THE HEALTH OF NATIONS Part 4 pot

the nation as mind politic 121 as things turned out, determined the subsequent course of European history, and then of world history. Nation and pathology 4.56 It follows from all that has been said above that the moral problem of the behaviour of nations in the twentieth century – in particular, the evil which has been done by nations acting through state-systems and by nations at odds with state-systems – is a complex one. We have identified a set of powerful resistances which must somehow be overcome if we are to understand and to deal with the problem: (1) the indeterminacy of transcendental philosophy undermines our capacity to understand the phenomena of the nation rationally and to judge them morally; (2) the naturalism of the humane sciences detaches the phenomena of the nation from our subjectivity, including our moral consciousness, individual and collective; (3) the naturalism of the humane sciences renders us passive in relation to the behaviour (political, economic, technological) of the nation, as passive as a remote tribe cowering before the omnipotence of Nature; (4) and yet our minds are full of the overflowing subjectivity of the modern nation, of our own nation or nations, and of other nations; (5) and the institutional authority of the state-systems relentlessly ap- propriates the phenomena of national subjectivity and transforms them into facts of power, instruments of power, commodities. 4.57 In short, we feel that we cannot judge the nation and its works, we cannot control the nation and its works, and yet we cannot escape the nation and its works. 4.58 To oppose such formidable forces, we have been able to sum- mon up only a modest array of intellectual weapons: (1) the idea that the mind which is involved in the mind politic of the nation is precisely the same mind as the mind which is involved in individualised human behaviour; (2) the idea that self-nationising is the same process as self-personising, forming a subjective totality which feeds on the mind that it feeds; 122 society and law (3) the idea that, having regard to (1) and (2), there is an indissoluble moral unity between the nation as mind politic and the person as mind individualised. 4.59 So it is that we find ourselves in the same condition – but what a different condition after three such centuries! – as the self-contemplating Descartes. The best efforts of philosophy, of academicism, of scientism, of economism and of state-power cannot separate us from that first hearth and last refuge which is our own consciousness. In our immediate and inescapable experience of ourinternal forum we must findthemeans to re-experience the public forum. In the communicating of our own self with itself, our most intimate experience, we must find the means to communicate with, and to cure, the self-communicating nation. 4.60 How to begin? We could try to re-experience, as if we were reliving some personal experience of our own, the development of the self-consciousness of actual nations. Using, as compass and map, our own conceptions of what it is to be a person, what it is to be a healthy or a virtuous person, what it is to be a diseased or an evil person, we might begin to imagine a way to find a sympathetic understanding of self-nationing, the kind of understanding which alone would entitle us to pass judgement on the behaviour of nations, and to condemn, if need be, the evil that nations do, and to propose therapies for the sicknesses that afflict nations and those whom they infect with their sicknesses. To make a start somewhere, we might consider, as a tentative and rudimen- tary thought-experiment, what is perhaps the most striking instance of modern times – the reconceiving of German national consciousness in the nineteenth century. 4.61 Beginning in the period of German Romanticism, Germans set themselves the task of rediscovering not only what it is to be human (a task that they shared with European Romantics everywhere) but also what it is to be German. They went in search of what Hegel would call ‘the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation . . . by which constitutions have been made and are made’. 35 It was a task made easier by the relative 35 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind (fn. 27 above), § 540, pp. 268–9. Hegel was disparaging about the medieval mystifying of Germany’s origins: Avineri, Modern State (fn. 34 above), p. 229, also at pp. 21–2. Gellner is dismissive, scornful even, of attempts to universalise the idea of the nation, to make of it a natural and inevitable category of human socialisation. The idea of the nation is a contingent thing, arising in particular ways in particular social conjunctures. See ‘Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion’, fn. 10 above, passim. ‘The the nation as mind politic 123 sparseness of the information and by the passage of time, and it was a task which, for the same reasons, could be, at one and the same time, an enthralling exercise in dry-as-dust objectivity and a thrilling exercise in rampant subjectivity. With remarkable facility and with surprising certainty there could be conjured out of the cold northern mists of a remote Teutonic past a German self which was heroic and pure and creative and dynamic and masterful. In such an interesting mirror, it was possible to see and to judge a German self that had somehow, in the meantime, become petty and and provincial and bloodless and aimless. It was not difficult to see that Germany was a genetic nation which had collapsed into a patchwork of insignificant nations, together forming some sort of shadowy and unsatisfactory generic nation, a nation which had not remained true to its self but which could, perhaps, be made to become its true self once again. 4.62 In the office of official psychoanalysts to the German nation, the brothers Grimm, whom we may take as symbolic heroes of a move- ment which involved countless scholars, including adepts of the new human naturalism, were able by their vast labours to bring up from the depths of German unconsciousness a German soul which mani- fested itself uniquely in German language, German folk-tales, German literature, German art, German religion, and even a German mythol- ogy. 36 In a more Jungian framework, Richard Wagner (once again, a hero-figure standing for countless German artists and writers) trans- muted the new consciousness through the magical processes of art into something which could return, as all art does, to take on a new univer- salised life in the depths of German unconsciousness. 37 By these means, German consciousness, at its most articulated and at its most secret, was changed. 4.63 The German case is merely an extraordinarily open and explicit and purposeful example of what all nations do all the time, in a much more disordered way. It raises, as all such cases do, the questions of why such a reforming of national self-consciousness occurs and what are its consequences. great, but valid, paradox is this: nations can be defined only in terms of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, theother way round.’ E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell; 1983), p. 55. 36 J. Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie (1835). 37 R. Wagner, My Life (tr. A. Gray; New York, Da Capo; 1983), pp. 280, 343. 124 society and law 4.64 In the case of Germany in the nineteenth century, it seems particularly perverse that a people should redefine themselves in so ro- mantic a spirit when (a) German scholars were using the spirit of ob- jectivity to carry the humane sciences and the natural sciences to the highest levels attained anywhere in Europe; (b) the Prussian state was leading Europe in the rational reorganisation of the social, if not of the political, aspects of society; and (c) German business and industry were applying the lessons of the British industrial revolution to generate an economy which was rapidly overtaking, in scale and sophistication, any other European economy. 4.65 Renan drew attention to the essential part that forgetting and error play in the formation of national consciousness. 38 The self-image may be based on false information about the past and present situa- tion of the nation, and it may, probably must, involve the repression of much in that situation which is inconsistent with the ideal-self-image. We may go further and say that national self-consciousness is a form of private fantasy, a reality-for-themselves of the nationals whose relation- ship to the reality-for-non-nationals is secondary. However, in the case of nations, the private fantasy is necessarily a public fantasy. The devel- opment of German consciousness was as much a matter of interest for other Europeans, especially the French and the British, as was German material progress. Germans were fellow members of a European society, a European family, a European nation even, and their state of mind could not be a matter of indifference to the other members. To a greater extent with the French and to a lesser extent with the unreflective British, the development of a new German consciousness generated modifications in all non-German national consciousness. 39 4.66 In these facts lie the roots of the pathology of national con- sciousness. 38 ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’, in E. Renan, Oeuvres compl`etes (Paris, Calmann-Levy; 1947), i, p. 891. 39 On Franco-German mutual self-nationalising, see Taguieff (fn. 32 above), passim; and P. Birnbaum, ‘Nationalisme ` a la franc¸aise’, same volume, pp. 125–38. See also L. Dumont, L’id´eologie allemande. France-Allemagne et retour (Paris, Gallimard; 1991). Compare Adam Ferguson: ‘Athens was necessary to Sparta, in the exercise of her virtue, as steel is to flint in the production of fire.’ An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) (ed. D. Forbes; Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press; 1966), p. 59. Discussed in P. Gay, The Enlighten- ment (fn. 10 above), pp. 340ff. For a comparison of British, French and German national constitutional psychologies, see ch. 7 below. the nation as mind politic 125 4.67 In the age-old language of historians – a form of language which, strange to say, is still used by specialists in International Re- lations – Germany was envious of the prestige of France and resented the world-power of Britain. France had a priceless possession, its private fan- tasy, the French nation – la France – which had been brought forth from 1,000 years of history, a history which had to be transmuted from being a record of remarkably sustained cultural excellence of all kinds (‘culture’ in the high-culture sense, rather than in the anthropological sense) into a supposedly coherent history of a self-knowing and self-forming po- litical nation. Britain, sub-Germanic in national origin, but a mongrel people, irrational and indolent in matters of social organisation, had, as a reward for no particular merit or effort, outplayed many other wor- thier players in the international power-game and had collected all sorts of undeserved advantages, including a blithe national self-confidence. In order to be able to play in the world-power-game, Germany wanted to make itself into a world-power nation like France and Britain. Such is the world-view of the human naturalists. 4.68 From such a viewpoint, these hypostatic bodies-politic, state- systems with personal names, are supposed to behave like real human beings in all but one respect. Their psychology is the psychology of the nursery, of books for children, of fairy-tales. 4.69 It was not a Gulliver called Germany which had taken a drink from the bottle of nationalism marked Drink-Me, in order to become a giant in a world of giants. It was the Germans who were re-forming their minds as collective subjectivity as they re-formed their minds as individ- ualised personality, allowing the new subjective totality to overwhelm their long-cherished regionalism and diversity. The consequences of such a re-forming of consciousness are felt in the personal lives of indi- viduals and also in the social life of the nation, its social life within itself and its social life in the company of other nations and their nationals. In order to be able to make the judgement that those consequences, in a given case, are diseased or evil, we must treat them not as the product of infantile personifications but as the everyday work of all-too-human human beings. To deal with the strange behaviour of nations we need, not iron laws of history or game-theories of power-politics or rational- choice theories of economics, but a nosology of the mental diseases of national identity. 126 society and law 4.70 A list of such diseases would include the following – neurotic nationalism; psychotic nationalism; biological racism; hysterical xenophobia; religious fanaticism; terrorism; anti-Semitism. 4.71 There must be an overwhelming presumption that not merely wickedness but mental disease is involved in human behaviour which leads to such terrible evil as the events of the two World Wars of the twentieth century. We may hazard the diagnosis that the First World War was a war of neurotic nationalism and that the Second World War (in Europe and in Asia) was a disease of psychotic nationalism. 4.72 The nationalist neurosis of the First World War was a sort of neurosis `a six, an interactive neurosis involving most of the German, French, British, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Turkish ruling classes, together with some part of their respective masses, to the extent that they were manipulated by those ruling classes. If patriotism conceives the nation in fantasy, nationalism conceives the nation in ob- session. The neurosis in question involves some unresolved conflict of self-identification and hence of self-esteem and hence of self- preservation. Such a neurosis is not a problem of acute social signif- icance unless and until it involves other people, including the people of another nation, or involves an interaction at the subjective and/or prac- tical levels between the different national obsessions, feeding on each other, reinforcing each other. 4.73 The Cold War was another example of such a neurotic interac- tion. Here the folie `adeuxwas between the United States which, despite its relative antiquity, continued to conceive of itself as a generic nation, and the Soviet Union, which had been formed when a small part of the Russian ruling class chose to reform the old genetic nation into a generic nation, defined by its particular social structures and a particular set of universalist ideas (Marxism-Leninism) put to exceptionalist use. It is in the nature of generic nations that they must continually compete (in war or sport or trade or whatever), in order continually to reaffirm their exceptional nature. In the Jungian typology, they are closer to the extraverted end of the personality spectrum; in Riesmann’s terms, they tend to be other-directed. 40 In the Cold War, the two nations drove each other (and the other nations who were infected by their neurosis) into 40 D. Riesmann, The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven, London, Yale University Press; 1950), pp. 17–25. the nation as mind politic 127 more and more irrational behaviour, above all into a wildly hypertrophic accumulation of military weapons – those fetishistic props of troubled identity, like a fast car or a young mistress. With the end of the Cold War, Russia reverted to an untidy genetic status, in which the sub-nation of Russia may once again come to imperialise some or all of the other sub-nations. The United States is left to struggle with its identity in new and especially difficult circumstances. 4.74 If the First World War was a neurotic episode, involving the newly genetic German nation, the Second World War was, from a clinical point of view, a very different thing. 4.75 Psychotic nationalism may be called madness, if we declare our grounds for continuing to use that terrible word. 4.76 Stunned into transcendental silence by the philosophical phe- nomena labelled above as Wittgenstein, Freud, Marx and Darwin, we must begin to find some way to incorporate them into a new way of speaking, at least of speaking at levels other than the transcendental level. We may try to find in them – separately and taken together – a new subjectivity-beyond-subjectivity, a new conception, if not of rationality or morality, then of sanity. 4.77 The Nietzschean resonance is no coincidence. Nietzsche, lonely prophet, saw the twentieth century and it drove him mad. Wittgenstein, Freud, Marx and Darwin are all, spiritually, post-Nietzschean. He saw that the products of the human mind, however sophisticated and self- assured, cannot be contained within the categories of rationality and morality, that all the efforts of the mind are nothing but a sort of per- manent self-exploration in the dimension of sanity, that is to say, an exploration by the mind of the mind’s reality-for-itself. Modernism in the fine arts and music and literature would be the twentieth century’s exploration of the mind’s reality through the power of creative imagina- tion. Totalitarianism, of left and right, would be the twentieth century’s exploration of the reality of the self-socialising mind through the power of the mind-filling institutional authority of the state-system. 4.78 The reality of the totalitarian nation is a possible reality for the self-nationing of the human mind. The twentieth century has demon- strated that. Nazi Germany might not have been Nazi Germany without a great European war. But Nazi Germany without a great European war might have become a German nation of perfected self-judging ratio- nality and morality. Without a great European war and without the 128 society and law Cold War, Stalinist Russia might have become as perfect a version of a greater-Russian nation as that difficult sub-continent may permit. 4.79 The psychotic personality of the human individual is similarly capable of apparently self-surpassing behaviour. The behaviour is self- surpassing from the perspective of public reality, the reality shared by most people and incorporated in the self-forming of society. But the behaviour is not at all self-surpassing, is rational and moral and sane, in the perspective of the private reality of the psychotic person. And in the processes of society, including self-nationing, psychotic reality can also be a public reality. 4.80 It is a phenomenon which has evidently existed throughout the whole history of human socialising, but it is a phenomenon which became of great practical significance in the twentieth century, given the intensity of the socialising of modern nations and the intensity of their social interaction. The private reality of a Hitler, a Stalin, a Mussolini – not to mention the dozens of other less successful but no less sinister holders of personalised institutional authority all over the world in the twentieth century – is also the public reality of a nation. 4.81 In the case of Hitler, the phenomenon is at its most acute and most sensitive. An aspect of the reality-for-itself of Nazi Germany was the discovery within the self-conceiving of the genetic German nation of an element which can only be called biological purity – and that element was also powerfully present in the reality-for-himself of the socially marginal Hitler. The German nation might then be said to be genetic, not merely in the metaphorical sense that we have been giving to the term, but in a descriptive sense. It has been rather rare for a nation to include a notion of biological purity as a primary element in its self- conceiving. (Oddly enough, Japan may be another example.) But there is frequently such an element latent somewhere in the self-conceiving of genetic nations and, perhaps, even in that of generic nations. (The treatment in the United States of native Americans and black Americans may be evidence of such a thing.) And such an element is probably a pathogenic factor in several of the mental diseases of national identity listed above. 4.82 Freud took a step which now seems to be irreversible when he removed the frontier dividing the mentally normal from the abnormal, the mentally healthy from the diseased. He also took the first step to- wards removing the frontier between personal psychology and social the nation as mind politic 129 psychology, in two rather rudimentary attempts – on the one hand, using the work of previous psychologists who had studied ‘crowd’ phe- nomena; 41 on the other hand, constructing one of his myth-models, as one may call them, which would find at the root of society something analogous to the Oedipal myth-model at the root of individual person- ality. 42 What we are considering in the present essay is the possibility that there is no frontier at all between personal psychology and the social psychology of the nation as collective subjectivity. 4.83 After Freud, in the work of the supposedly Freudian Lacan, 43 but also in the work of those who have opposed the ideas and practices of Freud-based psychiatry, 44 the very idea of madness is being dissolved. 41 S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (ed. J. Strachey; London, Hogarth Press; 1953–74), xviii. The focus is onthe effect on the psychology of the individual of participation in groups rather than on the nature of the group. 42 See S. Freud, Totem and Taboo. Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics (1912–13), in Standard Edition (fn. 41 above), xiii. Having put forward his explanation of the origin of society, Freud says that it is surprising to him that the problems of social psychology should prove soluble on the basis of one single point – man’s relation to his father (p. 157). He expresses concern that ‘I have taken as the basis of my whole position the existence of a collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in the mind of an individual.’ He is recognising in advance the criticism that there is no generally accepted biological explanation for the species-inheritance of mental events as part of human phylogeny. He had been anticipated by Hume and Nietzsche in the idea of society as the product of the repression of natural instincts. For three later works of Freud which explore the psychic aspects of society, see S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion (1927); Civilization and its Discontents (1930); and Moses and Monotheism (1939). They are written in Freud’s broader, more Jungian mode and do not amount to a rigorous philosophy of the psychology of society. For an impressive response, especially to Civilization, see H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization. A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (1955) (Boston, Beacon Press; 1966). 43 Lacan did not publish any exposition of a ‘general theory’ and rejected the idea of general psychological theory. This has not prevented publication of numerous Lacan texts nor the development of an academic extractive industry mining those texts (now at the tertiary level of writing about the secondary literature). We are still waiting for a general theory of the psychology of society. It may be hoped that, when it comes, it will be more exhilarating and empowering than the work of either Freud or Lacan. Especially on the philosophical resonances of Lacan, see M. Borch-Jacobsen,Lacan–Lemaˆıtre absolu (Paris, Flammarion; 1990). See also M. Marini, Lacan (Paris, Pierre Belford; 1986); S. Felman, Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight (Cambridge, MA, London, Harvard University Press; 1987); D. Macey, Lacan in Contexts (London, New York, Verso Books; 1988); M. Bowie, Lacan (London, Fontana Press; 1991) (with bibliography). 44 There is a very substantial literature critical of Freud at all three levels of theory: transcen- dental (about his empirical-metaphysical-mythological method);pure (aboutthe coherence and appropriateness of his concepts and structures); practical (about the social and psychic and clinical implications of his work). On the idea of levels of theory, see Eunomia, ch. 2. 130 society and law It is a step which seems to be inherent in the work of Freud but which, for some reason, he appears to have been inhibited from taking. The uniquely privileged status of the public reality of normal society is being challenged; the irredeemably alien character of private realities, even psychotic realities, is being mitigated. 4.84 New conventions of self-determination will have to be estab- lished, new rules as to the forming of the reality of the individual human being within the self-forming of the societies to which the individual be- longs. The concept of mental illness is a set of conventional limits on the right of self-determination of the human individual. On the hypothesis proposed in the present essay, the self-determining of nations is simply a special case of all human self-determining, and the self-determination of a nation must be seen as subject to conventional limits within the reality-for-itself of the society of all nations. With nations as with in- dividuals, madness may be conventionally defined, in a form which is deliberately fashioned on the model of Kant’s structuring of the ratio- nality of morality, in the following terms. The madness of nations is the self-forming of a nation within a reality-for-the-nation which could not be- come a reality for the society of all nations, the society of the whole human race. In this sense, Nazi Germany was a mad nation. 4.85 Madness is contagious, and the Second World War was a conta- gion of madness. But sanity may also be contagious. A more optimistic hypothesis has been proposed in relation to individual mental illness – that a family-member may take on as a scapegoat, so to speak, the mental illness of a family, and so make sane the other family-members. 45 We might say that the European Community is the product of a European family made sane by the madness of Nazi Germany. But the European On schizophrenia seen from a ‘communications’ aspect, see G. Bateson, ‘Towards a theory of schizophrenia’, in StepstoanEcologyofMind(St Albans, Paladin; 1973), pp. 173ff. On psycho-pathology and language as a social phenomenon, see M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization. A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (tr. R. Howard; London, Routledge; 1971). For an impassioned evocation (in almost impenetrable prose) of the socio-political implications of Freud, see G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia (tr. R. Hurley, M. Seem, H. Lane; Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press; 1983). 45 ‘From the observer’s standpoint the ostracized or scapegoated person thus takes an impor- tant covert family role in maintaining the pseudo-mutuality or surface complementarity of the rest of the family.’ L. C. Wynne et al., ‘Pseudo-mutuality in the family relations of schizophrenia’, in 21 Psychiatry (1958), p. 214. ‘One of the covert roles the patient takes in becoming overtly schizophrenic thus may be to allow other family members to achieve vicariously some measure of individuation’ (p. 219). [...]... happiness of the people For the whole of self-socialising humanity, the redeeming ideal will be not world peace but world happiness, not the wealth of nations but the health of nations 5 New Enlightenment The public mind of all-humanity THE CHALLENGE The mind’s freedom – Law’s power – Millennial potentiality – Surpassing the past – The health of nations: human inhumanity – The health of nations: de-humanising... mind of the human individual are extensions of each other Social evil arises at the intersection of the two, where the freedom of the mind and the freedom of the will of human individuals meets the freedom of the public mind and the freedom of the general will of society, and where the three vectors of human consciousness are integrated It is at the same intersection that our new purposive pursuit of. .. merely from the physiology of the brain, the emergence of the idea of Buddhist satori or of the Invisible Hand or the content of the present sentence, or any other idea whatsoever The capacity of the mind infinitely exceeds the capacity of the brain.29 5.68 We know that our bodies are conditioned and determined by the physical processes of the material world And yet we cannot escape the anguish and the excitement... just as the present is an actualised potentiality of the past In the words of Schiller’s Wallenstein: ‘in today tomorrow is already on the move’.1 This is true of the future of the natural world and the future of the human world But, in the case of the human world, there is an amazing difference We make the human world We choose the human future We can choose to actualise this potentiality rather than... think the ideal of the human future The idea of the ideal has been the wonderful instrument of human selfevolving and self-perfecting We can imagine and constantly re-imagine the ideal, as a dialectical negation of the actual which nevertheless affirms a potentiality of the actual The ideal is the perfectibility of the actual And we can constantly concretise the ideal in ideas which have the form of truth... far beyond the field of professional philosophy, including to those engaged in the work of human self-redeeming 5 .43 How can we say that the work of these three people has been part of our de-humanising? Like Rousseau and Nietzsche and Weber, among many others, they all knew that their work was incomplete This knowledge created great personal anguish in the minds of all three of them, a sense of failure... the participating nations The danger of pathological national developments remains 4. 86 We might also say that the future of the whole world, as a society of nations and as a society of human beings, depends on finding a way of judging and modifying the behaviour of nations, of making the nations sane Such a way will not be found by moral exhortation, social pressure, or the making of law It will only... dependent co-existence of human societies of all kinds far exceeds the capacity of the piecemeal aggregating of the self-interest of all such societies or the potentiality of a dream-world of self-ordering ‘democracies’ Law and freedom 5. 54 The misconceiving of democracy makes necessary its reconceiving Especially over the last two centuries, we have learned that the transformatory effect of democracy is... matter of institutions or of a particular distribution of social power The central ideal of democracy is better expressed as nomocracy, the rule of nomos (the law), rather than merely the rule of those who claim to represent the people (d¯mos).20 e 5.55 The two daring core-paradoxes of the democratic ideal – freedom under law, self-government – rest upon the strange fact that law, which is the archetypal... took over the rest of southern North America, and set about peopling its vast new space with people brought in from outside, an internal American empire, composed of people from every part of the world, living together in the American law-state The United States is a microcosm of the human world, of the actual human world, and of a potential Human World under Law.23 The Eunomian project 5.60 There cannot . before the omnipotence of Nature; (4) and yet our minds are full of the overflowing subjectivity of the modern nation, of our own nation or nations, and of other nations; (5) and the institutional. terms of the health and happiness of the people. For the whole of self-socialising humanity, the redeeming ideal will be not world peace but world happiness, not the wealth of nations but the health. and practices of Freud-based psychiatry, 44 the very idea of madness is being dissolved. 41 S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), in The Standard Edition of the Complete