I know that women don’t like me!’ Presuppositions in therapeutic discourse Marta Andersson pot

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma ‘I know that women don’t like me!’ Presuppositions in therapeutic discourse Marta Andersson ă English Language Department, Stockholm University, Universtietsvagen 10E, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden Received 23 March 2006; received in revised form 11 March 2008; accepted 25 September 2008 Abstract One of the biggest problems concerning presuppositions has been correctly dealing with their sensitivity to the context, i.e why inferences triggered by certain expressions not project out in all linguistic environments, even though the triggering words preserve their semantic content in different settings The answer which is of particular interest here goes along with the principles of the binding theory of presuppositions developed by van der Sandt (1992) According to this theory, presuppositions behave as anaphors and can be resolved in the same way at the level of discourse representation This article contributes to a very scarce body of empirical work on presuppositions, as it scrutinizes examples of presuppositions that act like discourse anaphors in the context of three psychotherapeutic sessions Such sessions can be analyzed in the same way as ordinary spoken discourse; however, the initial premise that the usage of presuppositions differs in this genre in comparison to daily interaction is confirmed The results of both quantitative and qualitative analysis indicate that presuppositions are used for different strategic reasons in the two genres compared, which influences the way they should be interpreted and also their frequency # 2008 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved Keywords: Anaphors; Accommodation; Binding; Presupposition; Representation Introduction The crux of van der Sandt’s (1992) binding theory, proposed as a solution to the projection problem of presuppositions (discussed further), is the idea that they can be handled using the same mechanism that is used to resolve anaphoric pronouns in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp, 1981; Kamp and Reyle, 1993) Van der Sandt’s claim is that presupposed information can be bound to an already existing antecedent in the discourse, exactly like pronouns Therefore it can serve as one of the ways of referring to such an antecedent, along with pronouns and demonstratives However, as van der Sandt argues, even if no suitable antecedent is given in the discourse, the rich semantic content of presuppositions enables them to accommodate, i.e create their own antecedent, which is impossible for anaphors or pronouns The biggest dissimilarity between these two strategies for presupposition resolution is that bound presuppositions (and anaphors) refer to hearer-known information already present in the discourse, while accommodation is regarded as a way to introduce discourse-new information, in which case the hearer needs to adjust cognitive structures and create a part of the speaker’s meaning by using inferences This is feasible on the basis of presumed common knowledge (Stalnaker, 1974:450) that enables the speaker to surmise what the hearer possibly knows and introduce such information felicitously E-mail address: marta.andersson@english.su.se 0378-2166/$ – see front matter # 2008 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2008.09.033 722 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 Most of the work on presuppositions written before van der Sandt’s (1992) binding theory was coined had examined them merely in meticulously contrived examples eagerly quoted and dissected from paper to paper (see Karttunen, 1973; Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 1983) The only empirical studies on presuppositions known to me are those by Prince ` (1978) on it-clefts, Fraurud (1990) on definite descriptions, Sbisa (1999) on the persuasive and informative use of presuppositions in the Italian press and Spenader (2002) on presuppositions in casual and casual-like conversation Apart from that the approach to presuppositions has been mainly philosophical rather than discourse-analytic, although, as Spenader (2002:49) argues, looking at naturally produced examples can yield new results in research into the communicative effects of using these inferences As features related to the context, presuppositions disclose the speaker’s state of knowledge and his/her assumptions on the hearer’s knowledge Thus they cause various reactions in the hearer, which is particularly discernible when analyzing longer stretches of spoken dialogues Hence, from the vantage point of the speaker’s intentions, therapeutic discourse seems to be a particularly interesting subject for analysis, as the exchange of information in this genre has a clear pragmatic goal, unlike in casual conversation (often just ‘talking for the sake of talking’, Eggins and Slade, 1997:6) investigated by Spenader Moreover, the information communicated via presuppositions and the way in which they contribute to the hearer’s understanding of the message are particularly salient in therapeutic discourse, as they can influence and eventually even change people’s (patients’) behaviour, which is not always the case in casual talk We can, therefore, presume that the strategies for presupposition resolution may be different in these two genres In this article I will investigate 1) whether binding as a strategy for presupposition resolution is more frequent in therapeutic discourse than in casual conversation Such an assumption seems rather apt, as it relates to constant referring to the same limited and repeatedly examined issues (ubiquitous in therapeutic sessions), and therefore suggests that one of the features distinguishing therapeutic discourse from ordinary conversation might be the frequency of bound presuppositions Moreover, as Labov and Fanshel (1977:62) write, the aforementioned acts of reference play a salient role in making the flow of a conversation smooth, which seems particularly desirable in therapeutic discourse and will also be illustrated in the further discussion Van der Sandt’s binding theory also brings in part into question what the utility of using a bound presupposition would be, if an anaphor would suffice In section 2.2 I will indicate 2) that in many cases the rich semantic context of presuppositions validates the aptness of their use as more efficient counterparts of anaphors and also 3) that the use of presuppositions instead of anaphors creates certain rhetorical effects particularly useful in therapeutic discourse The following paper will 4) also attempt to investigate instances when there are no accessible reference markers in the preceding discourse In such cases presuppositions are usually accommodated, but the kind of information they introduce may create certain obstructions in communication, particularly when the information is hearer-new Hence my hypothesis is that introducing new information via presuppositions may be avoided in the genres that have a clearly specified pragmatic goal, which will be discussed in section 2.3 1.1 Presuppositions in the binding theory From the vantage point of their logical properties presuppositions are inferences induced by certain linguistic expressions (presuppositional triggers) They can be distinguished from the context they occur in by means of established linguistic tests (Levinson, 1983:168) Consider the following examples: (1) (2) Eve has stopped smoking Eve hasn’t stopped smoking We can infer both from (1) and (2) that Eve has smoked before, as the underlined expressions implicate this fact The negation test illustrated in (2) is a common way in which inferences can be regarded as presuppositional This is converse to asserted information and entailment, for the example in (1) entails the fact that Eve does not smoke and asserts that she quit, all of which disappear under the negation However, certain contexts make presuppositions vanish: (3) If Eve has smoked, she has stopped smoking The presupposition that was triggered in (1) and (2) obviously does not project out of this environment, as the fact of Eve’s smoking is questioned by the antecedent of the conditional This illustrates the most perplexing aspect of the M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 723 nature of presuppositions, which, in the literature, is called the projection problem (see Karttunen, 1974; Levinson, 1983) This problem concerns presuppositions triggered in compound sentences in which the implications of separate clauses not always emerge (as in (3), which indicates their sensitivity to the context of an utterance (Geurts, 1999a:46) The projection problem had for decades been treated very differently by linguists who adhered to semantic approaches to presuppositions and those who subscribed to a pragmatic view (see Karttunen, 1973, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974; Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 1983) A new light on this issue was shed by Stalnaker (1974), who claimed that presuppositions treated from the pragmatic view of the speaker can differ from those treated semantically According to his intuitions pragmatic presuppositions not hold in compound sentences, as the speaker builds on what s/he has already said Hence, what is asserted cannot be later presupposed, as in the case of conditional sentences where presuppositions not project out if information is asserted in the antecedent Stalnaker was, therefore, one of the first who treated presuppositions from the vantage point of context It is now generally acknowledged that the interpretation of presupposed information should not be tackled on the level of the sentence, but we should instead account for the whole array of cognitive activities that accompany the process of comprehension and interpretation, within which meaning and its representations are constructed by the entire discourse This goes along with the assumptions of DRT, which is a cognitivist theory according to which mental processes involved in language comprehension play a prominent role The theory is related to the representations of the entire discourse (Discourse Representation Structures—DRS), not just individual sentences, and considers the construction of meaning as a process that proceeds sentence by sentence Each next sentence S contributes new information that updates the already existing representation (DRS) and changes it into a new one that includes S (Kamp and Reyle, 1993:11) As a solution to the projection problem of presuppositions van der Sandt (1992) extended DRT and proposed the binding theory, according to which presuppositions can be treated like pronouns or other anaphoric expressions at the level of representation in DRT Presuppositions can be resolved against the content of an evolving discourse by establishing a link between them and their antecedents, and this one of the two possible mechanisms for presupposition resolution is called binding The other mechanism is based on the rich semantic content of presuppositions thanks to which they can accommodate an antecedent even if it is not given in the discourse This constitutes, according to van der Sandt, the only essential difference between presuppositions and anaphors Consider first an example of binding: (4) (5) If Eve is seeing a guy, then he is divorced If Eve is seeing a guy, then the guy is divorced As we can observe here, whether we use an anaphoric expression (the pronoun in (4)) or a presuppositional one (i.e the noun in (15)), there will be no differences in interpretation of these sentences, and this, as van der Sandt (1992:344) writes, suggests that there is a similar force that underlies both pronoun resolution and presupposition projection Hence we should not treat the presupposition that does not project in (5) as cancelled, but bound to an antecedent in the preceding discourse, exactly like the pronoun in (4) In such a case the presuppositional construction will be absorbed in its antecedent and lose its presuppositional status.2 The anaphor in (4) is the most basic and the most uncontroversial example of incremental interpretation and it is, at the same time, closely related to familiar patterns of cohesion (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:276) As we can observe in (5), the presuppositional expression acts exactly in the same way, which makes the anaphoric character of definite NPs and the presuppositions they mark uncontroversial It is not only definite NPs, however, that can be resolved by the same mechanism that DRT uses with anaphors Van der Sandt’s (1992:342) claim also covers aspectual and factive verbs, cleft sentences, temporal clauses and adverbs like too or even, all of which can also be bound to an antecedent Presuppositional information, according to van der Sandt (1992), should be bound to an antecedent in discourse in order to get an interpretation, exactly like anaphors However, there is a difference between the two that emerges when a compatible antecedent cannot be identified in the Definite NPs trigger a presupposition that there is such a referent given in the discourse This is why bound presuppositions should rather be called: presuppositional inferences, as van der Sandt argues However, these two terms are used interchangeably in the literature on presuppositions, which I will follow in the present study 724 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 preceding discourse In such a case a sentence with a pronoun will be impossible to interpret,3 while a presuppositional expression, as it has a richer descriptive content, will provide its own antecedent, add itself to the main context and bind with that antecedent This process is called accommodation A good example of a presupposition that has to be accommodated is given in Lambrecht (1994:14) in his discussion on markedness in information structure The example depicts a woman who causes a delay of a bus and apologises the other passengers saying4: (6) My car broke down The definite possessive NP (my car) presupposes that the speaker has a car In van der Sandt’s (1992) view this expression has sufficient semantic content to establish its own antecedent and bind with it As he also argues, binding just updates the information already present in the discourse, while accommodation revises the context of an utterance and then enables an interpretation of presupposed information As Spenader (2002:29) writes, the hearer has to infer the context that the speaker is tacitly asking him/her to treat as already discourse-given, create part of the speaker’s meaning and modify his/her own discourse representation by adding the presupposed information to the DRS This process is regarded as the speaker’s ‘mistake’ that the hearer needs to repair Therefore accommodation is considered to be a repair strategy and should be used only after all potential possibilities for binding fail (van der Sandt, 1992; Geurts, 1999a) 1.2 Therapeutic discourse A therapeutic interview can be described as a type of conversation (Labov and Fanshel, 1977:30) However, a therapeutic session, unlike a casual conversation, is constrained by the agenda and the limitations of possible topics to discuss Therapeutic talk is a complex interactive situation between the patient whose task is to give the therapist an account of his/her problem and the therapist whose job is to collect a valid database, develop an evolving understanding of the patient and influence his/her way of thinking (see Blanchet et al., 2005:125ff) The process of influencing derives from concrete verbal and non-verbal actions and interactional approach which should lead the patient to reshaping his/her representation in a more efficient and logical manner This means that the therapeutic interventions should help the patient develop a new conception of his/her problem, i.e insight (Blanchet et al., 2005:126) The expected new representation may come only through further talk and gradual modifications to the patient’s discourse and, eventually, his/her self-concepts The most problematic feature of therapy emerges at this point, as in the course of an ordinary talk we can expect to be experts at least in one area: our inner world (Labov and Fanshel, 1977:34) In a therapeutic session the patient’s biography often renders a substance that is moulded in a way that is divergent from what his/her own model of this world represents In order to influence this process the patient formulates his/her thoughts so that they fulfil a certain emotive function: affect the listener, make him/her respond, move him/her, etc These verbal strategies pertain to pragmatic intricacies of language use that concern the speaker’s intended meaning in a certain context In the context of a therapeutic talk this meaning is a means to represent the patient’s model of experiences In this model the patient makes certain assumptions (Bandler and Grinder, 1975:52) One of the ways in which they protrude linguistically is presuppositions These are a prominent characteristic of human discourse in general, but the strategies for their resolution may be different in different genres In therapeutic discourse presuppositions may serve (from both the patient and the therapist’s perspective) as technical tools whose objective is to maintain the overall continuity of the topic and enhance the discourse flow, but also as rhetorical devices used in order to influence the interlocutor, provide him/her with additional clues, enhance the claim, or, possibly, serve as avoidance or defence strategy As the above reasoning indicates, therapeutic discourse is a clearly goal-oriented genre and therefore it is interesting to investigate whether its presuppositions have different pragmatic functions from those generated in the course of casual conversation This is, certainly, an oversimplified approach, since pronouns provide some descriptive content and in certain environments it is possible to interpret a pronoun without any clear antecedent in the preceding context Yet this discussion is beyond the scope of the present paper Neither the question of markedness of information, nor any other communicative and pragmatic functions of this example are the subject of the discussion in this study M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 725 1.3 Corpus and method The corpus of this study consisted of transcripts of three authentic therapeutic sessions Sessions and were borrowed from therapeutic books (Session from: Sluzki, 1990; and Session from: Bandler and Grinder, 1975) Both of them are initial meetings between the therapists and the patients, in Session the patients are a couple (Jennifer and Larry), while Session has a single patient (Ralph) Session was a subsequent meeting which I was lucky enough to obtain a recording of thanks to the courtesy of an English-native-tongue therapist and her patient from The Institute of Psychodrama, Sociometry and Group Psychotherapy in Stockholm.5 The transcriptions were stored electronically, and all triggers were identified and analyzed in the context from the vantage point of presupposition resolution, i.e either a suitable antecedent was found in the possibly closest context or presupposition was treated as accommodated The triggers considered here were borrowed from Geurts (1999a:2) and Spenader (2002:58) and comprise:     definite NPs (the N; demonstrative NPs, possessives) it clefts (it is/was Ci that/whom/which S-Ci) aspectual verbs (begin, finish, start, stop, cease, continue, carry on, avoid, force, hesitate, prevent) factive verbs (know, realize, resent, find out, discover, notice, see) Both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the presuppositions triggered by specified expressions in the context of this particular genre were, subsequently, compared with a corpus study of presuppositions in English conversation by Spenader (2002) Features excluded from the analysis comprise certain instances of definite NPs such as fixed expressions (e.g in my eyes), idioms (e.g the nuts and bolts etc.), calculable forms (i.e using information about a reference time and a reference place, such as: in that moment), known information (entity that is new in the text, but belongs to general knowledge, e.g the world) and also cases of bridging.6 Examples of factive verbs devoid of that sentential complement or at the end of a tone unit were also discarded (e.g ‘‘She knew ’’ where it was hard to determine what ‘knew’ actually presupposes) All this follows the procedure of Spenader’s (2002) study However, abstract triggers in sentences of all types were considered here, while Spenader’s survey was limited to those occurring in declarative sentences only The reason for that is that certain interrogative forms may make it rather difficult to get clear intuitions about what the presuppositions in a sentence are; for instance: ‘Did you discover that John was the murderer?’ might presuppose that John was the murderer, but could be a question about the presupposition itself Such ambiguous examples were also discarded in the present paper, but more straightforward interrogative forms were included, as they are crucial in therapeutic discourse (see examples from Session in 2.2 and 2.3) Presuppositions triggered in such non-declarative sentences considered here constitute 3% of the whole corpus Analysis 2.1 Cases of binding and accommodation in numbers Table shows the strategies for resolution of definite NPs Table Resolution of definite NPs in therapeutic discourse and casual conversation Trigger type Total Casual conversation (8 972 words) Binding The NPs Demonstrative NPs Possessive NPs Therapeutic discourse (7 900 words) Binding Accommodation 70 33 59 51 14 49 162 114 72.5 21.5 31 125 Accommodation 96 9.5 56.5 135 ă Stockholms Institut for Psykodrama, Sociometri och Gruppsykoterapi Cases like: ‘‘Sarah is married The guy is divorced’’ (Session 3, line 18) where the definiteness of the nominal in the second sentence implicates that it is a part of given information, even though physically absent in the preceding utterance According to the binding theory it can be treated as a stage between binding and accommodation (see also Clark, 1975) 726 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 The figures for definite NPs in casual conversation are based on a subcorpus of three dialogues, which had a combined length of 8972 words These figures are the average of the results of the two annotators annotating Spenader’s corpus of definite NPs7 for binding and accommodation (for practical reasons I did my own annotation) Therefore the corpora sizes are very comparable There is a statistically significant difference at p < 005 between the number of bound and accommodated NP presuppositions in therapeutic talk This observation is revealing, as it indicates that therapeutic discourse is, indeed, different from casual conversation Particularly the balance between the bound and accommodated possessive NPs in therapy talks in comparison to daily discourse is significant, as they refer to constantly repeated personal information (e.g ‘my husband’) ubiquitous in this genre Perhaps the most surprising result is the higher frequencies of both bound and accommodated ‘the NPs’ in casual conversation (the difference is significant at p < 001) Yet therapeutic discourse is fixed on the same, recurrent topics (it may, therefore, have more pronouns), while in ordinary interaction shifts in topic are quite frequent (Spenader, 2002:51-ff) Thus the variety of both referring and new expressions can be higher in the latter genre Table shows the results for abstract triggers Table Resolution of abstract triggers in therapeutic discourse and casual conversation Trigger type Therapeutic discourse (7900 words) Casual conversation (233 000 words) Binding Accommodation Binding It-clefts Aspectual verbs Factive verbs 14 11 17 19 10 28 12 58 81 Total 34 27 57 151 Accommodation Identifying a suitable resolution strategy was probably less complex for the analyst in the present study than in the case of casual conversation, where the information is more messy and diffused among several speakers (Spenader, 2002:68) However, it was not always easy to decide if information should be regarded as hearer-new or maybe discourse-new and, in the case of binding, if certain information was semantically similar enough to be an antecedent of another expression Yet considering the sizes of both corpora we can conclude that abstract presuppositional triggers are substantially more frequent in therapeutic discourse than in casual conversation (the difference is significant at p < 001) The reason might be that they can be used to refer precisely to abstract objects (facts, opinions, situations), which is crucial in this genre Table shows the number and distribution of all the chosen presuppositional triggers in the material analyzed Table Resolution of each trigger type in each session Binding Accommodation The NPs Demonstrative NPs Possessive NPs It-clefts Aspectual verbs Factive verbs 48 16 28 – 23 29 – 1 Total 98 57 Binding Accommodation Binding Accommodation – – – 21 14 22 25 19 15 23 76 77 The figures in Table indicate that binding predominates in Session ( p < 001) and ( p < 005), while in Session both strategies for presupposition resolution are used quite freely (with a non-significant predominance of accommodation) Since Session is the only analyzed transcript of a subsequent therapeutic talk, while the other two are first interviews, it can be suggested that there might be certain differences in the use of presuppositions between initial and subsequent therapeutic sessions A comparison between these two types of therapeutic talk, however, For more details see Spenader (2002:162-ff) M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 727 deserves a separate study based on more empirical material Yet the frequencies presented here will be interpreted in more detail in section As the above results show, binding is overall the predominant strategy for presupposition resolution in the analyzed corpus Yet more material is needed in order to provide even stronger empirical evidence for this initial observation for the whole genre This concerns particularly the strategies of resolution of abstract triggers in whose case a bigger corpus is needed in order to obtain significant results 2.2 Bound presuppositions in the context This section will show that presuppositions act like their anaphoric counterparts and are interchangeable with anaphors but also often show much greater adaptability in the context, i.e they are able to pick up an antecedent even if it would not be possible for a pronominal expression (e.g due to remoteness) They also contribute to the overall continuity of a topic, which is the reason why they are often used instead of anaphors The continuity of the topic is a feature of particular importance in therapeutic discourse, but the examples below will also illustrate rhetorical effects and other possible reasons for using full-fledged presuppositions instead of anaphors in this type of conversation Moreover, in more complex cases the mechanism of binding will also be described in closer detail Triggered information will be underlined and its antecedents italicised in the whole paper There is only one example in my corpus that illustrates a presupposition that, in terms of traditional presupposition theory, does not project out the embedded context: (7) P: definite (possessive) NP; induced information: specified feelings (S3:135–139)8 ( .) He deprived us of all this .and he still says that he had feelings for me, you know, loved me; cared I don’t believe him In my eyes even if he had feelings for me (a), those feelings (b) didn’t have anything in common with love (A) The sentence (A) could serve as a paradigm example in the literature on presuppositions written a few decades ago As we can see, the presupposition: those feelings is not inherited by the whole compound sentence, since the demonstrative points at feelings whose existence is questioned in (a) According to the previous theoretical approach the presupposition is cancelled here, while van der Sandt (1992) claims that it acts exactly like an anaphoric expression (‘they’) would – it is bound in the first conjunct The whole utterance, rather perplexing for linguists and language philosophers, in this context simply shows that the patient does not commit herself to the assumption that her husband loved her at the moment she refers to and the full-fledged presupposition (instead of anaphor also in this context felicitous) supports her belief state Consider an example of presupposition that can be replaced with an anaphoric expression: (8) factive; TP:9 it is safe to have these feelings (S1:37–39) Well, when I say ‘‘communication’’, I mean exchange of feelings and ideas and thoughts, you know, a sharing of these things I mean exposing one’s vulnerabilities and feeling that it’s safe to so (a) And my feeling is that if you can that with somebody, you establish a closer relationship with that person T: That makes sense J: And, uh, that’s what I mean by communication And, also, not being afraid to show these feelings is important I think that’s the first step in realizing that it’s OK or it’s safe to have these feelings and to show them to the other person (b) T: Are you talking about yourself, or are you (Sluzki indicates ‘‘gotcha’’ by making a stabbing gesture toward Larry and simultaneously emitting a short, humorous noise.) J: Oh, I’m talking more about Larry.(c) J: The triggering expression in (b) (realize) and its complement are a reformulation of an earlier utterance The patient decided on using a presupposition, although the entire sequence in (b) could have been replaced with an anaphor S3:135–139—Session 3, lines: 135–139 Abbreviation for: triggered presupposition 728 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 (‘this’) Yet this simple expression might have not been specific enough to clearly delimit what part of her concept is referred to Another reason for using a full-fledged presupposition might be the emphasis she wanted to put on her views, which would not have the same rhetorical effect in the case of an anaphor The presupposition makes her claim in (a) clearer and stronger, which is particularly interesting when juxtaposed with the fact that the proposition is in the scope of the propositional attitude verb: ‘think’ (Biber and Finnegan, 1989:119) This verb shows epistemic hesitation by the speaker on the one hand, which, on the other hand, is immediately suppressed by the presence of the factive verb According to the mainstream conviction, when using a factive verb, the speaker presupposes that the complement of the sentence expresses a true proposition (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971:345; Levinson, 1983), i.e commits him/ herself to the truth of this proposition, unlike in the case of epistemic stance features marking hesitation.10 Since Jennifer almost immediately admits that her utterance concerned her ideas about how her partner should act in their relationship (c), we can conclude that the stance marker was used probably in order to hedge the force of presupposition triggered by the factive Consider another example: (9) it-cleft; TP: there is a wall built (S3:50–54) P: No, maybe it just sounds like that .I love Jonas, if I didn’t, I wouldn’t be here, I wouldn’t even try .It’s just that after so many years of quarrels, I feel that there’s a wall (a) between us But I didn’t want to build it (b), I don’t feel guilty, it’s him who built up this wall (c) T: Do you ever try to something about it? About the wall? As Spenader (2002:81) argues, it-clefts are particularly well suited for corrections, as they focus on one element (the one that must be corrected) and background the rest In therapeutic discourse corrections seem to serve the obvious purpose of assigning the responsibility to the other partner and defending oneself (Labov and Fanshel, 1977:229) Here the patient introduces a new referent in (a), develops the representation in (b)11 and binds (c) to the information provided both in (a) and (b) The anaphoric relationship between (a) (b) and (c) is discernible on the basis of the correction that the latter utterance makes to the first two The presupposition triggered by the it-cleft in (c) points to something that might have been mistakenly inferred from both (a) and (b) and corrects it The full presuppositional expression, again, could have been replaced with a simple ‘did it’ In such a case, however, the whole utterance would have lost its emphasis and rhetorical effect Furthermore, the obvious and manipulative focus on the other person’s guilt would not be so conspicuous and, at the same time, the patterns of problematic behaviours not so easy to perceive In this case the therapist immediately identifies the patient’s assumptions of being a victim of her partner and challenges them by shifting the focus to what she does in the relationship Thus the patient’s strategy actually facilitates what the therapist wants to achieve (i.e changes in the patient’s self-concepts) Consider another example: (10) factive; TP: Janet was not interested in Ralph (S2:34–41) She just didn’t like me.(A) How, specifically, you know that Janet didn’t like you? She wasn’t interested in me.(a) Interested in what way? She didn’t pay attention to me.(B) How didn’t she pay attention to you? She didn’t look at me Let me see if I understand this You know that Janet wasn’t interested in you (b) because she didn’t look at you? R: That’s right! (c) T: Is there any way you could imagine Janet not looking at you and still be interested in you? R: Well .I don’t know T: Do you always look at everyone you’re interested in? R: I guess .not always (d) R: T: R: T: R: T: R: T: 10 11 ‘Think’ is a doubt verb (see Biber and Finnegan, 1989; Ajimer, 1996) Note that anaphoric ‘it’ is used here only in the relation to (a) M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 729 The presupposition in this passage could easily have been replaced by ‘this’ (like in (8)), but this simple anaphoric expression might have not been specific enough to clearly demarcate what part of the patient’s concept is referred to: (A), (a) or (B) Even though all these utterances convey similar information, relevant reference seems to be particularly important in therapeutic discourse, as the therapist shows The therapist’s intervention in the quoted passage consists in repeating verbatim the patient’s generalized and scanty information and bolstering it by means of presupposition (know that Janet wasn’t interested in you) This eventually leads to the patient corroborating his views in (c) and to the reconstruction of the situation that is obscurely introduced in the preceding discourse The most important factor here, however, is the fact that the presupposition is triggered by a factive verb (‘know’), which, as mentioned before (see (8)), presupposes that the uttered proposition is true Hence the patient’s loose ideas implying that he knows what other people think and feel about him, summarized and bolstered by means of exactly this presupposition, provide a basis for the therapist’s attempt to make him see his erroneous way of perceiving his personal problems (d) As Blanchet et al (2005:124) write, the paradigm for all psychotherapy is to encourage the patient to change his/her viewpoint and discourse about a subject of direct concern to him/her The above example illustrates how a deconstruction of the patient’s initial point of view may be initiated by the therapist, in this specific case by means of a presupposition Consider one more example: (11) aspectual verb; TP: there is something to tell (S2:97–102) T: R: T: R: T: R: T: R: Did you ever let her know for sure that you loved her [Ralph’s mother]? (a) She knew (b) How you know she knew? I I I guess I don’t What prevents you from telling her? (c) Ummm umm, maybe nothing MAYBE? Well, I guess I could The aspectual verb prevent triggers a presupposition that Ralph has something to tell to his mother Ralph’s utterance in (b): ‘she knew’ implies quite clearly that he did not tell his mother about his feelings and even though he chooses not to spell it out, the therapist apparently obtains a clue that is strong enough to generate such a hypothesis The latter is expressed via an aspectual verb that presupposes that something stops Ralph from making the confession in question By saying it the therapist in a clear and concrete manner encourages the patient to modify his approach to this sensitive issue, which he eventually does The presupposition also suggests that the therapist is qualitatively listening and actively exploring the patient’s conceptions of his problems Moreover, the presupposition is more felicitous in this context than anaphora would be (i.e ‘what prevents you from doing this?’), since it is the former expressions that make the utterance clearer, concrete and more informative, all of which are crucial for establishing connections and understanding between therapists and their clients (see also Hilsenroth and Cromer, 2007:210ff) The above examples indicate that bound presuppositions are interchangeable with anaphors; however, using the former can change the rhetorical effect and efficacy of utterances, while the latter lack the same force Presuppositions also exhibit greater adaptability in the context than anaphors do, as the next example will show: (12) definite description; TP: shame (S3:21–155) P: Shame, (a) shame is the punishment for that .I’m ashamed because I tolerate what he did ( .) (58 turns later) Yeah And when he almost managed to convince me that he was honest about his feelings, this huge punch came Have you ever reflected on this word ‘‘dumped’’, how nasty it really is? You really start to feel like trash when it concerns you! Then you feel the shame .(b) Exactly P: T: P: The most significant feature of the above passage is that the presupposition picks an antecedent at a considerable distance and after the topic of the discussion has drifted away from what the patient initially said This would not be 730 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 possible for an anaphoric expression, as its semantic content is not rich enough to bind over such a long distance, which illustrates how presuppositions contribute to the discourse flow In this example the presupposition in (b) gives the therapist a chance to be perceived as a good and active listener interested and involved in the patient’s experiences Particularly Sessions and are pervaded with this type of long-distance bound presuppositions made by the therapists, by which they can prove that they analyze and obtain clues when listening to the patients’ discourse Section 2.2 discussed the problems that van der Sandt’s (1992) binding theory has not yet satisfactorily addressed, i.e what the distinctive features are of cases where a full-fledged presupposition is used even though an anaphoric expression would have functioned As the above examples indicate, these uses are often occasions when an abstract concept is being referred to, as in (8), (10), (11) or when a simple anaphoric expression is not specific enough, e.g (8), (10) Presuppositions can also be used instead of anaphors for rhetorical purposes, as in (8), (9), (10), (11), and, in some settings, as more efficient counterparts of anaphoric expressions e.g (12) Section 2.3 will consider examples of presuppositions that not have any antecedent to bind to 2.3 Accommodation Accommodation is considered to be a repair strategy, a ‘mistake’ that the speaker made when planning and making his/her utterance It is believed to be usable for signalling hearer-old and discourse new information, since this type of information is also part of the common ground between interlocutors and simply makes the hearer recognize and retrieve what is important in the current discourse (Spenader, 2002:111) Hearer-new information, on the other hand, does not have this status and therefore is a potential source of communicational obstruction However, according to Spenader’s (2002:102-ff) findings about casual conversation, in surprisingly many cases when the speaker believed that the information was hearer-new, s/he intentionally used presupposition, in order to highlight the newly introduced entity This observation is revealing, since the mainstream assumption concerning presuppositions is that they are rhetorically related to discourse and serve a background function to other nonpresupposed information (see Asher and Lascarides, 1998; Delin, 1995) However, as Lambrecht’s (1994:61ff) discussion on presuppositions triggered by factive verbs illustrates, in some cases the proposition expressed in the complement clause does not have to be part of shared knowledge, for instance: I didn’t realize that you LIED to me! This sentence presupposes that the speaker was lied to and asserts that s/he was not aware of this fact at some earlier point in time, thus it could not have been part of common knowledge Yet in this case such an interpretation is strongly related to the accent placement, while Spenander’s study did not include any analysis of the influence of prosody on presupposed material This fact suggests that presuppositions may be in general (i.e independently of prosodic marking) quite commonly used to signal hearer-new information Since obstructions in communications are particularly infelicitous in goal-oriented genres, it is therefore assumed that introducing new information by means of presuppositions may be avoided in therapeutic discourse, or that it may have a clear pragmatic goal Spenader (2002:116f) does not offer a clear answer to the question why the speakers in her corpus use this strategy so frequently, but the heterogeneity of spoken discourse makes this problem hard to unravel The following section will investigate whether the reasons for intentional introduction of new information in therapeutic discourse are easier to interpret and how often this strategy is used A full-fledged comparison between the strategies used individually by the therapist and the patient is beyond the scope of the present study, yet certain differences will be illustrated Three factors will be considered in the analysis of the examples: (a) length and informativeness of the sequence usually signalling that the information evoked is new (Prince, 1978), (b) the role of the message in the current discourse (i.e hearer-new information should be the speaker’s main point) (c) the hearer’s reaction (see Spenader, 2002:111) In more complex cases also the mechanism of accommodation will be described in closer detail Consider the first example: (13) definite description, TP: there are other men (in Jennifer’s life) (S1: 190-195) L: Well, in the first number of years we were in a stage that I think was fairly different We were younger and I think she was a different person, and I was a different person in the sense that our values were different and our internal whatever drives us, I think, was slightly different Things have to happen to us since M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 731 then, things that happen to everyone But in those years, I would express a lot of emotion: ‘‘Why are you going out with those other men?’’ Even though the expression those other men is not very long and not particularly informative, it certainly constitutes discourse-new information, as there are no traces of any ‘other men’ involved in this relationship in the entire session Furthermore, from the vantage point of the therapist the information is hearer-new, as he could have not known about such details before (this is an initial session) However, Jennifer, who is aware of her own past, is also present in the room and Larry’s planning of what should be said obviously builds mainly around this fact Hence his utterance should not be considered as intentional signalling of new information via presupposition, but rather sloppiness and lack of precision Yet the therapist is not in a particularly difficult situation when interpreting this sentence, as it rather clearly shows the tension between what is said and what is generally established in people’s awareness The latter is related to the mainstream conviction that couples go to therapy when having problems and the problems can be other people involved in their relationship Larry is apparently aware of this fact, as he continues with his story in a matter-of-fact mode afterwards and does not dwell on it This confirms the view of Asher and Lascarides (1998) that not only the presuppositions used to activate hearer-known information can constitute a background to support other new information, but also these that introduce hearer-new information In (13) the presupposition triggered by the nominal expression those other men supports the message concerning Larry’s emotions and the way he expressed them in the situation he refers to Such an interpretation is, apparently, acquired by the therapist also, since he never returns to this subject Consider another example introducing information that may be considered hearer-new: (14) aspectual verb (a); TP: he has not thought about Janet before (S2:23–28) definite description (b); TP: a woman exists R: T: R: T: R: I guess what I have been trying to say is that women don’t like me Which woman, specifically? Most women I meet Which woman, specifically? Well, most women really but as you said that, I just started (a) to think about this one woman (b) – Janet Who’s Janet? (c) T: As the above passage indicates, the patient expands a specific hurting experience and makes generalizations about the entire female population The therapist’s goal is to help him to deconstruct this preconception and specify referents, which the patient apparently yields to and eventually picks out one Since the therapist does not object to this shift in Ralph’s point of view, we can conclude that the aspectual verb (start) triggering the presupposition in (a) is felicitously accommodated Furthermore, that change of perspective was apparently the therapist’s goal Yet the patient’s whole utterance is poorly planned, which the presupposition triggered by the definite description (this one woman) in (b) illustrates The demonstrative here points to a referent that is specific only for the patient, because the expression ‘this one woman’, without any clear antecedent, is almost equivalent to indefinite ‘a woman’ (for discussion on specifics see Geurts (1999b) There is, certainly, nothing unusual in using indefinite this-NPs to introduce a new discourse referent, however, as they are marked for definiteness, the hearer needs to ‘repair’ the speaker’s discourse and accommodate a new entity This is not always a straightforward process, which the therapist’s answer proves: the patient caused an apparent obstruction in the communication and therefore more information about the referent is requested, even though the name of the woman is immediately spelled out afterwards.12 Abstract triggers are accepted more easily than demonstrative NPs, which belong to the group of triggers that have lower capacity to accommodate This is probably related to the descriptive content of the former expressions (Spenader, 2002:117; van der Sandt, 1992) Next example illustrates one of such cases: 12 Proper names also trigger presuppositions about certain individuals and are usually accommodated Hence the name itself could not have been sufficient for the therapist to recognise the referent unknown to him However, the issue of proper names and their resolution is very complex and cannot be an element of such a short study For more detailed discussions see Kripke (1980), van der Sandt (1992), Geurts (1999a) 732 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 (15) aspectual verb; TP: he has watched Formula before (S3:55–56) P: I try to talk to him, but it’s always the same, I just talk and talk, carry on with my monologues and he doesn’t even stop watching Formula ( .) The presupposition triggered by the aspectual verb (stop) is certainly the main point of the patient trying to convey the lack of communication between her and her husband and also part of a longer, informative utterance Thus it can be regarded as hearer-new information In this case, however, the speaker’s ‘mistake’ is apparently easier to repair, since aspectual verbs are semantically rich enough to evoke and foreground a change of state, not its initial stage, which is taken for granted and therefore easily accepted (Geurts, 1999a:31) Yet both in Session and Session aspectuals often bind to an antecedent in the preceding discourse, which means that they can be used more efficiently and refer to previously discussed subjects In (15) however, the speaker again seems to have poorly planned her utterance relaying merely on the informative descriptive content of the presupposition trigger Consider an example in which the speaker seems to be aware that the conveyed information can be harder to comprehend for the listener: (16) factive; TP: those stupid jokes about guys make her laugh and think (S3:32–36) P: ( .) one day I just realized (a) that (b) those stupid jokes about guys, you know, like: ‘‘How can you impress a guy? Get undressed and bring some beer’’, I (c) realized that such stupid jokes, sure, they still make me laugh, but they also make me think .( .) It seems that you bear a grudge against men in general, or .? T: The presupposition triggered by the factive verb (realize) is a focal point of the patient’s story, which is typical of hearer-new information (Spenader, 2002:112-ff; Spenader, 2003) Furthermore, the length of the whole passage points to informativeness, a very important factor when introducing this kind of information The presupposition in (b) (those stupid jokes about guys) has no antecedent in the previous discourse either and also has to be accommodated; however, it is never problematic in the case of semantically rich big definite NPs.13 Thus the descriptive content of this presupposition on a par with the successive sentences contributes to the very long and informative complement of the factive verb, which certainly eases the transition of knowledge between interlocutors (additionally reinforced by the repetition of the factive realize in (c)) This passage indicates that there can be equilibrium between people’s discourse strategies, which is, unlike the preceding examples ((13), (14), (15), (16)) more compatible with Spenader’s findings according to which the speaker may deliberately use presupposition introducing hearer-new information Issues discussed in a therapeutic session are consensually validated by the patients trying to be as informative and verbally efficient as they can and the therapists introducing alternative descriptions as smoothly as possible (Labov and Fanshel, 1977:32; Buttny, 2001; Sluzki, 1975) There must be a certain feeling of reciprocity included in this exchange on the part of the patient, as the solutions s/he expects to get can be offered provided that problems will be comprehensibly described We can, therefore assume that the therapist needs to have a special reason to deliver new information as if it was a part of the common background (see (17) below), while such a situation in the case of the patient is, probably, either a corollary of his/her verbal clumsiness and inefficiency or the result of being the constantly challenged centre of attention This is particularly visible in (14) where the patient apparently tries to avoid being specific, while verbal inefficiency can be assigned to Larry’s utterance in (13) The following example illustrates how presupposition can be used deliberately to introduce hearer-new information: (17) definite description; TP: somebody has life without him (S3:47–48) T: P: But what will your life without him look like, I mean after divorce? Well .I haven’t told you that we’ll get divorced 13 NPs modified by adjectives, relative clauses and prepositional phrases See Spenader (2002:118) M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 733 The above passage illustrates probably the most prominent example of a communicational obstruction in all three sessions Even though possessive pronouns and big NPs accommodate very easily (van der Sandt, 1992), which involves felicitous introduction of new information, apparently this view is too ‘technical’, as it accounts only for the process of revising an incoming representation Certainly, this process takes place in this case also, as it is not unusual that married couples (particularly those that have problems) part and get separate lives without each other, so the patient certainly comprehends the message Yet the most important aspect of this context concerns her reaction that clearly illustrates the cases in which the status of shared knowledge is disputable In this case life without her husband is for the patient merely part of general knowledge, not knowledge she wants to associate with her relationship However, provoking a potential discussion is probably part of the therapeutic strategy here The entire tactic is additionally reinforced by the temporal connective ‘after’, commonly regarded as an expression that triggers a presupposition that something has happened (or here: will happen) (see Levinson, 1983; Geurts, 1999a,b; Schilder, 2001) The patient reacts as (probably) expected, however, considering the character of this reaction we can conclude that felicitous accommodation of a new discourse element does not have to be tantamount to accepting it Presuppositional information can be denied, just as all information in a discourse can This means that it will be removed from the discourse context,14 which the patient’s response illustrates Even though introducing hearer-new information via presuppositions can be quite an efficient strategy, the therapists in the analyzed sessions not resort to this means particularly often (2 times in Session and time in Session 3) In Session the therapist uses easily accommodating big NPs (here accompanied by a clausal complement) to foreground his main point: (18) definite description; TP: there are some fanatics (S1:133–135) T: It sounds like you (to Jennifer) are on of those fanatics that jump onto any bandwagon with all her soul, and you (to Larry) say ‘‘Hey, wait a minute, reality testing, one, two, three.’’ (Jennifer and Larry laugh) Since the patients not object and react with laughter, we can conclude that the information was felicitously accommodated Furthermore, due to its more figurative than factual character the whole utterance could have been treated as a type of humoristic retelling of the patients’ problems and not as hearer-new information par excellence The differences in use of presuppositions between therapists and their patients are rather conspicuous when we compare (18) with, for instance, (13) or (14) The therapists more often use presuppositions that accommodate in order to introduce discourse-new information Consider an example that illustrates the difference between hearer-new and discourse-new information: (19) factive; TP: it is easy to say something (S1:251–253) T: A technique’’ of getting in touch with his emotions may be for you (to Jennifer) to just listen and not react I know that it’s easy for me to say I’m an outsider I’m not involved in an intense relationship like the two of you are But that would be, in my view, an important way of doing something for each other The presupposition triggered by the factive verb (know) should be treated rather as discourse-new information, as the it expresses an opinion that can be accepted on the basis of Stalnaker’s (1974) presumed common knowledge We cannot assume that the patient did not know before that advice is very easily given by ‘outsiders’, particularly in the emotional sphere Conversely, we can argue that this is a rather common belief, thus the reason why the therapist asserts this knowledge might be a justification where a responsibility for the following utterances is evoked and, at the same time, their non-offensive character emphasised (Buttny, 1993:16) From this vantage point the presupposition evidently supports the information contributed by the whole sequence This seems to be a very sophisticated technique, as the process of accommodation involves revision of the incoming discourse representation structure with new information by the hearer The information, even though evoking rather bad news (it is easier to say than to do), yet channelled through presupposition that cleverly re-describes and tallies with the patient’s own beliefs, seems to be easy to accept 14 For a more detailed discussion on denials in DRT (see Maier and van der Sandt, 2003) 734 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 Section 2.3 shows that Spenader’s (2002) findings about the intentional use of presuppositions in order to signal hearer-new information in casual conversation only partly apply in the analyzed material, which implies a difference between the genres In her material in 58% (47 cases) of the cases the speakers seemed to believe that the presupposed information is new to the hearer, while in the present study only 10.6% (15 cases) of the analyzed instances was subsumed under this category This divergence will be discussed in more detail in section below, but it can already be concluded that the strategy of introducing hearer-new information by means of presuppositions may be, in general, avoided in therapeutic discourse, unless there is a specific reason for that In the case of the patients this strategy is probably the result of poor planning or verbal sloppiness (e.g (13), (14)), while the therapists seem to use it more consciously and more carefully ((17) or (18)) This observation points not only to different strategies apparently deployed by the therapist and their patients, but also to differences between individuals and their personal capabilities to furnish ideas, explain, explicate, and recapitulate them, all of which play a fundamental role in distribution and efficacy of presuppositional information Discussion and conclusions The above analysis of presuppositions in therapeutic discourse supports the opening prediction that binding may be the predominant strategy for presupposition resolution in this genre However, since presuppositions have not been studied before in the context of therapeutic talk, the results of the present study are a first approximation and can hardly be considered to be final More corpus material needs to be examined in order to confirm or refute what has been said here Yet the question is what contributes to these early findings and, at the same time, to the discrepancies between therapeutic discourse and casual conversation observed here? The first reason seems to be the limitation of topics discussed in a therapeutic session, in which features once examined are repeatedly referred to This explains the high scores of bound NPs of each kind (in comparison to the other triggers), particularly the demonstrative and possessive ones A second reason is, as Davis (1986) writes, the fact that among the most crucial elements of a therapeutic session are (re)formulations of the patients’ problems, which not only provide interpretations but also are diagnostic Therapists can use them in different ways, which is particularly discernible in Session 2, where the therapist very actively participates in reformulating the patient’s generalized version of his problems by making recurrent references to previously discussed issues via bound presuppositions Another reason for the predominance of bound presuppositions in therapeutic discourse may be the necessity of mediating between the typical inaccuracy of the patient’s account and the therapist’s aim to achieve more specific formulations This is, again, particularly conspicuous in Session Moreover, in this session the therapist confronts the client via constantly used presuppositions that include mostly bound factive verbs These verbs presuppose the truth of their complements, which implies not just a harmless strategy of requesting information, but a sophisticated way of challenging the patient’s generalized model of his/her situation Telling patients about their problems and making them aware of certain facts can be a delicate enterprise, as such accounts not always tally with their own beliefs This can be the reason why in Session presuppositional expressions other than definite NPs (mostly bound to an antecedent) are rather scanty (Table 3) and the therapist is very careful in making them As Sluzki (1990:107) writes, the therapist’s task to maintain noncommitment in the case of couple therapy is very complex, as one of the partners may feel alienated as soon as she or he can discern any overtones of a ‘coalition’ with the other part Indeed, statements that presuppose the truth of certain facts (e.g factive verbs) should be rather carefully distributed, particularly when they are part of multi-speaker discourse where they can be much more easily verified and objected to This can explicate why also the patients in Session hardly use presuppositional expressions other than definite NPs It seems that actual states of affairs are very significant in couple therapy Hence even bound presuppositions that can be used rhetorically or objectify loose ideas (see (8)) may be more difficult to make The above issues are not the case in Session where the patient freely makes presuppositions that concern subjectively perceived facts The therapist’s task in this talk is often to soften them, as in (16) where she marks the stance of her statement by using the doubt verb: ‘seem’ (on stance markers see Biber and Finnegan, 1989:120) However, the most interesting feature in this session is the high scores for both resolution strategies (Table 3) The difference between binding and accommodation in this particular session is not statistically significant, thus the figures may have been obtained due to chance However, since Session is, unlike the two other talks analyzed, a subsequent interview, therefore the question arises whether presuppositions are used differently in subsequent and initial M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 735 meetings And, as Labov and Fanshel (1977:86) write, most information in therapeutic discourse is to be found not in utterances themselves, but in the structure of shared knowledge The foundations of such knowledge are, apparently, stronger between those who know each other well than between people meeting for the first time Thus assumptions about common background made by the speaker can affect the form of linguistic production and, by default, presuppositions Yet this subject deserves a separate study where other corpora would be examined in order to confirm or disprove this hypothesis The aforementioned claim by Labov and Fanshel (1977:86) is in conflict with Spenader’s findings about casual conversation according to which most of the cases of accommodation occur when the speaker deliberately uses presupposition to communicate information that is not based on shared or general knowledge.15 However, in the samples of therapeutic discourse analyzed, presuppositions used in this way are, most likely, a corollary of poor planning or verbal inefficiency of the speaker, as, for example, in (13) and (14) Moreover, as many as out of 11 presuppositions identified as introducing hearer-new information were triggered by an aspectual verb Semantically such verbs refer to the temporal structure of their complement verbs and serve as markers of aspect (i.e beginning, continuation, termination) of the eventuality expressed by these complements (Dowty, 1986) In the case of (15) the verb ‘stop’ points to the end of the eventuality described, while the beginning and other stages of the event are backgrounded and taken for granted The foregrounded information is semantically rich and enables the accommodation of this particular instance (and the whole group) without the danger of the misinterpretation on the part of the hearer In fact, the speaker is probably not even aware of using a presupposition when introducing hearernew information by means of aspectual or factive verbs, exactly due to their rich descriptive content This gives a sound explanation to the high scores of aspectuals used in this way and accommodated aspectuals in general In general, however, it seems that presuppositions as the means of introducing hearer-new information are used less often in therapeutic discourse than in casual conversation (10.6% of the instances in the former genre and 58% in the latter) The reasons for this are not hard to unravel There is apparently not a big need to convey hearer-new information in therapy talks that revolve around limited and recurrent topics Furthermore, if patients try to be informative and provide a comprehensive account of their problems, they may often choose other means to communicate new information such as assertions This is how a therapeutic session differs from a daily-life conversation within which ‘hot news’ is ubiquitous and freely introduced In the therapy it may be avoided as a source of potential snarl-ups in communication Thus the present paper seems to validate the classic view that presuppositions are not often deliberately used when introducing hearer-new information The predominance of binding over accommodation in the analyzed samples of therapeutic discourse leads to one more conclusion The environment for the presentation of information in this genre is to a high extent pre-planned, which concerns not only the aim-and-agenda-orientated therapist, but also the patient who wants to achieve certain goals This explains the big disproportion between abstract triggers in the two genres compared (see Table 2), as in the therapy situation the speech of both interlocutors should be better organized and efficacy-oriented than in casual conversation To achieve such ‘tidiness’ the speaker needs to make use of certain rhetorical strategies, which suggests the aptness of using bound presuppositions in cases when anaphors or other expressions could be used instead One of the aims of this paper has been to present the role and significance of such uses Following van der Sandt’s (1992:360) reasoning, presuppositions lose their presuppositional character if bound to a discourse-given antecedent and become part of asserted information that is already present in discourse Indeed, as the analyzed examples of binding indicate, this resolution contributes to the cohesion and smooth flow of the discussion and efficiency in communication Bound presuppositions are, therefore, an appropriate ingredient of therapeutic discourse and can be very efficiently used instead of their semantically simple anaphoric counterparts in this genre According to van der Sandt’s theory, binding is preferable as a way of resolving presuppositions Yet, as Spenader’s (2002) study indicates, naturally produced examples indicate that accommodation predominates and is felicitously used in casual conversation (Tables and 2) The fact that the participants in therapeutic discourse make utterances that adhere to van der Sandt’s view and generate presuppositions that are more complementary with assertions suggests that this theory may be, to some degree, wishful thinking about human speech Therapeutic session takes place in particular settings, and has specified aims and well-defined internal structure (agenda), all of which strongly influence the reasons why certain utterances are generated As the above reasoning indicates, for these reasons the 15 This claim concerns mostly factives and it-clefts, but, as Spenader (2002:116) argues, this seems to be a frequent use of accommodated presuppositions 736 M Andersson / Journal of Pragmatics 41 (2009) 721–737 number and distribution of presuppositions made in therapeutic discourse may differ from those made in an ordinary conversation In summary, the study shows that the strategies for the presupposition resolution proposed in the binding theory can be felicitously used both in therapeutic interaction and in casual conversation Furthermore, the roles they play in the interaction, the ways in which they facilitate the communication (e.g when used instead of semantically simpler anaphors) or obstruct the communication are very similar in both genres What is different are the underlying reasons for making presuppositions and the effect they can have on the possible changes in the patients’ thinking Future work Certainly further investigation of empirical material is needed in order to verify the initial observation that binding may be a predominant strategy for presupposition resolution in therapeutic discourse, unlike in casual conversation Also possible differences between initial and subsequent sessions are worth further examination in order to judge if they constitute an invariable characteristic of this genre More empirical data should also be analyzed to determine more satisfactorily if the avoidance of introducing hearer-new information via presuppositions indicated in the present paper is constant in therapeutic talks Moreover, there are a lot of different therapeutic strategies and it would be illuminating to investigate whether the method acquired by the therapist influences both their own presuppositions and those made by patients Another interesting idea worth scrutinizing in therapeutic discourse would be presuppositions triggered in intensional contexts, i.e modals and attitude reports, which may be rather commonly used in this genre, as they have obvious emotive functions, particularly important when expressing feelings and emotions Acknowledgments I want to thank Jennifer Spenader for giving me the most useful advice and commenting on the earlier versions of this study Many thanks also go to Philip Shaw and Nils-Lennart Johannesson for giving me very valuable insights about the way of formulating ideas All errors are my own References Ajimer, K., 1996 I think—an English modal particle In: Swan, T., Westvik, O.J (Eds.), Modality in Germanic Languages Historical and Comparative Perspectives Mouton de Gruter, Berlin, New York, pp 1–48 Asher, Nicholas, Lascarides, Alex, 1998 The semantics and pragmatics of presuppositions Journal of Semantics 15 (3), 239–300 Bandler, Richard, Grinder, John, 1975 The structure of magic In: A Book About Language and Therapy, Science and Behaviour Books, Inc, Santa Clara Biber, Douglas, Finnegan, Ruth, 1989 Styles of stance in English: lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect Text (1), 93–124 Blanchet, Alain, Batt, Martine, Trognon, Alain, Masse, 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Semantics and Philosophy, New York, pp 1972–213 Reprinted in: Davis, S (Ed.), 1991 Pragmatics Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, pp 471–485 Marta Andersson is currently a PhD candidate at Stockholm University Her interests comprise discourse analysis, text linguistics and also issues concerning language competence and use from a semantic, pragmatic and psycholinguistic perspective  ... Certainly further investigation of empirical material is needed in order to verify the initial observation that binding may be a predominant strategy for presupposition resolution in therapeutic discourse, ... kind of information they introduce may create certain obstructions in communication, particularly when the information is hearer-new Hence my hypothesis is that introducing new information via... both their own presuppositions and those made by patients Another interesting idea worth scrutinizing in therapeutic discourse would be presuppositions triggered in intensional contexts, i. e modals