teased by semi-philosophical and semi-literary irregulars. That some of these irregulars, who were at one time justly condemned for professional incompetence, proved to have been fundamentally right at another time is neither paradoxical nor in itself proof of the incompetence of those who were responsible for the condemnatory sentence. 1 The surface was troubled still further by the internecine warfare between the various groups of sociologists who, like psychologists and economists, always claimed too much for their own methods or materials. But below the surface, there was both healthy achievement and promise for the future. The reader can easily satisfy himself from what has been said in the last but one paragraph that a science of society was in the making that included indeed many semi-independent or wholly independent provinces, yet was much more definite than was then believed. There was a sort of headquarters— headquarters without power to command, to be sure—in a region held by the problems of society, social relations, social processes as such. 2 And there were, steadily expanding, the ‘applied’ or ‘special’ fields such as the sociology of religion (hierology), of ethics, of all the arts—more recently also of knowledge, Wissenssoziologie—politics, economic institutions, and many others. Most of these served two kinds of masters: the practical lawyer or the practical educator, for instance, would be but ill served by treatises on the sociology of law or the sociology of education and both need another type of work. This division does not, however, depend entirely upon the needs of practical life but extends to purely scientific pursuits: the scientific economist, quite independently of any practical applications of his work, needs complete autonomy in part of his field—no sociological considerations would improve Professor Hicks’s Value and Capital. But between the sociologies of law, education, and economic behavior, as well as of all those other subjects, and that headquarters sociology, there is lively give and take, which in a sense unifies the whole of them. Headquarters cannot stay purely speculative—at the very least they need exemplifying and verifying materials—and thus are forced to draw upon all those ‘applied’ or ‘special’ fields; and these in turn use concepts and imply propositions that are drawn from, or else contributed to, headquarters. And to some extent all this was done, though with much ungraciousness and in the midst of many unnecessary quarrels. All this, however, tells us but little about methods and approaches which are largely determined by the materials used. 3 We turn to a brief and highly selective examination of this aspect. [(a) Historical Sociology.] Remembering both the vigorous advance of historiography and also its salient features, we shall not be surprised to learn that much of the best work done during that period in 1 Incompetence of professional leaders may of course be the cause of the phenomenon alluded to. The history of thermodynamics presents a well-known case (Robert Mayer). But each case must be judged on its merits. 2 Society may be defined so as to mean an entity. But it may just as well be defined as a term that is to stand for the total of relations between groups or individuals or the total of a set of processes— just as the soul may be defined as a ‘thing’ as well as a term that denotes all ‘psychic phenomena.’ The relational concept of society was History of economic analysis 752 expounded with particular energy by Georg Simmel (1858–1918), Soziologie (1908) and earlier in Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (1892)—mark the highly significant implications of the title. This makes of sociology the theory of human relations (Beziehungslehre is the word used, in our own time, by Professor Leopold von Wiese). The opposite view that postulates existence for society per se is the one taken by ‘universalists’ (Othmar Spann and his school) although it is found also in non universalist writings: in the former case society is a frankly metaphysical entity; in the latter, a methodological construct. 3 That the nature of a worker’s material is the chief element in determining the approach, method, and methodological creed, including the militant attitudes this creed may imply, is a fact of great importance for understanding the history of the social sciences, though it grew less important in the last quarter of a century or so. It will stand out in its full importance when we consider the further fact that the choice of material was not in all cases free—perhaps not even in the majority of cases. For during that period a man was often—perhaps as a rule—first a philosopher, historian, ethnologist, lawyer, etc., and then turned this equipment to sociological use. But whenever this was the case, the man was prisoner of his material and methods and could not change over to others at a moment’s notice: the materials and methods that he had learned to master in his formative years were the materials and methods that he really understood. These facts must never be forgotten if we are to diagnose correctly the group antagonisms in sociology (and elsewhere) and their influence upon its history. sociology was historical in nature. First, much of the work done by historians was sociological: a historian who writes what for a lack of a better term we have called ‘problem history’ is hard to distinguish from a sociologist. Second, many of the best sociologists drew primarily on historical material and understood this material better than any other. Third, going beyond this, some sociologists defined sociology as the analysis of the historical process. 4 I hope I have made it sufficiently clear that the important thing is not the general ‘theories of history,’ that is, the comprehensive hypotheses about the prime movers, if any, of the historical process of which the so-called materialistic interpretation of history discussed above is by far the most successful. Much more important in the long run were the contributions toward the solution of those more restricted problems of which examples have been given in the preceding section. 5 The attempts to schematize economic history by defining successive stages (e.g., village economy, town economy, territorial economy, national and international economy— Schmoller’s schema) present but little interest and need not detain us. [(b) Prehistorical-Ethnological Sociology.] But the term Historical Method in Sociology should really be extended to cover the use of logically contiguous material such as prehistoric archaeology—of which only beginnings had existed before the period under discussion—and of ethnology—which 4 This was the case, e.g., with Marx and Croce; only the latter said ‘philosophy’ rather than ‘sociology.’ A history of sociology written from this standpoint is Paul Barth’s Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie (1897), a very successful book, a fourth edition of which appeared as late as 1922. In spite of its misleading title, it is essentially a (still useful) history of sociology, written from the standpoint above, except that it exaggerated the role of general theories about historical causation. Let us note a saying of von Wieser’s to the effect that ‘sociology is history without names’—one of those exaggerations that are the means of inculcating important truths. Some developments in neighboring fields 753 5 I shall mention a masterpiece to illustrate the kind of work I mean: René Maunier, L’Origine et la fonction économique des villes (1910), which must stand for a large literature. then experienced its decisive development. For however much the fact-finding methods of historical, prehistorical, and ethnological research differ, the method by which the sociologist draws inferences from these different materials is fundamentally the same. We may therefore speak of a historical-prehistorical-ethnological sociology that definitely established itself during that period. Within my very limited range of knowledge, the most impressive example of prehistoric sociology is Oswald Menghin’s Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit (1931). The term ethnology I use in the sense which is perhaps more often expressed by the term cultural anthropology. The term anthropology is reserved for physical anthropology. I hope I am not misled by affection for a teacher of mine, if I call the two great works of the Finnish sociologist, Edward Westermarck (1862–1939), who taught sociology at the London School of Economics, 1906–30, the peak achievements of ethnological sociology during that period (History of Human Marriage, 1889, and Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, 1906), though in details neither has stood the test of time. But the formation of the period’s most important ‘school’ of ethnology (to which, in a sense, Westermarck belonged) is associated with the research and teaching of Sir Edward B.Tylor (1832– 1917); see especially: Primitive Culture (1st ed., 1871, many later ones). This school, though not averse to bold construction (Tylor himself, e.g., sponsored the idea that animistic beliefs were the embryos of religion) always retained a firm foundation in actual ethnographic work: by this it may perhaps be distinguished from the ethnological branch of social psychology (see below, sec. 3e) into which it otherwise tends to shade off. Methodologically, it presents several points of interest, for example, the application of statistical procedure (see Tylor: ‘On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions,’ Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 1888–9). Methodological superiority and extensive ethnographic research are also its distinctive traits as against the continental body of work in which J.J.Bachofen (1815–87; Mutterrecht [matriarchate], 1861) was perhaps the best-known figure. We cannot go much further—though it seems incongruous not to mention Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) and many other equally famous works, such as L.H. Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877)—but we have a special motive for adverting particularly to a school which followed and follows Fritz Graebner’s teaching (Methode der Ethnologie, 1911). Among other things, a prominent member of it, M.G.Schmidt, wrote the only treatise on ethnological economics we possess (Grundriss der ethnologischen Volkswirtschaftslehre, 1920–21); see also Wilhelm Koppers, ‘Die ethnologische Wirtschaftsforschung,’ Anthropos, 1915–16. But still more important for us is the theory of cultural areas (Kulturkreistheorie) that is characteristic of this school. The salient point is briefly this. Any investigation into primitive forms of civilization, of course, runs up against the problem of ‘origins’—for example, of observed types of tools or articles of adornment and the like; or of observed types of behavior, such as the domestication of animals—and also against the problem of the factors responsible for observed changes in time History of economic analysis 754 (‘progress’). Ethnologists or cultural anthropologists proffered widely different explanations in individual cases. 6 But the great majority of them agreed—or rather took it as a matter of course—that observed behavior or the observed types of physical things that reflect behavior must, on principle at least, be explained in terms of the conditions of the group or tribe to which each finding is to be attributed: that is to say, most ethnologists adhered to what may be called a theory of ‘independent origins’ and ‘autonomous development.’ Now, Graebner and his followers challenged this theory. On the strength of the fact that primitive cultural patterns are very stable over long periods, they denied the independent origins and the autonomous development of such things as similar tools but took the occurrence of similarities as an indication—if not proof—of a common source from which the use of, say, a particular type of button would spread by diffusion instead of being autonomously invented. Hence the existence of areas of culture—Kulturkreise. Whether or not we accept this theory to its full extent—its very logic makes it difficult to do so—its fundamental importance for the whole of sociology is evident. Even limited acceptance imparts a serious shock to the evolutionary views of that period and makes quite a difference to what we have called headquarters sociology. We conclude this part of our survey with a reference to Friedrich Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie (1882–91; 4th ed. 1921–2), a performance of formative influence and especially the forerunner, if not the basis, of increased work on human geography. Perhaps it means stretching a point if we include this type of research among the bases of historical sociology. 7 It is certainly more related to that specialty which has come to be denoted by the term Ecology, the study of spatial relations of groups and institutions, which is now being intensively cultivated in the United States. But, potentially at least, human geography complements the material of historical sociology—as Ibn Khaldun had realized—and the outstanding contribution of that period had therefore to be mentioned. 6 On ‘theories’ about the Origins of Invention, see, e.g., the book of this title by Otis T.Mason (1895), which it is interesting to compare with modern work on the subject, such as Usher’s or Gilfillan’s. But the most fascinating work of the period in the field of origins is to be found in the books and articles of Eduard Hahn. See especially Die Haustiere…(1896) and Die Entstehung der wirtschaftlichen Arbeit (1908). I am in no position to appraise the validity of the criticisms leveled at Hahn’s work. But there is no doubt that in perusing it an economist must, for the time being, turn into an institutionalist whatever his views on the scope and method of economics may be at other times: for surely these things are infinitely more important and enlightening than anything a mere economist can say. Some developments in neighboring fields 755 [(c) Biological Schools.] Application to social phenomena of the results of biological research loomed too large in the thought of that period to be passed by entirely. We might wish to do so because the field is infested by ideological bias and by dilettantism to an extent that surpasses anything that even we economists are accustomed to. But we cannot do so, among other reasons, because biological considerations, though they touched the work actually done by economists only peripherically, hovered around it all the time. No attempt will be made to describe the development of professional biological work: 8 it must suffice to state that none of it exerted any influence upon sociological or economic thought except the work done on the lines of Darwinism and the work done by its Mendelian and other critics. Of these, the most important for us is August Weismann (1834–1914). 9 And the points at issue that are most important for us were the importance of innate and the inheritance of acquired characteristics. There is, of course, no such thing as a biological sociology in the sense in which there is a historical sociology. Biological considerations may come in to furnish more or less important explanatory hypotheses—just as may economic considerations or any others— but the sociology they enter remains what it is by virtue of its own methods and materials. Emphasis upon biological factors or aspects is therefore all that can be meant by the loose phrase Biological Schools. We shall deal with them under four headings. In the first place, we notice the idea that society, being an ‘organic’ system and not a ‘mechanical’ one, can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of an analogy with biological organisms such as the human body. As an example that stands in the name of an economist I mention a work by Schäffle. 10 But the obvious puerility of this idea must not blind us to the fact that emphasis upon the ‘organic nature’ of the economic process may be but the means of conveying an eminently sound methodological principle—as it was, for instance, with Marshall. Theorists—especially of the ‘planning’ type—often indulge in the deplorable practice of deriving ‘practical’ results from a few functional relations between a few economic aggregates in utter disregard of the fact that such analytic set- ups are congenitally incapable of taking account of deeper things, the more subtle relations that cannot be weighed and measured but may be more important to a nation’s cultural life than the things that can. 11 ‘Organic’ considerations are perhaps the most obvious antidote—though in themselves hardly an adequate one—against such uncivilized procedure. In the second place, we notice the attempts that were made to apply the Darwinian concepts of Struggle for Existence and Survival of the Fittest to the facts of industrial and professional life in capitalist society. Two things must be carefully distinguished. On the 7 Readers familiar with Professor A.P.Usher’s teaching will not think so, however. 8 There are many sources from which this lacuna may be filled, e.g. the History of Biology (English trans., 1928), by Erik Nordenskiöld. 9 All of his writings that matter for us are available in English translations. 10 Albert E.F.Schäffle (see below, ch. 5, sec. 4), Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers (1st ed., 1875–8). Fortunately, the work is not entirely spoilt by its author’s attempts to discover in the social body nerves and digestive organs. History of economic analysis 756 11 An example will illustrate this. We have already referred to the fact that Russia, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, pursued a policy of monetary restriction that may have retarded her economic development. At the same time, I hinted at the possibility of making out an economic case for this policy. This was no contradiction. The opinion that that policy was simply foolish rests on nothing but rather obvious mechanics of the monetary and credit system and fails entirely to take account of the fact that a given monetary policy is the result of all the factors that constitute the economic, political, and moral pattern of a nation and influences them all in some obvious, and in other not so obvious, ways. Appraisal of the effects of a policy that neglects this is, from a practical standpoint, simply valueless. And it is precisely this which may be meant by him who urges ‘organic considerations.’ one hand, it may be—we cannot argue the case here—that certain aspects of the individual-enterprise system are correctly described as a struggle for existence, and that a concept of survival of the fittest in this struggle can be defined in a non-tautological manner. 12 But if this be so, then these aspects would have to be analyzed with reference to economic facts alone and no appeal to biology would be of the slightest use; vice versa, any opinions that biologists may entertain on the subject would be ruled out as laymen’s talk. On the other hand, there may be genuine appeal to biological facts and theories; this is the case whenever the question of inheritance of physical or mental qualities of the human material is brought in. The relevance of this question for an appraisal of the effects of certain institutions and policies is manifest, or should be. Then, as later, these two things were but imperfectly distinguished. 13 Here we are concerned with the second question only and in particular with its relation to the period’s discussion on social reform. The argument that measures in favor of the lowest strata of the population may have the effect of deteriorating the average quality of the human stock is, of course, much older than Darwinism. 14 During the period under discussion, it found many supporters, the most important being Herbert Spencer, who added, however, nothing but an elaboration, based upon research into biological selection, of the old idea. Critics objected not so much to the biology involved—in most cases they were in no position to do so—as to the application of the concept of natural selection to the facts of social selection, to the practice of identifying the ‘fitness’ that makes for survival with ‘socially desirable’ characteristics, and so on in what is by now a well-worn and familiar way. Two points about this discussion must be regretfully reported. Economists entirely failed to bestow on these problems the amount of attention they deserve: flippant phrases pro or con form the bulk of their contribution; the only one of the leading men to take more 12 To define those who survive as the ‘fit,’ that is to say, to define fitness by survival, would, of course, be tautological (meaningless). 13 Correct practice in this respect is one of the many merits of an author who was never recognized by the economic profession and seems to be entirely forgotten now, perhaps because he had the courage to tell unpopular truth: William H.Mallock (1849–1923). See his Social Equality (1882) and Aristocracy and Evolution (1898). 14 For an example, see above, Part II, ch. 5, sec. 1c. Some developments in neighboring fields 757 trouble was Pigou; and to him I refer the reader who wishes more information. 15 Worse still, in taking sides, economists revealed to a deplorable degree the influence of ideological bias. 16 And this is as true, if not more so, of those who pooh-poohed the idea of possible danger to the quality of the human stock as it is of those who uncritically affirmed it. Thus the question of Nature versus Nurture has remained in a most unsatisfactory state to this day. In the third place, we notice work that belongs under the second heading but which will be segregated for the sake of emphasis, namely, the work in statistical biology, biometrics, to which we also owe important methodological help. Two great names will suffice: Karl Pearson and Sir Francis Galton. Karl Pearson (1857–1936) surely does not need an introduction, any more than he needs a monument other than Biometrika. Therefore, let us merely recall his two famous adages that are so pregnant with significance: ‘ability runs in stocks’ and ‘the nation is being recruited from its failures.’ Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911) is the man whom I should choose as an illustrative example if I were asked to define the specifically English type of great man of science and the specifically English type of scientific creation. His training was medical, but apart from this he roamed in utmost freedom and informality over all parts of the world of thought that happened to attract him. Unconnected with universities and teaching, positing his own problems and going about treating them with an untutored originality that is perfectly fascinating—he was the most genuine yet the most unacademic of scientists, much like his kinsman Darwin. Of his many exploits, the following are relevant for us: he was the man who may be said to have independently discovered correlation as an effective tool of analysis; the man who set eugenics on its feet (in 1905 he founded the Eugenics Laboratory); the man who realized the importance of, and initiated, a new branch of psychology, the psychology of individual differences; and the man who tackled, although by an entirely inadequate method, the problems of Nature and Nurture (Hereditary Genius, 1869; Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, 1883; Natural Inheritance, 1889)—all of which makes him in my humble opinion one of the three greatest sociologists, the other two being Vico and Marx. 15 This was in 1912. I refer, however, to Economics of Welfare, 3rd rev. ed., 1929, Part I, ch. 10. The happy as well as famous phrase—‘environments, as well as people, have children’—occurs on p. 115. 16 It is interesting to note that the ideology involved is not necessarily class ideology. It often is, of course. But a man may be quite unable to see the element of truth in the selective argument simply because it does not go well with some cherished scheme or ideal of his. And these schemes or ideals are not uniquely correlated with location in the class structure. History of economic analysis 758 In the fourth place, we notice the racial theories. As here understood, 17 they are a subgroup of the biological theories. It is, of course, perfectly possible to believe that the range of individual variation is very great—think for instance of the immense differences we observe in mathematical or musical talent—and even that an individual’s position in the statistical distribution is primarily a matter of inheritance without believing that the sociologically relevant characteristics differ racewise. To believe the latter constitutes, then, the special feature of the racial theories. Extra-scientifically, this ‘racialist’ belief is as old as humanity and its towering monument is the Old Testament. Attempts to establish it by scientific methods do not, however, antedate the period under discussion to a significant extent. This is why I refrained from mentioning the strongest performance in this field (that of Gobineau) in Part III, where it chronologically belongs. The only other name that will be mentioned is Ammon’s. The other side is represented, at its highest, by Boas. 18 This extreme brevity is justified by the fact that economists, who are or should be vitally interested in the range of variation of individual ‘abilities’ and in the question of their inheritance, are but mildly interested in the specifically racialist aspect of the latter. In fact, so far as I know, Werner Sombart is the only economist of note that ever made significant use of the 17 Symbiosis in a territory, especially if its effects be reinforced by political union, will in general suffice to produce a certain number of common interests and habits and also consciousness of them. These facts have, of course, never been called into question. Nor has the importance for sociology been questioned of the further fact that they are apt to create relatively durable—e.g. ‘national’— types of behavior. By racial theories, we mean only theories that associate these types of behavior with physical characteristics that are common to groups. It should be observed that, since those ‘psychological’ or ‘cultural’ types possess some degree of durability and since the physical types are not absolutely stable, these two types of differentiation tend to shade off into one another. Just now, however, it is important to emphasize their conceptual distinctness. 18 Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau (1816–82) earned immortality by the superlative power of his novels and historical sketches (e.g. Renaissance, 1877), which should rank high as sociological performances. Here we are interested in his Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–5), a work, like his novels, of impressive personal power, which is why our text emphasizes the element of ‘strength,’ using the word in a sense different from that in which we speak, e.g. of a strong, that is, convincing, piece of criticism. A great vision is all but spoiled by faulty—in fact dilettantic— methods and obvious absurdities, although he who condemns Gobineau on these grounds could never, if he were fair and logical, admire Marx. As to material and method, Alfred O. Ammon (1842–1916) is vastly superior, although still open to a formidable number of objections (see his Gesellschaftsordnung…1895). Scientific conscientiousness and high competence have induced Professor Franz Boas, 1858–1942 (see especially, The Mind of Primitive Man, 1911; the German original uses the word kulturarm instead of primitive) to make, especially between the lines, concessions that cut more deeply than he seems to realize: not all of his—sweepingly adverse— conclusions follow from the facts presented. I am afraid I have to conclude this note with a piece of advice that unfortunately imposes itself often in sociological and economic matters: read the enemies of the racial theory in order to see its strong points; read the exponents of the racial theory in order to see its weak ones. Some developments in neighboring fields 759 element of race. 19 The only comment I feel it necessary to make is that here we have a case in which research into a real problem has been made all but impossible by what can only be described as warring infantilisms—infantilism of both parties to 759the controversy. For the problem is a real one and not merely an excrescence of overheated imaginations. It is important for sociology in many respects, of which the theory of social classes is but one instance. 20 [(d) Autonomous Sociology.] Seeing how widely we have defined Historical Sociology, the reader might well wonder whether there can be any non-historical sociology. For every sociologist or economist, however speculative his bent of mind, must use some facts, most of which are bound to be of a historical nature in our sense of the term. But this is not what I meant. We define a man as a historical sociologist only if he does serious historical or ethnological work himself or if at least he arrives at his results by analysis based upon such work done by others. Desultory use of historical facts for purposes of illustration or even verification of a theory does not make a man a historical sociologist. By the same token, the reader who wonders whether there can be any non-psychological sociology, because it is indeed difficult to imagine any piece of sociological analysis that does not use ‘psychic’ facts of one kind or another, has missed the essential point. It is the use of the methods and results of professional psychology that will, in this book, define psychological sociology or Social Psychology (see below, sec. 3e) and not the use of the facts of common experience observed and conceptualized by the sociologist himself, however psychological these facts may be by nature. In Chapter 7 below, we shall study in some detail an economic example of this distinction which will teach us that this is not merely a matter of words but a point of considerable methodological importance and a source of many misunderstand- 19 In his book, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (1911; English trans. 1951), which can hardly be described as a model of analysis. But incidental references to race are all the more frequent in economic writings. We have noticed an instance in Mill’s Principles. 20 The teaching of the Cambridge ethnologist, A.C.Haddon, was a shining example of a scientific attitude toward the problem and of effective use of ethnological material in dealing with it. But this was in lectures; I cannot find it in his published work. Another author (once famous, now almost forgotten) should be mentioned, whose treatment of the matter is free from the particular element that causes all the trouble now and shows how the explanatory value of racial differences may be exploited without implying anything about unique correlation between racial and cultural characteristics and, above all, without implying anything about all-round ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ of one racial type as compared with others. This is Ludwik Gumplowicz, 1838–1909 (professor of public law at the University of Graz), Rassenkampf (1883), and Grundriss der Soziologie (1885)—though his (physical) anthropology left something to desire. History of economic analysis 760 ings. The latter were fostered by the fact that sociologists and economists who never seriously applied professional psychology and never did any work that called for any of its methods, nevertheless, described their own procedure as psychological, thus exposing quite needlessly their pseudo-psychological constructs to professional criticism. We shall therefore recognize the growth during that period of an autonomous sociology, which groped for its own problems and methods, even though the products of this sociology were full of pseudo-psychological and pseudo-historical concepts and propositions. Society, class, group, structure, domination and subordination, leadership, assimilation, and adjustment are examples of the items which entered that part of this autonomous sociology that we have above described as ‘headquarters’ or ‘pure sociology.’ Cooley, 21 Giddings, Hobhouse, Ross, Simmel, Spann, Steffen, 22 Tarde, Tönnies are names that represent widely different approaches to it though we could, had we space, reduce many of these differences to far less than those authors themselves—all of whom still repay perusal—would have thought possible or desirable. 23 The efforts of these and other men did not indeed produce any ‘general sociology’ that was at all as widely accepted as was the ‘general economics’ of the preceding period. Such a general sociology was adumbrated rather than created. Perhaps that was only natural in a science that then struggled into existence. But the fact that the subsequent period did not complete this task requires explanation. Evidently, this was or is because sufficiently important sociologists did not bestow sufficient work on it. And this in turn was due not only to the fact that in postwar times sociologists grew increasingly absorbed in 21 Charles H.Cooley (1864–1929); let us mention a characteristic work of this author: Social Organization (1909) and add one by John Dewey: Human Nature and Conduct (1922). 22 G.F.Steffen (1864–1929), the Swedish socialist leader; his Sociologi (1910–11) must not go unmentioned. 23 The names mentioned—selected with much injustice to others—have been written down to indicate the types of sociological literature to which I meant to refer and also to provide suggestions for the reader that will automatically lead him further. It is not without regret that I omit the comments by which I might have tried to characterize the work of each of these men. One comment, however, cannot be omitted: to throw together such antipodes as, e.g., Simmel and Spann will seem to the critic to be explainable by nothing less than complete ignorance or lack of understanding on my part; and no other explanation may occur to him of my listing with non- psychological sociologists an author (E.A.Ross) who wrote a Social Psychology (1908) and another (Gabriel Tarde) who wrote La Psychologie économique (1901). I shall, therefore, indicate the two lines on which that attempt to reduce differences would proceed: on the one hand, I could show that these differences, to a surprising degree, result from philosophies and methodological creeds that affected language more than substance; on the other hand, I could show that the differences of the latter type produced propositions that are complementary rather than antagonistic. An author who traces cannibalism to certain spiritual ambitions will in general think that he has said something that is quite incompatible with the theory that bases explanation of cannibalism on the fact that human flesh tastes like pork and is, in the circumstances in which cannibalism occurs, a recherché delicacy. But that is not so. Some developments in neighboring fields 761 . against the problem of ‘origins’—for example, of observed types of tools or articles of adornment and the like; or of observed types of behavior, such as the domestication of animals—and also. took the occurrence of similarities as an indication—if not proof of a common source from which the use of, say, a particular type of button would spread by diffusion instead of being autonomously. work done during that period in 1 Incompetence of professional leaders may of course be the cause of the phenomenon alluded to. The history of thermodynamics presents a well-known case (Robert