Indonesia’s great power management in the indo pacific

Trang 2 executive summaryThis essay investigates Indonesia’s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers

asia policy, volume 17, number (october 2022), 123–49 •  http://asiapolicy.org  • special issue Indonesia’s Great-Power Management in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a “Dove State” Vibhanshu Shekhar vibhanshu shekhar is an Adjunct Professorial Lecturer at American University in Washington, D.C (United States) and author of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power (2018) He can be reached at or on Twitter note: This essay was first presented at the March 2021 workshop “Middle Powers amidst U.S.-China Rivalry” organized by Hoo Tiang Boon and Sarah Teo at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University keywords:indonesia; u.s.-china relations; indo-pacific; balancing © The National Bureau of Asian Research One Union Square, Suite 1012, 600 University Street, Seattle, Washington 98101 USA asia policy executive summary This essay investigates Indonesia’s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia’s strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region main argument The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers’ efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context for Indonesia in the coming years The U.S and China form the two poles shaping the global and regional balance of power Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo- Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as “dove state” behavior As a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture policy implications • Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region • As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market, Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance the country’s economic development • Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta’s development agenda shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific T he Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers’ efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, has emerged as the principal frame of reference for Asian geopolitics and the main arena for great-power politics The two-ocean regional canvas represents more than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of global GDP, two-thirds of global economic growth, 65% of Earth’s maritime space, and 25% of the world’s land.1 The increasing geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific region has coincided with the growing traction of the Sino-U.S rivalry, especially since Donald Trump’s presidency began in 2017 The reincarnation of the Quad in 2017 and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security pact in 2021, in particular, attest to an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and deepening regional uncertainty Indonesia, as the leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the largest actor in Southeast Asia, is facing the heat emanating from the region’s spiraling great-power rivalry Indonesia’s high stakes in the competition come from three key roles that the country has taken upon itself for much of the 21st century These roles involve securing domestic economic gains and maintaining strategic autonomy, facilitating peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and ensuring the relevance of ASEAN as an important regional cooperative architecture Any undermining of these roles is likely to mean an undercutting of Indonesia’s national interests and regional status Against the backdrop of changing geopolitical realities, this essay seeks to analyze Indonesia’s approach and responses to the emerging Sino-U.S great- power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region It makes three main arguments First, Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China great-power relationship in the Indo-Pacific region Jakarta believes that Sino-U.S relations have become more competitive, which has intensified rivalries and accentuated an atmosphere of instability and uncertainty Second, Indonesia has responded to the great-power rivalry in four specific ways: balancing its own interests while engaging the great powers, calling upon all states to maintain the status quo, rejecting any alliance-led or containment strategies, and reasserting the centrality of an ASEAN-led, cooperative, and inclusivist architecture Indonesia’s response to the deteriorating nature of the great-power relationship mirrors what Randall Schweller describes as “dove state” behavior.2 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., February 2022), u https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf Randall L Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 84–87 [ 125 ] asia policy Third, the biggest challenge to Indonesia’s ASEAN-led inclusivism comes from a serious lack of unity within the grouping that is gradually chipping away at the diplomatic space available to ASEAN and rendering the grouping a less attractive forum to resolve regional issues In other words, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture This essay is structured as follows: u pp 126–31 examine Indonesian views of U.S.-China relations and how U.S.-China rivalry affects the Indo-Pacific u pp 131–35 contextualize Indonesia’s behavior as that of a dove state and look at the historical events that have shaped Indonesia’s attitudes toward great powers u pp 135–42 analyze Indonesia’s great-power management strategies during the presidency of Joko Widodo as U.S.-China relations have grown increasingly conflictual u pp 142–48 address challenges for Indonesia in continuing this dove state position, including obstacles in its relationships with China and the United States, developing new thinking and planning to respond to great-power rivalry, and maintaining ASEAN unity and centrality in the region u pp 148–49 offer a conclusion indonesia’s gloomy view toward great-power relations in the indo-pacific Indonesia no longer holds a positive outlook on great-power politics in the region Rising China’s assertive behavior and the United States’ balancing response is increasingly framed in Indonesia as a rivalry Jakarta believes that major powers continue to “increase their spheres of influence in the region… distrust hinder[s] the creation of a conducive environment.”3 As an official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense stated, “There is an East Bloc and a West Bloc, and we are in the middle.”4 Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister, declared in 2018 that the country sought to steer clear of “cooperation that Retno L Marsudi, “2020 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 8, 2020 u https://kemlu.go.id/ thehague/en/news/4082/annual-press-statement-of-the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the- republic-of-indonesia-2020 Cited in Jonah Blank, Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region: Indonesia (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021), 13 [ 126 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific is based on suspicion or, worse, a perception of threat.”5 Indonesian experts have referred to the current Sino-U.S dynamic as a “great-power game… returning,”6 a “great-power clash,”7 a “Thucydides trap scenario,”8 a “zero-sum game,”9 and a “new cold war.”10 What Is Driving Indonesian Perceptions of Great-Power Relations? This dim outlook toward the U.S.-China rivalry gained traction during the Trump era The early shockwaves of the rivalry were felt in the controversial (both domestically and internationally) “America first” policy that resulted in U.S withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Climate Accords This policy soon paved the way for the tariff war that intensified in early 2019, with the Trump administration raising tariffs on various Chinese exports from 10% to 25% and China retaliating by imposing new tariffs on U.S exports and threatening to stop the export of rare earth elements and critical minerals The bilateral hostility quickly spread to other sectors, including high-end technologies, and to global supply chain matters, and the Trump administration “banned U.S companies from using foreign-made telecommunications equipment that could threaten national security.”11 The rise of the Quad reinforced Indonesia’s concerns about U.S.-China relations The Quad (initially known as the “Australia-India-Japan-U.S Consultation”) has resurfaced as a new U.S.-led geopolitical anchor for building a “free, open, and rules-based order” in an increasingly uncertain region After nearly a decade of dormancy, the group reconvened with a meeting in Manila on November 11, 2017, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit The rivalrous nature of the initiative can be gauged from Retno L Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 9, 2018, 14 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-Pacific Idea,” East Asia Forum, November 19, 2019 u https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/11/19/indonesia-asean-and-shaping-the-indo-pacific-idea Evan A Laksmana, “Indonesia Unprepared as Great Powers Clash in Indo-Pacific,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2021 u https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/26/indonesia-china-us-geopolitics Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no (2020): 113 Dino Patti Djalal, “Can Biden Keep the Peace in Southeast Asia?” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2021 u https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/30/biden-asean-southeast-asia-china-us-rivalry-geopolitics 10 Endy Bayuni, “ASEAN Can Stop Indo-Pacific from Becoming U.S.-China ‘Theatre’: Jakarta Post Columnist,” Straits Times, November 23, 2018 u https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ asean-can-stop-indo-pacific-from-becoming-us-china-theater-jakarta-post-columnist 11 Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline: U.S Relations with China, 1949–2021” u https://www cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china [ 127 ] asia policy various labels given to it—“Asian NATO”; “democratic security diamond”; “soft, ‘values-based’ containment of China”; “constellation of democracies”; and a “great game in Asia.”12 China, notably has termed the Quad as “sea foam,” “group politics,” and “selective multilateralism.”13 Though Indonesia has not taken an official position, Minister Marsudi cautioned in 2018 against using the Quad as “a containment strategy.”14 The U.S.-China rivalry has only continued under the Biden administration as the United States has sought to develop a more robust response to balance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.15 Since coming to power, the Biden administration has taken it upon itself to regularize and functionalize the Quad.16 The latest U.S Indo-Pacific strategy identified China’s “harmful behavior” as an important challenge to regional peace and stability, noting that China is “combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might” to build “a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific” and “become the world’s most influential power” through coercion and aggression.17 Calling China “one of the most urgent military threats,” U.S secretary of state Antony Blinken declared at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on March 24, 2021, that Beijing was taking steps “to threaten freedom of navigation, to militarize the South China Sea, to target countries throughout the Indo-Pacific with increasingly sophisticated military capabilities.”18 Recently, Chinese and U.S leaders have publicly sparred twice over contentious issues—during the 12 Carry Huang, “U.S Japan, India, Australia Is Quad the First Step to an Asian NATO?” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017 u http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/ article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato; Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012 u https://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe; Peter Drysdale, “China and India and the Transition of Regional Power,” East Asia Forum, January 17, 2011 u https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/17/china-and-india-and-the-transition-of-regional- power-2; and Brahma Chellaney, “Abe Propels a Potential Constellation of Democracies,” Japan Times, November 16, 2017 u https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/11/16/commentary/ world-commentary/abe-propels-potential-constellation-democracies 13 Yang Sheng, “Chinese FM Defines Multilateralism as Biden Admin Claims ‘America Is Back,’ ” Global Times, March 7, 2021 u https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217633.shtml 14 Renato Marsudi, “The Global Disorder: An Indonesian Perspective” (speech to 25th Pacific Economic Cooperation Council General Meeting, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia, Jakarta, May 7, 2018), available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=EVTl7-hoGqw 15 Felix Thompson, “Biden’s Long-Awaited China Policy ‘No Dramatic Shift’ from Trump Era,” Global Trade Review, June 10, 2021 u https://www.gtreview.com/news/americas/bidens-long-awaited-china- policy-no-dramatic-shift-from-trump-era 16 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad,’ ” White House, March 12, 2021 u https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement- the-spirit-of-the-quad 17 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 18 Antony J Blinken, “Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances,” U.S Department of State, March 24, 2021 u https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-and-reimagining-americas-alliances [ 128 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific bilateral meeting in Alaska in March 2021 and at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022.19 The rise of AUKUS—what Biden has called “enhanced trilateral security cooperation” with “two of America’s closest allies”20—has also reinforced the narrative of the U.S.-China rivalry.21 AUKUS is not merely an arrangement for the sale of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional weapons to Australia in ten years; it is also optics for the United States’ hard-balancing toward the China threat in the Indo-Pacific region One can infer from the AUKUS statement that it represents the United States’ most trusted alliance partnerships and is likely to form the bulwark of the country’s Indo-Pacific posturing in the medium term Commenting on AUKUS, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it was “deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”22 The emerging but somewhat tenuous bipartisan consensus within the United States over China underscores that the Sino-U.S great-power rivalry is likely to grow new fangs in the coming years as the United States seeks to gain more strategic constituencies and consolidate its position vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific The “Thucydides Trap” Indonesian pessimism has also manifested in the form of increasing references to and discussions about the “Thucydides trap.”23 The principle of the Thucydides trap argues that “when a rising power [China] threatens 19 The issues specifically mentioned in Alaska were Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyberattacks on the United States, and economic coercion toward U.S allies See “Secretary Antony J Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Director Yang and State Councilor Wang at the Top of Their Meeting,” U.S Department of State, Press Release, March 18, 2021; and Benjamin Ho, “Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 and the Future of Asia,” S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, IDSS Paper, no 33, 2022 u https://www.rsis edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IP22033-Ho-masthead-final.pdf 20 “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” White House, September 15, 2021 21 William Chung and Sharon Seah, “Why AUKUS Alarms ASEAN,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2021 u https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/asean-aukus-china-us-rivalry; and Xu Liping, “AUKUS Undermines ASEAN Centrality with Nuclear Subs, Terrifies Region,” Global Times, September 21, 2021 u https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234742.shtml 22 “Statement on Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), September 17, 2021 u https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/ statement-on-australias-nuclear-powered-submarines-program 23 Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak, “AS, Cina, dan perangkap Thucydides” [United States, China, and the Thucydides Trap], Republika, June 13, 2020 u https://www.republika.id/posts/7442/as-cina-dan- perangkap-thucydides; and Jusuf Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S Relations,” Jakarta Post, August 10, 2020 u https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/08/10/insight-the-future- of-china-us-relations.html [ 129 ] asia policy to displace a ruling power [the United States], standard crises that would otherwise be contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.”24 The doctrine builds on the assumption of the near inevitability of a violent power transition and the zero-sum nature of the great-power politics In his welcome speech at a United States–Indonesia Society event in September 2020, Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States, Muhammad Lutfi, claimed that the United States was following a Thucydides trap trajectory.25 Similarly, Ahmad Basrah, the vice chair of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), argued that the United States and China should find solutions to create stability so that the world can avoid the Thucydides trap.26 Indonesian discussion of the trap revolves around two relatively simplistic perceptions of the power transition doctrine The first is that China is rising and winning, while the United States is declining, as epitomized by Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani’s provocative book title Has China Won?27 To quote Marty Natalegawa, a former foreign minister, “There seems to be a dominant perception or narrative of a rising China and declining United States As a corollary, the former is deemed set to challenge the existing ‘order,’ while the latter keen to ensure its preservation.”28 According to a 2019 report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 73.9% of Indonesians surveyed believed that U.S power and influence had declined during the Trump era.29 Although views of the United States’ economic and strategic influence have gained ground among Indonesians surveyed in recent years (8.4% and 35.1%, respectively, in 2022) and views of China as the top power have slightly 24 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S and China Headed for War?” Atlantic, September 24, 2015 u https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/ united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756 25 “USINDO Hosted a Highly Successful Virtual Welcome Event for Indonesia’s New Ambassador to the United States, H.E Muhammad Lutfi—September 22,” United States–Indonesia Society, September 22, 2020 u https://usindo.org/special-events/video-of-usindos-virtual-welcome-event- in-honor-of-h-e-ambassador-lutfi-september-22 26 Mutia Yuantisya, “Jerman kirim bantuan kapal perang ke Laut China Selatan, Ahmad Basarah: Indonesia dapat memanfaatkan situasi” [Germany Sends Warship to the South China Sea, Ahmad Basarah: Indonesia Can Take Advantage of the Situation], Pikiran rakyat, August 5, 2021 u https:// www.pikiran-rakyat.com/internasional/pr-012341298/jerman-kirim-bantuan-kapal-perang-ke- laut-china-selatan-ahmad-basarah-indonesia-dapat-memanfaatkan-situasi 27 Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Supremacy (New York: Public Affairs, 2020) 28 Marty Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? A View from Within (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), 140 29 Tang Siew Mun et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2019, 15 [ 130 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific slipped, Indonesian respondents still rank China the most influential power in both categories among all the states and organizations considered (67.9% and 38.2%, respectively, in 2022).30 The second perception is that to maintain its preeminence in the region, a challenged United States is engaging in rivalrous behavior vis-à-vis China Experts and officials in Jakarta began to see the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach from the prism of an insecure and reactive great power that was willing to maintain its primacy at the cost of regional peace and stability Indonesian confidence in the U.S president declined steeply after Trump came to power, though it remained higher than during the George W Bush administration.31 However, Indonesian views remain divided on the extent of the Sino-U.S rivalry Some observers believe that the Thucydides trap is affecting all aspects of Sino-U.S relations, while others relate it to specific aspects For example, Jusuf Wanandi, former government adviser and co-founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, stated that “all the pillars supporting sound U.S.-China relations—security, economic development and culture—are being wrecked by both sides,” and appears to attribute the current sharpness in the Sino-U.S rivalry to the America-first policy of the Trump era.32 By contrast, Dewi Anwar, a noted Indonesian scholar and former adviser to the Indonesian vice president, has placed the rivalry in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative versus the U.S.-led Quad.33 In this context, the Sino-U.S great-power rivalry appears systemic indonesia as a dove state Framing Dove State Behavior Indonesia has responded to the evolving U.S.-China rivalry by positioning itself as a status-quo power and pursuing a policy that can be likened to the dove state in Randall Schweller’s depiction of the pecking order between status-quo and revisionist states There are five qualities of dove states that Indonesia has exhibited in its strategies for great-power management 30 Sharon Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, February 2022, 22–23 31 Richard Wike et al., “Trump Ratings Remain Low around Globe, While Views of U.S Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 2020, 15 u https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp- content/uploads/sites/2/2020/01/PG_2020.01.08_US-Image_FINAL.pdf 32 Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S Relations.” 33 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113 [ 131 ] asia policy First, dove states are status-quo states that aim to “maintain the peace without sacrificing the essential characteristics of the status-quo order.” This logic is visible in Indonesia’s emphasis on supporting the existing regional order and a stable balance of power between the United States and China Second, dove states subscribe to the “spiral model” of reasons for war The spiral model of war implies that attempts of balancing, containment, or military buildup escalate tensions, whereas concessions, reassurance, or avoidance of provocations eases them.34 This logic explains concerns that Indonesia has raised against some aspects of the U.S Indo-Pacific strategy (especially during the Trump administration) Indonesian opposition to alliance formation, containment strategies, and provocation can be situated against the actions of the dissatisfied powers in this context Third, a dove state, while pursuing its interests, follows the policy of engagement with both the reigning champion (status-quo power) and the challenger (revisionist power) This argument can be extended further to argue that a dove state would like to engage all of the major powers as it seeks to concentrate on peace and conflict avoidance Fourth, a dove state also engages in multilateral binding, whereby it expects great powers to commit to the multilateral processes prevalent in the region This argument can be used to explain Indonesia’s emphasis on ASEAN’s regional leadership and centrality Finally, dove states accept limited and “peaceful revision of the status quo.” In doing so, they essentially aim at “appeasing the ‘legitimate’ (in their eyes) grievances of the dissatisfied powers.”35 The appeasement argument can be related to Indonesia’s accommodation of Chinese assertive behavior in the region even though China and Indonesia share a disputed maritime space in the South China Sea The Historical Context of Indonesia’s Experience with Great-Power Politics Indonesia’s dove state behavior is a cumulative expression of three distinct sets of experiences with great-power politics—great-power conflict, great-power meddling in Indonesian domestic affairs, and stable and peaceful great-power relations The first two experiences dominated Indonesia’s engagements during the Cold War, and the last trend has shaped Indonesia’s perception toward 34 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 84 35 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 87 [ 132 ] asia policy Motivated by these considerations and building on past experiences, Widodo’s Indonesia has put forth an ASEAN-led approach to great-power management that is status-quo-focused, risk-averse, interest-driven, accommodative, and time-tested As discussed below, Jakarta has concentrated on strengthening engagements, eschewing alliances, avoiding escalation, pursuing autonomy, and recentering ASEAN in its regional and great-power engagements Engagement with All, but on Jakarta’s Terms A recent exposition of the robust engagement with all came from Foreign Minister Marsudi in September 2020 She declared, “ASEAN, Indonesia, wants to show to all that we are ready to be a partner…We don’t want to get trapped by this rivalry.”47 Indonesian equilateralism can be identified in in three principal areas—strategic partnerships, economic engagement, and weapons procurement and defense diplomacy Indonesia elevated its strategic partnership with China to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2015 and its comprehensive partnership with the United States to a strategic partnership in October 2015 during Widodo’s visit to the United States These partnerships entail prioritized, organized, and detailed agendas of bilateral engagements For example, a joint statement between the two states and the U.S.-Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation from October 2015 have provided a broader roadmap to bilateral maritime cooperation.48 Indonesia also has a maritime partnership with China Driven by the logic of development, Indonesia has tried to build strong economic relations with the major economies Its four top trading partners are China, India, Japan, and the United States, which are also the four largest state economies in the world in terms of purchasing power parity Indonesia has additionally sought greater market access, foreign investment in the infrastructure sector, and technologies from major economic players As an ASEAN member, Indonesia has signed free trade agreements with Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea In addition, Indonesia is a part of the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that 47 Tom Allard and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia to U.S., China: Don’t Trap Us in Your Rivalry,” Reuters, September 8, 2020 u https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-foreign-minister/ indonesia-to-u-s-china-dont-trap-us-in-your-rivalry-idUSKBN25Z1ZD 48 U.S Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, “Fact Sheet: Indonesia-U.S Maritime Cooperation” u https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/embassy-fact-sheets/fact-sheet-u-s- indonesia-maritime-cooperation [ 136 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific involves the major Asian economies except India Indonesia is also one of the founding partners of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and had expressed interest in joining the TPP when the United States was still a part of that grouping Indonesia has likewise pursued equilateralism in its weapons procurement and defense diplomacy It has bought fighter planes from France and Russia; submarines from the United States; submarines and warships from Germany, Russia, South Korea, and the Netherlands; and missiles from China, France, Russia, the United States, and the UK In doing so, Indonesia has not only diversified its defense supplies but also avoided dependency on any one supplier As a part of its defense diplomacy, Jakarta either has conducted or is planning to hold military exercises with Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States.49 Although Indonesia has not conducted a bilateral military exercise with China since 2012, China has participated in the multilateral naval exercise Komodo that Indonesia hosted in 2014, 2016, and 2018.50 Nevertheless, one should not confuse Indonesia’s equilateral engagement policy with the country’s actual level of cooperation with China and the United States Indonesia’s engagement with major powers also depends on what those major powers can offer and what Jakarta is looking to buy In the face of strong domestic opposition to any trade concessions or free trade negotiations in the United States, China has emerged as Indonesia’s dominant economic partner This partnership has, in general, outpaced that of Indonesia and the United States in a large number of economic and tech-related areas, such as trade, investment, infrastructure, 5G technologies, and even Covid-19 vaccines.51 For example, Indonesia and China signed five contracts for infrastructure development in Indonesia worth $23 billion in 2018 alone.52 China has been able to win over key political figures in Indonesia, such as Minister of Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who has reportedly acted as a key 49 Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, “Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo: Enhancing Indonesia’s Multilateral Defence Diplomacy?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 40, no (2021): 420–21 50 Ibid 51 Derek Grossman, “Indonesia Is Quietly Warming Up to China,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2021 u https:// foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/07/indonesia-china-jokowi-natuna-sea-military-bri-cooperation-biden- united-states 52 “Indonesia, China Sign US$23.3 Billion Cooperation Contracts under Belt and Road,” Antara News, April 14, 2018 u https://en.antaranews.com/news/115354/indonesia-china-sign-us233- billion-cooperation-contracts-under-belt-and-road [ 137 ] asia policy enabler in Indonesia’s economic ties with China.53 As a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Indonesia proposed 28 projects worth $91.1 billion to Chinese investors in 2019.54 And according to the 2022 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak survey, 68% of Indonesians now view China as the dominant economic power, as opposed to 8% who view the United States as the dominant economic power.55 As one Indonesian government official states, “The U.S uses sanctions and muscle too much…China is smart It always uses the soft-power approach, the economic approach, the development approach.”56 However, there does seem to be an interest in achieving more economic balance between the partners: while 60% of Indonesians surveyed in 2022 expressed concerns over China’s growing economic influence, 55% welcomed the United States’ growing economic presence.57 On the other hand, the U.S.-Indonesia partnership has expanded in the areas of maritime security, military training, clean energy, cybersecurity, and defense purchases.58 In February 2022, the U.S Department of State approved a potential sale of 36 F-15ID aircraft and related equipment worth $14 billion to Indonesia that will “provide increased deterrence and air defense coverage across a very complex air and maritime domain.”59 Indonesia has already signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that provide the foundation for “enhanced partnership, information sharing, and defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia.”60 Indonesia and the United States conducted their biggest military exercise, Super Garuda Shield, in August 2022, which involved more 53 Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, “Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan: The Prominent Enabler behind China-Indonesia Relations,” Global Policy, July 24, 2020 u https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/ blog/24/07/2020/luhut-binsar-pandjaitan-prominent-enabler-behind-china-indonesia-relations 54 “Indonesia to Propose Projects Worth US$91 Billion for China’s Belt and Road,” Straits Times, March 20, 2019 u https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-to-propose-projects-worth- us91-bilion-for-chinas-belt-and-road 55 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 15 56 Tom Allard, “Vaccines, Not Spy Planes: U.S Misfires in Southeast Asia,” Reuters, October 27, 2020 u https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-diplomacy-usa-china-insight/ vaccines-not-spy-planes-u-s-misfires-in-southeast-asia-idUSKBN27C19Z 57 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 21 58 Ade Irma Junida/Suharto, “Indonesia, U.S Discuss Clean Energy Cooperation, Climate Change,” Antara News, February 26, 2021 u https://en.antaranews.com/news/168861/indonesia-us-discuss- clean-energy-cooperation-climate-change; and U.S Department of State, “The United States–Indonesia Relationship,” December 12, 2021 u https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-indonesia-relationship 59 “Indonesia—F-15ID Aircraft,” U.S Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Press Release, February 10, 2022 u https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ indonesia-f-15id-aircraft 60 “U.S Security Cooperation with Indonesia,” U.S Department of State, March 23, 2021 u https:// www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia [ 138 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific than four thousand troops and brought in twelve other countries to exercise with them According to the 2022 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak report, nearly 40% of Indonesians surveyed trusted the United States as a reliable strategic partner and security provider, opposed to 29% of Indonesians who believed China would “do the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance.”61 On the question of picking sides, if forced, 56% of Indonesians preferred the United States, opposed to 44% who chose China.62 Strategic Autonomy and Alliance Avoidance Amid increasing tension between the United States and China, Indonesia has reiterated its long-standing principle of strategic autonomy as a path forward Though autonomy may mean different things in practice to different people, two components have stood out—no alliances and maintaining independence Indonesia has always followed the first principle and sought to obtain the second, albeit unsuccessfully on various occasions Strategic autonomy, enshrined in the principle of bebas dan aktif, remains the cornerstone and driving force of independent Indonesia’s foreign policy An important expression of this principle is not to be a part of any alliance or exhibit behavior that others may construe as taking a side Indonesia rejected the claim made by the U.S Department of Defense in its 2020 report that China has likely considered Indonesia as a potential location for Chinese military logistics facilities.63 Marsudi declared, “Indonesian territory cannot and will not be used as a military facility base for any country.”64 Similarly, Indonesia turned down a U.S proposal to permit U.S P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft to land and refuel in Indonesia.65 Jakarta has not made any overture toward building alliances with the United States against Chinese assertiveness in the 61 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 39 62 Ibid., 32 63 The U.S Department of Defense report states: “The PRC has likely considered Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan as locations for PLA military logistics facilities.” See U.S Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., 2020), 129 u https://media.defense.gov/2020/sep/01/2002488689/-1/- 1/1/2020-dod-china-military-power-report-final.pdf 64 Budi Sutrisno, “ ‘Indonesia Won’t Be Military Base for Any Country’, Retno Says, Dismissing Pentagon Report,” Jakarta Post, September 4, 2020 u https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2020/09/04/indonesia-wont-be-military-base-for-any-country-retno-says-dismissing- pentagon-report.html 65 Sebastian Strangio, “Indonesia Rebuffs U.S Request to Host Spy Planes: Report,” Diplomat, October 20, 2020 u https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/indonesia-rebuffs-us-request-to-host-spy-planes-report [ 139 ] asia policy South China Sea even though it has experienced a sustained escalation in the level of altercations with China in the Natuna Sea As the 2022 G-20 chair, Indonesia has also sought to walk an autonomous path It voted in favor of the UN resolution to condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine but abstained during voting to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council Indonesia has invited both Russia and Ukraine to the G-20 summit meeting to be held in November 2022 Such behavior can be attributed to the goal of staying engaged with all of the major powers, asserting Indonesian agency in steering the G-20, and avoiding being dragged into great-power conflict In a bid to play both sides and mediate the dispute, Widodo visited both Russia and Ukraine and sought a Russian security guarantee for the supply of Ukrainian grain, while the first lady visited a Ukrainian hospital.66 However, it is not clear if these optics will have any meaningful impact on the Indonesian president’s hope for a successful G-20 summit Indonesia’s ASEAN-Led Inclusivism Concerned by the inflammation of the U.S.-China rivalry during the Trump era and fearing being sidelined by a resurrected Quad, Indonesia launched its own ASEAN-centric Indo-Pacific strategy Widodo, while attending the ASEAN summit retreat in Singapore in April 2018, proposed a new Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy with ASEAN as the key instrument and fulcrum This pronouncement followed the earlier announcement made by Foreign Minister Marsudi in January 2018 that Indonesia would build “an ecosystem of peace, stability, prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific region.67 After deliberations, ASEAN adopted Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy in 2019 as the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”68 Since then, Indonesia has also referred to this document as its strategy Indonesia viewed the U.S.-led “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy as noninclusive and posited ASEAN’s outlook as an inclusivist approach China, notably, is not a member of either the Quad or IPEF Jakarta argues that not only should pan-Indo-Pacific architecture be free and open, it should also be (1) inclusive, transparent, and comprehensive, (2) beneficial for the long-term interests of all countries in the region, and (3) based on a 66 Aisyah Llewellyn, “Widodo’s Russia-Ukraine Trip Divides Critics in Indonesia,” Al Jazeera, July 5, 2022 u https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/7/5/indonesian-leaders-russia-ukraine-trip- divides-critics-at-home 67 Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement,” 68 ASEAN, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” June 23, 2019 u https://asean.org/speechandstatement/ asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific [ 140 ] shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific joint commitment by the Indo-Pacific countries to uphold peace, stability, and prosperity.69 Dewi Anwar has argued that ASEAN inclusivism aims at “promoting confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and cooperative security, and focusing on the development of friendship rather than the identification of enemies.”70 In addition to the polarizing effect of the U.S Indo-Pacific strategy, the fear of ASEAN (and Indonesia itself) being marginalized by the resurgent Quad pushed Indonesia toward developing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and reasserting ASEAN centrality Marsudi’s January 2018 pronouncement about building an ecosystem in the region came immediately after the revival of the Quad in November 2017 The principle of ASEAN centrality implies that “ASEAN, which unites an increasingly cohesive group of nations, should take charge of affairs in the region.”71 Worries that the Quad could adversely affect ASEAN centrality were reflected in surveys of Indonesian respondents conducted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.72 Indonesia’s own domestic debate over the rationale for ASEAN centrality has shown divergent opinions Rizal Sukma identifies ASEAN centrality as a core interest of ASEAN that must be “preserved, enhanced and reinforced” since the grouping “can no longer sit and watch extra-regional powers actively shape the future of the region,”73 albeit it is not clear if he is referring to ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asia or in the Indo-Pacific region broadly where the United States and China are not extraregional powers On the other hand, some Indonesian experts believe that Indonesian advocacy of the idea of ASEAN centrality amid Chinese assertiveness is essentially a “passing the buck from behind” strategy since Indonesia cannot challenge China militarily.74 Extending the buck-passing argument further, it has 69 Vibhanshu Shekhar, “Is Indonesia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ Strategy a Weak Play?” Pacific Forum, PacNet Newsletter, no 47, July 17, 2018 u https://pacforum.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/12/180717_PacNet_47.pdf 70 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113 71 Djalal, “Can Biden Keep the Peace in Southeast Asia?” 72 Huong Le Thu, “How Southeast Asians Really Perceive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 12, 2018 u https://amti.csis.org/how-southeast- asians-really-perceive-quad; and Tang Siew Mun et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2020, 33 73 Aditya Eko Sigit Wicaksono, “ASEAN Centrality Essential for Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Antara News, May 31, 2018 u https://en.antaranews.com/news/115946/asean-centrality-essential- for-peaceful-prosperous-indo-pacific; and Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo- Pacific Idea.” 74 Evan A Laksmana, “Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of Indo- Pacific Affairs 3, no (2020): 108–9 [ 141 ] asia policy also been argued that ASEAN centrality is a strategy for maintaining the status quo “ASEAN is well known for its indecisiveness and inefficiency,” and therefore Indonesian advocacy for ASEAN centrality is “tantamount to doing nothing.”75 The Widodo administration has not always pursued ASEAN-led inclusivism with the same vigor In fact, one can identify two distinct trends— disinterest and active interest—during the last seven years of Indonesia’s approach toward ASEAN The first three years (2014–17) saw an unwillingness of the country’s top leadership to fully commit to the ASEAN process.76 Widodo did not take much interest in ASEAN and expressed an unwillingness to participate in the meetings, also reducing Indonesia’s budget for ASEAN affairs.77 On the other hand, he showed greater interest in supra-ASEAN multilateralism, such as the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and a pan-Afro-Asian Non-Aligned Movement In fact, one can make a case for Widodo’s continued disinterest toward foreign policy.78 While his disinterest may have given greater bandwidth to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) in devising an appropriate response to great-power rivalry, this could also mean a lack of coordination between the top office and the foreign policy establishment As a result, Indonesia’s active interest and leadership in ASEAN has come from Kemlu, whose operations seem to follow a by-the-book approach Emphasis on ASEAN leadership, the quest for autonomy, and avoidance of alliances are essentially time-tested, risk-averse, and textbook approaches for Indonesia that are less likely to yield negative surprises or deviate from the existing paths of diplomacy challenges facing indonesia’s dove state behavior Indonesia’s dove state behavior faces various challenges that may affect the country’s ability to position itself strongly amid the U.S.-China rivalry and benefit optimally from the advantages that this power dynamic may 75 Yohanes Sulaiman, “Whither Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy?” Asie Vision, no 105 (January 2019): 76 Avery Poole, “Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?” Indonesia at Melbourne, University of Melbourne, September 1, 2015 u https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/ is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean 77 Shekhar, “Is Indonesia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ Strategy a Weak Play?” 78 For the lack of coordination between Kemlu and the president’s office, see Evan A Laksmana, “Stuck in Second Gear: Indonesia’s Strategic Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, ISEAS Perspective, no 170, December 28, 2021, 5–7 [ 142 ]