EUROPEAN BROAD CASTING LAW AND POLICY Part 5 docx

access 135 Access Directive do give some indication of what is meant by ‘non- discriminatory’. Arguably, these provisions limit the possibility of EPG operators bundling a content provider’s placement on the EPG with a requirement that it takes other services. 69 Other questions remain. In particular, are these terms to be assessed in the context of competing commercial undertakings; or should they take into account the fact that some broadcasters, at least, may be under specific obligations to fulfil societal goals? Whilst the answer to this question is not clear, that answer obviously has an impact on the viewing experience. FRAND terms can still be expensive, an issue that Oftel in the UK recognised. Its approach 70 sought to restrict excessive profits, but still allowed platform providers to take into account levels of risk. This is par- ticularly important given the rapid pace of technological development in the communications sphere and the need to introduce infrastructure, not just in terms of the service provider’s network but also in terms of the individual’s reception equipment. One particular problem relates to the costs of persuading viewers to acquire the necessary new technol- ogy. If subsidies are used, should the network operator be able to recover these, or a portion of them, via access charges? An important question is raised here, namely whether public service broadcasters can afford the market price, especially across a number of platforms. In its decision under general competition law in Newscorp/Telepiu, 71 the Commission required the platform operator to supply technical services ‘at fair, trans- parent, non-discriminatory and cost-orientated conditions’, thus limiting how much the operator could charge third-party content providers for the necessary service. This was not, however, aimed at the specific posi- tion of public service broadcasters. 72 The obligation in the directive is to negotiate; it is only SMP operators that might have the obligation to allow access. In general terms, it is not clear how FRAND relates to content-based issues. Theextentto which theFRAND terms address anabsolute refusalto supply to any third parties is unclear, although this issue might be covered 69 See Article 9(2) Access Directive; see commentary by A. Wichmann, ‘Electronic Pro- gramme Guides – A Comparative Study of the Regulatory Approach adopted in the United Kingdom and Germany – Part 1’, C.T.L.R 10(1) (2004), 16–23. 70 Oftel, ‘Ensuring Access on Fair Reasonable and Non-discriminatory Terms’, 1999. 71 NewsCorp/Telepiu,Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.2876, 2 April 2003. 72 Although conditions were imposed on the merger, it has been questioned whether the conditions were far-reaching enough: A. Fikentscher and K. Merkel, ‘Technical Bottle- necks and Public Service Broadcasting’, Regulating Access to Digital Television (Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2004) IRIS Special, p. 103. 136 jackie harrison and lorna woods under general competition law via the essential facilities doctrine. Given the technical nature of the framework, it has been argued that the regime concerns bottlenecks related to transport and would not include content- based bottlenecks, such as exclusion on editorial grounds. 73 Questions have, however, been raised as to the grounds on which operators could refuse access. To what extent should one party be obliged to disseminate the views of another, when those views conflict on political, religious or even more general editorial grounds? This point raises difficult questions concerning conflicting rights to freedom of expression, a conflict which is perhaps not best dealt with in a competition-based analysis. 74 Interoperability The access requirement in Article 5 of the Access Directive is an improve- ment on its predecessor, the Advanced Television Standards Directive, in that the Access Directive does open up the possibility of EPGs being coveredbyaccess requirements. This provision is still limited to digital television, leaving pay TV on analogue systems unprotected. Also, despite the terms of Article 18 of the Framework Directive, the requirement does nothing to ensure interoperability. 75 Although interoperability does not guarantee access, and neither access nor interoperability provides any guarantees regarding the diversity and plurality of broadcast content, at least ensuring interoperability removes barriers to media (and content) pluralism. Rights to access EPGs are limited in a practical sense by lack of interoperability (see further below). Lack of interoperability makes the likelihood of a competitive market in EPG services, so reducing problems arising from dominance in this area, more distant. 76 There is a real risk that EPG services will continue to be provided by one dominant supplier (per platform). In this, an opportunity to support the aim of providing diversity of content supply has not been taken. The Council of Europe Recommendation R(99) 1 specifically sug- gests that its signatory states adopt specific regulations dealing with CAS. It recommends that states introduce technical measures and stan- dards to ensure interoperability. By contrast, under Union law, member 73 N. Helberger and A. Springsteen, ‘Summary of the Discussion’, Regulating Access to Digital Television (Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2004) IRIS Special, p. 7. 74 Helberger and Springsteen, ‘Summary’, p. 8. 75 Helberger, Scheuer and Strothman, ‘Non-discriminatory Access’, p. 2 regarding Directive 95/47/EC on which the Access Directive is based vis `avisCAS. 76 Helberger and Springsteen, ‘Summary’, p. 8. access 137 states are limited in their freedom to impose national standards, as they may constitute a barrier to trade. The question of whether the Com- munications Package allows member states to make particular standards mandatory is affected by the scope of those directives (i.e. in principle, do the technical measures fall within electronic communications services or associated facilities?). This potential difficulty can be seen as an example of insufficient action at Union level, precluding member states’ corrective action within the national sphere. Looking at the interoperability provision, it is unclear what ‘encourage’ means within the terms of the Framework Directive. The Commission communication suggests that it does not mean ‘to impose’ standards. This implies a weak obligation, favouring industry-led standards rather than regulation. Such an approach prioritises the interests of the large conglomerates over the independent sector and the interests of viewers. Furthermore, the nature of the obligation on the member states is uncer- tain. It is unclear what level of action, if any, Article 18 of the Framework Directive requires them to take. The two paragraphs in Article 18 reflect the fact that there is a gap between European policy, which seeks to pro- mote open standards in the interests of the common market, and reality, in that proprietary standards exist. The second paragraph of Article 18 is therefore aimed at limiting the content control that a proprietary API owner may have,byallowingother service providers to design services that function with the proprietary API. The weakness is compounded by the fact that there is no cut-off date by which open APIs, or a common standard, must be in place. The one firm date in the directive concerned the Commission’s review under Article 18(3). This has already passed and the Commission clearly felt that its scope of action was inhibited by the fact that some member states had met the deadline for implementing the Communications package late. In this context it should also be noted that the term ‘interoperable’, used for example in Articles 17 and 18 of the Framework Directive and Recital 31, is susceptible of a number of different meanings. There is a difference between including multiple interfaces in one type of hardware and making one interface open to many services. The Commission in its working paper distinguished between simple interoperability, which involves a single universal receiver, and multi-standard systems. 77 This latter concept is not really interoperability at all, but rather a proxy for it. 78 77 Commission, Working Paper on Interactive Digital Television SEC (2004) 346, p. 6. 78 Ibid. 138 jackie harrison and lorna woods The distinction can be seen in the responses to the Commission’s working paper on interoperability of digital interactive television. The commercial broadcasters suggested that interoperability has already been achieved; their view suggests that interoperability requires the availability of the same interactive services on different distribution platforms. This form of interoperability is based on technologies on the network, which allow the content to be moved from one system to another (including multiple authoring systems, which allow content to be generated for more than one API). On this basis, where there is demand, interactive services will become availableacross several platforms. Unsurprisingly,those who took this view of interoperability saw little benefit in the impositionof common standards. By contrast, those who supported the introduction of common standards took the simple view of interoperability. 79 The Commission, by declining to commit itself, is implicitly adopting the interoperability by proxy approach, rather than simple interoperability from the perspective of the viewer. The suggestion that there are greater threats to diversity of supply, such as vertically integrated media conglomerates, does not justify a failure to act here, especially when the market developments providing for consumer welfare are based on the functioning of a market which the Commission admits is flawed. There is a difference between access regulation as found in the Access Directive, and a move towards open APIs. This raises uncertainty as to whether access regulation will be sufficient for more complex services, because it does not address re-authoring costs for use in conjunction with different APIs. Open/common standards have the advantage of being designed to serve the needs of the entire market rather than being designed to serve the needs of a particular broadcaster and its range of services/business model. Further, full and complete information about how the system operates will be available. For proprietary systems which are available for use by others, it is likely that only limited information will be made available. It would seem that requiring access to proprietary systems on its own is insufficient. Open standards seem more likely to be successful, although the obligations in the Framework Directive, or the will ofthe Commission, inthis context seemto be weak. Allowing industry to develop its own standards might prove beneficial in terms of achieving a standard that is workable. Such an approach, however, has been crit- icised as being open to manipulation on the part of dominant market 79 EBU, Comments. access 139 players 80 and also constitutes the privatisation of standard-setting, which may not always operate in the interests of the viewer. A focus on open standards could also allow for a Union-wide standard to be developed. Although standard-setting might restrict innovation in some quarters, as the Commission has noted, given subsidiarity and the differences in the member states’ markets, implementation of national standards across the Union is fragmented, which leaves the less economically well-developed member states dependent on the actions of the stronger member states. 81 None the less, given that there are significant numbers of proprietary APIs already on the market, forced migration to a common standard might have significant cost implications and it is unclear on whom the burden of that cost would fall. This problem is, however, endemic in a market with developing technology, as discussions about the possible change from the Union endorsed MPEG2 standard for STBs to the more efficient AVC standard illustrate. Presentational aspects of EPGs As presentational aspects of EPGs lie outside Article 5 of the Access Directive, so questions about how programmes are described and where they appear on the EPG (questions which exercised the BBC in relation to Sky) are not addressed by regulations. This allows the member states to make special provision, for example, in respect of the presentation of public service broadcasters, providing those rules comply with the basic principles of Union law, such as non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. 82 Whether member states would be permitted to require that, for example, national public service broadcasters should be given prominence, is questionable. Such a requirement could be considered as discriminatory as against other providers of broadcasting content which are based in other member states. A further weakness is, of course, that member states are not required to take any such action. Additionally, Article 5(1)(b) is of an optional character; again, although the possibility is there to protect access, it is not compulsory. There is thus no base level of protection. This is significant given the potential importance of the EPG for selecting content from the viewer’s perspective. 80 S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock, ‘The Privatising of Conditional Access Control’, Communications and Strategies 25 (1997), 91. 81 Commission, Working Paper,p.12. 82 Article 5(3) requires that any conditions be non-discriminatory. 140 jackie harrison and lorna woods USD and must carry The only measure in the Communications Package which is aimed at pro- tecting viewers directly is the USD. This directive contains a ‘must-carry’ provision, which seeks to ensure that specified types of content are carried by certain operators. It can be seen, therefore, as forming part of a content universal service obligation, containing some rules relating to geographic coverage and to content. None the less, there are weaknesses in the pro- tection awarded to viewers’ interests. The difficulty lies in the underlying assumptions on which the entire regulatory framework is based, that is, the correction of market failures. Whilst this might provide some protec- tion for consumers, citizens’ needs seem tohavebeenoverlookedentirely. Citizens’ interests are threatened by the view that must-carry obligations are a relic from the analogue era and that, with the development of digital services and the end of spectrum scarcity, there would be no need for such rules. The argument is based on the assumption that, in a world where content is scarce, popular content will be in demand and public service broadcasters (andothers) will be abletoaccess transmissionnetworks, and therefore regulation to ensure they have access to transmission networks is unnecessary. Some have argued that such content providers should be under a must-offer obligation. This would avoid the danger that such content providers would only offer it to a limited number of transmis- sion companies, giving those companies a competitive advantage. 83 This could be particularly problematic for new service providers. The assump- tion here is that a greater number of service providers is beneficial. It does not, however, look at the end result. Given our view of the public domain, we suggest that regulation should ensure that a certain minimum content service is available to the maximum audience, irrespective of geography, or ability to pay. As far as the citizenship-enhancing function of PSB or a Universal Service content package, the Communications Package is silent. It is also notable that the USD does not cover the possibility of must-offer obligations; presumably because these obligations might be thought to fall within the content end of television provision and be governed by either the TWFD or the general treaty rules. 83 The significance of PSB and even free-to-air television is illustrated by the attempts of BSkyB to acquire ITV channels for its basic package, so as to improve its attractiveness to viewers. This desire is based on viewing popularity; once ITV’s viewing figures started to drop, BSkyB became less enthusiastic and, conversely, ITV became more willing to contract with BSkyB: J. Doward, ‘Sky Digital ‘dumps’ ITV’, The Observer,28January 2001. access 141 The strength of the must-carry obligation is, however, undermined by a vague referenceto ‘legitimate publicpolicy considerations’. 84 Public policy is potentially a very broad concept, and arguably leaves significant discre- tion to the member states as to the policy considerations they wish to pro- tect. Certainly, as we have seenin chapter 5, issues such as media pluralism, freedom of expression and cultural policy have been accepted as falling within legitimate public policy concerns. 85 Conversely, the phrase ‘public policy’ has also been interpreted very narrowly, in particular excluding economic concerns. 86 The problem in this particular regard is that the boundary between economic concerns and other public-interest consid- erations is sometimes hard to define, especially where the state is trying to ensure that the provision of a public service is economically viable. The concern arises that a similarly limited view would be taken in the context of Article 31 USD. For example, the Flemish Community pro- posed introducing rules which imposed must-carry obligations in favour of all new commercial broadcasters. The idea was to give the new broad- casters time to develop market share and to establish themselves before having to negotiate on a commercial basis with the transmission compa- nies. The measure wasaimed at stimulating the development of innovative programmes in the region and to ensure that programming which would not otherwise have been aired received transmission time, contributing to the diversity of programming. The Commission disapproved of this mea- sure, as it viewed it as economic rather than cultural. 87 The introduction of DTT may give rise to similar problems. An important question is that of whether supporting the introduction of DTT by giving broadcasters must-carry status on established networks, and therefore access to larger audiences, is an economic issue, a concern for effectiveness of spectrum use or a concern to ensure plurality and diversity. 88 In sum, although must-carry obligations are permitted, the circumstances in which they 84 Recital 43, USD. 85 Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] ECR I-4007, paras. 22 and 23; Case C-353/89 Commission v. Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069, paras. 29 and 30; Case C-148/91 Ver onica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissari- aat voordeMedia[1993] ECR I-487, para. 9. 86 Case C-17/92 Distribuidores Cinematogr´aficos [1993] ECR I-2239, paras. 20 and 21; case C-211/91 Commission v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-6757, para. 9. 87 P. Valcke ‘The Future of Must-carry: From Must-carry to a Concept of Universal Service in the Info-communications Sector’, in To Have or Not to Have Must-carry Rules (Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2005), IRIS Special, p. 33. 88 On the different goals member states have attributed to the introduction of DTT, see Analysys, Report on DTT,p.48. 142 jackie harrison and lorna woods may be imposed are constrained. We suggest that the conception of USD is limited, since it tries to make a rigid distinction between content and carriage. It tries to do this in a rapidly changing environment, one that cannot easily accommodate such a distinction. Although the provisions are designed to be technology neutral and thus flexible, we need to consider whether the obligations, as specified, ensure universal coverage. Two problems are evident. The first problem arises because the division between content and transmission adopted in the Communications Package does not necessarily reflect the market. Whereas this analysis sees the market as divided in two, content and transmission, the market actually reflects a three-stage value chain: con- tent providers in the sense of those who have editorial control; those who package the content into bundles and offer these to viewers; and the net- work operators who provide transmission capacity. Although a particular market player may perform more than one of these functions,the problem is that the must-carry obligation falls on the network provider. Presum- ably the must-carry content should berequired to be includedin a package for distribution. Although in some countries, such as the UK, a network provider is also the provider of content packages, in some member states, such as France, they are separate entities treated differently under national law. 89 The second problem is that member states may impose obligations on undertakings only where a significant proportion of end users use the relevant networks as their main means of receiving television and radio broadcasts. It is possible to envisage the situation where a small popula- tion group uses a means of transmission not normally used by the rest of the national group for reception of broadcasts. It is worrying if the con- sequence of the drafting of Article 31 is that such groups will be excluded from the protection of the must-carry obligations. The must-carry provisions themselves identify the possibility of pay- ment for carriage. Indeed, it seems that the Commission, 90 and even COCOM, 91 have assumed that payment might be required to make the member states’ assessment of the necessity for the must-carry obligations proportional. 92 This overlooks two facts. The first is that, despite the 89 Roukens, ‘What Are We Carrying Across the EU These Days?’, p. 8. 90 Commission, Working Document The 2003 Regulatory Framework for Electronic Commu- nications – Implications for Broadcasting (Doc. ONPCOM02-14), 14 June 2002; Commis- sion, Working Document ‘Must Carry’ Obligations under the 2003 Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 22 July 2002. 91 Commission, Working Document An Approach to Financing the Transport of ‘Must-Carry’ Channels, in relation to Article 31 of the Universal Service Directive,COCOM03-38, 2 September 2003. 92 Roukens, ‘What Are We Carrying Across the EU These Days?’, p. 13. access 143 essentially one-directional nature of the access relationship in the broad- casting context, the network operator may itself benefit from carrying the content and might, indeed, expect to pay for that content rather than vice versa. 93 The second is that such an approach does not take into account the difficulties this might cause for PSB operators, who are under obligations to broadcast across multiple platforms, although some com- mentatorshavesuggested that the issue ofpaying fortransmission capacity might not fall to public service broadcasters alone. 94 Review of Communications Package The Communications Package has been perceived as successful. 95 None the less the Commission has commenced a review process to identify areas for change, propose reductions in administrative burdens and repeal out- of-date measures. The review is, at the time of writing, at a very early stage, none the less two main changes are likely to have an impact on the broadcasting sector: the changes to radio spectrum management; and the requirement, in the interests of the internal market, that must-carry obligations must be reviewed by specific deadlines. The proposal regarding spectrum management is to continue to move away from individual radiospectrum licencesto amarket-basedapproach. The Commission envisages spectrum management operating on the prin- ciples of ‘technology neutrality’ and ‘service neutrality’. 96 The former principle envisages that ‘spectrum users would be free to use any type of radio network or access technology in a given spectrum band to pro- vide a service’. 97 The latter principle envisages the provision of any service across a spectrum to which the service provider has access. The aim of these changes is to ensure a ‘high level of fluidity of radio resources’ 98 93 This seems to be the approach suggested by Eurostrategies, Study ontheAssessment of the Member States Measures Aimed at Fulfilling Certain General Interest Objectives Linked to Broadcasting, Imposed on Providers of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, in the Context of the New Regulatory Framework (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/information society/topic/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/finrep 18 march 2003.pdf. Note that Article 18(2) Framework Directive seems also to envisage remuneration for access to APIs. 94 Roukens, ‘What Are We Carrying Across the EU These Days?’, p. 15. 95 Commission, Communication on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Elec- tronic Communications Networks and Services, COM (2006)334 final, SEC (2006) 816 and 817, p. 6. 96 Commission, Staff Working Document on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,SEC(2006) 816, COM (2006) 334 final, p. 13. 97 Ibid.,p.13. 98 Ibid.,p.14. 144 jackie harrison and lorna woods viathe introduction of spectrum trading. The danger is that a service provider acquiring spectrum capacity might not provide the same type of service as the service provider selling the capacity on. Without any constraints, it might be more profitable for a television company to sell its spectrum rights to the provider of another service. In this example, it would not be possible to guarantee the same quality of content ser- vice continuing, or even the same type of service at all. To guard against this possibility, the Communication does suggest exceptions to achieve anumberoflegitimategeneralinterest objectives, of which audiovisual policy, promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism are some. It remains to be seen what the precise level of protection allowed to these interests is. The Commission expresses concern that the must-carry rules have not been reviewed sufficiently by the relevant NRAs. The implication is that in some member states must-carry obligations exist in excess of what the Commission views as necessary and proportionate. The Commission, in proposing that must-carry should be kept to a minimum, reflecting ‘evolv- ing market and technological developments’, 99 seems to be suggesting that whilst must carry rules have not lost their purpose, they are certainly the exception rather than the norm. In both these proposals we can trace an internal market-driven approach that is deregulatory in effect. By requir- ing the exceptions for broadcasting policy to be limited to the minimum, it seems that citizens’ concerns are not being accorded a high priority. Conclusion The adoption of the Communications Package signalled a move to a pol- icy of letting the market decide in an era of privatisation, corporatisation and liberalisation. This may be appropriate in the context of the compet- itive telecommunications market. Given the emphasis on technical and regulatory convergence in the Convergence Green Paper,someaspects of broadcasting are also subsumed within the same approach. To us, though, it seems that this is far from adequate, as weaknesses in the market struc- ture and the way commercial operators behave are not addressed. Further, the ability of viewers to access content is under-protected. Although the interests of the consumer get some mention in the recitals, they do not really form part of the ‘top-level’ rationale for the regulatory package. Specific problems arise from the hybridisation of competition law and 99 Ibid.,p.23. [...]... n these cases: ‘Competition Law and Pluralism’ in European Digital Broadcasting: Addressing the Gaps’, Communications and Strategies 54 (2) (2004), 97–128, p 109; C Marsden, ‘The European Digital Convergence Paradigm: From Structural Regulation to Behavioural Competition Law? ’ Journal of Information Law and Technology 3 (1997), p 19 available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc /law/ elj/jilt/1997 3/marsden1/,... the European courts have approached the question of diversity and media concentrations, we should note that there are problems which arise when taking a standard competition -law- based approach to cases in the broadcasting sector These problems arise from the particular characteristics of 148 jackie harrison and lorna woods the sector and the nature of competition law In general terms, competition law. .. the fact that fewer corporations own more and more of those channels and services This chapter looks at the approach of the European Commission in its capacity as a competition authority and the European courts (European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of First Instance (CFI)) to identify the relationship between media specific issues and competition law and policy One central question is whether the... Bourgeois and Bock in ‘Guidelines’ suggest that the new Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3) abandon this assumption The build standards and quality of a car, for example, remain the same throughout the distribution chain 168 jackie harrison and lorna woods broadcasting lies in the way it is transmitted We take for granted the transmission quality resulting in a certain standard of picture and sound... itself against long-term dominance by one company In its Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premier 52 53 54 H Ungerer, ‘Competition in the Media Sector – How Long Can the Future be Delayed?’, Info (20 05) 7 (5) , 52 –60 The Commission’s definition of the market in this case has been criticised; in particular it is unclear whether from the demand side, that is the perspective of the consumer, the online music industry is different... nature of many of the broadcasting markets The cases have tended to see the geographic market as the territory of the member state .57 The effect of this is that issues of plurality of supply are considered national market by national market As we shall suggest below, such an analysis neglects 55 56 57 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, para 100 Similar problems can be seen in the PC and software market, in... special needs of the broadcasting sector 7 Media ownership: impact on access and content Introduction As chapter 6 has shown, the actions of private parties, particularly the big and powerful, may have an impact on the content available to viewers Put briefly, limiting the range of different suppliers may adversely affect the range of content broadcast Similar concerns about access, and the consequent... KirchMedia and other units The banks began dismantling the group See www.ketupa.net/kirch1.htm for an overview of its numerous holdings prior to its collapse in 2002 See Nitsche, Broadcasting in the European Union, p 121 and contrast the merger decision in Newscorp/Telepiu, in which something was held to be better than nothing Ari˜ o, ‘Competition Law and Pluralism’, pp 110–11 n media ownership 1 65 unregulated... T -52 8, 54 2, 54 3 and 54 6/93 EBU/Eurovision System [1996] ECR II-649, para 118 Article 86(2) is discussed further in the context of state aid, in ch 12 Note, however, Craufurd Smith suggests that, in practice, the Commission has taken a narrow view of this provision: R Craufurd Smith, ‘Rethinking European Union Competence in the Field of Media Ownership: The Internal Market, Fundamental Rights and European. .. Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors and the Implications for Regulation COM (1997) 623 D Geradin, ‘Access to Content by New Media Platforms: A Review of the Competition Law Problems’, ELRev 30(1) (20 05) , 68–94 OECD, Media Mergers, p 25  152 jackie harrison and lorna woods costs Equally, it could have an adverse impact as it reduces the scope and diversity of content.13 Overview of the Merger . chapter 5, issues such as media pluralism, freedom of expression and cultural policy have been accepted as falling within legitimate public policy concerns. 85 Conversely, the phrase ‘public policy . the special needs of the broadcasting sector. 7 Media ownership: impact on access and content Introduction As chapter 6 has shown, the actions of private parties, particularly the big and powerful, may. corporations own more and more of those channels and services. This chapter looks at the approach of the European Commission in its capacity as a competition authority and the European courts (European Court