The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Part 48 pps

content, residing instead in certain basic cognitive abilities. A thing is any product of grouping and reification. The grouping of constitutive entities is ubiquitous in perception and cognition, effected (often quite automatically) on the basis of similarity or contiguity. In the following display, for instance, we automatically perceive four groups of three xs, not just twelve xs: [xxx xxx xxx xxx]. By reification is meant the manipulation of a group as a unitary entity for higher-level cognitive purposes. In the preceding display, the groups are reified when each is treated as a single entity for the purpose of counting, so that four higher-order things are observed. Many nouns profile things obviously formed from constitutive entities in this fashion: group, set, stack, team, alphabet, orchestra, collection , and so on. Physical objects, the category prototype, are precisely the case where grouping and reification are too low-level and automatic to be consciously accessible. 31 A group results from conceptualizing entities together, as part of a single mental experience. A mental operation that brings entities together, an assessment that interconnects them in some fashion, constitutes the conception of a relationship. 32 While some relationships obtain at a single instant, others evolve (and typically change) through time. A temporally evolving relationship is most naturally ac- cessed by sequential scanning, in which the component states (the relationships obtaining at successive points in time) are serially accessed, as in viewing a motion picture. A relationship sequentially scanned through time is called a process, used in Cognitive Grammar for the schematic definition of verbs. Verbs have a high degree of temporality, for sequential scanning reinforces the profiled relationship’s temporal evolution and thereby makes it salient. Relationships with a lesser degree of temporality are said to be atemporal. 33 A relationship can be atemporal either because it consists of just a single state (and can thus obtain at a single instant) or because its temporal extension is viewed in summary fashion, with all its compo- nent states being simultaneously active and accessible, as in a multiple-exposure photograph. Adjectives, adverbs, and adpositions can be characterized as profiling different sorts of atemporal relationships. Participles and infinitives are derived from a verb by imposing a summary view on the process it designates, producing either an atemporal relation or (with reification) an abstract thing. An expression belongs to a particular grammatical class by virtue of instan- tiating the schema describing it. Admire is thus a verb, and admirer a noun, because—as determined by their highest-level profiles—they respectively instan- tiate the verb and noun schemas: [process/ ] ? [admire/admire]; [thing/ ] ? [admirer/admirer]. 34 Like class schemas, grammatical markers are highly schematic at the semantic pole, but phonologically they have specific content. Semantically, for instance, the auxiliary verb do is equivalent to the verb class schema [process/do]. When do combines with a full verb, as in They do admire her, the schematic process profiled by do is equated with the specific process designated by admire, hence the same process is symbolized twice. Being a sche- matic verb, do can also function as a clausal pro form: They do. The derivational suffix -er likewise evokes a schematic process, but only as its base; its profile is a thing (prototypically identified as the more active participant in this process), 440 ronald w. langacker which makes it a schematic noun. It derives a specific noun from a verb stem (e.g., admire) by imposing its profile on the specific process designated by the latter. Grammar consists of combinatory patterns for assembling symbolically com- plex expressions out of simpler ones. The traditional distinction between mor- phology and syntax is just a matter of whether or not the expression formed is larger than a word (e.g., admirer vs. do admire). There is otherwise no sharp dis- tinction between them, and the same basic principles apply to both. A particular complex expression consists of an assembly of symbolic structures, each phono- logically specific. The constructional schemas describing their formation consist of symbolic assemblies where some or all of the structures are both semantically and phonologically schematic. Constructional schemas categorize (and are immanent in) instantiating expressions, just as class schemas are. Whether specific or schematic, symbolic structures are connected—and thereby form assemblies—by correspondences and relationships of categorization. A specific example, sketched in figure 17.9, is the nominal expression the table near the door. 35 Correspondences are given as dotted lines. They indicate how symbolic structures conceptually overlap by invoking entities construed as being the same. The arrows for elaboration and extension (solid and dashed, respectively) indicate that certain symbolic structures (or substructures thereof) are fully or partially immanent in others and thus contribute to their emergence. In particular, what is traditionally thought of as semantic and grammatical ‘‘composition’’ is viewed in Cognitive Grammar as a matter of categorization. Two levels of composition are shown in figure 17.9. At the ‘‘lower’’ level, two component structures, near and the door, categorize the composite structure, near the door. At the ‘‘higher’’ level, the component structures the table and near the door categorize the overall composite structure, the table near the door. Observe that near is schematic with respect to near the door, and the table with respect to the table near the door. On the other hand, near the door constitutes an extension vis-a ` -vis the door, and the table near the door vis-a ` -vis near the door, owing to discrepancies in the nature of their profiles. At a given level of organization, ‘‘horizontal’’ correspondence lines specify which facets of the component structures conceptually overlap and thus project to the same substructure at the composite structure level. Here the landmark of near corresponds to the profile of the door, which ‘‘unify’’ to form the composite con- ception. At the higher level, the trajector of near the door corresponds to the profile of the table. It is typical for one component structure to contain a schematic element which corresponds to the profile of the other component and which is elaborated by this component. This schematic substructure is called an elaboration site (e-site), marked by hatching. The horizontal arrows thus indicate that the door elaborates the schematic landmark of near, and the table the schematic trajector of near the door. It is also typical for one component structure to impose its own profile at the composite structure level. Thus, near contributes its profile to near the door (which profiles the relationship of proximity, not the door), and the table to the table near the door (which profiles the table). Called the profile determinant, the prevailing component is marked with a heavy-line box. cognitive grammar 441 Symbolic assemblies exhibit constituency when a composite structure (e.g., near the door in figure 17.9) also functions as component structure at another level of organization. In Cognitive Grammar, however, grammatical constituency is seen as being variable, nonessential, and nonfundamental. 36 An expression can have the same composite structure and the same grammatical relationships, with alternate orders of composition (or even a totally ‘‘flat’’ structure). The information essential to gram- mar does not reside in constituency but in the semantic characterizations of symbolic structures and how these relate to one another. A structure’s grammatical class is inherently specified by the nature of its profile. Various other aspects of grammatical organization inhere in relationships of correspondence and categorization. The head at a given level of organization is the profile determinant at that level, that is, the component structure whose profile corresponds to the compos- ite structure profile. In figure 17.9, near is thus the head in near the door,andthe table in the table near the door. The distinction between a complement and a modifier hinges on direction of elaboration vis-a ` -vis the head. A complement elaborates asalient e-site within the head. Hence the door is a complement of near. On the other h and, a modifier contains a salient e-site elaborated by the head. Near the door is thus a modifier with respect to the table. The grammatical notions subject and object are characterized in terms of the semantic constructs trajector and landmark. A subject or an object is a nominal expression whose profile corresponds, respectively, to the trajector or to the landmark of a profiled relationship. The door is thus the object of the preposition near in figure 17.9. And though it is not traditionally referred to as a subject, by this general definition the table bears a subject relation to near the door. 37 Figure 17.9. Constructions 442 ronald w. langacker A symbolic assembly is categorized by any number of constructional schemas corresponding to various facets of it. Representing conventional patterns of the language, the active schemas serve as templates guiding the formation of specific assemblies, in which they are fully or partially immanent. Among those immanent in the assembly of figure 17.9, for instance, are schemas for the prepositional phrase construction and for the construction in which a prepositional phrase modifies a head noun. Moreover, since the latter schema makes reference to a prepositional phrase, it incorporates the former as one component. To the extent that complex structural configurations recur, they give rise to constructional schemas of any size, incorporating any number of smaller ones as substructures. Additionally, any particular type of configuration—such as a prepositional phrase or a noun plus modifier combination—is characterized not just by a single schema, but a family of schemas representing constructional variants as well as generalizations at different levels of abstraction. Like other aspects of linguistic organization, grammatical constructions form complex categories, usually centered on a prototype. They can be modeled as networks, where each node is an entire constructional schema. Networks of constructional schemas provide the information that determines the distribution of linguistic forms, that is, which elements conventionally appear in particular constructions or constructional variants. Representing varying de- grees of abstraction from usage events, the schemas in a network range from highly specific structures, incorporating particular lexical items, to the maximally sche- matic characterization of fully general patterns. These schemas also vary in their degree of entrenchment and ease of activation for the categorization of new ex- pressions. If high-level schemas are readily accessible, constructions are fully productive. More commonly, it is lower-level schemas that are activated, so that only the limited range of expressions they subsume (out of all those that would be sanctioned by the highest level schema) are judged acceptable. Very often the critical information resides at the lexical level. The specification that a particular lexical item in a given construction takes the form of a low-level constructional schema which incorporates that lexical item in the appropriate structural posi- tion. 38 Even the most idiosyncratic distributional information can thus be cap- tured in properly configured networks of symbolic assemblies. 5. Phonology In principle, Cognitive Grammar embraces phonology to the same extent as any other facet of linguistic structure. To date, however, there have been few attempts to articulate the framework’s phonological pole or apply it descriptively. The the- oretical discussion in Langacker (1987a, 1988b, 2000) is at best programmatic. More substantive treatments of particular problems include Farrell’s (1990) usage-based cognitive grammar 443 account of Spanish stress, Rubba’s (1993) description of discontinuous morphol- ogy in modern Aramaic, F. Kumashiro’s (2000) examination of phonotactics (in comparison to the Optimality Theory approach), and Tuggy’s (2003) analysis of reduplication in Nahuatl. To these, of course, must be added certain substantial and basically compatible research initiatives in the broader context of Cognitive Linguistics (Nathan, this volume, chapter 23). A fundamental Cognitive Grammar notion is that the semantic and phono- logical poles of language show extensive parallelism, modulo the inherent differ- ences between conceptualization and expression. Each pole is resolvable into a number of separate yet interacting channels (figure 17.2). At each pole, moreover, a distinction needs to be made between two sorts of elements and configurations: those intrinsic to that pole (hence ‘‘unipolar’’) and those determined by symbolic relationships (hence ‘‘bipolar’’). Certain parallels can also be observed in the kinds of notions required for characterizing semantic and phonological structures. Be- yond this, the strictures and basic theoretical concepts devised for language in gen- eral are equally applicable to phonology (e.g., the content requirement, the usage- based conception, complex categories centered on prototypes, rules as schemas). Coexisting at either pole are two different organizational schemes, each with its own raison d’e ˆ tre. Factors internal to each pole determine its unipolar organization. At the phonological pole, some structures delimited in unipolar terms (represent- ing various dimensions and levels of organization) are segments, syllables, words, moras, and feet. At the semantic pole, unipolar organization can be identified with conceptual structure viewed in its own terms, that is, independently of linguistic expression. By contrast, bipolar organization is that imposed by symbolic structures and assemblies. Lexical items, for instance, reside in pairings of phonological and conceptual structures that do not necessarily coincide with structures naturally delimited on unipolar grounds. It is precisely by virtue of participating in symbolic relationships that their phonological and semantic representations are recognized as linguistically significant elements. 39 More generally, each pole of a symbolic as- sembly consists of phonological or conceptual structures delimited in bipolar terms. The semantic and phonological structures directly referred to in grammar are those reflecting bipolar organization. Phonology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with unipolar phonological organization In the same way that semantic and grammatical analysis depends on the char- acterization of conceptual structure, phonological analysis depends on the char- acterization of sound structure. Although Cognitive Grammar does not yet make any specific proposals in this regard, its basic philosophy dictates an approach that straightforwardly reflects the phenomenon’s intrinsic nature. In this respect, some version of ‘‘feature geometry’’ is closer to the mark than the representations of classical generative phonology based on unordered sets of binary features. Certain analogies (hopefully not too far-fetched) can be suggested between the descrip- tions of sounds and meanings. For a sound, the action of each articulator can be thought of as an ‘‘articulatory domain,’’ analogous to the cognitive domains evoked by a lexical item as the basis for its meaning. 40 Like the domains of a matrix, 444 ronald w. langacker articulatory domains are not disjointed but related in complex ways (e.g., voicing in the larynx creates the conditions for the shaping of vowel quality by other articulators). If articulatory domains provide phonological ‘‘content,’’ is there something analogous to construal? At least one option seems not implausible: that accentual prominence in a word is comparable to conceptual prominence, in par- ticular profiling. 41 More secure, perhaps, is an analogy based on autonomy versus dependence (Langacker 1987a: section 8 .3). A vowel is phonologically autonomous, in the sense that it does not require the support of other sounds for its full manifestation, whereas a consonant is phonologically dependent on a vowel. In the same way, a thing is often conceptually autonomous, in that we can conceptualize it independently of any relationship involving it, but since a relationship can- not be conceived without invoking its participants, it is conceptually dependent on them. As with lexicon and grammar, phonology is approached in Cognitive Grammar from a usage-based perspective (Langacker 1988b, 2000; Bybee 1994). It is subject to the content requirement, which limits the structures one can posit to those occurring in actual expressions and those derivable from these by means of schematization and categorization. Like lexical and grammatical units, therefore, phonological units are abstracted from usage events by the reinforcement of recurring commonalities. A multitude of units are thus abstracted, of different sizes and representing various levels and dimensions of schematization. Through relationships of categorization, they are organized in complex categories centered on prototypes. For example, a phoneme can be viewed as a complex category and modeled as a network (Nathan 1986). Lower-level nodes in the network represent allophones, the variants occurring in particular phonological contexts; the contextually least restricted variant is the prototype (‘‘basic allophone’’). 42 Higher-level nodes rep- resent further abstractions capturing whatever is common to different sets of allophones. Various other notions of phonological theory correspond to still greater degrees of schematization. A natural class of segments is defined by an abstracted segment that is specific only in regard to certain properties, schematic in regard to others. Corresponding to phonological features are abstracted segments that are specific in regard to just a single property. A tier can be characterized as a pho- nological sequence that is schematic except for properties of a certain sort. The abstraction of phonological units from usage events is not limited to structures of any particular size or nature. Among the units abstracted are schemas representing syllables, words, prosodic patterns, and intonation contours. As with segments, these are organized in complex categories comprising variants as well as the generalizations emerging at higher levels of schematicity. Inherent in these networks of abstracted units is a specification of phonological distribution and well-formedness. For example, highly schematic representations of syllables specify conventionally sanctioned syllable types (e.g., [CV], [CVC], [CCVC]), while more specific schemas (e.g., [strV ], [pLV ], [ VNT]) enumerate permissible consonant clusters. The phonotactic patterns of a language are thus embodied in schemas for phonologically complex structures. As part of a dynamic processing cognitive grammar 445 system, such units function as templates (routinized packets of processing activity) with varying degrees of accessibility for the categorization of new expressions. In Cognitive Grammar, linguistic ‘‘rules’’ are simply schemas. Phonotactic rules are readily seen as schematic templates for the structures concerned. What about phonological rules classically conceived as operations deriving superficial forms from underlying representations? To the extent that these are justified, they constitute patterns of phonological extension. 43 These patterns are simply sche- matized representations of categorizing relationships. They conform to the con- tent requirement because they emerge from actually occurring phonological structures through the general processes of categorization and schematization. Suppose, for instance, that a number of words ending in [d] start to manifest a variant pronunciation in which the final stop is devoiced. For each such word, usage events with [t] will be categorized as extensions from the established unit with [d]: ([Xd#] " (Xt#)), ([Yd#] " (Yt#)), ([Zd#] " (Zt#)). Eventually, as shown in figure 17.5, these recurring categorizations can themselves become entrenched as conventional units, characterized at whatever level of schematization the data permits: [[ d#] " [ t#]]. The structures related by these patterns of exten- sion may be purely phonological, but they can also incorporate information about symbolic relationships (e.g., the specification that [d] is suffixal), making them equivalent to morphophonemic rules. Chains of extensions give the effect of rule ordering. In a symbolic assembly (e.g., figure 17.9), each component and composite structure has both a semantic and a phonological pole. Internally, each symbolic structure’s phonological pole manifests the unipolar phonological organization of the language in question: its elements, their combination, and the patterns they instantiate. External factors—the delimitation of phonological poles (by the very fact of their symbolizing function) and their relationships to one another— constitute bipolar phonological organization. In bipolar terms, the relation be- tween component and composite phonological structures, or phonological com- position, is the counterpart of semantic composition. Moreover, the phonological composition at each level serves to symbolize the semantic composition at that level. This is part of what it means to say that grammar is inherently symbolic. Neither the phonological structures defined on a bipolar basis, nor the manner of their combination, need be natural from the standpoint of unipolar organiza- tion. It is for bipolar reasons that picnics is segmented into picnic and -s, whereas internally—on unipolar grounds—its basic components are pic and nics. Note further that in bipolar terms -s combines with picnic as a whole, while in unipolar terms it is incorporated in the second syllable as part of its coda. More drastically, when -s combines with the entire compound picnic table, its unipolar placement is in the coda of the final syllable of the last word: picnic tables. There is no ‘‘mis- match’’ here, for there is no reason to expect unipolar and bipolar organization to coincide in the first place. In bipolar phonological composition, the composite structure need only be some function of the component structures, with no re- quirement that their combination be isomorphic to unipolar composition. Hence, 446 ronald w. langacker there are numerous ways to form a composite phonological structure other than simply juxtaposing two components. As a case in point, it is quite unproblematic for one component structure to be placed inside the other. 44 6. Coverage In assessing the empirical coverage of any linguistic theory, expectations have to be realistic. The collective and cumulative efforts of all linguists, of all theoretical persuasions, have come nowhere close to providing even minimally adequate documentation of the world’s languages. For no single language have such efforts provided anything even remotely approximating an exhaustive description. Nor has any expression or phenomenon of any language been blessed with a full and definitive description that all linguists would acknowledge as such. Even the best- described and best-understood phenomena are subject to finer-grained description and characterization at deeper levels of understanding. The limitations are of course even more severe when considering a single theory of fairly recent vintage and initially pursued by just a small group of scholars. 45 Of necessity, therefore, research in Cognitive Grammar has followed a global strategy with two main objectives. The first has been to establish the framework’s viability (if not superiority) with respect to particular topics generally considered theoreti- cally significant. To this end, a point has been made to tackle certain classic problems dealt with in Generative Grammar, especially those supposedly demonstrating the autonomy of syntax. Among such problems are passives (Langacker 1982), con- straints on pronominal anaphora (van Hoek 1995, 1997), complementation (Achard 1998), so-called ‘‘raising’’ constructions (Langacker 1995c), and positive/negative polarity items (Israel 1996a, 1998). A special effort has been made to specify the meanings of grammatical formatives commonly taken as being semantically empty, such as of (Langacker 1992b), markers for case (Smith 1987) and gender (Langacker 1988a), and all the elements of the English auxiliary (Langacker 1991). The second objective is to show that these descriptive successes are not due to a selective choice of topics, but that the theory can in principle be applied with equal success to any phenomenon in any language. Here one can point to the framework’s inherent generality and flexibility (and hopefully its avoidance of blatant language bias). Still, there is no substitute for actually applying it to a large and representa- tive sample of languages and linguistic phenomena. Cognitive Grammar is indeed being applied to more and more languages of diverse types and genetic affiliations. Branches of Indo-European where substantial work has been done include Romance (Maldonado 1988, 1992;Vandeloise1991;DoizBienzobas1995; Achard 1996;Farrell 1998), Germanic (Smith 1987, 1993, 2001;Cornelis1997; Enger and Nesset 1999; Mortelmans 1999), Slavic (Janda 1986, 1993;Cienki1995;Da˛browska 1997;Nesset cognitive grammar 447 1998), and modern Greek (Manney 1995, 2000). Among the growing array of non- Indo-European languages examined from a Cognitive Grammar perspective are Basque (Doiz Bienzobas 1998), Finnish (Huumo 1998), Estonian (Vainik 1995), modern Aramaic (Rubba 1993), Mandarin (Poteet 1987;Hsiao1991; Shen 1996); Japanese (T. Kumashiro 1994, 2000; Matsumoto 1996; F. Kumashiro 2000;Nomura 2000), Korean (Lee 1999), Samoan (Cook 1988, 1993a, 1993b), and a variet y of native languages of the Americas (Tuggy 1981, 1986, 1988, 1992, 2003;Casad1982;Beck1996; Vela ´ zquez-Castillo 1996; Ogawa and Palmer 1999). The range of linguistic phenomena investigated from a Cognitive Grammar standpoint is likewise broad and steadily growing. On this front, a two-pronged strategy has been pursued. On the one hand, an attempt has been made to examine a wide spectrum of basic problems in preliminary terms. Here the objective is to show that the framework can in principle accommodate them, and also to provide an initial indication of what a Cognitive Grammar description might look like. An ex- ample is Langacker (1991), which considers in turn many basic aspects of nominal structure, clause structure, and complex sentences, primarily with respect to English, but with numerous references and comparisons to other languages. The papers in Casad and Palmer (2003) cover varied phenomena in non-Indo-European lan- guages. The second prong of the strategy, complementary and clearly necessary, is to investigate particular phenomena in great depth and detail. These in-depth probes have thus far included such varied topics as Cora locatives (Casad 1982), French complementation (Achard 1998), Samoan clause structure (Cook 1988), English nominalization (Heyvaert 2003) and noun-noun compounds (Ryder 1994), dative case in Polish (Da˛browska 1997), verb conjugation in Russian (Nesset 1998), middle voice in Spanish (Maldonado 1992) and modern Greek (Manney 2000), as well as double subject constructions (T. Kumashiro 2000; Kumashiro and Langacker 2003) and internally headed relative clauses (Nomura 2000) in Japanese. Unavoidably, coverage of the many facets of linguistic structure has been quite uneven. While the widespread notion that Cognitive Grammar deals primarily with locative expressions is completely erroneous, this has received its share of attention (e.g., Lindner 1981, 1982; Casad 1982; Hawkins 1984; Taylor 1988; Van- deloise 1991; Cuyckens 1995; Langacker 2002d). Quite a lot has been done on nominal and clausal grounding, whereby a profiled thing or process is related to the speech situation (Langacker 1991, 1997c, 1999d, 2001c, 2002b, 2002c, 2003c, 2003d, 2004a, 2004d; Mortelmans 1999; Brisard 2002). Possessive constructions, which have a grounding function, have been dealt with extensively (Tuggy 1980; Lan- gacker 1993c, 1995b, 2001d; Taylor 1994, 1996; Cienki 1995; Vela ´ zquez-Castillo 1996). Overall, the greatest concentration of effort may well have been in the general area of clause structure (Tuggy 1988; Langacker 1991, 1993a, 2001d; Cook 1993b; Smith 1993; T. Kumashiro 2000), including such topics as transitivity (Tuggy 1981; Rice 1987a, 1987 b; Cook 1988), voice (Langacker 1982, 2004c, forthcoming; Maldonado 1988, 1992; Manney 1995, 2000; Cornelis 1997), and the semantics of case markers (Smith 1987; Cook 1993a; Janda 1993; T. Kumashiro 1994). 448 ronald w. langacker The list of topics that have not been sufficiently investigated in Cognitive Grammar can be as long as one cares to make it. Little has been done, for example, on adverbs, comparatives, or serial verb constructions. Beyond an initial discus- sion (Langacker 1991: section 11.2), coordination has not been dealt with. Though morphology has not been ignored (Langacker 1987a, 1988a, 2000; Rubba 1993; Nesset 1998; Tuggy 2003), the full-scale description of a highly elaborate mor- phological system would be quite instructive. Also, the rather extensive efforts to characterize the meanings of grammatical elements contrast with the limited at- tention thus far devoted to lexical semantic description (Rice 1988; Vandeloise 1991; Farrell 1995; Shen 1996; Lee 1999; Langacker 2002a). 46 Obviously, expanding the coverage of Cognitive Grammar into these and other areas is essential for its continued development and empirical justification. 7. Directions The word ‘cognitive’ should not obscure the fact that Cognitive Grammar is a linguistic theory. Its analyses, descriptive constructs, and theoretical claims are all inspired and supported by specifically linguistic considerations. The assumptions it makes about mind and cognitive processing are general and fairly minimal. While it is meant to be broadly compatible with secure findings of the cognitive sciences, 47 Cognitive Grammar does not simply adopt any extant psychological theory. Indeed, it poses severe challenges for any processing model. More extensive interaction with the cognitive sciences can be anticipated as one direction in Cognitive Grammar’s future development. Hinting at the poten- tial for such interaction is a certain amount of experimental and observational work already carried out. Studies by Harris (1998) on entrenchment and by Tomlin (1995, 1997) on the focal prominence of subjects, illustrate experiments bearing on particular Cognitive Grammar notions. Basic ideas of Cognitive Grammar are incorporated in Barsalou’s (1999) research on ‘‘perceptual symbol systems.’’ Its usage-based nature dovetails with Tomasello’s (1992, 2003) observations on lan- guage acquisition. Kellogg’s (1996) investigation of aphasia provides a measure of support for its conceptual characterization of grammatical classes. In the future, evidence from studies in psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, language processing, language acquisition, and aphasia ought to become increasingly important as an empirical basis for assessing and refining Cognitive Grammar. Though less straightforwardly empirical, applications of Cognitive Grammar are significant as a potential source of validation. Its application to language pedagogy, especially foreign language teaching, is starting to receive serious attention (Taylor 1993;Pu ¨ tz, Niemeier, and Dirven 200 1a, 2001b; Rudzka-Ostyn 2003). It offers a cognitive grammar 449 . respect to near the door, and the table with respect to the table near the door. On the other hand, near the door constitutes an extension vis-a ` -vis the door, and the table near the door vis-a ` -vis. level, the trajector of near the door corresponds to the profile of the table. It is typical for one component structure to contain a schematic element which corresponds to the profile of the other. project to the same substructure at the composite structure level. Here the landmark of near corresponds to the profile of the door, which ‘‘unify’’ to form the composite con- ception. At the higher