Gross, Samuel R., and Debra Livingston. 2002. “Racial Profiling under Attack.” Columbia Law Review 1413. Heumann, Milton, and Lance Cassak. 2003. Good Cop, Bad Cop: Racial Profiling and Competing Views of Justice in America. New York: P. Lang. Sandy, Kathleen R. 2003. “The Discrimination Inherent in America’s Drug War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria Over Crack.” Alabama Law Review 665. Vidmar, Neil, and Hans, Valerie. 2007. American Juries. New York: Prometheus Books. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights; Drugs and Narcotics; Equal Protection; Fourth Amendment; Terrorism. RACKETEERING Traditionally, obtaining or extorting money illegally or carrying on illegal business activities, usually by organized crime. A pattern of illegal activity carried out as part of an enterprise that is owned or controlled by those who are engaged in the illegal activity. The latter definition derives from the federal Racketeer Influenced and Cor- ruption Organizations Act (RICO), a set of laws (18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq. [1970]) specifically designed to punish racketeering by business enterprises. Racketeering, as it is commonly understood, has always coexisted with business. In the United States, the term racketeer was synonymous with members of organized-crime operations. Congress passed RICO as part of the ORGANIZED CRIME Control Act of 1970. Organized crime in the United States had been increasing ever since the Twenty-First Amendment’s PROHIBITION of alcohol was repealed in 1933. Crime groups and families that had been bootlegging moved on to other moneymaking crimes by controlling legitimate businesses and by using some of them as fronts for criminal activity. Over the years, Congress had enacted several statutes authorizing increased punish- ment for typical organized-crime activities such as illicit gambling rings, loan sharking, trans- portation of stolen goods, and EXTORTION. However, it had not passed legislation that specifically punishes the very act of committing organized crime. Organized crime continued to proliferate in the 1960s. After investigating and debating organized-crime legislation for appro ximately 20 years, beginning with SENATE committee hearings conducted in 1951 by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, Congress finally passed RICO. The specific goal of RICO is to punish the use of an enterprise to engage in certain criminal activities. A person who uses an enterprise to engage in a pattern of racketeering may be convicted under the RICO criminal statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1963). An enterprise is defined as “any individual, partnership, corpo- ration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals assoc iated in fact although not a legal entity.” A pattern is defined as “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of [RICO’s passage] and the last of which occurred within 10 years after commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” Racketeering activity under federal law includes a number of criminal offenses, includ- ing: BRIBERY; sports bribery; COUNTERFEITING; felony theft from interstate shipment; embez- zlement from pension and welfare funds; extortionate credit transactions; FRAUD relating to identification documents; fraud relating to access devices; transmission of gambling infor- mation; MAIL FRAUD; wire fraud; financial institution fraud; citizenship or naturalization fraud; obscene matter; OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; obstruction of criminal investigation; obstruc- tion of state or local law enforcement; witness tampering; retaliation against witness; interfer- ence with commerce, bribery, or extortion; interstate transportation in aid of racketeering; interstate transportation of wagering parapher- nalia; unlawful welfare fund payments; prohibi- tion of illegal gambling business; MONEY LAUN- DERING ; monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activ ities; MURDER for hire; sexual exploitation of children; interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles; inter- state transportation of stolen property; sale of stolen goods; trafficking in motor vehicles and parts; trafficking in CONTRABAND cigarettes; white slave traffic; restrictions of payments and loans to labor organizations; embezzlement from union funds; BANKRUPTCY fraud; fraud in the sale of SECURITIES; FELONIOUS manufacture, im- portation, receiving, concealment, buying, sell- ing, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs; and any act that is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. RICO outlaws every manner in which an enterprise can be used for long-term racketeer- ing activity. Under the law, no person may invest racketeering proceeds to acquire any GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 238 RACKETEERING interest in an enterprise; no person may acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; and no person associated with or employed by an enterprise may conduct that enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The punishment for violating the criminal provisions of RICO is exceptionally severe. If convicted, a DEFENDANT is fined and sentenced to not more than 20 years in prison for each RICO violation. Furthermore, the defendant must forfeit any interest, claim against, or property or contractual right over the criminal enter- prise, as well as any property that constitutes the racketeering activity or that was derived from the racketeering activity. RICO contains civil provisions that allow a party who has been injured by a RICO defendant to recover from the defendant in civil court. A successful civil RICO PLAINTIFF may collect TREBLE DAMAGES,or three times the amount lost to the defendant, as well as attorney’s fees and other costs associated with the litigation. The intent of the many and various sanctions is to cripple, and ultimately eradicate, organized crime enterprises. RICO employs broad definitions to sweep a wide variety of enterprise criminal activity into its purview. One of the original goals of RICO was to eliminate organized-crime families. However, because Congress could not legislate against specific persons or families, it was forced to use broad language to define racketeering and organized crime. The far-reaching la nguage of the statute has subjected a wide range of criminal defendants to RICO’s penalties. The typical RICO defendant is far from the stereotypical violent mobster. A RICO defen- dant can be anyone who uses a business in any way to commit two or more of the many racketeering offenses. RICO has proved to be a powerful tool in the federal government’s fight against organized crime. Many states have enacted RICO-style statutes designed to apprehend organized crime that somehow escapes the provisions of RICO, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. While occasionally using different language, these state RICO statues generally concern the same legal areas and provide for damages similar to those under federal law. Prosecutors have used RICO against a variety of criminals and have obtaine d lengthy sentences for them. According to many critics, RICO has been expanded beyond its original purpose of eradicating traditional organized-crime groups to convict petty, nonviolent criminals and sentence them to unduly long prison terms. Supporters of RICO counter that the act was intended to reach all organized crime, not just traditional organized-crime groups. Advocates of RICO argue further that the statute is not unduly harsh because the use of a business enterprise to conduct criminal activity is more dangerous and more difficult to eradicate than individual, freelance criminal activity and that the defendants who commit acts that bring them under RICO’s provisions deserve the punishment they receive. Most observers agree that the civil provisions of RICO have been abused. Beginning in the late 1970s, civil attorneys began to realize the enor- mous moneymaking potential of RICO’s civil provisions allowing payment of treble damages, fees, and costs to successful RICO plaintiffs. It became common for supposed victims to bring civil actions against anyone who was remotely and indirectly associated with a criminal enter- prise and financially solvent enough to pay a RICO judgment. Some of the targets of civil RICO claims have included accountants, bank- ers, insurance companies, securities firms, and major corporations such as General Motors and MCI Communications. In many cases, defen- dants in civil RICO cases have denied any wrong- doing but have been forced to settle because they were afraid of losing and being forced to pay a significant judgment. In 1993 the U.S. SUPREME COURT limited the scope of civil RICO claims with its decision in the case of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 122 L. Ed. 2d 525. In Reves, an accounting firm had performed three audits of a farmers’ cooperative to determine its financial health after its general manager and accountant were convicted of tax fraud. When the cooper- ative went bankrupt, note holders on the cooperative filed suit against 40 individuals and entities associated with the cooperative. One of the claims was a civil RICO claim against the accounting firm. The note holders claimed that the accountants participated in a scheme to inflate the value of the cooperative above its GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RACKETEERING 239 actual value, that this scheme constituted fraud, and that the accountants had participated in the operation or management of the cooperative’s affairs. The high court disagreed, holding that the accounting firm’s level of participation in the cooperative did not rise to the level of operation or management of the cooperative’s affairs and that it was beyond the reach of RICO liability. The U.S. Supreme Court moved further to delineate the reach of RICO with three cases decided at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 120 S. Ct. 160 8, 146 L.Ed.2d 561 (U.S. Fla. 2000), the court ruled 7-2 that a company president’s termination, allegedly in furtherance of RICO CONSPIRACY, was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO, and that it did not give rise to a CAUSE OF ACTION under RICO. Justice CLARENCE THOMAS wrote in his majority opinion that an injury caused by an OVERT ACT that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not suffi- cient to give rise to a cause of action under RICO, regardless of whether there was a conspiracy that caused the plaintiff’s injury. In the 2001 case of Cedric Kushner Promo- tions v. Don King,, 533 U.S. 158, 121 S. Ct. 2087, 150 L. Ed. 2d 198, (U.S. 2001), the high court ruled unanimously that the controversial boxing promoter Don King could be sued under RICO, despite the fact he w as the sole owner and shareholder of his corporation. The court, in a majority opinion written by Justice STEPHEN BREYER , agreed that to establish liability under RICO, one must allege and prove the existence RICO in Need of Reform? W hen Congress passed the Racke- teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.) in 1970, its intent was to mount an all-fronts attack on the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized criminal enterprises. The RICO Act provides criminal and civil remedies, which are designed to im- prison racketeers and to destroy the financial base of organized crime. Since the act’s passage, however, its civil provisions have been applied more often than its criminal provisions and have generally been used against businesses and other organizations that are not dominated by organized crime. Plaintiffs have discovered that the act’s broad language allows its use in cases involving malpractice and “garden variety com- mercial fraud.” Critics of this use of civil RICO have called for congressional reform. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985), upheld the constitutionality of the RICO Act and made clear that, unless amended by Congress, the statute must be interpreted broadly. The Sedima decision removed a number of judicially created barriers to using civil RICO against legitimate businesses. Despite congressional attempts to limit the scope of civil RICO, only one major area of law has been removed from the RICO Act. The Private Securi- ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (15 U. S.C.A. § 77 et seq.) eliminated liability for RICO claims based on securities fraud, unless the defendant has already been criminally convicted of securities fraud. The act thus removed the threat of treble (triple) damages in such cases. Congress concluded that federal securi- ties laws generally provide adequate remedies for victims of securities fraud. Therefore, it was unnecessary and unfair to expose defendants in securities cases to the threat of treble damages and other extraordinary remedies provided by the RICO Act. Critics of the RICO Act applaud this congressional action but argue that the same reasoning can and should be applied to other areas of civil law. These critics maintain that the act’s broad scope has given plaintiffs an unfair advantage in civil litigation. One criticism of civil RICO is that no criminal convictions are necessary to win a civil case under the act. The plaintiff need only show, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is more likely than not that the ongoing criminal enterprise occurred. As a result RICO has been used in all types of civil cases to allege wrongdoing. By contrast, a criminal RICO case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the judge and jury in a criminal RICO case are prohibited from drawing an adverse inference from a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination. No such ban exists, how- ever, in a civil RICO case. Critics contend that it is unfair for a party in a civil RICO case who has concerns about potential criminal liability to be forced to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 240 RACKETEERING of two distinct entities: a “person” and an “enterprise” that is not simply the same “person” referred to by a different name. However, Breyer stated in his opinion that “the corporate owner/ employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status.” Thus, Don King the person could be separated from Don King the organization, and could be the subject of a RICO civil suit. In Scheidler v. NOW & Operation Rescue v. NOW, 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L. Ed. 2d 991 (2003), the court limited the use of RICO against protest groups and political demonstrations. In an 8-1 decision, the court ruled that RICO could not be used as the basis for criminal charges against pro-life protestors who demonstrate outside ABORTION clinics. It found that claims that organizers violated RICO by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity that includ ed acts of extortion were not valid where the protestors had not obtained property, nor attempted to obtain property, nor conspired to obtain property from the abortion clinics. The court also ruled that injunctions obtained against the abortions protesters on the basis of RICO were invalid. In 2006 the Supreme Court again addressed the requirements for a successful civil RICO action by private parties. In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006), the court held that a company could not sue a competitor under RICO because the injury it suf fered was not order to mount an effective defense in the civil action. Once testimony is given in the civil case, the party has effectively waived the privilege against self-incrimi- nation, and the testimony may be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Critics contend that the RICO Act should be amended to stay (delay) a civil RICO proceeding until a criminal RICO proceeding has been concluded. The critics of civil RICO also believe that its use has given plaintiffs an unfair tool that often serves to coerce a party to settle out of fear of a treble damages award. These critics believe that no civil RICO action should be allowed unless the party has been convicted under criminal RICO. Critics also contend that criminal RICO has been an almost total failure in stopping the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime. Not only have very few criminal RICO cases been brought to trial, but most of the defen- dants in those cases were not the targets Congress originally intended. According to the critics, most criminal uses of the RICO Act are redundant. Other laws exist to punish government corruption and white-collar crimes. The RICO Act merely enhances their penalties. Despite these criticisms, the RICO Act has many supporters. While agreeing that the statute is broad in scope and imprecise in language, they contend that Congress wanted the act to read just this way. Congress recognized that private enforcement of the act through civil lawsuits would supplement the govern- ment’s inadequate prosecution resources. Supporters of civil RICO also point out that parties can be protected from waiving the privilege of self-incrimination. A trial court has the authority to stay a civil RICO proceeding until a criminal RICO prosecution has been concluded or the government announces that a crimi- nal action will be commenced. In addi- tion, a trial court may enter a protective order that keeps the information revealed by the party confidential or sealed. Finally, as in a criminal case a judge in a civil RICO action may advise a jury not to draw an adverse inference if the defendant does not testify. Finally, supporters believe RICO actions should not be limited to orga- nized crime. They argue that as a matter of public policy, it is reasonable to award treble damages to victims of commercial fraud and other illegal behavior that comes within the language of the act. According to civil RICO’s defenders, these damage awards act as a deterrent to businesses and organizations that have created social harm by conducting busi- ness in a distinctly criminal way. In recent years, RICO statutes have been interpreted much more narrowly than in the past. In February 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003), that federal RICO laws could not be used to stop antiabortion activists unless there was proof of an underlying crime (e.g., extortion). The ruling ended a case dating to the mid- 1980s, when violent antiabortion protes- ters targeted abortion clinics, injuring patients and clinic staff and damaging buildings and medical equipment. The National Organization for Women (NOW) claimed that antiabortion groups were engaged in a type of nationwide racketeering conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through the use of threats and force. FURTHER READINGS Duffy, Shannon P. 2000. “HMOs Can’tbe Sued under RICO without Claims of Actual Injuries.” The Legal Intelligencer (August 14). “Ruling by Justices Stirs Abortion Protest Debate.” 2003. CNN.com: Law Center (February 7). Available online at www. cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/27/scotus.aborti on. protests.ap (accessed September 3, 2003). CROSS REFERENCE Securities. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RACKETEERING 241 directly caused by its competitor’s wrongful conduct. In this case it was filing false tax returns. The court required a direct link between the alleged RICO violation and the claimed injury, which limits the ability of private plaintiffs to assert civil claims for damages under RICO. FURTHER READINGS Bastista, Paul. 2005. Civil RICO Practice Manual. 2d ed. Boston: Aspen Publishers. Dietz, Laura Hunter. 2002. “Checklist of Acts Which Constitute Racketeering Activity; Federal Law Viola- tions.” American Jurisprudence. 2d ed. Extortion Sec. 120. Disanto, Carrie J. 1996. “Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Supreme Court’s Enigmatic Attempt to Limit Outsider Liability under 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).” Notre Dame Law Review 71. Goldsmith, Michael. 1993. “Judicial Immunity for White- Collar Crime: The Ironic Demise of Civil RICO.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 30. Vizera, Diane Lynne. 1993. “Redirecting the Debate on ‘Garden Variety’ Abuses of Civil RICO.” Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 26. CROSS REFERENCES Gaming; Hoffa, James Riddle; Kennedy, Robert Francis; Landrum-Grif fith Act; Money Laundering; Organized Crime. RAILROAD The idea of using rails for transportation was first conceived in the sixteenth century. The first railroads used wooden rails to guide horse- drawn wagons. In the eighteenth century, cast- iron wheels and rails were used in Europe and England, and by the nineteenth century, horses had been replaced by many steam-driven engines as the source of power. The first public railroad eq uipped for steam-powered engines was a 20-mile track built in England in the 1820s. In the United States, the first commercial steam-powered railroad service was provided in South Carolina. On December 25, 1830, the South Carolina Railroad pulled a short passen- ger train out of Charleston. Compared with the trains and lines in the early 2000s, the first trains were small and the lines were short. As the technology continued to improve, rail- roads increased in number, size, and strength throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1830 only 23 miles of rail existed in the United States. By the mid-1830s, more than 1,000 miles of railroad tracks had been laid, and by 1850 more than 9,000 miles of rails existed. Most of the railroads were first constructed in the eastern states. As the United States bought, acquired, and conquered land to the west of the colonies in the early nineteenth century, many industrialists came to see the railroad as the perfect vehicle for access to the natural resources and growing markets of the West. The idea of a transcontinental railroad was born in the early 1840s. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 accelerated the plans, but the most important event that inspired the creation of a transcontinental railroad was the Civil War. The federal government was eager to assume control over California to gain a strategic advantage over the CONFEDERACY. Passage to California by rail was the best way to secure a link to the West. In May 1862 Congress passed the PACIFIC RAILROAD ACT, 43 U.S.C.A. § 942-3, which granted public land to the Union Pacific Railroad for each mile of track that it laid from Nebraska to California. The land grants were designed to encourage private investment in the railroads. Shortly thereafter, the Central Pacific Railroad began to compete with the Union Pacific for government land grants. The construction of a transcontinental rail system was an enormous task. It was difficult for the private sector to find the resources to fund such an endeavor, and it became apparent to all concer ned that a railroad system that spanned the entire country would not be developed without some help from the govern- ment. From 1862 to 1871 the federal govern- ment granted more than 100 million acres of land to private railroad companies to promote the construction of railroads. As the country moved westward, construction increased. As construction increased, the need to move materials and goods increased, and this created a dependency on the railroads. The railroads became the most important service in the country from the late nineteenth century through the first part of the twentieth century. They largely supplanted the use of canals and other waterways for shipping large loads because they were faster than watercraft, operated on more direct routes, and were capable of carrying larger loads. As the public dependency on railroads increased, the railroad business became extremely profitable. Railroad companies consolidated and integrated the rail lines but maintained a vast system connecting all of the continental United States. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 242 RAILROAD In 1920 the Transportation Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 316, allowed railroads to abandon certain routes that were not profitable. As the railroads consolidated, they were forced to cut costs by laying-off workers. Congress addressed the problem by freezing railroad employment levels for three years in the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933. Shortly thereafter, the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION mandated protections for dismissed or displaced railroad workers. Dismissed or laid-off railroad workers are entitled to compensation, fring e benefits, moving and housing expenses, and training for new employment. The railroad boom of the late nineteenth century not only made moguls of railroad owners but also led to monopolies in other markets, such as the coal, iron, and steel markets. Large railroad companies were able to offer lower prices to buyers than could smaller companies. Unlike other producers, the rail- roads did not have to pay for shipping costs. The public outcry over these unfair trade practices, and the inability of states to deal with an essentially interstate problem, forced Con- gress to regulate the railroad industry. Around the same time, the existing railroad companies began to support regulation of railroad prices to keep rates from dropping due to increased competition within the railroad industry itself. Congress passed the SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT of 1890 (15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.) to prevent monopolization and unreasonable interference with the ordinary and usual competitive pricing or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade. In 1887 Congress passed the INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (24 Stat. 379), which established the Interstate Commerce The Robber Barons T B he U.S. rail road barons of the mid- to late- nineteenth century loome d over the nati on’s economy. Unfettered by rules and unrestrained by lawmakers and judges, the handful of railroad owners and executives could do virtually whatever they wanted. The va st fortunes they built and control they exercised not only helped to expand national frontiers but also ushered in the market controls that now limit the creation of trusts and monopolies. The r ailroad barons were colorful men. Probably the most notorious was Jay Gould (1836–1892). A one-time tannery operator from New York with little education, Gould gained control of the Erie Railroad while still in his early thirties. His methods included a number of unlawful or unethical practices: issuing fraudulent stock, bribing legislators, starting price wars against competitors, betraying associates, using his newspaper to cause financial ruin, and manipulating the gold market. Gould even managed to dupe the U.S. Treasury, causing the 1869 stock market panic. At the time of his death, h e was worth $77 million. The barons were passionately monopolistic. As a director of the Union Pacific Rail road, Edward Henry Harriman (1849–1909) gobbled up western competitors until he controlled the entire Pacific Coast. But he could not out-gobble James J. Hill (1838–1916), the immensely successful Canadian immigrant whose Great Northern Railway linked the North to the West. Harriman’s vicious stock battle with Hill led to a mutually satisfying truce: a short- lived monopoly called the Northern Securities Company, which the U.S. Supreme Court dissolved in 1904. The barons’ heyday began to decline at the turn of the century with increasing public outrage over unpredictable ticket prices and fluctuations in the stock market tied to the railroads. Increa sing federal pressure, through laws, regulation, and court orders, ended their reign. By 1907, when the Interstate Commerce Commission denounced Har- riman and other financiers for trying to destroy rival railroads, the age of the “robber barons” was over. FURTHER READINGS Strom, Claire. 2003. Profiting from the Plains: The Great Northern Railway and Corporate Development of the American West. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. Young, Earle B. 1999. Tracks to the Sea: Galveston and Western Railroad Development, 1866–1900. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RAILROAD 243 Commission to regulate, in large part, the railroad industry. The commission was granted the power to set railroad rates. However, the SUPREME COURT struck down this grant of power, and the commission was relegated to an information-gathering agency. In 1906 Con- gress again granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to set railroad service rates, and this grant of power survived JUDICIAL REVIEW (Delaware, Lackawanna, & Western Railroad Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 363, 34 S. Ct. 65, 58 L. Ed. 269 [1913]). Another important concern about railroads was price DISCRIMINATION in railroad service. Railroads are commo n carriers, which describes a transportation business that offers service to the general public. The rates charged by common carriers are regulated under the theory that their service has an effect on interstate commerce, which is within the regulatory power of the federal government under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution. Under its power to regulate interstate com- merce, Congress prevents rate discrimination on public railways because rate discrimination is a patently unfair trade practice that has a detrimental effect on interstate commerce and the economic health of the country. For instance, a railroad cannot charge some custo- mers one rate for shipping on the railroad and charge a subsidiary of the railroad company a lesser rate. Passenger trains also may not discriminate in rates or service because they offer carrier service to the general public. Congress and the states have enacted numerous statutes and regulations to address the extraordinary number of issues presented by railroads. The subject matter of these statutes and administrative regulations ranges from safety regulations to local speed limits to rate controls. In 1966 Congress created the Federal Railroad Administration along with the TRANS- PORTATION DEPARTMENT to give special attention to railroad concerns. The success of the railroad system was not without costs. Railroad work proved to be among the most dangerous occupations in existence. Freight car derailments, undepend- able brakes, and the challenging task of switch- ing heavy, rolling cars from one track to another in railroad yards all took their toll on railroad workers. Approximately 3,50 0 railroad workers were killed each year between 1903 and 1907, and the death toll continued at approximately one a day for several years after that. States began to enact safety measures to protect railroad employees, but state law s varied and did not always provide protection for workers. In 1970 Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 20101 et seq., to achieve uniformity in railroad safety regula- tions. The act provides for safety enforcement procedures, track safety standards, freight car safety standards, emergency order procedures, train-marking regulations, accident report pro- cedures, locomotive safety and inspection standards, safety appliance standards, power brake and drawbar specifications, and regula- tions on signal systems and train control systems. Railroad work is still a relatively taxing occupation, but it is nowhere near as dangerous as it once was. The quality of freight equipment has improved, and due to the creation of single- unit trains, freight cars do not have to be switched from track to track as often as they once were. Most railroad-related accidents and deaths now occur at grade crossings, where railroad tracks cross roadways. Railroad labor, management, and executive unions have been responsible for many of the gains in railroad safety. Railroad unions were some of the first unions created, and they quickly evolved to be among the most powerful. Under the law, railroads are a special form of transportation. Railroad companies must pay taxes on their land and pay for the maintenance of their rights of way. This is not the case for other transporters. Trucking companies do not have to pay their own separate taxes for roadways, and they do not have to pay to maintain them. Barge companies do not have to pay taxes on or maintain the waterways that they use, and airlines use airports and airways built in large part with public funds. Railroad companies must pay to build and maintain their tracks because they are for their exclusive use. However, railroad companies have received some assistance from government because rail- roads are important to the nation’s economy and because they have needed it. In the 1930s the trucking industry made technological strides that put it in direct competition w ith the railroads. Pneumatic tires were created to support heavier freights, hydraulic brakes were devised to safely increase GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 244 RAILROAD the weight of a load, and a network of paved intercity highways provided easy access and direct routes. The market advantages of truck- ing became apparent immediately, and the golden age of railroading came to an end after WORLD WAR II. Railroads abandoned thousands of miles of tracks and laid-off workers. The radical shift in transportation reshaped the map of the United States as small towns that depended on railroads for business turne d into ghost towns. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–797) consolidated the bankrupt northeastern railroads into a single railroad called ConRail, a for-profit corporation comprised of the bankrupt railroads. The consolidation resulted in some abandonment, but it eliminated duplicate milea ge and helped save and maintain the most popular routes. In March 1997, ConRa il was bought by CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp. It was to be divided between the two compan ies. Congress gave railroad companies federal funds to upgrade the railroad system in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.). This act also shortened the length of time that railroads had to wait before abandoning a track. President JIMMY CARTER proved to be a champion of railroad deregulation. Under Carter’s watch, the Interstate Commerce Com- mission dropped the government controls on shipping rates fo r coal, eliminated regulations regarding the shipping of produce, and made it easier for railroads to abandon unprofitable lines. Congress topped off several years of railroad legislation with the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 45, and 49 of the U.S.C.A.). The Staggers Act eliminated government rate controls and made it even easier for railroads to abandon lines. Although the deregulation resulted in many layoffs, the changes lowered prices, made rail- roads more profitable, and allowed railroad companies to increase expenditures on safety measures. The railroad system in the United States reached its peak in 1920, when approximately 272,000 miles of rails existed. As of 2003, less than 150,000 miles of rails existed. Railroads no longer domina te the transportation market, but the railroad system has been pared down and stabilized. The rails remain necessary for large, bulky loads of heavy cargo. For personal transportation, the passenger service Amtrak was established in 1970 and subsidized by Congress to provide nationwide railroad pas- senger service at reduced rates. Amtrak and a few shorter, private lines offer passenger service in many parts of the country. By the mid-1990s, Amtrak bordered on financial ruin. In 1997 the railroad was $83 million in debt and was unable to pay its creditors. In November 1997 Congress ap- proved the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-134, 111 Stat. 2570, in an effort to save the company. The act released $5 billion in operating and capital expenses to the company each year through 2002. The goal of the legislation was for Amtrak to modernize the railroad’s equipment and facilities in an effort to increase revenue and ridership. Although funding under the statute was supposed to end in 2002, the company’s financial shape worsened. By 2002, the railroad, which employs 24,000 people and runs 265 trains per day, was about $4 billion in debt, having lost $1.1 billion in 2001 alone. Congress approved short-term funding until the passage of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improve- ment Act of 2008, P.L. 110?432, a five-year authorization of Amtrak. Along with the funding came congressional oversight. Amtrak was ordered to develop a plan for restoring passenger rail service to the states of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, which lost rail infrastructure because of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In 2009 the Obama Administration, as part of its economic stimulus package, con- vinced Congress to appropriate funding for several high-speed passenger lines. FURTHER READINGS Ballam, Deborah A. 1994. “TheEvolutionoftheGovernment- Business Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present.” American Business Law Journal 31 (February). DeLucia, Robert J. 1996. Drug and Alcohol Testing Issues in the Airline and Railroad Industries. American Law Institute (ALI). Airline and Railroad Labor and Employment Law series, ALI order no. ABA CLE, SA31. MacDonald, James M., and Linda C. Cavalluzzo. 1996. “Railroad Deregulation: Pricing Reforms, Shipper Responses, and the Effect on Labor.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50 (October). Vranich, Joseph. 2004. End of the Line: The Failure of Amtrak Reform and the Future of America’s Passenger Trains. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RAILROAD 245 CROSS REFERENCES Antitrust Law; Carriers; Commerce Clause. RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT The Railroad Retirement Act is a federal law (45 U.S.C.A. § 231 et seq.) enacted by Congress in 1937 that provides a special system of ANNUITY, PENSION, and death benefits to railroad workers. Congress first passed the Railroad Retire- ment Act in 1934 to reward the hard work done by railroad workers, recognize the national benefits conferred by railroad work, and encourage the retirement of older railroad workers. By offering the means for railroad workers “to enjoy the closing days of their lives with peace of mind and physical comfort,” Congress intended to provide jobs to younger workers and generally improve the operation of the railroads with stronger, more able bodies (H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 [1935]). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the first version of the act. In 1935 the Court ruled that the act violated the U.S. Constitution because it deprived the railroads of property without DUE PROCESS under the FIFTH AMENDMENT and because it exceeded Congress’s power to regulate inter- state commerce (Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468 [1935]). Congress passed a similar law the following year based on its power to tax and spend for the GENERAL WELFARE (49 Stat. 967 and 974). That act was put on hold by judicial order (Alton R.R. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, 16 F. Supp. 955 [D.C. 1936]). President FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVELT worked with Congress to reformu- late the act, and in 1937 the Railroad Retirement Act emerged. The act established the Railroad Retirement Board to administer the benefits program. The Railroad Retirement Board also administers the benefits programs under the Railroad Unem- ployment Insurance Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 351 et seq.) and manages other rai lroad-related issues. The Railroad Retirement Act was amended several times to make it similar to the benefits scheme of the SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.). In 1970 Cong ress established a Commission on Railroad Retirement to thor- oughly analyze the structure of the act. The commission recommended changes, Congress negotiated with the railroad industry, and the act was overhauled in 1974. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 is a complex set of requirements for benefits that essentially provides two tiers of benefits . One level is similar to a private pension plan. The benefits received on this level are determined according to earnings and career service. To qualify for these benefits, the employee must have worked in the railroad industry for at least ten years. For seasonal workers, it may take several more years of railroad work to qualify. No benefits are paid until the employee either reaches the normal retirement age under the Social Security Act (age 65), or age 60 with 30 years of service. The second and larger tier of benefits under the act provides annuities that are similar to, and a replacement of, Social Security benefits. Under the act, that portion of earnings that would normally go into a worker’s Social Security account instead goes into a railroad retirement account. This account provides slightly higher returns than the average Social Security account. To qualify for this benefit, a railroad worker must work in the industry a total of ten years. The act also provides disability benefits to disabled workers and the children or parents of deceased railroad workers. A spouse of an employee who worked in the railroad industry for ten years or more also receives individual annuities. These benefits to the spouse cease if the couple divorces. Under the act, an employee is considered any person who received remuneration to work for any railroad company or carrier or for any railroad association that was owned by at least two businesses engaged in the railroad business. v RAMO, ROBERTA COOPER Roberta Cooper Ramo, the first woman to be elected president of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA), was a pathbreaker in many ways. She was also the first ABA president with a technological bent, proselytizing for decades about the need for modern management techniques and com- puterization in running law firms. Ramo, the daughter of a Western clothing retailer, was born August 8, 1942, in Denver, Cololrado. She graduated from the University of Colorado magna cum laude in 1964. She then entered the University of Chicago Law School, graduating in 1967. Ramo and her husband, Barry W. Ramo, were already pursuing their careers in tandem, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 246 RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT to balance work and family. They had married while they both were attending the Universit y of Colorado. When she went to law school in Chicago, he took an internship there. When he took a position at a teaching hospital at Duke Univ ersity, in North Carolina, she ran into a professional wall as a woman lawyer at a time when the number of woman lawyers was still small . “I was unable even to get an interview with a law firm in Durham, Raleigh or Chapel Hill,” she said. “ I was the only one from my law school class without a job.” Ramo’s law school dean called a friend in North Carolina, the state ’s former governor Terry Sanford, to ask forhelpinfindingherajob.Asgovernor, Sanford had convinced the Ford Foundation that it ought to try developing a state founda- tion for distributing its grants, which led to the creation of the North Carolina Fund. In 19 68 Ramo took a N ation Teaching Fellowship at Shaw University in Raleigh. After graduation, she moved with her husband to North Carolina, where she spent a year distributing Ford Foundation grants through a state foundation. In 1970 Ramo moved to San Antonio, where she began working part-time with the 12-lawyer firm of Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson, and Troilo. Sh e had an 18-month-old child and was seven-months pregnant when she inter- viewed for the job. Ramo and the law firm entered into an agreement that now is so common that it has a name—flextime. She would go in to the office earlier than most of the other lawyers, about 7:00 A.M., and leave earlier, about 2:00 P.M., taking work home with her. The agreement called for her to be paid two- thirds of what others in the firm were earning. In 1972 the Ramos moved to Albuquerque, where Roberta had grown up, and she made a similar arrangement with another law firm, where she worked for two years. She then spent three years as a sole practitioner, from 1974 until 1977, before becoming managing partner of Poole, Kelly, and Ramo, still working in a part-time, flextime arrangement. That kind of arrangement continued until the late 1980s, when her youngest child graduated from high school. In 1993 Ramo’s firm dissolved amid Chapter 11 BANKRUPTCY, and Ramo joined the Albuquerque firm of Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris, and Sisk. Over the years, despite the demands of her family and her own desire to do more than her agreed share of work, Ramo was heavily Roberta Cooper Ramo 1942– ▼▼ ▼▼ 2000 1975 19501930 ❖ 1942 Born, Denver, Colo. 1939–45 World War II ◆ ◆ ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ 1967 Graduated from Chicago Law School 1968 Accepted Nation Teaching Fellowship at Shaw University 1970 Entered into her first flextime working arrangement 1975 How to Create a System for the Law Office published 1977 Became managing partner in Poole, Kelly, and Ramo 1984 Chaired the ABA’s Law Practice Management Section 1991 Made first attempt to become president of ABA 2003 Appointed to Senate panel for reform of USOC 2000 Made an honorary member of the Bar of England and Wales 1993 Poole, Kelly, and Ramo dissolved; joined Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris, and Sisk 1997 Co-chaired ABA development of model law for regulating mediation 1995–96 Served as first woman president of the ABA 2008 Named first woman president of American Law Institute Roberta Cooper Ramo. COURTESY OF ROBERTA RAMO GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION RAMO, ROBERTA COOPER 247 . and Convincing Proof; Preponderance of Evidence. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PUNITIVE DAMAGES 209 of defendant’s conduct” as the most important indication of reasonableness. Rights Act signed into law ◆ 1964 Civil Rights Act signed into law GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PUTZEL, HENRY, JR. 213 HISTORICAL SOCIETY published a transcript of an interview that. Agreements.” Tulane Law Review 71 (June). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 216 QUANTUM MERUIT QUANTUM VALEBANT [ Latin, As much as they were worth. ] An archaic form of PLEADING a lawsuit