Three essays on volunteers in economics

THREE ESSAYS ON VOLUNTEERS IN ECONOMICS LI XIAOYE (B.A. 2010, Sun Yat-sen University) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2013 Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been used in the thesis. This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously. Li Xiaoye 28 April 2014 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have benefited greatly from the guidance and support of many people over the past three years. I hereby extend my grateful thanks to them for their kind help, without which the thesis would not have been what it is. My deepest gratitude goes first and foremost to Professor Jie Zhang, my supervisor, for his constant encouragement and guidance. He has walked me through all the stages of the writing of this thesis. Without his consistent and illuminating instruction, this thesis could not have reached its present form. Second, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Haoming Liu and Tiago Freire, who have taken the precious time off from their tight schedule, reading my thesis carefully and offering me constant encouragement, valuable suggestions and enlightening instructions, which contribute to the completion of my thesis. Furthermore, I also wish to sincerely thank Songfa Zhong and Shenghao Zhu, who provided valuable suggestions at several stages of my research; Bingyu Zhang, Yan Zhang and Yunfeng Lu, who made useful comments on an earlier draft; Qiushi Fu and Xudong Chen, who contributed to data collection. In particular, I owe my sincere gratitude to my good friend Liangjie Li, who has provided me his support and time in listening to me and helped me with my three studies all the way. Last my thanks would go to my beloved family for their loving considerations and great confidence in me all through these years. They always i share my weal and woe. I feel much grateful and heartily owe my achievement to them. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements i Table of Contents iii Summary v List of Tables vii List of Figures x List of Forms x Chapter 1: A Natural Field Experiment on How Volunteers with Different Dominant Motivation Behave in a Timely Evaluation System 12 1.1 Introduction 12 1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 15 1.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation 16 1.2.2 Incentive, Cognition and Motivation 17 1.2.3 Hypotheses 19 1.3 Experimental Design 21 1.4 Results and Discussion 29 1.4.1Statistical Description of Volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 29 1.4.2 Empirical Estimation and Results 31 1.5 Conclusion 36 Chapter 2: Understanding the Motivation of College Students to Volunteer: An Integrated Consumption/Investment Analysis iii 52 2.1 Introduction 52 2.2 Integrated Model of Investment and Consumption Motives 56 2.3 Data 61 2.4 Empirical Strategies and Results 68 2.5 Conclusion 75 Chapter 3: How Immigration Reduced Social Capital in the U.S.: 2005-2011 96 3.1 Introduction 96 3.2 Theoretical Framework 100 3.3 Social Capital and Immigration in the U.S. between 2004 and 2011 102 3.4 Empirical Results 105 3.4.1 Area Approach 106 3.4.2 IV formulation 108 3.4.3 Individual-level Results 110 3.5 Robustness Check 113 3.6 Conclusion 115 iv SUMMARY This thesis is composed of three essays on the volunteers in economics. A natural field experiment is designed in the first study to explore the effects of external incentives on the behavior of people differentiated by their original dominant motivation (intrinsic/extrinsic). This paper suggests that people who are intrinsically motivated respond to a more controlling incentive with a faster decrease of intrinsic motivation and a slower increase of extrinsic motivation, resulting in a crowding-out effect. Our study also finds the opposite crowding-in effect for more extrinsically motivated people. The second study attempts to examine the specific motivation of college students to volunteer, based on the interpretation of volunteering as consumption and investment. Micro-level data, collected by the online survey from volunteers at the Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China and (non-)volunteers on the RenDa Economics Forum, one of the main social networking sites in China, provide strong support for the consumption motive. As far as the investment motive is concerned we find no clear statistical evidence for its validity. The volunteering activities not play a significant role in determining the future income compared with other factors, such as SNCEE, gender, age, parental education, working location and the type of working organization. In the third study, we show that an inflow of immigrants reduces social capital in receiving communities. Since the 1960s, the U.S. has seen a large decrease in v social capital as well as a considerable inflow of immigrants. This increased heterogeneity in U.S. cities may have increased the cost of investing in social capital and thereby reduced such investment. By using survey data on volunteering (our proxy for social capital investment) for 2005–2011, we find that a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in a state reduces the probability of U.S.-born individuals volunteering by 4–6%. vi LIST OF TABLES Tables for Chapter Table 1.1 The Consistency Rates from Q1 to Q23 38 Table 1.2 The Consistency Rates of Q24 38 Table 1.3 The Consistency Rates of Q25 38 Table 1.4 The Treatment of Groups 39 Table 1.5 Statistical Description of Volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 39 Table 1.6a Ordered Logit Estimates of One-way Treatment 40 Table 1.6b The Marginal Effect of the Ordered Logit Estimates of One-way Treatment 40 Table 1.7a Ordered Logit Estimates of Two-way Treatment 41 Table 1.7b The Marginal Effect of the Ordered Logit Estimates of Two-way Treatment 41 Table 1.8a Ordered Logit Estimates of Full-disclosure Treatment 42 Table 1.8b The Marginal Effect of the Ordered Logit Estimates of Full-disclosure Treatment 42 Table 1.9a Ordered Logit Estimates of Social-information Treatment 43 vii Table 1.9b The Marginal Effect of the Ordered Logit Estimates of Socialinformation Treatment 43 Table 1.10a Ordered Logit Estimates of Full&Social Treatment 44 Table 1.10b The Marginal Effect of the Ordered Logit Estimates of Full&Social Treatment 44 Tables for Chapter Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 77 Table 2.2 Marginal Effect of Probit Regression of Dummy for Volunteering on Current Income 78 Table 2.3 Tobit Regression of Hours Volunteered on Current Income 79 Table 2.4 OLS of Future Income on the Dummy for Volunteering and Hours Volunteered 80 Table 2.5 Marginal Effect of Probit Regression of Dummy for Volunteering on Current Income among First-Tier Colleges 81 Table 2.6 Tobit Regression of Hours Volunteered on Current Income among FirstTier Colleges 82 Table 2.7 OLS of Future Income on the Dummy for Volunteering and Hours Volunteered among First-Tier Colleges 83 Tables for Chapter viii Table 3.8 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (1) Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) Log hourly income 0.0076* 0.0032+ (0.0029) (0.0019) Missing income 0.014* 0.00603 (0.0069) (0.0043) Full-time worker -0.0036** -0.00085 (0.00069) (0.00057) High school graduate 0.0054** 0.0018** (0.00084) (0.00054) Other college 0.015** 0.0059** (0.0012) (0.00074) College degree or more 0.026** 0.0079** (0.0015) (0.00088) State fixed effects Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Observations 270727 270727 R-squared 0.03 0.00 Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics (income and education) in a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 125 Table 3.9 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (2) Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) Aged between 20 and 24 0.012** 0.0043** (0.00102) (0.0012) Aged between 25 and 29 0.011** 0.0048* (0.0021) (0.0022) Aged between 30 and 34 0.0062* -0.0046 (0.0028) (0.0036) Aged between 35 and 39 0.00032 -0.0031 (0.0035) (0.0047) Aged between 40 and 44 -0.0027 -0.0017 (0.0054) (0.0059) Aged between 45 and 49 -0.00396 -0.00082 (0.0061) (0.0069) Aged between 50 and 54 -0.00089 -0.0037 (0.0068) (0.0081) Aged between 55 and 60 -0.0029 -0.0026 (0.00795) (0.0096) Birth year 0.00044+ 0.0000028 (0.00022) (0.00024) State fixed effects Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Observations 270727 270727 R-squared 0.03 0.00 Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics in a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 126 Table 3.10 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (3) Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) Dummy for women 0.013** 0.0043** (0.00076) (0.00045) Dummy for 0.0024** 0.00083 being married (0.000698) (0.00068) Child 0–2 years of age -0.0014 0.000042 (0.0016) (0.0011) Child 3–5 years of age 0.018** 0.0033** (0.0018) (0.000999) Child 6–13 years of age 0.052** 0.013** (0.00196) (0.0011) Child 14–17 years of age 0.011** 0.0049** (0.0014) (0.0014) State fixed effects Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Observations 270727 270727 R-squared 0.03 0.00 Part of the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and individual characteristics in a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 127 Table 3.11 OLS Regression for Volunteering by U.S.-born Individuals (4) Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) Household size -0.0102** -0.0033** (0.00055) (0.00031) Household income 0.0000088** 0.0000031 (0.0000016) (0.0000019) Household income -0.0000000026** -0.0000000011+ square (0.0000000006) (0.0000000007) Gini coefficient -0.024 -0.032* (0.016) (0.015) Racial -0.0075 0.024 fragmentation (0.0203) (0.024) State fixed effects Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Observations 270727 270727 R-squared 0.03 0.00 Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and household and state characteristics in a specification similar to Glaeser et al. (2002). Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in column 2, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 128 Table 3.12 OLS Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration Dummy for volunteering Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Change in proportion of -0.068+ -0.073+ -0.072+ -0.083* -0.0075 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.025 foreign-born people (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) Lagged number of 0.041+ 0.036+ 0.035+ 0.036+ 0.00102 -0.0000504 U.S.-born people (0.021) (0.021) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) 0.000502 (0.014) 0.0015 (0.014) Lagged number of -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0041 foreign-born people (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 R-squared Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns to 8, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 129 Table 3.13 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration Second stage Dummy for volunteering Change in proportion of Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) -0.393** -0.454** -0.465** -0.518** -0.116 -0.131 -0.135 -0.161 foreign-born people (0.111) (0.109) (0.109) (0.121) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.113) Lagged number of 0.0801** 0.083** 0.082** 0.0897** 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.018 U.S.-born people (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) Lagged number of -0.016** -0.018** -0.019** -0.021** -0.0078+ -0.0084+ -0.0087+ -0.0094+ foreign-born people (0.0051) (0.00499) (0.00499) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.005002) State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 First stage SPIV F-test 0.908** 0.908** 0.908** 0.818** (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0057) 22096.82 22078.99 20078.99 20423.27 Second stage (upper section) and first stage (lower section) of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns to 8, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. The IV for changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in the state is a SPIV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 130 Table 3.14 OLS Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race Dummy for volunteering Change in proportion of foreign-born people Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) -0.037 -0.038 -0.035 -0.0402 0.038 0.024 0.039 0.029 (0.0303) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) Change in proportion of own 0.0096 0.00901 0.0058 0.0058 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 race foreign-born people (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) Lagged number of own 0.0012* -0.00026 0.00038 0.00038 0.00016 0.00036 0.00057 0.00058 race U.S.-born people (0.00046) (0.00069) (0.00069) (0.000695) (0.00029) (0.00056) (0.00055) (0.00055) Lagged number of own -0.00027 -0.00038 -0.00043 -0.00042 -0.00033+ 0.000119 0.000055 0.000069 race foreign-born people (0.00035) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.000195) (0.00025) (0.00023) (0.00023) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State fixed effects Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 R-squared Relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. The proportion of foreign-born individuals is divided into individuals of the same race and individuals of other races. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. In columns to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for volunteering or not and in columns to 8, the dependent variable is the log of total hours volunteered by each individual. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 131 Table 3.15 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race (First Stage) First stage Change in proportion of foreign-born people (1) (2) (3) Change in proportion of own race foreign-born people (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) SPIV 0.944** 0.954** 0.954** 0.851** 0.089** 0.286** 0.286** 0.289** other races (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) SPIV 0.012** 0.010002** 0.010002** 0.0068** 0.124** 0.103** 0.103** 0.102** (0.00098) (0.000997) (0.000997) (0.00094) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes own race State fixed effects Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 F-test 7491.08 7550.66 7551.15 6736.97 1680.62 1246.7 1247.1 1244.84 First stage of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60, and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. The proportion of foreign-born individuals is divided into individuals of the same race and individuals of other races. Data are from the CPS September sample between 2005 and 2011. The IV for changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals that live in the state is a SPIV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 132 Table 3.16 IV Regression of Dummy for Volunteering with Immigration by Race (Second Stage) Second stage Dummy for volunteering Change in proportion of Ln of volunteer hours (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) -0.328** -0.376** -0.381** -0.4296** -0.135 -0.1398 -0.142 -0.174 foreign-born people (0.123) (0.128) (0.128) (0.143) (0.113) (0.119) (0.119) (0.133) Change in proportion of own -0.237* -0.252+ -0.247+ -0.254+ -0.115 -0.1004 -0.099 -0.102 race foreign-born people (0.119) (0.148) (0.147) (0.146) (0.109) (0.137) (0.137) (0.136) Lagged number of own 0.0029** 0.0039 0.0045+ 0.0046+ 0.00091 0.0018 0.00202 0.0021 race U.S.-born people (0.00078) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.00072) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) Lagged number of own -0.0024* -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0018+ -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0016 race foreign-born people (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes State fixed effects Number of states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Race dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Household controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes State controls No No No Yes No No No Yes Observations 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 270727 Second stage of an IV regression on the relationship between social capital investment by U.S.-born individuals aged 16–60 and changes in the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the state. 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On the importance of self-determination for intrinsically-motivated behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4(3), 443-446. 140 [...]... The first one is that people are motivated both extrinsically and intrinsically, and these two types of motivation work non-additively Secondly, people react to external incentives in a cognitive way, i.e., in accordance with their feelings 1.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation In opposition to the classical economics, there is a correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation Putting it differently,... by their personal decisions and efforts Since the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is non-additive, these two types of motivation will be changed simultaneously by external incentives In line with Frey (1997), the intrinsic motivation is likely to be lowered when people perceive external incentives as controlling, while the extrinsic motivation sees an increase; in contrast, an external incentive felt... the behavior of people motivated differently (extrinsically or intrinsically) To test this argument, volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011, one of the top tennis tournaments, are distinguished into two types according to their original dominant motivation: the intrinsic type if the original intrinsic motivation is stronger than the extrinsic one, and the extrinsic type otherwise A natural field experiment is... as self-determination tends to enhance the intrinsic motivation and weaken the extrinsic motivation The following hypotheses arise from these discussions: Hypothesis 1.1: For an individual motivated predominantly intrinsically, a more (less) controlling external incentive 1 sees a faster decrease (increase) of the intrinsic motivation than an increase (decrease) of the extrinsic motivation, thus an observable... 1.7a) However, the positive response from the 33 predominantly extrinsic volunteers (0.800**) corresponds to the prediction of crowding -in effect and provides a tentative confirmation of the Hypothesis 1.2 The volunteers predominantly intrinsically take a negative perception (-1.432***) on this more controlling Two-way evaluation, leading to a crowding-out effect, in line with the Hypothesis 1.1 To... aims: to collect the basic information of volunteers and measure their dominant motivation The volunteers were surveyed (see the Questionnaire of Pre-event Survey for Volunteers in CHINAOPEN 2011 in Form 1.1) on September 17th and 18th, 2011 when there was a mandatory training Since the CHINAOPEN has the tradition of asking volunteers to do a self-report survey on the training days and they were not... Chapter 2 Form 2.1 The Questionnaire for Volunteers in Shanghai World Expo 2010 in China 86 Form 2.2 The Questionnaire for Sample in RenDa Economics Forum xi 91 CHAPTER 1 A Natural Field Experiment on How Volunteers with Different Dominant Motivation Behave in a Timely Evaluation System 1.1 Introduction People who show a strong interest in their work and deeply enjoy the involvement in what they do are driven... Manderlink, and Sansone (1984), participants who have information about the evaluation commit less than those without the information Likely, if learning is aimed for test or examination, the learners’ intrinsic motivation sees a large decrease (Benware and Deci, 1984; and Maehr and Stallings, 1972) Our treatments are designed from these findings and in line with the degree of controlling By One-way... Social-information, the volunteer knows not only his/her own, but also his/her peers’ performance in the group, 27 resulting in a relative comparison With the treatments from One-way to Socialinformation, the leaders have added more external pressure on the volunteering environment, resulting in a more controlling external surrounding There might be some concern on the information leaking across different treatment... time-invariant 1.4.2 Empirical Estimation and Results We measured the crowding-out or crowding -in effect of external incentives by the change of volunteers performance Concerning the original dominant motivation, the coefficient of the treatment dummy variable is interpreted as the effect of external incentives for the volunteers motivated predominantly extrinsically The intersection of Intrinsic . are intrinsically motivated respond to a more controlling incentive with a faster decrease of intrinsic motivation and a slower increase of extrinsic motivation, resulting in a crowding-out. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation In opposition to the classical economics, there is a correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Putting it differently, the presence of one motivation. the RenDa Economics Forum, one of the main social networking sites in China, provide strong support for the consumption motive. As far as the investment motive is concerned we find no clear