Maintenance is most often used to provide temporary support to a spouse who was financially dependent on the other during the marriage. Temporary maintenance is designed to provide the necessary support for a spouse until he or she either remarries or becomes self- supporting. Many states allow courts to consid- er marital fault in determining whether, and how much, maintenance should be granted. These states include Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mas- sachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tenn essee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Like the entire body of divorce law, the issue of maintenance differs from state to state. If a spouse is found to have caused the breakup of the marriage, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia allow a court to refu se maintenance, even if that spouse was financi- ally dependent on the other. North Carolina requires a showing of the supporting spouse’s fault before awarding maintenance. Illinois allows fault grounds for divorce but excludes consideration of fault in maintenance and property settlements. Florida offers only no- fault grounds for divorce but admits evidence of adultery in maintenance determinations. An antenuptial agreement, or PREMARITAL AGREEMENT , is a contract between persons who plan to marry, concerning property rights upon divorce. A postnuptial agreement is a contract entered into by divorcing parties before they reach court. Traditionally, antenuptial agree- ments were discouraged by state legislatures and courts as being contrar y to the PUBLIC POLICY in favor of lifetime marriage. An antenuptial agreement is made under the assumption that the marriage may not last forever, which suggests that it facilitates divorce. No state expressly prohibits antenuptial agreements, but, as in any contract case, courts reserve the right to void any that it finds UNCONSCIONABLE or to have been made under duress. State statutes that authorize antenuptial and postnuptial agreements usually require that the parties fulfill certain conditions. In Delaware, for example, a man and a woman may execute an antenuptial agreement in the presence of two witnesses at least ten days before their marriage. Such an agreement, if notarized, may be filed as a deed with the office of the recorder in any county of the state (Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 301). Both antenuptial and postnuptial con- tracts concerning real estate must be record ed in the registry of deeds where the land is situated (§ 302). Jurisdiction over a divorce case is usually determined by residency. That is, a divorcing spouse is required to bring the divorce action in the state where he or she maintains a permanent home. States are obligated to acknowledge a divorce that was obtained in another state. This rule derives from the FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE of the U.S. Constitution (art. IV, § 1), which requires states to recognize the valid laws and court orders of other states. However, if the divorce was originally granted by a court with no jurisdictional authority, a state is free to disrega rd it. In a divorce proceeding where one spouse is not present (an EX PARTE proceeding), the divorce is given full recognition if the spouse received proper notice and the original divorce forum was the BONA FIDE domicile of the divorcing spouse. However, a second state may reject the divorce decree if it finds that the divorce forum was improper. State Courts are not constitutionally re- quired to recognize divorce judgments granted in foreign countries. A U.S. citizen who leaves the country to evade divorce laws will not be protected if the foreign divorce is subsequently challenged. However, where the foreign divorc e court had valid jurisdiction over both parties, most U.S. courts will recognize the foreign court’s decree. The only way that an individual may obtain a divorce is through the state. Therefore, under the Due Process Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution, a state must make divorce available to everyone. If a party seeking divorce cannot afford the court expenses, filing fees, and costs associated with the serving or publication of legal papers, the party may file for divorce free of charge. Most states offer mediation as an alternative to court appearance. Mediation is less expensive and less adversarial than appearing in public court. In January 1994 the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA- TION Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services published a report entitled Responding to the Needs of the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant. The committee recognized that a growing number of persons are divorcing pro GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 508 DIVORCE se, or without the benefit of an attorney. Some of these persons are pro se litigants by choice, but many want the assistance of an attorney and are unable to afford one. In response to this trend, the committee offered several ideas to the state bar associations and state legislatures, including the formation of simplified divorce pleadings and the passage of plainly worded statutes. The committee also endorsed the creation of courthouse day care for children of divorcing spouses, night-court divorce sessions, and workshop clinics that give instruction to pro se divorce litigants. Many such programs are currently operating at distr ict, county, and family courts around the United States. In the United States, divorce law consists of 51 different sets of conditions—one for each state and the District of Columbia. Each state holds dear its power to regulate domestic relations, and peculiar divorce laws abound. Nevertheless, divorce law in most states has evolved to recognize the difference between regulating the actual decision to divorce and regulating the practical ramifications of such a decision, such as property distribution, support obligations, and child custody. Most courts ignore marital fault in determining whether to grant a divorce, but many still consider it in setting future obligations between the parties. To determine the exact nature of the rights and duties relating to a divorce, one must consult the relevant statutes for the state in which the divorce is filed. FURTHER READINGS American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services. 1994. “Responding to the Needs of the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant.” Chi- cago: American Bar Association. Boumil, Marcia M., et al. 1994. Law and Gender Bias. Littleton, Colo.: Rothman. Legalines on Domestic Relations—Keyed to Wadlington and O’Brien’s Cases and Materials. 2009. Eagan, MN: West. Mather, Lynn. 2003. “Changing Patterns of Legal Represen- tation in Divorce: From Lawyers to Pro Se.” Journal of Law and Society 30 (March). Phillips, Roderick. 1991. Untying the Knot: A Short History of Divorce. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ. Press. Wardle, Lynn D. 1994. “Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture.” Utah Law Review (spring). Woodhouse, Barbara Bennett. 1994. “Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era.” Georgetown Law Journal 82. CROSS REFERENCES Annulment; Family Law; Premarital Agreement. v DIX, DOROTHEA LYNDE Dorothea Lynde Dix was a remarkably fore- sighted educator and social reformer who made major contributions to the welfare of persons with mental illness, prisoners, and injured Civil War soldiers. Dix was born on April 4, 1802, in Hampden, Maine. Her father, Joseph Dix, was an alcoholic and circuit-riding Methodist preacher who req uired young Dorothea to spend her time laboriously stitching and pasting the thick religious tracts he wrote and sold during his travels. Although considered a strict and sometimes abusive father, Joseph Dix taught his daughter to read and write at an early age. Dix, in turn, t aught reading and writing to her two younger brothers. Her mother, Mary (Bigelow) Dix, suffered from depression that made it difficult for her to care for her three children. At age 12, Dix lived briefly with her father ’s mother in Boston and then moved in with an aunt in Worcester, Massachusetts. Although her grandmother helped with her education, Dix had little formal training. Gifted with strong beliefs and intellectual abilities, Dix, at age 14, began teaching young girls a rigorous curricu- lum that she had created with emphasis on the natural sciences and ethical respo nsibilities. In 1821 Dix moved back to Boston and opened a private school on property belonging to her grandmother. Dix combined teaching with a prolific schedule of writing books and religious tracts, including Meditations for Private Hours (1828), The Garland of Flora (1829), and American Moral Tales for Young Persons (1832). One of her best known and most-often reprinted publications was Conversations on Common Things, which was published in 1824 as a guide to help parents answer everyday questions, such as “Why do we call this day Monday?” and “What is tin?” After her father’s death in 1821, Dix used her income to support her mother and her two younger brothers who had come to live with her in Boston. In addition to the private school she ran, Dix also conducted free evening classes for indigent children. She read prodigiously, con- tinued to study the natural sciences as well as history and literature, attended public lectures, and met the leading members of Boston’s intellectual and religious communities. She made the acquaintance of many Unitarians MAN IS NOT MADE BETTER BY BEING DEGRADED ; HE IS SELDOM RESTRAINED FROM CRIME BY HARSH MEASURES , EXCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF FEAR PREDOMINATES IN HIS CHARACTER ; AND THEN HE IS NEVER MADE RADICALLY BETTER FOR ITS INFLUENCE . —DOROTHEA DIX GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DIX, DOROTHEA LYNDE 509 and became friends with William Ellery Chan- ning, the famed pastor of Unitarian Federal Street Church in Boston and his wife Julia Allen Channing. Never robust, Dix suffered intermittently from depression and chronic upper respiratory infections variously attributed to tuberculosis and malaria. Her illnesses would flare up from time to time, exacerbated by the demanding schedule she kept and she developed a pattern of cutting back briefly on her work until she was able to resume her tasks. In 1836 Dix broke down while trying to care for her ill grand- mother in addition to all her other duties and it became clear that she would need to take an extended period of rest. She closed her school and sailed to Europe where she stayed in Liverpool, Eng land, with William Rathbone and his wife who were friends of the Channings. Rathbone was a prominent humanitarian and philanthropist who intro- duced Dix to a number of social welfare advo- cates including prison reformer Elizabeth Fry and William Tuke, a Quaker who had opened the York Retreat for the Mentally Disordered and who pioneered the theory of humane treatment for persons with mental illness. While Dix was in England, both her mother and her grandmother died, the latter leaving Dix a large inheritance. The income from the inheritance and royalties from her books were sufficient to give Dix a comfortable living for the rest of her life. Dix returned to Boston in 1838 and spent several years visiting friends and family members and traveling to var ious points of interest. In 1841 a ministerial student asked Dix to teach a Sunday school class to a group of women incarcerated in the East Cambridge Jail in Massachusetts. Her first visit to the jail marked a turning POINT in her life. After teaching the class, Dix toured the jail. On the lower level she found the “dungeon cells” that housed inmates considered to be insane. Dix was horrified to find men, women, and children, half-naked and underfed, chained to walls, and forced to sleep on the floors of the filthy unlit cells. Dix immediately took action. She surveyed every jail, poorhouse, and prison in Massachu- setts. In 1843, she delivered a report to the ▼▼ ▼▼ Dorothea Lynde Dix 1802–1887 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1802 Born, Hampden, Maine 1820 Missouri Compromise enacted, limiting slavery 1821 Opened private school in Boston, Massachusetts 1841 Visited jail and sees plight of "insane" prisoners 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act passed 1857 Supreme Court issues Dred Scott decision; Missouri Compromise unconstitutional 1861–65 Civil War 1877 Reconstruction ends, federal troops removed from the South 1868 Fourteenth Amendment ratified, mandated that states provide equal protection and due process to all persons 1843 Delivered report on mentally ill to Massachusetts state legislature 1845 Published treatise suggesting prison reforms 1854 Congress passed, but president vetoed, federal funding for state mental hospitals 1867 Resumed work on behalf of mentally ill persons 1861 Appointed Superintendent of Union Army Nurses ❖ 1887 Died, Trenton, N.J. Dorothea Dix. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 510 DIX, DOROTHEA LYNDE Massachusetts state legislature. Legislators and others at first criticized the report and denied the charges. When Dix’s charges were sustained by independent observations, the legislature allocated funds to expand the State Mental Hospital at Worcester. Dix continued her investigations in other states, first in New England and eventually nationwide. Dix traveled the country systemati- cally collecting data that she would then present in reports (called “memorials”) to various state legislatures. Seeking the establishment of state- supported institutions, Dix would lobby state officials and influen tial persons and attempt to raise a public outcry over the dreadful condi- tions she had found. Until Dix began her campaign to better the lives of persons with mental illness, the popular assumption was that persons who were insane were incurable and did not feel deprivation in the same way as ordinary persons. Dix was among the first to espouse the theory that insanity was treatable and that better living conditions could do much to help persons with mental illness. In three years, the indefatigable Dix trav eled more than 30,000 miles crusading for her cause. Her labors proved highly successful. In 1843, when she delivered her first memorial, there were 13 mental institutions in the United States. Several decades later, that number had grown to 123 with Dix helping to found 32 of them. In addition, Dix’s efforts played a major part in the founding of 15 schools for what were then called the “feeble-minded,” a school for blind persons, and a number of training schools for nurses. Buoyed by her success, Dix next set out to accomplish her goal of persuading Congress to set aside five million acres in federal land grants; the idea was that income from the land trusts would be used to endow state mental hospitals. In 1854 Congress passed the legisla- tion she sought. Although President MILLARD FILLMORE favoredthebill,itdidnotreachhis desk before the en d of his term. The bill was vetoed by Fillmore’s successor, President FRANKLIN PIERCE,thusdashingthehopesof Dix and her supporters of establishing federal funding for mentally ill persons. Eventually, in 1855, Congress provided funds for the found- ing of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Was hington, D.C., which remains t he oldest large mental hospital that is federally funded. Worn out and discouraged, Dix traveled to Europe to rest. Instead, she found herself investigating the same deplorable conditions in prisons and poorhouses in numerous European countries and once again began campaigning for, and achieving, many reforms. Throughout the 1850s, Dix worked for humanitarian reform in the United States and Europe as well in Canada, Russia, and Japan. In 1845 Dix published a TREATISE entitled Remarks on Prisons and Prison Discipline in the United States, in which she advocated for progressive reforms for ordinary prisoners in- cluding the separation of prisoners according to the type of offense committed and the need for education of prisoners. In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, the 59-year-old Dix volunteered her services and was made superintendent of women nurses for the Union Army. Although she worked until 1866 helping to organize women volunteers, establish hospitals, and raise funds, her capabili- ties as an administrator were questioned and her tenure was viewed as only partially successful. Dix resu med her work with persons with mental illness in 1867. She found many pro- blems including rising IMMIGRATION rates, state treasuries depleted by the war, a growing popula- tion of indigent persons with mental illness, and state legislatures that had new priorities. She continued her fight until ill health forced her to stop. In 1881 Dix took up residence in the guest quarters of the Trenton, New Jersey, state hospital she had helped found. She lived there until her death on July 17, 1887. FURTHER READINGS Brown, Thomas J. 1998. Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Dix, Dorothea. 2008. Remarks on Prisons and Prison Discipline in the United States (1845). Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger. Lightner, David L. 1999. Asylum, Prison, and Poorhouse: The Writings and Reform Work of Dorothea Dix in Illinois. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, v DIXON, JULIAN CAREY Representative JULIAN C. DIXON, who served the West Los Angeles District for 22 years in Congress, left a legacy as a supporting legislator on CIVIL RIGHTS and national security matters. He is also remembered for the differences he made in California and in the District of Columbia in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DIXON, JULIAN CAREY 511 his various roles serving in the U.S. House of Representatives. Julian Carey Dixon was born in Washington, D.C., in 1934. He moved to Los Angeles, California, with his family at the age of ten. He grew up and attended public school in Los Angeles. In 1957 he left to serve in the Army, returning in 1960 to receive his degree from California State University in 1962. Dixon then went on to earn his law degree from Southwest- ern State University in Los Angeles in 1967. Dixon spent only a few years in the private PRACTICE OF LAW before entering a life devoted to politics and public service. In 1972 he was elected to the California State Assembly, where he served for six years. In 1978 he was elected to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives. He served his constituents in the 32nd District of California for twenty-two more years in the House. Throughout his career, Julian Dixon was a strong advocate for civil rights causes. During the 1980s he was chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. He also created a MARTIN LUTHER KING Jr. Memorial in Washington, D.C. The HUMAN RIGHTS Campaign, this nation’s largest lesbian and gay political organization, views Dixon as an advocate for their cause, citing his introduction of the $8.6 billion relief bill after the 1994 earthquake in Los Angeles. The bill, for the first time ever in a federal law, specifically outlawed discrimination of disaster victims on the grounds of sexual orientation. Dixon was also co-sponsor of bills which sought to reduce discrimination against minority groups, includ- ing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and Hate Crimes Prevention Act. From the beginning of his career on Capitol Hill, Dixon earned the respect of his peers and served as chairman of several committees. In 1984 he was Rules Committee chairman of the Democratic Convention. He al so served as chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, better known as the Ethics Committee. This position proved to be Dixon’s most challenging position, particularly in 1989 when then-House Speaker Jim Wright a Demo- crat from Texas, was being investigated for ethics violations. Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich backed the Republicans in their attacks against the speaker, which predictably sparked a defensive tone from Democrats. As chairman of the Ethics Committee, Dixon emerged as a bi-partisan leader who focused on the facts and the true issues presented. In June 1989, Wright resigned. As a result of his leadership in this episode, Dixon was com- mended by members of both sides of the House for his fairness and judgment. More recently, Dixon was ranking Demo- crat on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Additionally, he served on a panel to determine defense spending. Here, he fought on behalf of his constituents for the appropriation of funds to aid southern Califor- nia communities hurt by base closings and defense budget cuts. Dixon w as also a senior member of the Appropriations Committee and, during the mid-1990s, chaired the Washington, D.C., subcommittee where he was able to make a difference in the city of his birth by focusing on public safety and education. During his leader- ship of the subcommittee, Congress began a crackdown on the scandal-ridden administra- tion of Mayor Marion Barry, leading the way for a federal takeover of the finances for Washing- ton, D.C. Because of his efforts in Washington, Dixon is still heralded by the leadership of Capitol Hill and the citizens of the city. Julian Carey Dixon 1934–2000 ▼▼ ▼▼ 19251925 20002000 19751975 19501950 ◆ ❖ ◆ ❖ 1934 Born, Washington, D.C. 1950–53 Korean War 1957–60 Served in U.S. Army 1961–73 Vietnam War 1967 Earned LL.B from Southwestern State University 1972–78 Member of California State Assembly 1979–2000 Served in U.S. House of Representatives 2000 Died, Inglewood, Calif. 1992 Riots broke out in Los Angeles after "not guilty" verdict in Rodney King beating trial GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 512 DIXON, JULIAN CAREY Dixon is, of course, highly regarded and remembered by his own constituents in western Los Angeles. He always came through with aid in times of emergency. In 1992 the streets of Los Angeles were rocked as buildings were broken into, looted, and burned after a verdict of “not guilty” was issued in the trial of two white police officers who beat motorist RODNEY KING in a highly-broadcast, videotaped incident. Dixon acquired emergency funds for the businesses of Los Angeles that suffered in the riots. He also came to the aid of his city after the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Perhaps his most lasting contribution to the Los Angeles community, however, was the effort he put into establishing the MTA, the commuter rail system in Los Angeles. Dixon was well aware that the city needed a solution to its major traffic problems, and high-speed public transportation seemed to be a good answer. The city and MTA recognized his efforts; they renamed one of the busiest rail stations the “Julian Dixon Metro Rail Station.” Dixon was so highly revered by his constituents that he won re-election in the November 2000 election with 84 percent of the vote. He died one month later, on December 8, 2000, at the age of 66 in Inglewood, California. DNA EVIDENCE Among the many new tools that science has provided for the analysis of forensic evidence is the powerful and controversial analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the material that makes up the genetic code of most organisms. DNA analysis, also called DNA typing or DNA profiling, examines DNA found in physical evidence such as blood, hair, and semen, and determines whether it can be matched to DNA taken from specific individuals. DNA analysis has become a common form of evidence in criminal trials. It is also used in civil litigation, particularly in cases involving the determination of PATERNITY or identity. History and Process of DNA Analysis DNA, sometimes called the building block or genetic blueprint of life, was first described by the scientists Francis H. C. Crick and James D. Watson in 1953. Crick and Watson identified the double-helix structure of DNA, which resembles a twisted ladder, and established the role of DNA as the material that makes up the genetic code of living organisms. The pattern of the compounds that constitute the DNA of an individual lif e-form determines the develop- ment of that life-form. DNA is the same in every cell throughout an individual’s body, whether it is a skin cell, sperm cell, or blood cell. With the exception of iden tical twins, no two indi- viduals have the same DNA blueprint. DNA analysis was first proposed in 1985 by the English scientist Alec J. Jeffreys. By the late 1980s, it was being performed by law enforce- ment agencies, including the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), and by commercial labora- tories. It consists of comparing selected segments of DNA molecules from different individuals. Because a DNA molecule is made up of billions of segments, only a small proportion of an individual’s entire genetic code is analyzed. In DNA analysis for a criminal investiga- tion, using highly sophisticated scientific equip- ment, first a DNA molecule from the suspect is disassembled, and selected segments are isolated and measured. Then the suspect’s DNA profile is compared with one derived from a sample of physical evidence to see whether the two match. If a conclusive nonmatch occurs, the suspect may be eliminated from consideration. If a match occurs, a statistical analysis is performed to determin e the probability that the sample of physical evidence came from another person with the same DNA profile as the suspect’s. Juries use this statistical result in determining whether a suspect is guilty or innocent. Although DNA analysis is sometimes called DNA fingerprinting, this term is a misnomer. Because the entire DNA structure of billions of compounds cannot be evaluated in the same way that an entire fingerprint can, a so-called match resulting from DNA typing represents only a statistical likelihood. Thus, the results of DNA typing are not considered absolute proof of identity. A DNA nonmatch is considered conclusive, however, because any variation in DNA structure means that the DNA samples have been drawn from different sources. An example from the early 1990s illustrates the way in which DNA EVIDENCE is used in the criminal justice system. After a Vermont woman was kidnapped and raped in a semi-trailer truck, police identified Randolph Jakobetz, a truck driver, as a suspect in the crime. Officers searched the trailer that Jakobetz had hauled on the night of the crime and found hairs matching those of the victim. After arresting Jakobetz, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DNA EVIDENCE 513 law enforcement officials sent a sample of his blood to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C., for DNA analysis and for comparison with DNA taken from semen found in the victim shortly after the crime. At Jakobetz’s trial, an FBI expert testified that the blood and semen samples were a “match,” concluding that there was one chance in 300 million that the semen samples could have come from someone other than Jakobetz. Based on this and other strong evidence, Jakobetz was convicted and sentenced to almost 30 years in prison. Jakobetz appealed the decision, claiming that DNA profiling was unreliable and that it should not be admitted as evidence. In the first major federal decision on DNA profiling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision to admit the DNA evidence (United States v. Jakobetz, 955 DNA Evidence: Boon or Boondoggle for Criminal Justice? S ince its first use in the late 1980s, DNA EVIDENCE has been a subject of controversy in the U.S. criminal justice system.Althoughcourtshaveincreasingly allowed DNA analysis to be admitted as evidence, doubts about the propriety of such evidence remain. In general, the debate over DNA evidence pits those such as prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are eager to use it as a tool to fight crime against those, particularly defense attorneys, who claim that it is unreliable and will lead to the wrongful conviction of innocent people. Law enforcement officials and pros- ecuting attorneys are quick to identify the benefits of DNA evidence for the criminal justice system. DNA evidence, they argue, is even more useful than fingerprinting, with several advantages over that more traditional tool of inves- tigation. DNA evidence is more readily available in criminal investigations than are legible FINGERPRINTS because body fluids and hair are more likely to be left at the scene of a crime. DNA evidence is also “robust”; that is, it does not decay or disappear over time. The DNA in a piece of physical evidence such as a hair may be examined years after a crime. Law enforcement officials have con- fidence in the reliability of DNA analysis performed by commercial and govern- ment forensic laboratories. They main- tain that innocent people have no need to worry about the use of DNA evidence in the legal system. In fact, they argue, DNA evidence will help to ensure that innocent suspects are not convicted because the DNA of such suspects will not match that taken from crime-related samples. Proponents of DNA evidence fear that successful courtroom attacks on its reliability will erode public confidence in its use, giving the state less power in bringing criminals to justice. But most remain confident that it will be a permanent part of criminal investigation. According to Eric E. Wright, an assistant attorney general for Maine, “The history of forensic DNA evidence consistently and ever increasingly demonstrates its reliability. It has been subjected to savage scrutiny unlike any FORENSIC SCIENCE before, and it has survived. Soon the only wonder about DNA evidence will be: What was all the fuss about?” Defense attorneys and others who are skeptical about DNA evidence strongly disagree with many of these claims. While generally accepting the scientific theory behind DNA evidence, including its ability to exculpate the innocent suspect, they assert that it is not nearly as reliable in practice as its proponents claim. They argue that DNA evidence may be unreliable for any number of reasons, including contami- nation owing to improper police proce- dures and faulty laboratory work that may produce incorrect results. Scandals in local, state, and federal crimes labs over DNA testing have added strength to this argument. Barry C. Scheck is a leading critic of DNA evidence. A professor at the BENJA- MIN N . CARDOZO School of Law, a defense attorney in several notable cases involv- ing DNA evidence, and an expert for the defense in the celebrated 1995 MURDER trial of O. J. SIMPSON, Scheck has led the movement for increased scrutiny of DNA evidence. Conceding that “there is no scientific dispute about the validity of the general principles underlying DNA evi- dence,” he nevertheless argued that serious problems with DNA evidence remained. He found particular fault in the work of forensic laboratories and pointed to research that showed that as many as 1-4 percent of the DNA matches produced by laboratories were in error. Laboratories denied such claims. Scheck also criticized the procedures used by laboratories to estimate the likelihood of a DNA match. Because juries consider the probabilities generated by the labs—figures such as one in 300 million or one in 5 million—when asses- sing the validity of DNA results, it is important to ensure that they are accurate. DNA critics assert that statistical estimates of a match may be skewed by incorrect assumptions about the genetic variation across a population. In some population subgroups, they claim, indi- viduals may be so genetically similar that GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 514 DNA EVIDENCE F.2d 786 [2d Cir. 1992]). The U.S. Supreme Court later declined to hear an appeal. The Jakobetz case illustrates the way in which the probabilities generated by DNA analysis can be used as devastating evidence against a criminal suspect. Juries have tended to view the statistical results of this analysis as highly incriminating, which has caused many defense attorneys to challenge the validity of the results, and many prosecuting attorneys to defend them. At the same time, defense lawyers have used DNA analysis as evidence to reverse the con- victions of their clients. Legal History of DNA Evidence In general, state and federal courts have incre- asingly accepted DNA evidence as admissible. The first state appellate court decision to uphold the admission of DNA evidence was Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. App. 1988), and the a DNA match is more likely to occur when comparing samples drawn from within that subgroup. Examples of such subgroups are geographically isolated populations or tightly knit immigrant or religious communities. Other pro- blems may occur in cases where suspects are closely related to one another. Critics call for more research on population substructures and DNA similarities with- in them, in order to get a better under- standing of statistical properties. In response to these arguments, proponents of DNA analysis maintain that the importance of frequency calcula- tions has been overrated. They claim that such calculations are, if anything, conser- vative. Furthermore, they argue that a match itself is more important than a frequency calculation and that questions of how to calculate frequency should not mean that DNA evidence is inaccurate. DNA critics call for a number of other procedures to make DNA testing more accurate. They advocate sample splitting, a procedure by which samples of physical evidence are sent to two forensic laboratories in order to better guard against mistaken matches. They also ask that all DNA laboratories be required to undergo proficiency testing through blind trials. Such trials would have laboratories analyze DNA samples without knowing whether the analysis was being done for an actual investiga- tion or for evaluation purposes only. Blind trials would yield error rates for each laboratory that could be given to a jury to help it weigh the significance of DNA evidence. Blind trials would also provide incentives for laboratories to lower their error rates. Criminal defense lawyers have also called for state-funded access to the services of experts who can evaluate the handling and analysis of DNA evidence. These “counter experts” would give the defense a chance to scrutinize DNA evidence more closely. Defense attorneys also assert the need for access to laboratory records and physical samples for retesting. Providing this access would require the state to preserve samples. Prosecutors and attorneys have con- tinued to identify new uses for DNA in law enforcement and in the legal system. In 2001 a Wisconsin appeals court upheld the validity of a criminal warrant for the arrest of “John Doe 12,” issued for a 1994 RAPE case just days before the STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS was to expire. What made the warrant noteworthy was that the suspect was identified only by his DNA profile. This was the first known case in which prosecutors sought arrest warrants based solely on a DNA description. When a DNA evaluation matched the DNA of “John Doe 12” with Bobby Richard D abney Jr., the state replaced “John Doe” with Dabney ’s name. Dabney’s attorney had sought to dismiss the claim because Dabney was not named in the origi nal complaint until after a six-year statute of limita- tions had expired. Following this decision, the Wiscon- sin state legislature amended the law governing the statute of limitations. This law expressly addressed DNA evidence and extended the time limits for such cases. The amendments permit prosecu- tion any time within 12 months of the time a DNA match results in a probable identification of a person. In another legal first, attorneys for PLAINTIFF Nanette Sexton Bailey of West Palm Beach, Florida, used DNA evidence found on bed sheets to allege ADULTERY on the part of her husband in a pending divorce matter. Five years into their marriage, the couple mutually agreed to amend their prenuptial agreement to include a “bad boy clause,” guaranteeing Sexton $20,000 per month for her husband’s infidelity. When she found a nightgown and stained bed sheets in their home, she wrapped them in a plastic bag. When the sheets and nightgown were examined by a Denver laboratory, it con- firmed that the DNA on the items belonged to another woman. Although the husband eventually challenged the “bad boy” clause, the judge ruled that the DNA evidence was admissible as evi- dence of the adultery. Science may eventually solve many of the problems regarding DNA evi- dence. In the meantime, debate over its use led to changes that will allow courts and juries to better assess the guilt or innocence of criminal suspects. FURTHER READINGS Committee on DNA Forensic Science. 1996. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Federal Judicial Center. 2000. Reference Man- ual on Scientific Evidence. New York: Lexis. National Institute for Justice. 2001. Under- standing DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service Providers. Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Justice. CROSS REFERENCE Forensic Science. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DNA EVIDENCE 515 first major federal court decision to uphold its admission occurred in Jakobetz. By the mid- 1990s, most states’ courts admitted DNA test results into evidence. No court has rejected DNA evidence on the grounds that the underlying scientific theory is invalid. However, some courts have excluded it from evidence because of prob lems with the possible contamination of samples, questions surrounding the significance of its statistical probabilities, and laboratory errors. Several states have passed laws that recognize DNA evidence as admi ssible in criminal cases, and others have enacted laws that specifically admit DNA evidence to help resolve civil paternity cases. The admissibility of novel SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE such as DNA profiling is governed by two different judicial tests or standards: the Frye, or general acceptance, standard, and the Daubert, or relevancy-reliability, standard. The Frye test, which comes from the 1923 case Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.), holds that the admissibility of evidence gathered by a specific technique (such as DNA analysis) is determined by whether that technique has been “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” In Frye, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that a lie- detector test using a blood-pressure reading was not admissible as evidence. By the 1970s, 45 states had adopted this common-law stan- dard for the admission of novel scientific evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court overruled use of the Frye test in federal courts in its 1993 decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469. In Daubert, the Court held that the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE , enacted in 1975, govern the admission of novel scientific evidence in federal courts. It found that Frye provides too stringent a test and that it is incompatible with the federal rules, which allow the admission of all evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the actio n more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” (Fed. R. Evid. 401). The Court found that judges have a responsibility to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” In general, courts that have used the Daubert standard have been more likely to admit DNA evidence, although many jurisdic- tions that have relied on Frye have permitted it as well. Nearly all cases in which DNA evidenc e has been ruled INADMISSIBLE have been in jurisdictions that have used Frye. States are free to adopt their own standards for the admission of evidence and have increasingly adopted the Daubert standard. By 2006 a majority of states had generally adopted the Daubert standard, though the individual states vary about how they apply this standard. A minority of states continue to apply either the Frye standard or a standard that differs from both Daubert and Frye. Use of DNA Evidence A report issued by the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT in 2002 indicated that two-thirds of chief prose- cutors in the United States rely on DNA testing during investigations and trials. The use of DNA evidence has exonerated at least ten individuals who were wrongly convicted of MURDER and faced the death penalty, whereas the sentences of more than 100 others convicted of lesser crimes were overturned based upon DNA evidence. The FBI maintains a database that may be used to compare DNA samples from unsolved state and federal crimes. Since its inception in 1992, the FBI database has made more than 5,000 matches, thus allowing law enforcement officials to solve crimes that might not have been solved without the use of DNA. The FBI crime laboratory dominated re- search in forensic sciences for much of the 1980s and 1990s. However, allegations surfaced in 1995 that suggested scientists at the crime lab had tainted evidence related to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. A former chemist in the lab, Frederic Whitehurst, testified before the House Com- mittee on the Judiciary that the FBI had knowingly drafted misleading scientific reports and pressured FBI scientists to commit PERJURY by backing up the false reports. These allega- tions injured the FBI’s reputation and led to speculation in the late 1990s that prosecutors could not rely on the FBI’s analysis of DNA evidence. Even as the FBI rebuilt its reputation, other questions surrounding the use of DNA evidence have ari sen since the late 1990s. In 1999 the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE issued a report stating that GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 516 DNA EVIDENCE evidence from at least 180,000 unsolved RAPE cases had not been submitted for testing. A 2002 report by USA Today suggested that several thousand pieces of evidence from rape and HOMICIDE cases had not been submitted for DNA testing, so they do not appear in the FBI’s database. In 2000 Congress allocated $125 million to support the national DNA database system, including $45 million designated to allow states to test evidence from unsolved crimes. However, several states claim that their law enforcement officials are so swamped with current cases that they cannot test older, unsolved cases. Moreover, a small number of states—primarily New York, Florida, Virginia, and Illinois—have aggressively developed their own DNA databases and have contributed heavily to the FBI’s system. These states accounted for more than half of the FBI’s DNA matches between 1992 and 2002. Use of DNA evidence to overturn criminal convictions remains a common topic of discus- sion among legal and criminal justice experts, as well as the popular media. One of the most closely followed cases involved the convictions of five young men for the rape of a jogger in Central Park in New York City in 1989. The five men in the case, dubbed the “Central Park Jogger Case,” served sentences ranging from seven to eleven years for the incident. However, another man, Matias Reyes, who was convicted for murder in 1989, confessed to the rape. Testing confirmed that the semen found in the victim and on the victim’ssockmatchedReyes’sDNA. Upon receiving the new evidence, the New York County district attorney’s office asked the New York State Supreme Court to overturn the convictions of the five men. Several groups, including women’s rights groups, cited this case as an example of why law enforcement should be more proactive in pursuing unsolved rape cases through the use of DNA testing. In 2004 Congress passed the Justice for All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, to expand access to DNA testing for rape victims and convicted felons. The total funding provided in the statute amounted to $1.4 billion. However, President GEORGE W. BUSH refused to allocate the full amounts called for in the statute, drawing fire from Democrats who supported the bill. By 2009 several states as well as the FBI had announced significant expansions of their DNA databases. Authorities began taking DNA samples from thousands of people who had been accused of crimes but not yet convicted. CIVIL RIGHTS activities, including t he AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION , have argued against such programs, noting that these programs have converted the United States into a “genetic surveillance society.” FURTHER READINGS Bennett, Margann. 1995. “Admissibility Issues of Forensic DNA Evidence.” University of Kansas Law Review 44 (November). Federal Judicial Center. 2000. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. New York: LEXIS. Jurs, Andrew. 2009 “Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting- Edge Science in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies.” Connecticut Law Review. November. Moore, Solomon. 2009. “F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases,” New York Times Robinson, Robert. 2009. “Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma- ceuticals and the Local Construction of Reliability.” Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology. 19. Wright, Eric E. 1995. “DNA Evidence: Where We’ve Been, Where We Are, and Where We Are Going.” Maine Bar Journal 10 (July). CROSS REFERENCE Forensic Science DOCK To curtail or diminish, as, for example, to dock a person’s wages for lateness or poor work. The cage or enclosed space in a criminal court where prisoners stand when brought in for trial. DOCKET To enter the dates of judicial proceedings scheduled for trial in a book kept by a court. In practice, a docket is a roster that the clerk of the court prepares, listing the cases pending trial. An app earance docket contains a list of the appearances in actions and a brief abstract of the successive steps in each case. A judgment docket is a listing of the judgments entered in a particular court that is available to the public for examination. Its purpose is to give official notice of the existence of liens or judgments to interested parties. A docket fee is a sum of money charged for the docketing of a case or a judgment or a set amount chargeable as part of the costs of the action. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DOCKET 517 . recognized that a growing number of persons are divorcing pro GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 508 DIVORCE se, or without the benefit of an attorney. Some of these persons are pro se. crime. Officers searched the trailer that Jakobetz had hauled on the night of the crime and found hairs matching those of the victim. After arresting Jakobetz, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD. of a case or a judgment or a set amount chargeable as part of the costs of the action. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DOCKET 517