Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans - Chapter 2 doc

27 2 Minamata Disease The “Dancing Cat Disease” of Minamata Sometime in the early 1950s, weird behavior began to be noticed in some of the nonhuman inhabitants of small fishing towns near the industrial city of Minamata, on the island of Kyushu in southern Japan. Birds tumbled from trees, or flew erratically, occasionally bumping into houses in their flight. Cats walked with a peculiar lopsided gait, or ran in tight circles, eventually becoming totally disoriented and dying. Locals called the condition “dancing cat disease.” Not long after these strange happenings were first observed, abnormalities began to occur in humans as well — abnormalities of increasingly frightening proportions. Fishermen and members of their families began to experience neurological disabilities: tremors, numbness of face and limbs, paralysis, visual disturbances (especially constricted vision), mental disorientation, and speech disorders. Advanced cases lost control of body functions, became bedridden, and died. Mortality was about 40% of affected individuals. The full horror of the disease was still ahead — in the birth of blind, dreadfully deformed, and mentally impaired children (Smith and Smith 1975). The affliction was first called “the strange disease” and later “Minamata Disease.” By the end of 1956, 52 victims had been identified in the small fishing communities surrounding Minamata Bay. The search for a cause was painfully slow, and was impeded by govern- ment/industry foot-dragging and denials by both parties that a problem existed. Mercury contamination of Minamata Bay and its fish and shellfish populations by the effluents of a chemical production company was suspected as the cause, and was reported as such in the scientific literature in 1959. It was not until 1968, however, that the Japanese government stated officially that organic mercury contamination of fish and shellfish was the cause of the disease in human consumers, and that the chemical company (a part of the Chisso Cor- poration) was the source. Later investigations disclosed that during the period 1932 to 1965 Chisso had dumped 80 tons of organic mercury into the bay. The company denied legal responsibility until 1973, although beginning in 1959 it had begun offering poisoning victims and their families minuscule compensa- tions (so-called “solatiums,” which acknowledged corporate concerns but were not to be considered admissions of guilt). For all the suffering, disfigurement, and death that this company had caused, it paid “solatiums” of only $800 for a death, $280 per year for adult victims, and $83 per year for afflicted children! (These amounts were increased in the 1970s after public outrage and legal decisions in civil suits forced action by Chisso.) Present compensation consists of a lump sum payment of about 24 million yen (about 240,000 U.S. dollars). 9677_book.fm Page 27 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 28 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans By 1975, 793 victims had been designated officially, but about 2700 other people living in the polluted zone around Minamata City had symptoms of mercury poisoning, and an additional 10,000 residents were considered latent victims. [According to the most recent government information (March 1997), 2762 victims have been certified in the Minamata area, although many other cases are still being contested in courts, or have gone unobserved, or have been concealed because of family pride , during the long interval from the early 1950s to the present.] But the Japanese mercury poisoning story was not confined to Minamata. In 1964, another outbreak of the “strange disease” due to mercury poisoning was discovered on the west coast of Japan, near the city of Niigata. The source of contamination was traced to a factory of the Showa Denko Corporation that was using the same acetaldehyde pr oduction process (with a mercury sulfate catalyst) as that used by Chisso in Minamata — with mercury being dumped into adjacent river waters. Cases were mostly confined to fishermen and their families, for whom fish was a dietary staple. Fortunately, the scale of contam- ination was less than that of Minamata Bay , with fewer deaths and disabilities. T o the present time, 690 cases of Minamata Disease have been certified officially from the Niigata area. Then in 1973, a third outbreak of the disease, involving only 10 cases, was reported from the coastal area bordering the Ariake Sea, 40 km north of Minamata Bay. Announcement of that outbreak touched off near-panic in all of Japan, accompanied by short-term but widespread incidents of civil disorder, aimed at for cing reduction of pollution by large industries and increasing government regulatory activities at prefectural and national levels. F rom Field Notes of a Pollution Watcher (C.J. Sindermann, 1983) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO MINAMATA DISEASE The Minamata mercury poisoning episode has become an important milestone in global environmental thinking, and, because components of such events become obscured with the passage of time, it seems useful here to summarize principal events on a time scale. It also seems relevant to consider those events from several perspectives: those of the victims, the scientific community, and the polluting indus- tries and the regulatory agencies. All the elements of high drama are here: the human pain and suffering, the struggles by scientists for understanding, the uncaring polluting industry, the reluc- tant governmental regulatory bodies, and the endless legal maneuvering to assign guilt and to secure adequate compensation for victims. Each group has its own perspective on the happenings. To minimize confusion, a time and event summary for each of the principal entities involved follows, with their perspectives on the unfolding story of Minamata disease in Japan. 9677_book.fm Page 28 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Minamata Disease 29 P ERSPECTIVE OF THE V ICTIMS Early 1950s — Fishermen and their families began exhibiting signs of an unknown illness characterized by trembling, numbness of hands and feet, paralysis, and loss of control over body functions. It was first thought to be an infectious disease, and signs of the affliction resulted in social ostracism of the victims. The Chisso factory was a known polluter of the bay, but it was also essential to the economy of the region, so when the disease became associated with eating contaminated fish, the local business community and the local government refused to confront the com- pany directly. 1958 — Disease victims and their families formed a mutual assistance society to negotiate with Chisso for compensation but were rebuffed (Huddle et al. 1975). 1959 — With the publication of a university scientific report implicating Chisso in polluting the bay, the demands of the fishermen’s union for compensation for reduced catches became more violent. Repeated demonstrations were held at the factory. A mediation committee formed of local politicians proposed a minimum solatium that specifically ignored the matter of compensation to disease victims. More than 2000 fishermen rioted, stormed the factory gates, and caused extensive damage. The riots brought national attention; disease victims conducted a sit-in, demanding that medical compensation be included in any settlement. An agreement was reached at year’s end, even though the victims’ mutual assistance society was extremely unhappy with the ridiculously small amounts of the solatiums ($800 for a death, $280/yr for adult victims, $83/yr for children, and $56 for funeral expenses). The fishermen’s union was the principal negotiator of the agreement (Huddle et al. 1975). 1960–1967 — The insultingly small solatiums to victims paid by Chisso sub- dued protests for a number of years, even though the victims continued to live in poverty and many received no treatment. Late in 1964, a second outbreak of Minamata disease occurred in the area of the Agano River near the city of Niigata. The sequence of events followed the course of the original outbreak in Minamata: illness and death among poor people with a fish diet, denial of responsibility by the polluting company, suppression of academic research findings by government agencies, and demonstrations and legal actions by victims’ associations. By 1967, victims from Niigata were cooperating with those from Minamata with joint protests and legal claims. 1968 — The national government finally and belatedly agreed that organic mercury caused Minamata disease and that its source in the Minamata area was the Chisso factory, and in the Niigata area the Showa Denko factory. It also passed in December 1968 the Pollution Victims Relief Law (later called the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law), in which certified victims of mercury poison- ing received a lump sum payment. Chisso claimed inability to pay the compensa- tions, so the national government has “assisted” (National Institute for Minamata Disease 1997). 1973 — A prefectural court found Chisso guilty of gross negligence, and the company finally admitted its responsibility for creating conditions leading to organic mercury poisoning — a clear victory for Minamata victims. Chisso also agreed to 9677_book.fm Page 29 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 30 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans pay compensation of 16 to 18 million yen (US$51,000 to US$59,000) to victims, but by 1975 Chisso was already requesting government loans. 1992 — In addition to compensation to certified victims, the Japanese govern- ment began providing financial or medical support to residents of contaminated areas, to reduce health-related anxieties. 2000 — Almost 3000 victims of organic mercury poisoning have been certified for compensation under the terms of the Victims Relief Law. Victims are now eligible for lump sum payments of about 24 million yen (roughly US$240,000 at the present rate of exchange). Chisso has claimed inability to pay the cost, so the national government has “assisted” with its payments. 2001 — The Japanese Supreme Court awarded an additional total sum of US$2.8 million to 51 plaintif fs who claim illness from mercury poisoning. The drama is not over. Every year, 400 to 700 people apply for certification and compensation — individuals who did not apply in the past, for various reasons, or those who were rejected earlier. A S CIENTIFIC P ERSPECTIVE 1956 — The “strange disease” was first officially described by the director of Minamata’s Chisso Hospital as “severe damage to the central nervous system of humans.” In that same year, a scientific/medical group (including Kumamoto Uni- versity researchers) was designated by the prefectural government to search for the cause. The first report of that group suggested very tentatively that the cause might be “heavy metal intoxication from eating contaminated fish.” 1957 — The university group reproduced the disease signs seen in cats by feeding experimental animals fish caught in Minamata Bay. The group recommended a ban on fishing in the bay, but no action resulted. Local fishermen were urged to limit fishing in the bay, but no compensation was provided. 1958 — After many inconclusive tests of various pollutants, organic mercury became a prime suspect, principally because a British neurologist, D. McAlpine, visited Minamata for 2 days and subsequently published a paper in The Lancet (September 20, 1958) suggesting that concentration of organic mercury in nerve tissue could produce the symptoms seen in Minamata patients. 1959 — Despite delays imposed by the Kumamoto Prefecture government, a university research report was published concluding that the causative agent of Minamata disease was organic mercury. The report identified Chisso effluents as “the likely source” of organic mercury compounds found in the environment (Huddle et al. 1975). Minamata thus became the first recorded episode of mass mercury intoxication from indirect transmission from a contaminated coastal environment. 1960–1967 — Charges by Chisso scientists resulted in the termination in 1960 of research grants to Kumamoto University scientists studying Minamata disease. Grant support was assumed for 3 yr by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). Organic mercury was found in the factory effluents in 1962, and it was found to be concentrated as it moved up estuarine food chains. The chemistry of conversion of inorganic mercury used as a catalyst for acetaldehyde production to methyl- mercury was also described in 1962. The prefectural and national governments, 9677_book.fm Page 30 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Minamata Disease 31 particularly the National Ministry of Health and Welfare, repeatedly suppressed or delayed scientific reports on Minamata disease. This was in part a result of some- times obstructive cooperation between government ministries and industry (Huddle et al. 1975). 1973 — The national government of Japan announced that during 33 yr of acetaldehyde production at Minamata (1932–1965), Chisso had discharged an esti- mated 80 tons of methylmercury into the bay. 1978 — The National Institute for Minamata Disease was established to carry out medical studies of the disease and to conduct medical examinations of possible victims. 1996 — The institute’s role was expanded to include international chemical and environmental studies of mercury poisoning in humans. 1997 — Monitoring of methylmercury concentrations in fish and shellfish con- tinued in the Minamata area, as did other investigations that led to the conclusion that “continuous methyl mercury exposure at the level which can cause Minamata Disease existed until no later than 1968 in the Minamata area and after that there has not been such exposure” (National Institute for Minamata Disease 1997). 2001 — Medical scientists disagree about the validity of neurological tests used to identify and certify victims of Minamata disease. I NDUSTRY /R EGULATORY P ERSPECTIVE Before 1950 — The huge Chisso Corporation, located on the shore of Minamata Bay in southern Japan and established in 1908, became a major producer of polyvinyl chloride, acetaldehyde, and other synthetic chemicals used in plastics manufacturing. Increased production for a booming economy, without concern for environmental consequences, was the prevailing philosophy of the time, and this philosophy was reflected in very tolerant government regulatory attitudes toward the actions of large polluting industries like Chisso. 1950 — Because of conspicuous postwar pollution damage to the fisheries, the local fishermen’s union appealed to Chisso for compensation. The company, citing lack of scientific evidence, denied responsibility for any deterioration of the bay. 1953 — The first cases of what came to be called the “strange disease” were reported to local authorities in Minamata City. 1954 — Chisso purchased land and fishing rights from the fishermen’s union to compensate for past and future damages, with the provision that “even if further damages occurred, no new claims would be made.” The company promised to test its effluents, install treatment equipment, and carry out pollution control measures (none of these steps was implemented, and fish production continued to decrease). 1959 — A Kumamoto University report identified organic mercury as the cause of the “strange disease” (which became known as “Minamata disease”). The report implied that Chisso was the source of the mercury, and its publication caused intensified efforts by fishermen and victims to receive compensation, as well as efforts by the company to deny responsibility and to discredit the organic mercury theory. Also in 1959, a scientist employed by Chisso reported to company manage- ment his experimental results with cats, finding that the factory effluents produced 9677_book.fm Page 31 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 32 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans signs of the condition then known as “dancing cat disease.” Chisso suppressed the report until 1968, and the experiments were terminated (Ui 1968). 1968 — The Japanese government stated officially that organic mercury com- pounds in industrial effluents caused Minamata disease. 1970 — The Water Pollution Control Act was enacted to reduce or eliminate industrial mercury and cadmium discharges in all of Japan. 1973 — Chisso admitted its responsibility for the mercury pollution and agreed to pay compensation to present and future victims. It also agreed to cooperate with the government in the cleanup of the bay. 1975 — Chisso applied for a government loan of US$33 million, in an attempt to shift responsibility for compensation payments, and began spinning off its more profitable subsidiaries as independent companies. 1976 — Kumamoto Prefecture began removing 1.5 × 10 6 m 3 of contaminated bottom sediments from Minamata Bay. Chisso was to pay 60% of the costs of removal. Work was completed in 1990. 1977 — Nets that had been installed in 1959 to reduce movement of fish into or out of Minamata Bay were removed, with the assumption that the methylmercury problem had been resolved. 1997 — Testing for methylmercury contamination in fish continued, as did other investigations by the National Institute for Minamata Disease. 2001 — Government and industry appealed the Japanese Supreme Court award of US$2.8 million to Minamata disease victims. Table 2.1 is a further condensation of events from the perspectives of victims, scientific, and industry/regulatory bodies. WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM THE MINAMATA EXPERIENCE? The sheer horror and accompanying public outrage over the Minamata poisonings marked an important turning point in national and eventually international attitudes about industrial development and environmental abuse. The phenomenal economic growth of Japan after World War II was accomplished at a huge cost in environmental degradation and human suffering. Minamata continues as a stark illustration of that reality, and one that the Japanese people recognized and began changing in the 1970s. Events during the course of massive and culpable polluting episodes like this one seem to follow an almost predictable course. The polluting industry, deliberately or through negligence, dumps toxic wastes into rivers or estuaries. Fish and shellfish may be affected, in that abnormalities appear and populations may decline. Fish-eat- ing birds and mammals (including humans) may be affected by ingested toxic chemicals, so that sickness and death may result. Medical scientists address the problem after growing public concern results in release of research funds. Investi- gations focus on suspect chemicals, and evidence accumulates about a specific contaminant and its likely source. During this period of initial uncertainty, the polluting company vehemently denies that its effluents can maim or kill, even when it has evidence from studies by its own 9677_book.fm Page 32 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Minamata Disease 33 TABLE 2.1 Important Milestones in the History of Minamata Disease Victims Science Industry/Government Fishermen of Minamata encounter reduced catches and blame pollution from Chisso factory, beginning in 1926 Fishermen’s union appeals to Chisso for compensation for lost catches in 1926, 1943, and 1950 Chisso denies responsibility for reduced fish catches, 1950 First cases of “strange disease” reported during early 1950s A university scientific/medical group is designated by the prefectural government to search for the cause of the “strange disease,” 1956 Chisso factory management refuses to allow scientists access to its effluents, 1956 Disease victims form mutual assistance society to negotiate with Chisso, 1958 First report of the scientific investigation of the “strange disease” suggests heavy metal intoxication as a cause, 1956 After demonstrations and riots outside Chisso factory, an agreement was reached at the end of 1959 in which the company paid tiny “solatiums” to disease victims and small compensations to the fishermen’s union The first scientific report implicating organic mercury as the probable cause of Minamata disease was published in 1959 Chisso begins paying “solatiums” but continues to deny responsibility, 1959 The U.S. National Institutes of Health provided principal financial support to Kumamoto University research on Minamata disease, 1960–1963 A second outbreak of Minamata disease occurred at Niigata, near the Showa Denko factory in 1964 Niigata University designated by the Japanese government to do research on Minamata disease, 1964 9677_book.fm Page 33 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 34 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans First report of Niigata research scientists points to mercury pollution from the Showa Denko factory as the cause of the disease outbreak, 1966 Victims from Minamata joined with those from Niigata in legal actions for compensation in 1967 Production of acetaldehyde by Chisso discontinued at Minamata in 1968 National government passes pollution-related Health Damage Compensation Law, providing compensation to victims, 1968 Japanese government states officially that Minamata disease was caused by organic mercury from the Chisso factory, 1968 National Water Pollution Control Law enacted, 1970 Chisso agrees to pay victims compensation of US$51,000 to US$59,000, 1973 Chisso requests loan of US$33 million from national government to help pay victims’ compensation costs, 1975 Kumamoto Prefecture begins dredging 1.5 × 10 6 m 3 of contaminated bottom sediment from Minamata Bay, 1976 Nets preventing fish from moving into or out of Minamata Bay removed, with the assumption that the mercury problem had been eliminated, 1977 National Institute for Minamata Disease established, 1978 National government begins providing financial and medical support to residents of contaminated areas, 1992 TABLE 2.1 (Continued) Important Milestones in the History of Minamata Disease Victims Science Industry/Government 9677_book.fm Page 34 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Minamata Disease 35 capti ve scientists that the company’s effluents are responsible (as did the Chisso management early in the Minamata incident). Scientists in the employ of the polluting industry conduct their own investigations, but they never release their findings (except to the CEO and the board of directors). Governments and their regulatory agencies, during this phase of denial, are reluctant to act against the industry in the absence of truly o verwhelming data and vigorous public outcry against the polluters. Civil suits instituted by individuals or groups may eventually resolve the impasse, if decided in favor of the victims, and if endless appeals by the polluting industry are denied. The proffered settlements are invariably far too small to compensate for damages; the polluter then pleads poverty and begs for a government bailout. The final stage is threatened or actual declaration of bankruptc y, after the company has spun off the more profitable of its subsidiaries as independent companies. The sequence of events in these major pollution episodes, often dragging on over several decades, seems to follow this common pattern — almost a formula — augmented occasionally by new legal devices designed to avoid admission of respon- sibility for en vironmental degradation or damage to resources and people. One of the few positive aspects of this prolonged struggle of victims against polluting industries has been the reinforcement of an important legal concept that had been developed during repeated earlier confrontations with polluters of Japanese waters, which states: “In the absence of conflicting clinical or pathological evidence, epi- demiolo gical proof of causation [of human disease] suf fices as le gal proof of cau- sation.” This hard-won concept — which has become known as the “Minamata Principle” — will be important in any future major contamination episode, anywhere in the world, that results in human illness. Today there is widespread recognition in Japan of the reality that post–World War II industrial development succeeded at a large cost in environmental damage Role of National Institute for Minamata Disease expanded to include environmental and international studies, 1996 Lump sum payments underwritten by the Japanese government are specified at 24 million yen (US$240,000), 1997 Japanese Supreme Court awards an additional total sum of US$2.8 million to 51 plaintiffs who claim illness from mercury poisoning, 2001 Medical scientists disagree about the validity of neurological tests used to identify and certify Minamata disease, 2001 Industry/government appeal Supreme Court award of US$2.8 million to Minamata disease victims, 2001 TABLE 2.1 (Continued) Important Milestones in the History of Minamata Disease Victims Science Industry/Government 9677_book.fm Page 35 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 36 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans and in damage to human health. Environmental protection has received increasing attention there since the late 1960s, when the consequences of earlier polluting practices began to be identified. Pollution prevention and control policies have been implemented throughout the country and in adjacent waters. The Minamata experience, partly because of widespread media coverage and public demonstrations, was an important factor in developing awareness of a national pollution problem and in g aining support for preventive and remedial actions (Ui 1968). REFERENCES Huddle, M., N. Reich, and N. Stiskin. 1975. Island of Dreams: Environmental Crisis in Japan. Autumn Press, New York. 225 pp. National Institute for Minamata Disease. 1997. Our intensive efforts to overcome the tragic history of Minamata Disease. Spec. Rep., NIMD. 23 pp. (In English) Smith, W.E. and A.M. Smith. 1975. Minamata. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York. 220 pp. Ui, J. 1968. The Politics of Pollution. Sanseido, Tokyo. (In Japanese) 9677_book.fm Page 36 Monday, November 14, 2005 9:17 AM © 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC . Page 35 Monday, November 14, 20 05 9:17 AM © 20 06 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 36 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans and in damage to human health. Environmental. research on Minamata disease, 1964 9677_book.fm Page 33 Monday, November 14, 20 05 9:17 AM © 20 06 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 34 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans . Group, LLC 28 Coastal Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans By 1975, 793 victims had been designated officially, but about 27 00 other people living in the polluted zone around