The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 58 doc

prescriptive in pointing to reasons for performing certain actions regardless of one’s wants. He thinks it possible and desirable to jettison this objectively prescriptive element in moral discourse and to continue using the same moral terms, not necessarily accepting previously held moral views, but (re)inventing morality as a device for counter- acting limited sympathies, and giving it whatever content we think best serves this purpose. In his comprehensive study of *causality, which draws extensively on historical sources, Mackie distinguishes an analysis of causation ‘as it is in the objects’ from an analy- sis of our ordinary concept of causation, offering a regu- larity analysis for the former, and a *counterfactual analysis for the latter, supplementing each with an account of the direction of causation. The regularity analysis is his memorable development from Mill, that a cause is an ‘inus’ condition of an effect—an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. His counterfactual analysis is that a cause is necessary in the circumstances for an effect, such counterfactual claims being, according to him, strictly speaking neither true nor false. n.l. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford, 1974), chs. 2 and 3. —— Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, 1977), ch. 1. Macmurray, John (1891–1976). British philosopher who held chairs in London and Edinburgh. He maintained that the error of traditional philosophy consisted in making its starting-point the self as subject—‘I think’. Macmurray proposed as the starting-point the self as agent—‘I do.’ He argued that thought is derivative from action, and that the identity of the self as agent is constituted by its relation- ships with other agents in communities. His belief that we are members not just of the human community but of the natural world gives his thinking a contemporary flavour reminiscent of much ‘applied philosophy’. He held that religion is distinctive of personal life, in that it celebrates and expresses the unity of persons in fellowship. He had a large following among the general public through his many broadcasts in the 1930s and 1940s which illustrated his desire, expressed in his Gifford Lectures, to ‘transfer the centre of gravity in philosophy from thought to action’. r.s.d. David Fergusson and Nigel Dower (eds.), John Macmurray: Crit- ical Perspectives (New York, 2002). John Macmurray, The Form of the Personal (London, 1991). macrocosm and microcosm. This pair of terms encapsu- lates the idea that a systematic analogy can be drawn between larger- and smaller-scale phenomena, particu- larly between the cosmic and the human. Thus it may be supposed that astronomical bodies bear the same mutual relations as do the parts of an individual animal body, or that the universe is ordered in the way that a human society is. The terminology may have been introduced in the fifth century bc by Democritus; but such analogies are also characteristic of Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic philosophy. They are not justified by argument, but they may have heuristic value as facilitating exploration of what would otherwise be hard to access for investigation. Plato certainly supposed natural science could be prose- cuted effectively only by one who appreciated the elem- ent of value which was implicit in the designation of the universe as kosmos, ‘order’. j.d.g.e. A recent discussion of *Pre-Socratic philosophy which takes the analogy very seriously is A. Capizzi, The Cosmic Republic (Amsterdam, 1990). Madhva (13th century ad). Dualist commentator on *Veda¯nta, part of the revealed scriptures of the Hindus. Madhva defends the reality of the external world, includ- ing infinitely divisible space, time, souls, bodies, and their unique particularities. Warning that you cannot adore God if you think that you are identical with him, he also celebrates all five differences denied by the idealist monists, namely, God ≠ the world, God ≠ I, I ≠ you, I ≠ the table, the table ≠ the chair. Such pluralism provoked astute rebuttals from the monists and counter-replies from the dualists for centuries. Distinctions, according to Madhva, are objective negative facts witnessed directly by the self rather than perceived through outer or inner sense. His rich epistemology tackles issues such as ‘If knowledge is self-validating, how can one tell its claim from an error’s claim to knowledge?’ Liberation, attain- able only through devoted worship of the personal God, brings blissful proximity to, but never equality with, God, though some sinners (non-dualists?) remain eternally damned! a.c. *Indian philosophy. S. S. Raghavachar, Dvaita Vedanta (Madras, 1977). magnitude. The particular amount, degree, or extent of a quantitative property. Thus 1 metre and 10 metres are dif- ferent magnitudes of length. Magnitudes are represented mathematically by scales of *measurement, which assign a unique numerical value to each magnitude of the quan- titative property. Scales are typically (but not exclusively) defined by selecting a standard whose magnitude becomes the unit, 1. The *number assigned to any other magnitude is determined by how many times greater it is than that of the standard. Thus a length ten times greater than that of the standard metre is represented by 10 on the metric scale. Magnitudes are measured by empirically comparing objects directly or indirectly to the standard. w.a.d. B. Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement (Cambridge, 1966). Maimonides, Moses (1135–1204). Jewish philosopher, jurist, physician. Exiled from his native Cordoba by the Almohad conquest (1148), Moses ben Maimon (also known as Rambam) settled finally in Egypt, where he became physician to Saladin’s wazir. His Arabic Commen- tary on the Mishnah, his Book of the Commandments, and his fourteen-volume Code of Jewish Law, the Mishneh Torah, 550 Mackie, John L. written in Mishnaic Hebrew, established his unparalleled authority in Jewish law. His Guide to the Perplexed (written in Arabic), addressed to a philosophically minded disciple, deconstructs the seeming anthropomorphisms of prophetic language to reveal the underlying logic of God’s absolute perfection. Neither biblical creationism nor Aris- totelian eternalism is demonstrable, it argues. But cre- ation is more probable, and preferable theologically, since it can explain the difference God’s act makes in the world and can rely on God’s freedom to explain how multiplicity emerges from sheer divine simplicity. Revelation accom- modates its recipients intellectually and culturally. Its fun- damental demand is that we pursue the human likeness to God by perfecting humanity in ourselves—minimally, by living in peace with one another, as we might have known without revelation. What distinguishes God’s law is its further expectation that we perfect ourselves morally and intellectually, improving our character through such exer- cises as reloading our enemy’s fallen ass (Exodus 23: 5); and improving our minds by seeking contact with God through study of nature, mathematics, and human and divine institutions, and contemplating God’s perfection. Prophets are (as al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ claimed) philosophers whose imaginative gifts afford the rhetoric, symbol, and story that transform abstract ideas and values into laws, rituals, and beliefs, allowing non-philosophers access to the moral and intellectual fruits of philosophic insight. Philosophy is universal; but the moral prerequisites of intellectual receptivity and the material perquisites of prophetic cre- ativity (confidence, contentment, a fertile and wholesome imagination, fostered by appropriate linguistic and cul- tural traditions) make true prophecy rare. Pagan religions are primitive, superstitious, or perverse; but Islam and Christianity, which have spread monotheism through the world, preparing for the Messianic age, are derivative from Israelite prophecy. l.e.g. L. E. Goodman (ed.), Rambam (New York, 1976). Maine de Biran, François-Pierre (1766–1824). French philosopher and politician. Maine de Biran is an empiricist philosopher because he holds that all knowledge is acquired through experience. However, while the clas- sical British Empiricists tend to the view that inner experi- ence is made possible by outer experience, Maine de Biran reverses this picture. For example, while Locke holds that acquaintance with sensations is a necessary condition for the operations of reflection, Maine de Biran holds that unless we were acquainted with the contents of our own minds we could not have knowledge of the external world. He claims that there is a sens intime (inner sense) or lumière intérieure (inner light) through which each person is aware of his own mental states, especially states of ‘croyance’ (belief), and aware of his own ‘effort voulu’ (voluntary physical action). It is not clear that acquaintance with one’s own mental states is a sufficient condition for knowledge of anything else, but it could be argued that Maine de Biran has isol- ated a necessary condition for knowledge if, for example, a person’s knowing that they know that P is a condition for their knowing that P. This claim is, however, contentious. s.p. *empiricism. Œuvres philosophiques de Maine de Biran, 4 vols. (Paris, 1841). Mair, John (or John Major) (1467–1550). Leader of a group of philosopher-logicians, many of them Scots, active in Paris and Scotland in the decades before the Reformation. Educated at Paris, where he rose to become Professor of Theology, he was subsequently Principal of Glasgow University. During his last years, while Provost of St Salvator’s College, St Andrews, he was the theology teacher of John Knox. He wrote numerous treatises on formal logic, presenting in great detail a system in direct line of descent from the logic of William Ockham. Many things he had to say on *supposition and *quantification, particularly on sentences containing several quantifiers, repay study. a.bro. A. Broadie, The Circle of John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre- Reformation Scotland (Oxford, 1985). Maistre, Joseph Marie de: see de Maistre. Malcolm, Norman Adrian (1911–90). One of the most dis- tinguished of Wittgenstein’s pupils and the main con- veyor of his ideas to the USA, where Malcolm taught for many years at Cornell. His writings were primarily in epis- temology and philosophy of mind. They are distinguished not only by force of argument, but also by lucidity and simplicity of expression. His book Memory and Mind is the finest on that subject, submitting both classical empiricist and modern neurological representationalist theories of memory to devastating criticism. In Consciousness and Causality, he developed Wittgenstein’s ideas on that theme, undermining introspectionist and materialist the- ories of *consciousness alike. His Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir has rightly been called ‘a classic of biographical literature’, and his last book, Nothing is Hidden, is a valu- able study of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical criticisms of his own earlier work. p.m.s.h. *Wittgensteinians. G. H. von Wright, ‘Norman Malcolm’, Philosophical Investigations (1992). Malebranche, Nicolas (1638–1715). Highly regarded in his own day, and long regarded in the francophone world as a philosopher of major importance, the author of The Search After Truth (De la recherche de la verité (1674–5)) and the Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion (1688) has only quite recently been brought in from the cold by English- speaking philosophers. The doctrine for which he is chiefly remembered, the theory of *occasionalism, seems bizarre to many modern readers who tend (following the damning verdict of Leibniz) to see it as a blundering piece of adhocery: an attempt to plug a logical gap in Cartesian *dualism (its inability to explain how mind and body, Malebranche, Nicolas 551 being incompatible substances, can interact causally) by dumping on to the Deity the task of obligingly ensuring that my jaw moves for me when I want to eat a meal. But in fact Malebranche invokes the efficacious will of God for all causal transactions, not just psychophysical ones. ‘A true cause, as I understand it’, he wrote in the Recherche, ‘is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect’; and if causation implies neces- sary connection, then the divine will must be involved in all causality, since true necessity applies only to events willed by God (it being a contradiction that anything willed by an omnipotent being should not come about). In the Malebranchian universe individual objects and events are thus stripped of their causal powers. Talk of causal ‘influence’ or ‘transfer of force’ is only a façon de parler. In reality, what we call the cause is merely the occa- sion for God to exercise his efficacious will. Malebranche thus radically rejects the scholastic conception whereby each kind of object behaved the way it did in virtue of its specific nature or essence, with properties being ‘trans- mitted’ from cause to effect. In the new Cartesian concep- tion of physics (which Malebranche strongly supports), the idea of some kind of essential connection or similarity between causes and effects is ultimately redundant; all that is needed is a specification of initial conditions, and a set of mathematical equations describing the (divinely decreed) regularities that in fact obtain. Seen in this light, Malebranchian occasionalism can be viewed as a bridge theory between Cartesian and the later Humean account of *causality. Malebranche subscribed to what is commonly called a *‘representative’ theory of perception, arguing that ‘we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves’ since ‘it is not likely that the soul should leave the body to stroll about the heavens to behold the sun and the stars’; when we perceive the sun, what we see is ‘not the sun but some- thing intimately joined to our soul, which I call an “idea”’. In developing his account of the direct objects of percep- tion, Malebranche went on to advance a distinctive theory of *ideas, summed up in the slogan that ‘we see all things in God’. Condemned by Locke as ‘an opinion that spreads not, and is like to die of itself’, Malebranche’s theory at least tidies up some of the ambiguities in Descartes’s broad use of the term ‘idea’. Malebranche is careful to dis- tinguish the mental phenomena he calls ‘sentiments’ (feel- ings or sensations) which are purely subjective and lack any intentionality (do not have representational content), from what he calls ideas in the strict sense; the latter are abstract objects of cognition whose presence ‘in God’ may be viewed as a graphic way of conveying their independ- ence from any subjective mode of consciousness. The resulting theory has the merit of making a firm distinction between the province of psychology and that of logic. A further important subject on which Malebranche takes issue with *Cartesianism concerns the alleged trans- parency of the mind—its supposed perfect internal aware- ness of its own nature as a ‘thinking thing’. Descartes has achieved this result by the dubious move of subsuming a large number of different operations (understanding, will- ing, imagining, sensing) under the single label ‘thought’. Malebranche argues persuasively that the various possible modifications of consciousness are not clearly and dis- tinctly deducible from a known essence (in the way in which the modifications of matter are deducible from the nature of extension); further, introspection can reveal only the presence of conscious activity, not the essential nature of the thinking self: ‘to myself, I am but darkness, and my own substance seems something which is beyond my understanding’ (Christian Metaphysical Meditations (1683)). j.cot. S. Brown (ed.), Nicolas Malebranche: His Philosophical Critics and Successors (Maastricht, 1991). N. Jolley, The Light of the Soul (Oxford, 1990). C. McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford, 1983). S. Nadler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche (Cambridge, 2000). malin génie . Descartes hypothesized a malin génie (evil spirit) in the course of his search for a truth that was absolutely immune from doubt. He found that even the truths of mathematics were not thus immune, for an evil spirit might be causing him to give his assent to math- ematical propositions which are in fact false. a.bro. *brain in a vat; scepticism. R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 1. Mandeville, Bernard (c.1670–1733) was trained in medi- cine in his native Holland, and settled in England in the early 1690s. He was a polemical writer, and the principal target of his polemics was hypocrisy. For Mandeville, behind the mask of respectability and virtue lay a Hobbe- sian egoism, which had to be faced up to in any through- going moral, political, and economic theory, and he was prepared to follow the consequences for all three of these areas. His most important work, The Fable of the Bees, began as a 433-line poem in 1705, but by the sixth edition of 1729 it had turned into a substantial treatise. It is an extremely witty and provocative book, if somewhat chaotic. Mandeville imagines a hive of bees each going about their own business in their own way and argues that their success is due as much to vice and fraud as it is to industry and virtue: all these are necessary for a flourish- ing market society, and indeed they mirror the egoistic qualities of the individuals who make up this society. s.gau. B. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 2 vols., with commentary by F. B. Kaye (Oxford, 1924). E. G. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable (Cambridge, 1994). Manichaeism. This widely influential gnostic religion of late antiquity, founded and spread by the Persian Mani (216–77), taught a radical dualism of good and evil that is metaphysically grounded in coeternal and independent cosmic powers of Light and Darkness. This world was regarded as a mixture of good and evil in which spirit represents Light and matter represents Darkness. 552 Malebranche, Nicolas Manichaean morality was severely ascetic. Before his con- version to Christianity, Augustine was an adherent of Manichaeism. p.l.q. *Gnosticism. H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston, 1958). manifold of sense. This is the expression Kant uses to refer to the data supplied to the mind through *sensation. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he argues that these data are given in accordance with the mind’s forms of sensibility, space and time, and that their unification, which is neces- sary for experience, is brought about through the syn- thetic activity of the imagination guided by the understanding. h.e.a. H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience (New York, 1936). Mannheim, Karl (1893–1947). Hungarian-German-British philosopher, father of the sociology of knowledge. He was originally a member of the Sunday Circle in Budapest, led by Georg Lukács, which opposed *Kantianism, *posi- tivism, and individualist liberal *capitalism, was nostalgic for the Middle Ages, and held a strongly Platonic view of psychic life and art. After his emigration to Germany in 1919 Mannheim tried to initiate a theoretical social science that could replace political philosophy. Social thought expresses rather than explains human life. Implicitly, this relegates political philosophy to the rank of a half- conscious projection of social aspirations. The task of theory is therefore to understand what people think about society rather than propose hypotheses about it. This did not prevent Mannheim from expressing his own political preferences in favour of an étatiste (statist–welfarist) democracy led by rational planners and scientists. g.m.t. His main works are: Ideology and Utopia (London, 1929). Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London, 1940). mantra. Literally, words which if meditated upon can save us. A subsection of the ritualistic part of the orally pre- served sacred texts called Veda was also called ‘Mantra’ because it consisted of revealed holy words, often addressed to nature-gods, chanted during sacrificial acts. Subsequently, the term signified any mystic syllable or strings thereof which were to be repeated, aloud or sub- vocally or mentally, often while keeping count on rosary beads. ‘Om’ is such a syllable, often identified with the word-God which became the world. Elaborate meta- physical and semantic theories developed to support the putative identity between the name and the named which went hand in hand with the worship of sound. a.c. *Veda¯nta; Indian philosophy. ‘Mantra’, in Mircea Eliade (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, ix (London, 1987). many questions fallacy. Illustrated by ‘Have you stopped beating your wife?’, the fallacy was first noticed by Aris- totle. It lies not in the question but in what is inferred from the answer. Putting B for ‘I have been a wife-beater’ and S for ‘I have stopped’, then a negative answer is equivalent to ‘(B and not-S) or (not-B and not-S) or (not-B and S)’. If the questioner infers that he may disregard one or more of these alternatives, his inference is transparently invalid. j.woo. John Woods and Douglas Walton, Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972–1982 (Dordrecht, 1989). many-valued logic. Logical systems in which formulae may be assigned truth-values other than merely ‘true’ and ‘false’. The term is often used more narrowly to refer to many-valued tabular logics, in which the truth-value of a formula is determined by the truth-values of its subformu- lae. (This characteristic distinguishes many-valued logics from standard *modal logics.) The idea that logic ought to countenance more than two truth-values arose naturally in ancient and medieval discussions of *determinism and was re-examined by C. S. Peirce, Hugh MacColl, and Nikolai Vasiliev in the first decade of this century. Explicit formulation and system- atic investigation of many-valued logics began with writ- ings of Jan Łukasiewicz and Emil Post in the 1920s and D. Bochvar, Jerzy Stupecki, and Stephen Kleene in the late 1930s. There has been some renewed interest in the sub- ject recently, because of perceived connections with pro- gramming languages and artificial intelligence. Łukasiewicz’s work is inspired by a view of ‘future con- tingents’ often attributed to Aristotle. There is a sense in which whatever happens in the present or past is now unalterable. This idea sometimes finds expression in the doctrine that sentences now true are unalterably true and those now false are unalterably false. But, although it seems that ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’ is now either true or false, it does not seem unalterably true or unalterably false. Considerations like this led Łukasiewicz to adopt the view that future contingent sentences are not either true or false, but have an intermediate truth-value, ‘the possible’. He constructed a formal language, taking the conditional (→) and negation (¬) as primitive connec- tives and false (0), possible (½), and true (1) as truth- values. Truth-values of compound formulae are deter- mined by the tables below. A¬A ABA→B 10 111 ½½ 1 ½½ 01 100 ½ 11 ½½1 ½ 0 ½ 011 0 ½ 1 001 To obtain a many-valued logic from a table like this, one specifies certain truth-values as designated. The argument from set Γ to formula A is logically valid if A gets a designated truth-value under any assignment in which many-valued logic 553 all the members of Γ do. A is logically true if it gets a des- ignated value under any assignment. For example, if fig- ure 1 and fi are both designated, then (P → ¬P) → ¬P is a logical truth by these tables; if (as Łukasiewicz intended) only figure 1 is designated, then it is not. With Łukasiewicz’s understanding that P ∨ Q abbreviates (P → Q) → Q, the formula in question expresses the law of excluded middle. It is doubtful that these (or any) truth-tables capture precisely the kind of possibility exhibited by future contin- gents. Why, for example, should ‘If there won’t be a sea battle there will be one’ be considered true, while ‘If 2+2=4 then there will be a sea battle’ is merely possible? Nevertheless, Łukasiewicz’s original system has been generalized, axiomatized, reinterpreted, modified, and otherwise studied. Łukasiewicz himself considered generalizations per- mitting more than one intermediate truth-value: ¬A gets truth-value 1 minus the truth-value of A; A ∨ B gets the greater of the truth-values of A and B. Other many-valued systems have been motivated by the idea that additional truth-values might express the notion of a proposition’s being paradoxical (its truth implying its falsity and its fal- sity implying its truth), of its having uncomputable truth- value, of its being approximately true, and of its having failed presuppositions of various sorts. Most of the sys- tems considered generalize classical logic in the sense that, if truth-values other than 0 and 1 are dropped, classical logic is obtained. Post formulated a technically advantageous system in which Łukasiewicz’s negation is replaced by a ‘cyclic’ negation—the truth-values are 0, 1, . . ., m and the truth- value of ¬A is 0 if the truth-value of A is m and it is 1 + the truth-value of A otherwise. Post’s negation and disjunction are truth-functionally complete: any connective in a finite- valued logic (including the conditional and negation of Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic discussed above) can be defined from them. This result has practical significance, for just as the formulae of classical propositional logic cor- respond to logic circuits, the formulae of m-valued logics correspond to switching-circuits in which inputs and out- puts can assume m states. More recent investigations have examined the model theory and proof theory of general many-valued logic and of continuous logic, in which the truth-values are assumed to have a topological structure. It is enlightening to see certain results of classical logic proved in a more general setting. s.t.k. The works cited below are a small sample of the large and varied literature on the subject, but they do contain references to much of the rest. N. Rescher, Many-Valued Logic (New York, 1969). A. Urquhart, ‘Many-Valued Logic’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenth- ner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, iii (Dordrecht, 1986). R. Wójcicki, Theory of Logical Calculi: Basic Theory of Consequence Operations (Dordrecht, 1988). R. Wolf, ‘A Survey of Many-Valued Logic 1966–1974’, in J. M. Dunn and G. Epstein (eds.), Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic (Dordrecht, 1975). Marcel, Gabriel (1889–1973). French philosopher, play- wright, and literary and music critic who converted to Roman Catholicism in 1929. Marcel (despite, in common with the other Existentialists, repudiating the title ‘Exist- entialist’) provides Christian solutions to existentialist problems. In Être et avoir (Being and Having (1935)) Marcel draws a distinction between one’s being and one’s life. ‘I am’ is existentially prior to ‘I live’ (meaning, approximately, that being is a necessary condition for living but not vice versa). Marcel takes this as a ground for believing that my life was ‘given to me’, a fact which is sufficiently impres- sive to suggest the existence of God. In a fashion analogous to Heidegger’s use of ‘being- toward-death’ Marcel notes that one’s being is at every moment ‘in jeopardy’ and concludes that the only way to understand the ‘ordeal’ of living is to have faith in one’s being ‘beyond’ one’s life, that is, surviving one’s death. Marcel’s existentialist metaphysics faces the difficulty that from the fact that I am not numerically identical with the life that I lead it does not logically follow that I pre-date or post-date that life. Similarly, from the fact that life is a senseless ordeal without God it does not logically follow that God exists. However, neither of these objections is strong enough to show that the central tenets of Marcel’s theological *existentialism are false. In ‘Existence and Freedom’ (1946) Marcel criticizes Heidegger, Jaspers, but especially Sartre for their ‘dog- matic negativism’ (their *pessimism about human prospects), a charge Sartre attempts to repudiate in his maligned but brilliant 1946 speech ‘L’Existentialisme est un humanisme’. s.p. K. T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, foreword by Gabriel Marcel (New York, 1962). G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, tr. René Hague (London, 1950–1). Marcus, Ruth (1921– ). Ruth Marcus is known as an early pioneer of *modal logic, the logic which formalizes the philosophical notions of possibility and necessity. Marcus, originally Ruth Barcan, was instrumental in exploring modal logics with quantifiers and assessing the philosoph- ical implications of mixing modality and quantification. A well-known formula in quantified modal logic, the *Barcan formula, bears her name; in one version it states that if everything necessarily bears a certain property, then it is a necessary truth that everything bears it. Marcus has also done a great deal of work in other areas of logic, most notably on the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, an approach which takes quantifiers to range not over ordinary objects but over linguistic symbols (in a prescribed formal language) which produce true substitu- tion instances. g.f.m. R. Marcus, Modalities: Philosophical Essays (Oxford, 1993). Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979). One of the most original and provocative non-Soviet Marxists of the century, Mar- cuse received a doctorate in literature (1922) but soon became attracted to Heidegger’s philosophy with its focus 554 many-valued logic on the individual as thrown into a world of objects and populated with others. But the writings of the young Marx convinced Marcuse that a genuine theory of individuality must take into account prevailing socio-economic struc- tures. Joining the *Frankfurt School in 1933, he con- tributed to the development of the dialectical criticism characteristic of the school: major concepts were analysed and traced to their material origins, and then recon- structed to show their altered political functions. His post-Second World War writings, however, pre- sent his most characteristic proposals and social critique. Freudian psychology provided a theory of human instincts, which are repressed under capitalism but which, when liberated, can be the basis for a life of sensousness, playfulness, peace, and beauty. This liberation requires a total transformation of present society: technology would be utilized to abolish poverty and provide for abundance; there would be a different relation to nature in which art and production are unified; the sexes and generations would overcome artificial constraints, and a new kind of person with advanced sensibilities would appear. Marcuse’s optimism for the actual achievement of these transformations was at its lowest in One Dimensional Man (1964); the student rebellions of the 1960s gave him renewed hope (e.g. Essay on Liberation (1969)). Counter- revolution and Revolt (1972) retreats from advocating revo- lutionary violence and confrontation and recommends working for change within the system. The Aesthetic Dimension (1978) argues that the sensuous appearance of beauty in the artwork preserves the memory of a liberated way of living and so escapes the domination of the pre- sent, repressive order. Marcuse’s revised Marxism provides both a broad cri- tique of advanced capitalist society and utopian proposals for a post-capitalist world. c.c. *Marxist philosophy. Barry Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography (London, 1982). Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley, Calif., 1984). Maritain, Jacques (1882–1973). The best-known neo- Thomist of the twentieth century. Having become dis- satisfied with secularism and scientism, at the age of 24 Maritain converted to Roman Catholicism and spent the following sixty or so years elaborating a comprehensive philosophical system based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas and of his scholastic followers, most especially John of St Thomas (1589–1644). His major contributions are to epistemology (The Degrees of Knowledge (1932)), social philosophy (The Person and the Common Good (1947)), and aesthetics (Art and Scholasticism (1920)). Maritain is a staunch realist in metaphysics and epistemology: he advocates ontological pluralism, claiming that there are various non-reducible levels of existence, e.g. the physical, the biological, the psychological, the social, and the spiritual; and similarly he insists upon the diversity of our ways of knowing reality, emphasizing the role of rational and creative intuition and thereby linking meta- physics and aesthetics. j.hal. *neo-Thomism. R. McInerny, Art and Prudence: Studies in the Thought of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame, Ind., 1988). markets. Originally, places at which independent sellers, who were usually also the producers, made their goods available to consumers coming there specifically to shop for them; terms of exchange (prices) were characteris- tically established for each individual transaction by hag- gling. The term ‘market’ is currently used to refer not only to particular local places but to the entirety of *free exchanges of goods and services within a society, by con- trast with the sphere in which exchanges are enforced by an authority external to the transfer of goods or services. The term ‘market’ is thus usually used interchangeably with ‘free market’, the implication being that prices are set by agreement between buyers and sellers. In this more abstract sense, the idea of the market is defined by the set of socially understood or enforced rights of participants: an arena of transfers is a market in so far as the disposition of the goods and services in question is at the will of vol- untarily acting individuals or co-operating sets of individ- uals, terms of exchange (prices) being freely negotiated. Prices are then determined by effective supply and demand on the part of participants. Constraints imposed by governments, requiring that goods or services transfer on certain terms even though one or both parties would not freely exchange on those terms, is called ‘intervention in the market’. *Socialism involves collective, political control, rather than market determination, of much economic activity, especially of capital (productive) goods; *capitalism leaves the alloca- tion of capital as well as all consumer goods to private con- trol (ownership). There is extensive political and moral discussion about the proper role of markets in society, ranging from those who think that the allocation of all goods and services should be determined by free market mechanisms (*‘libertarianism’) to those who think that none of them should (‘collectivism’). The latter, which Stalinism approximated, is defended by no one. The for- mer, or close approximations, has many advocates, due in part to its theoretical elegance and in part to the enormous empirical success of markets. The chief problem for the unlimited advocacy of market methods is what to do about externalities—involuntary effects (especially nega- tive ones) on persons outside the transaction, as with, say, an assassination contract; and especially about public goods, which are roughly externalities, such as pollution, whose involuntary costs are imposed on miscellaneous others rather than some few specific others, making it very difficult to allocate costs and benefits precisely. j.n. *anti-communism. For a fascinating radically pro-market book, see David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, 2nd ed. (La Salle, Ill., 1989). For a good, markets 555 brief discussion of many basics, see Allen Buchanan, Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market (Totowa, NJ, 1985). markets and the public good. Markets are places or net- works where buyers and sellers exchange goods or ser- vices for money. Capitalism is the economic system whereby the mass production of goods to be sold in mar- kets is financed by private capital for individual or corpo- rate profit. According to the ‘law’ of supply and demand, market price rises with the scarcity of items for sale and falls with their abundance; current price thus provides sell- ers with information enabling them to distribute their resources for maximum profit. This allows for an efficient allocation of resources based entirely on decisions of purchasers and without government or other inter- vention. A market economy also encourages innovation and individual initiative as incentives for profit. Mass production makes technologically advanced, inexpensive goods widely available, gradually improving the general welfare. Yet a market economy benefits most those sufficiently well-off to buy its products; those with few financial resources are seriously disadvantaged. Those born into poverty are likely to continue to suffer from economic deprivation. Secondly, unavoidably, there are long periods of unemployment after a period of economic con- traction; and market solutions to issues such as inflation, environmental destruction, and pollution are also prob- lematic. Finally, capitalism distributes wealth very unevenly, with investors and management highly rewarded by profits from sales, while workers are limited to labour for wages often lowered by competition among labourers for jobs. This tends to create a small wealthy class with great economic power in contrast to a large number of relatively impoverished, powerless workers. Liberals try to retain the advantages of capitalism by advocating that government protect basic civil rights but also provide medical services, education, transportation, access to positions of power, and a clean, sustainable environment. Guaranteeing broad rights and also a just distribution of wealth and services is to counterbalance market inequities. Socialists contend that even under liberal democracy the wealthy will inevitably have disproportionate eco- nomic and political power. Their solution is to eliminate or reduce the market system, either gradually through general education and democratic means or quickly through revolution. An economy with state control of production and distribution of goods for the benefit of all will retain the advantages of industrialism without the injustices of the market. c.c. M. Kelly, The Divine Right of Capital: Dethroning the Corporate Aristocracy (San Francisco, 2001). J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3 edn. (New York, 1983). marriage. Contractual union for the purpose of raising a family, or, derivatively, for the sex, domestic security, etc. associated with this. By contrast with the biological phe- nomenon of mating, marriage is, to taste, ‘made in heaven’ or instituted by human societies. The former view offers a theological justification for some particular conception of marriage, e.g. as an indissoluble union con- stituting the only permissible locus of sexual activity. The latter view emphasizes the variety of forms of marriage, e.g. polygamy and polyandry, and typically offers justifi- cations of these in terms of their social function. Forms of marriage may thus be criticized as dysfunctional: so Plato regards monogamous marriage carrying parental respon- sibilities as a threat to social solidarity, and he recom- mends instead that wives and children should be shared in common. Other criticisms of marriage complain of the restrictions it imposes on individual liberty. These may be met by noting its voluntary contractual character. This reply appears to require that divorce be readily available to terminate the contract and also, perhaps, that different types of marital contract should be possible. Yet an exclu- sive emphasis upon contracts seems unromantic in the face of the contemporary Western insistence that mar- riage is only justified by *love. But in view of the notorious mutability of romantic love, we can either reply that mar- riage makes possible a commitment that gives conjugal love its value (e.g. Kierkegaard), or conclude that mar- riage is indefensible, creating ‘that moral centaur, man and wife’ (Byron). p.g. *sex; Augustine; friendship; sexual conduct. B. T. Trainor, ‘The State, Marriage and Divorce’, Journal of Applied Philosophy (1992). Marsilius (Marsiglio) of Padua (c.1280–1342). Italian medieval political theorist who contested the dominant view of hereditary kingship as the best form of govern- ment. Drawing on Aristotle’s Politics, Cicero (as the defender of republican liberty), and his experience of vibrant Italian city states ruled de facto by assemblies, Mar- silius elaborately argued a theory of popular sovereignty, opposed to Dante, in Defender of the Peace (1324). Legisla- tive power most appropriately resides within the lay citi- zen body, which may delegate executive power to an aristocracy or even to a monarch, but which does not thereby lose it. Of the three forms of government dis- cussed by Aristotle, monarchy, aristocracy, and the city state or ‘polity’, only the last for Marsilius fully guarantees political *liberty, and the flourishing of justice and peace. The two main threats to peace are (1) factionalism and, more serious, (2) the papacy’s demands for supreme sov- ereignty in the secular sphere. Marsilius’ arguments were known to fifteenth-century Italian humanist defenders of republicanism. l.p. A. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace, 2 vols. (New York, 1957). Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1980). Martin, Charles B. (1924– ). Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary, formerly Chair of Philosophy, 556 markets University of Sydney, past President of the Australasian Philosophical Association, noted for work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Citing Locke as his inspir- ation, he was an early proponent of causal theories of per- ception, knowledge, and memory, and a principal architect of Australian metaphysical *realism. Martin advocates an uncompromising materialist conception of minds as complex neurologically based propensities for the manipulation of sensory materials. The ‘ofness’ and ‘aboutness’ of thoughts and images arises from their dis- positional realizations in the nervous system. More gener- ally, Martin holds that property instances invariably possess both dispositional and non-dispositional aspects, and that causal transactions are best regarded, not as rela- tions between distinct events, but as the ‘mutual manifest- ations of reciprocal dispositional property partners’. j.heil *Australian philosophy. D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, and U.T. Place, Dispositions: A Debate (London, 1996). C. B. Martin, ‘Protolanguage’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1987). Martineau, James (1805–1900). Leader of the Unitarians in Victorian England and brother of social critic Harriet Martineau, Martineau taught at Manchester New Col- lege, where he eventually served as Principal. He was an intuitionist about morality, and a chapter of Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics is devoted to criticism of his views. Today he is best remembered for his advocacy of an agent-based form of *virtue ethics according to which motives are the fundamental objects of moral evaluation (with reverence ranking highest, followed by compassion) and all actions are to be evaluated derivatively in terms of their relation to such motives. Martineau’s theory is perhaps the purest example of agent-basing in the entire history of philosophy. m.s. *agent-relative moralities. J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 1977), esp. ch. 7. Marx, Karl Heinrich (1818–83). Radical social theorist and organizer of the working class, whose thought is widely regarded as the chief inspiration for all forms of modern social radicalism. Born 5 May 1818 in the Rhenish city of Trier, Marx was son of a successful Jewish lawyer of con- servative political views who converted to Christianity in 1824. He studied law at the University of Bonn in 1835 and at the University of Berlin in 1836, changing his course of study in that year to philosophy, under the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and the Young Hegelian movement. Marx completed his doctorate in philosophy in 1841. With the accession of Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1840, however, the Young Hegelians came under attack from the government, and Marx lost all chance of an academic career in philosophy. Between 1842 and 1848 he edited radical publications in the Rhineland, France, and Belgium. He married his child- hood sweetheart, Jenny von Westphalen, in 1843; despite their exceedingly hard life after 1850, the marriage was a happy one, and lasted until her death in 1881. (While in London the Marxes’ family servant, Helene Demuth, gave birth to an illegitimate child; during the present cen- tury it was believed for a time that Marx was the father, but it is now widely held that he was not.) In 1844, while in Paris, Marx was introduced both to the working-class movement and to the study of political economy by his former fellow student at Berlin, Friedrich Engels, with whom he began a lifetime of collaboration. While in Brussels, he formulated the programme of his- torical materialism, first expounded in the unpublished manuscript The German Ideology. Marx returned from Belgium to Paris in 1848 after the revolution, and then went back to the Rhineland where he worked as a publicist on behalf of the insurrection there. In the same year Marx and Engels played a key role in founding the Communist League (which lasted until 1850); the Communist Manifesto was part of their activity in the League. After successfully defending himself and his associates in a Cologne court on charges of inciting to revolt, Marx was expelled from Prussian territories in 1848. After a brief stay in Paris, he took up residence in London. The first years in England were a time of bitter, brutal poverty for the Marx family: three of their six children died of want and Marx’s health suffered a collapse from which it never fully recovered. For much of the 1850s his only regular income was from Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, for which he served as European correspondent, receiving a fee of £1 per article. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, when not confined to bed by illness, Marx regularly spent ten hours of every day in the library of the British Museum studying and writing. His first scientific work on political economy, Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, was published in 1859; the Preface to this work contains a succinct statement of the materialist conception of history, usually regarded as the definitive formulation of that doctrine. This was only a prelude to Marx’s definitive theory of *capitalism. Vol- ume i of Capital was published in 1867, but two more vol- umes were left uncompleted at his death. Engels edited and published them in 1884 and 1893 respectively. Marx was instrumental in founding the International Working Men’s Association in 1864, and guided it through six con- gresses in nine years. The demise of the First International in 1876 was brought about by a combination of factors, notably the organization’s support for the Paris Com- mune (see Marx’s The Civil War in France) and internal intrigues by Mikhail Bakunin (expelled in 1872). Marx died of long-standing respiratory ailments on 13 March 1883, and is buried next to his wife in Highgate Cemetery, London. Marx’s interest in philosophical *materialism is evident as early as his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of nature in Democritus and Epicurus. But the dissertation’s focus on Epicurus’ philosophy of self-consciousness and its historical significance equally displays Marx’s Marx, Karl 557 education in German idealist philosophy and his preoccu- pation with its themes. As a philosopher Marx self- consciously sought to marry the tradition of German *idealism, especially the philosophy of Hegel, with the scientific materialism of the radical French Enlighten- ment. This was to some extent the tendency of the Young Hegelian movement generally, but Marx’s emphatic admiration for English and French materialism in contrast to the Young Hegelians’ depreciation of it is displayed in a well-known passage from The Holy Family (1844). Of greater significance for Marx’s later thought is the way in which his famous Paris manuscripts of 1844 address to the ‘materialistic’ science of political economy a set of issues which Hegel and his followers had treated as questions of religious subjectivity. German idealism was concerned with problems of human selfhood, the nature of a fulfilling human life, and people’s sense of meaning, self-worth, and relatedness to their natural and social environment. They saw modern culture as both a scene of *‘alienation’ for human beings from themselves, their lives, and others, and also as holding out the promise of the conquest or overcoming of alienation. Hegel, how- ever, saw the task of self-fulfilment and reconciliation as a philosophical–religious one. It was Marx in the Paris man- uscripts who first attempted to see it as fundamentally a matter of the social and economic conditions in which people live, of the kind of labouring activities they per- form and the practical relationships in which they stand to one another. Marx’s concern for the plight of the working class was from the beginning a concern not merely with the satisfaction of ‘material needs’ in the usual sense, but fundamentally with the conditions under which human beings can develop their ‘essential human powers’ and attain ‘free self-activity’. The Paris manuscripts view human beings in modern society, human beings as they are understood by the sci- ence of political economy, as alienated from themselves because their life-activity takes an alien, inhuman form. Truly human and fulfilling life activity is an activity of free social self-expression. It is free because it is self- determined by human beings themselves; it develops and expresses their humanity because, as Hegel had realized, it is the nature of a spiritual being to create itself by objecti- fying itself in a world and then comprehending that world as its adequate expression, as the ‘affirmation’, ‘objectifi- cation’, and ‘confirmation’ of its nature; and it is social because it is the nature of human beings to produce both with others and for others, and to understand themselves in the light of their mutual recognition of one another and their common work. The social relationships depicted by political economy, however, are relationships in which the life-activity of the majority, the working class, is increasingly stunted, reduced to meaningless physical activity which, far from developing and exercising their humanity, reduces them to abstract organs of a lifeless mechanism. They do not experience the products of their labour as their expression, or indeed as theirs in any sense. For these products belong to a non-worker, the capitalist, to whom they must sell their activity for a wage which suf- fices only to keep them alive so that they may sustain the whole absurd cycle of their lives. Political economy, moreover, depicts human beings whose social life and relationships are at the mercy not of their collective choice but of an alien, inhuman mechanism, the market-place, which purports to be a sphere of individual freedom, but is in fact a sphere of collective slavery to inhuman and destructive forces. Hegel had earlier conceived of alienation in the form of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ (a misunderstood Christian religiosity which experiences the human self as empty and worthless, and places everything valuable in a super- natural ‘beyond’). The cure for alienation in Hegel’s view is the recognition that finite nature is not the absence of infinite spirit but its expression. Feuerbach brought to light the latent *humanism in Hegel’s view and attacked all forms of religion (and even Hegel’s speculative meta- physics) as forms of alienation. The true being of human individuals, he maintained, is in the enjoyment of sensu- ous nature and of loving harmony with other human beings. What both Hegel and Feuerbach had in common is the perception of alienation as fundamentally a form of false consciousness, whose cure was a correct perception or interpretation of the world. Alienated consciousness contains both a lament that our natural human life is unsatisfying and worthless, and also the hope of consol- ation in the beyond. Hegel and Feuerbach agree that the illusion of alienated consciousness consists in its negative attitude toward earthly life; the comforting assurances of religion, according to both philosophers, contain the truth, if only we know how to put the right philosophical interpretation on them. To Marx, however, alienation becomes intelligible as soon as we adopt just the reverse supposition: that the alienated consciousness tells the truth in its laments, not in its consolations. Religion, according to Marx, gives expression to a mode of life which is really empty, unfulfilled, degraded, devoid of dig- nity. Religious illusions have hold on us because they pro- vide a false semblance of meaning and fulfilment for a mode of life which without this illusion would be seen for the unredeemed meaninglessness that it is. For Marx reli- gious misery is both an expression of actual misery and an attempt to flee from it into a world of imagination: it is the ‘opium of the people’. The way out of alienation is not, as Hegel and Feuerbach thought, a new philosophical inter- pretation of life, but a new form of earthly existence, a new society in which the material conditions for a fulfill- ing human life would no longer be lacking. ‘The philoso- phers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it.’ For Marx the ultimate tendency of history is the Promethean drive of the human species to develop its ‘essential human powers’, its powers of production. Under capitalism these powers, and the complex network of human co-operation through which they are exercised, have for the first time grown far enough to put within the reach of human beings themselves the collective, rational 558 Marx, Karl control of the social form of their own production. This self-conscious self-determination is the true meaning of human freedom. But human beings under capitalism are alienated because capitalist social relations, by dispossess- ing the vast majority of producers and subjecting the form of social production to the market mechanism, frustrate this collective self-determination. The historic mission of the proletariat is to actualize the capacities for human free- dom which the capitalist mode of production has put within our reach, by abolishing class society. In this way, historical materialism gives the working class a full con- scious understanding of its historic mission, so that unlike previous ruling classes it may fulfil this mission con- sciously, and thus truly enable the human species to mas- ter itself and its destiny. The materialist conception of history thus serves as the link between Marx’s concern with the conditions for human fulfilment, his theoretical enterprise as economist and historian, and his practical activity as a working-class organizer and revolutionary. According to Marx’s materialist conception of history, the goals of a class movement are determined by the set of production relations the class is in a position to establish and defend. This implies that historically conscious revo- lutionaries should not proceed by setting utopian goals for themselves and then looking around for means to achieve them. Revolutionary practice is rather a matter of partici- pating in an already developing class movement, helping to define its own goals and to actualize them through the use of the weapons inherent in the class’s historical situ- ation. The definition of these goals, moreover, is an ongo- ing process; thus it is pointless to speculate about the precise system of distribution which a revolutionary movement will institute after its victory when the move- ment itself is still in its infancy. Marx believed that future society would see the aboli- tion of classes, of private ownership of means of produc- tion, and even of commodity production (production of goods and services for exchange or sale). He believed communist society would eventually eliminate all sys- tematic social causes of alienation and human unfulfil- ment. Yet he never thought of future society as an unchanging state of perfection. On the contrary, he thought of the end of class society as the true beginning of human history, of the historical development of human society directed consciously by human beings. Above all, Marx never attempted to ‘write recipes for the cookshops of the future’ or to say in any detail what distribution rela- tions in future socialist or communist society would be like. He equally scorned those who concerned themselves with formulating principles of distributive justice and con- demning capitalism in their name. Marx conceives the justice of economic transactions as their correspondence to or functionality for the prevailing mode of production. Given this conception of justice, Marx very consistently (if rather surprisingly) concluded that the inhuman exploit- ation practised by capitalism against the workers is not unjust, and does not violate the workers’ rights; this con- clusion constitutes no defence of capitalism, only an attack on the use of moral conceptions within the prole- tarian movement. Marx saw the task of the proletarian movement in his time as one of self-definition and growth through organization, discipline, and self-criticism based on scientific self-understanding. He left for later stages of the movement the task of planning the future society which it is the historic mission of the movement to bring to birth. a.w.w. *anti-communism; Marxist philosophy. Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 4th edn. (Oxford, 1978). Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, 2 vols. (New York, 1977–8). David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, 2nd edn. (London, 1980). Richard Miller, Analyzing Marx (Princeton, NJ, 1984). Paul Walton and Andrew Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1972). Allen Wood, Karl Marx (London, 1981). Marxism after communism. Eastern European and Soviet communism as a political system collapsed after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Marxism understood as the philosophical basis of this system collapsed at the same time. Whether or not a philosophy can be taken as refuted by a political system’s defeat in a kind of war, something like this has been accepted. Leninist Marxism (one-party rule in the name of the working class) and Stalinist Marx- ism (the ‘planned economy’ and ‘socialism in one coun- try’) have all but vanished. Elements of this conjuncture of theory with practice were preserved in Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and China. Elsewhere Marxism survives as a politically engaged philosophy. Marxism after communism is grounded in concepts of human social activity. In particular it is concerned with historical stages of technological development and criti- cisms of contemporary capitalism. Marxism thus presents many political issues as philosophical problems, and embraces many concepts that belong to history and eco- nomics. In Marxism many traditional problems in moral philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind, for instance, get little attention. The problems addressed by Marxism as a social philosophy are economic exploitation, distributive inequalities, social class, and political change. This makes it a form of ‘critical theory’. Marxism offers philosophically based criticisms of the capitalist economic system, and of the linkage between liberal democracy and commercial interests. It currently presents very little in the way of utopian thinking about communism, even as a philosophical ideal. Instead it has broadened Marx’s central notion of class struggle to include a wider variety of human differences and broader movements in identity politics. This gives an economic slant to nationalist and gender conflict, for example, par- ticularly when conceptualized with respect to inter- national capitalism. For some philosophers Marxism is still a ‘grand theory’ searching for directionality in human history, and for Marxism after communism 559 . lifeless mechanism. They do not experience the products of their labour as their expression, or indeed as theirs in any sense. For these products belong to a non-worker, the capitalist, to whom they must sell their. advocates, due in part to its theoretical elegance and in part to the enormous empirical success of markets. The chief problem for the unlimited advocacy of market methods is what to do about externalities—involuntary. soul should leave the body to stroll about the heavens to behold the sun and the stars’; when we perceive the sun, what we see is ‘not the sun but some- thing intimately joined to our soul, which