CoRRuptIon, Global SECuRIty phần 7 potx

family, community, or political connections will give them the inside track. People share a sense that corruption has perpetuated poverty in a land of wealth, and that only the rich get richer. Nonetheless, everyone aspires to be rich. Although Nigerians recognize and condemn, in the abstract, the patronage system that dominates the allocation of government resources, in practice people feel trapped. A university professor, and friend, who was appointed as state commissioner of agriculture, explained corruption to me in this way: “Even if I wanted to avoid the practice of awarding contracts on the basis of favoritism, I could not. My people would say that I am selfish and foolish.Who gets to such a position of power and then refuses to help his people? Only the worst kind of person.” A man who enriches himself through emptying gov- ernment coffers is, in his community, despised only if he fails to share that wealth with his people—through direct gifts to individuals and community development projects, but also through more ceremonial distributions such as lavish weddings for his children, spectacular burials for his parents, and extravagant chieftancy installation ceremonies for himself. At such events his people enjoy his wealth; they “chop” (eat) his money. Although their wealth must be shared, the pressure on big men to be cor- rupt goes beyond awarding contracts to their relatives and cronies. One also enriches oneself. To be a commissioner and not build a palatial house in the village would be to fail to fulfill the expectations of one’s family and commu- nity. A big man in government or business can only distribute to and share with relatively few people the fruits of his office through official channels, but there are additional expectations that he should accumulate significant personal wealth—wealth that one’s kinsmen and townsmen feel entitled to draw upon. 30 The case studies of the awarding of contracts that are detailed below illus- trate the ways in which local moralities intersect with state politics to create and reproduce a political economy grounded in patron-clientism. These examples involve relatively small-sized patrons and smaller-sized clients to support the overall argument that corruption is sustained precisely because people at all strata in Nigeria are invested in and, in some measure, benefit from the accu- mulation and distribution of public resources through informal private net- works. The cases also highlight the importance of personal relationships, espe- cially kin relationships, in negotiating a system in which patron-client ties become less dependable as social connections grow more distant. case study 2. Ike Nwodu is a married father of five who lives in Umuahia. One of his relatives directed the World Bank–funded Abia State Agricul- tural Development Programme from 1994 to 1995 and Ike was awarded a Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 297 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 297 substantial contract—about 4 million naira (almost $50,000)—to supply locally fabricated machinery for palm kernel processing. Ike estimated that he would make close to a 500,000 naira profit ($6,250) for himself at the end of the contract, after supplying the equipment and giving his relative his share. In Ike’s case, his relative, the director, would receive about 400,000 naira. Igbos often spoke of “the 10 percent rule”—meaning that one is expected to give back 10 percent of the total amount of any contract to the person(s) who awarded it. In the 1990s, people began to complain that commissioners, direc- tor-generals, directors, and military administrators were demanding more than the customary 10 percent. One military administrator in Abia State earned the dubious nickname “Where My Own?” for his incessant demands for his share. In response to widespread evidence that its funds were being misused, the World Bank ordered a probe of many of its projects and imposed a freeze on payments to all contractors. Ike had supplied the equipment and used his initial “mobilization fee” (money awarded, in theory, to help the contractor with start-up costs) to pay off his relative. At the time that the World Bank stipulated these investigations or freezes, Ike was waiting for the final payment to repay debts to his own suppliers and pocket his profit. As a result of the probe, Ike’s relative was fired and a new director was appointed. When the World Bank finally lifted the freeze on payment of out- standing debts to contractors and Ike went to collect, he found that the new director wanted his own share in order to authorize disbursement. The delay imposed by the World Bank had caused his own creditors to become annoyed, and this change in directors meant that almost all of Ike’s profit was drained to pay off the new man. Ike vowed never again to seek a contract from an internationally funded project. case study 3. Godwin Okoro is in his late 40s, married with five children. Godwin is popularly known as “World Biz”—short for World Business— among his friends, a praise name coined during his past as a wealthier man. He hails from a local government area (similar to a county) that is the home of a former civilian governor. World Biz is married to a woman from the for- mer governor’s family, and during the former governor’s tenure, World Biz parlayed his in-law relationship into a series of lucrative contracts. Times became leaner during the military regime. His patron was long out of power. World Biz did not have a job, but still managed to make a living through small contracts. In 1996, World Biz campaigned for a particular candidate in his local government chairmanship elections. He borrowed money from me and others, assuring us that when his candidate won he 298 Daniel Jordan Smith 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 298 would “be in money.” He expected lucrative contracts in return for his mobi- lization of followers. His candidate won the election, but for months afterward World Biz com- plained that the man was ungrateful. He made frequent visits to the chair- man’s office in hopes of a business deal. But the chairman refused, complain- ing about lack of funds, debts to pay that had been inherited from the last government, and increased state and federal scrutiny of local government spending. At first World Biz accepted the excuses and maintained hope. Even- tually he concluded that the chairman had no intention of rewarding him. The chairman was an ingrate, World Biz said, and he did not “know politics.” Within a few months the military again dissolved the local government coun- cils. The chairman was out of office. Only weeks after that he died unexpect- edly of a heart attack. World Biz said it was God’s way of punishing him. World Biz’s expectation that he be rewarded was directly related to the fact that he had “delivered his people” in the chairmanship election. Given World Biz’s propensity to exaggerate on his own behalf, there is no way of knowing how instrumental he was in securing the chairman’s election. Regardless, World Biz had called upon a widely shared value in Nigerian politics that a man should be rewarded for delivering his people. While there is no doubt that elite Nigerians disproportionally benefit from the country’s current political and economic structures, these structures are sustainable only because they are supported by a complex moral economy in which those at the top fulfill obligations and duties to their followers and clients. In the first case, Ike’s kinship tie was crucial for securing the govern- ment contract. When his relative was dismissed, Ike’s contract was compro- mised. World Biz’s experience with his local government chairman illustrates that patrons and clients do not always agree on the extent of obligations. World Biz’s interpretation of the chairman’s death demonstrates the strong belief in the moral economy of patron-clientism. That his marital ties to the last civilian governor proved more beneficial than the political ties to the elected official shows that one can be secure in ties created through marriage and kinship, more so than in those produced purely through political alliances. Good Corruption and Bad Corruption The community development union is perhaps the most important formal mechanism by which the Igbo-speaking people of southeastern Nigeria (par- ticularly those who have migrated away from their rural villages) “deliver”or “share” the fruits of success with their kin and their communities of origin. Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 299 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 299 The importance of these unions in tying migrants to their natal communities and bringing material benefits to rural villages is well-documented. 31 These voluntary organizations, with ascriptive membership bases, focus their ener- gies on developing or “getting up” rural communities. 32 Migrants who accu- mulate wealth in their endeavors away from the village are expected to con- tribute significantly to development efforts at home. Of course, wealthy “sons abroad”do not act purely out of loyalty to their natal communities; in the act of contributing they build their networks of clients and enhance their pres- tige. In the context of contemporary Nigerian politics, such ties and bases of support are essential to achieve political power. These dynamics contribute to the tremendous importance of place of origin in Nigerian politics. 33 Processes of securing and delivering resources to rural communities through community development unions illustrate the shifting and situa- tional definitions of corruption in the minds of Nigerians. The dynamics that underlie these unions also illustrate the processes by which common people put pressures on their successful kin that contribute to corruption. The fol- lowing case study depicts the nature of such pressures and shows how differ- ently corruption is judged depending on the context in which it occurs. case study 4. Odi Nwoke was in his twenties when he first migrated from Ubakala to Lagos before the Nigerian civil war. He built a successful printing business and over the years had become rich. Like most of Ubakala’s success- ful migrants, he built a house in his village and came home several times a year to visit family and participate in important social events and ceremonies. He maintained active membership in the Ubakala Improvement Union and con- tributed to community development projects. In the early 1990s, during one of the several transitions from military to civilian rule, a political patron who Odi had cultivated over the years selected Odi for a directorship in an Abia State government parastatal (an institution set up by government that is ostensibly independent from the government). This position enabled Odi to disperse significant business contracts and build his own fortune. At home in Ubakala, his appointment was celebrated and during his brief tenure of eighteen months Odi managed to enhance his posi- tion significantly in Ubakala through awarding favors, increasing his contri- butions to the Ubakala Improvement Union, and hosting lavish social cere- monies to which his kin and neighbors were invited. In 1996, Odi left Lagos and retired to Ubakala. In part as a reward for his contributions to the community, he was voted in as an officer of the Ubakala Improvement Union. Immediately following Odi’s election, Ubakala went through a period of political upheaval over the selection of a traditional ruler, 300 Daniel Jordan Smith 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 300 or eze. Efforts to control the Ubakala Improvement Union were central in this political fight. Several months after his election, rivals accused Odi of misus- ing the union’s funds. His accusers demanded that he be removed from office. Judgments about whether Odi had misused union funds fell largely along lines of political cleavage in the community, but no one disputed that misus- ing union funds was a grievous offense. Odi had been celebrated and rewarded for the benefits that he delivered to the community through his position with the parastatal, even though most people assumed that resources had been accumulated through diverting “public funds” for “private use.” Money allegedly stolen from the Ubakala Improvement Union, on the other hand, brought great condemnation and was used as a political weapon against Odi and his allies. In these two instances, the contrast in how Odi’s corrupt behav- ior was judged illustrates the importance of social context in Nigerians’ per- ceptions of the relationship between morality and corruption. 419: Corruption, Deception, and Social Morality Despite the continued prevalence of ordinary Nigerians’participation in cor- ruption and the pragmatic role that various corrupt practices play in how Nigerian citizens navigate the challenges of contemporary life, many forms of corruption are perceived as illegitimate. As indicated in Odi’s case, similar instances of corruption can be accepted or condemned based on a person’s social position (e.g., beneficiary or victim; distant observer or interested party). If “the Nigerian factor” is corruption, the primary mode of illegitimate corruption in Nigeria is “419.” Named after the number in the Nigerian penal code for a specific form of fraud, 419 (pronounced four-one-nine) emerged in the 1980s during Nigeria’s economic decline, when the country fell from the heights of the worldwide oil boom into a political and economic morass marked by military dictatorships, inflation, a rapidly devaluing currency, and widespread poverty and unemployment. 34 The original meaning of 419 is linked to a particular practice in which the perpetrators sent letters and faxes that relied on the symbols of Nigeria’s petroleum-dominated political econ- omy—official letterhead and signatures, Nigerian National Petroleum Cor- poration insignia, lines of credit, government contracts, etc.—to bait largely foreign targets into providing advance fees with the promise of a larger pay- off. The scams relied not only on the trappings of the Nigerian state, but also its reputation for corruption, enticing people with the expectation that some of the millions of dollars siphoned off by corrupt officials could be obtained simply by providing a foreign bank account and advance fees. Apter has Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 301 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 301 cogently described how 419 emerged as Nigerians became disillusioned with the state at the same time that the state itself, no longer awash in oil money, relied on the politics of illusion to maintain its eroding legitimacy. 35 The original 419 scams have continued to flourish; they have even increased and expanded as the Internet has democratized access to technology during the same period as Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance after many years of military rule. Even more significant than the continued practice of 419 scams through e-mail is that 419 has become an all-encompassing signifier in Nigerian discourse for any behavior that relies on dissimulation, illusion, or some other manipulation of the truth to facilitate gain or advantage. Indeed, nothing better illustrates the Nigerian definition of illegitimate corruption than the spectrum of activities and behaviors that are described as 419. During my fieldwork in 2004, the Nigerian Labour Congress, an umbrella organization that represents many trade unions, called a national strike to protest government efforts to deregulate the price of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel, a policy that would result in significant increases in the cost of Nige- ria’s highly subsidized domestic fuel. National strikes over fuel prices have been common in Nigeria’s recent history. 36 The strike in 2004 was widely observed, and after several days, during which the nation’s economy was largely shut down, the government was forced to compromise, still raising fuel prices but keeping them well below the deregulated levels that had been pro- posed. In the period during and after the strike, the issue of corruption in Nigeria’s oil economy, always a popular topic, reached its peak in everyday conversations. Nigerians commonly believe that cheap domestic fuel is a national birthright, perceived as one of the few benefits that an otherwise corrupt and ineffectual government ought to be able to deliver to the masses in Africa’s oil- producing giant. In one of the great ironies and tragic symbols of Nigerian underdevelopment, during the Obasanjo regime, from 1999 to 2003, Nigeria imported nearly all of its refined fuel from overseas, as the country’s four broken-down oil refineries remained non-functional despite numerous huge government contracts to repair them. The popular belief, voiced in the idiom of 419, was that the country’s political elite, led by the president, deliberately kept the country’s refineries from being repaired so that they could profit from controlling the importation and distribution of fuel. One account of the domestic fuel situation, provided by a friend during a conversation as we waited in line for fuel at a crowded petrol station after the 2004 strike was called off, illustrates a widely held view: 302 Daniel Jordan Smith 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 302 [President] Obasanjo is just playing us 419. Government could easily repair the refineries but they leave them failing on purpose. I mean, in this country, with the billions generated from oil revenues, are you telling me that for several years they cannot even repair one refinery? No way. Obasanjo and the ex-military boys, they want it this way. They control the importation of fuel from abroad. They own the ships, the local marketing companies, the petrol stations. I understand some of them have even built refineries abroad. Can you imagine? While our refineries rot they have built their own abroad to profit from our suf- fering. It is not enough that they steal the oil revenues. They also sell our oil back to us at a profit. No. It’s 419, it’s 419. Whether or not this account is entirely factual, it represents a common awareness that elites are getting rich at the expense of the masses and that 419—here, illusion created through deception—is the central strategy. While most people see elites as the biggest perpetrators of 419, people also share a common belief that 419 has filtered throughout Nigerian society, a perception illustrated in the discourse resulting from the fuel strike. For example, pro- prietors of local filling stations were accused of 419 for hoarding fuel as the strike approached, pretending that their stocks had run out in anticipation of higher prices after the strike. Even the urban street urchins who sell black market fuel in plastic jugs at the roadside when gasoline is scarce are accused of 419 because motorists suspect that they mix cheaper kerosene with more expensive gasoline to increase their small profits. Implied in many common popular critiques of 419 is an understanding that politicians use the state to deceive ordinary people for the benefit of elites. Indeed, politics is perceived to be a primary arena for 419. Over the years Nigerians have realized that various programs implemented by military governments as part of the promise to return the country to civilian rule were elaborate ruses. No example is more telling than the 1993 presidential elec- tion, when then military dictator Ibrahim Babangida ultimately annulled the vote after dragging the country through an artificial process in which the military directed every step of the transition, including the creation of polit- ical parties, the writing of their manifestos, and the determination of eligi- ble candidates. Babangida’s cancellation of the election just days after the vote, which led to five more years of brutal dictatorship under Abacha, was viewed by many Nigerians as the ultimate 419, committed by the Nigerian leader who was most associated with the term. 37 Political 419 has not been the Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 303 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 303 exclusive province of the military, however. The elections in 2003, conducted by a democratically elected government, were widely viewed as 419 by Nige- rians who saw the huge victories for President Obasanjo’s ruling People’s Democratic Party as a process of elite-driven selection masquerading as a democratic election. The concept and practices of 419 have extended to multiple spheres of contemporary life in Nigeria. Any new visitor to the country is bound to notice that literally thousands of houses and buildings in cities and towns across the country bear the message “This House Is Not for Sale.” Ask any Nigerian the purpose of this message and he or she will tell you that it is to prevent 419. One popular form of 419 is to assume the identity of a real estate agent or a property owner trying to sell his house. In Nigeria’s cities and towns, where the real estate market is tight, buyers can be induced to make down payments to secure a later purchase, and in some cases entire transac- tions have been completed before the buyer discovered that the deal was a scam. In Nigeria there is always the added fear that even if a house has been sold in a scam one might still lose it if the buyer has more money or better political connections than the owner. Four-one-nine appears in contexts where one might not expect it to; indeed, that it does so is part of the reason that it is successful. When I first lived in Nigeria, young men in Lagos sometimes stood on the side of the road signaling to drivers that something was wrong underneath the drivers’ cars. If a driver stopped, the man that had flagged him or her down would offer to check under the car, quickly creating a real problem that only a mechanic— his co-conspirator—could fix. On a bus ride that I once took between cities in Nigeria, a passenger asked that we all pray for Jesus’“journey mercies,” a practice common in the heav- ily Christian south. Indeed, buses are a popular venue for evangelism and I braced myself for proselytizing. But the man quickly shifted from talk of God to talk of illness and medicine, explaining that he was a renowned healer and that he had brought his medicines on board to help his companions on the journey. He explained that his plastic bottles full of red liquid treated malaria and typhoid and that the ones with yellow liquid treated an assortment of “woman problems” such as irregular menses and infertility; he even had dif- ferent powders for toothaches and foot odor. Each time that he introduced a new medicine a man in the back of the bus shouted that he wanted it and asked the price. He paid enthusiastically and was given his medicine. Eventu- ally, a few other passengers bought some too.After several stops the medicine peddler disembarked, presumably to continue his sales on a bus going the 304 Daniel Jordan Smith 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 304 other way. His main customer also left at the same stop. Once they exited, the woman sitting beside me turned toward me and said, as I had been thinking, “It’s 419. The fellow at the back eagerly buying all the medicine is his partner.” She paused and added, with a sigh, “Nigeria ” Corruption and Its Discontents Nigerians’ sense that their state and society have become increasingly amoral—with elites pursuing wealth and power without regard for the con- sequences, and ordinary people seeking money by all means available simply to survive—contributes to a popular perception that law and order have given way to rampant corruption at every level. The concept of 419 and the breadth with which it is applied across social domains represent this collective con- clusion that the country has spiraled out of control. The Pidgin English phrase Nigeria na war-o (Nigeria is a war) has become one of the most common expressions in everyday speech. No external critics are as harsh in the evalu- ation of Nigerian society as are Nigerians. Nonetheless, implicit in Nigerians’ anger and frustration about corrup- tion is the recognition that matters could be and should be different. The perception of 419 as amoral is rooted in strong expectations about social morality, based, in part, on a traditional moral economy wherein reciprocity, kinship, and personal allegiance dictate forms of sociability and social obli- gation in which the welfare of others is privileged over individual interests. Or perhaps more accurately, individual interests are tied to protecting the welfare of others. In many ways, this moral economy remains powerful in contem- porary Nigeria and even contributes to forms of “corruption” that Nigerians see as more or less legitimate. In some situations, Nigerians’ discontents are projected backward to better times, in a nostalgia for an idealized past. But in their frustrations over the current state of affairs, many people also look for- ward to anticipated transformations. The ideals of democracy and develop- ment promulgated by the post-colonial state increasingly influence expecta- tions about social morality. Concepts of probity and official accountability are fertilized even in a setting where they are frequently deployed duplicitously. It is absolutely essential to recognize that Nigerians are ambivalent about corruption. Their acute dissatisfaction with the most amoral forms of cor- ruption, commonly glossed as 419, is produced in relation to experiences with institutions and forms of human relationship that are not corrupt. Whether it is trusted friendships and family ties, upright and generous religious congre- gations and fellowship groups, or networks of informal business relationships Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 305 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 305 that cooperate effectively based on high degrees of trust and internal self-reg- ulation, all Nigerians have experiences with social forms that are honest and scrupulous. Even in the realm of formal institutions associated with the state, examples of people and organizations with a reputation for integrity are well known. Understanding these social currents that push against corruption is as important as explaining those that facilitate corruption. Conclusion Distortions are created and inequalities perpetuated when corruption in Nige- ria is explained based on reified and simplistic notions of African culture. Such conceptions should be strongly contested. But it is irresponsible, both from a political and a scholarly point of view, to shrink from confronting the troubling conclusions about the relationship between corruption and culture that are evident in this ethnographic account. It is impossible to absorb the prevalence of corruption and the discontent that it produces in Nigeria with- out concluding that corruption has become heavily implicated in Nigerians’ views of their culture. Nigerians’ ambivalence about corruption is explained by the realities that they face. To the extent that ordinary Nigerians are participants in corruption, as well as critics and victims, it is because they are pragmatic: the stakes for indi- viduals in Nigeria are tied ideologically and materially to the social groups to which they belong. Thus, when individuals make choices that one might describe in terms of corruption, they do so with a sense that their own failures to acquire resources will drag others down, and with the knowledge that their own success will be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the larger group. Further, people are well aware of the intense scrutiny that they face from their families, communities, and other associates. When Nigerians speak of “the Nigerian factor,”they are referring not only to corruption per se, but also to the pragmatic choices that individuals must make in the context of their obligations to deliver to their people whatever share of the national cake they can capture. From this perspective, corruption does not appear so detrimental, and, indeed, if this were all there was to corruption, perhaps Nigerians would be much less discontented than they are. But as the concept of 419 suggests, cor- ruption in contemporary Nigeria has far exceeded the boundaries that can be explained by ties of kinship, obligations of patronage, and duties to the com- munities and groups to which an individual belongs. Because 419 relies on deceptions that manipulate the facades of the state, the trappings of develop- ment and democracy, and the symbols of modernity, 419 stands for people’s 306 Daniel Jordan Smith 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 306 [...]... (Berkeley, 19 97) 14 Apter, The Pan-African Nation; Michael Watts,“Oil as Money: The Devil’s Excrement and the Spectacle of Black Gold,” in R Martin (ed.), Money, Power and Space (Malden, 1994) For a similar analysis of Venezuela’s petro-state, see Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago, 19 97) 15 Bayart, The State in Africa, 89 16 Ibid., 2 37 17 See, for... framework, according to the 20 07 Human Development Index, Malawi ranks 164th out of 177 countries Malawi is considered one of the least developed countries, with relatively weak state institutions, facing major development challenges Corruption is one of these challenges—Malawi ranked 115th out of 180 countries on the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with its score of 2 .7, which remained virtually... www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf (accessed 2 May 2008) 2 “Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 27 January 1999, European Treaty Series No 173 The convention entered into force on 1 July 2002 3 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen du 26 août 178 9: “considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics... 5.1 See also Ben W Heineman, Jr., “The Role of the MultiNational Corporation in the Long War against Corruption, chapter 14 in this volume 7 See UNCAC, Article, 6, 7, 13, and Chapter 3, respectively 8 See Article 9, 10, and 13, respectively A simple word-count shows that the UNCAC encompasses 18,4 17 words, but the terms “political rights,”“torture,”“health,” “food,” or “wages” are not mentioned, and... Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, 20 07) Many of the ethnographic examples in this chapter draw on material from this monograph In addition to addressing the paradoxes of popular participation in corruption, the book explores the social consequences of popular discontent about corruption, arguing that this discontent helps explain many significant contemporary... (ICHRP) Working Paper (Geneva, 20 07) , available at www.ichrp.org/en/projects/131?theme=8 (accessed 5 February 2009) 5 Some of the most important conventions are the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the OECD-ADB Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific, the OAS Convention, the Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Law Conventions against Corruption, as well as the... the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Journal of Society and History, XVII (1 975 ), 91–112 308 Daniel Jordan Smith 5 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (London, 1983), 2 6 Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” 29 7 Bayart, The State in Africa, 87 8 Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa”; Bayart, The State in Africa 9 Ibid.; Joseph, Democracy... Sardan,“La Corruption Quotidienne en Afrique de l’Ouest,” Politique Africaine, LXXXIII (2001), 8– 37; Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington, 1999); Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (New York, 19 87) ; Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” The Journal... agencies financially, materially, and technically; hence, it does not suffer from a lack of capacity In spite of the relatively comfortable funding situation, the ACB is deemed to be “weak” by the 20 07 Global Integrity Report (although Malawi’s anti-corruption legislation is classified as “very strong”).40 This assessment reflects the popular perception of the ACB, which says that the ACB suffers from... surge in citizens’ articulation and power.49 The ACB has conveyed this insight succinctly on its website: “In order for every person in Malawi to benefit from a decline in corruption, there needs to be fostered a climate which is hostile to corruption, whereby every person stands up and says that they will not tolerate corruption any longer A massive change in attitude towards corruption is needed, and the . Comparative Journal of Society and History, XVII (1 975 ), 91–112. Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 3 07 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/ 15/09 3:50 PM Page 3 07 5. Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria. (Chicago, 19 97) . 15. Bayart, The State in Africa, 89. 16. Ibid., 2 37. 17. See, for example, Arnold Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York, 1 970 ). 18 1995 and Ike was awarded a Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 2 97 11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/ 15/09 3:50 PM Page 2 97 substantial contract—about 4 million naira (almost $50,000)—to supply locally