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Cognition 85: 145–74. 1044 eric pederson chapter 39 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS gary b. palmer 1. Introduction Coming from opposite directions on the cognitive-cultural spectrum, linguists are approaching a theory of grammar in which meaning originates not only in bio- logically driven cognitive processes and embodied categories of physical and so- cial experience, but also in cultural traditions. Each of these sources of meaning provides schemas and more elaborate cognitive models that constitute semantic categories. Culture takes on heightened significance in this equation when we con- sider that even embodied categories such as that of ‘container’ may be shaped by living within dwellings of various architectures or by the sight, feel, and charac- teristic usage of household cups, bowls, saucers, and baskets (Sinha and Jensen de Lo ´ pez 2000). This perspective has been called Cultural Linguistics (Palmer 1996), but it is entirely consistent with Cognitive Linguistics as defined by Langacker (1999a: 16), who has stated that ‘‘language is an essential instrument and compo- nent of culture, whose reflection in linguistic structure is pervasive and quite significant.’’ Similarly, Lakoff has argued that metaphorical idioms involve cultural knowledge in the form of conventional images and that links in radial semantic categories are structured by experiential domains, which may be culture-specific (Lakoff 1987: 95; Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 69). 1 Making the point even more directly, Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 177) claimed, ‘‘If cognitive models are cultural models, they are also cultural institutions.’’ Thus, it is clear that Cognitive Linguistics must keep one eye on culture. It is the shift of focus to culture as a source of lexicon, grammar, and metaphor that takes us into the realm of An- thropological Linguistics. This chapter focuses on the intersection of cultural knowledge with the se- mantic component of Cognitive Grammar. In the theory of Cognitive Grammar, the semantic component includes Idealized Cognitive Models and maps, domains of experience, image schemas, conceptual metaphors and metonymies, prototypes, complex categories, radial categories, and encyclopedic knowledge (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991, 2000). These elements almost always present important cultural components, in that they take specific forms which speakers learn in the course of socialization and enculturation. Cognitive models that are culturally specific may be termed cultural models. Though we may think of cultural models as primarily structuring social interaction and cultural artifacts, they may also provide specific conceptual structure for cognitive maps of salient physical domains of nature, such as geography or anatomy (Hallowell 1955; Wallace 1965; Bickel 1997; Basso 1990; Palmer 1998a). Cultural models of social action may be termed scenarios (Lakoff 1987; Palmer 1996)orcultural scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977; Frake 1981; van Dijk 1987; Wierzbicka 1994a, 1994b), depending on whether one wishes to highlight contingencies and expectations (scenarios) or fixed sequences with slots for paradigmatic alternatives (scripts). 2 Others simply refer to them as schemas (Malcolm and Sharifian 2002; Sharifian 2001, 2002)or scenes (Grady and Johnson 1997). The conceptual content of scenarios may pertain to any social institutions or domains of discourse, from the mythical and ritual to the economic and domestic. Lakoff (1987) based his famous interpretation of Dyirbal noun classifiers on the domain of myth. In Palmer and Woodman (1999) and Palmer (2006), we centered our analysis of Shona noun classifiers on the do- mestic activity of pounding grain. Wierzbicka (1994b) presented scripts of discourse on various topics in Japanese and in American Black and White English. Examples of cultural structuring of scenes with schemas, scenarios, or scripts are myriad; but a few examples will make the point. In English, we commonly conceptualize the future as lying ahead of us on the horizontal plane. When the speaker of Cora, a Uto-Aztecan language of Mexico, talks about the future, we find that time marches uphill, curving around the side of the hill on a path leading to the top (Eugene Casad, p.c.). In southwest Australia, Aboriginal English half refers to any degree of partiality (Malcolm and Sharifian 2002; also see Sharifian 2001), which suggests that these speakers apply a different cultural schema than that of non-Aboriginal English half. In Zapotec, the schemas that in English must be termed in or under are both referenced by one term whose prototype meaning is ‘stomach’ (Sinha and Jensen de Lo ´ pez 2000). Examples such as these, revealing conceptualizations that are simultaneously semantic and cultural, could be mul- tiplied into the thousands. Scholars have been aware of cross-linguistic differences 1046 gary b. palmer in construal and categorization of common experiences since at least the early nineteenth century (Humboldt [1836] 1972). If we subscribe to Langacker’s (1987: 63) assertion that semantic knowledge is encyclopedic, then semantic schemas may be discovered and recorded by system- atic ethnographic research. Linguistics that aspires to explain grammatical struc- ture requires ethnographic methods aimed at discovering and verifying those cultural models, maps, and scenarios that govern and motivate linguistic usages, where usage refers not only to grammar, but also to the pragmatic dimension of language—the uses of language to accomplish social goals (Duranti 1997). This chapter examines research in two broad semantic domains: (i) agency and emotion and (ii) spatial orientation. There is no presumption that these categories have folk or emic status in other languages; their status is merely analytic. In actual case studies, one seeks to discover how speakers themselves delineate their semantic domains. One can think of other semantic domains that linguists and anthropol- ogists have studied—color, kinship, illness, firewood, botany, anatomy, geography, and the earmarkings of reindeer come to mind. The two discussed in this chapter are less well publicized than the research on color terms and kinship, but they are prominent in contemporary research. 3 My purpose is to discuss new approaches and findings in each of the selected domains that offer promise for Anthropological Linguistics. I focus on studies demonstrating strong interdependencies between grammar and culture, but I will show that the findings do not support a strong Whorfian position on the determination of perception by grammar. 2. Agency and Emotion Emotion language has been the object of intensive study in recent years, both in Cognitive Linguistics and in anthropology (see, e.g., Niemeier and Dirven 1997; Palmer and Occhi 1999; Wierzbicka 1999;Ko ¨ vecses 2000). Much of this research has focused on the search for universals in emotion language and the debate over whether any universals can be demonstrated (see, e.g., Geeraerts and Grondelaers 1995 vs. Ko ¨ vecses 1995;Ko ¨ vecses and Palmer 1999;Ko ¨ vecses, Palmer, and Dirven 2002). In this section, I will first show that many verbal expressions of emotion are governed by conceptual scenarios in which emotions are evoked and lead to sub- sequent actions and thoughts (see also Dirven, Wolf, and Polzenhagen, this volume, chapter 46). These scenarios of emotion presume agents and patients who possess various qualities and degrees of agency that are specific to languages and cultures. The topic of agency is one that has received much attention in contemporary an- thropology, especially among critical theorists who study social inequalities per- taining to race, ethnicity, gender, or class (Ortner 1996;Ahearn1999). In linguistics, topics pertinent to agency include voice, ergativity, transitivity, and hierarchies of cognitive linguistics and anthropological linguistics 1047 animacy or empathy, all of which have received extensive study. 4 Thus, it seems worthwhile to explore connections between the anthropological notion of agency and the grammatical topic of voice. I propose that morphemes of voice predicate and profile highly abstract scenarios of agency. To illustrate, I will describe the usage of grammatical voice in the emotion language of a Tagalog melodrama in which agency is very much at stake. Emotion language is not the only domain exhibiting con- nections between voice and agency, but emotional scenes often highlight the links. 2.1. Agency and Grammatical Voice The grammar of voice should be of high interest to linguistic anthropologists as well as to linguists, because it provides vehicles for the communication of agency. Lin- guistic anthropologists take it as axiomatic that agency is not only expressed by language, but also constructed and maintained by it (Duranti 1997; Ahearn 1999). Agency is the capacity of an intentional being or social group to make choices, to perform actions that have intended consequences, to effect results, or to control situations. It is conferred by political and economic power, which are central to theories of self, gender, race, ethnicity, and class. Grammatical voice refers to how linguistic forms and constructions predicate relationships between nominal par- ticipants in a clause, particularly the degree of influence of active Agents on the objects of action or attention. Voice covers such phenomena as the English active and passive voice, the ‘‘middle’’ voice of Greek and Interior Salish languages, reflexive verbs, noncontrol verbal affixes (which may be misleadingly called ‘‘causatives’’), experiential verb forms, ‘‘impersonal’’ constructions, and antipassives (Crystal 1991; Langacker 1991). Ergative markers and active transitive constructions signal rela- tively high agency in a clausal subject or focal participant. Passive constructions, ab- solutive markers, and noncontrol or stative verb forms signal relatively low agency in subjects and focal participants. Thus, these voicing constructions are crucial to dis- courses involving the assertion, denial, and negotiation of agency. But agency is not one-dimensional. Prototypically, it involves an Agent who applies mechanical force to an object or a Patient, but it could also mean applying social influence or controlling the actions of a secondary active participant. Or it may involve nothing more than active attention and perception as contrasted with experience over which one lacks control. Thus, it would appear that there is no simple semantic model of agency that can be applied cross-linguistically and cross-culturally. Most probably, the grammar of agency is constructed more or less uniquely in each language. Here I propose that grammatical morphemes and con- structions of voice predicate highly schematic scenarios that characterize either the influence of agents on other participants, the degree of control over events affect- ing the agent or patient, or the degree of direct involvement of agents in predi- cated events or processes. These semantic qualities are independent of, but inter- act with, related potentials in the verb or verb stem. Some of these possibilities are diagrammed for Tagalog voice constructions in Palmer (2006). 1048 gary b. palmer To the extent that expressions signaling voice are based either directly or met- aphorically on scenes involving mechanical forces, their semantics may be repre- sented by Talmy’s (1988) model of force dynamics (see also De Mulder, this vol- ume, chapter 12). A well-known feature of Navajo verb morphology demonstrates that each culture arrives at its own conventional construals of the force dynamics of events. Navajo can mark a transitive verb construction with one or the other of the prefixes yi- or bi It was formerly thought that the yi- marked transitive objects and bi- marked passive subjects, but Witherspoon (1977) has shown this to be an oversimplification. The bi- is best understood as marking a scenario in which a controlling subject allows him-/her-/itself to be acted upon by a noncon- trolling agent. Relative control is defined by a cultural schema that ranks intelli- gent ‘‘talking’’ beings (mostly people) above less intelligent ‘‘calling’’ beings (mostly animals), large beings above small ones, and animate beings above inanimate ob- jects. Infants are ranked with ‘‘calling’’ beings. Thus, Navajo grammar is not simply marking Agonists and Antagonists as Agents and objects; it is also marking the Navajo construal of the mental efforts that control events (Palmer 1996: 158), a lin- guistic development whose appearance in some language or other would have been predictable from Talmy’s (1988) theory of force dynamics. In many languages, it is uncommon to explicitly mention agents of transitive constructions, so that sentence subjects are often Experiencers or objects of tran- sitive actions. In some of these languages, such as Samoan, a transitive Agent may require explicit ergative marking, while in others, such as Tagalog, transitive Agents are given no special marking, 5 but absolutives (objects, Patients, and Experiencers) are focused. In a study of village council meetings in Western Samoa, Duranti (1994: 114–43) has shown how the study of grammar in context can reveal estab- lished patterns of agency as well as bids and concessions thereof. During the be- ginnings of meetings, participants use few constructions with ergative Agents, re- vealing a reluctance to assign agency. As meetings progress, ergative constructions are used only where participants are receiving credit or blame or where the power of actors is acknowledged. This is most evident in talk about actions of the Al- mighty, which place the Lord in the ergative case (126). Duranti pointed out that speaking with ergative Agents constructs relations of power as much as it reflects them. The powerful may use ergative constructions to frame the situation, but the less powerful use them at their own risk. Section 2.2 will demonstrate how voice morphology expresses qualities of agency in Tagalog by predicating scenarios in- volving direct and indirect agency and noncontrol. 2.2. Agency and Emotion Language In linguistics, emotion is often regarded as a kind of basic experience that is expressed or predicated by particular lexemes and constructions, but in linguistic anthropology, emotion language is more likely to be treated as a kind of discourse with pragmatic consequences (Rosaldo 1984; Lutz 1988; Palmer and Brown 1998). cognitive linguistics and anthropological linguistics 1049 . focuses on the intersection of cultural knowledge with the se- mantic component of Cognitive Grammar. In the theory of Cognitive Grammar, the semantic component includes Idealized Cognitive Models. con- structions of voice predicate highly schematic scenarios that characterize either the influence of agents on other participants, the degree of control over events affect- ing the agent or patient, or the. Donald C. Olivier. 1972. The structure of the color space in naming and memory in two languages. Cognitive Psychology 3: 337–54. Hering, Ewald. 1964. Outlines of a theory of the light sense. Cambridge,