agreement, a court could find consent to suit on the part of the government. A quasi-contract claim, by contrast, does not allege that an agreement existed, only that one should be imposed by the court to avoid an unjust result. Because a quasi-contract claim does not allege any consent on the part of the government, it would fail under the doctrine of sovereign IMMUNITY. A quasi contract may afford less recovery than an implied-in-fact contract. A contract implied in fact will construct the whole agreement as the parties intended, so the party seeking the creation of an implied contract may be entitled to expected profits as well as the cost of labor and materials. A quasi contract will be created only to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. As one court has put it, contracts implied in law are “merely remedies granted by the court to enforce equitable or moral obligations in spite of the lack of assent of the party to be charged” (Gray v. Rankin, 721 F. Supp 115 [S.D. Miss. 1989]). The amount of recovery for an implied-in-law contract usually is limited to the cost of labor and materials because it would be unfair to force a person who did not intend to enter into a contract to pay for profits. Quasi contracts are made possible by the doctrine of QUANTUM MERUIT (Latin for “as much as is deserved”), which allows courts to imply a contract where none exists. Quantum meruit includes implied-in-fact contracts as well as quasi contracts. Courts also use the term quantum meruit to describe the process of determining how much money the charging party may recover in an implied contract. FURTHER READINGS Knapp, Charles L., and Nathan M. Crystal. 2007. Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials. 6th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers. Skrocki, Anthony M. 2006. Contracts in a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West. Woodward, Frederic Campbell. 1987. The Law of Quasi Contracts. Littleton, Colo.: F.B. Rothman. QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION Quasi in rem jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear a case and enforce a judgment against a party, even if the party is not personally before the court, solely because the party has an interest in real property or PERSONAL PROPERTY within the geographical limits of the court. Quasi IN REM is a type of PERSONAL JURISDIC- TION exercised by a court over a party who owns property within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court. A court must have personal jurisdic- tion over the parties to a case before it can bind them with its decision. A court can gain personal jurisdiction over a party who resides in the court’s home state; a court can also gain jurisdiction over an out-of-state party who has made some contact with the state or who owns property within the court’s geograp hical limits. There are two types of jurisdiction based on property: quasi in rem and in rem. In rem and quasi in rem jurisdictions are based on the presence of the party’s property within the court’s territorial authority. In each instance the court may exercise jurisdiction without the actual presence of the party in court. The distinction between the two types of jurisdiction involves the nature of the dispute to which each applies and the extent of the authority each conveys. In rem (Latin for “against the thing”) jurisdiction applies where the dispute involves the property itself. A court exercising in rem jurisdiction has the authority to make a decision as to the property’s ownership that will be binding on all the world. Quasi in rem (Latin for “sort of against the thing”) jurisdiction applies to personal suits against the DEFENDANT, where the property is not the source of the conflict but is sought as compensation by the PLAINTIFF. The authority of a court exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction is limited to a determination of the respondent’s interest in the property. A respondent in a quasi in rem proceeding is entitled to receive notice of the proceeding. If the respondent makes an appearance to defend against a quasi in rem claim, he may be forced to defend against all the claims made by the plaintiff. In many states a respondent may avoid this by making a limited appearance to defend the case on the merits with only the property located in the area at stake. The concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction has become all but obsolete. It is no longer acceptable for a state court to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant merely because the defendant owns property in the state. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), the U.S. SUPREME COURT ruled that a respondent must have a minimum level of purposeful contacts with the forum state GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 218 QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION before a state court may gain jurisdiction over the respondent. With enough contacts a re- spondent is deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the state and its courts. The Shaffer Court also held that courts should consider fair play and substantial justice in determining whether to require the appearance of an out-of-state respondent. These con- siderations should be applied to all forms of personal jurisdiction: IN PERSONAM, in rem, and quasi in rem . The practical effect of the Shaffer decision is to limit the number of cases based on in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. Due to the increasingly interstate nature of commerce in modern times, the average person may have contacts with, or own property in, several faraway states without even knowing it. With- out a narrowed treatment of quasi in rem jurisdiction, potential civil respondents would be open to suit in any number of states with which they have no real connection. To guard against the abuse of quasi in rem jurisdiction, courts tend to closely examine intangible, movable property such as money and other negotiable instruments, such as stocks, bonds, and insurance policies. To exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over money or other negotiable instruments, a court will examine the nature of the respondent’s contacts with the state and the relation of the property to the underlying dispute. Quasi in rem jurisdiction as a basis for personal jurisdiction has been almost com- pletely absorbed by LONG-ARM STATUTES. These statutes help plaintiffs gain in personam juris- diction, so quasi in rem jurisdiction, with its limited relief, is frequently unnecess ary. How- ever, if the plaintiff’s home state does not have a LONG-ARM STATUTE and an out-of-state respon- dent owns property in the state, the plaintiff may seek an attachment of the property by asking the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the property. As a concept, quasi in rem sometimes still arises. In Cable News Network, L.P. v. CNNews. com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 2001), for instance, the court analyzed quasi in rem in the context of the registration of an INTERNET domain name under the Anticybersquatting CONSUMER PROTECTION Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (though the court ultimately held that the proceeding involved true in rem jurisdiction). FURTHER READINGS Greer, John. 2008. “If the Shoe Fits: Reconciling the International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test with the Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.” Vanderbilt Law Review 61. Hannan, Edward A. 1998. “Using Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdic- tion to Prevent Pre-Suit Loss or Alteration of Evidence.” Defense Counsel Journal 65 (April): 247. “Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction and the Question of Due Process for Foreign Entities.” 1998 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 26 (fall): 119–22. CROSS REFERENCES In Rem; Jurisdiction; Federal Courts. QUASI-JUDICIAL Quasi-judicial is the action taken and discretion exercised by public administrative agencies or bodies that are obliged to investigate or ascertain facts and draw conclusions from them as the foundation for official actions. As a general rule, only courts of law have the authority to decide controversies that affect individual rights. One major exception to this general rule is the power of an ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY to make decisions concerning the rights of parties. An administrative agency is a body of government created by a branch of the govern- ment (typically the legislature) and charged with supervision and regulation of a particular area of governmental concern. Part of the regulatory power given to an administrative agency is the power of ADJUDICATION. Under the Administra- tive Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237 [5 U.S.C.A. § 551 et seq.]), an agency engages in adjudication when it follows a process for the formulation of an order. With the exception of rule making, any decision by an agency that has a legal effect is a quasi-judicial action. Complaints against administrative agencies often arise when an agency denies benefits or places restrictions on an individual. For exam- ple, homeowners who seek to build another structure on their property must obtain ap- proval from a number of administrative agen- cies. If the local conservation agency refuses to issue a permit for the building of a new structure, homeowners may appeal this decision in a hearing before the agency ’s administrative board. The board may hear testimony and examine evidence at the hearing, and then it will decide whether to issue the permit or uphold the agency’s refusal. Quasi-judicial activity is limited to the issues that concern the particular administrative GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION QUASI-JUDICIAL 219 agency. For example, the SOCIAL SECURITY Ad- ministration may resolve disputes on issues concerning SOCIAL SECURITY contributions and benefits, but it may not decide any other issues, even those related to Social Security benefits such as tax, estate, and probate questions. An administrative agency must hold a formal hearing only when required by statute. A formal hearing is a complete hearing with the presentation of testimony, evidence, and argu- ments. An informal hearing usually is a simple meeting and discussion between an agent of the agency and the individual affected by the agency’s actions. As a general rule, the scope of a hearing depends on the importance of the right at issue. If the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS) attempts to take away a person’s HOME- STEAD , for example, a full hearing would be required. By contrast, when an agent of a STATE DEPARTMENT of safety issues a small fine for illegal parking, the agency needs to provide only a brief, one-to-one meeting with a hearing officer regarding the issuance of the fine. Quasi-judicial action by an administrative agency may be appealed to a court of law. With a few exceptions, a PLAINTIFF generally must exhaust all remedies available through an agency before appealing the agency’s decision in a case. One notable exception is that a person may appeal directly to a court of law and bypass the quasi-judicial activity of an administrative agency if the agency’s remedies would be inadequate. For instance, if the creditors of a failed bank are suing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, they need not go through the agency’s hearings before filing suit in a court of law because the agency has adverse interests to the creditors (Coit Indep. JOINT VENTURE v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 109 S. Ct. 1361, 103 L. Ed. 2d 602 [1989]). FURTHER READINGS Mashaw, Jerry L., Richard A. Merrill, and Peter M. Shane. 2003. Administrative Law: The American Public Law System; Cases and Materials. 5th ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West. Mezines, Basil J., Jacob A. Stein, and Jules Gruff. 2009. Administrative Law. New York: Matthew Bender. CROSS REFERENCES Administrative Law and Procedure; Bureaucracy; Public Administrative Bodies; Regulation. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE The capacity in which a public administrative agency or body acts when it makes rules and regulations. When an ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY exercises its rule-making authority, it is said to act in a quasi-legislative manner. Administrative agen- cies acquire this authority to make rules and regulations that affect legal rights through statutes. This authority is an exc eption to the general principle that laws affecting rights should be passed only by elected lawmakers. Administrative agency rules are made only with the permission of elected lawmakers, and elected lawmakers may strike down an admin- istrative rule or even eliminate an agency. In this sense quasi-legislative activity occurs at the discretion of elected officials. Nevertheless, administrative agencies create and enforce many legal rules on their own, often without the advice of lawmakers, and the rules have the force of la w. This means they have a binding effect on the general public. Examples of quasi-legislative actions abound. Dozens of administrative agencies exist on the federal level, and dozens more exist on the state and local levels, and most of them have the authority to make rules that affect substantive rights. Agencies with authority over environ- mental matters may pass rules that restrict the rights of property owners to alter or build on their land; departments of revenue may pass rules that affect how much tax a person pays; and local housing agencies may set and enforce standards on health and safety in housing. These are just a few of the myriad rules passed by administrative agencies. Except where prohibited by statute or judicial precedent, quasi-legislative activity may be chal- lenged in a court of law. Generally, a person challenging quasi-legislative activity must wait until the rule-making process is complete and the rule or regulation is set before challenging it. Moreover, a challenge to an agency’sruleor regulation usually must be made first to the agency itself. If no satisfaction is received from the agency, the complainant can then challenge the rule or regulation in a court of law. Another distinctive feature of quasi-legislative activity is the provision of notice and a hearing. When an administrative agency intends to pass or change a rule that affects substantive legal GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 220 QUASI-LEGISLATIVE rights, it usually must provide notice of this intent and hold a public hearing. This gives members of the public a voice in the quasi- legislative activ ity. CROSS REFER ENCES Administrati ve Law and Procedure; Bureaucracy; Public Administrati ve Bodies. QUEEN’S BENCH See KING’S BENCH OR QUEEN’S BENCH. QUESTION OF FACT An issue that involves the resolution of a factual dispute or controversy and is within the sphere of the decisions to be made by a jury. A question of fact is a factual dispute between litigants that must be resolved by the jury at trial. It is an issue that is material to the outcome of the case and requires an interpreta- tion of conflicting views on the factual circum- stances surrounding the case. A question of fact is best understood by comparing it to a QUESTION OF LAW. Whether a particular issue in a civil case is a question of fact or law is significant because it can determine whether a party wins the case on SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Summary judgment is a judgment on the merits of the case without a trial. A civil respondent may move for summary judgment at any time after the suit has been filed, but a plaintiff generally must wait a short period after filing the suit (for the defendant to respond) before moving for summary judg- ment. In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider admissions by the parties in their pleadings, answers to interrogatories and depositions, and affidavits of personal knowl- edge of facts. A court will order summary judgment in a civil case if there is no genuine issue of fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a MATTER OF LAW . If a case does not involve any questions of fact, the only issues are questions of law, so the fact-finding process of a tri al is not needed. To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff files suit to enforce an agreement to buy a plot of real estate. The respondent declares in her answer that the agreement was oral, and the plaintiff does not deny that the agreement was oral. The court could then order summary judgment in favor of the respondent because a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be enforceable. Assuming that no other issues are involved, the admission that the agreement was oral eliminates the only material question of fact in the case. The only issue the court would have to decide would be a question of law: whether an oral agreement for the sale of land is enforceable. It is not, so the plaintiff would lose the case without the benefit of a trial because there are no material facts for a fact finder to decide. Even if a plaintiff challenges a respondent’s answer, a respondent may still win summary judgment by proving before trial that no question of fact exists in the case. To do this, the respondent must prove that no question of fact exists by the evidentiary standard that would be used at trial. In civil trials, this standard is either a PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE or the slightly higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. Whether an issue is a question of fact or law is not always clear. In Cruse v. Coldwell Banker, 667 So. 2d 714 (Ala. 1995), Gary and Venita Cruse were shown a house advertised as new, although the sellers, Rand y and Brenda Harris, were living in the house. The Cruses bought the house before making a complete inspection. Upon further inspection they discovered nu- merous defects, and sued the seller and the brokerage firm for FRAUD. The respondents moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Cruses knew that the sellers were living in the house and that the Cruses signed a contract that stated that they took the house as it was, without warranties. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that no question of fact existed in the case and that the respondents were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Regardless of the contract and the Cruses’ knowledge of previous inhabitants, the description of the house as new carried with it an IMPLIED WARRANTY of habitabil- ity. Because no determination had been made as to whether the house was actually new, a material question of fact remained and sum- mary judgment was inappropriate. A question of fact receives the same treatment in a bench (non-jury) trial as it does in a jury trial. The only difference is that in a bench trial the same person resolves both GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION QUESTION OF FACT 221 questions of law and fact because the fact finder is the judge. Nevertheless, in a bench trial, a judge may not decide material questions of fact without first affording the parties the process of a trial. On appeal, a question of fact is treated differently than a question of law. If an appellant alleges that the fact finder incorrectly decided questions of fact, an appeals court will give deference to the fact finder’s decisions. The fact finder gets to see and hear all the evidence and thus is in a better position to make factual determinations than is the appeals court. If an appellant claims that the trial judge incorrectly decided a question of law, however, the appeals court will examine the trial judge’s ruling more carefully. Essentially, it is more difficult to overturn a verdict based on a question of fact than a verdict based on a question of law. FURTHER READINGS Arnold, Alvin L., and Marshall E. Tracht. 1996. “Fraud: Whether a House Is New Is Question of Fact.” Real Estate Law Report 26 (November). Louisell, David W., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and Colin C. Tait. 1989. Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal; Cases and Materials. 6th ed. Westbury, N.Y.: Founda- tion Press. Meslar, Roger W., ed. 1990. Legalines Civil Procedure. 3d ed. Chicago: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Profes- sional Publications. Reytblat, Julia. 1999. “Is Originality in Copyright Law a ‘Question of Law’ or a ‘Question of Fact?’” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 17 (spring). CROSS REFERENCES Clear and Convincing Proof; Preponderance of Evidence. QUESTION OF LAW An issue that is within the province of the judge, as opposed to the jury , because it involves the application or interpretation of legal principles or statutes. At any stage in a proceeding, before or during trial, a judge may have to determine whether to let a jury decide a particular issue. In making this determination, the judge considers whether the issue is a question of law or a QUESTION OF FACT. If the question is one of fact, it should be decided by the jury at trial. If the question is one of law, the judge may decide it without affording the parties the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses to the jury. A question of law involves the interpretation of principles that are potentially applicable to other cases. In contrast, a question of fact requires an interpretation of circumstances surrounding the case at hand. Resolving QUES- TIONS OF FACT is the chief function of the jury. Resolving questions of law is a chief function of the judge. If the pleadings and initial evidence in a case show that there are no factual disputes between the parties, a court may grant SUMMARY JUDGMENT to a party. Summary judgment is a final judgment in the case made by the court before trial. A court may grant summary judgment in a case that contains no factual disputes because such a case presents only a question, or questions, of law, so the fact-finding function of the jury is not needed. On appeal, the trial court’s ruling on a question of law generally receives closer scrutiny than a jury’s findings of fact. Being present at the trial, the fact finder is in a better position than the appeals court to evaluate evidence and testimony. An issue may be characterized on appeal as a mixed question of law and fact. A mix ed question occurs when the facts surrounding the case are admitted and the rule of the applicable law is undisputed ; the issue then is whether the RULE OF LAW was correctly applied to the established facts. In a criminal case, for example, assume that a trial court, over the objection of the defendant, allows the prosecu- tion to present evidence that the defendant was identified as the perpetrator. If the defendant is found gui lty and challenges the identification procedure on appeal, the question is one of both law and fact. The appeals court must decide whether the trial court correctly appli ed the law on DUE PROCESS in identification procedures to the particular identification procedure used in the case. In such a case, the appeals court will scrutinize both the facts and the trial judge’s rulings on questions of law. FURTHER READINGS Meurer, Michael J. and Katherine J. Strandburg. 2008. “Patent Carrots and Sticks: An Economic Model of Nonobviousness” Lewis and Clark Law Review 12. Thomas, Janet Shiffler. 1984. “Likelihood of Confusion under the Lanham Act: A Question of Fact, A Question of Law, or Both?” Kentucky Law Journal 73. QUI TAM ACTIONS Qui tam actions are civil actions maintained by private persons on behalf of both themselves and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 222 QUESTION OF LAW the government to recover damages or to enforce penalties available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct. The term qui tam is short for the Latin qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who brings the action for the king as well as for himself.” Qui tam actions are unusual in that the plaintiffs do not allege injuries to themselves but rather claim injuries to the government. In a successful qui tam action, the PLAINTIFF, who is known as a relator or informer, shares any monetary recovery with the sovereign (the government). Qui tam actions are created solely by statute. Legislatures authorize qui tam actions to encourage private citizens to assist the govern- ment in enforcing its statutes. By authorizing a qui tam action, the legislature creates a dual enforcement scheme where both private citizens and the EXECUTIVE BRANCH may redress violations of the statute creating the action. In some respects a qui tam action is similar to the more common citizens’ suit, which allows a private citizen to sue to redress injuries to the public. For example, environmental statutes often authorize citizens’ suits as a means for members of the public to redress injuries to the environ- ment. In a citizens’ suit, however, plaintiff citizens allege an injury to themselves as members of the public at large, whereas a plaintiff in a qui tam action alleges a specific injury to the government. Although qui tam actions are relatively unknown, they have existed in England for hundreds of years and in the United States since the foundation of the government. Too, al- though qui tam actions were authorized by the very first Congress, the most important statute creating qui tam actions was the False Claims Act of 1863 (FCA). During the Civil War, defense contractors frequently defrauded the Union government. In response, Congress enacted the False Claims Act, which sought to encourage private citizens who had information concerning corrupt defense contractors to come forward. Under the original False Claims Act, a successful relator in a qui tam action was entitled to one-half of the damages and forfeitures recovered and collected from the DEFENDANT, while the other half went to the federal treasury. This procedure was frequently abused, however, as plaintiffs brought qui tam actions when the government had already instituted criminal investigations against de- fense contractors. Thus, private citizens profited from the government’s efforts to stop FRAUD by defense contractors. In response, Congress barred qui tam actions based on information already known to the government at the time the civil suit was filed, even if the government had taken no action on the information. Because of this restriction and the repeal of many qui tam statutes, the qui tam action was almost extinct until 1986. In 1986 Congress revitalized qui tam actions under the False Claims Act in response to the widespread procurement abuses by defense contractors during President RONALD REAGAN’S defense buildup. The 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729 et seq.) increased the financial incentives for bringing a qui tam action while easing the jurisdictional requirements for instituting a suit. Specifically, the 1986 amendments permit relators to bring qui tam actions even if the government is aware of the information on which the action is based, unless the relator obtained the information from public disclosures by the governme nt. As a result of the amendments, the number of companies sued in qui tam actions under the False Claims Act greatly increased. In addition to defense contractors, MEDICARE and MEDICAID providers have frequently been the target of qui tam actions. As of the summer 2009, the False Claims Act is the only widely use d statute authorizing qui tam actions. The 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act have been challenged by defendants and other critics who assert that qui tam actions unconstitutionally delegate the executive branch’s obligation to enforce statutes to unaccountable and self-interested citizens. In addition, defendants have argued that relators in qui tam actions lack legal standing to bring a lawsuit. The U.S. Constitution requires plain- tiffs in lawsuits to allege distinct injury to themselves; when plaintiffs fail to allege such an injury, they lack standing to sue. Critics of qui tam actions point out that qui tam relators are alleging an injury to the government rather than themselves. Despite these challenges, no court has held as unconstitutional the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. In early 1997, the SUPREME COURT agreed to hear an appeal of a qui tam GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION QUI TAM ACTIONS 223 action under the False Claims Act but declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the act’s qui tam provisions are constitutional (Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 138 L. Ed. 2d 135 [1997]). Defenders of qui tam actions point out that the individual members of the public are, at least indirectly, hurt by fraud against the government because the government is financially supported by the public. The courts have also repeatedly recognized Congress’s authority to legislate the means for implementing its policy objectives. By authorizing qui tam actions, Congress has determined that allowing citizens to sue on behalf of the government is a valid and effective means for enforcing statutes. Thus, the qui tam action remains an important legal tool in redressing fraud against the government. The ultim ate success of a qui tam action under the FCA depends largely on whether the U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL decides to intervene. Between 1987 and 2004, the attorney general decided to intervene in 747 qui tam actions. A total of 705 of those actions resulted in settlement or judgment, representing 94 percent of the instances where the attorney genera l intervened. By comparison, the attorney general declined to intervene in 2,578 cases. Of those, only 164 cases (6% of the total) resulted in settlement or judgment. FURTHER READINGS Boese, John T. 2000. Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions. 2d ed. New York: Aspen. Broderick, Christina Orsini. 2007. “Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis.” Columbia Law Review 107. Cahoy, James. 1996. “U.S. Supreme Court to Review Scope of Qui Tam Lawsuits under Federal False Claims Act.” West’s Legal News (October 17). McGreal, Paul E., and Dee Baba. 2001. “Applying Coase to Qui Tam Actions against the States.” Notre Dame Law Review 77 (November). Shane, Peter M. 2000. “Returning Separation-of-Powers Analysis to its Normative Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits to Enforce Civil Fines.” Environmental Law Reporter 30 (December). West, Robin Page. 2001. Advising the Qui Tam Whistle- blower: From Identifying a Case to Filing Under the False Claims Act. Chicago: General Practice, Solo, and Small Firm Section, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, ABA. CROSS REFERENCES Damages; Re medies. QUICK ASSETS Personal property that is readily marketable. Quick assets are items, such as jewelry, that can be easily converted to cash for immediate use. QUID PRO QUO [ Latin, Something for something or This for that. ] The mutual consideration that passes between two parties to a contractual agreement, thereby rendering the agreement valid and binding. In common usage, quid pro quo refers to the giving of one valuable thing for another. It has the same meaning in the law but with varying implications in different contexts. Quid pro quo, or the exchange of VALUABLE CONSIDERATION , is required for the formation of a valid co ntract between individuals who are not merchants. This requirement of mutual consid- eration, or the exchange of something of value, indicates the sincerity of the parties’ intent to adhere to the contract between them. The term quid pro quo is also used in the contexts of politics and SEXUAL HARASSMENT.In politics, the term can refer to the use of political office for personal benefit. For instance, an elected official might promise favorable govern- mental treatment to a person in exchange for something of value. This form of quid pro quo would be a violation of the law. At the federal level, the Hobbs Ac t (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 [1994]) makes it a felony for a public official to extort property under COLOR OF OFFICE. Trading campaign contributions for promises of official actions or inactions are also prohibited under the act. (Legislation introduced in 2009 would amend the Hobbs Act to close a loophole that could be interpreted as permitting coercion or violent acts on behalf of labor unions under certain circumstances.) In the area of sexual harassment, quid pro quo describes a form of sexual BLACKMAIL. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is the conditioning of employment benefits on an employee’s submission to unwelcome sexual conduct. Title VII of the CIVIL RIGHTS Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (e)-2 [1988]) provides a remedy for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Most courts follow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidelines and hold that the necessary quid pro quo exists if submission to unwelcome sexual GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 224 QUICK ASSETS advances “is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individua l’s employ- ment” or if submission to unwelcome sexual advances “is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual” (29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) [1997]). QUIET ENJOYMENT A COVENANT that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants. Quiet enjoyment is a right to the undis- turbed use and enjoyment of real property by a tenant or landowner. The right to quiet enjoyment is contained in covenants concerning real estate. Generally a covenant is an agreement between two parties to do or refrain from doing something. Courts read a covenant of quiet enjoyment between the LANDLORD AND TENANT into every rental agreement, or tenancy. Thus a renter, or tenant, has the right to quiet enjoyment of the leased premises regardless of whether the rental agreement contains such a covenant. In the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the landlord promises that during the term of the tenancy no one will disturb the tenant in the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the premises. Quiet enjoyment includes the right to exclude others from the premises, the right to peace and quiet, the right to clean premises, and the right to basic services such as heat and hot water and, for high-rise buildings, elevator service. In many respects the implied covenant of quiet enjoy- ment is similar to an IMPLIED WARRANTY of habitability, which warrants that the landlord will keep the leased premises in good repair. For example, the failure to provide heat would be a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment because the lack of heat would interfere with the tenant’s use of the premises and would also make the premises uninhabit- able, especially in a cold climate. Other rights related to quiet enjoyment may be tailored to specific situations. For example, at least one court has found that the ringing of smoke alarms for more than a day is an interference with a tenant’s quiet enjoyment of leased premises (Manzaro v. McCann, 401 Mass. 880, 519 N.E.2d 1337 [1988]). Tenants have at least two remedies for a landlord’s breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment: The tenant can cease to pay rent until the problem is solved, or the tenant can move out. A tenant who moves out may be liable for any rent owing under the agreement if a court decides that the landlord did not breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment. A covenant of quiet enjoyment may be included in an exchange, or conveyance, of land ownership at the option of the parties to the deed. Quiet enjoyment has a slightly different scope in the context of land ownership than it has in the context of a tenancy. When a seller gives a deed to the land to another party, the seller no longer has control over the property. The covenant of quiet enjoyment, when con- tained in a deed to real estate, warrants that the title to the land is clear, meaning that it has no encumbrances, or claims against it by other persons. A warranty deed includes a covenant of quiet enjoyment. By contrast, a quitclaim deed makes no warranties regarding the title and contains no covenant of quiet enjoyment. FURTHER READINGS Kroll, David G. 1992. “The Landlord/Tenant Warranty of Habitability and the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.” Colorado Lawyer 21 (June). Mann, Richard A. and Barry S. Roberts. 2009. Essentials of Business Law and the Legal Environment. 10th ed. Mason, OH: South-Western, Cengage Learning. “Real Property.” 1994. SMH Bar Review. QUIET TITLE ACTION A proceeding to establish an individual’s right to ownership of real property against one or more adverse claimants. An action to quiet title is a lawsuit filed to establish ownership of real property (land and buildings affixed to land). The plaintiff in a quiet title action seeks a court order that prevents the respondent from making any subsequent claim to the property. Quiet title actions are necessary because real estate may change hands often, and it is not always easy to determine who has title to the property. A quiet title suit is also called a suit to remove a cloud. A cloud is any claim or potential claim to ownership of the property. The cloud can be a claim of full ownership of the property or a claim of partial ownership, such as a lien in an amount that does not exceed the value of the property. A title to real property is clouded if the plaintiff, as the buyer or GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION QUIET TITLE ACTION 225 recipient of real estate, might have to defend her full ownership of the property in court against some party in the future. A landowner may bring a quiet title action regardless of whether the respondent is asserting a present right to gain possession of the premises. For example, assume that the seller of the property agreed to sell but died before the sale was finalized. Assume further that the seller also gave the property to a nephew in a will. In such a situation, both the nephew and the buyer have valid grounds for filing a suit to quiet title because each has a valid claim to the property. The law on quiet title actions varies from state to state. Som e states have quiet title statutes. Other states allow courts to fashion most of the laws regarding quiet title actions. Under the COMMON LAW, a plaintiff must be in possession of the property to bring a quiet title action, but many state statutes do not require actual possession by the plaintiff. In other states possession is not relevant. In some states only the person who holds legal title to the real estate may file a quiet title action, but in other states anyone with sufficient interest in the property may bring a quiet title action. Generally, a person who has sold the property does not have sufficient interest. When a landowner owns property subject to a mortgage, the landowner may bring a quiet title action in states where the mortgagor retains title to the property. If the mortgagee keeps the title until the mortgage is paid, the mortgag ee, not the landowner, would have to bring the action. The general rule in a quiet title action is that the plaintiff may succeed only on the strength of his own claim to the real estate, and not on the weakness of the respondent’s claim. The plaintiff bea rs the burden of proving that he owns the title to the property. A plaintiff may have less than a fee simple, or less than full ownership, and maintain an action to quiet title. So long as the plaintiff’s interest is valid and the respondent’s interest is not, the plaintiff will succeed in removing the cloud (the respon- dent’s claim) from the title to the property. CROSS REFERENCES Cloud on T itle. QUINLAN, IN RE In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), was the first major judicial decision to hold that life-sustaining medical treatments may be dis- continued in appropriate circumstances, even if the patient is unable or incompetent to make the decision. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision has been followed by nearly every state appellate court to consider the issue. In addition to establishing a patient’s right to refuse life- sustaining medical treatments, the Quinlan decision also made clear that a decision to remove or withhold life support systems from an incompetent patient would not constitute HOMICIDE or MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. In 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, age 22, stopped breathing and lapsed into a coma. Quinlan’s treating physicians determined that in addition to being comatose, Quinlan was in a “chronic persistent vegetative state” and could not survive without the assistance of a respira- tor. Further, the physicians believed that Quinlan had no chance of recovery and could not survive for more than a year even with the assistance of the respirator. Although Quinlan was not dead by any legal standard, her family wished to disconnect the respirator. The treat- ing physicians, however, refused. Quinlan’s father then sought judicial approval to act as Quinlan’s legal guardian and to have the respirator removed. After a lower court refused to order physicians to remove the respirator, Quinlan’ s father appealed to the New Jersey SUPREME COURT . First the court determined that a patient’s decision regarding whether to continue with life-sustaining medical treatments impli- cates the patient’s right to privacy, much as a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy implicates the right to privacy, as established in ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). The court then proceeded to weigh Quin- lan’s right to privacy against the state’s interest in preserving human life and defending the right of a physician to administer medical treatment according to his or her best judg- ment. The court found that as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis for the patient’s recovery dims, the patient’s right to privacy increases and the state’s interest weak- ens. In Quinlan’s case, where the medical pro- cedures were extremely invasive and Quinlan had virtually no chance of recovering from a permanent vegetative state, the court concluded that Quinlan could choose to have the respira- tor discontinued, even if it meant she would die. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 226 QUINLAN, IN RE However, Quinlan was unable to make this decision. Thus, the court was faced w ith the issue of whether Quinlan’s father could make the decision on her behalf. The court concluded that Quinlan’s father and the rest of her family could decide whether to disconnect the respira- tor, stating that the “decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming major- ity of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them.” The court stated that Quinlan’s father should act in accordance with his understand- ing of his daughter’s best interests and not necessarily upon what his daughter would have done had she been able to express her wishes. Although the Quinlan decision is most often cited as the decision that recognized the “right to die,” commentators have stated that the decision’s most important legacy was in offering the medical profession freedom from criminal prosecution and civil liability when removing life support from patients in a chronic persistent vegetative state. The Quinlan court stated that it believed the testimony of Quinlan’s doctors who testified that the fear of criminal prosecu- tion or civil liability had nothing to do with their refusal to disconnect Quinlan’s respirator at her father’s request and that their decision comported with standard medical practices. However, the court also believed that the fear of criminal sanctions and civil liability must have had some bearing on medical standards and practices as they then existed. Thus, the Quinlan court was faced with the conflict between the patient’s right to refuse invasive, life-sustaining medical procedures and the doctors’ right to treat their patient as they saw fit. The court believed that the focal point in balancing these rights ought to be the possibility of the patient’s returning to a cog- nitive and fulfilling life, as opposed to the “for- ced CONTINUANCE of that biological vegetative existence” to which Quinlan was doomed. In resolving Quinlan’s case, the court concluded that if her attending physicians, after consulting with the hospita l’s ethics committee, concluded that Quinlan had no reasonable possibility of ever emerging from her comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the respirator that was believed to be sustaining her life ought to be removed in accordance with her family’s wishes. The physicians could not be subject to criminal or civil liabili ty for that decision. Ironically, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision had little impact on Quinlan’s fate. Almost six weeks after the Court’s ruling, Quinlan was still attached to a respirator, and more medical technology was being em ployed to keep her alive. Eventually Quinlan was weaned off the respirator in accordance with her family’s wishes. She survived another nine years, although she never emerged from a comatose state. The Quinlan case has influenced U.S. law by providing the framework for deciding the difficult legal issues that continue to arise as advances in medical technology allow doctors to keep patients alive, even when they have little or no chance of returning to normal life. Nearly every judicial decision since Quinlan has recog- nized a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatments. Finally, the courts have agreed with Quinlan that where a patient is incompetent, the right to refuse such treatments may be asserted by the patient’s family or guardian. FURTHER READINGS Bishop, Mark Stephen. 1999. “Crossing the Decisional Abyss: An Evaluation of Surrogate Decision-Making Statutes as a Means of Bridging the Gap between Post- Quinlan Red Tape and the Realization of an Incompe- tent Patient’s Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treat- ment.” Elder Law Journal 7 (spring). Nearly every state appellate court followed the N.J. Supreme court ruling that allowed Karen Quinlan’s parents, Joseph and Julia Quinlan (with a photograph of Karen), to withhold life-sustaining medical treatment from their comatose daughter. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION QUINLAN, IN RE 227 . is that in a bench trial the same person resolves both GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION QUESTION OF FACT 221 questions of law and fact because the fact finder is the judge. Nevertheless,. civil actions maintained by private persons on behalf of both themselves and GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 222 QUESTION OF LAW the government to recover damages or to enforce penalties. substantive legal GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 220 QUASI-LEGISLATIVE rights, it usually must provide notice of this intent and hold a public hearing. This gives members of the public