program: professors called on students in class, asked them to present their analysis, and challenged their presentation. Langdell also embraced the nineteenth cen- tury’sbeliefinprogressandinthesuperiorityof scientific inquiry. Langdell’s conclusion that the law could be a science became a tenet of legal scholarship, but he was eventually challenged by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Holmes, a professor and scholar before serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the U.S. Supreme Court, rejected the assumption that law was a science or a logical system. Holmes wrote a set of legal essays that was published in 1881 as The Common Law. In this volume, which is the most renowned work of legal philosophy in U.S. history, Holmes systematically analyzed, classified, and explained various aspects of U.S. common law, ranging from torts to contracts to crime and punish- ment. He concluded that: The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had become an industrialized, urban nation. Some lawyers and legal scholars attempted to inject new ideas and information into the law in hopes of overturning stubbornly held doctrines and restoring public confidence in a legal system that appeared to be unprepared to face the realities of the new century. Famed lawyer and later Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis revolutionized the law by submit- ting what has come to be known as the “Brandeis brief” in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908). The brief contained sociological information on the health and well-being of women that Brandeis believed was relevant to deciding whether an Oregon law limiting work hours for women was constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law, lending credibility to Brandeis's use of nonlegal information. ROSCOE POUND, a scholar, teacher, reformer, and dean of Harvard Law School, worked to link law and society through his sociological juris- prudence and to improve the administration of the judicial system. His 1906 speech, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” was a call to improve court administration and a preview of his theory of law. In 1908 he published “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” attacking the notion that an unchanging and inflexible natural law formed the basis for the common law. The twentieth century also saw the growth of law through legislation. As state legislatures and the U.S. Congress enacted more statutes contain- ing complex and often unclear provisions, the courts were called upon to interpret these laws by using various rules of statutory construction to determine legislative purpose. In 1947, Harvard law professor and later Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter delivered a lecture entitled “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” which expounds on the effect that legislative law has on the courts. Fifty years later, the torrent of legislation remains unabated. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 526 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY PRIMARY DOCUMENTS Legal Scholarship Lawyers and Judges Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835 A lexis de Tocqueville, a French political scientist, historian, and politician, is best known for Democracy in America (1835). A believer in democracy, he was concerned about the concentration of power in the hands of a centralized government. During his visit to the United States in 1831 and 1832, Tocqueville observed the deep social and political divisions produced by slavery. He was impressed, however, by the power of a free press and the importance that citizens placed upon the legal system. In his observations on lawyers and judges, Tocqueville noted that U.S.courtsof lawpossessed enormouspoliticalpower. Judgeshadthe powerof judicial review, which allowed them tostrikedown laws as unconstitutional. He also observed that lawyers were active in politics, bringing to government and the politicalarena the knowledge, skills, and temperament peculiar to their profes- sion. Tocqueville pointed out that lawyers are wedded to the public order and are often conservative. He concluded that “lawyers belong to the people by birth and interest, and to the aristocracy by habit and taste; they may be looked upon as the connecting link between the two great classes of society.” k Lawyers and Judges Whenever a law that the judge holds to be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influence. In truth, few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power for any length of time, for there are few that are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and none that may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties or by the necessity of the case. But as soon as a judge has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law immediately loses a portion of its moral force. *** Within these limits the power vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers that have ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies. *** When we have examined in detail the organization of the [United States] Supreme Court and the entire prerogatives which it exercises, we shall readily admit that a more imposing judicial power was never constituted by any people. The Supreme Court is placed higher than any other known tribunal, both by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties which it controls. *** The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union are vested in the hands of the seven Federal judges [of the United States Supreme Court]. Without them the Constitution would be a dead letter: the executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative power; the legislature demands their protection against the assaults of the executive; they defend the Union from the 527 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY disobedience of the states, the states from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against private interests, and the conser- vative spirit of stability against the fickleness of the democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion. They are all- powerful as long as the people respect the law; but they would be impotent against popular neglect or contempt of the law. The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its exact limits cannot be defined; and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain below the boundary prescribed. *** Democratic laws generally tend to promote the welfare of the greatest possible number; for they emanate from the majority of the citizens, who are subject to error, but who cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage. The laws of an aristocracy tend, on the contrary, to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the minority; because an aristocracy, by its very nature, constitutes a minority. It may therefore be asserted, as a general proposition, that the purpose of a democracy in its legislation is more useful to humanity than that of an aristocracy. This, however, is the sum total of its advantages. *** No political form has hitherto been discov- ered that is equally favorable to the prosperity and the development of all the classes into which society is divided. These classes continue to form, as it were, so many distinct communities in the same nation; and experience has shown that it is no less dangerous to place the fate of these classes exclusively in the hands of any one of them than it is to make one people the arbiter of the destiny of another. When the rich alone govern, the interest of the poor is always endangered; and when the poor make the laws, that of the rich incurs very serious risks. The advantage of democracy does not consist, therefore, as has sometimes been asserted, in favoring the pros- perity of all, but simply in contributing to the well-being of the greatest number. The men who are entrusted with the direction of public affairs in the United States are frequently inferior, in both capacity and morality, to those whom an aristocracy would raise to power. But their interest is identified and mingled with that of the majority of their fellow citizens. They may frequently be faithless and frequently mista ken, but they will never systematically adopt a line of conduct hostile to the majority; and they cannot give a dan gerous or exclusive tendency to the government. *** It is not always feasible to consult the whole people, either directly or indirectly, in the formation of law; but it cannot be denied that, when this is possible, the authority of law is much augmented. This popular origin which impairs the excellence and the wisdom of legislation, contributes much to increase its power. There is an amazing strength in the expression of the will of a whole people; and when it declares itself, even the imagination of those who would wish to contest it is overawed. The truth of this fact is well known by parties, and they consequently strive to make out a majority whenever they can. If they have not the greater number of voters on their side, they assert that the true majority abstained from voting; and if they are foiled even there, they have recourse to those persons who had no right to vote. In the United States, except slaves, servants, and paupers supported by the townships, there is no class of persons who do not exercise the elective franchise and who do not indirectly contribute to make the laws. Those who wish to attack the laws must consequently either change the opinion of the nation or trample upon its decision. A second reason, which is still more direct and weighty, may be adduced: in the United States everyone is personally interested in enforcing the obedience of the whole commu - nity to the law; for as the minority may shortly rally the majority to its principles, it is interested in professing that respect for the decrees of the legislator which it may soon have occasion to claim for its own. However irksome an enact- ment may be, the citizen of the United States complies with it, not only because it is the work of the majority, but because it is his own, and he regards it as a contract to which he is himself a party. In the United States, then, that numerous and turbulent multitude does not exist who, regarding the law as their natural enemy, look upon it with fear and distrust. It is impossible, on the contrary, not to perceive that all classes display the utmo st reliance upon the legislation of their country and are attached to it by a kind of parental affection. *** GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 528 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY PRIMARY DOCUMENTS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP LAWYERS AND JUDGES In visiting the Americans and studying their laws, we perceive that the authority they have entrusted to members of the legal profession, and the influence that these individuals exercise in the government, are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democ- racy. This effe ct seems to me to result from a general cause, which it is useful to investigate, as it may be reproduced elsewhere. Men who have made a special study of the laws derive from [that] occupati on certain habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multitude. The special information that lawyers derive from their studies ensures them a separate rank in society, and they constitute a sort of privileged body in the scale of intellect. This notion of their superiority perpetually recurs to them in the practice of their profession: they are the masters of a science which is necessary, but not very generally known; they serve as arbiters between the citizens; and the habit of directing to their purpose the blind passions of parties in litigation inspires them with a certain contempt for the judgment of the multitude. Add to this that they naturally constitute a body; not by any previous understanding, or by an agreement that directs them to a common end; but the analogy of their studies and the uniformity of their methods connect their minds as a common interest might unite their endeavors. Some of the tastes and the habits of the aristocracy may consequently be discovered in the characters of lawyers. They participate in the same instinctive love of order and formalities; and they entertain the same repugnance to the actions of the multitude, and the same secret contempt of the government of the people. I do not mean to say that the natural propensities of lawyers are sufficiently strong to sway them irresistibly; for they, like most other men, are governed by their private interests, and espe- cially by the interests of the moment. *** I do not, then, assert that all the members of the legal profession are at all times the friends of order and the opponents of innovation, but merely that most of them are usually so. In a community to which lawyers are allowed to occupy without opposition that high station which naturally belongs to them, their general spirit will be eminently conservative and anti- democratic. When an aristocracy excludes the leaders of that profession from its ranks, it excites enemies who are the more formidable as they are independent of the nobility by their labors and feel themselves to be their equals in intelligence though inferior in opulence and power. *** Lawyers are attached to public order beyond every other consideration, and the best security of public order is auth ority. It must not be forgotten, also, that if they prize freedom much, they generally value legality still more; they are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrary power; and, provided the legislature undertakes of itself to deprive men of their independence, they are not dissatisfied. *** The government of democracy is favorable to the political power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble, and the prince are excluded from the government, the lawyers take possession of it, in their own right, as itwere, since they are the only men of information and sagacity, beyond the sphere of the people, who can be the object of the popular choice. If, then, they are led by their tastes towards the aristocracy and the prince, they are brought in contact with the people by their interests. They like the government of democracy without participating in its propensities and without imitating its weaknesses; whence they derive a two-fold authority from it and over it. The people in democratic states do not mistrust the members of the legal profession, because it is known that they are interested to serve the popular cause; and the people listen to them without irritation, because they do not attribute to them any sinister designs. The lawyers do not, indeed, wish to overthrow the institutions of democracy, but they constantly endeavor to turn it away from its real direction by means that are foreign to its nature. Lawyers belong to the people by birth and interest, and to the aristocracy by habit and taste; they may be looked upon as the connecting link between the two great classes of society. The profession of the law is the only aristocratic element that can be amalgamated without violence with the natural elements of democracy and be advantageously and perma- nently combined with them. I am not ignorant of the defects inherent in the character of this body of men; but without this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY 529 LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP LAWYERS AND JUDGES principle, I question whether democratic insti- tutions could long be maintained; and I cannot believe that a republic could hope to exist at the present time if the influence of lawyers in public business did not increase in proportion to the power of the people. *** In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and the most cultivated portion of society. They have therefore nothing to gain by innovation, which adds a conservative interest to their natural taste for public order. If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not among the rich,whoareunitedbynocommontie,butthat it occupies the judicial bench and the bar. The more we reflect upon all that occurs in the U nited States, the more we sh all be persuaded that the lawyers, as a body, form the most powerful, if not the only, counterpoise to the democratic element. In that country we easily perceive how the legal profession is qualified by its attributes, and even by its faults, to neutralize the vices inherent in popular government. When the American people are intoxicated by passion or carried away by the impetuosity of their ideas, they are checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence of their legal counselors. These secretly oppose their aristocratic propensi- ties to the nation's democratic instincts, their superstitious attachment to what is old to its love of novelty, their narrow views to its immense designs, and their habitual procrastination to its ardent impatience. The courts of justice are the visible organs by which the legal profession is enabled to control the democracy. The judge is a lawyer who, independently of the taste for regularity and order that he has contracted in the study of law, derives an additional love of stability from the inalien- ability of his own functions. His legal attainments have already raised him to a distinguished rank among his fellows; his political power completes the distinction of his station and gives him the instincts of the privileged classes. *** It must not be supposed, moreover, that the legal spirit is confined in the United States to the courts of justice; it extends far beyond them. As the lawyers form the only enlightened class whom the people do not mistrust , they are naturally called upon to occupy most of the public stations. They fill the legislative assem- blies and are at the head of the administration; they consequently exercise a powerful influence upon the formation of the law and upon its execution. The lawyers are obliged, however, to yield to the current public opinion, which is too strong for them to resist; but it is easy to find indications of what they would do if they were free to act. The Americans, who have made so many innovations in their political laws, have introduced very sparing alterations in their civil laws, and that with great difficulty, although many of these laws are repugnant to their social condition. The reason for this is that in matters of civil law the majority are obliged to defer to the authority of the legal profession, and the American lawyers are disinclined to innovate when they are left to their own choice. *** The influence of legal habits extends beyond the precise limits I have pointed out. Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings. As most public men are or have been legal practitioners, they introduce the customs and technicalities of their profession into the management of public affairs. The jury extends this habit to all classes. The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced in the schools and courts of justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of society, where it descends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate. The lawyers of the United States form a party which is but little feared and scarcely perceived, which has no badge peculiar to itself, which adapts itself with great flexibility to the exigencies of the time and accommodates itself without resistance to all the movements of the social body. But this party extends over the whole commu nity and penetrates into all the classes which compose it; it acts upon the country imperceptibly, but finally fashions it to suit its own purposes. From Democracy in America. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 530 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY PRIMARY DOCUMENTS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP LAWYERS AND JUDGES Legal Scholarship What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? David Dudley Field, 1847 D avid Dudley Field was an attorney from a prominent New York family. His brother was Stephen J. Field, a U.S. Supreme Court justice. Field was a leading crusader for the codification movement. He attacked the rules of civil procedure of his time, which were based on English common-law pleading prac- tices. Common-law pleading was an arcane practice filled with traps for the uninitiated that could result in the dismissal of the case on procedural grounds. Field’s essay of 1847, “What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts,” presented his case for what is now known as code pleading. As a member of the New York pleading and practice commission, Field prepared a civil procedure code that the legislature adopted in 1848. The code simplified the filing and prosecu- tion of lawsuits. It was a significant improvement over common-law systems of procedure, in that it required that the complaint contain “a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting plaintiff’s cause of action.” The code used the pleading as a way of narrowing and defining the dispute rather than as a general means of initiating a civil action. The Field Code was later adopted by Missouri, California, and many other states. In time, however, code pleading became very technical, requiring the pleader to set forth the facts underlying and demonstrating the existence of the cause of action. Matters were simplified in 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. Rule 8(a) provides that the complaint shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Likewise, the defendant “shall state in short and plain terms” the defenses to the plaintiff’s complaint. There is no requirement that facts be alleged. In the twentieth century, the desire for codification led to the drafting of various sets of uniform laws, including the Uniform Commer- cial Code and the Uniform Probate Code. k What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? The Constitution of this State [New York, 1846], which goes into effect to-day, will render great changes necessary in our system of legal proce- dure. It remodels our Courts; unites the admin- istration of law and equity in the same tribunal; directs testimony to be taken in like manner in both classes of cases; abolishes the offices of Master and Examiner in Chancery, hitherto important parts of our equity system; and, finally, directs that the next Legislature shall provide for the appointment of three commissioners, “whose duty it shall be to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge the rules of practice, pleadings, forms, and proceedings of the courts of record,” and report thereon to the Legislature for its action. Important modifications of the equity prac- tice are thus made indispensable, in order to adapt it to the new mode of taking testimony. But I think that the Convention intended, and that the people expect, much greater changes than 531 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY these. We know that radical reform in legal proceedings has long been demanded by no inconsiderable number of the people; that a more determined agitation of the subject has been postponed by its friends, till such time as there should be a reorganization of the judicial establishment, upon the idea that a new system of procedure and a new system of Courts ought to come in together; that it was a prominent topic in the Convention itself, where its friends were in an undoubted majority; and that the manifesta- tions of public sentiment out of doors were no less clear than were the sentiments of that body. Indeed, if now, after all that has been done within the last five years, there should be made only such changes as the Constitution absolutely com- mands, there will be great and general disap- pointment. *** Every consideration, as it seems to me, makes it expedient for us all now to enter heartily upon the work of amendment. Those of us who have long been laboring for a radical reformation of the law, and those who have felt less inclination for it, should find this an occasion to act together in the common pursuit of thorough and wise reforms. We feel the inconvenience of the present state of things. We know that the technicality and the drudgery of legal proceed- ings are discreditable to our profession. Justice is entangledinthenetofforms. *** Believing, therefore, that great changes are inevitable in any event, and that this is a period favorable to the adoption of all the reforms which are really required, I wish it were possible to engage every member of the legal profession in the promotion of a wise, safe, and radical reform. Radical reform will come sooner or later, with us or without us. Shall we cooperate to make it at the same time wise and safe? Such a reform, I am persuaded, should have in view nothing less than a uniform course of proceeding, in all cases, legal and equitable. *** What I propose, then, in respect to cases of legal cognizance, is this: that the present forms of action be abolished, and in their stead a complaint and answer required, each setting forth the real claim and defense of the parties. Such pleadings would be precisely similar to those proposed for equity cases, and we should thus have a uniform course of pleading for all cases, legal and equitable. The distinction between the two classes of cases is now merely a distinction in the forms of proceeding. The Court of Chancery has existed only in conse- quence of the narrow and fixed forms of the common law. If those forms had been abol- ished, and a natural procedure adopted, the course of the two Courts would long ago have been assimilated. Let the plaintiff set forth his cause of action in his complaint briefly, in ordinary language, and without repetition; and let the defendant make his answer in the same way. Let each party verify hisallegationbymakingoaththathebelievesitto be true. The complaint will then acquaint the defendant with the real charge, while the answer will inform the plaintiff of the real defense. The disputed facts will be sifted from the undisputed, and the parties will go to trial knowing what they have to answer. The plaintiff will state his case as he believes it, and as he expects to prove it. The defendant, on his part, will set forth what he believes and expects to establish, and he need set forth no more. He will not be likely to aver what he does not believe. His answer will disclose the whole of his defense, because he will not be allowed to prove anything which the answer does not contain. He will not be perplexed with questions of double pleading, nor shackled by ancient technical rules. *** The legitimate end of every administration of law is to do justice, with the least possible delay and expense. Every system of pleading is useful only as it tends to this end. This it can do but one of two ways: either by enabling the parties the better to prepare for trial, or by assisting the jury and the Court in judging the causes. *** If we adopt the plan of pleading which I propose, we shall save both time and expense. We shall avoid the risk of losing causes from mistaking the rules of pleading; and we take one step, and that a great one, toward introducing simplicity and directness into the machinery of the law. *** And is, indeed, the learning of the pro- fession bound up with the system of common- law pleading? Is the noble science of jurisprudence—the fruit of the experience of ages, at once the monument and the record of civilization—inseparable from such paltry GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 532 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY PRIMARY DOCUMENTS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS? learning as that, “after the declaration, the parties must at each stage demur, or plead by way of traverse, or by way of confession and avoidance,” or that “upon a traverse issue m ust be tendered,” or anything of that sort? Lawyers have enough to learn if their studies are confined to useful knowledge. To assert that the great body of the law, civil and criminal— the law which defines rights and punishes crimes; the law which regulates the proprietor- ship, the enjoyment, and the transmission of property in all its forms; which explains the nature and the obligations of contracts through all their c hanges; the law that pre vails equally on the sea and the land; the law that is enforced in courts of c hancery and courts of admiralty, as well as in the courts of common law—to assert that this vast body of law requires the aid of that small portion which regulates the written statement of the parties in the courts of common law, is to assert a monstrous paradox, fitter for ridicule than for argument. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY 533 LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS? Legal Scholarship Contracts Christopher C. Langdell, 1871 T he 1871 publication of A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts by CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL revolutionized legal educa- tion. The book, which consiste d of a collection of mostly English judicial opinions, was meant to assist the professor in developing within the student a scientific approach to the law. Langdell chose the cases for the fundamental principles they contained. Students were expected to dispense with the idea that the y were attending a vocational school. Instead, they were to apply the principles they learned in the scientific search for truth. In his preface Langdell said that he sought to “select, classify, and arrange all cases which had contrib uted in any important degree to the growth, develop- ment, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines.” k Contracts PREFACE I entered upon the duties of my present position, a year and a half ago, with a settled conviction that law could only be taught or learned effectively by means of cases in some form. I had entertained such an opinion ever since I knew anything of the nature of law or legal study; but it was chiefly through my experience as a learner that it was formed, as well as subsequently strengthened and con- firmed. Of teaching indeed, as a business, I was entirely without experience; nor had I given much consideration to that subject, except so far as proper methods of teaching are involved in proper methods of study. Now, however, I was called upon to consider directly the subject of teaching, not theoretically but practically, in connection with a large school with its more or less complicated organization, its daily routine, and daily duties. I was expected to take a large class of pupils, meet them regularly from day to day, and give them systematic instru ction in such branches of law as had been assigned to me. To accomplish this successfully, it was necessary, first, that the efforts of the pupils should go hand in hand with mine, that is, that they should study with direct reference to my instruction; secondly, that the study thus required of them should be of the kind from which they might reap the greatest and most lasting benefit; thirdly, that the instruction should be of such a character that the pupils might at least derive a greater advantage from attending it than from devoting the same time to private study. How could this threefold object be accomplished? Only one mode occurred to me which seemed to hold out any reasonable prospect of success; and that was, to make a series of cases, carefully selected from the books of reports, the subject alike of study and instruction. But here I was met by what seemed at first to be an insuperable practical difficulty, namely, the want of books; for though it might be practicable, in case of private pupils having free access to a complete library, to refer them directly to the books of reports, such a course was qui te out of the question with a large class, all of whom would 534 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY want the same books at the same time. Nor would such a course be without great drawbacks and inconveniences, even in the case of a single pupil. As he would always have to go where the books were, and could only have access to them there during certain prescribed hours, it would be impossible for him to economize his time or work to the best advantage; and he would be liable to be constantly haunted by the appre- hension that he was spending time, labor, and money in studying cases which would be inaccessible to him in after life. It was with a view to removing these obstacles, that I was first led to inquire into the feasibility of preparing and publishing such a selection of cases as would be adapted to my purpose as a teacher. The most important element in that inquiry was the great and rapidly increasing number of reported cases in every department of law. In view of this fact, was there any satisfactory principle upon which such a selection could be made? It seemed to me that there was. Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainly to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centu- ries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast majority are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study. Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension. If these doc- trines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their number. It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, develop- ment, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines; and that such a work could not fail to be of material service to all who desire to study that branch of law systematically and in its original sources. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY 535 LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP CONTRACTS . not ignorant of the defects inherent in the character of this body of men; but without this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY. kind of parental affection. *** GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 528 REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND SOCIETY PRIMARY DOCUMENTS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP LAWYERS AND JUDGES In visiting the Americans. Reading of Statutes,” which expounds on the effect that legislative law has on the courts. Fifty years later, the torrent of legislation remains unabated. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E