abilities makes the study of linguistic structure redundant or that language is an epiphenomenal reflex of general cognitive processes. As Langacker (1999: 25) put it, ‘‘Grammar does exist.’’ c. Turning to linguistic structure itself, we can enquire whether the differ- ent levels of organization, such as syntax and morphology, are autono- mous. To speak of the ‘‘autonomy of syntax’’ would mean that syntax is organized in terms of elements and relations which are unique to this level of organization—elements such as ‘‘noun phrase’’ and ‘‘subject of (a clause)’’—and which cannot be reduced to, or fully explained in terms of, elements at other levels (such as semantics). While Cognitive Linguistics rejects the idea that syntax is autonomous in the sense described above, it also does not endorse the view that syntactic organization can be reduced to matters of conceptualization. Rather, syntactic units and their pattern- ing are analyzed in terms of conventionalized associations between a (pos- sibly highly schematic) phonological structure and a (possibly highly schematic) semantic structure. There is, to be sure, the expectation that syntactic structures will be motivated by their semantic aspects, and, as already noted, a major thrust of Cognitive Linguistics research has been to elucidate the nature and extent of this semantic motivation. At the same time, the approach leaves open the possibility that some associations of form and meaning may be essentially arbitrary and purely a matter of convention. This is most obviously the case with simplex morphemes. There is no reason other than convention why the phonological form [kæt] should be paired with the conceptual unit [cat]. The allocation of items to inflection classes may also, in many cases, lack conceptual motivation. There is no conceptual motivation for the fact that the Italian noun casa ‘house’ patterns with the definite article la. Langacker ( 1991: 180 –89) has suggested how facts of this nature can be accommodated within Cognitive Grammar. d. Recall that in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar there are only three objects of linguistic study: semantic structures, phonological structures, and sym- bolic associations. While no special status attaches to syntax and mor- phology (these, as pointed out above, are analyzed in terms of assemblies of symbolic units), phonology does constitute a distinct level of organization, and to this extent it may be legitimate to regard phonology as an auton- omous level of linguistic structure. (In this, of course, Cognitive Linguistics does not differ substantially from other linguistic theories.) It is evident that phonological units such as phoneme, syllable, and foot have no con- ceptual content in themselves and cannot therefore be reduced to matters of conceptual structure and its symbolization. This, no doubt, is one of the reasons why phonology has tended to be neglected by Cognitive Linguis- tics researchers. This is not to say that phonology is not a cognitive phe- nomenon. Sounds, classes of sounds, and schemas for the combination of 580 john r. taylor sounds are subject to much the same categorization principles as symbolic and conceptual units. These issues are addressed in Nathan (this volume, chapter 23) and Taylor (2002). While ‘‘autonomy’’ may be a convenient slogan for capturing some important points of contrast between Cognitive Linguistics and other approaches, a closer look at the concept suggests that a more differentiated account is called for. It is certainly not the case that Cognitive Linguistics is compatible with a wholesale rejection of autonomyin all its various applications to linguistic study. Phonological structure, for example, has to be accorded a degree of autonomy vis-a ` -vis semantic structure and symbolic relations. The crucial point of differentiation, I think, lies elsewhere, namely in the Cognitive Linguistics commitment to the study of lan- guage as a symbolic system. It is this commitment which has determined not only the content but also the distinctive methodology of cognitive linguistic analyses. 7. Convergences? In recent years, practitioners from within the field of ‘‘autonomous linguistics’’— in view of my above remarks on autonomy, the scare quotes around the expres- sion are in order—have addressed topics that have been of central concern to Cognitive Linguistics and have even proposed solutions that are converging on, or at least which are not radically opposed to, positions espoused by Cognitive Lin- guistics. 7.1. Constraints and Rules Generative Grammar, and indeed other formalist models, are popularly associated with algorithmic rules which perform specified operations over inputs. Needless to say, rules in this sense have no place in a theory which construes language knowledge as an inventory of units (semantic, phonological, and symbolic) which are available to speakers and hearers for the creation and interpretation of usage events. Some recent developments in Generative Grammar have, however, shifted the focus from the rules which generate an output toward the constraints which a well-formed expression has to satisfy. Optimality Theory is a case in point. Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 1993) was first developed in phonology in response to the observation that different rules of a language often seemed to ‘‘conspire’’ to generate outputs with certain characteristics, for example, to eliminate certain consonant clusters or to guarantee CV syllables. The idea was that competing surface forms were evaluated according cognitive linguistics and autonomous linguistics 581 to whether they satisfied constraints on acceptability. Since the satisfaction of one constraint might entail the violation of another constraint, the constraints needed to be ranked with respect to their defeasibility. Recently, attempts have been made to extend Optimality Theory principles to the study of syntactic structures (Dekkers, van der Leeuw, and van de Weijer 2000). There are, to be sure, many aspects of Optimality Theory which are problem- atic from a cognitive linguistic perspective (see Nathan, this volume, chapter 23); critical voices have also been raised from other perspectives (McMahon 2000). One issue concerns the supposedly universal status of the constraints and their cogni- tive grounding; another concerns the processes by which the array of competing surface forms are generated and what the input to these processes might be. Nevertheless, there is an obvious affinity between the Optimality Theory notion of constraints satisfaction and the Cognitive Grammar view that ‘‘an expression’s structural description resides in simultaneous categorization by numerous sym- bolic units, each interpretable as a constraint pertaining to some aspect of its organization’’ (Langacker 1991: 532). An exploration of these points of convergence, as well as the points of controversy, will likely be an important field of research in the coming years. 7.2. Idioms There has been a growing interest from linguists of many theoretical persuasions in idioms and fixed expressions. At least since the appearance of Nunberg, Sag, and Wasow (1994), Langacker’s (1987: 23–25) strictures on the treatment of idioms in mainstream linguistic theory have lost much of their polemical punch. Jackendoff (1997), in particular, has emphasized the central role of idioms and formulaic expressions in the system of knowledge which constitutes a language. Jackendoff’s approach needs to be understood against his critique of the syntac- tocentrism of mainstream Chomskyan theory. Jackendoff accords a central role to lexical items, which are understood as combining a phonological, semantic, and a syntactic representation. Words and morphemes combine in larger configurations through the integration of their properties at the three autonomous levels of pho- nology, syntax, and semantics. The approach, it will be noted, differs from the cognitive linguistic approach largely in according a degree of autonomy to syntactic organization. Interestingly, idioms are also assimilated to the lexicon as ‘‘phrasal lexical items’’ (Jackendoff 1997: 153). As Jackendoff (1997: 174) notes, his treatment of ‘‘constructional idioms’’ (such as the way-construction, exemplified by Bill belched his way out of the restaurant) has affinities with the treatment of these expressions in Goldberg’s (1995) Construction Grammar. Indeed, Jackendoff observes that the only real issue separating the two approaches concerns the treatment of ‘‘core’’ syntactic structures, such as the transitive clause. Jackendoff prefers to account for core phrase structures in the syntax largely, it would seen, because these are not 582 john r. taylor associated with any specific semantic or lexical properties. But he also admits that core structures might also be viewed as ‘‘maximally underspecified constructional idioms.’’ If this move were taken, the need for a level of autonomous syntax would evaporate. To all intents and purposes, Jackendoff’s theory would converge on the Cognitive Linguistics position. 7.3. The Core and the Periphery Mention must be made of a remarkable work by one of the protagonists of auton- omous linguistics, Peter Culicover. Culicover (1999) offers a radical critique of Universal Grammar and the notion of acquisition through parameter setting. He argues his case by pointing out that a very great deal in a language is ‘‘idiosyncratic’’ and can hardly be said to fall under general, universal principles. In surveying the English determiners and quantifiers, for example, he notes that just about each of them has a unique distributional profile: ‘‘There seem to be almost as many patterns as there are elements’’ (64). The only plausible classification is based in semantic categories, such as ‘‘universal quantifier’’ and ‘‘number expression.’’ Still, there are idiosyncrasies pertaining, for example, to partitive of: all (of) the men, both (of) the men, each *(of) the men, all three *(of) the men, and so on. Culicover’s point is that the task of the language learner is to learn the facts as they are encountered; the learner cannot appeal to general principles of Universal Grammar: ‘‘Once the learner has identified the special properties and made the generalizations, the learner knows the relevant facts about the language in this domain, and we may say that the learner has ‘acquired’ this part of the language in some concrete sense’’ (67–68). Culicover’s account presupposes a ‘‘conservative and attentive’’ learner who attends to all the relevant facts about the domain and who does not generalize be- yond what is justified by the facts. The conclusion, I think, is not so radically dif- ferent from that reached, by a very different route, by Tomasello (2000). Learning, in the traditional sense of the term being proposed by Culicover, was denounced by Chomsky as inadequate as a means for acquiring a language (Chomsky 1965: 54). But a traditional learning mechanism clearly must exist, given the extent of the idiosyncratic and the idiomatic in a language. But if such a learning mechanism exists for the ‘‘periphery’’ (which might not be so peripheral, after all), the very same mechanism can surely handle the ‘‘core.’’ In this way, Culicover has driven a nail into some of the most central and cherished assumptions of ‘‘au- tonomous linguistics.’’ In view of these developments within the autonomous linguistics camp, many of the old polemics which defined the Cognitive Linguistics enterprise in its earlier days are losing their actuality. As Cognitive Linguistics enters the mainstream—the publication of the present Hand book is testimony to this—it will become increasingly anachronistic for Cognitive Linguistics to frame itself in terms of opposition to other approaches. Dialogue—and dare I suggest, integration—with other approaches may well become the order of the day. cognitive linguistics and autonomous linguistics 583 NOTES 1. In the generative literature, the elimination of lists in favor to rules is often justified by the need to remove redundancy from the grammar: what can be stated as a higher-order generalization does not need to be repeated in statements of specific facts. For a repre- sentative statement of this position, see Radford (1988: 366–69). 2.Somewhatmorecontentiously,Lakoff(1990) distinguishes Cognitive Linguistics from Generative Linguistics in terms of the former’s ‘‘generalization commitment,’’ that is, a commitment ‘‘to characterizing the general principles governing all aspects of human lan- guage’’ (40); it is this commitment, Lakoff claims, which renders Cognitive Linguistics ‘‘a scientific endeavor.’’ The corollary, presumably, is that Generative Linguistics, because it is not committed to generalizations, is not a scientific endeavor. This way of contrasting the two approaches is particularly unfortunate. In fact, one of the characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics in practice has been, precisely, a recognition of the particular, the idiosyncratic, and the quirky, in contrast to Generative Linguistics, where the search for high-level gen- eralizations has tended to restrict the field of enquiry to ‘‘core’’ syntactic phenomena. 3. For a survey of twentieth-century linguistics, see Sampson (1980) (now somewhat dated, but still worth reading). For Chomskyan linguistics and its critics, see Newmeyer (1980, 1986, 1998) and Harris (1993 ); see Radford (1988) for a textbook presentation of the 1980s model of Generative Grammar; Culicover (1997) is a more advanced text, incor- porating more recent developments. 4. In order to avoid misunderstandings on this point, it should be emphasized that a commitment to cognitive realism does not entail that speakers necessarily have conscious access to mental representations. Much of the mind’s contents may well be unavailable to introspection. 5. The example is from Lakoff’s 1965 PhD dissertation, published as Lakoff (1970). 6. The spirit of Generative Semantics still lives on, however; see Seuren (1997). Consider also Sadock’s (1990) review of Baker (1988). In his monograph on incorporation, Baker (1988: 46) proposed that ‘‘identical thematic relations’’ between constituents, irre- spective of their surface manifestation, had to be derived from unique representations at the level of deep structure. Sadock (himself a participant in the Generative Semantics movement) draws attention to the irony of the fact that this preeminently Generative Semantics notion is developed within the framework of orthodox Chomskyan linguistics. As Sadock (1990: 130) notes, Baker managed to write a book that ‘‘is actually more ‘gen- erative semantics’ than the Generative Semantics of the late 60s and early 70s.’’ 7. Langacker (1987: 4), however, disagrees: ‘‘Cognitive grammar is not in any signif- icant sense an outgrowth of generative semantics.’’ 8. For ease of presentation, I describe the development of autonomous linguistics in terms of Chomsky’s publications, ignoring the numerous scholars who contributed sig- nificantly to the enterprise. 9. It is interesting, however, to note that some of Chomsky’s very recent observations on semantics touch on issues which have long been of interest in Cognitive Linguistics. Noting the varying reference of the word house in expressions such paint the house brown, be in the house, be near the house, and see the house, Chomsky (2000: 35–36) raised the question of what the concept might be that the word house designates. It will be appreciated that the issues touched on by Chomsky pertain to the ‘‘active zone phenomenon,’’ familiar to Cognitive Linguists since Langacker (1984). 584 john r. taylor 10. Observe that I am using ‘‘symbol’’ to refer to an association of a sign with a conceptualization. Earlier in this chapter, I used the word in a very different sense, to refer to category labels such as ‘‘N’’ and ‘‘NP.’’ REFERENCES Baker, Mark. 1988. Incorporation: A theory of grammatical function changing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Bresnan, Joan. 1978. A realistic transformational grammar. In Morris Halle, Joan Bresnan, and George A. Miller, eds., Linguistic theory and psychological reality 1–59. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Brugman, Claudia. 1981. Story of Over. MA thesis, University of California at Berkeley. (Published as The story of Over: Polysemy, semantics, and the structure of the lexicon. New York: Garland, 1988) Bybee, Joan L. 1995. Regular morphology and the lexicon. Language and Cognitive processes 10: 425–55. Bybee, Joan L. 2001. Phonology and language use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bybee, Joan L., and Paul Hopper, eds. 2001. Frequency and the emergence of linguistic structure. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 1970. Remarks on nominalization. In Roderick Jacobs and Peter Ro- senbaum, eds., Readings in English transformational grammar 184–221. Waltham, MA: Ginn. Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on government and binding. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris. Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin, and use. New York: Praeger. Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2000. New horizons in the study of language and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Croft, William. 1991. Syntactic categories and grammatical relations: The cognitive organi- zation of information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Croft, William. 1995. Autonomy and functionalist linguistics. Language 71: 490– 532. Croft, William. 1999. Some contributions of typology to cognitive linguistics, and vice versa. In Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker, eds., Cognitive linguistics: Foundations, scope, and methodology 61–93. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Croft, William. 2001. Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological per- spective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culicover, Peter. 1997. Principles and parameters: An introduction to syntactic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culicover, Peter. 1999. Syntactic nuts: Hard cases, syntactic theory, and language acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deacon, Terrence. 1997. The symbolic species: The co-evolution of language and the human brain. New York: W. W. Norton. cognitive linguistics and autonomous linguistics 585 Deane, Paul D. 1992. Grammar in mind and brain: Explorations in cognitive syntax. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Dekkers, Joost, Frank van der Leeuw, and Jeroen van de Weijer, eds. 2000. Optimality Theory: Phonology, syntax, and acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gazdar, Gerald, Ewan Klein, Geoffrey Pullum, and Ivan Sag. 1985. Generalized phrase structure grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Geeraerts, Dirk. 1990. Editorial statement. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 1–3. Givo ´ n, Talmy. 1979. On understanding grammar. New York: Academic Press. Givo ´ n, Talmy. 1984. Syntax. A functional-typological introduction. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Goldberg, Adele E. 1995. Constructions: A construction grammar approach to argument structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Harnish, Robert. 2002. Minds, brains, computers: An historical introduction to the founda- tions of cognitive science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Harris, Randy A. 1993. The linguistics wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hudson, Richard. 1984. Word grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Imai, Mutsumi, and Dedre Gentner. 1997. A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition 62: 169–200. Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jackendoff, Ray. 1983. Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jackendoff, Ray. 1997. The architecture of the language faculty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lakoff, George. 1970. Irregularity in syntax. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Lakoff, George. 1977. Linguistic gestalts. Chicago Linguistic Society 13: 236–87. Lakoff, George. 1982. Categories: An essay in cognitive linguistics. In Linguistic Society of Korea, ed., Linguistics in the morning calm 139–93. Seoul: Hanshin. Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George. 1990. The invariance hypothesis: Is abstract reason based on image- schemas? Cognitive Linguistics 1: 39–74. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought. New York: Basic Books. Lamb, Sydney M. 1999. Pathways of the brain: The neurocognitive basis of language. Am- sterdam: John Benjamins. Lambrecht, Knud. 1990. ‘‘What, me worry?’’—‘‘Mad Magazine sentences’’ revisited. Ber- keley Linguistics Society 16: 215–28. Langacker, Ronald W. 1982. Space grammar, analysability, and the English passive. Lan- guage 58: 22–80. Langacker, Ronald W. 1984. Active zones. Berkeley Linguistics Society 10: 172–88. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of cognitive grammar. Vol. 1, Theoretical prereq- uisites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of cognitive grammar. Vol. 2, Descriptive appli- cation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993. Clause structure in cognitive grammar. Studi Italiani di Lin- guistica Teorica e Applicata 2: 465–508. Langacker, Ronald W. 1995. Raising and transparency. Language 71: 1–62. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999. Assessing the cognitive linguistic enterprise. In Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker, eds., Cognitive linguistics: Foundations, scope, and methodology 13–59. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 586 john r. taylor Lieberman, Philip. 1991. Uniquely human: The evolution of speech, thought, and selfless behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lindner, Susan. 1981. A lexico-semantic analysis of English verb-particle constructions with OUT and UP. PhD dissertation, University of California at San Diego. (Also published as A lexico-semantic analysis of English verb-particle constructions. LAUT Paper, no. 101. Trier, Germany: Linguistic Agency of the University of Trier, 1983) McMahon, April. 2000. Change, chance, and optimality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Newmeyer, Frederick. 1980. Linguistic theory in America: The first quarter-century of transformational generative grammar. New York: Academic Press. Newmeyer, Frederick. 1986. The politics of linguistics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Newmeyer, Frederick. 1998. Language form and language function. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Noble, William, and Iain Davidson. 1996. Human evolution, language and mind: A psycho- logical and archaeological inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nunberg, Geoffrey, Ivan Sag, and Thomas Wasow. 1994. Idioms. Language 70: 491–538. Prince, Alan, and Paul Smolensky. 1993. Optimality theory: Constraint interaction in generative grammar. Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science, Technical Report no 2. Available at http://roa.rutgers.edu/files/537-0802/537-0802-PRINCE- 0-0.PDF. Radford, Andrew. 1988. Transformational grammar: A first course. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sadock, Jerrold. 1990. Review of Incorporation: A theory of grammatical function changing, by Mark Baker. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 8: 129–41. Sampson, Geoffrey. 1980. Schools of linguistics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Saussure, Ferdinand de. [1916] 1967. Cours de linguistique ge ´ ne ´ rale. Paris: Payot. Seuren, Pieter. 1997. Semantic syntax. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Soja, Nancy, Susan Carey, and Elizabeth Spelke. 1991. Ontological categories guide chil- dren’s inductions of word meaning. Cognition 38: 179–211. Talmy, Leonard. 1988. Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 12: 49–100. Taylor, John R. 1996. Possessives in English: An exploration in cognitive grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, John R. 2002. Cognitive grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, John R. 1989. Linguistic categorization: Prototypes in linguistic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2nd ed., 1995; 3rd ed., 2003) Tomasello, Michael. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tomasello, Michael. 2000. First steps toward a usage-based theory of language acquisition. Cognitive Linguistics 11: 61–82. Tomasello, Michael, and Patricia Brooks. 1998. Young children’s earliest transitive and intransitive constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 9: 379–95. Tuggy, David. 1996. The thing is is that people talk that way: The question is Why? In Eugene H. Casad, ed., Cognitive linguistics in the Redwoods 713–52. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Tuggy, David. 2003. The Orizaba Nawatl verb kı ˆ sa: A case study in polysemy. In Hubert Cuyckens, Rene ´ Dirven, and John R. Taylor, eds., Cognitive approaches to lexical semantics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. cognitive linguistics and autonomous linguistics 587 van Hoek, Karen. 1997. Anaphora and conceptual structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Verspoor, Marjolijn, Dong Lee, and Eve Sweetser, eds. 1997. Lexical and syntactical con- structions and the construction of meaning: Proceedings of the Bi-annual ICLA Meeting in Albuquerque, July 1995. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1986. What’s in a noun? (Or: how do nouns differ in meaning from adjectives?) Studies in Language 10: 353–89. 588 john r. taylor chapter 22 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AND THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS brigitte nerlich and david d. clarke 1. Introduction In 1908 Friedrich Ebbinghaus stated that psychology has a long past and a short his- tory (see Farr 1991: 371). Howard Gardener (1985: 9) has said of cognitive science that it has a very long past but a relatively short history. We have pointed out in vari- ous publications that semantics and pragmatics have short histories but long pasts (see Nerlich 1992; Nerlich and Clarke 1996). Cognitive Linguistics, too, can be said to have a long past and a short history (Nerlich and Clarke 2001). In this article, we will present a number of aspects of the long past of Cognitive Linguistics. Specifically, we will try to point out that the understanding that Cognitive Linguistics has of its own past is not in all respects optimal: on the one hand, we will point to forerunners that have hardly been recognized as such; on the other, we will make clear that some of the theoreticians that served as a negative reference point for Cognitive Linguistics were actually closer to the cognitive approach than can be derived from the discussions. We will not, however, try to give an exhaustive overview of all relevant his- torical sources—actual ones or neglected ones. In particular, although the long past . partitive of: all (of) the men, both (of) the men, each * (of) the men, all three * (of) the men, and so on. Culicover’s point is that the task of the language learner is to learn the facts as they. autonomous linguistics camp, many of the old polemics which defined the Cognitive Linguistics enterprise in its earlier days are losing their actuality. As Cognitive Linguistics enters the mainstream the publication. integration—with other approaches may well become the order of the day. cognitive linguistics and autonomous linguistics 583 NOTES 1. In the generative literature, the elimination of lists in favor