Academy, to get hold of the ‘Side Letter’. Nevertheless, for this thesis, wherever possible, oral (and apocryphal) accounts will be authenticated with documentary evidence. v Thus to say the obvious, because the Myanmar Government lets out nothing practically, undertaking research in Myanmar is a gargantuan task. This is well documented and every researcher so engaged, will indubitably attest to this. For this reason, most “modern” writings on Myanmar are based on secondary sources, so that even academics within Myanmar are enthusiastic over the fact that someone who has had exposure to the power/stake-holders over an extended period of time and who can assess and document the “Myanmar Story” from an inner perspective, is researching the pitfalls which have caused the country’s vicissitudes, in its transition to a modern democratic state. This need for extreme secrecy inspite of the usual Official Secrets Act being in place, understandably represents a throwback of Myanmar's unduly “checkered” historio-political development; the “let-downs” of what Myanmas1 unmistakably and positively appear to attribute to the “trickery” of its past colonial masters – the British and Japanese — or in their words, their abomination of lu — yon — thut — lo — the. The disputes over territorial and autonomous rights with the Minorities/National Races have not been totally resolved either so that any unnecessary exposure of state secrets may cause the “unravelling” of the existing system just as it is in the throes of overall national ethnic integration, stabilization and transition to democratization and modernity. “Myanmar” represents both the country as well as its citizens according to Myanmar etymologist, U San Lwin, who opines that depending on context, “Myanmar” could be a noun, pronoun or adjective. The use in more recent time of “Myanmese, Myanmarese” to denote Myanmar citizens is unknown. For expediency, in this thesis, I shall use “Myanmar” to denote the Country and “Myanma” its citizens. See also page 24. vi This Thesis is the product of some four years of intensive painstaking research, both desk and field, not to mention some twenty years of personal exposure to, and experience of, members of the Government, bureaucrats, academics, locals of all strata of society – in the private and public sectors – the politically influential Sangha and the layman, apart from seeking input from foreign Myanmar scholars, watchers and analysts. The task has proved to be infinitely more daunting than originally envisaged and it would have been impossible to achieve but for the assistance, in particular the encouragement provided by many, both inside and outside Myanmar. Often enough I have come up against a blank wall which was fortuitously demolished with the assistance of the many kind and helpful, knowledgeable and wise souls who are not only steeped in academe but also in Myanmar governance and the Government. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Daw Ni Ni Myint (Former Director General, University Historical Research Commission; Member Myanmar International Commission), whose pearls of wisdom “not to be too greedy in writing” should, in retrospect, have been followed to the ‘T’; U Tun Aung Chain (Former Professor, Department of History, Yangon University, Secretary, Myanmar Historical Research Commission); U Maung Maung Aye (Former Associate Professor International Relations Department, Yangon University); Joanna MM Hoogvelt Drs. (former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Sheffield University); Brig. Gen. David O. Abel (Retd.) (Former Minister of Finance, Trade & Planning/Minister in the Chairman, SLORC/SPDC’s Office); Lt. Gen. Kyaw Ba (Retd.) (Former Member SLORC/SPDC and Minister of Hotels & Tourism); Vice Admiral Maung Maung vii Khin (Retd.) (Former Deputy Prime Minister/Chairman Myanmar Investment Commission; Member SLORC/SPDC,) Former Chief of Myanmar Navy; Lt. Gen. Tin Tun (Retd.) (Former Deputy Prime Minister, Member of SLORC/SPDC,) Former Chief of Myanmar Air Force; Brig. Gen. Myo Thant (Retd.) (Former Minister of Information); Brig. Gen. Saw Lwin (retired Minister of Telecommunications/Hotels and Tourism); Col. Ko Lay (Former Mayor of Yangon City Development Committee/Minister in Prime Minister’s office); Dr Than Nyun (Former Rector, Institute of Economics, Yangon; Deputy Minister of Higher Education/Currently Chairman, Civil Service Selection & Training Board); U Pan Aung (Former Minister of Education & Transport); Col. Aung Phone (Former Ambassador to Italy and Former Minister of Forestry); Dr Hla Pe (Pro-Rector, International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University); The Venerable Ashin Nanissara (Chancellor, Sitagu International Buddhist Academy) U San Lwin (formerly Director General of the Department of the Myanmar Language Commission and currently Member of the Commission) Dr Chee Kuan Tse, Professor of Psychiatry, Institute of Medical Health, Singapore, without the assistance of all, it would not have been possible to gather information and conduct this research. The abovementioned people together with many “unmentionable” senior bureaucrats and private sector individuals assisted in piecing together the very complex historio-econo-political development of Myanmar and gave me invaluable first hand knowledge of the past and the ebb and flow of events of Myanmar in its “developmental/ modernizing process,” not to mention their critiques, encouragement and suggestions, resulting in the crystallization of this Thesis. viii It would be superfluous to say how grateful I am to my supervisor at the National University of Singapore (NUS), Professor Reynaldo C. Ileto, whose academic credentials are most intimidating and whose exacting standards are difficult to meet but fortuitously this is compensated by his humane understanding of having to supervise what by local standards is a “geriatric” candidate, who, to boot is lumbered with a full-time job and therefore his provision of guidance and tender loving care. Above all, it was his encouragement and supreme confidence that he could yet excoriate the latent and nascent goodness of an experienced (albeit not academically trained) mind that was the decider and was crucial to my embarking on this exercise. My grateful thanks also go to the members of my thesis committee: Assistant Professor, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto who stimulated great interest in me about ASEAN, in particular Indonesia during my ASEAN Country Module for my Masters degree and Assistant Professor Kyaw Yin Hlaing, who is a Myanma and a Myanmar scholar and an active researcher on Myanmar himself. His “guidance” at my PhD studentship time and my Thesis Proposal Defense was helpful. I found their own research output inspite of their other responsibilities somewhat inspirational, encouraging me to continue with the research. I must perforce not forget my dedicated secretarial aides Salmah K. and Linda Lim who had to pour through my many draft manuscripts over and over again following my interminable corrections, most conscientiously and patiently, despite their heavy normal work load as well as my wife, Alice who had to suffer night after night of my writing with the table lamp switched on when she is so used to sleeping without light, not to mention her having to forego holiday trips. I must also not ix forget to mention my daughter, Gillian who rather like the Honourable Lord Chevalier de Rohan who wanted Voltaire punished for having the audacity to answer his query “unanswerably” and who consequently got a band of ruffians to assault Voltaire by night, however with the caution “Don’t hit his head; something good may come out of that yet,” and who seemingly unwittingly put her judgment in jeopardy by her supreme confidence that this head would yet make the grade. This was encouragement par excellence. In any event, the outcome of this Thesis, will tell. My thanks also go to the many administrative staff members of SEASP Office shuffling papers to and fro between me and my supervisor. This Thesis represents my own work and as is evident from the footnotes and bibliography, the relevant sources and information which form the basis of this work have been duly acknowledged. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to attribute many of the information and philosophy behind the policies/moves made by the Government to specific individuals albeit on a strictly confidential basis and after years of quanxi building in Myanmar, individuals—including certain “unmentionable’ members of Government, senior bureaucrats and private sector individuals—were quite prepared to share their thoughts on a strictly confidential and friendly basis on government motivations or reluctance, for undertaking certain actions to ensure (the Official Secrets Act is not breached) and heads not roll. For this reason, I have perforce had to resort to the use of pseudonyms/nom de guerre especially in the revelation of the more sensitive areas of Government thinking in policy formulation and action or inaction, for that matter. 338 Efforts by other governments.No other nation has implemented the same set of sanctions as the U.S., and none has adopted the new economic sanctions the U.S. put in place after the May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi's motorcade. Nonetheless, over the last year many have indicated concern for the situation in Burma and instituted new or expanded measures to promote democracy and human rights. In 2003, the European Union (EU) expanded its existing visa and travel restrictions and its asset freeze list to identify a broader set of Burmese who benefit from the oppressive policies of the junta. The EU also has in place a ban on arms sales and limits on assistance to the government. The EU has traditionally drafted the annual General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights resolutions on Burma. EU "troika" visits to Burma have drawn attention to the continuing lack of progress on democracy and human rights issues. The United Kingdom has called on its companies to review their investments in Burma; two major British investors, British American Tobacco Company and Premier Oil, have sold their investments in the country to outside parties in the past year, and at least 18 UK companies cut ties with Burma in 2003. Canada has also expressed concern for the lack of progress in Burma and imposed visa and travel restrictions on Burmese officials in the wake of May 30. Under Canadian government and popular pressure, major Canadian investor Ivanhoe Mines is reported to be considering selling its operations in the country to Chinese investors. Norway has sanctions similar to the EU, banning arms sales and enforcing a broad visa ban and asset freeze. In addition, Norway has been a supporter of the Burmese exile movement and hosts a radio service dedicated to providing uncensored information to those inside Burma. Japan has frozen all new development assistance to the government in response to the May 30 attacks. However, Japan does continue funding, on a case-by-case basis, certain urgent humanitarian programs, democracy capacity-building projects, and those projects supporting 339 economic structural reform. Senior Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Koizumi, have called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and progress toward democratization. Since May 30, Australia has deferred its recurring human rights training program and put certain agricultural assistance programs on hold. Australian officials have also called publicly for Aung San Suu Kyi's release. ASEAN nations issued an unprecedented call for change from fellow member state Burma at their June 2003 ministerial meeting. In mid-June, then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir issued a statement indicating the Burmese government's actions were creating a "dilemma for the [ASEAN] organization." However, at their October 2003 meeting in Bali, ASEAN states took a different path and welcomed "positive developments" in Burma, including the junta's road map to democracy. The U.S. continues its dialogue with countries in the region and has made clear the important role that ASEAN has to play in encouraging reform. Administration officials have noted to ASEAN counterparts that there would not be high-level U.S. participation in ASEAN events hosted by the Burmese junta in 2006 unless the country adopted significant reforms. While we share with Thailand the goal of advancing democracy in Burma, our approaches differ. Thailand is unlikely to change its policies or adopt sanctions against Rangoon. Thailand, however, has played a critical role for many years as a refuge to Burmese fleeing their country, and we have stressed to the Thai the importance of continuing to fulfill this role and supporting UNHCR in its work with Burmese refugees. The Royal Thai Government has also organized the "Bangkok Process," envisioned to be a series of meetings of interested governments discussing political reform with the Burmese government. At the initial December 2003 meeting, all participants except India called on the Burmese junta to release Aung San Suu Kyi and include the democratic opposition in the democratic reform process. Neither the United States nor Burmese opposition groups were invited to the initial meeting, 340 although some European countries participated. The United States did not seek to participate in this meeting. China continues to be Burma's primary financial and one of its primary military supporters. Chinese officials participated in the Bangkok Process, though they did not make any public statements critical of the government's presentation. China has, however, expressed support for national reconciliation and according to some observers, is encouraging reform in discussions with the Burmese government. India has neither provided strong public support for the democratic opposition nor called for an improvement in the human rights situation. Since the 1990s, India has vied with China for influence in Burma, sending high-level delegations, including a July 2003 visit by the Commerce Minister and a November 2003 visit by the Vice President, and offering significant financial and diplomatic support. Burma has also cooperated with India on the question of Indian insurgent groups operating out of Burmese territory. United Nations efforts The U.S. supports the work of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. Ambassador Razali continues his efforts to facilitate a dialogue toward national reconciliation among the parties in Burma. Special Rapporteur Pinheiro has drawn attention to the continuing human rights violations in Burma and called for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and an investigation into the premeditated attacks on Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2003. The UN country team inside Burma has focused its efforts on a range of humanitarian issues. The United States backs UN initiatives to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, support returned refugees, and fight narcotics. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and humanitarian assistance for the communities of Muslim Burmese in Northern 341 Rakhine State [Rohingya] who have returned to Burma after fleeing to Bangladesh in 1991. UNHCR representatives recently gained access to areas in the east of the country to begin measures to create the necessary conditions for the large-scale return of refugees from Thailand. U.S. officials in Rangoon maintain close communication with UN counterparts. III. Effects of trade-related measures Political and economic situation The U.S. trade-related sanctions have had an effect on the situation in Burma. Coincident with the June 4, 2003, introduction in the House and Senate of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, U.S. embassies in ASEAN capitals made a strong demarche to the respective host governments. This in part led to statements critical of the junta's behavior made by individual ASEAN leaders and by the ASEAN leaders as a group during the June 2003 ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh. With this increasing pressure from Burma's closest allies, and the passage of the Act on July 28, 2003, the junta on August 30 publicly recognized the need for democracy with its "road map." In April 2004, the government issued invitations to a National Convention starting in May designed to draft a new constitution, taking up where the failed 1993-1996 National Convention left off. It is unclear to what extent, if any, the democratic opposition and ethnic groups have been involved in planning the Convention. For a constitutional convention to be successful, the political opposition and ethnic groups must support it and must be involved in preparations for it. We not know whether participants will be able to voice their opinions or make changes to Convention documents. The junta has not announced an overall timetable for a transition to democracy. In September 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi was moved from prison to house arrest, and in November, five of the NLD's most senior leaders were allowed out of their homes. Two more were released from detention in April 2004. Aung San Suu Kyi and one other senior NLD leader remain under house arrest. NLD officials who participated in the Convention in the 342 mid-1990s have been invited to attend the one that will convene in May. The NLD Central Executive Committee has called for the procedures of the Convention to be in line "with democratic principles." In recent months, the military junta and Burma’s largest remaining ethnic insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU), entered into serious cease-fire negotiations. KNU leader General Bo Mya visited Rangoon in January, and subsequent talks in February helped to secure progress toward a lasting cease-fire. If a final agreement between the parties is reached, it could end over five decades of conflict, and could open up Karen and Mon States for badly needed international economic and humanitarian assistance and the eventual voluntary repatriation of thousands of refugees from Thailand with UNHCR involvement and return home of thousands of internally displaced persons. Over twenty groups have concluded ceasefire agreements with the junta. It is the Burmese junta's dismal economic policies that have led to widespread poverty and the flight of most foreign investors from the country. Likewise, Burma's dreadful employment situation reflects decades of economic mismanagement by the Burmese government. However, the 2003 U.S. ban on Burmese imports had an impact on at least one sector of the economy: the garment industry. More than 100 garment factories, already in dire economic straits, that had relied on exports to the United States have now closed. There has been an estimated loss of around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs. However, new orders from importers in EU member countries helped remaining factories continue production. Human Rights Despite the Burmese Government's stated desire to make progress toward democracy, its extremely poor human rights record has worsened over the past year, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Citizens still not have the right to change their government. Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocate persons, 343 and use forced labor. The military junta continues to be hostile to all forms of political opposition. After the May 30 attack, in which government-affiliated agents killed as many as 70 pro-democracy activists, the government cracked down severely on the NLD and shuttered all 300 NLD offices in Burma. Arrests and disappearances of political activists continue, and members of the security forces torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. The government has allowed two visits by Amnesty International and maintained cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Our expanded sanctions represent a clear and powerful expression of American opposition to the developments in Burma over the past year and signal strong support for the prodemocracy movement. Sanctions are a key component of our policy in bringing democracy to Burma and have been a key source of support for the morale of many democracy activists. IV. Effects of sanctions policy on broader policy interests and relations It is U.S. steadfastness that sends a clear signal to the junta of U.S. support for change. The measures in place have the broad backing of Burmese democracy activists. Although the EU and others have taken some steps, no other country has taken measures similar to those of the U.S. We continue diplomatic efforts at all levels to urge other countries to adopt broad sanctions similar to ours or targeted approaches to dealing with Burma. We have found that many in the international community have a different view on how best to achieve our shared goals in Burma. The trade-related sanctions implemented pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 have had limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations. Although some foreign businesses have complained about the impact on their operations, all who have invested in Burma have done so recognizing the difficult operating environment and overall poor economic climate fostered by the junta. Furthermore, many U.S. and other companies 344 had already pulled out of Burma prior to the passage of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. Conclusion International pressure and support for the Burmese democracy movement is essential for promoting change in Burma. However, the import ban implemented in 2003 would be far more effective if countries importing Burma's high-value exports (such as natural gas and timber), which also tend to have closer economic links with the SPDC, would join us in our actions. Other U.S. measures, such as the ban on new investment in Burma and the ban on the export of financial services to Burma would also be more effective were the EU and others to take similar steps. The Administration remains unwavering in its support for the establishment of democracy and a greatly improved human rights situation in Burma. [end] 345 ANNEX G: OVERVIEW OF US BURMESE SANCTIONS REGULATIONS Source: US Department of Treasury http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/burma/burma.shtml An overview of the Burmese Sanctions Regulations Title 31 Part 537 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Burma (Myanmar) INTRODUCTION - On May 20, 1997, in response to the Burmese Government's large scale repression of, and violence against, the Democratic opposition, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13047 declaring a national emergency with respect to these actions and policies of the Government of Burma. The order, issued under the authority of section 570(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701- 1706)(IEEPA), prohibits new investment in Burma by U.S. persons and U.S. persons' facilitation of new investment in Burma by foreign persons. On July 28, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) was signed into law, to restrict the financial resources of Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The BFDA requires the President to ban the importation into the United States of products of Burma, beginning 30 days after the date of enactment of the BFDA, as well as to consider blocking the assets of certain SPDC members and taking steps to prevent further financial or technical assistance to Burma until certain conditions are met. To implement the BFDA and to take additional steps with respect to the Government of Burma's continued repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, the President issued Executive Order 13310 (the Order) on July 28, 2003. The Order blocks all property and 346 interests in property of the persons listed in the Annex to the Order and of certain persons determined, at a future point, by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to meet the criteria set forth in the Order. It also bans the importation into the United States of products of Burma and the exportation or reexportation to Burma of financial services from the United States or by U.S. persons. Like the previous executive order, it exempts from its blocking and financial service prohibitions any transactions pursuant to pre-May 21, 1997 agreements between a U.S. person and any entity in Burma. The Department of the Treasury's Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 537 (the BSR), were issued initially to implement Executive Order 13047. To implement Executive Order 13310 and the BFDA, these regulations were extensively amended and reissued in their entirety. Criminal penalties for willful violations of the BSR, or of any license, rule or regulation issued under it, include $50,000 in fines for a corporation or individual, or up to 10 years imprisonment for an individual, or both. Fines for criminal violations may be increased to $500,000 for corporations and $250,000 for individual pursuant to 18 U.S.C 3571. Civil penalties of up to $11,000 per violation may be imposed administratively. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY - Executive Order 13310 blocks property and property interests of persons listed in the Annex to the order and of persons that are designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as being a senior official of the Government of Burma, of the State Peace and Development Council of Burma, of the Union Solidarity and Development Association of Burma or of any successor to the foregoing. The Executive Order also gives the Treasury Department the authority to designate individuals or entities that are owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, any of those officials or groups. Generally, no U.S. person can have any dealings with persons listed in, or designated by the Treasury under, 347 Executive Order 13310, and all property in which any listed or designated person has an interest is blocked if it is in the United States or in the possession or control of a U.S. person. Three of the four entities listed in the annex to Executive Order 13310 are the banks in Burma that conduct international transactions. Some dealings with these banks are authorized if the transactions are necessary to conduct otherwise authorized transactions. In no case, however, can a blocked account of one of these financial institutions on the books of a U.S. bank be used to transfer the funds. All authorized transactions must be conducted through an account of one of these banks on the books of a non-U.S. bank. NO IMPORTATION OF PRODUCTS OF BURMA – Generally speaking, Burmese origin goods may not be imported into the United States. There are a few limited exceptions, such as the importation of household goods by a person who had lived in Burma, certain diplomatic imports, and informational materials. EXPORTATION OF GOODS AND NON-FINANCIAL SERVICES TO BURMA - There is no prohibition on the exportation of goods and services other than financial services to Burma. You need to be aware of how some of the other prohibitions may affect these transactions, however. For example, in light of the prohibition on the exportation of financial services to Burma, and the blocking of the property of certain individuals and entities in Burma, you can only be paid from an account maintained on the books of a non-U.S. bank. You also need to be aware of the prohibitions on new investment in Burma. EXPORTATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES TO BURMA - Generally speaking, the exportation of financial services to Burma is prohibited. The term exportation or reexportation 348 of financial services to Burma is defined broadly to mean (1) the transfer of funds, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to Burma, and (2) the provision, directly or indirectly, to persons in Burma of insurance services, investment or brokerage services, banking services, money remittance services; loans, guarantees, letters of credit or other extensions of credit; or the service of selling or redeeming traveler's checks, money orders and stored value. This defined term is unique to the Burma sanctions program. There are limited exceptions to the ban on the exportation of financial services. For example, payments can be made for certain licensed or exempt transactions, such as diplomatic payments and payments for goods exported to Burma. Under no circumstances can payments be made from blocked accounts on the books of a U.S. bank. OPERATION OF ACCOUNTS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN BURMA U.S. financial institutions can operate accounts for individuals in Burma, provided that the individual is not a blocked party, the account is used solely for personal transactions that are not otherwise prohibited, and no transfers are made from the account directly or indirectly to Burma or for the benefit of individuals ordinarily resident in Burma unless authorized by section 537.517 of the BSR. TRANSFER OF PERSONAL REMITTANCES TO/FROM BURMA - Pursuant to section 537.517 of the BSR, U.S. banks, U.S. registered broker-dealers and U.S. registered money transmitters are authorized to send non-commercial, personal remittances to or from Burma or for or on behalf of an individual ordinarily resident in Burma, provided that the funds are not being sent by, to or on behalf of a blocked party. Total remittances may not exceed $300.00 per Burmese household in any consecutive three-month period. These transfers may not involve a blocked account on the books of a U.S. bank. Noncommercial, personal remittances not include charitable donations to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business. U.S. persons, however, may make charitable donations 349 to nongovernmental organizations in Burma that are authorized to operate pursuant to section 537.523 of the BSR (see next item), provided that the donations are made pursuant to section 537.523 and the terms of the authorization. NGO ACTIVITY IN BURMA - OFAC issues licenses to nongovernmental organizations to engage in humanitarian or religious activities in Burma that would otherwise be prohibited. Any NGO interested in obtaining such a license should refer to section 537.523 of the BSR, or contact OFAC's Licensing Division at 202/622-2480. NEW INVESTMENT - The sanctions prohibit new investment in Burma by U.S. persons on or after May 21, 1997, unless such investment is pursuant to an agreement in place prior to May 21, 1997. A number of criteria are used to determine whether or not a specific activity is "grandfathered." Factors taken into account include the clarity of the scope of the agreement, the degree of specificity with which the activity is described, and the extent to which the terms of the agreement are legally enforceable. New investment in Burma is defined as a contract with the Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma for the development of resources (including natural, agricultural, commercial, financial, industrial and human resources) located in Burma. The prohibition includes purchasing a share of ownership (an equity interest) in a project or entering into an agreement that provides for a participation in royalties, earnings, or profits from the economic development of resources located in Burma. Executive Order 13047 and the BSR also prohibit a U.S. company from entering into a contract that provides for the general supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of an agreement for the economic development of resources located in Burma. U.S. persons with pre-May 21, 1997 agreements for the economic development of resources located in Burma should contact the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for a determination as to whether or not their project is exempt from the sanctions. 350 FACILITATION - A U.S. person is prohibited from approving, aiding or supporting a foreign person's investment in Burma, if the foreign person's activity would constitute prohibited new investment if engaged in by a U.S. person. Exception: Although contracting to sell to a foreign person a U.S. person's equity or income interest in a development project in Burma constitutes facilitation of that foreign person's investment in Burma, such a divestiture is authorized by general license. If the transaction is valued at more than $10,000, a report must be filed for statistical purposes with the Office of Foreign Assets Control within ten business days of the signing of such an agreement. Examples of prohibited facilitation of a foreign person's new investment in Burma follow: * The foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company wishes to bid on a project to develop a coal mine in Burma. The U.S. parent cannot approve, supervise, or otherwise be involved in the foreign subsidiary's negotiations with regard to this project. * A U.S. oil company holds a pre-May 21, 1997 contract to develop a Burmese oil field. It wishes to sell its rights under the contract to a foreign company. It is authorized to sell an interest without prior authorization from OFAC, but if the agreement is valued at more than $10,000, the seller must file a report with OFAC within ten days of the signing of the agreement. INVESTMENT IN THIRD COUNTRY COMPANIES - U.S. persons are prohibited from purchasing shares in a third-country company if the company's profits are predominantly derived from the company's economic development of resources located in Burma. If a person holds shares in an entity that subsequently engages exclusively or predominantly in the economic development of resources in Burma, or subsequently derives its income exclusively or predominantly from such activity, the U.S. person is not required to relinquish its shares, 351 This document is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. The Executive Orders and implementing Burmese Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 537) contain the legally binding provisions governing the sanctions against Burma described above. This document does not supplement or modify the Executive Orders or 31 CFR Part 537. The Office of Foreign Assets Control also administers sanctions programs involving, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Liberia, certain targets in the Western Balkans, highly enriched uranium transactions, diamond trading, designated terrorists and international narcotics traffickers, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and designated foreign persons who have engaged in activities relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For additional information about these programs or about the Burmese sanctions program, please contact the: OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL U.S. Department of the Treasury Washington, D.C. 20220 202/622-2520 August 16, 2005 but may not purchase additional shares. If the U.S. person sells off shares valued at more than $10,000, the seller must file a report with OFAC for statistical purposes within ten days of the sale. If you have information regarding possible violations of these regulations, please call the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-2430. Your call will be handled confidentially. 352 ANNEX H: EU Trade Sanctions Against Burma INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU) PRESS RELEASE DOCUMENT DATE: DECEMBER 18, 1996 Burma: Trade unions applaud European Union move to link trade with labour standards. International trade union groups have applauded a European Commission recommendation to suspend Burma's trade privileges because of systematic use of forced labour. Burma’s exports to the European Union are worth US$75 million (60 million ECUS), two thirds of which were eligible for substantial tariffs reductions. ``This is a welcome step which sends a clear message that privileged access to European markets is not available to countries that grossly abuse human rights at work'' leaders of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) say. The European Commission's decision is based on a 1,500-page complaint lodged in 1995 by the ETUC and the ICFTU. According to the unions 800,000 Burmese are presently involved in various forms of forced labour which makes up to 10% of the country's total GDP. ``Thousands of Burmese have died after having been forcefully recruited by the army to serve as porters. Others are found on construction sites and railways and entire villages have been evacuated by government forces in connection with the construction of a gas pipeline by oil giants, Total and Unocal,'' says ICFTU General Secretary Bill Jordan. The suspension decision is the first since the European Union included social provisions in its Generalized Scheme of Preferences in 1995. The GSP is aimed at helping developing countries to access European markets with substantial reduction in tariffs for their exports. 353 The social provisions, however, enable the EC to deny such advantage to countries resorting to forced labour. The ICFTU and the ETUC have also announced that they will call on the EU to extend its GSP denial to cover Burma's agricultural exports worth 15 million ECUS, as until January 1997 agricultural exports (a quarter of Burma’s total export to the EU) are immune of GSP sanctions. The trade union complaint was supported by Aung San Suu Kyi, in the form of a taped interview smuggled out of Burma and presented to the Commission's hearings last September. ``We hope that European sanctions will sent a strong signal to the generals in Rangoon, that the international community will not tolerate forced labour,'' the trade unions say. The unions have submitted a similar complaint regarding forced labour in Pakistan and expect the Commission to consider it with the same rigour and determination. The ICFTU consists of 195 national trade union centres in 137 countries representing 124 million workers world-wide. The ETUC consists of 62 national trade union centres in 28 European countries and 14 trade union industrial federations. It represents 57 million European workers. For details contact the ICFTU Trade Union Rights Department at 32 224 0201 or the ICFTU Press at 32 224 0210. END OF DOCUMENT 11:07 12-23-96 [...]... that matter, what can we make of Silverstein’s claims that, “there is little tradition of democracy in Myanmar including during the period of British administration” when trying to push it into democracy a la (the) West?6 What is the validity of claims like Myanmar having been caught in a “time warp”.7 What of Myanmar being a “pariah”8 or that the Government is a “repressive regime”; that it is a hermit... Government was formed and indeed the new Parliament Building was inaugurated in the year with fresh hope and inspiration of a renewed future for all On the other hand, 2000 represents the end of the millennium and the beginning of a new one and within Myanmar, there was the air of expectancy of new changes One was that the George W Bush government might respond more “positively” to Myanmar by changing the. .. well initially, inspite of Myanmar not taking advantage of international financial institutions’ aid packages; how economic sanctions imposed by the US derailed the whole planned development trajectory Chapter VI This chapter endeavors the task of locating Myanmar in history especially it deduces from the introspective narratives of key players of government how events in Myanmar s past could have worked... impunity and at will, as in the days of its early history when King Bayinnaung “brought Siam to its knees” or having pillaged the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya, frequently invaded Laos and even India.2 Then, perhaps in the euphoria of it all, it met its political coup de grace in its engagement with the superior British forces, then again fighting and regaining its independence and sovereignty But now it appears... it appears that for various geopolitical and geo-strategic reasons Myanmar finds itself at the wrong end of the stick Many Myanmar scholars, academics, analysts and the foreign press and media have offered a number of explanations for the “dire situation” Myanmar is in They have also provided analyses of the conundrum and suggestions for resolving this, but to no avail In my view, essentially there... Members of the Junta provide the raison de’tre of the moves they made and of events leading to and during the 1988 Conflagration Here the role of superstition, culture and religion is elaborated in the resolution of problems as was the role of students in bringing about the Conflagration Post 1988, the moves made by the military to govern in a move “inclusive way” incorporating the needs of the Sangha,... hermit state9 and is “guilty of human rights abuse”?10 In this thesis I am well aware of the above questions, representations and assertions raised by professional Burma scholars and observers However, rather than address them head-on I will assume an alternative tack by drawing on my exposure over many years to the “inner circle” of the Myanmar political and business elite as a foreign direct investor... SUMMARY Chapter I This chapter sets out the overall direction of the thesis and of what I perceive are some of the “shortfalls” in the existing body of literature on Myanmar Of how, after some twenty years of exposure to and association and quanxi building with influential members of the ruling military elites, I would by experiential endeavour, ascertain what have been the pitfalls which have led to the. .. economy at the structural level This thesis attempts to contribute to the epistemology of the truth or falsity of the general perceptions of many Myanmar scholars as well as to provide an analysis of the military Junta’s ostensible “inexplicable” behaviour – what I would term the Myanmar Exceptionalism” – by presenting and analyzing information emerging from the deep recesses of the Myanmar generals’... US policy of sanctions towards Myanmar However, instead of this, the 9/11 incident caused the US policy to Myanmar to be even more “chronic” George W.Bush got rather riled over the incident and started talking of the ‘axis of evil states’, classifying Myanmar, along with other countries like North Korea and Iraq As such, according to one of my research respondents Brother, the Myanmar sense of optimism . – the politically influential Sangha and the layman, apart from seeking input from foreign Myanmar scholars, watchers and analysts. The task has proved to be infinitely more daunting than. itself at the wrong end of the stick. Many Myanmar scholars, academics, analysts and the foreign press and media have offered a number of explanations for the “dire situation” Myanmar is in. They. my ASEAN Country Module for my Masters degree and Assistant Professor Kyaw Yin Hlaing, who is a Myanma and a Myanmar scholar and an active researcher on Myanmar himself. His “guidance” at my