Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 13 P33 doc

north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, and west and north of the present State of Missouri, was then a wilderness, uninhabited save by savages, whose possessory title had not then been extinguished. It is impossible for me to conceive on what ground France could have advanced a claim, or could have desired to advance a claim, to restrain the United States from making any rules and regulations respecting this Territory, which the United States might think fit to make; and still less can I conceive of any reason which would have induced the United States to yield to such a claim. It was to be expected that France would desire to make the change of sovereignty and jurisdiction as little burdensome as possible to the then inhabitants of Louisiana, and might well exhibit even an anxious solicitude to protect their property and persons, and to secure to them and their posterity their religious and political rights; and the United States, as a just government, might readily accede to all proper stipulations respect ing those who were about to have their allegiance trans ferred. But what interest France could have in uninhabited Territory, which, in the language of the Treaty, was to be transferred “forever, and in full sovereignty,” to the United States, or how the United States could consent to allow a foreign nation to interfere in its purely internal affairs, in which that foreign nation had no concern whatever, is difficult for me to conjecture. In my judgment, this Treaty contains nothing of the kind. The 3d article is supposed to have a bearing on the question. It is as follows: “The inhabitants of the ceded Territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess.” There are two views of this article, each of which, I think, decisively shows that it was not intended to restrain the Congress from exclud- ing slavery from that part of the ceded Territ ory then uninhabited. The first is, that, manifestly, its sole object was to protect individual rights of the then inhabitants of the Territory. They are to be “maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess.” But this Article does not secure to them the right to go upon the public domain ceded by this Treaty, either with or without their slaves. The right or power of doing this did not exist before or at the time the Treaty was made. The French and Spanish Governments, while they held the country, as well as the United States when they acquired it, always exercised the undoubted right of exclud- ing inhabitants from the Indians country, and of determining when and on what conditions it should be opened to settlers. And a stipulation, that the then inhabitants of Louisiana should be protected in their property, can have no reference to their use of that property, where they had no right, under the Treaty, to go with it, save at the will of the United States. If one who was an inhabitant of Louisiana at the time of the Treaty had afterwards taken property then owned by him, consisting of fire-arms, ammunition, and spirits, and had gone into the Indian country north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, to sell them to the Indians, all must agree the 3d article of the Treaty would not have protected him from indictment under the Act of Congress of March 30, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 139, adopted and extended to this Territory by the Act of March 26, 1804, 2 Stat. at L. 283. Besides, whatever rights were secured were individual rights. If Congress should pass any law which violated such rights of any individual, and those rights were of such a character as not to be within the lawful control of Congress under the Constitution, that individual could complain, and the Act of Congress, as to such rights of his, would be inoperative; but it would be valid and operative as to all other persons, whose individual rights did not come under the protection of the Treaty. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any inhabitant of Louisi- ana, whose rights were secured by Treaty, had been injured, it would be wholly inadmissible for this court to assume, first, that one or more such cases may have existed; and second, that if any did exist, the entire law was void—not only as to those cases, if any, in which it could not rightfully operate, but as to all others, wholly unconnected with the Treaty, in which such law could rightfully operate. But it is quite unnecessary, in my opinion, to pursue this inquiry further, because it clearly appears from the language of the Article, and it has been decided by this court that the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 306 CIVIL RIGHTS PRIMARY DOCUMENTS SLAVERY DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD stipulation was temporary, and ceased to have any effect when the then inhabitants of the Territory of the Louisiana, in whose behalf the stipulation was made, were incorporated into the Union. In the case of New Orleans v. De armas et al. 9 Pet. 224, the question was, whether a title to property, which existed at the date of the Treaty, continued to be protected by the Treaty after the State of Louisiana was admitted to the Union. The 3d article of the Treaty was relied on. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: “This article obviously contemplates two objects. One, that Louisiana shall be admitted into the Union as soon as possible, on an equal footing with the other States; and the other, that, till such admission, the inhabitants of the ceded Terri- tory shall be protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion. Had any one of these rights been violated while these stipulations continued in force, the indiv idual supposing himself to be injured might have brought his case into this court under the 25th section of the Judicial Act. But this stipulation ceased to operate when Louisiana became a member of the Union, and its inhabitants were “admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.” The case of Chateau v. Marguerita, 12 Pet. 507, and Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589, are in conformity with this view of the Treaty. To convert this temporary stipulation of the Treaty, in behalf of French subjects who then inhabited a small portion of Louisiana, into a permanent restriction upon the power of Congress to regulate territory then uninhabited, and to assert that it not only restrains Congress from affecting the rights of property of the then inhabitants, but enable them and all other citizens of the United States to go into any part of the ceded Territory with their slaves and hold them there, is a construction of this Treaty so opposed to its natural meaning, and so far beyond it subject matter and the evident design of the parties, that I cannot assent to it. In my opinion, this Treaty has no bearing on the present question. For these reasons, I am of opinion that so much of the several Acts of Congress as prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude within that part of the Territory of Wisconsin lying north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and west of the River Mississippi, were constitutional and valid laws. I have expressed my opinion, and the reasons therefore, at far greater length than I could have wished, upon the different questions on which I have found it necessary to pass, to arrive at a judgment on the case at bar. These questions are numerous, and the grave impor- tance of some of them required me to exhibit fully the grounds of my opinion. I have touched no question which, in the view I have taken, it was not absolutely necessary for me to pass upon, to ascertain whether the judgement of the Circuit Court should stand or be reversed. I have avoided no question on which the validity of that judgment depends. To have done either more or less, would have been inconsistent with my views of my duty. In my opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 307 SLAVERY DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD Slavery “A House Divided” Speech Abraham Lincoln, June 16, 1858 I n 1856 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, an Illinois lawyer and politician, left the WHIG PARTY over the issue of SLAVERY and joined the newly-formed, antislavery REPUBLICAN PARTY. Lincoln was out- raged at the KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT OF 1854 and the Dred Scott decision. He was particularly dis- pleased with Senator STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS (D-Ill.) for championing the popular sovereignty doc- trine, which allowed territories to decide whether to be free or slave states. The Dred Scott case suggested that there was no legal way to prevent slavery in the North as well. The Republicans chose Lincoln as their candidate in the 1858 Illinois senatorial race against Douglas. The campaign was marked by a series of seven brilliant debates betw een the two contenders. Lincoln advocated loyalty to the Union, regarded slavery as unjust, and was opposed to any further expansion of slavery. He opened his campaign on June 16, 1858, with the declaration “‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.” His speech attacked the morality and legitimacy of popular sovereignty and warned that whether slavery could be permitted in the North was still an open question. Lincoln lost the election due to an unfavor- able APPORTIONMENT of legislative seats in Illinois. At that time U.S. senators were elected by a vote of the state legislature. Though Lincoln gar- nered more popular votes, the legislators chose to reelect Douglas. Despite the loss, Lincoln’s firm antislavery position had enhanced his national reputation and helped him win elec- tion as president in 1860. k “A House Divided” Speech “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new—North as well as South. Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let any on e w ho dou bts, c arefully con template that now almost complete legal combination— piece of machinery so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott decision. *** [The Kansas-Nebraska Act] opened all the national territory to slavery. This had been provided for in the notable argument of “squatter sovereignty,” otherwise called “sacred right of self government,” which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted 308 CIVIL RIGHTS use of it as to amount to just this: That if any one man, choose to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to object. *** While the Nebraska Bill was passing through Congress, a law case, involving the question of a negro’sfreedom was pa ssing through the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska Bill and law suit were brought to a d ec ision i n the same month of May, 18 54. The Negro’snamewas“Dred Scot t”. *** [The points decided by the Dred Scott decision include] that whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free state, makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave state the negro may be forced into by the master. Thispointismade,nottobepressed immediately [that] t he logical conclusion that what Dred Scott’smastermightlawfullydowith Dred Scott, in the free state Illinois, e very other master may lawfully do with any o ther one, or one thousand slaves, in I llinois, or in any o ther free st ate. *** While the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case expressly declare[s] that the Constitution of the United States neither permits congress nor a territorial legislature to exclude slavery from any United States territory, [Taney] omit[s] to declare whether or not the same constitution permits a state, or the people of a state, to exclude it. Possibly, this was a mere omission; but who can be quite sure. The nearest approach to the point of declar- ing the power of a state over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language too, of the Nebraska Act. On one occasion his exact language is, “except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction.” In what cases the power of the states is so restrained by the U.S. Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the sam e question, as to the restraint on the power of the territories was left open in the Nebraska Act. Put that and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United State s does not permit a state to exclude slavery from its limits. *** Such a decision is all that slavery now la cks of being alike lawful in all the states. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their state free; and we shall awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave state. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 309 SLAVERY “A HOUSE DIVIDED” SPEECH Slavery Emancipation Proclamation By the President of the United States of America P resident ABRAHAM LINCOLN supported the U.S. CIVIL WAR to preserve the Union, not to end SLAVERY. Though he was personally opposed to slavery, he had been elected on a platform that pledged the continuation of slavery in states where it already existed. Wartime pressures, however, drove Lincoln toward emancipation of the slaves. Military leaders argued that an enslaved labor force in the South allowed the Confederate states to place more soldiers on the front lines. By the summer of 1862, Lincoln had prepared an EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, but he did not want to issue it until Unio n armies had had greater success on the battlefield. He feared that otherwise the proclamation might be seen as a sign of weakness. The Union army’s victory at the Battle of Antietam encouraged the president to issue a preliminary proclamation on September 22, 1862, that announced the abolition of slavery in areas occupied by the Confederacy effective January 1, 1863. The wording of the Emancipa- tion Proclamation on that date made clear that slavery would still be tolerated in the border states and areas occupied by Union troops, so as not to jeopardize the war effort. Lincoln was uncertain that the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality of his action, so he lobbied Congress to adopt the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT , which totally abolished slavery. k Emancipation Proclamation APROCLAMATION Whereas, on the twenty-second day of Septem- ber, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the president of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: “That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward and forever, free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. “That the executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such states shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong 310 CIVIL RIGHTS countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.” Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, presi- dent of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties desig- nated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, includ- ing the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recom- mend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. By the President: Abraham Lincoln William H. Seward, Secretary of State. Source: Statutes at Large, vol. 12 (1864), pp. 1268–1269. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 311 SLAVERY EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION From Segregation to Civil Rights  “THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES”  PLESSY V. FERGUSON  LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM CITY JAIL  “IHAVEADREAM” SPEECH  CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964  VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AC T OF 1990 A fter the U.S. CIVIL WAR the THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH,andFIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS to the U.S. Constitution, along with many pieces of CIVIL RIGHTS legislation, were enacted to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves. Nevertheless, African Americans were soon ensnared in a southern political and legal system that limited their political, economic, and social freedoms. Initially after the war, during the RECON- STRUCTION era (1865–1876), the former Confed- erate states were placed under federal military control. During this time African Americans were able to register to vote and to be elected to state and local government posts. This period was also marked by white vigilantism, however, in the form of the KU KLUX KLAN (KKK). The KKK used terror to discourage African Amer- icans from voting or from asserting their other constitutional rights. The presidential election of 1876 resulted in a deadlocked ELECTORAL COLLEGE and allegations of election fraud. A congressional compromise was reached in which Republican RUTHERFORD B. HAYES became president. In exchange, southern Democrats were rewarded with the withdrawal of federal troops and the end of Reconstruction. During the 1870s the U.S. Supreme Court was called on to decide the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the CIVIL RIGHTS CASES , 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883), the Court struck down the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1875, which had been based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the amendment prohibited only official, state- sponsored discrimination and did not reach discrimination by private parties. By the 1890s African Americans had lost virtually all their civil rights as southern states, emboldened by the Civil Rights cases, passed laws that segre- gated all public facilities and public transporta- tion on the basis of race. In PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), the Supreme Court endorsed “separate- but-equal” laws, holding that they did not violate the Constitution. Beginning in the 1930s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP) fought a series of court battles against various aspects of state-sponsored seg- regation. The NAACP’s main focus, however, was the desegregation of public schools. A team of talented attorneys, which included future Supreme Court justice THURGOOD MARSHALL,led the fight. Ultimately, they succeeded in having Plessy struck down. In BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA , KANSAS, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954), the Supreme Court ordered the end of state-sponsored segregated schools. Despite these legal victories, most African Americans in the South were not able to vote or to exercise their civil rights. In response, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR . started the modern CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT in the 1950s. Instead of lawsuits, he used nonviolent public protests to attract the nation’s attention to the conditions under which African Americans were forced to live. King and his followers were jailed for their demonstrations, but by the early 1960s it was clear that legal change must come. 312 CIVIL RIGHTS President LYNDON B. JOHNSON pushed for the enactment of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.), which prohibited racial and other types of disc rimina- tion in employment, education, and public accommodations. The act outlawed both state- sponsored and private segregation in hotels, restaurants, and public transportation. Johnson also introduced the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 et seq.), which ensured protection against discriminatory voting prac- tices. This act changed the South, as African Americans were allowed to register to vote for the first time since Reconstruction. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 313 From Segregation to Civil Rights “The Civil Rights Cases” T he Civil Rights cases involved five prosecu- tions and civil suits from California, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and Tennessee for denying African Americans access to public accommodations (hotels, theaters, and railroad cars) in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only official, state-spon- sored discrimination and could not reach discrimination practiced by privately owned places of public accommodation. Justice John M. Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, argued that segregation in public accommodations was a “badge of slavery” for the recently freed African Americans and that the act could be constitutionally justified by looking to the Thirteenth Amendment. This amendment gave Congress the authority to outlaw all “badges and incidents” of slavery. Not until the passage of title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would the federal government achieve the desegregation of public accommodations. k “The Civil Rights Cases” UNITED STATES V. STANLEY. [On a Certificate of Division in Opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.] UNITED STATES V. RYAN. [In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.] UNITED STATES V. NICHOLS. [On a Certificate of Division in Opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.] UNITED STATES V. SINGLETON. [On a Certificate of Division in Opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.] ROBINSON AND WIFE V. MEMPHIS & CHARLESTON R. CO. [In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee.] Supreme Court of the United States 3 S.Ct. 18 27 L.Ed. 835 (Cite as: 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18) October 15, 1883. Harlan, J., dissents. Sol. Gen. Phillips, for plaintiff, the United States. No counsel for defendants, Stanley, Ryan, Nichols, and Singleton. Wm. M. Randolph, for plaintiffs in error, Robinson and wife. W. Y. C. Humes, for defendant in error, the Memphis & Charleston R. Co. Bradley, J. These cases are all founded on the first and second sections of the act of Congress known as 314 CIVIL RIGHTS the “Civil Rights Act,” passed March 1, 1875, entitled “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights.” 18 St. 335. Two of the cases, those against Stanley and Nichols, are indictments for denying to persons of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or hotel; two of them, those against Ryan and Singleton, are, one an information, the other an indictment, for denying to indiv iduals the privileges and accommodations of a theater, the information against Ryan being for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire’s theater in San Francisco; and the indictment against Singleton being for denying to another person, whose color is not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the theater known as the Grand Opera House in New York, “said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” The case of Robinson and wife against the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, to recover the penalty of $500 given by the second section of the act; and the gravamen was the refusal by the conductor of the railroad company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies’ car, fo r the reason, as stated in one of the counts, that she was a person of African descent. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants in this case upon the merits under a charge of the court, to which a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs. The case was tried on the assumption by both parties of the validity of the act of Congress; and the principal point made by the exceptions was that the judge allowed evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the plaintiff, the wife, was an improper person, because she was in company with a young man whom he supposed to be a white man, and on that account inferred that there was some improper connection between them; and the judge charged the jury, in substance, that if this was the conductor’s bona fide reason for excluding the woman from the car, they might take it into consideration on the question of the liability of the company. The case is brought here by writ of error at the suit of the plaintiffs. The cases of Stanley, Nichols, and Singleton come up on certificates of division of opinion between the judges below as to the constitutionality of the first and second sections of the act referred to; and the case of Ryan, on a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of California sustaining a demurrer to the information. It is obvious that the primary and important question in all the cases is the constitutionality of the law; for if the law is unconstitutional none of the prosecutions can stand. The sections of the law referred to provide as follows: “Section 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” “Sec. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall, also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000, or shall be imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than one year: Provided, that all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid, or to proceed under their rights at common law and by state statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal law of any state: And provided, further, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively. ” Are these sections constitutional? The first section, which is the principal one, cannot be fairly understood without attending to the last clause, which qualifies the preceding part. The essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 315 FROM SEGREGATION TO CIVIL RIGHTS “THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES” . with my views of my duty. In my opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS. state. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 309 SLAVERY “A HOUSE DIVIDED” SPEECH Slavery Emancipation Proclamation By the President of the United States of. South, as African Americans were allowed to register to vote for the first time since Reconstruction. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PRIMARY DOCUMENTS CIVIL RIGHTS 313 From Segregation