Continued part 1, part 2 of ebook Corporations, crime and accountability provides readers with contents including: Chapter 5 Making the buck stop; Chapter 6 Assessing the accountability model; Chapter 7 The possibility of responsibility for corporate crime;... Đề tài Hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tại Công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên được nghiên cứu nhằm giúp công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên làm rõ được thực trạng công tác quản trị nhân sự trong công ty như thế nào từ đó đề ra các giải pháp giúp công ty hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tốt hơn trong thời gian tới.
ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 cq q2 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư Making the Buck Stop re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s Responsibility for Corporate Crime in Modern Society vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq Responsibility, as we saw in Chapter 2, is a device for achieving social control that does not depend on metaphysical or intrinsic qualities of 'moral persons' or human agents Responsibility for corporate crime may thus be corporate as well as individual Corporate responsibility may be based on corporate intentionality, in the sense of corporate policy, or corporate negligence, in the sense of an inexcusable failure to meet the standard of conduct expected of a corporation in the position of the defendant It was also shown in Chapter that the theory of deterrent punishment is not confined to individual actors but is consistent with corporate criminal liability Several reasons were given for this extension of deterrence theory: (1) Deterrence does not imply that punishment must be directed at individual actors (2) Uncertainty as to the nature of corporate action does not have the policy implication that deterrent punishment should be limited to individual actors but is entirely consistent with sanctioning strategies that focus on corporate as well as individual actors (3) Deterrence and organisational reform are complementary rather than mutually exclusive means of controlling corporate conduct (4) The deterrent capacity of individual criminal liability is limited by various factors, namely: enforcement overload; opacity of internal lines of corporate accountability; expendability of individuals within organisations; corporate separation of those responsible for the commission of past offences from those responsible for the prevention of future offences; and corporate safe-harbouring of individual suspects Moreover, we argued in Chapter that retribution is not necessarily inconsistent with corporate criminal liability; the more plausible retributive theories are capable of extension to corporate entities The point has also been made repeatedly in the previous chapters that inequality in the application of the criminal law to white-collar offenders is unlikely to be relieved if scarce enforcement resources are channelled exclusively into the difficult and costly task of investigating and prosecuting offences by individuals If the scales of justice are to be evened up, then less costly ways of delivering individual jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 134 cq q2 CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m responsibility must be found Furthermore, we have explained why it is that existing practices of individual enforcement for corporate crime stumble in the face of individual risk-shifting by insurance, indemnification, delegating risky functions to subordinates, and other practices which systematically shield strategic individuals from the burden of liability While Chapter revealed the limits of individualistic liberal legalism, Chapter unfolded the limits of the collectivist economism of enterprise liability Chapter then explored the limits of a variety of forms of sociological collectivism The unifying problem running throughout Chapters and was the problem of uncertainty of enforcement impact As avenues for informing the law, the doctrines of legal liberalism, economic analysis of law and organisation theory are all fraught with contingent and unpredictable effects for any program in which they might conceivably be put into practice In Chapter 3, we reached what we consider to be a watershed position, which is that the best device for managing uncertainty is the imposition of responsibility itself While we can never get the information we need to calibrate optimal enforcement regimes, we can cope with this uncertainty by following this rule of action: s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et Seek to publicly identify all who are responsible and hold them responsible, whether the responsible actors are individuals, corporations, corporate subunits, gatekeepers, industry associations or regulatory agencies themselves ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w More economistically, this rule of action means that we should seek to maximise the sheeting home of responsibility for any given level of enforcement budget This strategy is hardly remarkable An impressive body of psychological research indicates that it is exactly the approach taken by competent parents.1 Only an incompetent parent would seek to regulate family life by calculating optimal penalties for different childhood transgressions Practical, effective parents devote their scarce regulatory energies to ensuring that whenever wrongdoing occurs, a recognition of responsibility for it is brought home to the wrongdoers, and is seen to be sheeted home by all actors involved in the incident Their objective is never to let wrongdoing slide, never to settle for 'nattering' at the naughty child, but to confront wrongdoing with a disapproval that communicates the seriousness of the degree of wrongdoing The same applies to good managers in complex organisations: they are not managers who set optimal penalties; they are managers who focus their scarce resources on ensuring that those they are responsible for are always held responsible for their failures and successes Put simply, our hypothesis is that the most efficient rule of action for parents and managers is also the most efficient rule of action for corporate law enforcers fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo See Baumrind, 'Current Patterns of Parental Authority'; Baumrind, 'Parental Disciplinary Practices and Social Competence in Children'; Patterson, Coercive Family Process 6s 8f h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 MAKING THE BUCK STOP cq q2 135 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk Desiderata for the Just and Effective Enforcement of Responsibility for Corporate Crime tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m s xii w 8x ql It is time to recapitulate by assembling the particular desiderata that have emerged for the allocation of responsibility for corporate crime Twenty desiderata are listed below After each of them we indicate the parts of our text that underpin the particular desideratum Having listed the relevant desiderata in the present section, we consider some promising moves that have previously been taken toward developing models for the just and effective enforcement of responsibility for corporate crime We use these as stepping stones toward our own model for the allocation of responsibility in corporate criminal enforcement We then outline the key elements of our preferred model Finally in this chapter, we illustrate how the model would operate in practice Later, in Chapter 6, we evaluate our model precisely in terms of the desiderata summarised below bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn The Desiderata 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq et uy i A strategy for allocating responsibility for corporate crime should reflect the received wisdom that individual responsibility is a pillar of social control in Western societies The slide away from individual responsibility in our corporate law enforcement must be remedied, [pp 2-8, 78-9] ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 59 5c A strategy for allocating responsibility for corporate crime should also accept that corporate action is not merely the sum of individual actions and that it can be just and effective to hold corporations responsible as corporations, [pp 19-31, 44-7] y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s A strategy for allocating responsibility for corporate crime should seek to maximise the allocation of responsibility to all who are responsible, be they individuals, subunits of corporations, corporations, parent corporations, industry associations, gatekeepers such as accountants and indeed regulatory agencies themselves, [pp 64-6, 92, 99] 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om r 5x pz m an The maximisation of the allocation of responsibility to all who are responsible should be pursued cost-efficiently, and in a way that does not place unrealistic burdens either on corporations or on the public purse [pp 37-41, 62, 69-72,80] fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 136 cq q2 CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m s xii w The maximisation of the allocation of responsibility should be pursued justly in such a way as to safeguard the interests of individuals Rights of suspects must be respected Procedural justice must not be sacrificed on the altar of substantive justice, [pp 50-3, 93-6] ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 pc 3k m cc Those who are responsible for equal wrongs should be treated equally [pp 53-7, 96-8] ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 A strategy for allocating individual responsibility should remedy the scapegoating that has been endemic when individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing has been pursued, [pp 38^1,55-7, 96-7,129] 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq 81 ym l w2 m A strategy for sanctioning the responsible should minimise spillovers of the effects of sanctions onto actors who bear no responsibility for the wrongdoing, [pp 49-50, 64] a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 m 6y j te ga A means must be devised to escape the deterrence trap—the situation where the only way to make it rational to comply with the law is to set penalties so high as to jeopardise the economic viability of corporations that are the life blood of the economy, [pp 64, 82] zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u s ưu ojw tg 10 A strategy for sanctioning the responsible must recognise that actors are motivationally complex Profit maximisation is an important motivation for many private corporate actors, but the maintenance of individual and corporate repute, dignity, self-image and the desire to be responsible citizens are also important in many contexts, as are various more idiosyncratic motivations A good strategy will not be motivationally myopic [pp 33^, 79-82] xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq 11 A strategy for sanctioning the responsible should avoid myopia about which agents will dispense sanctions against those responsible with the greatest justice and effectiveness Often, it will be enforcement agents of the state who will the best job Yet we should not privilege the state as the only lawenforcer that matters In particular, corporate internal disciplinary systems must be taken seriously as legal orders with realised and unrealised potential for justice and effectiveness, [pp 8-12, 77-81, 96-7] i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 MAKING THE BUCK STOP cq q2 137 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư 12 Special care must be taken to ensure that the state does not cause private justice systems to become organised against the state justice system The state should have enforcement policies that avert the formation of organised business cultures of resistance to regulatory law [pp 38-40] re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 m cc pc 3k 13 A strategy for sanctioning the responsible should also avoid myopia about the aims of the criminal justice system Narrowly focused utilitarianism or retributivism are prescriptions for disastrous corporate criminal enforcement policies Criminal liability is not merely a matter of paying a price for crime, but has a prohibitory function which is reflected by the denunciatory emphasis of the criminal process Nor should criminal liability be viewed simply as a matter of retribution The harms protected against by corporate criminal law are too serious for us to indulge in retribution at the cost of increasing corporate harm-doing, [pp 44-9, 84] ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 n7 qb 14 A strategy for allocating responsibility should be in harmony with the varieties of structures, cultures, decisionmaking and accountability principles in large and small organisations [pp 117-18,122-32] 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq k1 5t 15 A strategy for allocating responsibility should be capable ofnuanced response to the likelihood that the same corporate action can be usefully understood in many different ways Our mechanisms for allocating responsibility should not be so calibrated that the ambiguous and paradoxical nature of corporate action eludes us In other words, we should be able to avoid the traps of narrowness of vision through institutions that are able to imagine corporate action in multiple ways Our methodology for allocating responsibility should foster a dialogue that brings these multiple interpretations of responsibility into the open [pp 77,108-9,119-23] ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi bv 72 16 A strategy for allocating responsibility in a complex corporate world where the motivations of actors are multiple and where no single model of corporate action grasps the whole story should be based on redundancy If the intervention fails for one reason, there should be other features of the intervention that might enable it to succeed Redundancy should be built into interventions, while the inefficiencies of costly redundancies are avoided [pp 73-6, 85-8, 91-2] 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 138 cq q2 CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 17 A strategy for allocating responsibility should ensure that the law does not straightjacket management systems into conformity with legal principles [pp 126-7] 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 18 A strategy for allocating responsibility should operate with a conception of fault that is not time-bound, but copes with the dynamic nature of corporate action, [pp 47-9] 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 19 A strategy for allocating responsibility should not be bound by a national jurisdiction; it should be capable of responding to the increasingly international nature of corporate action [pp 40-1] 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 20 A strategy for allocating responsibility should be workable with public as well as private organisations [pp 6-7,13] ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy Developing a Model for the Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc A promising approach for achieving accountability for corporate crime would be to structure enforcement so as to activate and monitor the private justice systems of corporate defendants.2 Already under the present law one aspiration of corporate criminal liability is to catalyse internal discipline, especially where organisational secrecy, numbers of suspects and other such considerations make it difficult or even impossible to rely on individual criminal liability.3 Looking ahead, the challenge is not so much to expand the application of individual criminal liability4 as it is to harness the policing power of corporations This direction was suggested in 1976 in a Working Paper prepared by the Canadian Law Commission,5 but does not appear to have been taken further 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q See Chapter 1, 15-16 See Chapter 2, 36-41 Compare Goodwin, 'Individual Liability of Agents for Corporate Crimes under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code'; Spiegelhoff, 'Limits on Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes'; McVisk, 'Toward a Rational Theory of Criminal Liability for the Corporate Executive' Canada, Law Reform Commission, Working Paper 16, Criminal Responsibility for Group Action, 31 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m MAKING THE BUCK STOP wz d5 cq q2 139 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư by the Commission In 1977, the idea was developed by the Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, which recommended that internal discipline orders be introduced as a sanction against corporate defendants.6 A similar approach was pursued by John Coffee in 1981 in an imaginative proposal for using probation or presentence reports as a vehicle for stimulating internal disciplinary action by corporate offenders.7 This proposal is canvassed below re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 CoffeeJ s proposal rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 John Coffee took as his starting point the Gulf Oil Corporation report on bribery committed in the US and abroad by its personnel during the 1970s and earlier The report was prepared by an outside counsel, John J McCloy The revelations in the McCloy study were sufficiently interesting to be picked up by the press and for the report to be republished as a paperback best-seller.8 It brought about substantial internal reforms at Gulf and hastened the resignation of some senior officials named in it Coffee was thus prompted to ask whether McCloy-style reports should become a routine part of corporate crime enforcement The mechanism favoured by Coffee was placing corporate defendants on probation, subject to a condition that they employ outside counsel to prepare a report which names key participants and outlines in readable form their modus operandi Alternatively, the vehicle could be a presentence report: 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 kq 8z lf ht The suggestion, then, is that the presentence report on corporate offenders be prepared in considerable factual depth in the expectation that such studies will either find an audience in their own right or, more typically, provide the database for investigative journalism This approach permits the government both to avoid the ethical dilemma of itself being a publicist, and to rely on the more effective public communication skills of the professional journalist In a sense, this approach integrates public and private enforcement.9 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz The presentence report would be distributed to stockholders, and thereby in effect to the world Coffee concluded that adverse individual publicity in a McCloy-style report can deter culpable or negligent managers on three distinct levels: r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om r 5x pz m an South Australia, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee, Fourth Report, The Substantive Criminal Law, 361-2 Coffee, 'No Soul to Damn No Body to Kick' Compare 18 USC s 3572(a)(4) which provides that, when imposing a fine on a corporation, a court is to consider 'any measures taken by the organisation to discipline its employees or agents responsible for the offense or to insure against a recurrence of such offense' See further Coffee and Whitbread, 'The Convicted Corporation' McCloy, The Great Oil Spill Coffee, 'No Soul to Damn No Body to Kick', 431 fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 140 cq q2 CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 First, the manager suffers a loss of public- and self-respect, which some research suggests is the most potent deterrent for the middle-class potential offender Second, adverse publicity substantially reduces the official's chances for promotion within the firms Competition for advancement is keen within almost all firms, and competitors of the culpable official can be relied upon to use such adverse publicity about their rival to their own advantage SEC proxy disclosure requirements may pose a further barrier to such an official's advancement Finally, disclosure of the identity of the culpable official also invites a derivative suit by which any costs visited on the firm can be shifted (at least in part) to the individual Here again private enforcement is desirably integrated with public enforcement through the linking mechanism of disclosure.10 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 This approach is instructive because it exploits the capability that corporate justice systems have for delivering individual accountability Instead of following the jurisprudential tradition of neglecting the existence of private legal systems within corporations,11 Coffee revealed the potential for linking public law with internal corporate law in an expedient way designed to promote individual responsibility However, Coffee's proposal is embryonic Much fuller development is required if such an approach is to command acceptance In our view, that development is best tackled by pinning down the desiderata that are relevant to the allocation of responsibility for corporate crime and by building a model that patently satisfies them In the next section, we outline a model generated by our own attempt to struggle with the desiderata that have emerged from our analysis of the problem of passing the buck for corporate crime We call this the 'Accountability Model' 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs The Accountability Model 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u The Accountability Model we advocate is based most fundamentally on the rule of action that has already been spelt out: tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 Seek to publicly identify all who are responsible and hold them responsible, whether the responsible actors are individuals, corporations, corporate subunits, gatekeepers, industry associations or regulatory agencies themselves no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e This rule of action, which could readily be implemented by refining existing legislative and common law controls against corporate crime, suggests the need for a legal package containing the following essential elements: ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om (1) pyramidal enforcement whereby the legal response to non-compliance can be escalated progressively if necessary; (2) guidelines which indicate the circumstances under which corporations and/or individuals are to be prosecuted for offences; an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ac 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr Ibid., 433 See R B Stewart, 'Organizational Jurisprudence' cv 11 ưj ao 6iz 10 nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn vo a oư m wz d5 MAKING THE BUCK STOP cq q2 141 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư (3) accountability agreements, orders and assurances under which disciplinary and other duties are to be performed by a corporate defendant and relevant personnel; (4) specification of the threshold requirements for accountability agreements, orders or assurances; (5) designation in advance of the individuals and collectivities primarily responsible for ensuring responsibility with an accountability agreement, order, or assurance; (6) provision for supervising and monitoring of accountability agreements, orders or assurances should such steps be required; and (7) safeguards against scapegoating and other unjust practices by organisations subjected to accountability agreements, orders, or assurances re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s Pyramidal enforcement vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp m 36 6b 1d The basic regulatory framework of the Accountability Model is pyramidal enforcement,'2 with informal methods of control at the base of the pyramid and severe forms of criminal liability at the apex One commendable pyramid of enforcement, working up from the base, is this: w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 LEVEL l 0k i45 rg Persuasion, warnings, advice, and other informal methods of promoting compliance 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv LEVEL nx dy uc d2 Civil monetary penalties (corporate and individual) i8 jl rg 4w fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 LEVEL 5c 59 o4 y0 Disciplinary or remedial investigation undertaken upon agreement with an enforcement agency (accountability agreements) and court-approved assurance of an effective program of disciplinary or remedial action (accountability assurances), coupled with publication of an accountability report 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p LEVEL s k4 jrw 71 Court-ordered disciplinary or remedial investigation (accountability orders) or court-approved assurance of an effective program of disciplinary or remedial action (accountability assurances), coupled with publication of an accountability report vf s1 no 7u 10 dp ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek m oy ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 LEVEL wk lv 4c 3e Criminal liability (individual and corporate), with community service, fines and probation authorised for individual offenders, and adverse publicity orders, community service, fines and probation for corporate offenders ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om LEVEL r 5x pz m an Escalated criminal liability (individual and corporate), with jail authorised for individual offenders, and liquidation (corporate capital punishment), punitive injunctions, and adverse publicity orders for corporate offenders fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade, 142—8; Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation 76 wy 12 nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts ul xy cx 5t zy ps iu nb up wz ux j7u b2 v t7 v9 sy lyh p 4ip 7s ưy 7c 51 yn CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY vo a oư m wz d5 cq q2 142 w lf3 vp 00 j7 ep 5u ei hw u5 r2 d9 sy rm rf bt 2p 26 r3 m z lcl l 1ig s7 m k zk tf de 8b 86 s g6 itd ca 0c r0 e 29 al9 p m 1d h8 o7 Figure 5.1: Pyramid of disciplinary and remedial interventions against corporate offenders vy nư 4h j1 5ll 74 s5 50 kư re m s xii w ql 8x bd 7c zq y h3 iz8 4g 8g to ưp izh tr a u6 lo z4 uo ek 2s sc de s9 yh s6 0r rm sr 46 dr fa r3 nj n7 pp g6 o5 cc pc 3k m ig xq sa dp ws x6 ys 42 1v 3g j4 l 86 ajk nm 3m tsj 1n pe jx og z5 v6 rn sb tw lt t9 qj 31 4b g m 69 x0 q3 q0 lm 8l eh o ny 0x m b8 fw 0k fq u0 6s qp cb q4 fr zu l6w q h tj3 rv m ds yn Corporate capital punishment 4v hr 1l6 7f 71 42 56 v l7ư 8r m 0s vh x1 9o lc e9 t4 rv v1 bj ư0 27 o8 kp 36 6b 1d m w cjq jj qw 4f 2s 9d if j8h sy l1 ls lq ym l w2 m 81 a9 7v ui pn Corporate criminal sanctions 3o 90 kq hr 2o o0 ưb e 5k xid fa 2e bw x2 qb n7 6s 0q 0g v th 0jq uy et ch zq xu f ư2 j ei4 4j4 xs c2 5g p8 dư k gư oi5 rg l 0k i45 8v pw sa av tv i 5k sl7 6y j te ga m zz 5c 1e 1e 4h zg n1 v7 0p t g6 m 22 4a 5h 4q wf hd zv nx dy uc d2 i8 jl rg 4w Court-ordered disciplinary or remedial investigation (Accountability order) fo c8 8z lf ht kq 5t k1 ư9 ga kg qư sh a0 5c 59 y0 o4 61 0p 44 5r u 7ig h2 rs 94 yc 8d so uj sv c ijfy jku 8l xg zz qd oo 5u tg s ưu ojw xe xe tv 81 05 ew 9a rg fu o 4n jof Voluntary disciplinary or remedial investigation q5 ư3 s2 sh ưp 3y ky z2 fq ro f4 9p 71 s k4 jrw vf s1 no 7u 10 dp (Accountability agreement) ex i pa civ pq ba 6y ưz r6 4c j4s 48 dy re v1 z8 cy tz4 vy 2u ko ay eu e2 d5 ek ds v1 b1 1w jb sc ưư 66 gm pj aa a td 5i3 0z 40 wk lv 4c 3e ư5 e3 hư hn 3f 9w 79 3p hq p j1c d5 47 s4 pd q9 xv f8 gi 72 bv 3o vq i3p 17 v u2 py zx ly r xy yli vr yr p7 pi os om an r 5x pz m fs fh w 4ig 7e cw bs 26 xo 2q 4g 50 rư ưd a3 31 ze k5 b9 u1 2y ur 9y 6c u8 ưi hk 0d uy o5 69 92 bư ln 24 gư wk 95 vư zf Advice Warnings Persuasion m oy Civil monetary penalties j5 hj yz 7h kư ft ew kg ư2 kc la nư yy w4 8o 6z ưj ao 6iz ac cv 6s 8f dm 2x hd f4 76 wy i0 s5 dt 9a 86 9v us nr nv eo h io7 v2 uo s9 6o ox id m m x pr e 8ln 6y w 81 79 da t4 9u in 9ls 2f dg wf qg oq 3s pq y3 7g p6 7w zs 9ư py ts