butterworth and houghton - 1995 - auditor switching - the pricing of audit services

Journal of Business Finance t3' Accounting, 22(3). April 1995, 0306 686X AUDITOR SWITCHING: THE PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES s. BUTTERWORTH AND K.A. HOUGHTON. INTRODUCTION The cost of obtaining audit reports has, in recent years, come under increasing scrutiny. A sub-committee of the United States Senate investigated this issue and found evidence of a lack of competition in the provision of audits to major US corporations (Chung and Lindsay, 1988). Studies in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States reveal that companies in these countries doubt that they are getting value for the money spent on audits (Firth, 1985). One strategy employed by auditees to mitigate these costs is to engage in audit tendering, and the common resultant phenomenon, to switch auditors. The alleged benefit of this auditor change is that the new auditor cuts the price of the initial audit.' That is, after controlling for other factors that affect audit fees, a new auditor is said to charge less for an audit than an incumbent auditor. The presence, or otherwise, of price-cutting has important implications for the independence of auditors and the level and type of competition in the auditing industry. However, in Australia (and elsewhere), evidence as to the existence of price-cutting through auditor switching is largely anecdotal,* and evidence in the research literature is mixed. This paper seeks to more systematically investigate the relationship between auditor switching and audit fees, using the population of companies under the monitoring control of the Western Australian Division of the Australian Securities Commission. The next section of the paper reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and develops the hypothesis to be tested. The third section contains a description of the methodology used in the study. The fourth section presents the empirical findings and the fifth section summarises the findings and describes the limitations to the study and those findings. The sixth section describes some The authors are from the University of Melbourne, Australia. They gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Australian Securities Commission, Western Australian Division, the financial suppon of the Coopers and Lybrand Accounting Education Research Fund and the helpful comments of Jere Francis (University of Iowa), Bill Kinney (University of Texas), Don Stokes (University of Southern Queensland), Stephen Taylor (University of Sydney), Philip Brown and Gary Monroc (University of W.A.) and Christine Jubb (The University of Melbourne) and participants at workshops at Monash University (Clayton), City University (London), the University of Texas (Austin), the University of Western Australia and the Annual Conference of the Accounting Association of Australia and New Zealand. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. (Paper received April 1993, revised and accepted July 1993) Address for correspondence: K.A. Houghton, Fitzgerald Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, the University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia. @ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF. UK and 238 Main Street. Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. 323 324 BUTTERWORTH AND HOUGHTON of the policy implications of the results. The final section contains conclusions and proposals for future research. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION This section consists of three parts, the first of which reviews the theoretical reasons as to why an auditor might cut initial audit fees. The second part reviews the empirical evidence as to the existence or otherwise of price-cutting, and the third part formulates the hypothesis to be tested. Theoretical Formulation In a competitive market for audit services one can theoretically justify the presence of fee-cutting for initial audit^.^ Despite this, the professional audit literature condemns price-cutting as being irrational and harmful to the profession. For example, practising accountants have decried the possibility that the practice may lead to sub-standard audits which harm financial report users.' It can also be argued (see the penultimate section) that price-cutting reduces auditor independence, and thereby violates the ethical requirement that audits should be priced so as to maintain auditor impartial it^.^ Given this apparent professional predisposition, one could be excused for believing that price-cutting would be a rare phenomenon. However, the anecdotal evidence in Australia indicates that the practice is becoming increasingly common. Contracting theory may explain this behaviour. Coase (1937) suggests that a firm auditee may be viewed as a nexus of contracts. The substance of those contracts is that factor-providers (claim-holders) give control of their factors of production to an entrepreneur, in return for a pay-off from the firm in a future period. Those pay-off functions are specified in terms of accounting numbers which are calculated according to the rules set down in the claim- holders' ex-ante contracts with the firm. The main role of the auditor is to examine the accounting numbers produced by the auditee to determine the degree of correspondence between those accounting numbers, and the numbers that would be produced by applying the contracted-for accounting rules. If there is a high degree of correspondence, an auditor will signal this to the claim- holders by issuing a clean audit report, or if the degree of correspondence is low (or if a serious flaw exists), the signal will be in the form of a qualified report. A commonly accepted set of rules for determining accounting numbers may evolve over time (Anderson and Stokes, 1986). However, each auditee would modify those rules to reflect the particular nexus of contracts that constitute that auditee. This leads to a demand by different auditees for different audit systems and procedures (Anderson and Stokes, 1986). The incumbent auditor will develop unique systems and procedures that enable it to deliver the required 0 Bad Blackwell Lid. 1995 AUDITOR SWITCHING: THE PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 325 service in the most efficient manner possible (Anderson and Stokes, 1986). Therefore, during the initial stage of the audit, an incoming auditor’s systems and procedures may not be perfectly adapted to the task of monitoring the claimholders’ ex-ante contracts. Consequently, an auditee is likely to bear auditor-switching costs in familiarising a new auditor with the accounting and information systems of the auditee. As a result, an auditee may not costlessly change auditors. This means that the possibility exists for an incumbent auditor to set a fee above the avoidable cost (including opportunity costs) of doing the audit, without the auditee finding it profitable to change to a new auditor. That is, an auditor is able to earn quasi-rents (de Angelo, 1981b).6 As has been argued elsewhere, quasi-rents may lead to the practice by potential auditors of ‘low-balling’, or the setting of initial audit fees below total audit costs (de Angelo, 1981a), to attract new auditees and the fees (including quasi-rents) that may flow from them. The next part of the paper examines evidence of the existence of fee cutting in the market for audit services. Empirical L iteralure One could argue that the seminal work in this area is Simunic (1980). Using a regression approach he found no evidence of significant price-cutting in the audits of the 397 US companies in his sample. Subsequent related studies (including Chung and Lindsay, 1988; Francis, 1984;7 and Palmrose, 1986a) arrived at similar conclusions. The first such study to find price-cutting was Francis and Simon (1987), but it was based on a small sample size (12 changes). That paper motivated a much more substantial study involving 214 auditees switching auditors, and a similar number that did not (Simon and Francis, 1988). This later study did find a significant association between auditor switching and price-cutting in the early years of an engagement. This study is an important contribution but suffers from certain difficulties arising out of the fact that in the US audit fee information is non-public and therefore fee data is drawn from responses to questionnaires. The response rate was 24% with no reported information on any possible non-response bias. Arguably, those who responded were more likely to be those who were reporting ‘good news’ (a decline in audit fees) rather than other facts. Such a bias, if it exists, would provide an over-estimate of the general presence of price-cutting. One would not be surprised therefore if such a study found the existence of fee-cutting. In more recent studies (not using the methodology adopted by the above cited researchers), Turpen (1990) found that fees for new engagements were, interalia, lower than fees for predecessor auditors, and Ettredge and Greenburg (1990) found a mean audit fee reduction of 25% after auditor switching. A laboratory simulation by Schatzberg (1990) found evidence of ‘low balling’, a finding consistent with the presence of price-cutting on initial engagements. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 326 BUTTERWORTH AND HOUGHTON Table 1 Results of Empirical Studies Investigating Price-Cutting Country Date Price Year(s) Cutting Results Private Sector 1. Simunic (1980) 2. Chung & Lindsay (1988) 3. Francis (1984) 4. Palmrose (1986a) 5. Francis & Simon (1987) 6. Simon & Francis (1988) 7. Schatzberg (1990) 8. Turpen (1990) 9. Ettredge & Greenburg (1990) Baber, Brooks & Ricks (1987) Public Sector 10. 11. Rubin (1988) USA Can. Aust . USA USA USA USA USA USA USA USA 1976 1979 1981 1984 1984 nla 1982-4 1983-7 1974-8 1980-4 1982 No" No" No No Yesb Yes' Yes" Yes Yes Mixed Nod Notes: a Indirect text of price-cutting only. Potential small sample problem. The fee data from 'change' auditees was collected by questionnaire with only a 24% response rate. " However, indirect evidence of price-cutting was found. In two studies of audit fees in the public sector, Baber, Brooks and Ricks (1987) and Rubin (1988) found some evidence of audit price-cutting, but due to sample size or other methodological difficulties, were unable to report the 'change' variable in the regression functions as being significant. In 1988, Simon and Francis described the 'research evidence as inconclusive', and little has changed since. A summary of the findings is provided in Table 1. FOGW ofthe Present Study The previous sections have suggested that price-cutting is theoretically justifiable, and that its presence can be empirically tested by comparing the fees charged by new and incumbent auditors. To determine whether or not this phenomenon is present in the Australian market, the following research question is tested: In a given year, are the fees charged by auditors who are in their first year of an engagement, all things being equal, significantly lower than those charged by incumbent auditors? @ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 AUDITOR SWITCHING: THE PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 327 If this question is answered in the positive, then evidence of price-cutting will have been found. For the purpose of our study, auditor change (or switch) is defined as a change in the audit firm specified in the auditee’s annual report between the two years of our inquiry (1987 and 1988). As with the audit fees themselves this information is publicly available, and there exist non-trivial regulatory penalties for disclosure of false or misleading information. ‘Changes’ in auditor due to the merging of audit firms, or audit firm name changes are regarded as ‘no change’. An auditor is regarded as incumbent where no change exists between 1987 and 1988. Note that the reasons behind auditor switching may not be fee-based. For example, auditor switching may occur because of auditee takeover and because of changes in company directorates.’ Also an auditor change may occur because of qualitative reasons not associated with price. One important non-price factor may be the provision and extent of availability of non-audit business services by the audit firm. Recent evidence from the Trade Practices Commission Enquiry into the accounting profession showed that the market for audit services was very competitive and that auditor choice was determined by a number of factors including price and expertise (which may incorporate both audit and non-audit services). The present study differs from the preceding research in one or more of the following three ways. First, the study is based on a population of companies, and not a sample (either derived randomly or other~ise),~ second, the study is based on information on the public record, and third, the model which has been developed in the present study allows for control of potentially confounding variables beyond those which have so far been considered in the literature. These are considered in some detail in the section which follows. METHODOLOGY To test for price-cutting it is necessary to control for those factors (in addition to price-cutting) which affect audit fees. The first sub-section below identifies those factors. The second determines a research design which controls for those factors and which can be used to test the hypothesis of interest and defines the variables to be used in the study. The third and fourth sub-sections outline the variable measurements used and describe the company database respectively. Audit Fee Factors In order to execute the audit task, the auditor must perform both compliance and substantive testing. lo Client-specific characteristics will affect the carrying out of these tests and therefore, the audit fee. The literature reveals that four 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 328 BUTTERWORTH AND HOUGHTON client-related factors are important. I' These are: Client Size: Consistent with the findings of numerous other audit fee studies," it is expected that as client size increases, the audit fee increases. This is because as the auditee increases in size, then all other things being equal, the auditor will have to perform more work to ensure adequate compliance and substantive testing. However, the audit fee should increase at a decreasing rate because the larger the auditee, the easier it is for the auditor to achieve economies of scale in its production function (Firth, 1985). Provided that the audit market is competitive, such savings will be passed on to the auditee. Alternatively, auditing is a sampling-based procedure. As the auditee grows in size, the sample size required to give a certain degree of control will increase at a decreasing rate (Simunic, 1980), thereby allowing the auditor to do proportionately less work (and therefore charge less to the auditee) for each unit increase in auditee size. Client Complexify: Given the results of most other studies,13 it is expected that as client complexity increases, so too does the audit fee. The reason for this is that the more complex the client, the more time the audit manager must spend co-ordinating the audit function, and the greater the difficulties incurred in performing audit duties. This suggests that the more complex the auditee, the more resources must be consumed in order to carry out an audit of a given quality and therefore, the higher the audit fee. This function may also increase at a decreasing rate. For example, Palmrose (1986a) found that the audit fee was significantly and positively related to the natural log of a measure of complexity. Client Risk:'* Another factor that may affect the audit fee is the risk that the auditor might be successfully sued by claim-holders of an auditee who have suffered a negative pay-out, caused (at least in part) by the auditor negligently concluding that the auditee's accounts were drawn up in accordance with the contracted-for accounting rules when this was not the case. This could impose significant costs upon the auditor. To reduce this risk, the auditor may devote more resources to testing, and pass this cost on to the auditee. Alternatively, the auditor may demand a premium to bear the risk of auditing the client. Given either of these propositions, it is expected that auditors will demand higher fees from clients who expose them to a greater risk of being successfully sued by claimholders (Firth, 1985). Client Industry: Some prior research has suggested that an audit fee will be influenced by the auditee's industry.I5 Possibly this is due to differences in audit risk across industry groupings (Simunic, 1980; and Palmrose, 1986a). Alternatively, different industries may have different audit requirements that may require differing amounts of work in the audit and, consequently, attract different audit fees. In the context of the present study, a critical industry differentiation exists between companies in the mining and extractive industry and non-mining companies. All other things being equal, the less diverse nature of the asset base and generally qualitatively simpler nature of those companies 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 AUDITOR SWITCHING: THE PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 329 (at least in Western Australia) leads to the expectation that mininglextractive industry companies will have lower fees than other companies. To test for price-cutting in the first year of an audit, four client-specific factors are controlled for: size, complexity, risk and industry. It is also necessary to control for factors relating to the auditor. Auditor Size: Empirical studies suggest that auditor size is an important determinant of the cost of an audit.I6 A number of reasons have been suggested for this. Firstly, it is aruged that large auditors can achieve economies of scale in their production function, and provided that the audit market is sufficiently competitive, those savings will be passed on to the auditee (Firth, 1985). Secondly, it is argued that large auditors will deliver a higher quality audit (de Angelo, 1981b). Consequently, one would expect larger firms to charge higher fees, even if the market for audits is competitive (Rosen, 1974). Alternatively, it is possible that large auditors may form a cartel so as to charge a monopoly price to those firms who wish to obtain higher quality audits (Firth, 1985). Despite some contradictory results in previous Australian ~tudies,’~ the expectation is that Big 8 auditors will have higher fees than Non-Big 8 auditors. Non-Audit Services Provided by the Auditor: Simunic (1984), Palmrose (1986b) and Turpen (1990) found an association between audit fees charged to auditees and the fees for non-audit services (“AS’) which they purchased from their auditor. There are two reasons why the audit fee charged may be affected by the provision of NAS. Firstly, audits may serve as a ‘loss-leader’ for firms providing both audits and NAS (Hillson and Kennelley, 1988), with auditors recouping audit losses through an upwards adjustment of the NAS fee. As a result, it is possible that audit fees are a decreasing function of NAS fees (Simon and Francis, 1988). Secondly, there may be a link between NAS and the audit fee caused by the presence of spillovers of knowledge from the NAS area to auditing and vice versa (Simunic, 1984). According to Simunic (1984), the effect of these knowledge spillovers on the audit fee depends on whether a spillover from NAS to auditing reduces the start-up cost of an audit or the marginal cost of auditing, the price elasticity of demand for auditing and the effect on NAS costs of a spillover from auditing to NAS. Research Design To control for the effect of the factors outlined above and to test for price-cutting, a multiple linear regression model of audit fees is used. To avoid the econometric problems that could be caused by pooling observations across time, cross- sectional data is used.” Given the limitations inherent in such a research design, the audit fee model takes the following form: FEE, = bo + bICHANGE, + b,AUD, + b,,NAS, + b$IZE, + bSCOMP, + b6RISK, + b71ND, + p 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 330 BUTTERWORTH AND HOUGHTON Where, FEE; = Audit Fee charged to auditee i, = Hypothesis Variable, first year of engagement, = Size of auditee i’s auditor (Big 8 or Non-Big 8), = Amount of NAS provided to auditee i by its auditor, = Size of auditee i, = Complexity of auditee i, = Risk to the auditor of the auditee i, auditee i, CHANGE; AUD; NAS, SIZE; COMP; RISK; IND; = Industry classification (mining or non-mining) of CL = error. Variable Measurement The measurement of each of these variables is outlined below. Audit Fee: The audit fee charged to auditees is measured by the dollar value of audit fees paid by the firm to its auditor. This dollar value is required to be disclosed by law.” Auditor Change: To test the hypothesis that new auditors charge less than incumbent auditors in a given year, a dummy variable, coded 1 if the audit of a firm is the initial engagement for the audit (and zero otherwise), is included in the regression model. If the hypothesis is true, then the regression co-efficient on this dummy variable should be statistically significant and negative. Auditor Size: As with other studies in this field, auditor size is measured using a dummy variable coded 1 if the auditor is a member of the first tier of auditors2’ (the Big 8, or, more recently, the Big 6); otherwise coded zero. Provision of Non-Audit Services: In this study, the amount of non-audit services provided by an auditor to an auditee is measured by the dollar amount of NAS purchased by the auditee from its auditor. As with the audit fee, this amount must by law be disclosed by the auditee. This continuous variable captures the possibility that the greater the amount of non-audit services provided by the auditor, the greater will be the potential spillover effects or the greater will be the potential for audit fee/non-audit services fee trade-offs, and the greater Client Size: Consistent with other researchers, (see for example, Francis and Simon, 1987; and Gerrard et al., 1986) the size of an auditee is measured using the book value of the auditee’s total assets. Client Complexty: Most researchers in this field have measured the complexity of an auditee by using a continuous measure of its legal/organisational dispersion such as the number of consolidated subsidiaries in the auditee’s group of companies. The rationale behind these measures is that the greater the dispersion that is shown by a firm’s structure, the more intricate and sophisticated become the legal and operational forms adopted by the firm (Taylor and Baker, 1981). Consistent with this, the present study uses the number of companies in the auditee’s group (holding company plus subsidiaries) as the measure for complexity.21 . will be the effect on the audit price. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 AUDITOR SWITCHING: THE PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 33 1 Client Risk: Following the practice of previous studies," a dummy variable is used to control for risk. It is coded 1 if an audit qualification is given by the auditor.23 The rationale behind this measure is that some form of audit qualification may signal the possibility of 'significant uncertainties which may result in future losses to the auditee' (Simunic, 1980), consequently exposing the auditor to a higher risk of being successfully sued as a result of the audit. It has the further advantage that, in contrast to the risk measures used in some other studies, there appears to be no a priori reason for believing that it is a proxy for the size or complexity of the a~ditee.'~ Two such measures of risk are used in this study: audit qualification in the year the auditor is changed in this study (1988), and the year preceding (1987). The first measure represents a contemporaneous measure of risk, the second a lagged measure. Note that these variables have the disadvantage of not capturing the effect of gradations in auditee risk on the audit fee.25 Client Industry: The companies in the sample were divided into their industry groups as classified by the Australian Stock Exchange. Industry influences were then controlled for by using a dummy variable coded 1 where a company was involved in the extractive industry and 0 if not. Company Selection and Data The data used in this study came from a computerised data-base of the Annual Reports of 433 Western Australian-headquartered companies maintained by the (then) Department of Corporate Affairs in Perth, Western Australia, now part of the Australian Securities Commission. Unlike other studies, this represents the population of all publicly listed companies in the region.26 RESULTS This section consists of four parts. The first considers the results of the data selection process. The second part provides results of univariate tests on the sample data, and the third shows the results of the regression analysis. The final part carries out further tests on the data. Sample Companies were included in the analysis where certain conditions were met:27 Valid No. of Cases 433 1. Total companies on file; 2. Active (i.e. trading) Companies (neither failed in 1988 3. The company had filed its 1988 annual report and it nor dormant); 349 0 Basil Blackwcll Ltd. 1995 332 BUTTERWORTH AND HOUGHTON had been processed by the regulators at the time of data collection; 305 organizational complexity was determinable; 293 determined for both 1987 and 1988. 268 4. Information on the company’s subsidiaries1 5. The company’s auditors and audit fee could be Of the 433 companies on the database, 268 fulfilled the selection criteria. Of these, 37 (13.8%) changed auditors between 1987 and 1988. Changes to Big 8 firms totalled 29 (including ten changing from one Big 8 firm to another, and nineteen changes from Non-Big 8). There were 8 which changed to Non- Big 8 firms (including one change within this sector, and seven changes from Big 8 firms). As noted above, these changes are exclusive of changes caused by auditor name changes and mergers. Table 2 shows the distribution of companies in the sample across industry groups and across the Main and Second boards of the Australian Stock Exchange in Perth. Table 2 Summary of Sample Coverage by Industry and Board Panel A: Industry Coverage Stock Exchange Total Non-Change Change Industry Sample Corn pan ies Companies Classification R&D - Hi-Tech R&D - Others Retail Manufacturing Consultancy Property investment Investment - others Financial services Leisure & Tourism Construction Mining (Extractive) Transport Health Total 8 (3%) 7 (3%) 28 (10%) 26 (10%) 8 (2%) 9 (3%) 21 (8%) 9 (3%) 5 (2%) 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 4 (2%) 140 (52%) 268 7 (3%) 5 (2%) 7 (3%) 9 (4%) 19 (8%) 8 (3%) 4 (2%) 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 4 (2%) 26 (11%) 23 (10%) 116 (50%) 23 1 1 (3%) 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 3 (8%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 2 (5%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 24 (65%) 37 Panel B: Board Classification Stock Exchange Total Non-Change Change Industry Sample Companies Cornpan ies Main 219 (82%) 188 (81%) 31 (84%) Second 49 (18%) 43 (19%) 6 (16%) Total 268 (100%) 231 (100%) 37 (100%) Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 0 Basil Blackwell Lrd. 1995 [...]... AUDITOR SWITCHING: T H E PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 337 There are at least two plausible explanations for the result for the Big 8 auditees It could be that the auditor switch was made so that auditees could avail themselves of the greater expertise in the provision of non -audit services by the Big 8 firms to which the change was made That is, the non -audit service expertise was a c a m of auditor switching. .. be that the auditors were able (and motivated) to sell the new clients a greater level of non -audit services than the incumbents, so that the non -audit services were a result of the switch If the first alternative is correct, it provides a new explanation for auditor switching (availability of considerable non -audit services) , in addition to the one based upon the lowering of audit fees If the latter... non -audit services and, (2) the total non -audit and audit fee (with loglo transformation) Results show that the change variable was associated with an increase in both the non -audit fee and total non -audit and audit fee for the client This increase is weakly significant (non -audit service fees, T = 1.757, P = 0.080, total audit and non -audit fees, T = 1.615, P = 0,108) 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1995 AUDITOR. .. effect, the fee model (without the auditor size dummy) was re-estimated using two sub-samples T h e first sub-sample was chosen by selecting those auditees using a Big 8 auditor and either (1) did not change their auditor, or ( 2 ) changed from another Big 8 auditor (those who changed from Non-Big 8 auditors were excluded) T h e second sub-sample contains those firms who use a Non-Big 8 auditor and either... study of the accounting profession in Australia In respect of the provision of auditing services the final report of that enquiry states ‘ the market for both external and internal audit services is very competitive Larger audits are usually awarded on the basis of a tender, with the choice of the auditor depending on a number of factors, such as the expertise of the personnel, demonstrated understanding... for the general result found T h e further tests relate to (1) presence of an interaction between change and to a move to a high or low ‘quality’ auditor, ( 2 ) the possibility of auditor change for the purpose of ‘opinion shopping’ and ( 3 ) the association between audit and non -audit services and fee setting for these services In addition, given the important place of the mining industry in the market... However, if the auditor cheats in this way, and is found out, it will lose quasi-rents as a result of clients leaving and other clients being prepared to pay less for the services of that auditor The auditor has an incentive to prevent this loss by acting professionally and reporting the breach (de Angelo, 1981b) 34 However, see note 28 35 Some would argue that the number of observations of auditor switching. .. reject the proposition that new auditors will charge significantly less than incumbent auditors These findings seem not to be driven by the existence of quality premiums or ‘opinion shopping’ However, it is observed that auditor switching is associated with increases in the total of audit and non -audit service fees paid to the auditor The finding is subject to a number of limitations In particular, to the. .. the lagged A measure of risk is presented in Column B of Table 4 An examination of Columns A and B of Table 4 shows that the regression 0 Basil Blackwell Lrd 1995 AUDITOR SWITCHING: T H E PRICING OF AUDIT SERVICES 335 co-efficient on the auditor change dummy is negative, that is, a n initial audit fee is lower than a non-initial fee However, the difference is not significantly different from zero Therefore,... expected that as audit firm size increases (Big 8 as opposed to Non-Big 8), so does the quality premium charged by that firm Hence, if the companies changing auditors in the sample were moving to Big 8 auditors (and in the sample there were many more changes to the Big 8 than away) then the amount of the quality premium paid by them may have been off-setting the effect of any price-cutting which may . ‘quality’ auditor, (2) the possibility of auditor change for the purpose of ‘opinion shopping’ and (3) the association between audit and non -audit services and fee setting for these services. . whether a spillover from NAS to auditing reduces the start-up cost of an audit or the marginal cost of auditing, the price elasticity of demand for auditing and the effect on NAS costs of. if the auditor is a member of the first tier of auditors2’ (the Big 8, or, more recently, the Big 6); otherwise coded zero. Provision of Non -Audit Services: In this study, the amount