Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law Part 7 potx

sovereignty and the post-colonial state 213 which had been granted by the colonial powers to trading companies exploiting the resources of colonial territories. Mohammed Bedjaoui, forexample, argued that ‘a concessionary contract must end with the extinction of the ceding state and could survive the change of sovereignty only at the express wish of the new authority’. 42 This position was understandable as colonial powers and trading enterprises often acquired ‘rights’ over these resources through duress and deception, and the concessions had often never been the subject of meaningful consent on the part of the Third World peoples. The review would examine the legality of the manner in which the concessions had been obtained and, further, the profits made by the colonial power or trading company from the exploitation of the resources. These factors could then be taken into account in assessing the compensation to be paid to the nationalised enterprises. Finally, the Third World argued that nationalization was to be determined according to national rather than international standards, thus attacking once again the rules of state responsibility relating to foreign investment. 43 The West differed from the Third World on each of these issues. First, it argued in effect that the only sovereignty enjoyed by the Third World wasthe sovereignty provided by European international law; this international law legitimized conquest and dispossession, as a result of which no remedy was available to the victims. 44 Secondly, the West argued that the new states were bound by established international law, and that the Third World state’s control over its natural resources had to comply with the doctrines of state succession and acquired rights which stipulate that a new state must respect the obligations undertaken by a predecessor state. 45 Accordingly, it followed, contrary to Bedjaoui, that thenewly independent countries were legally bound to honour the concessionary rights to their natural resources which trading companies had acquired prior to independence. Finally, the former colonial powers 42 Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘First Report on Succession of States in Respect of Rights and Duties Resulting From Sources Other Than Treaties’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/204, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II, 1968,UNDoc. A/CN.4/SER.A./1968 Add 1 at p. 115. 43 Ibid., p. 116. 44 Chief Justice Marshall asserts the point in its most implacable form: ‘The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes the limits.’ Johnson v. McIntosh,21U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 45 On acquired rights, see Daniel P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956). For a general overview of the debates, see the various essays collected in Richard B. Lillich (ed.), The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1975). 214 imperialism, sovereignty and international law did not dispute the right of a sovereign to nationalise property per se. 46 Rather, they argued that nationalization was legitimate provided that a number of conditions were met, the most significant of these being payment of compensation according to internationally determined standards. The West relied on sources doctrine for this argument, asserting that the international standard of compensation was established by customary international law which was binding upon the new states once they became independent, and that the ‘national standard’ asserted by the Third World lacked any such legal foundations. The various doctrines state succession, acquired rights and sources doctrine are related to each other in complicated ways. Simplifying once again, Western and Third World characterizations of these doctrines reveal fundamental differences in the ways in which each side understood the history of sovereignty doctrine and its engagement in the colonial encounter. For instance, acquired rights doctrine, when con- sidered in the context of state succession which was so central to the debate involving Third World countries, essentially asserted that the rights granted by a sovereign to a private entity had to be respected by the successor sovereign. 47 In this way, it seemed to provide sovereignty doctrine with a past by establishing that the obligations of a predecessor state to a private party were binding on a successor state. Beyond the minimalist assertion as to the continuity of obligations, it failed to provide any more complex or substantive means of comprehending therelationship between the predecessor and successor sovereign. As a consequence, it denied the Third World’s attempts to recount a complex history in which colonial powers had, in a number of respects, delib- erately compromised the nascent sovereignty of the colonial territory. As an example, several colonial powers sought to protect their interests by manipulating the essential expression of the Third World state’s 46 See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, ‘Compensation for Nationalisation and Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity’, (1975)24International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255, 260 261. 47 ‘When a certain status or legal right has been acquired under the municipal law of a State, such status or right must be respected as a matter of international obligation.’ Francioni, ‘Compensation’, 259. I have discussed acquired rights in the context of state succession, as it was in this context that the doctrine was especially significant to the new states. However, as Francioni points out, the doctrine has developed in different ways in different areas of law. For an extended examination of acquired rights in the context of a dispute over the ownership of resources in a colonial territory, see Christopher G. Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage Under International Trusteeship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 307 ff. sovereignty and the post-colonial state 215 sovereignty, its constitution. These colonial powers did so by incorporat- ing provisions protecting fundamental rights and freedoms in the con- stitutions to be inherited by the newly independent states; the purpose of such provisions was not simply to enhance liberal-democratic institutions in the newly independent states, but also to protect their own property interests. In crucial respects, then, Third World sovereignty was manufactured by the colonial world to serve its own interests. 48 In addi- tion, as Okon Udokang points out, countries such as France adopted the practice of entering into an agreement with one of its colonies shortly before that colonial state acquired its independence; under the terms of these agreements, the nascent new state undertook to protect all rights acquired with respect to its territory prior to independence. 49 The same method was used by America with respect to the Philippines and the Netherlands with respect to Indonesia. 50 As a consequence, the vulner- able new states often surrendered important rights in order to achieve independence. Acquired rights, however, remains agnostic to these events; instead it simply focuses on sequence, the succession of one state by another, rather than on the historical and political factors which compromised thesovereignty asserted by the Third World. The manner in which sovereignty is brought into being, the complex political and economic forces which finally shape the appearance of an equal and sovereign state is thus suppressed by the doctrine. As with nineteenth-century positivist jurisprudence, the real work of sovereignty doctrine occurs at a level which is beyond the scrutiny of any approach to these issues which is based on a question of how order is maintained among ‘sovereign states’. The presumption that states are sovereign and equal prevents an examination of the processes by which sovereignty is shaped in such away as to preclude scrutiny of its historical engagement in the colonial encounter. The contradiction was that even while the West asserted that colonialism was a thing of the past, it nevertheless relied precisely on those relationships of power and inequality that had been created by that colonial past to maintain its economic and political superior- ity which it then attempted to entrench through an ostensibly neutral international law. From a legal point of view, this entailed emphasizing and expand- ing those doctrines of international law which prevented those unequal 48 See Okon Udokang, Succession of New States to International Treaties (New York: Oceana Publications, 1972), pp. 462 464. 49 Ibid., p. 465. 50 Ibid., pp. 465 466. 216 imperialism, sovereignty and international law colonial relations from being re-examined and remedied. Indeed, in its most extreme form, acquired rights doctrine appeared to suggest that theeffects of those unequal relations would have been legally valid and this would have to be accepted by the post-colonial state and be given continuing legal effect. 51 The 1962 Resolution on PSNR Confronted with the many legal difficulties that impeded their effective exercise of independence, the Third World attempted to change the relevant international law. The new states enjoyed a significant majority in the General Assembly, and it was through the mechanism of General Assembly resolutions that the new states launched their campaign to establish the principle of PSNR, which culminated in General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962, that is seen as the most complete expression of the principle up to that time. 52 This resolution is the focus of many of the legal disputes that arose from nationalizations by the new states. The links between natural resources and sovereignty are suggested by the legal instruments which elaborate PSNR doctrine. The 1962 General Assembly Resolution on PSNR declares that: ‘The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth must be exercised in the interest of their national development and the well-being of the people concerned.’ 53 Para.7ofthe same Resolution states that: Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the development of international economic cooperation and the maintenance of peace. 54 Crucially, the same resolution stipulated that in the event of a nationalization, ‘the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures 51 Thus, for example, in debates relating to the drafting of a resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, the Netherlands asserted that ‘as a general rule, old investments should not be jeopardised by new laws and should be protected in accordance with the generally recognized principle of international law of respect for legally acquired rights’. Karol Gess, ‘Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources’, (1964)13International and Comparative Law Quarterly: 398, 442 443. 52 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G. A. Res. 1803, 17 GAOR, Supp. 17, U. N. Doc. A/5217 at p. 15. 53 Ibid., Article 1. 54 Ibid., para. 7. sovereignty and the post-colonial state 217 in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law’. 55 The clear link between sovereignty and PSNR was also emphasized in therealm of human rights, by Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Eco- nomic, Social and Cultural Rights both of which describe the right of a people to control its natural resources in the following terms: All people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 56 The use of the term ‘people’ in this context could be compared with thearticulation of a right of ‘peoples to self-determination’, the right of an entity which had not yet acquired independence to some sort of recognition and protection by the international legal system. These terms of Resolution 1803 raise several interpretive problems. The provision leaves unexplained the content of the right and the meaning of the word ‘people’. But the term ‘people’ refers at least to ‘people’ under colonial rule, and further suggests that these people possess a latent sovereignty over resources and, therefore, an accompanying right to their natural resources. This in turn raises the issue of what obligations, if any, are imposed on an administering colonial power by this right. Some of these issues are illuminated by the General Assembly’s approach to the rights of the people of Namibia, who had been placed under the protection of the Mandate System. The view that dependent peoples, and not merely states, had a right to their natural resources wasaffirmed, for example, by the General Assembly, which reproduced some of the phraseology of Resolution 1803 in seeking to protect the interests of the Namibian people who were struggling to win independence from South Africa. The Assembly stated that it ‘Reaffirms that the natural resources of Namibia are the inviolable heritage of the Namibian 55 Ibid., Article 4. The United States and the United Kingdom successfully fought for this inclusion of a reference to ‘international standards’. For the debates surrounding the drafting of this resolution, see generally Gess, ‘Permanent Sovereignty’, and Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘The Story of the UN’s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources’, (1963)49American Bar Association Journal 463. 56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 218 imperialism, sovereignty and international law people’ and that the systematic plunder of those resources by foreign economic interests, in collusion with South Africa, presented a ‘grave threat to the integrity and prosperity of an independent Namibia’. 57 The same Resolution declared that any state violating the rights of the Namibian people over their natural resources would be in violation of theUNCharter. The use of the term ‘people’ the Resolution refers to ‘peoples and nations’ in both the Resolution and the Covenants suggests, then, that even those colonized peoples who had not as yet become independent were granted certain rights that could protect their resources. If indeed a dependent people had a right to sovereignty over their natural resources, then it could be further argued that nationalization of its resources, once those people became an independent state, was one way in which this right was being exercised. Further, the violation of such a right to natural resources arguably gave rise to claims of compensation for colonial exploitation. It was precisely on the basis that the people of Nauru were sovereign over the phosphates found in that island even prior to acquiring official independence that the state of Nauru took action against Australia, arguing that Australia and the other partner governments had violated these rights. 58 I cannot examine in detail here theimportant question of reparations for colonial exploitation that has once again become a focus of international attention. Arguably, however, thewording of the 1962 Resolution could have been used as a basis for peoples seeking compensation for colonial exploitation upon becoming independent, sovereign peoples, capable of presenting claims in international law, particularly because Resolution 1803 is widely recognized as stating customary international law. Scholars and jurists of the period were aware of these possibilities, and an examination of some of their arguments as to the interpretation of the resolution illuminates the ways in which concepts of Third World sovereignty, acquired rights and colonialism are inter-connected in complex ways. In his authoritative study of the drafting of the 1962 declaration, Karol Gess makes the character of the personality of Third World sovereignty central to his argument. He commences by focusing on the assertion that colonial peoples had sovereignty over their resources 57 Question of Namibia, G. A. Res. 35/227, U. N. Doc. A/RES/35/277, adopted on 6 March 1981. 58 Foranaccount of the litigation, see Antony Anghie, ‘The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case’, (1993)34Harvard International Law Journal 445. sovereignty and the post-colonial state 219 even while subject to colonial rule. His argument requires quotation at length: To the extent to which the peoples and nations in whom the right of self- determination a concept basic to that of sovereignty over natural resources is vested are those of the colonial administrative units which came into being between the middle and end of the nineteenth century, and to the extent to which these units bear little or no relation to such former territorial or tribal sovereignties (if any), it is difficult to uphold the notion of a title to permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over natural resources which lay dormant during the colonial era and which can be revived upon accession of the colonial administrative unit to independence. 59 Gess’ argument takes the West’s position on sources doctrine and consent a stage further. Not only are newly independent states bound by international law as a condition of becoming sovereign states; but they possess no history or existence which may be asserted in international law until that precise time when they are ‘created’ by colonialism. They enter the international realm by being conquered that is, they come into existence as a result of the very act which nullified their sovereignty. Title presupposes the existence of personality to exercise it. Colonial territories had no pre-colonial personality cognizable by international law; as a consequence, their resources were unprotected by international law. In this sense they belonged to no one and could, presumably, be appro- priated by the colonial state even as it brought into existence the unit, the‘people’ to which PSNR ostensibly refers. Against Gess, it could be argued that if the tribes of Africa lacked personality to own their own resources then, presumably, they also lacked the personality to consent in any meaningful manner to the appropria- tion of these resources by Western trading interests by means of ‘concession’ agreements. Thus, the agreements had no validity. This is the issue I discussed in some detail in chapter 2 in relation to the nineteenth century. Gess demurs again. Colonial peoples were not completely lacking in capacity during the colonial era; sovereignty in resources was not vested only upon the accession of these peoples to sovereign statehood. Rather, as Gess puts it, there was a period of ‘transition or evolution’ during which time ‘territorial legislatures and governments came into being and began to take over functions representing the exercise of territorial sovereignty, however limited their scope might have been’. Whatever the 59 See Gess, ‘Permanent Sovereignty’, 446 447. 220 imperialism, sovereignty and international law ‘limitations’, however, they do not preclude the peoples from entering into valid concessions. With the arrival of independence, territorial title was passed to the newly independent state which thus became bound by its predecessor. Gess concludes: Such transfers of territorial title traditionally safe-guard acquired rights and we may conclude that contracts entered into with respect of such territories and from a practical viewpoint equally important by such territories acting in theexercise of a limited but nevertheless existing sovereignty during the above- mentioned transition period are performable by the successor State. (Emphasis in original) 60 The line of argument is familiar; it is articulated by Vitoria in the six- teenth century, and by Westlake in the nineteenth. The elisions and transitions in Gess’ argument are evident in the last paragraph: territories are transformed from mere passive arenas which are demarcated by colonial powers, into subjects, actors (contracts are entered into ‘by territories acting’) who possess both the volition and now, suddenly, thesovereignty necessary to justify the imposition of obligations. Gess attributes to colonial territories just that degree of sovereignty necessary to make the concessions binding. Thus the essential manifestation of self-determination, the assertion of sovereignty, becomes primarily a surrender to obligations. Personality, as in the case of Vitoria, is invented in order to be bound. The crucial point is not only the recurrence of this form of argument, the mechanism by which sovereignty doctrine repeats the same steps when dealing with the colonial past; but, rather, that these arguments continue to have a vital significance in contemporary international relations and law. Gess, after all, was writing in the 1960s. This then, is the paradox: that Western international lawyers relied on the past by insisting that these concessions had to be respected by the new states. And, yet, the version of the past on which this argument relied curiously denied the realities of colonialism even while relying on the effects of such realities as suggested by an examination of Gess’ argument. The 1974 Charter of Rights and Duties Among States While the 1962 Declaration is seen as an important initiative by the new states to further and protect their economic interests, a number of the 60 Ibid., 448. sovereignty and the post-colonial state 221 provisions in that declaration appeared to weaken the Third World position. Thus, Resolution 1803 stated that in the event of expropriation, owners would be paid ‘in accordance with international law’; 61 the reference to international standards here arguably affirmed the traditional law of state responsibility, which had been continuously questioned by Third World states and which maintained that standards of compensation would be determined by international rather than local law. Further, the same resolution appeared to empower corporations by the use of the phrase that ‘Foreign investment agreements entered into by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith’. 62 The reference to agreements entered into ‘by States’appeared to encompass agreements between states and corporations. Ironically, then, the 1962 Resolution may have harmed rather than furthered the interests of the new states. By the 1970s, some of these defects with Resolution 1803 were apparent, and far more explicit and strongly worded provisions were included, in subsequent resolutions, most prominently in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 63 The provisions on nationalization that appeared in the Charter, while affirming the right of a state to nationalise foreign property, made no reference to international standards of compensation, stating instead that in theevent of a controversy regarding compensation, ‘it shall be set- tled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals’, unless all concerned States agreed on some other peaceful alternative. 64 This resolution, which provides the nationalizing state with expan- sive powers, was closely examined in the celebrated arbitration involving Libya and Texaco. 65 Professor Dupuy, in his famous arbitral decision, explored the legal significance of these resolutions and concluded that they were not binding on capital exporting states; while the relevant provision had been passed by large majorities of Third World states, it had been opposed by many industrialised states. 66 Dupuy, relying on a 61 G. A. Res. 1803 at para. 4. 62 Ibid.atpara. 8. 63 G. A. Res. 3281. 64 Res. 3281, para. 2(c); the reference to states is significant as this seemed to diminish theimportance of corporations. 65 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co.v.The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,53ILR 389 (Preliminary Award 27 November 1975; Award on the Merits 19 January 1977) (hereafter Texaco Award). 66 Paragraph 2(c) of Article 2 was subject to a separate vote. 104 states voted in favour, with sixteen against and six abstentions. Texaco Award, p. 489. The major capital exporting states were among the sixteen dissenters. 222 imperialism, sovereignty and international law considerable literature analysing the status of General Assembly resolutions, concluded that the relevant provision was not law, and even more broadly, that ‘Article 2 of this Charter must be analysed as a political rather than as a legal declaration concerned with the ideological strat- egy of development and, as such, supported only by non-industrialised states’. 67 The validity of the reasoning and legal status of this decision has been widely questioned. 68 The ramifications, which have been much extracted and analysed, are several. In effect, the decision starkly asserts that the new states, whatever the numbers they possessed, were incapable of changing international law if those changes were opposed by the industrialised states. Such opposition was inevitable, given that the old rules had in effect been created by those industrialised states to further their own interests during the colonial period. Even more significantly, the decision presents as decisive the Western version of the old rules of state responsibility that were so vehemently attacked by the new states; these were the old rules that Dupuy applied to the dispute despite the fact that the new states, by voting for Article 2, had clearly demonstrated that they no longer regarded themselves as bound by the old law. The stark contrast that I have been attempting to illuminate, between Third World and established sovereignty, is clearly demonstrated once again; theresistance of the old states to the emerging law of development is upheld as a valid exercise of sovereignty. According to Dupuy, however, thenew states were powerless to change the law that they had played no role in creating and which profoundly undermined the sovereignty they were supposed to enjoy. These were the legal techniques used to oppose the attempts of the new states to use the General Assembly to create a different type of international law. In effect, then, the efforts made by both Western and Third World lawyers in the 1960s, to create an international law that could accommodate the legitimate aspirations of the new states, was contested in these different ways. Indeed, it is arguable that the new states were unable even to use the ‘old’ law to their advantage, because of the emergence of a new arena and a new type of law in which development issues were to be resolved. The West not only negated Third World attempts to use the General Assembly as a means of transforming a colonial international law, but set about using a new legal framework, 67 Texaco Award, p. 492. 68 See discussion infra of the views, for example, of Ian Brownlie and M. S. Sornarajah. [...]... in content and stage of development’ in the laws of, basically, Western countries and the law of many Asiatic countries’.80 The domestic law of these new states ‘has not yet been developed to deal with this particular type of transaction’.81 Given the enormity of the departure from classic principles of international law and the quite sweeping assertion that a law adequate for the purposes of dealing... a law by which the law of the Third World state is in effect selectively replaced by the law of England through the invocation of ‘general principles of law Startling consequences follow from this reasoning: not only is the concession not governed by the law of Abu Dhabi, but it could, rather, be governed by the law of England because that law represented the ‘modern law of nature’ As mentioned, these... making the transition to international law on the basis that ‘established public international law is necessarily a part sovereignt y and the post-colonial state 243 of the law of Kuwait’ and, further, that ‘general principles of international law are part of public international law .120 The international law that proclaims general principles that protect acquired rights is thus transformed into the law. .. in this international law of contracts derived from ‘general principles of law One of the aspirations of the new states was to expand the range of international law and to contribute towards its formation by drawing upon Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which mentions general principles as a source of law As Abi-Saab argued: This source of international law is very... Law of the Future or Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation’, (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 474 ; M S Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp 249ff; Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of Origin’, (1981) 30 International & Comparative Law. .. with the colonial government were regulated by the laws of that government These agreements were not, of course, the subject of international law since they fell within the scope of the domestic jurisdiction of the colonial state The acquisition of sovereignty by the new states profoundly changed these comfortable arrangements and assumptions, for these foreign corporations were now regulated by the. .. bodies of law or transforming private law and rules into norms of public international law .1 17 It was through this mechanism that a ‘whole new body of international commercial public law is developing’.118 Apart from stressing the universality of the international law of contracts, the jurists developing this body of law focused on legal doctrines which bind sovereigns, the most prominent of these... sufficient to interpret this particular contract’ .79 The basic reasons for departing from the clearly established principle that the applicable law is the law of the host state are further developed and elaborated by Lord McNair in a notable article that appeared in the British Yearbook of International Law McNair argued that there is a 76 77 78 79 Abu Dhabi Award, p 149 The Case Concering Various Serbian... Governance and globalization, civilization and commerce Introduction Few of the NIEO initiatives had an enduring impact on international law and the international economic system Rather, through the 1980s, neo-conservative economic and development policy became the norm, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War were taken to signal the ultimate triumph of capitalism and its decisive... focusing on the manner in which the IMF and the World Bank, the world’s two major international financial institutions (IFIs), use the concept of governance to expand their activities through, in part, their articulation of a novel relationship between their activities and international human rights law mediated through the concept of governance My focus on the IMF and the Bank is in part determined by the . Norton, Law of the Future or Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation’, (1991)85American Journal of International Law 474 ; M. S. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign. 223 suggested by the term ‘transnational law , to further undermine the economic sovereignty of the new states. Colonialism and the emergence of transnational law Both the West and the new states. dealings with the colonial government were regulated by the laws of that government. These agreements were not, of course, the subject of international law since they fell within the scope of the domestic

Định dạng
Số trang	39
Dung lượng	202,31 KB