History of Economic Analysis part 79 pptx

ground that it interferes with natural selection and therefore with the progress of humanity. The reader should observe, however, that the almost pathetic nonsense could have been avoided and that the sound element in his argument could have been partly salvaged by adding ‘unless methods more humane and more scientific than natural selection can be found in order to achieve what survival of the fittest is supposed to achieve.’ 6 It was in this period that the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas was declared to be official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church (encyclical Aeterni Patris, 1879). But this only sanctioned an existing state of things and did not exert influence beyond the Catholic clergy. The vogue of Thomism among the laymen of all countries—many Protestants and Jews among them—that was to make him one of the most influential of ‘modern’ authors dates from the twenties only. The vogue in the United States came a little later still. 7 Marx was often read vicariously in as much as the ideas of many a bourgeois intellectual hailed from him. But he was also read directly, outside of the camp of orthodox socialists, particularly by intellectuals without training in economics. There is a curious explanation for this. Marx is, for the economist, one of the most difficult authors. But it is a fact that the layman who reads him never discovers that he does not understand him. 8 Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was the author of a great many works that are held together by his antagonism toward bourgeois intellectualism: although in every other respect they present a curious assortment of topics and (sometimes irreconcilable) views that are extremely difficult to interpret, they all assert both the negative and positive implications of the anti-intellectualist principle and display in all its extent the range of economic, political, and cultural problems that this principle puts into new light. His (temporary) sympathies with revolutionary syndicalism, Italian fascism, and Leninist bolshevism exemplify but one aspect of his thought and are of secondary impor- On the theory that the work of professional philosophers stands in a closer relation to a period’s Zeitgeist than does the scientists’ work in the various ‘sciences,’ I shall now append a desperately brief survey of some—to be precise ten, to be numbered I–X—of the many currents in the period’s philosophical thought. Philosophy is to be defined strictly, though the philosophers’ concern with questions of epistemology and logic will be included. Our selection must not be understood to imply evaluation: we are interested in currents that are characteristic for the period whatever our opinion of their merits. This is why I do not touch upon Thomism again. The purely philosophical aspects of Marxism—Engels carried on Marx’s philosophical interests and the German party had, as it were, an official party philosopher, Dietzgen—are in line with the German classic philosophy of the preceding period and therefore implicitly noticed with it. Our keynote is: we are about to glance at the philosophy of an essentially unphilosophic and anti-metaphysical age in which the proposal to strike out the word Philosophy from university catalogues was actually made. Accordingly, we shall expect professional (and professorial) philosophers to interest themselves intensively in the history of philosophy. This is what we find (I). Excellent histories of the History of economic analysis 742 philosophies of all ages and nations appeared in numbers. I shall name but one name, that of the man whose work seems to me to have been the peak achievement of the ‘historical philosophy’ of that or any other age: Wilhelm Windelband. 9 Similarly, we shall understand that declining fervor of philosophical creation should have facilitated the survival or renascence of philosophical creations of the past. This we also find. Provided we call utilitarianism a philosophy at all, it affords an instance, for it certainly was taught throughout the period, especially, under the influence of J.S.Mill, in England (II). Elsewhere we find, for example, Neo-Kantians and Neo- Hegelians and other ‘Neo’s’; and there were always some adherents of Herbart and Schopenhauer (III). Next, we notice another body of thought, the emergence of which conforms not less to expectation. Whoever believes that experimental science has effectively destroyed the bases not only of religious belief but also of metaphysical speculation may, in case he experiences a void or, being a philosopher, wishes for employment, conceive the idea—or take it from Comte—that a picture of the universe (Weltbild) might be pieced together from the most general results of the individual sciences. The substitute for philosophy may take many forms and does not necessarily constitute philosophy as the universal science, scientia scientiarum, though the idea sometimes has been expressed in ways that suggest analogy with a holding company. Philosophy in this sense will look very different according to the individual philosopher’s training. One type emerged from the hands of philosophers grounded in the physical sciences—a type of positivism or monism that does not differ in any matter of principle from the ‘empirio- tance in the whole of it. His most characteristic utterances are perhaps his Procès de Socrate (1889) and his Illusions du progrès (1908), but of all his works the Réflexions sur la violence (1908; English trans., 1914) is the best known by far. The bourgeois found in them, among other things, feelings of admiration for industrial leadership and of contempt for parliamentary democracy. From our standpoint, it is relevant to note the affinity of some of Sorel’s ideas with some of one of the greatest economists of the period, Pareto. Other affinities do not interest us here. 9 To save space, no references to individual books are given in this survey except in cases in which there is a special reason for drawing attention to a particular work—the interested reader can supply them without trouble. Background and patterns 743 criticism’ of Avenarius and Mach (IV). 10 Another type which emerged from the hands of philosophers who were psychologists or sociologists by training later on came to be called Philosophical Anthropology (V) and is not always easy to distinguish from parts of Social Philosophy or straight Sociology. 11 Both types invited misunderstandings of the specialist’s theories 12 and trespassed upon his preserves, and they were not unnaturally resented. 13 The resulting atmosphere impaired the success of enterprises such as the Unity-of-Science movement of later days or, at any rate, the philosopher’s influence on them. It also impaired the authority of yet another type of research, which will be mentioned here, though it does not belong to the domain of philosophy in the strict sense—the type of research that continued the efforts of Whewell and Mill and of the German Wissenschaftslehre or general methodology of scientific procedure in the preceding period. For examples, I choose the works of Jevons, Sigwart, and Wundt. 14 The methodologies of the social sciences and particularly of economics by Carl Menger, (J.N.) Keynes, and Simiand will be mentioned in another connection (see below, ch. 4, sec. 2). But the contributions by Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert must be mentioned here, both because of the influence they exerted (though, so 10 Let us note the strong affinity of Mach’s views with those of W.K.Clifford, K.Pearson, and J.H.Poincaré. Pearson’s Grammar of Science (1892) and J.H. Poincaré’s La Valeur de la science (1904) are the two books I should recommend to readers desiring an easy guide to empirio-criticism. 11 Georg Simmel’s Soziologie (1908) illustrates the latter point. 12 An amusing—or sad?—example of the occurrence of such misunderstandings even in the domain of physical sciences is the following: philosophers use the term Relativism frequently and in several different senses. It so happened that one of the most important novelties in the physics of the period was dubbed relativity theory, a term that has, of course, nothing whatever to do with historical or philosophical relativism in any sense. Nevertheless, a number of instances can be adduced of writers who made themselves ridiculous by interpreting the Einstein theory as a manifestation of the latter. I owe this fact (which at first I refused to believe) to Professor Philipp Frank. 13 Economics, not sheltered like physics by age-old prestige, was frequently victimized. As an example, I mention G.Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes (1900), which treats of topics nearly all of which belong to the economist’s sphere. Matters were not improved by Simmel’s declaration that no proposition of the book was intended to be understood in the specialist’s sense (ist einzelwissenschaftlich gemeint)—which was, of course, interpreted to mean that he would not accept criticism from the only people who understand, or should understand, the subject. 14 The three works differ widely from one another. Jevons’ Principles of Science (1874) is of course of particular importance to us since the author was one of the leading economists of that period. It is not concerned with the practice of any or all of the individual sciences but is what may be called a theory of scientific History of economic analysis 744 thinking. Two strikingly original features stand out that anticipate later tendencies: (1) the central position assigned to the idea that all analysis (whether ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive’) reduces ultimately to statements of identities; (2) the basic position assigned to probability—to the idea that scientific truth is basically stochastic. Christoph von Sigwart’s Logik (1st ed., 1873–8), less original, more comprehensive than Jevons’ Principles, is also an analysis of fundamentals. Wilhelm Wundt’s (see below, ch. 3, sec. 3) Logik… (1st ed., 1880–83) is the only one of the three to analyze, and to start from, the actual practice of individual sciences. Here, therefore, the difficulty arose that, in the present state of individual sciences or even in their state as it was in 1880, no man can have that intimate knowledge of actual procedure that comes only from personal experience of detailed research. Wundt realized his limitations and tried to solve the problem by calling in the aid of specialists, but this course, obviously, had disadvantages of its own and results were distinctly indifferent. far as I know, only in Germany) and because of a typical shortcoming that illustrates what has been said above. 15 We return to the high road. As we walk along it, we shall shut our eyes to everything except the following pieces of the scenery. A historian who insists on forcing thought into unique correlation with the structural changes in the social organism would assuredly hold that his theory is admirably verified by the emergence at that time of a philosophy that found the criterion—or even the definition—of truth in the value for our individual and social life of the beliefs that are to be accepted as true—Pragmatism (VI). But the elements of this philosophy are as old as is philosophy itself, and the manner in which it was formulated by William James amounts to little more than systematic 15 Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (History and Physics; a rectorial address that attracted great attention, 1894; 3rd ed., 1904); Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft; ein Vortrag (Cultural and Natural Science; 1899; see also Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 1902; 2nd ed., 1913); Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (the term is best rendered by ‘sciences of mind and society excluding physiological psychology’; 1883). I mean no disrespect to those eminent men, who were sovereign masters of wide domains. But their minds had been formed by the tasks and the training of the philosopher, historian, and philologist. So when they proceeded, with enviable confidence, to lay down the law for us, they drew an entirely unrealistic dividing line between the ‘laws of nature’ and ‘the laws of cultural development’ or the ‘formulation of laws’ (nomothesis) and ‘historical description’ (idiography), forgetting that great parts of the social sciences ride astride this dividing line, which fact seriously impairs its usefulness (though, for the truly philologico-historical disciplines it does retain validity). They were simply strangers to the problems and the epistemological nature of those parts of the social sciences, yet failed to add the proper qualifications to their arguments. That this was apt to mislead the many economists who listened to them—Max Weber, e.g., was strongly influenced by Rickert—was as inevitable as it was regrettable. But let us note the striking saying of Dilthey that reads like a motto of Max Weber’s methodology: ‘We explain the phenomena of nature we understand the phenomena of the mind (or of culture).’ Background and patterns 745 elaboration of ideas that have never quite been absent from any kind of human action or thought and were bound to assert themselves sooner or later through the mechanism of filiation of philosophic thought alone. Whereas pragmatism at least did not clash with the main currents in the Zeitgeist of the period, Henri Bergson’s L’Évolution créatrice (1907) did (VII). His anti-rationalist and anti-intellectual philosophy is something entirely different from the anti-rationalism of pragmatism, which merely meant the negative of the existence of ‘pure’ truth, the product of a pure reason that is unconnected with the purposes and values of life: Bergson meant that the new truth or, more generally, the new creation is not worked out by logical processes at all. This involves indeed—which James’s philosophy did not—an entirely new Weltanschauung wholly at variance, among other things, with the views then current (the Marxist one included) about cultural development. Not equally novel, but still more influential owing to the personal force of its great teacher, was the philosophy of Benedetto Croce (VIII), which is of particular interest for us because Croce himself is something of an economist and because he is associated, more than is the case with any other philosopher, with some aspects of the professional work of Italian economists. Though it is impossible to convey in a few sentences an idea of his work as a whole— and, unfortunately, precisely of the most original elements in it—it is possible to reduce to a single sentence the basic philosophical principle involved: a Hegelian spirit embodies itself in the actual course of universal history so that the subject of philosophy becomes identical with the metaphysics of the historical process. 16 No survey of the philosophical currents of that time can afford to omit the name of Edmund Husserl and the beginnings of Phenomenology (IX), though no attempt at brief characterization seems to me to promise anything but confusion. Therefore, I prefer to resort to a reference. 17 But I may say that of all the philosophies of our time, Husserl’s is the most autonomous with respect to social or socio-psychological facts: nothing but the filiation of philosophical ideas can account for it and, apart from what it owes to preceding philosophies beyond which it tries to advance, it could have been written just as well in scholastic times. This also holds for a body of philosophic thought that in other respects 16 Disciples of Croce sometimes resent the imputation of Hegelianism and declare it to rest upon misunderstanding. The ‘emanatistic’ nature of the principle above is, however, undeniable. 17 Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (1943). Of course, this book discusses mainly the fullfledged phenomenology of the subsequent period. History of economic analysis 746 seems to—though ‘seems’ more than ‘does’—involve a wholly different approach to problems that are not problems of any ‘other’ science. I am referring to Cambridge philosophy of the pre-Wittgenstein days which in the last years of that period may be said to have been dominated by Bertrand Russell and G.E.Moore (X). As the last sentence but one suggests, this conception makes philosophy a non-speculative special science that like any other science has its special task, the task in this case being to analyze the meanings of terms (such as number) or propositions that are used with confidence, but uncritically, in those other sciences or in everyday life. But, treated in this spirit, even topics such as the analysis of mind and the analysis of matter seem to me to pass from the domain of philosophy into the domain of epistemology or logic. And this is the fundamental reason why there is a path from the philosophy to the new logic and, in particular, to Bertrand Russell’s and A.N.Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica (1911–13). But here we must stop. No history of any kind of analysis, economic or other, should ever be published that does not take account of the developments for which the term New Logic is intended to stand. But this is precisely what this history cannot do. Finally, we must ask the question: what did any of this mean to the period’s leading economists? With the utmost confidence I answer: very little indeed—still less than it meant in the two preceding epochs and that, we know, was not much. But, in view of the fact that a different opinion is frequently expressed, we must go into the matter a little more deeply. In doing so, we must divide our question into two parts. First: what influence did philosophy—or any particular philosophy—exert upon the analytic work of economists or, more precisely, did they arrive at any results that may be shown to depend upon philosophic influences? Second: what did philosophy, or a particular philosophy, mean to them as men and citizens; how far did it influence their general attitudes and horizons? This distinction, as we have had occasion to observe, is important for all times and places. But it acquires additional importance for a period in which economics grew more specialized and more technical. As regards the first question, it has been answered elsewhere for Marx and the Marxists. That answer will not, however, greatly differ from the one I am about to return for the rest of the economists: no philosophy can be proved to have influenced the economists of the period in the sense that they arrived at or failed to arrive at any analytic conclusions which they would not have arrived at or failed to arrive at without guidance from any philosopher—except in their methodological investigations and squabbles. It is natural that, when trying to clarify their ideas about their own methods of procedure or when engaged in controversy about them, economists should invoke not indeed philosophical teaching in the strict sense but the teaching of methodologies written by philosophers—Max Weber affords a conspicuous instance. But it would be nothing short of ridiculous to aver that economists allowed philosophers to teach them Background and patterns 747 their business when they were investigating the conditions in domestic industry, or railroad rates or trust problems of their time, or merchants’ guilds in the twelfth century, or, for that matter, the validity or otherwise of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interest. Edgeworth professed utilitarianism in season and out of season. Yet analysis shows that these professions may be struck out from his economic propositions without being missed. 18 As regards the second question, the answer is different. Practically all the economists of the period sprang from bourgeois families and were the beneficiaries or victims of an elaborate education that in most countries included philosophy even in its secondary (that is, pre-university) stage. As youngsters they could not have avoided some grounding in philosophy, even if they had hated philosophy like poison. The presumption is, however, that they did not hate it. The kinds of philosophy they got were mostly of the types that have been numbered I, II, III, V, and, in Italy and toward the end of the period, perhaps VIII. And this means overwhelming emphasis, direct or indirect, upon the German classics, particularly Kant. It is interesting to note that Marshall, in the preface to his Principles, mentioned Hegel’s Philosophy of History—and the writings of Herbert Spencer (!)—as among the chief influences that affected the ‘substance’ of his views. 19 And many economists of that time might have expressed themselves similarly; their study of philosophy certainly made more civilized beings of them. Many readers will, no doubt, disagree with me if I go on to say that this was all, and that ethical and cultural attitudes are influenced but little by philosophies, and a man’s social sympathies and political preferences not at all. Since in this book we are concerned only with methods and results of analysis, this difference does not greatly signify. 18 They could not, of course, be struck out from his speculations on ethics. 19 If this were to be taken seriously, then our answer to the first question asked above would, of course, be wrong. But it is not to be taken seriously. No Hegelian or Spencerian influences can be traced in Marshallian analysis. If he really thought that his preoccupation with das Werden as against das Sein (he used these German words) had anything to do with Hegelianism, the only possible inference would have to be that he had never understood Hegel. Marshall was still more enthusiastic about Kant, whom he described as his guide and the only man he ever worshipped (J.M.Keynes, Essays in Biography, p. 167). But the fact remains well established that he made a serious study of both. History of economic analysis 748 CHAPTER 3 Some Developments in Neighboring Fields THE FACTS ABOUT developments in neighboring fields that will be assembled in this chapter are of necessity fragmentary. They are, to repeat it once more, impressionist patches of color which any other writer—according to his ideas about what has been or could have been relevant to the development of economic analysis—would have chosen in a different way. In fact, had I been writing histories of these fields for their own sake, I should have chosen differently myself. This inevitable arbitrariness—reinforced by the inevitable arbitrariness that comes from my personal limitations—is much more serious for this period than it was before, for it is in this period that the wealth of specialized work became unmanageable and that any attempt at neat logical tectonics becomes futile. Another point of view that influenced selection must also be kept in mind, namely, the ease or difficulty with which the reader can himself supply the necessary information. For economics, sociology is a most important neighbor. But at the same time, owing to its immature state, its historical development is the most difficult to get at. Psychology and, still more, historiography, however important they are for us, need less comment because their developments have been more satisfactorily described. And though statistics is for us the closest of all neighbors, its development during that period is so well known to the student of economics that we can pass it by entirely in this chapter, on the understanding that a few facts that must be recalled will be mentioned in the section on Econometrics below. 1 1. HISTORY As regards historiography, the great event, from our standpoint, was the close alliance with economics implied in the program of the Historical School of Economics. But precisely because this event will have to be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4, little needs to be said about historiography in general. The historian’s partial conquest of the economic field was of course not his only one—all social sciences, including jurisprudence (where the conquest had taken place in the preceding period) and sociology, came partially under his sway. This, in turn, made him a student of social states and processes to an extent to which he had not been one before: the impersonal facts of social history (leavened, sometimes, by biological and psychological theories of less than unquestionable standing 1 ) gained ground at the expense of the romance of battles and intrigues. And even within social historiography, work geared to problems— such as the emergence of the feudal domains in the sixth and seventh centuries, the origin and function of towns, the organization of medieval trade, the rise of capitalism, and the like—gained ground at the expense of work defined by country and period. Of course, 1 [Part IV, ch. 7, sec. 2. J.A.S. intended to write more at length on econometrics in the recent period in Part V but completed only a few preliminary pages.] 1 This may be illustrated by the imposing work of Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), who was, in the first instance, an original and indefatigable research worker in economic history (see, especially, his Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter, 1885–6), but who adopted an evolutionary schema (with stages, like Comte’s) for which he claimed all but universal validity and which he cast into terms of a social psychology of his own (see his monumental Deutsche Geschichte, 1891–1909). This social psychology was a curious mixture of original ideas—one was, e.g., the study of an extensive collection of children’s drawings—and something very like irresponsible dilettantism. But he valiantly stood by his guns in the face of not unnatural criticism (see his Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft, 1905; English trans., 1905). historians of legal institutions—who were mostly lawyers by training—had always done work of the former kind and, so far as they are concerned, all we have to note is the greatly enlarged scope and the greatly improved methods of their work. But the important thing is that the tendency became general. 2 Another tendency that is much in evidence in modern economic historiography, the tendency to emphasize quantitative aspects, was of course not entirely absent—it never had been—but it was not yet a universally recognized item of the economic historian’s program. Some topics that are statistical in nature did, however, attract interest. 3 And the important question—How much?—turns up where we should hardly have expected it. 4 Finally, ‘general’ history grew increasingly institutionalized and increasingly inclined to emphasize economic conditioning of historical process. Economists are apt to attribute this to Marxist influence. This influence did assert itself toward the end of the century. But the tendency in question was in full swing before, and to hold that Marx influenced historians, other than professional economists or professed socialists, in the seventies and eighties is to exaggerate greatly the specialist’s speed of reaction to factors external to his field. As an outstanding example, I mention Karl W.Nitzsch (1818–80), 5 a man who is particularly important for us owing to his close relations to some historical economists, especially Schmoller. Remark. The reader will please remember the warning at the head of this chapter about disconnected patches of color. Even so, I cannot leave the subject without having pointed out the importance for the progress of historiography during that period of entirely new sources of material. The most important single instance is afforded by the Egyptian papyri: papyrology revolutionized the science of Roman Law. J.A.S. 2 Representative figures in the host of legal historians were, e.g., Brunner, Gierke, Maitland, Maine, Vinogradoff. In order to illustrate the type of work to which I meant to refer when speaking of a general tendency toward problem-history writing, I shall mention but two names; one, which has been mentioned already, is Hippolyte Taine (1828–93). The work that matters in the present connection is: Les Origines de la France contemporaine (1876–93; English trans., 1876–94). The other is Georg von Below (1858–1927, especially: Territorium und Stadt, 1st ed., 1900–1902). These two names have probably never before been put into juxtaposition. 3 See, e.g., the inevitably imperfect exploratory work in the history of prices that was done by Thorold Rogers (History of Agriculture and Prices in England, 1259–1793; 7 vols., 1866–1902) and G.d’Avenel (Histoire…de tous les prix…7 vols., 1894–1926), neither of whom seems to me to receive today all the credit he deserves. In addition, d’Avenel had an eye for the wider implications for social and political history of prolonged and pronounced price changes. 4 I have been much struck by the quantitative spirit, as it were, that pervades the works of one of the greatest economic historians of that period, Alfons Dopsch, whose material was certainly not propitious. See his Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit (1912–13) and also his later work, History of economic analysis 750 Wirtschaftliche und soziale Grundlagen der Europäischen Kulturentwicklung…von Cäsar bis auf Karl den Grossen (1918–20). 5 See, in particular, his posthumous work, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes bis zum Augsburger Religionsfrieden (1883–5). 2. SOCIOLOGY During the period under survey, Sociology more or less struggled into academic recognition, not as a universal science of man in society—as Comte had conceived it— but as one of the social sciences, though one that was not too sure of what its subject matter really was. All social sciences run up against certain fundamental problems of society, and none of them can afford to surrender its claims to some competence in matters of motors and mechanisms of social life—witness the necessity under which we have found ourselves of recognizing an Economic Sociology. But room and need for the study of society and social processes per se are bound to emerge as soon as the growth of materials and the development of techniques enforce increasing specialization. The social science of Aristotle and the scholastic doctors formed a single unit—and one that was no full-time job, even as a whole. The philosophy of natural law was in the same case. Hume or A.Smith or Turgot or Beccaria had no difficulty in embracing sociology as well as economics and much besides. But this changed in the course of the nineteenth century: width of scope then became increasingly inimical to quality of work. More and more, writers who inquired into the nature of society as such or who asked such questions as what it is that determines the social structure or produces revolutions and the like ceased to be writers on such topics as money or interest or employment. This defines one type of sociology by subject though not by method. In addi-tion, ethics, religious law, and many other topics that, as we have seen, had been made the subject of positive—non- metaphysical—analysis before, then naturally fell into the province of the student of society as such. Finally, there were groups of social problems, such as sex relations, that all but lacked accredited specialists, and others, such as education, that presented aspects in which the accredited specialists were not primarily interested. Thus an imperfectly autonomous sociology grew and expanded in spite of a reception that was not conspicuous for cordiality. Of course, there were good as well as bad reasons for this grudging welcome. It was not all a matter of trade unionism. The serious workers in the field that came to be known as sociology were flanked by swarms of littérateurs whose presence discredited a fundamentally good cause and this is the reason for a fact that greatly increases our difficulties of exposition: many of the best sociologists preferred to call themselves something else, for example, lawyers, geographers, ethnologists, anthropologists, historians, economists, if they were in a position to do so, in order to stress the element of professional competence in the face of the indictment of dilettantism. The case for the two last categories was particularly strong. Historiography was raising itself to a new level of technical efficiency: historians who were justly proud of this achievement cannot have viewed with pleasure the activities of writers who used their results in ways that habitually violated their new standard of scholarship. Similarly, economics was also climbing a long, steep, stony path toward a new level of technical efficiency: economists had enough to do in defending their work against the laggards in their own ranks and against a public that always misunderstood; they did not relish being Some developments in neighboring fields 751 . expect professional (and professorial) philosophers to interest themselves intensively in the history of philosophy. This is what we find (I). Excellent histories of the History of economic. Principles of Science (1874) is of course of particular importance to us since the author was one of the leading economists of that period. It is not concerned with the practice of any or all of the. Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (1943). Of course, this book discusses mainly the fullfledged phenomenology of the subsequent period. History of economic analysis 746 seems to—though