Economics and Liberating Theory - Part 8 docx

8 International Economics: Mutual Benefit or Imperialism? Mainstream economics emphasizes the positive possibilities of inter- national trade and investment to such an extent that most economists have difficulty imagining how more free trade, more international lending, or more direct foreign investment could possibly be disadvantageous. They understand why colonial relations might be detrimental to a colony. When Great Britain prevented its North American colonies from trading with Spain, and required them to buy only from England at prices set by England, mainstream economic theory recognizes that Great Britain was benefitted, but her new world colonies were made worse off. But mainstream economists point out that the era of colonialism is behind us. They point out that under free trade any country that is not benefitted by trade with a particular trading partner can look for other trading partners, or not trade at all. They point out that when all are free to lend or borrow in international credit markets any country that is not benefitted by the terms of a particular interna- tional loan is free to search for other lenders offering better terms, or not borrow at all. Mainstream theory teaches that as long as inter- national trade and investment is consensual and countries do not mistake what the effects will be, no country can end up worse off, and all countries should end up better off. So now that colonialism is behind us the only reason mainstream economists can see why developing economies would be damaged by international trade or investment is if they make a mistake. Only if they think a good or service they import will be more beneficial than it turns out to be, only if they think an international loan will improve their economic productivity more than it really can, can developing economies be disadvantaged in the eyes of most mainstream economists. Political economists, on the other hand, argue that international trade and investment are often vehicles through which more 175 advanced economies at the “center” of the global economy exploit less advanced economies in the “periphery” – long after the latter cease to be their colonies. Third world political economists in particular argue that “unequal trade” enriches more advanced economies at the expense of less advanced ones. Many political economists emphasize that direct foreign investment allows multi- national companies from advanced economies to take advantage of plentiful raw materials and cheap labor in less developed economies, and to take over lucrative markets from domestic producers. And many political economists point out that international borrowing can ensnare poor countries in debt traps from which it is impossible for them to escape. Mutual benefit or imperialism? Global village or global pillage? First we explore the logic behind each view – taking pains when reviewing mainstream theory to “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.” Then we see if mainstream and political economists are destined to talk about international economics in different languages with little hope of communication, or if we can sort out the sense of where things lie. We will discover that while international trade and investment could improve global efficiency and reduce global inequality, neoliberal, capitalist globalization will continue to do just the opposite if it is not stopped. WHY TRADE CAN INCREASE GLOBAL EFFICIENCY When we use scarce productive resources to make one good those resources are not available to make another good. That is the sense in which economists say there are opportunity costs of making goods. The opportunity cost of making a unit of good A, for example, can be measured as the number of units of good B we must forego because we used the resources to make the unit of A instead of using them to make good B. Opportunity costs are important for understanding the logic of inter- national trade because whenever the opportunity costs of producing goods is different in different countries there can be positive benefits, or efficiency gains from specialization and trade. And as long as the terms of trade distribute part of the benefit of specialization to both countries, trade can be beneficial to both trading partners. Suppose, for example, by moving productive resources from the shirt industry to the tool industry in the US shirt production falls by 4 shirts for every additional tool produced, while moving resources from the shirt industry to the tool industry in Mexico results in a 176 The ABCs of Political Economy drop of 8 shirts for every new tool produced. The opportunity cost of a tool in the US is 4 shirts while the opportunity cost of a tool in Mexico is 8 shirts. Conversely, since moving productive resources from the tool to the shirt industry in the US leads to a loss of 1 ⁄4 tool for every new shirt produced, while moving resources from the tool to the shirt industry in Mexico leads to a loss of 1 ⁄8 tool for every new shirt produced, the opportunity cost of a shirt in the US is 1 ⁄4 tool while the opportunity of a shirt in Mexico is 1 ⁄8 tool. Suppose the terms of trade were 6 shirts for 1 tool, or what is the same thing, 1 ⁄6 tool for 1 shirt. The US would be better off producing only tools – trading tools for any shirts it wanted to consume – because instead of using the resources necessary to produce 4 shirts, the US could instead produce 1 tool and then trade the tool for 6 shirts. So if the terms of trade are 1 tool for 6 shirts the US is always better off using its resources to produce tools and never shirts – even when it wants to consume shirts. Mexico, on the other hand, would be better off producing only shirts – trading shirts for any tools it wants – because instead of using the resources necessary to produce 1 tool, Mexico could instead produce 8 shirts and trade the 8 shirts for 1 ⁄6 tools per shirt times 8 shirts, or 1 1 ⁄3 tools. So if the terms of trade are 1 tool for 6 shirts Mexico is always better off using its resources to produce shirts and never tools – even when it wants to consume tools. Gen- eralizing we have the central theorem of mainstream trade theory: As long as opportunity costs of producing goods are different in different countries, (1) specialization and trade can increase global efficiency, and (2) there are terms of trade that can distribute part of the efficiency gain to both trading partners thereby making all countries better off. Comparative, not absolute advantage drives trade When David Ricardo first explained the logic of trade he was not concerned with why opportunity costs might be different in different countries. Instead he wanted to dispel the myth that mutually beneficial trade could only take place when one country was better at making one good while the other country was better at producing the other good. Ricardo showed that even if one country was more productive in the production of both goods, that is, even if one country had an absolute advantage in the production of both goods, the more productive country, not just the less productive country, could gain from specialization and trade. Ricardo demonstrated that the more productive country could benefit by importing the good in International Economics 177 which it was relatively, or comparatively less productive, and exporting the good in which it enjoyed a relative, or comparative advantage. In other words, Ricardo showed that comparative advantage – not absolute advantage – was the crucial factor driving trade. Suppose in the above example it only takes 1 hour of labor to make either 1 tool or 4 shirts in the US, but it takes 10 hours of labor to make 1 tool or 8 shirts in Mexico. In this case the opportunity costs of tools and shirts in both countries is exactly the same as before, but the US is 10 times more productive than Mexico in tool production and 5 times more productive than Mexico in shirt production. In other words, the US is more productive than Mexico in producing both tools and shirts, and enjoys an absolute advantage in both industries. Before Ricardo, economists believed a country like the US would have no incentive to trade with a country like Mexico. Certainly the US would not import tools from Mexico because it can produce them 10 times more productively than Mexico can. But why would the US import shirts from Mexico when the US is 5 times more productive than Mexico in shirt production? Notice that the conclusion we derived above – both Mexico and the US are better off specializing in the good where they have the lower opportunity cost, or comparative advantage, and trading 6 shirts for 1 tool – still holds. We assumed nothing about how productive either country was when we derived this conclusion. Since the logic was airtight, the conclusion holds even if the US is more productive in the production of both tools and shirts, i.e. has an absolute advantage in both. Where, you might ask, did the terms of trade, 1 tool for 6 shirts come from? Mainstream theorists hasten to point out that in one sense it does not matter where it came from. If there is even one terms of trade that distributes part of the efficiency gain from spe- cialization and trade to each country, all the conclusions of mainstream trade theory we derived above do follow. But there is more we can say about terms of trade that is very important to political economists concerned with the distributive effects of trade. In our example as long as 1 tool trades for more than 4 shirts but fewer than 8 shirts both countries will benefit from specialization and trade. If 1 tool traded for fewer than 4 shirts the US would have no incentive to trade because instead of producing 1 tool and importing fewer than 4 shirts from Mexico, the US could simply move resources from its own tool industry to its own shirt industry and get 4 shirts for each tool it loses. So the opportunity cost of a 178 The ABCs of Political Economy tool in the US, 4 shirts, forms a lower bound on the feasible terms of trade, i.e. terms of trade that leave both countries better off. On the other hand, if 1 tool traded for more than 8 shirts Mexico would have no incentive to trade. By moving resources from its own shirt industry to its own tool industry Mexico only has to give up 8 shirts to get 1 tool. So Mexico has no reason to trade more than 8 shirts to get a tool from the US, and the opportunity cost of a tool in Mexico, 8 shirts, forms an upper bound on the feasible terms of trade. Any terms of trade in the feasible range – 1 tool trades for more than 4 shirts but fewer than 8 shirts – leave both countries better off because it distributes part of the efficiency gain from international special- ization to each country. Unless Mexico were a US colony and had no choice, it would presumably refuse to trade more than 8 shirts for 1 tool, and unless the US were a colony of Mexico it would presumably refuse to trade 1 tool for fewer than 4 shirts. We will return to the all-important question of where within the feasible range the actual terms of trade will end up below, when we take up the distributive effects of trade. But note for now that since Mexico is going to be exporting shirts it is better off the fewer shirts trade for a tool. That is, Mexico gets a greater share of the efficiency gain the closer the terms of trade are to the opportunity cost of tools in the US (4 shirts). Conversely, since the US will export tools, the US is better off the more shirts trade for a tool. That is the US gets a greater share of the efficiency gain the closer the terms of trade are to the oppor- tunity cost of tools in Mexico (8 shirts). To review, what Ricardo proved, to the surprise of his nineteenth- century fellow economists, was that differences in opportunity costs is a sufficient condition for mutually beneficial trade, and compar- ative, rather than absolute advantage was the determining factor in what countries should and should not produce. In our example the opportunity cost of a tool is lower in the US (4 shirts) than it is in Mexico (8 shirts) – which gives the US a comparative advantage in tools. The opportunity cost of a shirt is lower in Mexico ( 1 ⁄8 tool) than it is in the US ( 1 ⁄4 tool) – which gives Mexico a comparative advantage in shirts. As we proved above, if the terms of trade are 1 tool for 6 shirts – or more generally 1 tool for more than 4 shirts but fewer than 8 shirts – each country is better off specializing in the production of the good in which it has a comparative advantage and importing the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage. Ricardo also proved that absolute advantage plays no role in deter- mining whether mutually beneficial specialization and trade is International Economics 179 possible, nor in determining who should produce what. Instead opportunity costs and comparative advantage are determinant. The intuition in our example is as follows: The US is more productive than Mexico producing tools and shirts, but is relatively more productive making tools. That is why the US should produce tools and let Mexico produce shirts. Mexico is less productive than the US producing tools and shirts, but is relatively less productive making shirts. That is why Mexico should produce shirts and let the US produce tools – provided terms of trade can be agreed to that distribute part of the efficiency gain to each country. 1 Trade theory since Ricardo has focused on reasons why opportu- nity costs differ between countries. Differences in climate or soil are obvious reasons countries might differ in their abilities to produce agricultural goods. Differences in the accessibility of deposits of natural resources are obvious reasons for differences in the oppor- tunity costs of producing oil, coal, gas, and different minerals in different countries. And differences in technological know-how – with significant effects of “learning from doing” – obviously give rise to differences in opportunity costs of producing different manufac- tured goods. A more subtle source of differences in opportunity costs is different factor endowments. Even if technologies are identical in two countries, and even if the quality of each productive resource is the same, if countries possess productive factors in different pro- portions the opportunity costs of producing final goods will differ – giving rise to potential benefits from trade. WHY TRADE CAN DECREASE GLOBAL EFFICIENCY It is pointless to deny that if opportunity costs of producing goods are different in different countries there are potential efficiency gains from specialization and trade. The theory of comparative advantage (CA) is logically sound when it teaches that global efficiency is increased when countries specialize in making the goods they are relatively better at producing, and import the goods some other 180 The ABCs of Political Economy 1. We have implicitly assumed that we cannot move Mexican workers to the US where they become as productive as US workers. If we could move all Mexican workers to the US and they instantly became as productive as US tool and shirt makers, it would be efficient to do so and make all shirts and shoes in the US. But as long as some workers must remain in Mexico it is more efficient to have them produce something rather than nothing, and more efficient to have them produce shirts rather than tools. country is relatively better at producing. But this does not mean spe- cialization and trade always improve global efficiency. Inaccurate prices misidentify comparative advantages If commercial prices do not accurately reflect the true social oppor- tunity costs of traded goods, free trade can produce a counterproductive pattern of specialization, yielding global efficiency losses rather than gains. If commercial prices inside a country fail to take account of significant external effects they may misidentify where the country’s comparative advantage lies. And if international specialization and trade are based on false comparative advantages it can lead to international divisions of labor that are less productive than the less specialized patterns of global production they replace. For example, we know the social costs of modern agricultural production in the US are greater than the private costs because envi- ronmentally destructive effects such as soil erosion, pesticide run-off, and depletion of ground water aquifers go uncounted or are under- valued. This translates into commercial prices for corn in the US that underestimate the true social cost of producing corn in the US. On the other hand, when corn is grown in Mexico farmers live in tradi- tional Mexican villages that are relatively disease and crime free and where centuries-old social safety nets exist when family members fall on hard times. Whereas producing shoes, for example, in Mexico requires a Mexican to live in an urban slum or maquiladora zone where disease and crime are higher and social safety nets absent. The positive external effects of rural village life when corn is produced in Mexico are undercounted in the commercial price of Mexican corn. So we know the commercial price of corn divided by the commercial price of shoes is lower than the social cost of corn divided by the social cost of shoes in the US, but higher than the social cost of corn divided by the social cost of shoes in Mexico. If the external effects are large enough, relative commercial prices in the two countries can misidentify which country truly has a com- parative advantage in corn, and which country truly has a comparative advantage in shoes. The external effects neglected in US prices make it look as though corn production is less costly than it really is. The external effects neglected in Mexican prices make it look as though corn production is more costly than it truly is. While the ratio of the commercial price of corn to the commercial price of shoes makes it appear that the US is relatively more productive in corn production and Mexico relatively more productive in shoe International Economics 181 production, it may be that the comparative advantage of the US is really in shoe production and Mexico’s comparative advantage is actually in corn production. The problem is that even if external effects are significant enough so that taking them into account means it is more efficient to continue producing corn in Mexico and shoes in the US, free trade will lead to counterproductive specializa- tion in which the US expands environmentally damaging corn production, importing more shoes from Mexico, while Mexico moves its population from traditional rural villages to urban slums and maquiladoras to increase shoe production, importing more corn from the US. Efficiency losses like this can happen when treaties like NAFTA increase trade based on differences in relative commercial prices rather than on true, relative social costs – which can be sub- stantially different. 2 Unstable international markets create macro inefficiencies Even if international prices for traditional exports from underdevel- oped economies did not decline over the long run compared to the prices they pay for imports, if prices for LDC exports are highly volatile this can damage their economies leading to global efficiency losses as well. In the first half of the twentieth century there were years when the international price of sugar was ten times higher than in other years. In years when Cuba exported sugar at 20 to 30 cents per pound the Cuban economy ran on all cylinders, but in years when sugar prices fell to 2 to 3 cents per pound the Cuban economy sputtered. The international price of tin experienced similar fluctuations during the same time period, periodically wreaking havoc with the Bolivian economy. One problem is that once the export sector reaches full capacity levels of output there is no way to take further advantage of price spikes. But unfortunately, when the bottom falls out of a traditional export market there is no lower limit on how many people can be thrown out of work and how many businesses can go bankrupt. So even if large drops in export prices in bad years were canceled entirely by equally large 182 The ABCs of Political Economy 2. Environmentalists argue that international transportation is a service where commercial prices greatly underestimate true social costs. “Remember the Exxon Valdez!” is the environmentalist’s equivalent of “Remember the Alamo!” The discrepancy between social and commercial costs of inter- national transportation always makes it appear that specialization and trade are more efficient than they really are. increases in good years, LDC economies cannot benefit from price spikes as much as they get hurt when prices crash in their traditional export markets. Another problem is that economic development requires a degree of stability. If every decade a crash in the price of sugar or tin means local businesses selling to the growing domestic market go bankrupt as well, it is difficult to develop new sectors of the economy. In short, greater reliance on trade can lead to efficiency losses when international prices prove very unstable. Adjustment costs are not always insignificant The adjustment costs of moving people and resources out of one industry and into another can be considerable. If adjustment costs are large they can cancel a significant portion of the efficiency gain from a new pattern of international specialization – irrespective of who pays for them. If people must be retrained, if equipment is scrapped before it wears out, if new industries are located in different regions from old ones so people must move to new locations requiring new schools, parks, libraries, water and sewage systems, etc., leaving perfectly useable social infrastructure idle in “rust belt” regions they vacate, all this duplication and waste should be subtracted from any efficiency gains from further specialization and trade. Since a great deal of the adjustment costs are not paid for by the businesses who make the decisions about whether to specialize and trade, the market fails to sufficiently account for adjustment costs. Consequently, when productivity gains from some new inter- national division of labor are meager and adjustment costs large, we can easily get efficiency losses rather than gains from trade. Dynamic inefficiency Finally, the theory of comparative advantage is usually interpreted as implying that a country should specialize even more in its tradi- tional export products, since those would presumably be the industries in which the country enjoys a comparative advantage. But underdeveloped economies are less developed precisely because they have lower levels of productivity than other economies enjoy. If less developed economies further specialize in the sectors they have always specialized in, it may well be less likely that they will find ways to increase their productivity. In other words, increasing static efficiency by specializing even more in today’s comparative advantages may prevent changes that would increase productivity a great deal more, and therefore be at the expense of dynamic efficiency. International Economics 183 The hallmark of the Japanese and South Korean economic miracles, and the considerable successes of the other Asian “tigers” who followed their lead, was that they did not accept their compar- ative advantages at any point in time as a fait accompli. Instead they aggressively pursued plans to create new comparative advantages in industries where it would be easier to achieve larger productivity increases. Japan moved from exporting textiles, toys, and bicycles right after World War II, to exporting steel and automobiles in the 1960s and early 1970s, to exporting electronic equipment and computer products by the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was accomplished through an elaborate system of differential tax rates and terms of credit for businesses in different industries at different times, planned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the taxing authorities. The whole point of the process was to create new com- parative advantages in high productivity industries rather than continue to specialize in industries where productivity growth was slow. Neither Japan, South Korea, nor any of the successful Asian tigers allowed relative commercial prices in the free market to pick their comparative advantages and determine their pattern of indus- trialization and trade for them. Had they done so it is unlikely that they would have enjoyed their economic miracles. WHY TRADE USUALLY AGGRAVATES GLOBAL INEQUALITY While mainstream trade theorists are adamant in their insistence that freer trade always yields efficiency gains, and practically blind to reasons why this may not be the case, they are much quieter about the distributive effects of trade. When forced to address this unpleasant topic the academy admits to the following: (1) How any efficiency gains from trade will be distributed between trading partners depends, or course, on the terms of trade. (2) While any feasible terms of trade make both countries better off, this does not mean all groups within each country are benefitted. There will usually be losers as well as winners from trade. (3) In the short run the internal distributive effects of trade favor the owners and employees of firms in the industries in which a country has a com- parative advantage and disfavor the owners and employees of firms producing goods in which a country does not have a comparative advantage. In other words, in the short run owners and workers in exporting industries benefit and owners and workers in importing 184 The ABCs of Political Economy [...]... believe the expansion of trade is partly to blame To understand why trade has aggravated inequalities inside MDCs we need go no farther than mainstream trade theory itself After David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, the most famous theory in international economics is due to two Scandinavian economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin According to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, countries will have a... the demand for relatively abundant factors of production and decreases the demand for factors that are relatively scarce within countries In advanced economies where the capital–labor ratio is higher than elsewhere, and therefore capital is “relatively abundant,” Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that increased trade will increase the demand for capital, increasing its return, and decrease the demand for... the 1950s and 1960s as US businesses expanded rapidly into Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia in the aftermath of World War II Clearly those capital account deficits were not signs of economic decline OPEN ECONOMY MACRO ECONOMICS AND IMF CONDITIONALITY AGREEMENTS In chapters 6 and 7 we learned how aggregate demand explains the causes of some kinds of unemployment and inflation, and studied... international trade and investment and foreign ownership Since the economy is invariably already in recession, fiscal and monetary “austerity” further aggravate the recession Reducing government spending and increasing taxes both decrease aggregate demand, and therefore decrease employment and production Reducing the money supply raises interest rates, which reduces investment demand and further decreases... globalization, and export oriented agriculture have raised the value of that land Peasant squatters are no longer tolerated Peasant renters are thrown off by owners who want to use the land for more valuable export crops Even peasants who own their family plots fall easy prey to local economic and political elites who now see a far more valuable use for that land and have become more aggressive land-grabbers... manufacturing – as Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts it should have Instead Barkin4 and other Mexican political economists point out that disastrous changes in Mexican agriculture, induced in part by terms of the NAFTA agreement, negate any small beneficial Heckscher-Ohlin effects on employment and wages that might have been expected, and explain the large increases in overall unemployment and the dramatic fall... of the costs and benefits of trade within countries When the gap between rich and poor countries increases, global inequality rises But when the gap between the rich and poor within 188 The ABCs of Political Economy countries increases, global inequality rises as well Unfortunately inequality of wealth and income inside both MDCs and LDCs has been rising steadily over the past 20 years, and there is... macro model in chapter 9 to understand things like the logic of IMF conditionality agreements In an open economy, besides domestic production, imports add to the supply of final goods and services available And besides the demand that comes from the domestic household, business, and government sectors, foreign demand for exports adds to the demand for final goods and services So when we write the equilibrium... theorist, and allows other dynamics to proceed, we often find the predictions of some particular theory are not borne out That is not necessarily because the theory was flawed It can simply be because the predicted effects of the theory are overwhelmed by the effects of some other dynamic the theory never pretended to take into account In this case I believe the dynamics unaccounted for in Heckscher-Ohlin theory. .. provide foreign exchange needed for debt repayment Deflationary fiscal and monetary policy reduces aggregate demand and therefore inflation, which tends to increase exports and decrease imports By reducing aggregate demand deflationary fiscal and monetary policy also reduces output, and therefore income, which further reduces International Economics 205 imports Tight monetary policy raises domestic interest . advantage, the most famous theory in inter- national economics is due to two Scandinavian economists, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. According to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, countries will have. to local economic and political elites who now see a far more valuable use for that land and have become more aggressive land-grabbers through a variety of legal and extralegal means. And finally,. elsewhere, and therefore capital is “relatively abundant,” Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that increased trade will increase the demand for capital, increasing its return, and decrease the demand for