A Companion to the History of Economic Thought - Chapter 24 pps

POSTWAR NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS 377 CHAPTER TWENTY- FOUR Postwar Neoclassical Microeconomics S. Abu Turab Rizvi 24.1 INTRODUCTION Postwar neoclassical microeconomic theory was a curious mixture of successes and problems. Its successes include widespread use, as both a basis for all areas of economics and a growing method in other social sciences. The ideas that constrained optimization is the embodiment of individual rationality and that individually rational behavior should be the building block of all social theory have proved very popular. This popularity is belied, however, by very serious churning in the underlying formal theory of neoclassical microeconomics in the postwar period. Indeed, the formal theory can be characterized as having a series of impossibility results that imply a demonstrable lack of progress on the main problems set for the theory. The theory had to be reinvented regularly in response to problems, and applications of the theory are often tenuous inasmuch as the theory is not firm. While this protean character has allowed the theory to survive and become widespread, many of the main interests of microeconomists have been sidestepped. The overall result is breadth of application and use combined with troubling lack of depth. The resulting dynamic is best seen historically. The topic is vast. In order to keep this presentation manageable, this chapter focuses on the main aspects of general equilibrium theory and the pluralist approaches that have come, increasingly, to replace it. 24.2 SAMUELSON’S FOUNDATIONS AND ITS SETTING Postwar neoclassical microeconomics began confidently with Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947). The book arose from Samuelson’s Harvard 378 S. A. T. RIZVI Ph.D. dissertation. As Samuelson’s career advanced, the book’s main mathematical device – the formulation of nearly every economic matter as a constrained optimization problem – became commonplace. Constrained optimization came to represent the economic problem, subsuming Lionel Robbins’s formulation of economics as the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends. Scarcity was represented as constraint and the allocation process involved optimization. Constrained optimization had been a hallmark of neoclassical theory, at least since the work of Vilfredo Pareto, who stated: “The principal subject of our study is economic equilibrium. We shall see shortly that this equilibrium results from the opposition between men’s tastes and the obstacles to satisfying them. Our study includes, then, three distinct parts: 1° the study of tastes; 2° the study of obstacles; 3° the study of the way in which these two elements combine to reach equilibrium” (Pareto, 1971 [1906], p. 106). Maximization (of something good or valuable) and minimization (of something bad or undesirable) often imply goal-directed behavior; constrained optimization became seen as the embodiment of individually rational choice. As such, constrained optimization has reverberated and replicated throughout economics and into related fields (Heilbroner, 1991). The success of neoclassical microeconomics in taking over nearly all of economics and spreading into sociology, political science, and other areas not ordinarily seen as economic rested on the portability and usefulness of constrained optimization as an expression of individual rationality. The basic, fecund mathematical technique used by Samuelson in constrained optimization was the Lagrange multiplier method of differentiable calculus. An indication of Samuelson’s influence is found in Robert Lucas’ Nobel lecture: It was lucky for me that one of my undergraduate texts referred to Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis as “the most important book in economics since the war.” Both the mathematics and the economics in Foundations were way over my head, but I was too ambitious to spend my summer on the second most important book in economics, and Samuelson’s confident and engaging style kept me going. All my spare time that summer went in to working through the first four chapters, line by line, going back to my calculus books when I needed to. By the beginning of fall quarter I was as good an economic technician as anyone on the Chicago faculty. Even more important, I had internalized Samuelson’s standards for when an economic question had been properly posed and when it had been answered, and was in a position to take charge of my own economic education. (Lucas, 1995) As useful and original as Samuelson’s work was, it might best be situated as part of a revival of neoclassical microeconomics that took place in the 1930s and 1940s. Mathematical microeconomics again became prominent after the initial activity – associated with Menger, Jevons, Walras, Pareto, and others – in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Mirowski, 1989). This revival took place at Harvard and Chicago in the United States, at the London School of Economics, and as part of French planning. It was associated with the names of Oskar Lange, Harold Hotelling, John Hicks, Maurice Allais, Abba Lerner, and, POSTWAR NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS 379 of course, Samuelson. They and many other contributors published their works in the Economic Journal, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, and Econometrica – the prestigious publications in neoclassical economics. The culminating statement of the results was Samuelson’s Foundations. It derived demand curves from utility functions and based the production side of the economy on the profit-maximization decisions of firms, both using the calculus. Samuelson and his colleagues provided a basis for the demand and supply sides of the economy with a single method, constrained optimization. While these authors did not successfully solve the general equilibrium equations resulting from these optimizations, they were able to state them. They identified, though they did not successfully pursue, some of the key desiderata of microeconomic general equilibrium theory: the existence, stability, and uniqueness of equilibrium, and the long-sought relations thereof to the theories of money, capital, and growth. These issues were to centrally occupy neoclassical microeconomics for the next forty-odd years. The establishment of equilibria of demand and supply is an important feature of neoclassical microeconomics. An equally important preoccupation has been the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocations. Prior to Samuelson’s Foun- dations, Lerner, Lange, and Allais demonstrated what became known as the two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics: that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, such that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off, and that any Pareto-optimal allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with some redistribution of the agents’ initial endowments. Lerner and Lange had used these results to argue for economic planning and market-based socialism, and engaged with Austrian thinkers in what became known as the Socialist Calculation debate (Lavoie, 1985). But many Pareto-optimal allocations remained from which to choose; an important research project became the determination of the best Pareto optimum. The approach favored by Samuelson, building on the work of Abram Bergson (1938), posited a social welfare function ordering all allocations. The Bergson–Samuelson social-welfare-function approach was to receive a fatal blow, however, due to the Impossibility Theorem of Kenneth Arrow (1951b). Arrow and his associates, Gerard Debreu and Tjalling Koopmans, also challenged the use of calculus in microeconomic theory. 24.3 ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM Postwar activity in microeconomic theory began with Samuelson’s Foundations. The 1950s were ushered in by Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (1951b), also begun as a Ph.D. dissertation. Contributing to the Cowles Foundation monograph edited by Tjalling Koopmans on activity analysis (Arrow, 1951a), Arrow deployed the Cowles Foundation’s axiomatic approach to economic theorizing. After moving to the Rand Corporation, he explored when supra-individual entities such as societies and nations could be said to have well-behaved preferences of the sort attributed to individuals in neoclassical 380 S. A. T. RIZVI economics (the importance of Cowles and Rand in the development of the economics of this period is discussed by Mirowski, 2002; see also Leonard, forthcoming). Arrow’s exploration led him to his Impossibility Theorem, which concluded that under fairly innocuous conditions, including one on nondictator- ship according to which no single individual’s preferences would dominate the social ranking, there were no such well-behaved preferences. This proved to be a remarkably durable result. It is also a negative result and has important consequences for the neoclassical project. Much of economics and politics – and social science generally – is concerned with making statements about collectivities: countries, societies, groups, and institutions. The hope that such statements could have solid microeconomic foundations in individual optimization was devastated by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. It also had other important consequences. For example, the Bergson– Samuelson social welfare function – an attempt to make a statement about which economic allocations were best, as opposed to the imperfect ranking given by the Pareto criterion – was a direct casualty of the Impossibility Theorem. Neoclas- sical economics could not presume to say much about the overall ranking of allocations except in terms of the quite partial ordering implied by the First Welfare Theorem and its emphasis on (Pareto) efficiency. The usefulness of the Second Welfare Theorem was also limited: asserting that any competitive equilibrium could be obtained with a suitable configuration of endowments, the theory was unable to develop a coherent comparative statics by which changes in endowments could relate to changes in equilibria, and this assertion could never approach practical implementation. Arrow’s theorem announced two further troubling and interrelated themes for neoclassical theory. The first is its problem with the aggregation of individual economic relations; this surfaced in Arrow’s theorem itself, in the capital contro- versies of the 1960s (Harcourt, 1972) and in the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu results on the arbitrariness of aggregate excess demands (discussed in section 24.5). The inability to address aggregated economic relations means that the legitimate scope of the theory is circumscribed and its usefulness is bounded. The second, related problem is that the course of neoclassical theory has often been thwarted by internally generated impossibility results. By “internally generated” is meant that it is results of the neoclassical theorists themselves that often have shown the limits of the theory. But this is to get ahead of ourselves. The heady and confident days of neoclassical microeconomic theory continued, as general equilibrium theorists achieved successes in establishing the existence of competitive equilibrium. 24.4 THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM Authors in the 1930s and 1940s did not pay much attention to rigorous demonstration of the existence of a general equilibrium. In the early 1950s, this issue received considerable attention. The existence issue had already been examined by the theorists of the Vienna Colloquium around 1930 (Weintraub, 1983), when POSTWAR NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS 381 they explored the equations that Gustav Cassell derived from Walras’s work (this strand of general equilibrium theory is often called neo-Walrasian). Frederik Zeuthen, Hans Neisser, and Heinrich von Stackelberg noted problems with the Walras–Cassell equations, including the possibility that prices might be negative in a proposed solution. Karl Schlesinger proposed complementary slackness conditions, and Abraham Wald fashioned a general equilibrium proof using inequalities rather than equations. John von Neumann’s work on other issues resulted in the introduction of fixed-point theorems into economics that would become important in existence proofs. The German invasion of Austria, however, meant the end of the Vienna Colloquium, whose members, in large part, fled Vienna into exile in the United Kingdom and the United States. The efforts to demonstrate the existence of competitive equilibrium continued in the United States under the auspices of the Cowles Commission, which began in Chicago (later moving to New Haven). The general equilibrium theorists (Arrow, Debreu, Tjalling Koopmans, Lionel McKenzie, and others) used mathematical techniques resembling those employed by the Vienna group rather than the calculus methods of Hicks and Samuelson. The Cowles economists, including Arrow (1951b), used axiomatic reasoning (which had also played a prominent role in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Beha- vior). They also employed set theory, especially as it analyzed convex structures (Koopmans, 1957; Debreu, 1959). Many of the economic issues that they examined were similar to those considered by Samuelson: consumer theory, producer theory, and the theorems of welfare economics. These were reconsidered with the new mathematical methods, often exaggeratedly contrasted with the earlier calculus: Debreu wrote disparagingly of “calculus and other compromises with logic” (Debreu, 1959). The basic tenets of this approach were given in the methodological treatment of Koopmans (1957) and the summary statement of Debreu (1959). These authors referred to existence proofs of Arrow and Debreu (1954), Lionel McKenzie (1954), David Gale (1955), and Hukukane Nikaido (1956). In these proofs, the general equilibrium theorists demonstrated the existence of competitive equilibrium using fixed-point theorems, such as that of Kakutani, which was related to the fixed-point theorem introduced to the economics literature by von Neumann (1937) in his growth model, printed in English translation in 1945. These accomplishments were important in moving the general equilibrium program forward. Problems were immediately recognized, however. For example, the economic models with which the theorists’ demonstrated existence did not demonstrate the specialization taken for granted in market economies (Rizvi, 1991). However, the most important set of problems was that of the definiteness of the competitive equilibria. While the existence proofs demonstrated that the general equilibrium equations had some solution, they did not show that there was just one equilibrium (uniqueness), that the economy would converge to an equilibrium if it were not in one or were perturbed while in one (stability), and that the precise characteristics of the equilibrium could be found once the data of preferences, endowments, and technology had been given (computability). These important 382 S. A. T. RIZVI concerns had been broached by Hicks (1939), Samuelson, and others, and then by the axiomatic general equilibrium school (Koopmans, 1957; Scarf, 1967). Other important concerns were not addressed in the existence work, but had to be if general equilibrium theory were to be a progressive research program. One was the issue of comparative statics, which answered the question: If an aspect of the data of the problem (preferences, endowments, or technology) changed in some direction, how would the equilibrium change and could we expect this change to be uniformly in a particular direction? This was clearly related to uniqueness. Other questions were: Could existence of equilibrium be proved for imperfectly competitive economies? Could the general equilibrium project help to identify econometric equations? Could general equilibrium theory underpin the theories of money and of macroeconomics more generally? What about capital and growth? In this sense, the demonstration of existence raised more questions than it answered. It was difficult to make progress on these questions during the later 1950s and 1960s; many new ideas emerged, which nevertheless did not conclusively settle matters. For example, the stability of equilibrium was examined by Arrow and Leonid Hurwicz (1958), Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959), and Lionel McKenzie (1960). No sooner had this work begun than counterexamples to the kind of stability sought began to appear: by Herbert Scarf (1960), for instance. The response was to reformulate the concept of stability, as in the work on non- tâtonnement stability (Frank Hahn and Takashi Negishi, 1962). A similar dynamic is seen in work trying to meld the theories of money and of general equilibrium. Donald Patinkin’s (1956) initial attempt was criticized by Hahn (1965) along strictly general equilibrium lines. In response to his own critique, Hahn – along with others – tried to develop an equilibrium theory of money based on transaction costs and sequence economies (Hahn, 1971, 1973; Grandmont, 1977). Likewise, when Edmond Malinvaud (1953) was able to incorporate aspect of capital into the general equilibrium framework, he did so by incorporating an intertemporal equilibrium framework (Milgate, 1979). In each of these cases – from more usual stability concepts to non-tâtonnement stability, from straightforward approaches to money to transactions cost and sequence economy approaches, and from synchronous to intertemporal equilibrium – changes arose because of a lack of progress on the basis of the earlier, more clear-cut concepts. The result was a theory that became increasingly abstruse and rarefied, such that the average practitioner increasingly became disenchanted with and unable to understand or use general equilibrium theory. This process continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s and beyond, as conceptual innovation and ever-greater mathematical sophistication was applied to seemingly fundamental aspects of microeconomics for which clear and simple answers ought to have been available. This trend bears some examination. In the pages of Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, and Journal of Economic Theory, numerous articles seemed to have little relevance to the main concerns of most economists. The mathematics employed was high-powered and arcane. One example was the many works aimed at demonstrating that the core of an economy would converge to its competitive equilibria as the number of agents in the POSTWAR NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS 383 economy increased without limit. In establishing this Edgeworthian conjecture, economists used the mathematically sophisticated tools of measure theory and nonstandard analysis. It was impossible for many economists to read this literature. Debreu and Scarf (1963) demonstrated this conjecture for a case where the set of agents was repeatedly replicated in its entirety. Robert Aumann (1964) did the same for a case in which the economy had a continuum of agents, akin to points on a line. A key mathematical device from measure theory, Lyapunov’s Theorem, came to be widely used. Edgeworth’s conjecture was developed for more and more general cases by Truman Bewley (1973), Werner Hildenbrand (1974), Donald Brown and Abraham Robinson (1972), and Robert Anderson (1978). With each development, the mathematics became harder to understand and the additional insight gained was arguably decreasing. This pattern was seen in several other areas of general equilibrium endeavor. First, general equilibrium theorists became concerned with the existence of general equilibrium with an infinite number of goods. This meant the use of infinite- dimensional vector space theory. The problem was first set by Debreu (1954) and followed up by Truman Bewley (1991 [1969], 1972), Bezalel Peleg and Menahem Yaari (1970), and many others. Secondly, Debreu (1970) realized that some progress on uniqueness could be made if the differentiability assumptions he had once disparaged were applied in very particular settings. He employed Sard’s Theorem from differentiable topology to demonstrate that, in such settings, equilibria are locally unique, such that there is usually a finite number of equilibria. Egbert Dierker (1974) and many others then applied the methods of global analysis to the problem of uniqueness. In these and many other cases, sophisticated mathematics, comprehensible to a few and used in very restricted domains, was employed to pursue a topic that did not really speak to the main concerns of economists. Consequently, a pressing need existed for clarity and progress in general equilibrium theory. In an attempt to provide these, Arrow and Hahn (1971) wrote their epochal textbook, General Competitive Analysis, which heralded the beginning of a decade that was to prove fateful for microeconomic theory. 24.5 THE ARBITRARINESS RESULTS In General Competitive Analysis, Arrow and Hahn restated and summarized the main results of the general equilibrium efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, and formu- lated a series of research questions that would have to be answered for the theory to make progress. The problems were stability, uniqueness, comparative statics, econometric identification, imperfectly competitive general equilibrium, and the microfoundations of macroeconomics. This last topic shows how central microeconomic theory had become to all aspects of economics. In the neoclassical approach, theoretical development proceeded on the basis of individualist foundations. This implied that for a theory to be well founded, it had to have a microeconomic basis. Since all of the formal theory of economics was evidently at the microeconomic level, and formalist 384 S. A. T. RIZVI general equilibrium theory was microeconomics par excellence, no sub-field of economics could be said to have an adequate foundation without becoming, as it were, an applied field of general equilibrium theory. Thus macroeconomics – as a conceptually distinct field from microeconomics – nearly disappeared, except as serving as a label, during this time. E. Roy Weintraub (1979, p. 5) stated quite correctly for the time he wrote in that “even those few economists who argue that current microeconomics does not generate macroeconomics have been extremely shy in their attempts to convince their colleagues of the seriousness of their concerns.” Allan Drazen (1980, p. 293) similarly expressed a common view when he held that “explanations of macroeconomic phenomena will be complete only when such explanations are consistent with microeconomic choice theoretic behavior and can be phrased in the language of general equilibrium theory.” Many economists today recall the period of 1970–85 as one in which nearly every economic statement was considered suspect without some sort of microfoundations; this thinking continues in large measure to this day, albeit with significant exceptions (Rizvi, 1994b). A curious feature of this period was the reliance on representative agent models that purported to demonstrate microfoundations with the use of a single agent or very few types of agent. This particular approach has been criticized very effectively (Kirman, 1992). Suffice it to say, general equilibrium theory as it emerged in the time following Arrow and Hahn’s book had a very large burden to bear. It proved unequal to this task. Such became clear in a spectacular series of impossibility results that might be called Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu (SMD) theory after its main promulgators (Rizvi, 1994b, 1997b). In the 1970s, it was established that despite the availability of well-behaved axioms at the individual level, the aggregate excess demands arising in Walrasian formalist general equilibrium models were arbitrary, except that they satisfied Walras’s Law and a form of continuity. These two properties were needed to establish existence of the general equilibrium solutions, but all of the Arrow–Hahn desiderata mentioned at the beginning of this section required well-behaved aggregate excess demands. Economists eventually came to see that there could be no general results on uniqueness (Mas-Colell, 1977), stability (Sonnenschein, 1973), comparative statics (Kehoe, 1985), econometric identification (Diewert, 1977; Stoker, 1984a,b), imperfectly competitive general equilibrium (Roberts and Sonnenschein, 1977; Grodal, 1996), and microfoundations of macroeconomics (Rizvi, 1994b). The SMD articles showed that formalist general equilibrium theory had reached a dead end: no general results beyond existence of equilibrium were possible. Consequently, when SMD theory became well known by the early 1980s (for example, through the survey by Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1982), it became increasingly clear to many economists that general equilibrium theory could not fulfill a promise of over 30 years. This realization had serious and unsettling consequences. Werner Hildenbrand wrote that: When I read in the seventies the publications of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu on the structure of the excess demand function of an exchange economy, I was deeply consternated. Up to that time I had the naïve illusion that the microeconomic POSTWAR NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMICS 385 foundation of the general equilibrium model, which I had admired so much, does not only allow us to prove that the model and the concept of equilibrium are logically consistent (existence of equilibria), but also allows us to show that the equilibrium is well determined. This illusion, or should I say rather, this hope, was destroyed, once and for all, at least for the traditional model of exchange economies. (Hildenbrand, 1994, ix) It is difficult to overstate the importance of the arbitrariness results for neoclassical microeconomic theory. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem meant that general progress on welfare economics in the neoclassical vein was unattainable; the SMD theory meant that microeconomics could not yield determinateness to general equilibrium. Importantly, it also meant that the project of providing aggregate phenomena with a basis in general equilibrium microeconomics had come to an end (Rizvi, 1994b). The results had an epoch-ending impact. Erst- while champions of general equilibrium theory have had to abandon the field. Christopher Bliss thus wrote, “The near emptiness of general equilibrium theory is a theorem of the theory” (Bliss, 1993, p. 227). Once the arbitrariness results called into question the central status of general equilibrium theory, a stage of pluralism in microeconomics ensued (Rizvi, 1994a, pp. 2–6; 1997b, pp. 275–6). Strictly, the arbitrariness results put an end to neoclassical general equilibrium theory of the Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie variety. Many neoclassical ways of thinking – partial equilibrium arguments, textbook presentations, many applications, and much of economic practice – still persist, even if they might explicitly or implicitly make reference to an underlying general equilibrium model. More in keeping with the emphasis of this essay on theoretical developments, it is notable that rational-choice game theory, experimental economics, and other developments arose in the early- to mid-1980s. In each case, no significant theoretical or methodological innovations were deep enough to have caused this upsurge. Rather, general equilibrium theory vacated the dominant position it had enjoyed since the early 1950s, and these alternative approaches were able to develop and to receive a hearing on issues that the previous theory could not. 24.6 GAME THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS The still-continuing wave of pluralism in economic theory, begun in the wake of general equilibrium theory’s collapse, is seen in the work on complexity (Mirowski, 2002), experimental economics, the market demand approach championed by Hildenbrand, Grandmont, and others, and other approaches (Rizvi, 1997b). The most prominent of the pluralist approaches became rational-choice game theory. (Rational-choice game theory contrasts with game theory that emphasizes rule-following behavior, such as evolutionary game theory.) In the early 1980s, as increasing numbers of economists accepted the gravity of the arbitrariness results, game theory seemed to have certain things in its favor (see contributors to Weintraub, 1992). It dealt with strategic interactions, had a history of dealing with imperfect competition, and had recently been revivified with Harsanyi’s 386 S. A. T. RIZVI (1973) reinterpretation of mixed-strategy equilibrium and Rubinstein’s bargain- ing result (1982). It is arguable, however, that its ascendance occurred mainly because of the vacuum created by the collapse of general equilibrium theory. An example illuminating this transition may be seen in comments by Sonnenschein – a key figure in establishing the problems with general equilibrium theory – who showed a way out of the older theory and toward game theory, despite reserva- tions (Rizvi, 1994a). In commenting on a paper by Oliver Hart that surveyed the unsuccessful attempts at demonstrating an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium, Sonnenschein (1985, p. 176) argued that there was a need for “new blood” and that this was to be provided by rational-choice game theory. He also mentioned his students, Dilip Abreu, Vijay Krishna, David Pearce, Motty Perry, and Leo Simon – who were to be influential in the new trajectory – as influencing his thinking. Sonnenschein quite explicitly linked the need for game theory to the problems with general equilibrium. He wrote that game theory has ideas “that are useful for the theory of monopolistic competition . . . My feeling is that the Negishi line [of approaching imperfect competition via general equilibrium theory], which builds on the Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie theory, has been pretty much played out” (Sonnenschein, 1985, p. 176). This turn toward the theory of games in economic theory gained enormous momentum at this time. Fisher (1989, p. 113) correctly asserted that “game theory [had come] to the ascendant as the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists. That ascendancy appears fairly complete.” Very shortly after Fisher wrote, the textbooks and treatises by Kreps (1990a,b) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) cemented the position of game theory in economic theory. Rational-choice game theory reached beyond pure theory, however, transforming many fields, including industrial organization and international economics. Industrial organization in particular was thoroughly changed; Tirole’s (1988) game-based treatment became the leading textbook in the field. This trend was documented by Peltzman (1991). Rational- choice game theory came to dominate microeconomics and its applied fields (Rizvi, 1994a). Unfortunately, rational-choice game theory suffered from key foundational problems. Once again, the cycle of theoretical difficulty following theoretical transformation arose in neoclassical microeconomics. A key problem for rational- choice game theory was the very concept of rationality in a game-theoretic setting (Rizvi, forthcoming). The primary difficulty is that its common solution concepts (prescriptions as to how to play a game), such as Nash equilibrium, are burdened with extremely implausible common-knowledge assumptions (Brandenburger, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993). Common knowledge means that each player knows that each player knows that each player knows (and so on) each player’s rationality and structure of the game. With such an immense structure of knowledge being assumed, the idea of strategizing, which involves guesswork in the face of a lack of knowledge, is nearly rendered incoherent. Common knowledge also has important negative implications for the economics of asymmetric information, on which a large edifice has been built, usually in the context of game-theoretic models (Riley, 2001). Asymmetric information models are used to illuminate areas as diverse as incentives, auctions, insurance, [...]... come to an end The idea of basing the study of aggregate economic relations on individualist microfoundations was therefore challenged As competitive general equilibrium theory began to have problems, rational-choice game theory – even in the absence of significant theoretical innovation – came to the fore The wholesale adoption of rational-choice game theory meant that implausible assumptions about agent... traditional rational arguments First, rational-choice game theory keeps the rationality but adds the interactivity, hence the common-knowledge problems Secondly, to a large extent, evolutionary game theory removes the rationality Thus rational-choice game theory is an important intermediate stage in the change to the approach to rationality To the extent that individual rationality might be seen as a defining... knowledge had to be granted These resulted in further conundrums, such as the no-trade theorems, which call into question an economics based on asymmetric information The problems of rational-choice game theory led to the rise and acceptance of evolutionary game theory and experimental economics, even though rule-based behavior contradicts the long-held neoclassical assumption of rational maximization by agents... troublesome parts of the theory have been thoroughly eliminated: social welfare functions, well-behaved aggregate demands, and Nash equilibria remain prominent in textbooks Yet many theorists, realizing the significance of the problems, have gone on to seek firmer foundations Their search has led them farther and farther from the easily recognizable neoclassical theory inherited from Jevons, Menger, Walras, and... The lack of progress in general equilibrium theory beyond the demonstration of existence meant that theorists devoted much of their attention to the elaboration of variant concepts and the use of abstruse mathematics, which were far from the concern and understanding of most economists and users of economics The arbitrariness results meant that broad progress in general equilibrium theory itself had... equality, for example) In the words of Samuelson (1995), the response to this confusion was to abandon the model of rational players optimizing against stable preferences” of whatever sort The result has been the development of evolutionary game theory.” In evolutionary game theory, dating from around 1990, agents are rulefollowing rather than maximizing, although one rule can be to maximize in a. .. agents The experimental method similarly contradicts the long-held neoclassical deductive, often axiomatic, style of theoretical development prior to confrontation with facts A constant factor in all of this theorizing, however, is the persistence of the mathematical mode of expression While this aspect of microeconomic theorizing cannot be pursued here, it is worth noting that all of the postwar microeconomic... the “touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals.” Despite these important examples, however, for the main body of economists, social regularities remain a category that must be explained with reference to individual behavior Neoclassical microeconomics therefore now combines pluralism with a measure of confusion Very few of the. .. landscape – a situation in which experiments helped to de-center rational-choice game theory in favor of evolutionary arguments These three examples of pluralism following the arbitrariness troubles with general equilibrium theory – rational-choice game theory, evolutionary game theory, and experimental economics – depart in different ways from the main neoclassical general equilibrium program None deals... the basic explanatory variable in analyzing social behavior, but rather should themselves be explained in terms of people’s individual objectives and interests.” Yet many prominent economists now acknowledge significant exceptions Kenneth Arrow (1994, p 1) has announced that “social categories are in fact used in economic analysis [as] absolute necessities of the analysis” and has cast a skeptical . evolutionary game theory removes the rationality. Thus rational-choice game theory is an important intermediate stage in the change to the approach to rationality. To the extent that individual rationality. in the absence of significant theoretical innovation – came to the fore. The wholesale adoption of rational-choice game theory meant that implausible assumptions about agent knowledge had to. to argue for economic planning and market-based socialism, and engaged with Austrian thinkers in what became known as the Socialist Calculation debate (Lavoie, 1985). But many Pareto-optimal allocations

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