Who Needs Emotions The Brain Meets the Robot - Fellous & Arbib Part 10 potx

164 brains Figure 6.1. A tentative illustration of the many interactions between two agents. Each agent builds in the brain a representation of both his or her own intended actions, using internal cues like beliefs and desires, and the potential actions of the other agent. These partly overlapping representations are used by each agent to build a set of predictions and estimates about the social consequences of the represented actions, if and when they would be exe- cuted. When an action comes to execution, it is perceived by the other agent as a set of social signals which do or do not confirm predictions and possibly modify beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires of Agent A Beliefs and desires of Agent B Execution of action Execution of action Representation of self- generated action Representation of observed action Representation of observed action Social signals from Agent B Social signals from Agent A Who ? Who ? Estimation of social consequences Estimation of social consequences Representation of self- generated action in the pattern of cortical connectivity could alter the shape of the networks corresponding to different representations or the relative intensity of acti- vation in the areas composing these networks. Although little is known on the functional aspects of cortical connectivity underlying the formation of these networks and, a fortiori, their dysfunction in schizophrenia, several studies have pointed to the prefrontal cortex as one of the possible sites for how do we decipher others’ minds? 165 perturbed activation (e.g., Weinberger & Berman, 1996). Because prefron- tal areas normally exert an inhibitory control on other areas involved in vari- ous aspects of motor and sensorimotor processing, alteration of this control in schizophrenic patients might result in aberrant representations of actions and emotions. 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The reactive level is pri- marily a hard-wired releaser of fixed action patterns and an interrupt generator, limited to such things as processing simple stimuli and initi- ating approach and avoidance behaviors. This level has only proto-affect. The routine level is the locus of unconscious, uninterpreted expectations and well-learned automatized activity, and is characterized by aware- ness, but not self-awareness. This level is the locus of primitive and unconscious emotions. The reflective level is the home of higher-order cognitive functions, including metacognition, consciousness, and self- reflection, and features full-fledged emotions. In this framework, we characterize personality as a self-tunable system comprised of the tem- poral patterning of affect, motivation, cognition, and behavior. Person- ality traits are a reflection of the various parameter settings that govern the functioning of these different domains at all three processing lev- els. Our model constitutes a good way of thinking about the design of emotions in computational artifacts of arbitrary complexity that must [...]... refer to as “proto-affect.” The realm of proto-affect is restricted to the here and now, as opposed to the future or the past The second, routine, level is primarily concerned with the execution of well-learned behaviors At this level, affect begins to show some of the features of what we would ordinarily call emotions but in a rather limited and primitive manner These “primitive emotions can involve... example, the newt, motivated to copulate (below the water), is also motivated to breathe (above the water); sometimes the behavior can be modified to accommodate both drives, but otherwise, the more critical will dominate and temporarily inhibit the other (Halliday, 1980) As for affect, our proposal is that at the reactive level there is only the simplest form of affect imaginable, what we call “proto-affect.”... (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) The strength of these expectations together with the intensity of valence associated with the current and expected states influence the strength of the ensuing feelings Expectations might also arise from some kind of continuity-of-experience mechanism—an implicit belief that the future is not apt to deviate much from the recent past However, whether the expectations are learned... at the routine level Given our view that the routine level allows for some representation of the future as well as the present, four elementary cognitive categories emerge as a result of crossing these two levels of time with the two levels of valence (positive and negative) These four categories lie at the heart of the rudimentary, primitive emotions that arise at the routine level In terms of the. .. cognitively elaborated, full-fledged emotion (reflective level) Although these different kinds of affective state vary in the degree to which they involve components of prototypical emotions, many are still emotion-like, albeit not very good examples (Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987) The graded nature of the concept of emotion is readily accommodated by our account partly because the specificity of an affective... Rather, they vary in their typicality, with some cases being better examples than others Thus, we propose that the best examples of emotions, which we often refer to as “full-fledged emotions, ” are interpretations of lower-level feelings and occur only at the reflective level, influenced by a combination of contributions from the behavioral, motivational, 178 robots and cognitive domains At the middle, routine,... valence to stimuli At the same time, these reactive-level affective signals are so intimately related to behavioral (especially motor) responses and to the motivation to approach or avoid a stimulus that it makes little sense to try to distinguish them from one another Throughout evolutionary history, the specificity of the automatic response systems has grown so much that, in the human, there are specific,... Affect at the Routine Level: Primitive Emotions The core of the routine level is the execution of well-learned routines— “automatic” as opposed to “controlled” processes (e.g., Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) In contrast to the reactive level, the routine level is capable of a wide range of processes, from conditioning involving expectancies to quite sophisticated symbolic processing This is the level... although there is no consciousness at the routine level, awareness is an important cognitive aspect of it Earlier, we defined cognition as the domain associated with meaning and affect as the domain associated with value One of the things of which we can be (cognitively) aware is (affective) feeling; but although there is awareness at the routine level, there is no self-awareness This is because self-awareness... Since routine-level processes cannot examine their own operations, self-awareness is possible only at the reflective level Expectations play an important role at the routine level Routine-level processes are able to correct for simple deviations from expectations, although when the discrepancy becomes too large, reflective-level control is required Consider the case of driving an automobile If the routine . “proto-affect.” The realm of proto-affect is re- stricted to the here and now, as opposed to the future or the past. The second, routine, level is primarily concerned with the execution of well-learned. (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The strength of these expectations to- gether with the intensity of valence associated with the current and expected states influence the strength of the ensuing. modification of output, but none of the activity is cognitive in nature—there is no cognition at the reac- tive level. Furthermore, at the reactive level, the other three domains of functioning—affect,