True North Groups A Powerful Path to Personal and Leadership Development BK Business_11 pdf

186 BUSINESS AT A CROSSROADS title” the executive director Graham Parker told Jennifer Higgs. 6 A few hours after the core team has met the full orchestra assembles to rehearse. In “the executive,” board and orchestra members may have different roles – musicians may have administrative roles; staff members may sit on orchestra committees. “We try and mix it up as much as we can,” says Parker. Orpheus is tinkering constantly with its system. Richard Hackman, a Harvard Business School professor, was recently appointed to the board (see Chapter 6). He is working with Orpheus to improve integration, communications, and accountability. Hackman introduced Orpheus to the linking pin model where the team sits at the center of a horizontal and vertical matrix, and groups radiate from it. Orpheus is the 2008 award winner at WorldBlu Inc., a design studio founded by organizational democracy evangelist, Traci Fenton. The 25-strong, 2008 WorldBlu List of Most Democratic Workplaces also included a Fortune 500 group for the first time – DaVita, a leading U.S. supplier of dialysis services. A company much admired by Fenton and many other organizational democracy advocates is Semco Group, a Brazilian supplier of industrial machinery. It has a charismatic leader in Ricardo Semler, but the CEO is elected. As the principal architect of Semco’s democratic system, Semler thinks he has too much power. He spends as much time writing books and spreading the gospel at business schools and elsewhere, as he does at Semco. The company, which before the 2009 recession had recorded 14 years of uninterrupted, double- digit growth, ran perfectly well without him for several months in early 2005 when he was recovering from a car crash (see box at the end of this chapter). The election of the company’s senior managers by employees, rather than shareholders, is the crucial democratizing step. There is no avoiding it. In The Democratic Enterprise, Professor Lynda Gratton follows former London Business School colleague, Sumantra Ghoshal, in assigning a key role to leaders in corporate reformations. She says that in the democratic enterprise “it is in the creation of a shared purpose that the role of the leadership is most vital,” and that without the containment of such a purpose people will “simply go their own way and the organization rapidly becomes an adhocracy … the leaders’ personal philosophy pervades the company and their sense of purpose articulates a common vision for the realization of freedom and choice.” Gratton’s book is an excellent survey of the business benefits of a demo- cratic workplace, but she advocates benign tyranny, rather than democ- racy. She doesn’t acknowledge the possibility that leaders are the problem, not part of the solution. 7 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 186 09/09/2009 10:03 10 CORPORATE REFORMATION 187 In their book The End of Management and the Rise of Organizational Democracy, 8 Kenneth Cloke and Joan Goldsmith take that crucial step and advocate the election of CEOs by employees. They also advocate the replacement of hierarchies by what they call “heterarchies” in which the employees “make decisions for themselves and one another horizon- tally.” I approve fully of the sentiment and the shape, but in English English, “heterarchy” means rule by an alien. Companies are already heterarchies, because in theory they’re ruled by their shareholders. Cloke and Goldsmith democratize leadership itself, by arguing that it is a quality required at every level and that companies should try to develop “ubiquitous, linking leadership.” This is similar to the “context- specific” leadership developed by the Nhunggabarra in Australia tens of thousands of years ago (see Chapter 6). I have no quarrel with this kind of leadership, but it is not what most people understand by the word. If democracy is to come to the large modern company, the omnipotent CEO has to go. In the political world tyrannies can be overthrown by revolutions and replaced by democracies, but you cannot turn business tyrannies into democracies overnight. You have to take one step at a time as Ricardo Semler did at Semco. You have to nudge. Numbers that nudge When I was doing my research on Gini coefficients for Chapter 4, it occurred to me that companies wishing to establish reputations for being fair organizations might consider publishing their own Gini coef- ficients. To save you leafing back let me remind you. The Gini coeffi- cient is a measure of inequality. A coefficient of zero is perfect equality; everyone in the population measured has the same income. A coeffi- cient of one is perfect inequality; one person has all the income. Insofar as able people think extremely high levels of executive pay are wrong, unfair, or merely unfashionable in this day and age, they will be attracted by a company with a Gini below the average for its sector. Numbers such as these can make a difference. If a graduate has two equally attractive job offers, he or she might choose the one from the company with the lower Gini. It would be easy to calculate the Semco Gini, because the pay of every employee, including Ricardo Semler’s, is an open book. This was part of the democratization of Semco; the opening up, the laying of cards on the table, an end to secrecy. Most writers on organizational democracy make much of the need for open- 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 187 09/09/2009 10:03 188 BUSINESS AT A CROSSROADS ness or “transparency” as the modern parlance has it. In conventional companies the possession of information is closely linked to power. The higher up the hierarchy you are, the more you are allowed to know, and vice versa. Giving everyone access to the important numbers is a vital step toward democracy. OPEN-BOOK MANAGEMENT Giving everyone access to the critical numbers is called open-book management (OBM). Ricardo Semler was an OBM pioneer. So was Jack Stack, CEO of Springfield ReManufacturing Corporation. The idea is that a company performs better when everyone involved knows how it is performing. It is also in tune with demands for openness in our institutions, and a dislike of secrecy and obfuscation. People are less willing to be pawns in other people’s games and stories, and are more financially sophisticated these days. They have more skin in the business game and have become more interested in the wealth creation process. The OBM evangelists argue that, if that interest is satisfied by opening the books, employees will understand how their work contributes to wealth creation, and more wealth will be created. But you can’t stop there. “Opening the books” is opening Pandora’s box. It unleashes a host of new desires, hopes, and anxieties that can initiate changes so profound the OBM company could soon become unrecognizable. In The Open-book Management Experience John Case tells the tale of Jack Stack’s experiment at Springfield ReManufacturing and of many other companies that have implemented OBM. 9 He reaches three main conclusions. The first is that it is pointless to tell people the whole, unvarnished truth in a language that’s foreign to them. It follows from this that OBM implies an obligation to educate and explain, so that the critical numbers disclosed are understood. Since the goal is to get people to work more effectively, and make better decisions, OBM also requires a strong form of empowerment, because it would be fruitless to help people understand how they contribute without giving them responsibility for, and the freedom to increase, their contributions. Case’s second conclusion is that OBM companies are “companies of businesspeople.” Transparent companies, employing “businesspeople” are risk- sharing companies, because employees who see the critical numbers “moving south” know they will have to tighten their belts. Their know - 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 188 09/09/2009 10:03 10 CORPORATE REFORMATION 189 ledge restrains them but, in return for their restraint in hard times, they will feel entitled to more rewards when the numbers tell them the good times have returned. This is Case’s third conclusion. OBM requires employees to have “a stake in success,” because they will not feel they own the critical numbers unless they own some of the value they measure. Case sees bonuses as “an integral part of the whole manage- ment system [which are] expected, not only to motivate employees, but to help them learn.” He says bonus plans should be “fair, generous and comprehensible” and designed by employees. But surely an employee- designed bonus scheme would favor employees, at the expense of share- holders? Apparently not. “For reasons I don’t entirely understand,” Case reported, “the opposite is more common.” This is indeed puzzling, until one learns that most of the open-book companies Case studied are owned in whole or in part by their employees. When employees are owners a miserly, employee-designed bonus scheme reflects people’s preferred mix of income and capital appreciation. Employee ownership or part ownership is an implicit destination of OBM, because equity can be seen as the capitalization of income from bonus schemes. In large companies in which employees cannot, in the short term at any rate, own a significant proportion of the equity, and the contribution of an individual has only a marginal impact on overall performance, the performance benefits of OBM are likely to be less evident than in small companies. But insofar as OBM does improve performance, there are two implications for large companies. The first is that small and medium-sized companies that adopt OBM will outper- form their larger rivals, and so become more attractive to able people. The second is that large companies that seek the benefits of OBM should review their bonus schemes. OBM bonus schemes are “fair, generous and comprehensible.” Schemes that are confined to senior executives are unfair, they’re usually extremely generous, but only to senior executives, and their blend of salary-based bonuses and grants of options and restricted stock make them incomprehensible to the average employee. It is an axiom of OBM that everyone contributes to company performance. The bonus schemes at most large companies implicitly deny this obvious fact, and imply instead that only top executives, particularly the chief executive, create value. A significant step toward democracy, and to a fairer distribution of valued added, would be to put everyone on the same bonus scheme and, as far as possible, to base the bonus of each employee on the economic value he or she adds. 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 189 09/09/2009 10:03 190 BUSINESS AT A CROSSROADS MEASURING CEO PERFORMANCE It’s often said that you can’t measure the economic value added by CEOs, because they’re members of the staff function, and the staff function’s job is to consume value (and how!) supporting the line func- tion. All you can do is ensure that the interests of the staff are aligned as closely as possible with those of shareholders. An implication of this argument is that if the value added by a CEO personally, rather than employees collectively, could be measured, she or he would not have to be paid so much (unless of course, she or he was adding enormous, and measurable amounts of value. Were I a shareholder, I would be willing to take my chances on that). I’m not aware of any attempt to measure CEO value added. For their part, CEOs are unlikely to see it as in their interests to partake in such a study. But, given the potential savings, it would surely be in the interests of shareholders to explore the possibility. The obvious approach is to apply the activity-based costing method that has revolutionized management accounting and ask each area of the business – manufacturing, marketing, distribution, public and investor relations, accounting, human resources, and so on – touched by the CEO how much it would be willing to pay for the services he or she has rendered. Negative figures would be acceptable. Some value could be added to the total for strategic moves and balance-sheet trans- actions such as acquisitions, but only insofar as they can be shown subsequently to have created value. It would be useful for assessing the value added by the CEO in the company’s strategic and other balance-sheet moves, and appropriate in a company committed to openness and candor, if the board, the board committees, and the executive committee were all required to publish the minutes of their meetings. It wouldn’t be easy to calculate CEO value added and the result of such a calculation would not be precise, but precision wouldn’t be necessary. A ballpark figure would do. The objective is to bring some proportion and clarity to CEO pay, so that both employees and share- holders can be confident that taking as much as possible into account, the CEO’s pay packet is reasonable. It’s entirely possible, of course, that an activity-based analysis of the CEO’s value added will produce such a small number that the company will decide it can do without a CEO. 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 190 09/09/2009 10:03 10 CORPORATE REFORMATION 191 Redeeming the corporation The dramatic events of the past two years or so in banking and in busi- ness at large, offer an unprecedented and, hopefully, never to be repeated opportunity, which should not be wasted, to take stock of our economic arrangements and institutions. The large listed joint stock company is an enormously powerful and successful institution and is, in large part, the creator of the modern world. If things had turned out differently, other forms of enterprise might have done a better job, and might still do so in future, but the corporation as we know it today has been and will continue to be for the foreseeable future the main engine of world economic develop- ment. But although its achievements are all around us and its strengths are formidable, it has serious weaknesses. I have argued in this book that it has recently become a liability for liberal capitalism, because the huge sums of money it pays its top execu- tives, which are not required for the efficient conduct of modern business, are eroding the consensus on which the liberal capitalist system depends. Excessive executive pay was tolerated before the crash because the system seemed to be working. Now that those highly paid executives running the system have turned out collectively to be reckless and incompetent the trust invested in them has dissipated and the myth of business leadership has been dispelled. As shown by the furor over the $165 million worth of bonuses that were to be paid to executives of U.S. insurance giant AIG, after it received $152 billion of bailout cash, people are angry. They feel badly let down. The least that they, as the ultimate owners of big business (through pension funds and savings) had a right to expect from such well-paid servants was prudence and competence. They got neither, because as the past two years have made abundantly clear, the CEO-led system of corporate governance doesn’t select for such qualities. The danger, in these times of turbulence and anger, is that deeply disillusioned and resentful voters will insist that the commanding heights of their economies be taken into state ownership, and that the liberal capitalist experiment be abandoned. To pre-empt such a backlash, the large listed company must reform itself. It must become freer, fairer, more open, more reasonable in its dealings with its various constituencies, and more decent. In its shape, governance, and distributions of power and rewards, it must come to resemble more closely the political system we call liberal democracy to which it owes its freedoms. 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 191 09/09/2009 10:03 192 BUSINESS AT A CROSSROADS State ownership of our large companies is too drastic a remedy for what ails big business. Its poor record disqualifies it. It would cost too much in lost efficiency, dynamism, and the disciplines of competition. My prescription is decapitation; the removal of the institution’s head; of the position of CEO. The CEO-led system, in the power it gives to individuals (untested during their climbs to the top for prudence and competence), and the inequalities within companies and society at large it creates, is the source of almost all the company’s own problems and of the problems it creates. In this chapter I have suggested how such a decapitation might be executed, so to speak, and proposed other steps companies can take to make themselves more democratic. Democratic companies will be driven, not by the dreams and visions of omnipotent CEOs, but by the interactions of self-interested and self- confident employees empowered to make decisions and motivated by fair rewards and their hunger for self-esteem, to be innovative and entrepreneurial. They will perform better than unreformed CEO-led companies, because they will find it far easier to attract and keep able people who want work to be, not a price they have to pay to be them- selves outside work, but an interesting, challenging, and deeply satis- fying part of their lives. We must move away from the current system, which John Rawls called the “capitalist welfare state,” because it concentrates too much power, wealth, and story in the hands of a small elite to allow the full flowering of liberal principles. We must create a new kind of liberal capitalism. Rawls proposed a “property owning democracy,” in which ownership of wealth and productive assets is spread more widely, or a “liberal socialist regime” in which political power is widely shared and economic power is dispersed within companies, as when, for instance, employees elect managers and own a significant proportion of their company’s shares. 10 Ordinary people in search of self-respect will be the sculptors of the reformed system. They will seek out organizations and forms of associa- tion that don’t retain power, wealth, and story in the hands of a small elite and, instead, allow each contributor to feel that he or she is being fairly rewarded and is the author of his or her own story. There’s no reason why people should continue to be mere “extras” in the stories of superstar CEOs. They can be the authors of their own work narratives and play significant roles in stories of enterprise with beginnings, middles, and ends. 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 192 09/09/2009 10:03 10 CORPORATE REFORMATION 193 References 1 Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution, Harvard Business Press, 2002. 2 The Individualized Corporation: A Fundamentally New Approach to Management, Harper- Collins, 1997. 3 The Organization Man, Simon & Schuster, 1956. 4 The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw Hill, 1960. 5 The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge, 1945. 6 Orpheus Chamber Orchestra embodies democratic principles. Self-governing orchestra empowers musicians, by Jennifer Higgs, Axiom News, October 28, 2008. 7 The Democratic Enterprise, Prentice Hall, 2005. 8 Jossey-Bass, 2002. 9 The Open-book Management Experience: Lessons from Over 100 Companies that Have Trans- formed Themselves, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 1998. 10 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Belknap Press, 2001. Semco’s steps to democracy Ricardo Semler’s guru and principal ally in the democratization of Semco was Clóvis da S ilva Bojikian, a radical educator and admirer of A . S . N eil’s S ummerhill school in E ngland. They took it slowly. T he first step was to respond to complaints about the cafeteria by asking employees to help improve it. A group of employees ended up running it. I t was a small step from there to let employees choose the color of their uniforms and the paint on factory walls. Th e Sã o Pa ulo rush hour is notorious – Se mco employees spent hours in traffic jams travelling to and from work. No problem. Th ey can set their own hours, and travel at non-peak times. Sk eptics within Se mco’s management warned of disaster, but it worked fine, because employees sorted out schedules that suited them and the factory. I t was another small step from setting their own hours, to setting their own pay. Benchmarks based on pay at 35 comparable companies were established and 10 percent was added to help reduce employee turnover. Everyone’s pay, including S emler’s, is published. P eer pressure produces differentials that are seen as fair. I t was not a huge step from there to allow subordinates to appoint and review their supervisors and ultimately for employees as a whole to elect the senior executives. I t was not as easy as all that, of course. T here were problems and arguments along the way and the whole democratization process took nearly five years. But the results, in terms of performance, speak for themselves. Source: “Ricardo Semler Won’t Take Control,” by Lawrence Fisher, Strategy + Business, issue 41, January 2006. 9780230_230941_12_cha10.indd 193 09/09/2009 10:03 194 Index A Accenture 166 Acorn Computers 167–8 activity-based costing 59, 190 administrative coordination 52–5, 60 agency costs 10, 38, 45, 53, 54, 65, 81, 94, 97, 98, 111, 112, 117, 119 AIG 191 Andersen Consulting See Accenture Apache Software Foundation 138 ARM Holdings 167–70 Armstrong, Lord 67 artificial life 169 asset-skimming 92–5, 98 A. T. Kearney 167 B Barclays Bank 184 Barnevik, Percy 179 Barrett, Matt 184 Bartlett, Christopher 178–82 Berle, Adolf 37, 62 Black-Scholes 84, 85, 95 Booz-Allen & Hamilton 166, 167 Branson, Sir Richard 26, 63, 90 Brimm, Michael 26–8 Broughton, Philip Delves 61 B-schools See business schools business schools 60, 61, 102, 107, 109, 113, 186 Buttrick, John 58 C Canonical 137 capitalism entrepreneurial 62, 63, 66, 67, 131 family 62, 63, 67 financial 62, 63 investor 63, 99 managerial 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 99, 131, 175 Case, John 188, 189 Catalyst 150 Catcher in the Rye 143 CEO -led company 8, 11, 17, 29, 120, 123, 124, 127, 135, 138, 139, 148, 163–7, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 185, 191, 192 pay, pay packet 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 24, 45, 54, 63, 67, 69, 72, 78–86, 88–98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 110, 114, 117, 119, 143, 148, 159, 165, 174, 175, 182, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191 system 61, 105, 109–11, 113, 114, 117, 119, 132–5, 142, 149, 177, 181–3 9780230_230941_13_ind01.indd 194 09/09/2009 10:35 INDEX 195 Chambers, John 26 Chandler, Alfred 43, 44, 48, 51–6, 58, 60–7, 69, 71, 99, 124, 125, 127, 131, 163, 179 chief executive officer See CEO Chrysler 99, 162, 163 Clapham, Sir John 57 Clive, Robert 38, 42 Cloke, Kenneth 187 cloud computing 137 Coase, Ronald 52, 53, complex adaptive systems 132, 133, 142, 170 coping classes See Woods, Judith corporate community 148, 149, corporate purpose 96, 133, 145, 146, 147, 181, 186 corporate social responsibility See CSR corporate soul 148, 149 Cranfield University 150 Crystal, Graef 82, 85 CSR 147, 148, 150, 155 D Dawkins, Richard 34 Deering, Anne 170, 171, 173, 174 Deloitte 123 Deming, Edwards 163 democracy 3, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, 29, 48, 69, 71, 90, 118, 131, 149, 185–9, 191, 192, 193 democratization 20, 187, 193 de Quincey, Thomas 41 difference principle See Rawls, John distributive justice 24, 70, 71, 145 E Eagly, Alice et al. 154 Economic Policy Institute (EPI) 95, 96 economies of scale 162 English East India Company (EEIC), the 37, 38, 53 environment of evolutionary adaptedness See EEA 8, 10, 43, 44, 52, 54, 55 F Fels, Anna 153 Female FTSE Report, The 150 Fenton, Traci 186 Fink, Albert 125, 126 fitness landscape 129, 130 Follett, Mary Parker 154–6, 160, 165 Frank, Barney 81 Free Software Foundation 135, 136, 139 Frenier, Carol 156 Fukuyama, Francis 17, 18, 63 G Gates, Bill 26, 90, 175 GE 96, 100, 101, 105, 114 Gekko, Gordon 89 General Electric See GE Gent, Sir Christopher 94 Gerstner, Louis 106, 126 Ghoshal, Sumantra 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 186 Gilligan, Carol 159 Gini coefficient 72, 73, 74, 76, 187 in China 73–4 in the UK 75–7, 82 in the US 75, 82 Gini, Corrado 72 GNU 135, 136, 142 GPL 135, 137, 138 9780230_230941_13_ind01.indd 195 09/09/2009 10:03 [...]... GNUpedia 139 golden parachute 2, 24, 80, 81, 82, 83, 114 Goldsmith, Joan 187 Gould, Jay 126 Gould, Stephen Jay 44, 49 Graham, Jacey 150 Graham, Pauline 155 Granovetter, Mark et al 126 Gratton, Lynda 186 greed 5, 6, 10, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 98, 108 H Hackman, Richard 110, 186 Hamel, Gary 133 Harvard Business School 59, 60, 61, 63, 71, 98, 116, 186 Harvey-Jones, Sir John 101 Hastings, Warren 38 Hayek,... 137, 138 Nhunggabarra 118, 119, 187 niceness 146, 148 Nietzsche, Friedrich 18 Nupedia 140, 142 O Obama, Barack 84 O’Neal, Stanley 79, 81 open-book management 188, 189 original situation 19 Orpheus Chamber Orchestra 110, 185, 186 Ousterhout, John 138, 142 outsourcing 9, 53, 54, 170 P parasite strategy 169 Parker, David 133, 134 Parker, Graham 186 Peter, Laurence 133 Peters, Tom 133 physiocrats 32, 40,... 57, 179 Taylor, Martin 184 telegraph 43, 56, 126 Thomson, Peninah 150 Tierra 169, 170 Torvalds, Linus 136, 137, 142 tournament theory 46, 47, 72, 97 TQM 163 transaction costs 52, 53 Troubled Asset Relief Program See TARP Tyler, Carlotta 155–7 U/V Ubuntu 137 value-added reseller 166 value-adding partnership 166 Vanderbilt, Cornelius 126 veil of ignorance 19, 30 Vickers-Armstrongs 62, 64, 67–8 Vodafone... 90, 191 liberal socialist regime 71, 192 line -and- staff organization 51 Linux 11, 56, 126, 135–8, 142, 143, 163, 170 London Business School 178, 181, 186 M Machiavelli, Niccolò 18 managerial hierarchy 51, 54, 55, 57, 63 Marx, Karl 2, 40, 41 Masefield, John 40 MBA 60, 61, 71, 106 McGregor, Douglas 182 Means, Gardiner 37, 62 meme 34 mercantilism 36, 39, 40, 41 mergers and acquisitions (M &A) 7, 22, 54,... 192 Ray, Thomas 169, 170 regents committee 182–5 regulated companies 36 RemCo 83, 84, 85, 93, 98, 104 Remuneration Committee See RemCo reputational assets 25, 147, 148, 154 restricted stock 92, 93, 148, 182, 183, 189 Ricardo, David 34 Ridley, Matt 33, 112, 151, 152, 153 RISC 167, 168, 169 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 18 S Salinger, J D 143 Sanger, Larry 140, 142 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 4, 111, 112, 158 Saxby,... Partnership See JLP Johnson, Thomas 58 Johnson, William 82 joint stock company CEO-led 8, 11, 17, 29, 120, 123, 124, 127, 135, 138, 139, 148, 163–7, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 185, 191, 192 company as a state 22, 23, company as a people 22, 23 “nice” company, the 25, 146 justice as fairness 18, 69, 70 K Kaplan, Robert 58, 59 Kauffman, Stuart 55, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135 Keynes, J M 3 Keynesian... 41 Pickett, Kate 76 Popper, Sir Karl 3, 30, 96, 183 Porter, Michael 133 powers of sovereignty 16, 22, 24, 26, 30, 117 Prahalad, C K 133 PricewaterhouseCoopers 123 primary good 9, 17, 18, 28, 70, 127 Prince, Charles (Chuck) 78, 79, 81 procedural justice 21 property owning democracy 71, 192 psychological contract 9, 17, 145, 148 Q/R Quesnay, François 40, 41 198 Rappaport, Alfred 96, 97 Rawls, John 9,... 131 INDEX social construction 99, 104, 123, 124, 126, 127 Stacey, Ralph 133, 134 Stack, Jack 188 stakeholders 21, 96, 146, 156 Stallman, Richard 135, 136, 139, 142 Stern, Joel 97 Stern Stewart 97, 114 Sternberg, Elaine 147 stock options 5, 32, 46, 63, 79, 84, 85, 92, 93, 95, 97, 114, 148, 182, 183, 189 Sveiby, Karl-Erik 33, 57, 118 SVM 96, 97, 146, 147 T TARP 79–82, 112 Tawney, R H 35 Taylor, Frederick... Vodafone 94 199 INDEX W Wales, Jimmy 140, 142 Wall, Larry 138, 142 war for talent 7, 24, 59, 150 Weber, Max 33, 89, 99 Welch, Jack 26, 96, 100, 102, 105, 179 Western Railroad 34, 43, 51, 56, 126, 179 Whyte, William 180 Wikipedia 11, 139–41, 142, 143, 163 Wilkinson, Richard 76 Williamson, Oliver 53 Windows 4, 136, 137, 138 Woods, Judith 77 work–life balance 7, 17 work-related stress 17 WorldBlu 186... M 3 Keynesian 64 Khurana, Rakesh 63, 98, 99, 115, 124 Kingfisher 94 Kotter, John 59, 60, 61 KPMG 123 Kuznets, Simon 73–5 L Landes, David 34 Lazear, Edward 46 Lewis, John Spedan 155 liberal capitalism 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 70, 71, 78, 84, 86, 88, 102, 119, 191, 192 consensus 3, 6, 10, 11, 70, 72, 77, 78, 83, 86, 88–90, 102, 119, 143, 145, 160, 177, 191 197 INDEX liberal democracy 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, . out organizations and forms of associa- tion that don’t retain power, wealth, and story in the hands of a small elite and, instead, allow each contributor to feel that he or she is being fairly. obvious approach is to apply the activity-based costing method that has revolutionized management accounting and ask each area of the business – manufacturing, marketing, distribution, public and. in this day and age, they will be attracted by a company with a Gini below the average for its sector. Numbers such as these can make a difference. If a graduate has two equally attractive job