Indonesia’s great power management in the indo pacific

Trang 2 executive summaryThis essay investigates Indonesia’s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers

Indonesia’s Great-Power Management

in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a “Dove State”

Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an

Indo-Pacific Power (2018) He can be reached at <vshekhar@american.edu>

or on Twitter <@vibshekhar>.

note: This essay was first presented at the March 2021 workshop “Middle Powers amidst U.S.-China Rivalry” organized by Hoo Tiang Boon and Sarah Teo at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University.

executive summary

This essay investigates Indonesia’s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia’s strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region

a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture

• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to

be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta’s development agenda

The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers’ efforts to forge new

strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, has emerged

as the principal frame of reference for Asian geopolitics and the main arena for great-power politics The two-ocean regional canvas represents more than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of global GDP, two-thirds of global economic growth, 65% of Earth’s maritime space, and 25% of the world’s land.1 The increasing geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific region has coincided with the growing traction of the Sino-U.S rivalry, especially since Donald Trump’s presidency began in 2017 The reincarnation of the Quad

in 2017 and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security pact in 2021, in particular, attest to an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and deepening regional uncertainty

Indonesia, as the leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the largest actor in Southeast Asia, is facing the heat emanating from the region’s spiraling great-power rivalry Indonesia’s high stakes in the competition come from three key roles that the country has taken upon itself for much of the 21st century These roles involve securing domestic economic gains and maintaining strategic autonomy, facilitating peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and ensuring the relevance of ASEAN as an important regional cooperative architecture Any undermining of these roles is likely to mean an undercutting of Indonesia’s national interests and regional status.Against the backdrop of changing geopolitical realities, this essay seeks to analyze Indonesia’s approach and responses to the emerging Sino-U.S great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region It makes three main arguments First, Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China great-power relationship in the Indo-Pacific region Jakarta believes that Sino-U.S relations have become more competitive, which has intensified rivalries and accentuated an atmosphere of instability and uncertainty

Second, Indonesia has responded to the great-power rivalry in four specific ways: balancing its own interests while engaging the great powers, calling upon all states to maintain the status quo, rejecting any alliance-led

or containment strategies, and reasserting the centrality of an ASEAN-led, cooperative, and inclusivist architecture Indonesia’s response to the deteriorating nature of the great-power relationship mirrors what Randall Schweller describes as “dove state” behavior.2

1 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., February 2022), 5 u

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

2 Randall L Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 84–87.

Third, the biggest challenge to Indonesia’s ASEAN-led inclusivism comes from a serious lack of unity within the grouping that is gradually chipping away at the diplomatic space available to ASEAN and rendering the grouping

a less attractive forum to resolve regional issues In other words, the strength

of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture

This essay is structured as follows:

u pp 126–31 examine Indonesian views of U.S.-China relations and how U.S.-China rivalry affects the Indo-Pacific

u pp 131–35 contextualize Indonesia’s behavior as that of a dove state and look at the historical events that have shaped Indonesia’s attitudes toward great powers

u pp 135–42 analyze Indonesia’s great-power management strategies during the presidency of Joko Widodo as U.S.-China relations have grown increasingly conflictual

u pp 142–48 address challenges for Indonesia in continuing this dove state position, including obstacles in its relationships with China and the United States, developing new thinking and planning to respond

to great-power rivalry, and maintaining ASEAN unity and centrality in the region

u pp 148–49 offer a conclusion

indonesia’s gloomy view toward

great-power relations in the indo-pacific

Indonesia no longer holds a positive outlook on great-power politics in the region Rising China’s assertive behavior and the United States’ balancing response is increasingly framed in Indonesia as a rivalry Jakarta believes that major powers continue to “increase their spheres of influence in the region…distrust hinder[s] the creation of a conducive environment.”3 As an official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense stated, “There is an East Bloc and a West Bloc, and we are in the middle.”4 Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister, declared in 2018 that the country sought to steer clear of “cooperation that

3 Retno L Marsudi, “2020 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic

of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 8, 2020 u https://kemlu.go.id/ thehague/en/news/4082/annual-press-statement-of-the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the- republic-of-indonesia-2020.

4 Cited in Jonah Blank, Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region:

Indonesia (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021), 13.

is based on suspicion or, worse, a perception of threat.”5 Indonesian experts have referred to the current Sino-U.S dynamic as a “great-power game…returning,”6 a “great-power clash,”7 a “Thucydides trap scenario,”8 a “zero-sum game,”9 and a “new cold war.”10

What Is Driving Indonesian Perceptions of Great-Power Relations?

This dim outlook toward the U.S.-China rivalry gained traction during the Trump era The early shockwaves of the rivalry were felt in the controversial (both domestically and internationally) “America first” policy that resulted in U.S withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Climate Accords This policy soon paved the way for the tariff war that intensified in early 2019, with the Trump administration raising tariffs on various Chinese exports from 10% to 25% and China retaliating

by imposing new tariffs on U.S exports and threatening to stop the export of rare earth elements and critical minerals The bilateral hostility quickly spread to other sectors, including high-end technologies, and to global supply chain matters, and the Trump administration “banned U.S companies from using foreign-made telecommunications equipment that could threaten national security.”11

The rise of the Quad reinforced Indonesia’s concerns about U.S.-China relations The Quad (initially known as the “Australia-India-Japan-U.S Consultation”) has resurfaced as a new U.S.-led geopolitical anchor for building a “free, open, and rules-based order” in an increasingly uncertain region After nearly a decade of dormancy, the group reconvened with a meeting in Manila on November 11, 2017, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit The rivalrous nature of the initiative can be gauged from

5 Retno L Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic

of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 9, 2018, 14.

6 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-Pacific Idea,” East Asia Forum, November 19,

10 Endy Bayuni, “ASEAN Can Stop Indo-Pacific from Becoming U.S.-China ‘Theatre’: Jakarta Post

Columnist,” Straits Times, November 23, 2018 u https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ asean-can-stop-indo-pacific-from-becoming-us-china-theater-jakarta-post-columnist.

11 Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline: U.S Relations with China, 1949–2021” u https://www cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china.

various labels given to it—“Asian NATO”; “democratic security diamond”;

“soft, ‘values-based’ containment of China”; “constellation of democracies”; and a “great game in Asia.”12 China, notably has termed the Quad as “sea foam,” “group politics,” and “selective multilateralism.”13 Though Indonesia has not taken an official position, Minister Marsudi cautioned in 2018 against using the Quad as “a containment strategy.”14

The U.S.-China rivalry has only continued under the Biden administration

as the United States has sought to develop a more robust response to balance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.15 Since coming to power, the Biden administration has taken it upon itself to regularize and functionalize the Quad.16 The latest U.S Indo-Pacific strategy identified China’s “harmful behavior” as an important challenge to regional peace and stability, noting that China is “combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might” to build “a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific” and “become the world’s most influential power” through coercion and aggression.17 Calling China “one of the most urgent military threats,” U.S secretary of state Antony Blinken declared at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on March 24, 2021, that Beijing was taking steps “to threaten freedom of navigation, to militarize the South China Sea, to target countries throughout the Indo-Pacific with increasingly sophisticated military capabilities.”18 Recently, Chinese and U.S leaders have publicly sparred twice over contentious issues—during the

12 Carry Huang, “U.S Japan, India, Australia Is Quad the First Step to an Asian NATO?”

South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017 u http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/ article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato; Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s

Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012 u syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe; Peter Drysdale,

https://www.project-“China and India and the Transition of Regional Power,” East Asia Forum, January 17, 2011 u

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/17/china-and-india-and-the-transition-of-regional-power-2; and Brahma Chellaney, “Abe Propels a Potential Constellation of Democracies,” Japan

Times, November 16, 2017 u https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/11/16/commentary/ world-commentary/abe-propels-potential-constellation-democracies.

13 Yang Sheng, “Chinese FM Defines Multilateralism as Biden Admin Claims ‘America Is Back,’ ”

Global Times, March 7, 2021 u https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217633.shtml.

14 Renato Marsudi, “The Global Disorder: An Indonesian Perspective” (speech to 25th Pacific Economic Cooperation Council General Meeting, Centre for Strategic and International

Studies Indonesia, Jakarta, May 7, 2018), available on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=EVTl7-hoGqw.

15 Felix Thompson, “Biden’s Long-Awaited China Policy ‘No Dramatic Shift’ from Trump Era,” Global Trade Review, June 10, 2021 u https://www.gtreview.com/news/americas/bidens-long-awaited-china- policy-no-dramatic-shift-from-trump-era.

16 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad,’ ” White House, March 12, 2021 u https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement- the-spirit-of-the-quad.

17 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 5.

18 Antony J Blinken, “Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances,” U.S Department of State, March 24, 2021 u https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-and-reimagining-americas-alliances.

bilateral meeting in Alaska in March 2021 and at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022.19

The rise of AUKUS—what Biden has called “enhanced trilateral security cooperation” with “two of America’s closest allies”20—has also reinforced the narrative of the U.S.-China rivalry.21 AUKUS is not merely an arrangement for the sale of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional weapons

to Australia in ten years; it is also optics for the United States’ hard-balancing toward the China threat in the Indo-Pacific region One can infer from the AUKUS statement that it represents the United States’ most trusted alliance partnerships and is likely to form the bulwark of the country’s Indo-Pacific posturing in the medium term Commenting on AUKUS, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it was “deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”22

The emerging but somewhat tenuous bipartisan consensus within the United States over China underscores that the Sino-U.S great-power rivalry

is likely to grow new fangs in the coming years as the United States seeks to gain more strategic constituencies and consolidate its position vis-à-vis China

in the Indo-Pacific

The “Thucydides Trap”

Indonesian pessimism has also manifested in the form of increasing references to and discussions about the “Thucydides trap.”23 The principle

of the Thucydides trap argues that “when a rising power [China] threatens

19 The issues specifically mentioned in Alaska were Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyberattacks on the United States, and economic coercion toward U.S allies See “Secretary Antony J Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Director Yang and State Councilor Wang at the Top

of Their Meeting,” U.S Department of State, Press Release, March 18, 2021; and Benjamin

Ho, “Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 and the Future of Asia,” S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, IDSS Paper, no 33, 2022 u https://www.rsis edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IP22033-Ho-masthead-final.pdf.

20 “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson

of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” White House, September 15, 2021.

21 William Chung and Sharon Seah, “Why AUKUS Alarms ASEAN,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2021

u https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/asean-aukus-china-us-rivalry; and Xu Liping, “AUKUS

Undermines ASEAN Centrality with Nuclear Subs, Terrifies Region,” Global Times, September 21,

2021 u https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234742.shtml.

22 “Statement on Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), September 17, 2021 u https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/

statement-on-australias-nuclear-powered-submarines-program.

23 Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak, “AS, Cina, dan perangkap Thucydides” [United States, China, and the

Thucydides Trap], Republika, June 13, 2020 u

https://www.republika.id/posts/7442/as-cina-dan-perangkap-thucydides; and Jusuf Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S Relations,” Jakarta

Post, August 10, 2020 u of-china-us-relations.html.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/08/10/insight-the-future-to displace a ruling power [the United States], standard crises that would otherwise be contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.”24

The doctrine builds on the assumption of the near inevitability of a violent power transition and the zero-sum nature of the great-power politics In his welcome speech at a United States–Indonesia Society event in September

2020, Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States, Muhammad Lutfi, claimed that the United States was following a Thucydides trap trajectory.25 Similarly, Ahmad Basrah, the vice chair of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), argued that the United States and China should find solutions to create stability so that the world can avoid the Thucydides trap.26

Indonesian discussion of the trap revolves around two relatively simplistic perceptions of the power transition doctrine The first is that China

is rising and winning, while the United States is declining, as epitomized by

Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani’s provocative book title Has China

Won? 27 To quote Marty Natalegawa, a former foreign minister, “There seems

to be a dominant perception or narrative of a rising China and declining United States As a corollary, the former is deemed set to challenge the existing

‘order,’ while the latter keen to ensure its preservation.”28 According to a 2019 report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 73.9% of Indonesians surveyed believed that U.S power and influence had declined during the Trump era.29

Although views of the United States’ economic and strategic influence have gained ground among Indonesians surveyed in recent years (8.4% and 35.1%, respectively, in 2022) and views of China as the top power have slightly

24 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S and China Headed for War?” Atlantic,

September 24, 2015 u https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/

united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756.

25 “USINDO Hosted a Highly Successful Virtual Welcome Event for Indonesia’s New Ambassador

to the United States, H.E Muhammad Lutfi—September 22,” United States–Indonesia Society, September 22, 2020 u https://usindo.org/special-events/video-of-usindos-virtual-welcome-event- in-honor-of-h-e-ambassador-lutfi-september-22.

26 Mutia Yuantisya, “Jerman kirim bantuan kapal perang ke Laut China Selatan, Ahmad Basarah: Indonesia dapat memanfaatkan situasi” [Germany Sends Warship to the South China Sea, Ahmad

Basarah: Indonesia Can Take Advantage of the Situation], Pikiran rakyat, August 5, 2021 u https:// www.pikiran-rakyat.com/internasional/pr-012341298/jerman-kirim-bantuan-kapal-perang-ke- laut-china-selatan-ahmad-basarah-indonesia-dapat-memanfaatkan-situasi.

27 Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Supremacy (New York:

slipped, Indonesian respondents still rank China the most influential power

in both categories among all the states and organizations considered (67.9% and 38.2%, respectively, in 2022).30

The second perception is that to maintain its preeminence in the region,

a challenged United States is engaging in rivalrous behavior vis-à-vis China Experts and officials in Jakarta began to see the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach from the prism of an insecure and reactive great power that was willing to maintain its primacy at the cost of regional peace and stability Indonesian confidence in the U.S president declined steeply after Trump came to power, though it remained higher than during the George W Bush administration.31

However, Indonesian views remain divided on the extent of the Sino-U.S rivalry Some observers believe that the Thucydides trap is affecting all aspects

of Sino-U.S relations, while others relate it to specific aspects For example, Jusuf Wanandi, former government adviser and co-founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, stated that “all the pillars supporting sound U.S.-China relations—security, economic development and culture—are being wrecked by both sides,” and appears to attribute the current sharpness in the Sino-U.S rivalry to the America-first policy of the Trump era.32 By contrast, Dewi Anwar, a noted Indonesian scholar and former adviser to the Indonesian vice president, has placed the rivalry in the context

of China’s Belt and Road Initiative versus the U.S.-led Quad.33 In this context, the Sino-U.S great-power rivalry appears systemic

indonesia as a dove state

Framing Dove State Behavior

Indonesia has responded to the evolving U.S.-China rivalry by positioning itself as a status-quo power and pursuing a policy that can be likened to the dove state in Randall Schweller’s depiction of the pecking order between status-quo and revisionist states There are five qualities of dove states that Indonesia has exhibited in its strategies for great-power management

30 Sharon Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, February 2022, 22–23.

31 Richard Wike et al., “Trump Ratings Remain Low around Globe, While Views of U.S Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 2020, 15 u https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp- content/uploads/sites/2/2020/01/PG_2020.01.08_US-Image_FINAL.pdf.

32 Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S Relations.”

33 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113.

First, dove states are status-quo states that aim to “maintain the peace without sacrificing the essential characteristics of the status-quo order.” This logic is visible in Indonesia’s emphasis on supporting the existing regional order and a stable balance of power between the United States and China.Second, dove states subscribe to the “spiral model” of reasons for war The spiral model of war implies that attempts of balancing, containment,

or military buildup escalate tensions, whereas concessions, reassurance, or avoidance of provocations eases them.34 This logic explains concerns that Indonesia has raised against some aspects of the U.S Indo-Pacific strategy (especially during the Trump administration) Indonesian opposition to alliance formation, containment strategies, and provocation can be situated against the actions of the dissatisfied powers in this context

Third, a dove state, while pursuing its interests, follows the policy of engagement with both the reigning champion (status-quo power) and the challenger (revisionist power) This argument can be extended further to argue that a dove state would like to engage all of the major powers as it seeks to concentrate on peace and conflict avoidance Fourth, a dove state also engages in multilateral binding, whereby it expects great powers to commit to the multilateral processes prevalent in the region This argument can be used to explain Indonesia’s emphasis on ASEAN’s regional leadership and centrality

Finally, dove states accept limited and “peaceful revision of the status quo.” In doing so, they essentially aim at “appeasing the ‘legitimate’ (in their eyes) grievances of the dissatisfied powers.”35 The appeasement argument can

be related to Indonesia’s accommodation of Chinese assertive behavior in the region even though China and Indonesia share a disputed maritime space in the South China Sea

The Historical Context of Indonesia’s Experience with Great-Power Politics

Indonesia’s dove state behavior is a cumulative expression of three distinct sets of experiences with great-power politics—great-power conflict, great-power meddling in Indonesian domestic affairs, and stable and peaceful great-power relations The first two experiences dominated Indonesia’s engagements during the Cold War, and the last trend has shaped Indonesia’s perception toward

34 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 2017), 84.

35 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 87.

great-power politics for the first fifteen years of the 21st century in the Widodo era The first two trends made Indonesia distrustful of great powers’ intentions and concentrate on the pursuit of national interests while avoiding alignment or external intervention in domestic or regional affairs The third trend pushed Indonesia toward deeper engagement, as Jakarta realized that the country could benefit from stable great-power relations and the peaceful involvement of great powers in the region.

pre-Soon after declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia found itself facing what former prime minister Mohammad Natsir termed “a very dangerous situation” marked by “a conflict of ideology and policy” that “could develop any moment into a war at the frontier of the sphere of influence of the two power blocs.”36 Indonesia had inherited a poor economy and needed resources and international aid to embark on the process of postcolonial state-building and economic development Postcolonial Indonesia was underdeveloped, still engaged in military confrontation with the Dutch, and faced religious and ideological tensions within the country It needed international support at the United Nations over the West Irian issue, and aligning with any one power would have limited the scope of international support In other words, the country could not afford enmity and needed international economic support for growth and development.37

Following the logic that security and prosperity were contingent on regional peace and stability, Indonesia’s leaders laid out two philosophical foundations of the country’s postcolonial foreign policy: (1) free and active

(bebas dan aktif) and (2) “rowing between the two reefs.” The first principle

aimed at ensuring the country’s own agency in shaping its foreign policy, and the second sought to minimize the negative impact of Cold War politics Together, they meant no alignment, no neutrality, no third bloc, and no playing favorites.38

Indonesia’s subsequent experience with great-power politics reinforced this independent and unaligned foreign policy As the Communist movement gained momentum in Indonesia, the United States grew distant and distrustful of Indonesia as led by Sukarno, especially when John Foster Dulles served as the secretary of state Bringing the Cold War tension closer

to Southeast Asia, the United States forged the Manila Pact, or SEATO (the

36 Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–65 (The

Hague: De Gruyter Mouton, 1973), 179.

37 For the discussion on Indonesia’s dependence dilemma, see Franklin B Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign

Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

38 Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, April 1953, 443.

Southeast East Asia Treaty Organization), in 1954 Indonesia opposed the formation of the military pact and rallied around the idea of nonalignment, which took a definitive shape in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 1955 international conference of newly independent African and Asian states in Bandung.39

Indonesia’s troubled experience with great-power politics did not end there; in fact, such politics came to dominate not only the region but also Indonesia’s own domestic space Both the United States and China undertook subversive activities in Indonesia during the Cold War era While Indonesia failed to receive adequate military support from the United States

in its military campaigns against the Dutch, it also faced domestic rebellions armed with U.S weapons, which the United States supplied clandestinely to the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi The CIA launched covert operations in Indonesia during the 1950s with the hope that they would be able to oust the pro-Communist Sukarno presidency.40 Communist China, during the 1950s and 1960s, provided financial and political support to the Indonesian Communist Party and demanded financial contributions from ethnic Chinese Indonesians to support the Communist movement in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region.41 Chinese meddling culminated in a failed coup by Communist leaders in 1965 that led to a complete freeze in China-Indonesia diplomatic relations for over two decades Indonesia’s national sentiments largely remain anti-Communist even today

In contrast to the Cold War bitterness and suspicion toward the great powers, in the first fifteen years of the 21st century Indonesia experienced the more positive influence of great-power politics on regional geopolitics and its own strategic calculus, which pushed it to build robust engagement with China and the United States During this time, Indonesia signed strategic partnerships with most major powers, including Russia (2003), China (2005), India (2005), Japan (2006), and the United States (2010) Democratic Indonesia pushed for more involvement of the great powers in the ASEAN processes, leading to the expansion of the ASEAN+ dialogue partnerships; the

39 It should be noted that for Indonesian leaders nonalignment was never a third front against either power bloc.

40 Audrey R Kahin and George McT Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and

Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: New Press, 1995); Jaechun Kim, “U.S Covert Action in

Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences,” Journal of International and

Area Studies 9, no 2 (2002): 63–85; and Jim Mann, “CIA’s Covert Indonesia Operation in the 1950s

Acknowledged by U.S.: Cold War: State Department Publishes Unprecedented 600-Page History

Documenting Anti-Communist Program,” Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1994.

41 Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 410; and Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Reengagement,” Asian Survey 49, no 4 (2009): 592–93.

formation of the East Asia Summit and its expansion to admit China, Russia, and the United States; and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Celebrating Indonesia’s honeymoon with great-power politics, then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono endorsed the idea of “a million friends, zero enemies,” and Indonesian minister for foreign affairs Marty Natalegawa called for a “dynamic equilibrium” in engagement with the great powers.42 Natalegawa termed this period as a “peace dividend” due to a “ ‘condominium’ arrangement for the region, involving common understanding and mutual respect of their particular core interests in the region.”43 Dewi Anwar has referred to this period as “the long period of peace, stability and prosperity.”44 Rizal Sukma, a former Indonesian ambassador, views this era of peace as a “short-lived unipolar moment,” when the United States exercised preeminence in the region.45

indonesia’s dove state behavior during the widodo era

President Joko Widodo’s Indonesia—from late 2014 to the present—stands

at the intersection of all three sets of past experiences with great-power politics: the intensification of great-power rivalry, involvement in domestic and regional affairs, and the need for great-power support in national development There is general recognition among the Indonesian leadership that it has benefited from the existing U.S.-led global liberal order and that the continuation of this order is in the best interest of Indonesia’s economic rise and regional leadership Similarly, the ASEAN-led regional architecture has provided Indonesia an important avenue for projecting this leadership Any systemic upheaval or escalation of the U.S.-China rivalry is likely to undermine regional peace and stability, challenge ASEAN’s role, and limit Indonesia’s economic rise As Natalegawa noted in 2013, “stability and security are a prerequisite for economic development That is why…Indonesia’s foreign policy never ceased to exert its utmost to maintain regional stability and security in the face of all challenges.”46

42 Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? 140.

43 Ibid., 42.

44 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113.

45 Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-Pacific Idea.”

46 Marty Natalegawa, “2013 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 4, 2013, 3.

Motivated by these considerations and building on past experiences, Widodo’s Indonesia has put forth an ASEAN-led approach to great-power management that is status-quo-focused, risk-averse, interest-driven, accommodative, and time-tested As discussed below, Jakarta has concentrated on strengthening engagements, eschewing alliances, avoiding escalation, pursuing autonomy, and recentering ASEAN in its regional and great-power engagements.

Engagement with All, but on Jakarta’s Terms

A recent exposition of the robust engagement with all came from Foreign Minister Marsudi in September 2020 She declared, “ASEAN, Indonesia, wants to show to all that we are ready to be a partner…We don’t want to get trapped by this rivalry.”47 Indonesian equilateralism can be identified in

in three principal areas—strategic partnerships, economic engagement, and weapons procurement and defense diplomacy

Indonesia elevated its strategic partnership with China to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2015 and its comprehensive partnership with the United States to a strategic partnership in October 2015 during Widodo’s visit to the United States These partnerships entail prioritized, organized, and detailed agendas of bilateral engagements For example, a joint statement between the two states and the U.S.-Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation from October 2015 have provided

a broader roadmap to bilateral maritime cooperation.48 Indonesia also has a maritime partnership with China

Driven by the logic of development, Indonesia has tried to build strong economic relations with the major economies Its four top trading partners are China, India, Japan, and the United States, which are also the four largest state economies in the world in terms of purchasing power parity Indonesia has additionally sought greater market access, foreign investment in the infrastructure sector, and technologies from major economic players As an ASEAN member, Indonesia has signed free trade agreements with Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea In addition, Indonesia is a part of the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that

47 Tom Allard and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia to U.S., China: Don’t Trap Us in Your Rivalry,” Reuters, September 8, 2020 u https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-foreign-minister/ indonesia-to-u-s-china-dont-trap-us-in-your-rivalry-idUSKBN25Z1ZD.

48 U.S Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, “Fact Sheet: Indonesia-U.S Maritime Cooperation”

u https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/embassy-fact-sheets/fact-sheet-u-s- indonesia-maritime-cooperation.