A Companion to the History of Economic Thought - Chapter 30 docx

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 507 CHAPTER THIRTY The Sociology of Economics and Scientific Knowledge, and the History of Economic Thought A. W. Bob Coats 30.1 INTRODUCTION The title of this essay conveys only a hint of the terminological and substantive confusion, yet also the promise, suggested by the loosely interlinked network of subjects (disciplines, sub-disciplines, and fields) to which it refers. Some of these subjects are venerable and comparatively static, whereas others, of more recent origin, are not merely rapidly expanding and overlapping, but also changing their shape and content. (Current general terminology includes “the sociology of knowledge,” “the sociology of science,” “the sociology of scientific knowledge,” “social studies [or theories] of science,” “science as social knowledge,” “science studies [or theory],” “the science of science,” and “social economics.” More specific terms such as “the economics of science” and the “economics of scientific know- ledge” suggest possibilities for further, perhaps even endless, terminological proliferation. However, in recent years there seems to have been an increasing tendency to use the portmanteau term “science studies.”) This state of affairs may be stimulating to scholars working or specializing in these branches of know- ledge, but it is somewhat bewildering to newcomers and students who are trying 508 A. W. BOB COATS to take their bearings and find their way through the substantial volume of relevant literature. The following account is subdivided into five sections: • Section 30.2 is a brief introduction to Schumpeter’s conception of economic sociology, which originated in 1912, and its relationship to sociology, economic history, and the history of economic thought. His unfinished posthumous His- tory of Economic Analysis (1994 [1954]) covers a much broader territory than the title suggests. • Between Schumpeter’s death in 1950 and the extraordinary impact of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970 [1962]), the most influential American version of the sociology of science was Robert Merton’s functional- ism. His most significant writings appeared between the late 1930s and The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (1973). The discussion of Merton’s ideas in section 30.3 leads to a brief consideration of Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions and the “social conditioning” of economics. • From the early 1970s the Mertonian approach was gradually superseded by new developments that can be loosely grouped under the general heading of “the sociology of scientific knowledge” (SSK). In section 30.4, attention will be focused on only one of the two principal “first-generation” species of SSK – social constructivism – because the second approach, known as the “Strong Programme” and associated with the so-called Edinburgh school, is less directly relevant to the history of economic thought. • A “second-generation” example of SSK – “the economics of science,” or “the economics of scientific knowledge” (ESK) – is the main subject of the short penultimate section 30.5. • Finally, section 30.6 is devoted to general reflections on the past and future of the subjects discussed in the previous sections. 30.2 SCHUMPETER’S ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY As this Companion focuses on the history of economic thought, it is appropriate to begin by considering the views of that outstanding master of the discipline, Joseph A. Schumpeter, the first major economist to examine what he termed “economic sociology.” Schumpeter’s works provide a direct intellectual link be- tween the founders of economic sociology – Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel, in the period 1890–1920 – and the renaissance of that subject since the later 1970s. As early as the first (1912) edition of his Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Schumpeter outlined his conception of a universal social science that would combine the sociology, methodology, and history of science – of which the history of economic analysis would constitute an integral part. [Shionoya notes that Schumpeter’s conception of the research program of a universal sci- ence has been neglected because the relevant chapter (7) of the first edition of his Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung was omitted from subsequent editions (Shionoya, 1998, p. 436). The present account draws heavily on Shionoya’s work, THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 509 including Shionoya (1996, 1997).] Although he did not participate in the famous Methodenstreit or “battle of methods” between the Austrian and German econom- ists, Schumpeter was inspired by the controversy, and recognized virtues and limitations on both sides in the debate. Indeed, throughout his life he endeavored to develop an approach that would integrate theory and history. He viewed the history of economics as exploring the relationship between the economy and ideas, a field in which the sociology and methodology of science converge. Eco- nomic dynamics, he argued, should be based on economic statics, and combined with economic sociology to provide an analysis of changes in the institutional framework of the economy. He viewed economic sociology as one of the prin- cipal specialized fields in economics (together with theory, history, and statistics), describing it as “a sort of generalized, or typified or stylized economic history” (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 20). “Of these fundamental fields, economic history [he said] . . . is by far the most important,” adding that if “starting afresh,” and having to choose only one field, it would be economic history (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 12, cf., p. 13). It is obvious why Schumpeter’s “all encompassing” approach is attractive to an economic historian with a special interest in the institutional history of economics. In the uncompleted part I of his posthumously published magnum opus, The History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter left only brief and tantalizing glimpses of how he might have developed his views on economic sociology (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], pp. 20–1, “Economics and sociology,” pp. 25–7, and “The scientific process: vision and rules of procedure,” pp. 41–7). As Mark Perlman has observed, he “wanted a vision which embraced and bound together the permanent and exogenous with the sociological–transitory and indigenous [sic], and he failed to find it” (cf., Perlman, 1996, p. 200). Nevertheless, his magisterial volume con- tained many suggestions and aperçus that have stimulated a considerable volume of research on the sociology of economic knowledge (science). To cite a single example of Schumpeter’s penetrating insights, see the History (1994 [1954], p. 47): the professionals that devote themselves to scientific work in a particular field and even all the professionals who devote themselves to scientific work in any field tend to become a sociological group. This means that they have other things in common besides the interest in scientific work or in a particular science per se . . . The group accepts or refuses to accept co-workers for reasons other than their professional competence or incompetence. Remarks of this kind have had a lasting influence on research into the sociology and professionalization of economics. It is often difficult to identify clear turning points in the history of economic and social ideas, and the present case is no exception. In more senses than one, the timing of Schumpeter’s posthumous History was unfortunate for, as Richard Swedberg has noted: “from the 1920’s to the 1960’s economists and sociologists have completely ignored each other and have gone about their business as though the other science did not exist” (Swedberg, 1990, p. 4). Of course, there were some exceptions to this sweeping generalization, such as the American Talcott 510 A. W. BOB COATS Parsons, and numerous non-American authors. But for much of the three decades after Schumpeter’s death in 1950, the climate of opinion was no more re- ceptive than it had been earlier, although with hindsight it is clear that Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970 [1962]) was the harbinger of a new era. 30.3 ROBERT MERTON’S FUNCTIONALISM Prior to the publication of Kuhn’s path-breaking study of scientific revolutions, the leading American sociologist of science was the functionalist Robert K. Merton, whose publications spanned the period from the late 1930s to the late 1970s. Unlike the Marxist tradition in science studies – which had a direct, if limited, impact on economic ideas – the Mertonian writings were only indirectly relevant to economics, although they were influential in shaping the prevailing view of the essential characteristics of science, the social and cultural context of scientific knowledge, and the scientist’s distinctive role in Western society. Starting with the seventeenth century, Merton traced the historical process whereby science had acquired and maintained its twentieth-century cultural hegemony, and emphasized the importance of four central norms: a) Universalism: the criteria for scientific evaluation are not specific to any particular individual or group. Scientific standards are independent of the author and applicable to all. b) Communism: science is an intellectual commune. Scientists share their results and data with the wider scientific community. c) Disinterestedness: scientists (qua scientists) are disinterested in the impact of their work. They do not seek political or financial rewards for their work and can therefore follow an argument wherever it leads. d) Scepticism: no scientific result is accepted without scrutiny by empirical and logical criteria. Scientists refuse to believe any result until it has been demon- strated by scientific standards. (Hands, 2001, p. 181) During what can loosely be termed the “Mertonian era” in the sociology of science, philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science devoted considerable energy to discussing the relative importance of “external” and “internal” influences on the development of science. Of course, the two sides in the debate were not as clearly demarcated as this description might suggest, but on the whole the Mertonians were externalists, whereas the intellectual pendulum subsequently shifted toward internalist explanations – for example, with the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and the leading writers in the sociology of scientific know- ledge movement (to be considered below; see section 30.4). According to a leading latter-day Mertonian sociologist of science, Joseph Ben David, historical studies in the field should be focused on external events, because “the influence of internal disciplinary traditions is permanent and ubiquitous,” whereas “the sociological influences upon the actual products of scientific inquiry THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 511 can only be tenuous and sporadic,” therefore presenting few research opportun- ities (Ben David, 1984 [1971], pp. ix, xxii). As Jan Golinski has observed: The Mertonian model gives institutions a central, but strangely occluded role in the sociology of science . . . [they] arise when they mirror a broader cultural acceptance of the scientific ethos . . . and become vehicles for imparting the norms to initiates, hence sustaining scientific practice over time; [and yet] they remain curiously insub- stantial entities. Although dysfunctional organizations can hinder growth, properly functioning institutions are simply channels to convey the fertilizing values that irrigate the field of science. In an important sense, Ben David’s work is “a sociological history that aims to show how scientists attained independence from social forces.” Three stages can be identified: the creation of a “social role” for the scientist; the achievement of “intellectual autonomy” for science; and the construction of “organizational autonomy in institutions devoted to the subject” (Golinski, 1998, pp. 50, 51; sentence order slightly changed). In what might be termed the “late Mertonian period,” the focus of attention among sociologists of science shifted away from consideration of the norms of science to investigations of “the interplay between social formations of scientists and cognitive developments in the field of science” (Hands, 2001, p. 185). Statis- tical methods were often utilized in citation analysis, content analysis, and histor- ical analysis, in addition to the study of empirical ideas, such as the self-fulfilling prophesy, the Matthew effect, and the nature and significance of multiple dis- coveries. Mertonians undertook valuable studies of the organization of science, university institutionalization, the role of scientific associations, and the signi- ficance of generation differences among scientists (Coats’s work was similar, though not self-consciously Mertonian). Merton himself never questioned the high intellectual status of science, but in the tension between the “technocratic” and the “critical” approaches, J. D. Bernal and the Marxists were in the latter camp (Hands, p. 185). Generally speaking, the Mertonians were moderates, emphasizing the import- ance of the social and cultural factors that shaped the development of science while avoiding the cruder versions of social or economic determinism to be found in some Marxist writings, and in the works of the sociologist Karl Mannheim. More careful and subtle interpretations of social conditions are now available, for example in the writings of Uskali Mäki, who has suggested that at least three distinct kinds of social conditioning are implied in the recent sociology of science literature: 1 The content of accepted theory or belief (or its metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions) is caused (in an unspecified way) by social factors (such as cultures or interests internal or external to science). Here, a social fact causally generates an aspect of science (namely, scientific knowledge). 2 The goals of scientists’ actions are social states or processes (such as credibility or power and their growth). Here a social fact constitutes an aspect of science (namely, scientists’ goals). 512 A. W. BOB COATS 3 The process of the justification of scientific claims is a social process of negotia- tion and rhetorical persuasion. Again a social fact constitutes an aspect of science (namely, the process of justification). (Mäki, 1992, pp. 65–104) Of these, Mäki adds, point 1 has been endorsed by the so-called “Strong Programme” of the Edinburgh school, while points 2 and 3 have been more emphatically studied by the so-called “social constructivists” in ethnographic and anthropological approaches (cf., Mäki, 1992, p. 66; see also the “Commentary” by Coats, ibid., pp. 105–10; and Mäki, 1993b, pp. 76–109). In place of the established Mertonian “uniformitarian” or incrementalist view of the progress of science, Kuhn substituted a “castastrophist” interpretation, centering on the impact of revolutionary paradigm changes. The details of Kuhn’s account are by now familiar and need not be recounted here. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to recall the remarkable intellectual stimulus provided by his synthesis of history, philosophy, epistemology, the sociology of science, and the study of science as a profession. In the longer term, as D. Wade Hands has observed, since Kuhn: No longer is science examined from a purely philosophical perspective; it is now investigated from a much wider range of historical and empirical viewpoints. The result of these changes has been the elaboration of a vision of science that is anti- foundationalist, fundamentally social, much less uniform and much more amenable to a naturalistic mode of inquiry . . . These changes have radically undermined the traditional philosophical approach to scientific knowledge, and opened the door for other, more sociological, approaches that take the collective nature of scientific activity as their starting point. (Hands, 1998, p. 474) Kuhn was, of course, primarily interested in the history of the natural sciences. Nevertheless, his ideas had a considerable impact on a wide range of other disciplines including economics, and there were a variety of attempts to provide a Kuhnian account of the general development of the discipline. Research on the economist’s role and function in society and government was directly stimulated by Kuhn’s ideas. 30.4 THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE In recent years, students of the sociology of economics and economic methodo- logy have drawn a distinction between the older “sociology of science” and the more recent “sociology of scientific knowledge” (SSK), arguing that whereas the former focused on the changing social and cultural context of science, the latter has been more radical, and focused on the content of science (Hands, 2001, pp. 183–4). In accordance with the positivistic, rules-based (so-called “Received View”) of scientific (and economic) methodology, the sociology of science “does not really question the objective validity of science,” whereas “much of the con- temporary [SSK] literature considers even the content of science to be socially THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 513 constituted and contingent (thus neither universal nor distinctive)” (Hands, 2001, p. 183; emphasis added). However, Hands cautions that the distinction between the sociology of science and SSK “is not as crisp as it initially sounds, and it can be difficult to apply in specific cases . . . [thus] it is a useful, but imperfect concep- tual tool” (p. 184). Broadly speaking, the same is true of the difference between the earlier general concepts of the sociology of scientific development (sometimes referred to as Weltanschauungen analyses) and the predominantly local concerns of SSK. Here too, the shift of focus should not be overstated. For example, the earlier “sociology of science (knowledge)” in Schumpeter and later writings considered numerous less general topics, such as the nature and significance of “schools” of economic thought, changes in the academic and other institutions that provided research opportunities, and the functions and control of scientific journals and other publication outlets – matters on which broad national, or even international, patterns have been established, with an obviously translocal range and significance. These can be termed the “institutional,” or “organizational,” struc- tures of science. [See, for example, the numerous research possibilities mentioned in Coats (1993a, pp. 13, 24ff.) and Coats (1993b, pp. 38–48). These papers were originally published in 1984 and 1985, respectively. For pertinent reservations about the concept of professionalization, see Golinski (1998, pp. 67–9).] In the post-Mertonian social constructivists’ accounts, it is recognized that scientific concepts and institutions have been constructed – that is, they are “the outcome of interactions and negotiations among those who participate in them as well as of larger-scale forces affecting society as a whole.” Moreover, “organizations are not regarded as inflexible determinants of individual behavior” (Golinski, 1998, p. 55). Such a view obviously has radical implications for the con- ception of the role of scientific knowledge and organizations in society, especially as applied to the natural sciences. According to Hands (2001, p. 176), the “Strong Programme” (or the Edinburgh school – hereinafter SP) and the social con- structivists together constituted the first generation of SSK authors, beginning in the 1970s. In the following account, however, attention will be focused exclusively on the latter category, since exponents of the SP, unlike the social constructivists, have displayed no direct interest in the history of economic thought. According to Golinski (1998, p. 5), the SP “provided an important inspiration” for the SSK. [Hands treats the terms “constructivism” and “social constructivism” as interchange- able, attributing the latter to Berger and Luckman (1996). He also occasionally describes the exponents of these views as “constructionists.”] In one sense, the relevance of sociological influences to economic ideas and economists’ practices is only too obvious, and too often disconcerting, for it is easy to poke fun at the economists’ scientific pretensions and the claims of “economics imperialism.” Most economists are well aware of the troubled rela- tionship between economic ideas and policy, and few of them cherish the illusion that they are immune from societal pressures and temptations. Nevertheless, they cling to an ideal of scientific autonomy while, at the same time, in many cases seizing the available opportunities to participate in public policy discussion and/or decision-making. Sociological analysis can provide a bridge that links economic methodology with the history of economics. This is especially the case 514 A. W. BOB COATS when methodology is viewed as the study and evaluation of the procedural rules, heuristic principles, and scientific conventions utilized by economists, and the history of economics is focused on the origins, development, and significance of changing styles of professional activity, rather than merely the study of disem- bodied ideas or outstanding individual contributors to the discipline. However, this is not the place to pursue these matters further (cf., Coats, 1993a, pp. 23ff.). With the more recent influence of constructivism, there has been a discernible shift of emphasis in the history of economics literature from “economic thought to economists’ practices” (Emmett, 2001, p. 262). Ross Emmett maintains that constructivism “is not a new form of intellectual history. Rather, it is the applica- tion of certain sociological methods to the explanation of scientific activity” (ibid.). In the constructivist writings, five aspects of scientific practices are singled out: a) How scientists and their communities identify themselves and discipline their conduct; b) the sites of scientific production; c) the rhetorical devices scientists use; d) the use of tools, models and representations of nature; and e) the relation between science and culture. (Emmett, 2001, pp. 262–3) Hands has summarized the characteristics of constructivist literature succinctly, as “hands on, micro, no tight priors, everything negotiable, impotence of nature, and the debunking of the traditional view of scientific knowledge” (2001, p. 93). For a somewhat different list of Golinski’s “five themes,” see Sent (2001, p. 69). In a brief essay, it is obviously impossible to cover the entire range of SSK and constructivist writings. I shall therefore focus on three very different examples that are directly relevant to the history of economic thought, authored by E. Roy Weintraub, Esther-Mirjam Sent, and Yuval P. Yonay. Weintraub has been the most vigorous and outspoken proponent of con- structivism in economics in a number of writings, but especially in his book Stabilizing Dynamics (1991a) and in a conference paper with the same title (1991b). The book is an outgrowth of his work on Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science – the Lakatos of Proofs and Refutations (1976) rather than his Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1978). In his brief “Comment on Weintraub” (in De Marchi and Blaug, 1991, p. 291), Philip Mirowski (1991) claimed that Weintraub’s work “on the construction of the idea of economic stability within the neoclassical research program will stand as one of the milestones in the history of economic thought in the twentieth century” (for serious criticisms of Weintraub’s work, see Hands, 2001, pp. 293–5). Weintraub’s research called for a rare combination of technical expertise in abstract economic theory and an impressive dedication to historical reconstruc- tion. A brief statement of his credo is the following: We must accept that history is not presented to us raw, as a neutral case or data source on which we can perform tests of our methodological theories of how scientific THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 515 knowledge is gained. History is not “out there” waiting to answer our questions or corroborate our hypotheses. History is not found; history is written. It is an author- ial construction to some purpose or other and is itself as much a creative enterprise as is the “theory” it is often “meant” to describe. (Weintraub, 1991a, p. 4) Weintraub attaches paramount importance to the fact that economics, like other disciplinary activities, is undertaken in “interpretive communities,” and is necessarily a social activity: . . . historians of economics seem to have as an audience not only the methodology community but also a community of sociologists who study science as a social enterprise. There is not, however [at least yet!] a subdiscipline within economics based on the sociology of science that corresponds to that subdiscipline called methodo- logy that is based on the philosophy of science. Whether this is because economists in the end disbelieve in sociology as, in Leijonhufvud’s phrase “a lesser tribe with- out a modl as totem,” or whether this is because it is too difficult for neoclassical economists to think about groups as social actors is in the end of no matter. There are not many historians of economics who have an interest in the sociology of the economics profession. (Weintraub, 1991a, pp. 8–9) Nevertheless, in the decade since that passage was published the situation has changed substantially, and for the better. Whereas the central feature of Weintraub’s constructivist approach has been the analysis of sequences of research papers on specific problems in mathemat- ical economic theory (for example, the “existence” of a competitive equilibrium, general equilibrium analysis, and stability theory), Sent’s book is designed to trace and account for sequential phases in the research of a single individual: the rational expectations theorist, Thomas J. Sargent. Using the framework constructed by the sociologist of science Andrew Pickering, Sent provides a subtle and detailed account of Sargent’s succession of intellectual and technical “free moves” (under his own control), “forced moves” (beyond his control), resistance (when significant obstacles are encountered), and the dialectic of resistance and accommodation (Pickering, 1995, p. 52; Sent, 1998, p. 16; for a valuable account of the application of Pickering’s work to economics, see Davis, 1998). Sent’s approach is: inspired by the increased interest of science studies scholars in scientific culture and practice , where culture is defined as a heterogeneous multiplicity of skills, social relations, concepts, theories, and so on, and practice involves cultural extension. (Sent, 1998, p. 14) Sent seeks to identify, understand, and explain the significance of the specific alternatives available to Sargent, the choices that he made, and the consequences of those decisions. They show that even the treatment of rational expectations by this one particular economist had many faces (Sent, 1998, p. 13). In her innovative Introduction, from which the above quotations have been taken, Sent describes ten different “stories” about the rise of rational expectations – 516 A. W. BOB COATS related to availability of new data or use of new techniques or natural development from existing theories or problems with existing theories or linking of theory and econometrics. (Sent, 1998, p. 2) – a task to which Sargent attached great importance. He was seeking to develop a universal economic science “by establishing a tie between neoclassical economic theory and econometrics.” His search was driven more by narrow technical con- cerns than by philosophical goals, for he was not a “big picture” theorist (Sent, 1998, p. 14). Sent obviously does not believe that there is one “true” story of Sargent’s quest for knowledge. As Sheila Dow remarks in her perceptive review, Sent’s promise of an “assess- ment” of Sargent’s “achievements” is not incompatible with the post-positivist rejection of “external” standards, because Sargent’s work is assessed by reference to his own standards, “and this is an important step before proceeding to apply different criteria” (Dow, 2001, p. 424). Dow’s comment recalls the central prin- ciple in Bruce Caldwell’s advocacy of “methodological pluralism” (Caldwell, 1982, ch. 13). Sent’s book is so rich in detail, so well written, and so boldly and effect- ively organized, that it is especially valuable to the nontechnical, primarily historical, reader. It sets new standards in the sociology of economic science literature. The third example of the application of SSK to the history of economic thought – Yuval P. Yonay’s book, The Struggle over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalists and Neoclassical Economists in America between the Wars – is very different. As an avowed constructionist, Yonay rejects the conventional historiography of the dis- cipline “built on clear definitions of schools and approaches,” since it character- izes “any two movements . . . either as completely contradictory or as compatible.” [This is, of course, a caricature. Are there no intermediate cases?] By contrast, the constructivist “treats intellectual schools as labels fluidly assigned to groups either by themselves or by others,” so that the resulting “map of the discipline . . . depends on negotiation among different definitions of the situation” (Yonay, 1998, p. 70; cf., pp. 75, 195). Yonay is an enthusiastic (and uncritical) advocate of the sociological actor- network analysis (hereinafter ANA; alternatively known as ANT – actor-network theory) proposed by Michael Callon and Bruno Latour (1981). This emphasizes the diversity and complexity of the sciences, and denies that there is any absolute standard by which to judge scientific enterprises. A network consists of a mélange of “facts, people, money, methodological principles, theories, instruments, mach- ines, practices, organizations, and so forth,” and these elements are mutually reinforcing. “Consequently, it is difficult to undermine any single link of the network without undermining the others” (Yonay, 1998, p. 22). Admittedly, Yonay adds, it is absolutely [sic] possible that the whole network is based on shaky foundations, but such a claim can be made only by other scientists and scholars who must base their claim on another network, stronger or weaker. (Yonay, 1998, p. 22) [...]... to those of economics As John Davis (1997) has argued the goals of science studies have been to dethrone the notion of an ahistorical and universal science, and to broaden the explanatory scope of the historian On the other hand, economics, at least in its mainstream form, affirms the universality of economics and, in a reductionist fashion, seeks to explain all human action as economic Despite the. .. the appraisal of economic theories: unlike historians and sociologists of natural science, most historians of economics already practice the subject that they want to describe They work in university departments of economics as economists while their history takes only part of their time And yet many historians of economics seem to want to throw away these advantages, preferring to do the sort of. .. rationality – a matter of significance in any consideration of ESK or the economics of science Mäki maintains that the authors who employ such “quasi -economic argumentation” (for example, Latour and Woolgar, and Karin Knorr-Cetina) are not in fact applying economics to science On the contrary, they probably “consider neoclassical economics to be naively reductionist, narrowly individualist, and in general a quite... historians of science but other economists The judges of good work in the history of economics are likewise economists, rather than historians of science in general That, I suppose, is why only a few historians of economics have been caught up with the changes that have happened in the history of science over the last two decades In addition, being on the outside of these debates, perhaps they remain... of history of economics which does not require any special understanding of the subject With a few exceptions, historians adopt the distanced viewpoint of rational reconstruction as their perspective Part of the reason for this must be the very institutional location of historians of economics which confers upon them such a potential advantage The professional reference-group for historians of economics... inherent in the present situation, it may be appropriate to conclude with the appeal of a leading, if somewhat controversial, member of the sociology of science community of scholars, H M Collins, issued a decade ago at a distinguished gathering of economists, historians, philosophers, and sociologists who had assembled at a conference to assess the influence of Imre Lakatos’s ideas on the problems and possibilities... far too crude to reveal the more subtle and intricate aspects of the story that he has undertaken to tell 30. 5 THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE, OR THE ECONOMICS SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF It is now time to turn from SSK to the economics of science and the economics of scientific knowledge (ESK) As Hands suggests, although the development of an economic version of SSK may seem a rather obvious next step in the. .. 2000: Review of Yuval P Yonay: The Struggle over the Soul of Economics Institutionalists and Neoclassical Economists in America between the Wars The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 7(1), 169–71 Collins, H M 1991: History and sociology of science and methodology of economics In De Marchi and Blaug, op cit., pp 492–8 Davis, J B 1997: The fox and the henhouses: the economics of scientific... OF ECONOMICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 521 Callon, M and Latour, B 1981: Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so In K Knorr-Cetina and A V Cicourel (eds.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology Boston: Routledge Coats, A W 1955: Review of Joseph Schumpeter: A History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press Economica, N.S., May,... branches of science studies There is concern among historians of economics that SSK’s focus on economists’ practices will foster an unduly narrow conception of the field and a corresponding loss of contact with the broader, more conventional, interests of historians Likewise, a concentration on ESK and the economics of science may lead to an unduly economistic approach of the kind favored by advocates . 195). Yonay is an enthusiastic (and uncritical) advocate of the sociological actor- network analysis (hereinafter ANA; alternatively known as ANT – actor-network theory) proposed by Michael Callon and. economists while their history takes only part of their time . . . And yet many historians of economics seem to want to throw away these advantages, preferring to do the sort of history of economics. and universal science, and to broaden the explanatory scope of the historian. On the other hand, economics, at least in its mainstream form, affirms the universality of economics and, in a reductionist