special and very ‘factual’ problems but also to another: pure theory really thrives only in quantitative fields; where problems are of necessity non-mathematical, its scope is fatally limited and it soon fails to attract. We proceed to mention a few examples of the period’s performances in special fields that, however, belonged to autonomous sociology—to sociology that did not borrow methods and results from outside. We choose Durkheim to represent hierology, Ehrlich to represent the sociology of law, Le Bon to represent the sociology of politics. Durkheim’s name must not be omitted from these pages for reasons other than that he was one of the leading sociologists of religion. Besides contributing to several other special fields, he formed a school of sociology that followed a method based upon a principle that was anything but new but assumed a particular form in his hand. He realized that individual behavior can never be explained exclusively from the facts that pertain to the individual himself and that it is necessary to fall back upon the influences of his social environment. This can be done in many ways. Durkheim’s way was to construct a group mind—or, since his method was to explain things by means of material about primitive civilizations, a tribal mind—that feels and thinks and acts as such: since this idea itself is of romantic origin, we may describe Durkheim’s position as a sort of positivist romanticism. The fundamental explanation of the phenomenon of religion, for example, that was derived from this principle may be conveyed by the phrase: religion is the group’s worship of itself. No attempt was made to buttress this theory by anything that resembles professional psychology, social or other. This is why Durkheim’s 24 methods should not be confused with Lévy-Bruhl’s. The time-honored ‘philosophy’ of law, of course, always contained genuinely sociological elements. It survived during the period—in part, thanks to required courses on ‘history of philosophy of law’—but independently of this, there evolved a strictly scientific research into legal phenomena. One of the most important lines of advance consisted in studying the actual legal ideas and habits of the people (‘live law,’ lebendes Recht) and in making generalizations from these, rather than the abstractions of jurisprudence, the basis of the theory of legal practice. This was Ehrlich’s idea which, produced in a small Austrian university under the most unfavorable circumstances imaginable, attracted world-wide, if sporadic, attention by its sheer weight. 25 No other department of social life stood more sorely in need of research guided by scientific interest than did politics, where the dreams of the philosopher had produced ideological issues in utter disregard of the most ob- 24 See, especially, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912; English trans., 1915); but also De la Division du travail social (1893), and Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (1895). There is quite a Durkheim literature. Professor Pitirim Sorokin deals with him in Contemporary Sociological Theories (1928), a work which I take this opportunity to recommend. Lévy-Bruhl is discussed below, sec. 3e. 25 Eugen Ehrlich (1862–1922), Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (1913); see Roscoe Pound, ‘Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,’ Harvard Law Review (1911–2). History of economic analysis 762 vious facts. Political scientists and economists alike, when talking about public policy, kept on constructing pleasant vistas of a public good, which it was the high destiny of ‘statesmen’ to pursue, and of a state that floated in the clouds very much like a beneficent deity. 26 The facts of group warfare, machines, bosses, pressure-group propaganda, mass psychosis, and corruption were looked upon as aberrations—‘party politics’ was looked upon as something that really should not exist—instead of as essentials. But during that period there began something like an awakening of the scientific conscience, and political sociology—the study of political institutions as they actually work—put in an appearance. As a symptom we might choose the delightful book of a delightful man that everyone will read with pleasure as well as profit. 27 But instead I choose the books— successful at the time but smothered by hostile criticism by now—of a man whose merit it was to drive home, with unsurpassable energy, one point that is of fundamental importance in the analysis not only of political, but of any, groupwise action. Le Bon’s performance is one of a large class: the class of performances that make stand out before our eyes, and thus ‘discover’ for analysis, what everyone always knew to be true in everyday life. Everyone knows from experience that in a crowd, no matter whether this crowd is a raging mob in the streets of a non-English town (for English mobs do not ‘rage’) or a faculty committee of elderly professors, we immediately drop to a level of intelligence, morality, and responsibility that is lower than the one we habitually move on when thinking and acting by ourselves. And the merit of having presented this phenomenon with all its implications is great indeed, in spite of everything that might be urged against Le Bon’s material and method. 28 Finally, we must mention three works of considerable importance which had economists as authors—Veblen, Wieser, and Pareto. Appraisal or even characterization is, however, impossible in the space at our command. Max Weber’s sociological work will be noticed in Chapter 4 below. 29 26 We have noticed that A.Smith was remarkably free from that sort of thing. But James Mill was not. He was no ‘statist’ of course, but the ‘grand principles’ of his ideal of a democracy were all the more free from analytic scruple. 27 Human Nature in Politics (1908; 3rd ed., 1914) by Graham Wallas. 28 Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), La Psychologie des foules (1895; English trans., The Crowd; A Study of the Popular Mind, 1896, 16th impression, 1926). From this book stems a considerable literature that has largely succeeded in removing technical objections. But an unpopular idea or fact will never be rescued by rational argument in its defense. 29 Thorstein Veblen’s work was practically all in economic sociology, but I refer specifically to his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). Friedrich von Wieser’s Gesetz der Macht (best rendered by Sociology of Power) appeared in extenso in 1926 but the fundamental idea was already presented in Recht und Macht (1910). Vilfredo Pareto’s Trattato di sociologia generale (1916), in its English translation under the title Mind and Society (1935), enjoyed considerable success in the United States during the thirties: I have never been able to make out whether this was on account of its interesting analytic schema or on account of the profusion of home truths that Pareto expressed about the mortality of decadent liberalism. Some developments in neighboring fields 763 3. PSYCHOLOGY The wealth of the period’s developments in professional psychology—as distinguished from work of more or less psychological nature that was done in other fields—defies description, though most of them grew from older roots and few only spelled new departures. For our purpose, however, we can reduce this wealth to five items: (a) experimental psychology, (b) behaviorism, (c) gestalt psychology, (d) Freudian psychology, (e) social psychology. None of these exerted during that period any real, as distinguished from phraseological, influence upon economic research. But they must be mentioned because of the light their development sheds upon that period’s Zeitgeist and because of their potential importance, which will be indicated in each case. (a) Experimental Psychology. The quest for measurable facts or at least for facts observable by methods other than introspection was, of course, nothing new. Psychology had always been observational in this sense, and many of its votaries had always professed allegiance to the method of physics. But the ‘empiricism’ of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill had been, so far as psychology is concerned, merely programmatic and did not induce actual experiment and measurement. These developed in the preceding period and gathered momentum in the one under survey. The most telling symptom was the advent of the psychological laboratory. Wundt’s Leipzig laboratory may serve as a landmark. 1 Its methods and its spirit exerted formative influence far and wide, even on men like William James and G.Stanley Hall, who quickly outgrew both the narrow scope of experimental psychology in this sense and Wundt’s personal message. The statistical complement of this type of work was much improved later on in the United States (Edward L.Thorndike). One of the many offshoots of it that should, but does not, interest economists intensely is noticed in the footnote below. 2 1 Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) was one of the outstanding and most influential men of science of that age. Not of first-rank originality, but a worker, leader, teacher, writer of almost unbelievable energy and fertility, he left his mark also on other lines of advance (see, e.g., above, ch. 2, sec. 4b). The Leipzig laboratory has a long history and was the ripe fruit of a long line of previous efforts. Wundt was a medical man by training and approached psychology from physiology in a way that makes him a direct descendant of R.H.Lotze (Medicinische Psychologie, 1852). Other names that may serve as stepping stones for readers who wish to follow up the origins of what on occasion has looked in the past, and possibly may look again at some future time, like an important ally of economic theory are these: Johannes Peter Müller, E.H. Weber, G.T.Fechner, Ewald Hering, H.von Helmholtz—physiological psychologists all of them, whose work centers in the problem of Measurement of Sensation (psycho-physics). It is very interesting to note that it has not so far occurred to economists to explore the opportunities this line of research might conceivably offer (see on this ch. 7 below). 2 This is the study of differences among individuals of characteristics and especially of abilities. Many roots and lines should be distinguished, but I mention only one that links up with Wundt’s teaching and is represented by William Stern’s Differen- History of economic analysis 764 Wundt’s laboratory work found a curious complement in his ten volumes of Völkerpsychologie (1900–1920). This is a study of language, myths, and mores that seems to have more to do with the ideas of Hobbes and Vico than with the Leipzig laboratory. It is mentioned here, instead of under ethnological sociology to which it really belongs, 3 because from Wundt’s own standpoint and within his scheme of thought this type of research in fact complements the material that the laboratory produced, though it does so over a wide gap and will not do so at all from any other standpoint than his. It was only much later that genuine psychometrics displayed any tendency to enter the field of social phenomena. (b) Behaviorism. In a sense Comparative Psychology (mainly animal psychology) 4 and, through comparative psychology, Behaviorism, 5 though new departures both of them, may be said to stem from Wundt’s experimental psychology. Since some American economists have shown more interest in the programmatic pronouncements of behaviorists than they have in any other of the developments in psychology, 6 it is important for the reader to realize the severe limitations to which the application of behaviorist principles is subject in the social sciences. Fundamentally, the behaviorist method amounts to a resolution of behavior into objectively observable responses—that is, reactions that we can observe without resorting to introspection or any other psychological interpretation of ‘meanings’—to objectively controllable stimuli: the method accepts the reacting organism as a perfect blank without any propensities of its own (much as Locke had done with the ‘mind’) and (going beyond Locke) avoids the whole complex of concepts and interpretations that is indicated by words like consciousness, sensation, perception, will, urge, or instinct. This is why the behavior of the lower animals and the simplest reactions of man in early childhood are the stronghold of the behaviorist method. Any step beyond the precincts of this stronghold is an achievement that helps us to do without certain tools, the validity of which it is possible to challenge. tielle Psychologie (1911), and another that hails rather from Galton—inasmuch as it implements an idea of his—and will be represented by Charles Spearman’s theory of the Central Factor (see the latter’s Abilities of Man, 1927, with general survey of the field). Both books should be required reading for all economists. Of course, this particular aspect of child psychology and pedagogics is also of obvious importance to us (see, e.g., E.L.Thorndike, Educational Psychology, 1913–14, vol. III). 3 This is also why I mention here the names of Lazarus and Steinthal (to whom is due the phrase Völkerpsychologie, usually translated as ‘folk psychology’ though tribal psychology would express the meaning better), who may be considered as Wundt’s immediate predecessors in this field. 4 See C.L.Morgan, Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1894). 5 The word and the most radical formulation of the program are John Broadus Watson’s; see his Behavior: an Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1914); also Behaviorism (1925). 6 The frequent occurrence of the word Behavior in modern economic literature may be due to this. Some developments in neighboring fields 765 But beyond the range within which it is operational, that is to say, beyond the range within which it is actually possible to produce uniquely determined responses by controllable conditioning, the method itself becomes invalid. A generalization to the effect that man’s behavior is uniquely determined by his environment that cannot be established experimentally is not so much wrong as meaningless. But precisely this generalization is the goal of some behaviorists’ argument: it marks the frontier that separates a fundamentally sound method of research from an ideology, the popularity of which is not difficult to understand. The support it lends to extreme environmentalism is obvious. (c) Gestalt Psychology (Ehrenfels, Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Riezler) develops from a single basic fact: no individual element of any set of elements is perceived or appraised or interpreted individually—a sound in a song, a color in a carpet, or even a glass of wine that is part of a dinner is never ‘experienced’ in isolation and, if it were, it would mean to us something quite different from what it does mean actually, that is, as part of the definite set in which it occurs. All we need to say about this evidently highly important discovery—for it was nothing less, though my formulations sound trivial enough—is, first, that its development belongs mainly to the subsequent period and only the beginnings of it to the one under discussion; and, second, that among the many possible uses to which gestalt psychology may be put in the social sciences, there is at least one of considerable importance. Gestalt psychology may be used in order to arrive at a sensible and non-metaphysical concept of psycho-sociological collectives—such as society itself. (d) Freudian Psychology. Before the end of the century psychoanalysis was a therapeutic method—to be traced to the teaching of J.M.Charcot in Paris—that had scored remarkable successes, especially in cases of ‘hysterical’ inhibition of motion, in the hands of Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. But about 1900, though it always remained a therapeutic method, it began to reveal a very much wider aspect—it began to develop into a general theory of the working of the human mind. The old idea of a subconscious personality and its struggles with the conscious ego was elaborated and made operational with unsurpassable effectiveness by Freud. 7 Again I cannot—and perhaps need not—do more than point to the vast possibilities of application to sociology—political sociology especially—and economics that seem to me to loom in the future: a Freudian sociology of politics (including economic policies) may some day surpass in importance any other application of Freudism, though so far only a small beginning has been made (W.H.R.Rivers). Nor can I go into certain other currents of thought that display important parallelisms with 7 Freud’s writings are now available in a cheap American edition to which the reader is referred. It occurs to me that my few sentences on Freud might be interpreted in a derogatory sense. Nothing could be further from my intention. All great achievements are but final acts of birth that are preceded by long prenatal histories. Freud had a large number of pupils who split up, however, into different groups, some of which cannot be called Freudian any more. But potential fertility for the social sciences is a feature of all of them (all of them I know, that is). History of economic analysis 766 Freud’s, however different in method and aim they may be in other respects. But I will mention T.Ribot. 8 (e) Social Psychology. This branch of psychology is usually defined very widely so as to include all types of research that have anything at all to do with psychic facts relevant to social phenomena and, in particular, all types of research that are based on the concept of a group or national mind or other collectives of this kind. This practice may be useful for the purpose of coordinating all conceivable sources of conceivably relevant facts or suggestions. But we cannot adopt it because it makes social psychology useless as a pigeonhole (the only use we have for the term here): for our purposes there is no point at all in throwing together men and methods that differ as widely as Herder and romanticist philosophy and history, Westermarck or Tylor and cultural anthropology, Ross and ‘autonomous’ sociology, and so on. Thus we are left with a very restricted field in which, during that period, McDougall was the most important figure. 9 He was a professional psychologist and tried to block out a special psychology that would account for phenomena of interaction between individuals or groups and for the shaping influence a group mind, once formed, exerts upon the individuals that are born into it. The fact that he emphasized the creative element and reasoned in terms of instincts and emotion explains why his teaching, after a strong initial success, lost favor in a time that was rapidly becoming behaviorist and environmentalist. Less of a professional psychologist was Lévy-Bruhl. 10 But he was still primarily interested in mind and only secondarily in society. Not many names would have to be added in order to draw up a fairly complete list. Psychological investigations (mostly of a statistical nature) were carried out in the service of several practical specialties—child psychology, I think, coming nearest to relevance for problems of general sociology—that cannot be noticed here. 8 See, especially, Théodule Ribot (1839–1916), Maladies de la personnalité (1885; English trans., 1895), another book that I should make required reading for economists if I could. The parallelism above mentioned is evident not so much from comparison with Freud’s own writings as it is from comparison with the writings of some men who began as followers of Freud, notably, of Alfred Adler. One more book of Ribot’s should be mentioned: Evolution of General Ideas (English trans., 1899). 9 See, especially, William McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology (1908). 10 Of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s (1857–1939) many works it will suffice to mention Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (1910; English trans., 1926). Some developments in neighboring fields 767 CHAPTER 4 [Sozialpolitik and the Historical Method 1 ] [1. SOZIALPOLITIK] ECONOMISTS EXPERIENCED the influence of the new atmosphere as they had experienced that of early liberalism and as they were to experience, in our day, that of socialism. In all these cases this meant not only or even primarily new facts and problems but also new attitudes and (extra-scientific) creeds 2 and hence, for a time at least, revolt against those restraints which in each epoch, as it wears on and as initial enthusiasms cool, the men who are engaged in the work of analysis find it necessary to impose upon themselves. The ‘mercantilist’ writers had not discovered that there was anything for an economist to do except to propose measures and fight for them; the economists of the ‘liberal’ age were at first in no better state, though they eventually did discover the difference between a theorem and a recommendation; and the economists of the period under discussion, yielding to what the reader may call either temptation or the call of duty, similarly deviated from the stony path that leads to scientific conquest. 1 [EDITOR’S NOTE. This chapter was in an unfinished and unsatisfactory state. It had no titles and no sub-titles; these were inserted by the editor. My knowledge about it is gleaned from what J.A.S. said in the introduction to Part IV and from a folder which I found containing two sections of typescript clipped to their respective manuscripts. This folder also contained a great many notes and pamphlets and reprints which J.A.S. apparently intended to use in his work of revision. On the outside of the folder was written ‘Part IV/4.’ Originally, it had been ‘Part IV/4, 5’ but the 5 had been erased when the author decided to incorporate the material in a single chapter instead of in two separate chapters. In Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3, Plan of the Part, J.A.S. has this to say: ‘Then follow comments on two allied groups of men and ideas that lend themselves to separate treatment, the group whose work centered in the contemporaneous interest in social reform and whose leaders were with singular infelicity dubbed “socialists of the chair” (Kathedersozialisten): and the group that was called, and called itself, the historical school (Chapters 4 and 5). The much-debated question of economists’ value-judgments will be touched upon in connection with the former and the famous “battle of methods” (and its American counterpart, the institutionalist controversy) in connection with the latter.’ The treatment of the socialists of the chair is very incomplete. In fact, it looks as though a whole section on these people in Germany had been omitted. It is obvious that the treatment of people of this type in France has been omitted. The carbon of this particular section is dated December 17, 1943. The carbon of the section on the historical school is dated January 10, 1943. These were undoubtedly preliminary studies and would have been completely rewritten. The section on the socialists of the chair and value judgments is especially unsatisfactory, but it is published here because Schumpeter felt so keenly that the work of many economists has been and is im- paired by their value judgments, and also that this need not be so with respect to their analysis. This belief of his is obvious in all his writings. The treatment of the historical school is also incomplete. After some discussion of the older and younger historical schools and the Methodenstreit, there follows a discussion of historical economics outside Germany, especially in France and England. But there is nothing at all about the United States and American institutionalism, which had been promised in the Plan of the Part.] 2 [At top of this page a great many shorthand notes and the following statement in the hand of J.A.S.: ‘I do not see what more I could say in order to protect from misunderstanding the following piece of plain speaking.’] [(a) Influence upon Analytic Work.] The manner in which and the degree to which the economists of that time allowed their analytic work to be influenced by the new spirit of economic policy differed greatly, however, as between countries and groups. In England, continuity in research and teaching was never in serious danger. The small body of English economists moved with the times, of course—which was not difficult for pupils of J.S.Mill—but did not jettison pieces of scientific apparatus along with old value judgments. In part this was due to the fact that the average member of that body understood economic theory much better than did the average economist in any other country, and hence he was in a position to realize the full extent of the latitude it left for any social creed he might choose to embrace. For the rest, that singularly happy state of things was simply an instance of the genuine freedom guaranteed by the English environment that removed many sources of irritation. Opposition to what many people believed to be an alliance between economics and laissez-faire policy existed both within and without the small group of orthodox socialists. But it did not amount to much. In particular it did not amount to a new ‘School of Thought’ [A note indicated that J.A.S. intended to write a paragraph on the Fabians at this point.] In the United States scientific tradition was not anything like as strong. But the ‘radicalism’ of the typical member of the economic profession did not go beyond the points covered by old doctrine: antagonism to protection and to ‘monopolistic’ big business, which then developed into the typical American economist’s pet aversion. The processes of competitive capitalism were also under fire—some economists were sympathetic with the ‘popula-tionist’ movement, others lent qualified support to the ideas of Henry George, 3 and views indicative of hostility to the capitalist order as such were not absent though very few voiced them as candidly as did Thorstein Veblen. But that fire was weak. The large majority of economists conformed to the bluff convictions of businessmen who did not as yet share the misgivings of their European peers. No economist whom anyone would care to call ‘leading,’ in any sense whatsoever, identified himself with any radical scheme of social reform. 3 [The note on Henry George intended at this point was not written. For a discussion of this writer, see below, ch. 5, sec. 7.] Sozialpolitik and the historical method 769 [Not completed: J.A.S. evidently intended to sketch the development of social reform in France and Germany before going on to the paragraphs which follow.] I do not hesitate to say that this achievement was one of the most important in the records of the economic profession. Having made this quite clear I hope that what follows will not be misunderstood. That achievement, great as it was, evidently did not belong to the sphere of scientific analysis. And since this is a history of scientific analysis, it does not in itself concern us here. What does concern us is another aspect of it—which I readily concede is a less important one—namely its influences on teaching and research. Appraisal of this influence will then offer an opportunity to touch upon, so far as it is necessary to do so, the problem of the economist’s value judgments. The efficiency of teaching indubitably suffered. I have emphasized above the share that the academic lecture hall had in spreading the spirit of social reform. The German ‘socialists of the chair’ certainly fulfilled the ideal of progressive politicians and laymen—the ideal of the professor who preaches reform and denounces obstructing interests. Lujo Brentano addressed his classes as he would have political meetings, and they responded with cheers and countercheers. Adolf Wagner 4 shouted and stamped and shook his fists at imaginary opponents, at least before the lethargy of old age quieted him down. Others were less spirited and effective but not less hortatory in intent. 5 Such lectures need not necessarily be weak in the technical instruction they impart, but as a rule they are. He who thinks this a cheap price to pay for ethics and ardor will please consider for a moment where, say, internal medicine would be if its teachers, instead of developing the analytic powers of their pupils, indulged in rhetoric about the glories of healing. An increasing number of students left the universities and entered the practical vocations 4 On A.Wagner, see below, ch. 5, sec. 4 and ch. 8, sec. 2. 5 I do not mean to assert that German lectures or seminars were exactly fascinating. The two examples adduced were exceptional. As a rule, the professor read from a manuscript that was often yellow with age, or presided languidly over seminar meetings at which candidates for the Ph.D. read preliminary drafts of their theses. This is the scene American visitors beheld and their experience may be one of the causes of irreconcilable—and I think, exaggerated—hostility to the lecture method of teaching which we observe in many American universities. History of economic analysis 770 open to economists with an equipment that was nothing short of lamentable, and some of the best of them left thoroughly disgusted. 6 [(b) Verein für Sozialpolitik.] As regards research, a credit item first claims recognition. It has been pointed out above that the German economists’ zeal for reform concentrated upon individual problems or measures much as did that of the Fabians in England: fundamental reconstruction of society was to come about in time, as a by-product rather than as the result of efforts directly aimed at it. This procedure involves accumulation of facts on a large scale, and the impressive series of the Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik—188 ‘volumes’ most of which actually consisted of several volumes—testifies to a relentless will to dig, to which we are indebted for an invaluable extension of our factual knowledge. Much additional work of the same type was done by individuals and groups either in connection with or outside that corporate effort of the profession. 7 If, because of considerations of space, the Schriften are allowed to stand as the only example of this kind of analysis, it must be understood that this instance is to illustrate what constituted the greater part of the work done by the economists of all countries—in England, as before, it was done partly for Royal Commissions. 8 6 However repugnant to scientific etiquette jokes and anecdotes may be, there are cases in which they illustrate a situation better than could anything else. So I will risk offering two such illustrations. The one is a definition of economics that obtained some currency at the time: ‘economics, what is that? Oh, yes, I know…you are an economist if you measure workmen’s dwellings and say that they are too small.’ The other is a dictum I once heard from a very intelligent and accomplished German woman: ‘I have taken courses and examinations in economics, but I know nothing and care less about it. You see, I felt I had to comply with the fashion of “studying” at a university, but I did not mean serious work. So I chose economics because all that is required there in order to satisfy examiners is the ability to chat a little about ethics, reform, control, and that sort of thing.’ Of course, I do not mean to say that these were the standards of most or even many teachers. The significance of the anecdote should not be overrated. But neither should it be equated to zero, not at least for the last three decades of the nineteenth century. 7 The importance of that effort, which as an effort of a national group of professional economists has no equal, makes it desirable to say a few words about its organization. It was essentially a team- work arrangement. Every member, especially every member of the large council, was free to suggest a project of research. The Verein decided which were to be taken up and then entrusted individuals or small committees with the direction of the research involved. These in turn parceled out the work among a number of collaborators and integrated the results that were to be published in the Schriften. Moreover, they arranged for discussions of those results at the meetings of the Verein, appointing ‘reporters’ (usually two) and other participants. Success at these meetings was of some importance in a man’s academic career. [Some of this information has already been presented in Chapter 1 of this Part.] 8 To mention a few of those Commissions whose reports are particularly interesting from the standpoint of economic analysis: Shipping Dues (1853), Coal Supply (1866), Agriculture (1881), Housing (1885), Depression of Trade (1886, particularly the 3rd report), Gold and Silver (1887), Poor Laws (1909—especially the famous minority report). Sozialpolitik and the historical method 771 . ‘philosophy’ of law, of course, always contained genuinely sociological elements. It survived during the period—in part, thanks to required courses on history of philosophy of law’—but independently of. But potential fertility for the social sciences is a feature of all of them (all of them I know, that is). History of economic analysis 766 Freud’s, however different in method and aim they. be one of the causes of irreconcilable—and I think, exaggerated—hostility to the lecture method of teaching which we observe in many American universities. History of economic analysis