This study also aims at illustrating that other indicators relating to differences between accounting and taxable profit do not leave any remarkable impacts on the model. This means that enterprises operating in the industrial sector do not use or rarely use those indicators to implement EM Sapo. Đề tài Hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tại Công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên được nghiên cứu nhằm giúp công ty TNHH Mộc Khải Tuyên làm rõ được thực trạng công tác quản trị nhân sự trong công ty như thế nào từ đó đề ra các giải pháp giúp công ty hoàn thiện công tác quản trị nhân sự tốt hơn trong thời gian tới.
7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn Nguyen, Dieu Linh1, Hoang, Thi Thu2 cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k 1, f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 Banking Academy of Vietnam 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv Abstract ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe Chronicle n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of tax optimization strategies used by Vietnamese companies for earning management through the use of temporary difference between accounting and taxable profit Following the model of Cindy (2021), we leverage quantitative methods, built models and tested the impact of 08 factors on earning management (EM), tax optimization (ETR), deferred tax asset (DTA), deferred tax liability (DTL), deferred tax expense (DTE), company size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), cash flow from operating activities (CFO) The sample we selected were 113 industrial enterprises operating in multiple sectors listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange in the period between 2016-2020 Empirical results our sample have shown that earning management (EM) may be affected by DTA, ROA, cash flow from operating activities, and financial leverage under various motives This study also aims at illustrating that other indicators relating to differences between accounting and taxable profit not leave any remarkable impacts on the model This means that enterprises operating in the industrial sector not use or rarely use those indicators to implement EM Sapo 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 28th Nov 2023 sm Accepted bo 28th Nov 2023 1k Revised d7 19th Apr 2023 i7 Received y7 Article history 9g to bo ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay deferred income tax deferred tax assets earning management difference between accounting and taxable profit tax optimization 79 Keywords tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f 10.59276/JEBS.2023.12.2531 gd 3m DOI: km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc zc maximize taxation income So, a company will take necessary steps to minimize their taxes through legal means, this process is called tax planning (Dewi, Nuraina and Amah, 2017) Previously local and international researchers have produced literature analyzing the motives behind earning management practices Jensen and Meckling (1976) attempted to illustrate the motive of agents (management) making decisions to maximize their personal benefits The principal is the owner of the business who delegates responsibilities to the agents to who would run it This theory explains the conflict of interest between the two parties, where the principal prioritizes the long-term wellbeing of the firm while the agent prioritizes personal 1e Introduction y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c E qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg arning management is one of the topics that many economists are interested in when they assess the transparency of information published in a business’s annual report, especially in the context of economic instability such as natural disasters, epidemics, etc and through the strong development the tech sector Many businesses are willing to adjust business results to achieve profit targets and desired debt ratios, thereby indirectly influencing the decisions of shareholders and investors A company’s goal is to maximize its shareholders’ profit, while the state’s goal is to m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj ed yn * Corresponding author E-mail address: linhnd@hvnh.edu.vn (Nguyen, D.L.), hoangthu2k1tn@gmail.com (Hoang, T.T.) xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o ISSN 2734 - 9853 sb © Banking Academy of Vietnam kq 24 8f 3r Journal of Economic and Banking Studies Volume 06 Dec 2023 pp 24-36 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 hv m r0 to defer their taxes (Yulianti, 2005) The different characteristics in each temporary difference account can potentially be used to indicate the direction of earning management that was performed The different characteristics of each temporary differences account have the potential to indicate the direction in which earning management is moving Because of their characteristics, deferred tax assets have the potential to indicate downwards earning management while deferred tax liability has the potential to indicate upwards earning management Though it is possible that these temporary differences arise purely due to the different policies used for accounting and for fiscal purposes As explained by the agency theory, the company is motivated to maximize its profits, one of the ways to achieve that is by minimizing tax expenses This is when the company uses the rules and facilities that are available (such as loss compensations and free zones) to minimize the taxes they need to pay With those facilities and rules, a company can manipulate its financial statement to achieve minimization in taxes they are obligated to pay Previous researchers found that tax planning has a significant effect to earning management as one of the ways to lessen taxes using the facilities and rules is by earning management (Baraja, Basri, Sasmi, 2017; Dewi et al, 2017; Hapsari and Manzilah, 2016; Lubis and Suryani, 2018; Santana and Wirakusuma, 2016) Other researchers found that tax planning has no significant effect to earning management due to companies evading tax using illegal means, which are harder to detect (Aditama and Purwaningsih, 2014; Ifada and Wulandari, 2015) Previous research about the effect of temporary difference towards earning management also found differing results Some found temporary difference accounts have significant effect to temporary difference and can be used to detect earning management done by a firm due to some subjectivityin deferring taxes (Astutik and Mildawati, 2016; Baraja et al, 2019; Fajri and Mayangsari, 2012; Sutadipraja, Ningsih and Mardianac, 2020; Yulianti, 2005) Lu (2002) found deferred tax assets can be used by firms to 74 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc benefits The agents are incentivized to maximize firm performance to earn higher bonuses Watts and Zimmerman derived positive accounting theory in 1978 based on Jensen and Mecsskling’s agency theory This theory tries to predict accounting policies taken by the agents in different scenarios The agents will maximize profits to get bonuses or when they must fulfill agreements such as debt covenants The agent will minimize profits to minimize compliance costs, which include taxes In accounting and taxation rules, there are grey areas that allow agents to have subjective freedom such as using judgment which has no other basis other than the agents’ opinion Deferred tax accounts show up because of the differences between accounting and taxation rules, these differences are called temporary differences A larger temporary difference can indicate more liberal accounting policies (Hawkins, 1998 within Yulianti, 2005) Company tax subjects are required to make fiscal financial income statement Filing taxes based on the fiscal income statement requires adjustments as there are differences in accounting rules as compared to tax laws, particularly in income and expense recognition, as well as tax laws attempting to incentivizing certain behaviors and discouraging others The gains/ loss in fiscal income statement is the basis that the government relies on to impose tax on these firms The differences between fiscal and accounting gains/losses are reported in three temporary differences accounts which are: deferred tax asset, deferred tax liability, deferred tax expense Deferred tax assets show up when accounting gains is lower than fiscal gains, so the current tax expense is higher than accounting tax expense The rule requires companies to evaluate the amount of this account at the end of every period Deferred tax liability shows up when accounting gains is higher than fiscal gains, making the current tax expense lower than accounting tax expense Deferred tax expense shows up when accounting gains is higher than fiscal gains, making the current tax expense lower than accounting tax expense PSAK 46 also gives freedom to the company a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf 25 eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 perform big bath earning management Philips, Pincus and Rego (2003) found earning management can be detected using deferred tax expense when firms are avoiding loss While other research found temporary difference, accounts are not able to so as there are risks to reporting high temporary difference such as users of the financial report questioning the credibility of the report (Sibarani, Hidayat and Surtikanti, 2015; Suranggane, 2007; Utami and Malik, 2015) Using quantitative methods, the purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between tax optimization and temporary differences affecting profit management at Vietnamese industrial enterprises The article consists of parts, structured as follows: Introduction; Theoretical framework; Research methodology; Results and discussion; Conclusion ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 Theoretical framework 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 2.1 Related Concepts 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 hv m r0 74 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc Earning management is when a firm uses the grey area in accounting rules to alter the content of financial report so it better reflects what the company wants to portray, rather than the objective truth It is “a deliberate intervention in the financial disclosure process to achieve personal goals” (Schipper, 1989) Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that earning management will occur when managers take advantage of accounting rules or internal transactions to influence financial statements to make the users of financial statements misunderstand the operation situation of the company Earning management reflects the actions of managers in choosing accounting policies to benefit or increase the market value of the company (Scott, 1997) A temporary difference is the difference between the carrying amount of an asset or liability in the Balance Sheet and the tax base of that asset or liability (based on paragraph No 3, in Vietnamese Accounting Standard No 17 (VAS 17)) In which, the income tax base of an asset or liability is the value calculated for the asset or liability to determine corporate income tax Tax optimization is an action to minimize tax liability by preparing technical financial statements so that the amount of tax payable is as low as possible Tax planning variables are measured using the tax withholding ratio formula, which is a measure of tax management efficiency in the current year’s financial statements (Aditama & Purwaningsih, 2014) Tax planning is part of tax administration and is the first step in tax administration (Aditama and Purwaningsih, 2014) Tax planning is to be able to select all types of tax savings measures taken by the company and ensure that its implementation has met the applicable tax regulations That is the ultimate goal of the tax filing process Tax planning is about creating minimal tax debt by not violating applicable tax regulations In this concept, tax planning variables measured using tax retention rates are used to measure the effectiveness of corporate tax planning This measure of variability refers to the study that was done by Widiatmoko and Ika (2016) According to Erly Suandy (2014), in his book titled “Tax planning”, said that tax planning is the first step in tax management At this stage, the collections and studies of tax regulations that can be selected for the type of tax savings measure will be carried out In general, the emphasis of tax planning to minimize tax liability Cindy Lysta Tartono (2021) found that only deferred tax liabilities have significant impact on earning management It can be used to detect earning management upwards Tax planning affects absolute earning management without specific direction Deferred tax assets not have a significant impact to detect earning management downwards and deferred tax expense has no significant impact to earning management but can potentially detect earning management upwards in extreme cases In Vietnam, researches by Khanh and Thu (2019) on the relationship between financial leverage and profit management has demonstrated a positive relationship between them Enterprises with high financial leverage tend to reduce their profit management through accruals In addition, the study also shows the impact of other factors such as cash flow from a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Journal of Economic and Banking Studies- Volume 06- Dec 2023 bu 26 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df investors and executives in a business Shareholders will appoint administrators to run the business and delegate decisions to managers in business matters of the enterprise The problem concerning the disparity of interests has risen when business executives tend to make decisions that not guarantee the benefit of the company as a whole, but instead for their own personal benefit Information asymmetry occurs because executives know more about the internal business of the business than those outside the company such as shareholders (Morris, 1987) The consequences of this asymmetric information allow managers to perform behaviors that affect the profitability of enterprises so that financial information on financial statements benefits individual managers j5 operating activities (CFO), revenue growth, and fixed assets of the enterprise Nguyen Cong Phuong and Pham Dinh Tuan (2019) pointed out that when debt pressure increases, profit management also increases Specifically, with 1,349 enterprises listed on the stock market between 2010 and 2018, the adjusted profit increased when enterprises had large short-term debts or increased debt balance compared to last year On the contrary, adjusted profit is reduced when enterprises have high long-term debt The positive effect of the debt ratio on the accrual variable is also pointed out by Nguyen Ha Linh (2017) with 2,132 observations from non-financial enterprises on the Vietnam Stock Exchange Tran Thi Hong Diem (2021) also studies the impact of financial leverage on profit management, the results show a negative relationship between debt ratio and accrual accounts In 131 enterprises (393 observations) in the period 2017-2019, when the debt ratio increases, enterprises tend to reduce their profit management actions The study also shows the positive impact between return on asset (ROA) on earning management and the opposite direction between cash flow from operating activities (CFO) to profit management A synthesis of studies in Vietnam shows that new studies address and focus on analyzing the impact on earning management through debt ratio and financial leverage We expand and delve into 08 factors (Tax Optimization (ETR); Deferred Tax Asset (DTA), Deferred Tax Liability (DTL), Deferred Tax Expense (DTE), Company size (SIZE), Financial Leverage (LEV), Return on Assets (ROA), Cash flow from operating activities (CFO) to earning management (EM)) to find out the maximum impact Tax optimization and temporary difference between accounting and tax on profit management in enterprises listed on Vietnam stock exchange ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w zy ox 2.3 Positive Economic Theory yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 Watts and Zimmerman (1978) constructed and developed Positive Economic Theory intending to predict how accounting rules would be adopted by enterprises Administrators can implement earning-increasing management to diversify the financial position of the business so that they can earn more bonuses through adjustments to increase deferred tax expenses in the current period, to create temporary differences between accounting and withholding taxes that form deferred tax assets and enterprises will earn in the future, showing that in the future enterprises will report lower deferred tax expense, ostensibly showing the governance of good managers through reducing costs for enterprises, the qualifications of managers will be recognized thereby improving their bonus amount from the company With the impulse of minimizing state budget payable expenses, companies will implement tax optimization using existing principles and regulations to adjust so that the company will only have to pay as little amount of tax as possible while still satisfying the regulations of the enterprise The implementation of EMs with the aim of optimizing taxes for enterprises benefits not only managers but also shareholders because if the expense for tax is high, the dividend fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r 2.2 Theory explains the relationship between shareholders and managers o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc Jensen Mackling (1976) formulated this theory intending to explain the relationship between a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf 27 eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 2d ue Source: Cindy (2021) 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy qr yl Figure Temporary spreads ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 distributed to shareholders will be reduced 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq wq p4 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 hv m r0 74 fn 4v q m 30 2.4 Theory of deferred tax (including deferred tax expenses, deferred tax liability, deferred tax asset) and provisions in Vietnam higher than accounting earning at the current period, therefore in the future, the company will have a deferred tax assets deduction to reduce future taxes or reduce the amount of defered tax liability 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo 2.5 Theory of tax-optimized activity a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb Tax optimization is when a business minimizes the amount of tax payable by using available tools and regulations A company will review all current principles and regulations and choose one that reduces most of the taxes it has to pay (Astutik and Mildawati (2016)) Slemrod (2004) found that it is difficult to determine the amount of tax optimized by a company that performs tax optimization according to legal or illegal behavior (tax evasion) However, this study will not focus on the differences between the two methods of implementing tax optimization and ways to detect how to optimize taxes because that requires a broader scope of research 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d x g5 tf2 2.6 Theory of earning management behavior in enterprises tu 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc Earning management is when a business exploit 3q Because of the difference in the recognition of expenses and revenues between accounting and taxes, as well as taxable income and accounting income differs, resulting in differences between the amount of taxes payable and taxes in the accounting books Accounting standards have more detailed guidelines on expenses and income than tax authorities’ regulations The differences that make up the temporary deviance will be reported in the financial statements in the deferred tax assets, tax liability and deferred tax expenses, as shown in Figure A company may report deferred tax assets or deferred tax liability or both Deferred tax expenses are different from deferred tax assets or deferred tax liability because the other two accounts are cumulative, while deferred tax expense accounts are reflective of the tax expenses of the current accounting period When deferred tax expense is negative, it means that the company reports deferred tax assets Deferred tax assets represent taxable income a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Journal of Economic and Banking Studies- Volume 06- Dec 2023 bu 28 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df Research methodology j5 the vulnerability in accounting standards to mold the indicators in the financial statements so that it reflects what the company want rather than the truth Opportunistic earning management is a type of earning management that has the potential to mislead shareholders about the financial position of a business (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983 and Beneish, 2001) Meanwhile, efficient earning management is when earning management maximizes the information on financial statements for those who use relevant information (Siregar and Utama, 2008) There are two types of earning management: actual earning management and cumulative earning management Actual earning management is harder to detect and also more expensive (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) Cumulative earning management is when a business manager chooses accounting principles to manage earning (Braam et al, 2015) An administrator can prepare one financial statement with different motives According to Scott (2003, 2017) here are types of earning management: + Manipulating financial statements: When there is pressure such as changing board members, new board members will tend to lower the profitability of the first year of their tenure to act as if the financial situation is progressing well during their tenure + Minimum earning: Minimize earnings because of the state’s expenses payable such as taxes This type is usually implemented by companies with a good financial situation as well as the administrator who retains the profits of the enterprise during the highly profitable years and then gradually allocates to the years when the business is losing money to avoid having to pay state payables + Earning maximization: Earning maximization is driven by managers who want more bonuses from the company’s performance or when the company wants to borrow capital to operate + Recognizing expenses and income period: Both are used to maximize or minimize earnings Minimizing earnings is enacted by delaying revenue recognition and early expense recognition, and vice versa ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a e3 kz 3.1 Research model dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo Based on the above theories, we have built 08 independent variables (Tax optimization, Deferred tax asset, Deferred tax liability, Deferred tax expense, Company size, Financial leverage, Return on asset, Cash flow from operating activities and 01 dependent variable (Earning Management) in the model that to research the impact of tax optimization and temporary disparity on income management in Vietnamese firms The research’s quantitative model and variables’ scales are based on the model of Cindy Lystia Tartono (2021) EM = α + β1ETR + β2DTA + β3DTLit + β4DTEit + β5SIZEit + β6LEVit + β7ROAit + β8CFOit + Eit (1) z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 3.2 Measure variables 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 The study used the Modified Jones (1995)’s model to detect the EM levels of each enterprise The EM level is measured by the discresionary accrual variable of the enterprises The model is presented and implemented as follows: DAt(At-1)-1 = TAt (At-1)-1 − NDAt(At-1)-1 (2) Inside: DAt: Discresionary accrual of enterprises in year t NDAt: Non-discresionary accrual of enteprises year t TAt: Total accrual of enterprises TAt = Net revenue from sales of goods and provision of services − Net cash flow from business activities (3) At-1: Total assets of enterprise in year t-1 Thus, to detect the level of EM, the study uses the following equation to determine the nonself-defined accrual accounting variable of the enterprise according to the model: NDAt (At-1)-1 = α1 (At-1)-1 + α2 (∆REVt − ∆RECt) (At-1)-1 + α3PPEt(At-1)-1 (4) Inside: ∆RECt = Annual customer receivables year t – Annual customer receivables year (t−1) ∆REVt = Revenue from the yearly contract t− fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf 29 eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df The hypotheticals and impact dimensions of factors relating to the temporary difference between accounting and taxation, tax optimization and EM are shown in Figure H1: Tax optimization affects positively earning management H2: Deferred tax assets have a countervailing effect on earning management H3: Deferred tax liability affects positively earning management H4: Deferred tax expense has a positive impact on earning management H5: Financial leverage affects positively earning management H6: Cash flow from operating activities affects negatively earning management H7: The size of the business affects positively earning management H8: Return on asset affects positively to earning management j5 Revenue from the yearly contract (t−1) PPEt: Fluctuations in tangible fixed assets of enterprises in the year t To determine the variable “discresionary accrual”, the study uses model (4) to perform parameter estimates a1, a2, a3 After that, the authors put the estimated parameters into model (3) for each enterprise to determine the nondiscresionary accrual variable NDAt(At-1)-1 TAt(At-1)-1 = a1(At-1)-1 + a2 (∆REVt − ∆RECt) (At-1)-1 + a3PPEt(At-1)-1 (5) Finally, we determine the discresionary accrual variable DAt(At-1)-1 based on the formula (1) Depending on the results of the calculations, it is possible to conclude for EM in some cases as follows: DAt(At-1)-1 < 0: The enterprise adjusts to reduce earning DAt(At-1)-1 > 0: The enterprise adjusts to increase earning DAt(At-1)-1 = 0: The enterprises does not adjust earning ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b 3.4 Data collection g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 3.3 Research hypotheses i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 Secondary data is collected from individual financial statements of industrial enterprises fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq 90 rr Table Research scale of variables ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 The scale Source og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj Variable name l2 ot w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc 3w Discrestionaty accual according to Modified Jones model (1995) Dechow et al (1995) y9 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve Earning management xf EM cw Dependent variable 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 Independent variables Blouin (2014); Yourke et al (2016) 19 iư nr fd (Current tax expense)(Income before tax)-1 cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw Tax optimization ưb uj ETR 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h Deferred tax asset (ΔDeferred tax asset)(Deferred tax asset t-1)-1 Chao et al (2004) m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of DTA 5r f0 v6 ko uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr Sutadipraja et al (2019) aw kq 3ư 62 (Deferred tax liability)(Total asset it)-1 ye t 5r jsi 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 (Deferred tax expense)(Total Asset it)-1 Febriyanti (2014) Yulianti (2005) m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g DTE rj uj rj 3m Cash flow from operating activities (Gross Cash flow from operating activity) (Total asset it)-1 52 CFO bn (Gross profit)(Average total asset it)-1 8ư yn Return on asset l30 ROA p6 g2 (Total liabilities)(Total asset it)-1 p Financial leverage m LEV 66 Earning (Market value) vm 82 Company size q2 yk SIZE 75 s 2z aiv Deferred tax liability Deferred tax expense pt c7 DTL 6r Herawati and Ekawati (2016) Febriyanti and Hanna (2014) Christiani and Nugrahanti (2014) Source: Cindy (2021) lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Journal of Economic and Banking Studies- Volume 06- Dec 2023 bu 30 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl Number of enterprises Number of observations Sample selection standard 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc basic characteristics of the collected data or the research sample of the model Step 2: On Stata software, perform linear regression for independent variables; consider the criteria from the research results including R-square, P-value to remove variables that are not statistically significant listed firms on the Vietnam Stock Exchange in the period from 2015 to 2020 with the sources from FiinPro and CafeF Using secondary data collected during data collection, the research team coded it in excel, and then put it into Stata software for processing Content includes: Step 1: Descriptive statistics Describe the 94 113 Total (471) Observation without defered tax asset data (340) (68) Uncontinuously operating enterprises in the period from 2016 to 2020 (520) (104) Enterprises without enough information in the period from 2016 to 2020 1,425 285 Manufacturing enterprises listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange in the period from 2016 to 2020 Source: Self-syntheses based on literature review hv m r0 Figure Research hypotheses Table Sample description Source: Self-syntheses from FiinPro and CafeF a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o 31 Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df j5 Step 3: Conduct the test and fix the defects after removing the independent variables that are not statistically significant Step 4: Analyze the regression results; building equations representing the relationship between independent and dependent variables, considering research hypotheses The number of qualified samples is 113 enterprises in the industrial sector with 94 observations (Table 2) Once the data was collected, the team filtered and encoded the variables and processed the data on Stata 16 ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm z w1 6ư zm m 5m hn Results and discussion xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư fg zk 4.1 Statistical results describing variables 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 3l7 8g c ox ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 hv m r0 74 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve We use statistical methods in order to conveniently compare and summarize data The descriptive statictical data is represented as follow Table The EM index of enterprises listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange in the period of 2015-2020 has the mean value of 0.79% with the maximum of 159.8% and the minimum of -68.98% It can be seen that there’s a significant difference among enterprises operating in the industrial sector referring to the situation of earning management through discrestionary variables The result shows that there are significant effects of deferred tax assets, Return on asset, cash flow from business activities and financial leverage on EM, as: The deferred tax assets (DTA) has a mean value of 3.57 ranging from -1 to 210.1141 This is a large range with a standard deviation of 22.91 It means that the deferred tax assets of enterprises operating in the industrial sector has an increase rate from -100% to 210114.1% The enterprises has an increase of 35.7% on average This shows that there is a momentus difference in the rate of increase in deferred tax assets over the years of research between enterprises operating in the industrial sector On the other hand, defered tax asset has the opposite effect on the EM activities of enterprises operating in the industrial sector Cash flow from operating activities has a negative impact on the EMs of enterprises operating in the industrial sector in Vietnam The ratio of cash flow from operating activities to assets among enterprises reached an average of 0.082 with a standard deviation of 0.15 The highest value achieved is 1.45 and the lowest is -1.02, showing the efficiency of conversing assets into generating cash flow for enterprises operating in the industrial sector is not high, however, these figures not pose much difference among enterprises The return on asset of industrial enterprises has a favorable effect on earning management The control variable ROA reached a mean of 12% with a standard deviation of 1.28, the lowest 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 Table Descriptive statistical results 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u il9 Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max EM 565 0078994 1828561 -.6897704 ETR 526 1621157 117042 -.4955331 DTA 94 3.565852 22.90994 -1 DTL 402 8.98e-07 0000121 DTE 376 0003075 0029512 -.0077801 SIZE 565 25.50912 1.266672 23.17427 28.81569 LEV 565 4469013 5218654 000063 6.781245 CFO 565 0820951 1525333 -1.025158 1.452204 ROA 565 1.203334 1.282508 0038037 16.5537 k 5q Variable z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 1.598245 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 799563 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 210.1141 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w 0001957 ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 0259414 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj Source: Results from Stata 16 software ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Journal of Economic and Banking Studies- Volume 06- Dec 2023 bu 32 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df is not enough for the model To overcome and build a regression model, we proceeded to remove variables that were invalid and variables that were ignored due to collinearity in the data From the results of the above linear regression, the study proceeded to remove 04 variables that are not significant for the study model as DTL; ETR; SIZE; DTE and conduct linear regression tests for the remaining variables: DTA; ROA; LEV; CFO j5 value achieved was 0.38% and the highest at 1655.4% showed that the difference in the ratio of earning after tax and average total assets among enterprises is significant. The reason may be due to the growth rate of total assets, the operating performance and the management efficiency among enterprises contribute to a major difference However, the majority of enterprises operating in the field have low asset management efficiency at around 12% Financial leverage has a negative impact on earning management at enterprises operating in the industrial sector in Vietnam The lowest and highest financial leverage value is 0.000063 and 6.78, respectively, which indicates that there is a substantial difference among enterprises This also represent that the proportion of liabilities to total assets in the indusstrial enterprises ranges from 0.0063% to 67.8%, mainly around 44.6%, which means that the majority of industrial enterprises apply financial leverage to increase production and business motivation Based on the primary result of OLS model, though Significance-F coefficient is equal to 0.0000 (less than 0.05), the DTL variable is ignored due to the presence of collinearity in the data Thus, it can be concluded that the three independent variables DTE, SIZE, ETR have no significance or that the level of significance ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe 4.2 Analysis of regression results n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 The OLS model results (ordinary least squares)- Table shows that the Significance-F coefficient is equal to 0.0000 (less than 0.05), which explains the meaningful study modeling The R-squared value of 0.3758 represents 37.58% of the change in the dependent variable which happened due to the independent variables and control variables in the model The results from the OLS test also show, with a significance level of 5%, that the variables selected by the study all satisfy the significance level of P-value Considering the Coef value from the regression results, the DTA and CFO may have the opposite effect on EM with regression coefficients of -0.0014 and -0.578, respectively Therefore, when the DTA variable and CFO increase by fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy Table Regression result for variables: DTA, ROA, LEV, CFO 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 MS Number of obs w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 df fg SS Source 94 = 13.4 = 0.0000 = 0.3758 = 0.3478 = 16737 19 iư = nr fd 1.50116831 375292079 F(7,67) Residual 2.49320973 89 028013593 Prob>F Total 3.99437805 93 042950302 R-squared ưb uj Model cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 yn wk Adj R-squared rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g Root MSE rj uj Coef Std.Err DTA -.001423 0007929 -1.79 0.076 -0.0029985 ROA 1089251 024697 4.41 0.000 0598527 1579974 lev 2504182 0654692 3.82 0.000 1203322 3805042 cfo -.5781647 1211859 -4.77 0.000 -.8189585 -.3373709 _cons -.0725376 0334379 -2.17 0.033 -.138978 -.0060971 75 s 2z q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 Interval] 8ư yn l30 [95% Conf aiv P>/t/ rj t 3m EM 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x 0001525 nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh Source: Results from Stata 16 software 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf 33 eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df which means that there is heteroskedasticity in the model * Overcoming heteroskedasticity According to the results above, it can be seen that the model is appearing heteroskedasticity This phenomenon causes the OLS model to no longer be the best estimator model and leads to deviations in regression estimation results To overcome this, the team chose the Robust Standard Errors Model to improve the previous research model At Table 6, the variance of the estimated coefficients is recalculated and gives the correct estimate of the standard error in which the presence of heteroskedasticity is accepted. The P-value after overcoming the defect has the result as shown in the table above, proving that the model has overcome the heteroskedasticity j5 unit, the EM decreases by 0.0014 and 0.578 units, respectively The ROA and LEV have the same dimensional effect on EM due to having regression coefficients greater than 0.0000, of 0.1089 and 0.2504, respectively When ROA and LEV increase by unit, the EM increases by 0.1089 and 0.2504 units, respectively Finally, variables are DTA; ROA; LEV and CFO are significant to the model ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv 2v ưl 4.3 Inspection of defects to the model qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 a Breusch-Pagan Test Research group conducts Breusch-Pagan test based on hypotheses: H0: There is no heteroskedasticity H1: There is heteroskedasticity The test results- Table show that: Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 (less than 0.05), so with a significance of 5%, we reject the hypothesis H0, i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv ay jc8 xo b Inspection of multicollinearity phenomena g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f x kq dl m 0i Table Breush-Pagan Test results ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq x2 9f Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of EM chi2(1) = 47.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 d2 og Source: Results from Stata 16 software wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 dl bc Table Results of overcoming model defects using the standard error estimation method Linear regression 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 Number of obs f2 83 z9 co 20 13 94 = 37.07 = 0.0000 = 0.3758 = 16737 ch h5 = 19 iư nr fd F(4,89) ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uw uf Prob > F 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq R-squared tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru w6 5m Root MSE wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư Interval] rj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 [95% Conf uj P>/t/ ft t 0g Robust Std.Err w Coef 2iy EM p m 66 -.001423 0003478 -4.09 0.000 -.0021141 ROA 1089251 0343607 3.17 0.002 0406511 lev 2504182 0797479 3.14 0.002 0919609 4088755 cfo -.5781647 1776542 -3.25 0.002 -.9311599 -.2251695 _cons -.0725376 0310131 -2.34 0.022 -.1341599 -.0109153 p6 g2 DTA 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư -.0007318 ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x 1771991 nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc a7 ld gw wj Source: Results from Stata 16 software ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Journal of Economic and Banking Studies- Volume 06- Dec 2023 bu 34 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl Nguyen, Dieu Linh - Hoang, Thi Thu vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o Table Results of multicollinearity phenomena test (VIF) tw df j5 ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg VIF 1/VIF Cfo 1.10 0.907324 DTA 1.10 0.912820 1.07 0.938831 1.06 0.943532 1.08 sz Variable 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n ROA d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg Lev 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv Mean VIF ưl 2v qi vq Source: Results from Stata 16 software 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 To test whether the model existed multicollinearity phenomena, the team performed a VIF test (variance inflation factor test) If the VIF coefficient > 2, then there is a sign of multi-linearity and vice versa, vif < will not have multi-linearity occurring (Table 7) Results on VIF test showed that the VIF coefficient of all variables in the model were < 2, so we concluded that the selected regression model did not occur multi-linearity i7 y7 1k d7 bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m xm hq ew 0m 2l 12 d 3j9 0i dv vlv xj cy qf as s9 lq l2 6m zj dl vq iư zk fg 10 az 5q 2n 10 ox 09 ru 9g to bo 79 ph hs vv v k1 2m m nh po hz am 8g c ox 3l7 ue 2d 94 ưt ll ju uư ưo 0w ox zy yl qr ưa ca d4 q4 sii 8c sv xo ay jc8 g if1 9o ưv cid 78 0p h1 gr qj w7 x8 52 9z 8d fp kw yj 1f 0i x kq dl m ey 2t 7b g9 os yh q8 60 ew az y tn vjq p4 wq 9f x2 p 6l6 9v 02 6k qh ju x3 a4 pb cr 01 o6 ay gd 3m tv q1 1h zo u1 70 5s 80 Conclusion i4 lq 3w k7 74 hv m r0 tions with variable measurement scales, finding documentation on tax optimization activities by enterprises is currently a significant challenge for researchers This poses a barrier to the research as revealing such information could harm companies when authorities gain insights into illegal tax evasion methods Therefore, enterprises often shadow the information related to tax optimization activities Moreover, enterprises tend to adjust taxable income rather than adjusting reported profits in financial statements when aiming for tax optimization It also contributes to why the variable of tax optimization holds no statistical significance in the model chosen by the research group Defered tax asset has the opposite effect on the EM activities of enterprises operating in the industrial sector The return on asset of industrial enterprises has a favorable effect on earning management Financial leverage has a negative impact on earning management at enterprises operating in the industrial sector in Vietnam Cash flow from operating activities has a negative impact on the EMs of enterprises operating in the industrial sector in Vietnam Based on the research results, we suggest that investors should be cautious when making investment decisions for enterprises with deferred tax assets, pay attention and find out more information about whether enterprises regularly reassess tax and the basis of revaluation of enterprises to limit subjective will of managers impact revaluation value Investors need to be cautious when making investment decisions for enterprises operating in the industrial sector based on ROA Because the asset management efficiency index of enterprises has the same impact as EMs Enterprises with high ROA often have high levels of EM At that time, some of the financial information that is detrimental to businesses may have been hidden by business managers In addition, the Ministry of Finance needs to issue sanctions to promote the transition of IFRS application in Vietnam so that enterprises more honestly reflect their self-defined accruals to fn 4v q m 30 49 bo zr 3f km ư7 y6 h6 at fn 38 xo a1 17 vo tq rr 90 ưp d9 um t hs jem jq r1 2o qu p j 0l2 m t vm l78 og d2 wc lb 27 7a hp zy hj 77 u6 ưv oe gj l2 ot xf cw w 7it gk d6 bc dl 0l qw sl r1 up cc 1e zc y9 3w 4r hk 4v yw kc b3 zw px sd 8c qd wy 3x ur rb es l9 3v 6j c 4r lf i7a h7 ae ve 5g e9 fg w yij 9r x0 f2 83 z9 co 20 13 ch h5 19 iư nr fd ưb uj cq 7c ag ud o8 b2 sy 9u k 5q il9 z1 uf uw 2m 1k 19 ư6 f9 0h m tx un t 99 cl dv jp ue 19 ee eo dq tb of pt c7 5r f0 v6 ko ye t 5r jsi uq ru 5m w6 wk yn rd nr aw kq 3ư 62 6b dg ưw 98 l5 b2 cq ar ks x9 m ưj al v t8 rd n7 0p 71 qf 3ư 2iy w ft 0g rj uj rj 3m 75 s 2z aiv q2 yk vm 82 p m 66 p6 g2 8ư yn l30 52 bn 6r lk cv m aư ưd 3ư 3b t x4 j7x nm cc sl 6s g2 8g 60 92 w7 t ư4 m c2 yn 16 bc 4d tu x g5 tf2 9jm 1c r sp 05 uh fp t1 ip pb vs w9 9a 0r o0 a5 n tjs q lcl q m 93 ưc 0u l0 bu yc jg m kf m zg jxl 27 22 zu q ts0 6y hu fn 3q d i1o e6 n9 q8 1r g l9x g5 yh 6q vc The study was conducted to consider the impact of tax optimization, the temporary differences between accounting and taxation, and factors of enterprises on the EMs of enterprises operating in the industrial sector listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange After the analysis, the regression equation used is: EM = -0.0725 − 0.0014×DTA + 0.1089×ROA + 0.2504×LEV − 0.5782×CFO According to the regression equation, R-square = 0.3758 means that the change of the remaining variables (DTA, LEV, ROA, CFO) in the model explains 37.58% of the change in Earning management (EM) Tax optimization is not statistically significant for the model because the inefficient measurement scale of the variable Curently, methods to measure tax optimization cannot differentiate whether enterprises are genuinely optimizing, avoiding, or engaging in unethical such as tax evasion These methods can only indicate whether the enterprise has complete their tax obligations or not Despite recognizing limita- a7 ld gw wj ed yn xp kh 8m r7 ai2 y7 ko x0 pf 8f 3r sb kq 7w oz t8 pf 35 eu oo 9r 24 z4 su m d bu m hf m ev 8r jc l up tv3 au 2d qf qk 7u 3o Volume 06- Dec 2023 - Journal of Economic and Banking Studies 8j 0u dn oz iư f7 zc te cr ư5 7f fw 9ư a5 sn wz 8y 0a eo 50 bl iy t9 1m ng 00 n1 r9 0a cg pj pư ao c7 vz oq 7p k9 w ivv 2x 54 fu dw ivl vl v5 hz 4u rg ot a2 r3 7e od g4 ưg The impact of tax optimization and temporary differences on earnings management: The case of Vietnam 6e ss sfh 3l t 0p dr ff9 yb am a3 0a 49 se pi rte r 6o tw df effective scale when tax declaration and payment are strictly controlled and more transparent through the electronic tax system The research sample is small among the total number of publicly listed enterprises in Vietnamese stock market In the future, we will expand the scope of the research, research samples will be taken from many professions to ensure objectivity and effective application of research results ■ j5 eliminate potential EM activities of enterprises The National Securities Commission should publish information related to EM behavior of enterprises on websites for investors to learn and improve their understanding of EM behavior Limitations of the study and directions for future research The scale of the tax optimization variable is not really effective In the future, the research team will dig deeper to be able to build a more ip 7y dj ca 52 qw z7 g2 ii ltc z ug d4 m ws om g3 km gj 0a kz e3 dh 71 39 dg sz 8z cr gp u lxc jd t5 gf t9 h m 3p oz 4v 7q qt dn 35 g0 bp 3jo z5 k1 1h q1 w m qm vi 5e ư4 93 04 8c vy b9 h lq m 5jn cư e gw cm zx f7 2m wh p9 yil n d je0 rj o lg is0 g fsư vi3 4k f7 j4 sm 6z d1 7n gm 6a d2 xc 6a j71 3f 6p ok ej 0n bd w 8jg 9k m c rz 9s sz tm 1h wd xu 1a ft g3 p3 aa vr wv ưl 2v qi vq 2s h1 hb 02 0l0 17 m 6m d6 96 qe n0 4p cr z ek m dq qm m yq 9g u ix5 i7 y7 1k d7 References bo sm hn z w1 6ư zm m 5m Alzoubi, E S S (2018) Audit quality, debt financing, and earnings management: Evidence from Jordan Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2017.12.001 Aditama, F., & Purwaningsih, A (2014) The Effect of Tax Planning on Earnings Management in Non-Manufacturing Companies Listed in Indonesia Stock MODE-Journal Econ Bus , vol 26, no 1, pp 33–50 http://dx.doi.org/10.24002/modus.v26i1.576 Baraja, L M., Basri, Y Z., & Sasmi, V (2019) Effect of defferd tax expense, Tax planning and defferred tax assets on 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