(Luận văn) banking system reform and investment–cash flow relation, the case of vietnam

Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 453 t to Banking System Reform and Investment–Cash Flow ng Relation: The Case of Vietnam hi ep NGUYEN THI UYEN UYEN w n University of Economics HCMC - uyentcdn@ueh.edu.vn lo ad TU THI KIM THOA PHAM THIEN BACH yi u yj th University of Economics HCMC - tkthoa@ueh.edu.vn pl n ua al University of Economics HCMC - bachphamthien@gmail.com n va Abstract m ll fu t n oi Becoming the 150th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Jan 2007, Vietnam has step by step opened the door of its financial system to the world The banking industry, which was dominated by statecontrolled banks, was the main source of financing for inefficient state-owned enterprises while non-statecontrolled enterprises found it difficult to access bank loans The growing presence of foreign banks in Vietnam has resulted in decreasing in dependence on local banks and changed investment behavior Using a sample of listed companies in both stock exchanges in Vietnam, HOSE and HNZ, this research investigates the effect of banking system reform which is measured by foreign bank’s presence on investment-cash flow sensitivity for the period of 2009–14 We found evidence that banking system reform had certain effects on investment behavior of listed firms After the reform, they are less dependent on their internal cash flow for investments Underinvestment issues of non-state-controlled listed firms were also mitigated due to better accessibility to bank loans z z j ht vb k m gm om l.c an state-controlled listed firms; Vietnam Lu Keywords: banking system reform; investment-cash flow sensitivity; state-controlled listed firms; non- n va y te re 454 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development Introduction t to ng hi Bank loans together with internal cash flow have been two main financing sources of funds for firm’s investments in Vietnam However, credit market is not a fair play ground for state – owned enterprises and private companies due to some historical reasons1 although Vietnam has done a lot of effort to improve the situation Vietnam has conducted several reforms in banking sector in order to improve its efficiency as well as competitiveness since it started the Doi Moi policy2 in 1986 The biggest reform in banking sector was the separation the role of central bank and commercial bank Prior to 1990, banking system in Vietnam was a 1-tier system in which state bank functioned as both central bank and commercial bank After 1990, State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) only played the central banking role, while its former commercial functions were separated and delegated to newlyestablished major state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs): Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank), Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade (Vietinbank), Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank) and Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) The only four banks dominated the whole credit market with more than 70% market share Traditional customers of these banks are state-owned enterprises, which were favorable in getting loans at lower cost The entry into international trade and investment agreements such as USVietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (2001), WTO (2007) of the country… allowed presence of foreign banks with the hope that domestic banks would benefit from management technology, business operating skills, professional knowledge and additional capital provided by foreign banks Equitisation (privatization) of state-owned commercial banks was also another effort to reform the sector by the government, etc However, after many reforms, companies have still not been easy to access the bank’s capital while local banks are still struggling with restructuring programs to solve non-performance loans (NPLs) as well as other structural problems Tsai et al (2014) found an evidence that bank sector reform had a significant impact on Chinese companies’ investment – cash flow relation in general and in both state-controlled listed and non-state controlled listed firms, which reliance on internal cash flows were reduce after the reform Although Vietnam has similar political, cultural, social and economic conditions with China, Viet nam was just a very small country in comparison with China that just opened the economy for about 30 years Therefore we conduct this research to examine the effect banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation in a context of small transitional economy Presence of foreign banks is considered additional credit channel to companies for financing their investment opportunities, helping to mitigate firm’s financial constraints It also create reform pressures on local banks that they have to improve their ep w n ad lo yi u yj th pl n ua al n va m ll fu t n oi z z j ht vb k m gm om l.c an Lu n va y te re Vietnam used to be a centrally-planned economy in which state – owned banks mainly served for state-owned enterprises Doi Moi Policy is the policy on tranforming the economy from centrally-planned to market-oriented one (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 455 t to corporate governance to compete with foreign banks who have stronger capital, more advanced technologies, better business operating skills, etc ng hi ep In this study, we use a sample of Vietnamese listed firms from 2009 – 2014 to examine impact of banking system reform, which is defined by presence of foreign banks, on firm’s investment – cash flow relation The impact was also investigated for the two sub samples: state-controlled listed firms and nonstate-controlled firms due to their different ownership characteristics as Tsai et al (2014) As other transforming countries, state-owned enterprises in Vietnam also had to some political responsibilities and they got some favorable privileges in terms of capital, investment opportunities, etc than other form of businesses, especially private ones w n ad lo u yj th yi Our main findings are as follows: First, we found a U-shape relation between investment – cash flow on listed companies in Vietnam Second, banking system reform changed firm’s investment behavior in the way they were less dependent on internal cash flow, implying that reducing politically-oriented investment problem in state-controlled listed companies and also overinvestment problem Underinvestment problem in non state-controlled listed companies seemed to be alleviated because the companies have more channels to raise funds pl n ua al n va m ll fu Investment and debt relation is also investigated because bank loans are main source of funds for Vietnamese companies n oi t Contribution of this study to enrich the literature, providing empirical evidence on the impact of banking sector reform on investment – cash flow relation in a small transitional country It also provides some policy implications at both govermental and firm levels to improve investments z z j ht vb The remainder of this research is organized as follows Section presents literature review Section describes research methodology Section reports research results and Section concludes the research k m om l.c 2.1 Investment – cash flow relation gm Literature review an Lu In financial theory, a company can use two sources of funds to finance its potential positive NPV projects: internal funds which is the cash flow generated by company’s operation and external funds which is newly – issued debt/equity In a perfect capital market where transaction cost does not exist, funds are available for all firms, so they not need to rely on availability of internal cash flows for financing their investments (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) However, in an imperfect capital market, external funds are more costly than internal funds, so internal funds becomes main source of financing n y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam va The topic of investment – cash flow relation has been studied by many researcher for many decades and this still is a controversial one so far Fazzari et al (1988) and (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Cleary, 1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) are representatives for the two opposite (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 456 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi opinions Fazzari et al (1988) used a sample of US manufacturing firm in the period of 1970 – 1984 to study firm’s investment and cash flow relation under financial constrain The authors used payout ratio as measure for financial constrain, in which firm paying decreasing dividend considered as more financially constrained and vice versa The authors found that financially constrained firms had more sensitive relation between investment and cash flow, and the relation was less sensitive for non-financially constrained firms Hoshi et al (1991) supported Fazzari et al (1988) findings with their research on relation between capital structure and investment Hoshi et al (1991) found that individual company who did not have good relation with banks, meaning facing financial constraint have higher investment – cash flow sensitivity than Keiretsu – a type of Japanese group ep w n ad lo u yj th yi The opposite opinion was represented by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) These authors built up KZ index to measure financial constrain and examined investment – cash flow relation with KZ index They found that cash flow had positive relation with investment Besides, less financially constrained firms had more sensitive investment – cash flow relation which was opposite to Fazzari et al (1988) Sean Cleary (1999) used samples, one US firms and the other Canadian firms to test both Fazarri et (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) findings The US sample results supported Kaplan and Zingales (1997) that less financially constrained firms had more sensitive investment – cash flow relation However, the Canadian sample supported Fazzari et al (1988) Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) documented that state–controlled companies had soft budget constrain because they could access external funds easier than private companies, so are less financially constrained pl n ua al n va m ll fu t n oi z Hubbards (1998); and Cleary et al (2007) demonstrated that financial constrain would make the U-shape curve of investment flatter, meaning that firm’s investment would be less dependent on its internal cash flow Cleary et al (2007) found a U-shape for relation between investment and cash flow with a large sample of 88,599 observations for the period of 1980 – 1999, causing by cost and revenue effects The cost effect arises because the more investment the firm takes, the more borrowing cost incurred Accordingly, higher level of investment, more revenue is expected to generate Guariglia (2008) supported Cleary et al (2007) that there was a monotonical relation between investment – cash flow and degree of internal or external financial constraints “Internal” financial constraints are measured by firms’ cash flow and coverage ratio, and “external” financial constraint is measured by firm size, and age Firth et al (2012) also confirmed the U-shape curve but further argue that the curve may vary with politically – oriented investment or soft budget constraint Tsai et al (2014) also support Cleary et al (2007) and Firth et al (2012) with their findings that banking system reform would reduce financial constrain for firms, especially non-state controlled listed firms, leading flatter U-shape It means that lesser investment- relation sensitivity would reduce underinvestment problem of non-state controlled listed firms Banking system reform also reduced political- oriented overinvestment problem at state – controlled listed firms z j ht vb k m gm om l.c an Lu n va y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 457 2.2 Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation: t to ng hi ep A study of Liu and Lu (2007) on China reported that government officials at state – controlled listed firms often had incentives to achieve social and political objectives to serve for their own promotion, therefore politically-oriented investments were the main cause of overinvestment situation in these firms Firth et al (2012) found similar evidence supporting that point of view w Detragiache et al (2008) found evidence that foreign banks were less sensitive to political pressure, and they had less pressure of lending relation partners, who were capable of breaking relation barriers Political and non-economic motivations were not top priorities of domestic banks now Therefore, state-owned commercial banks were transformed from politically – incentive organization to modern corporate governance – oriented ones Therefore, reforming bank system by allowing foreign banks holding ownership at domestic state-owned banks could reduce policies favoring to politically – oriented investments of state – controlled companies With presence of foreign investors, credit granting would be more careful, that careless loans as well as politicallyoriented loans could be reduced With this research, Detagiache et al (2008) used foreign ownership in domestic bank as proxy for banking system reform This research was supported by Beger et al (2008) Beger et al (2008) reported that after reform, foreign ownership in domestic banks, especially state-controlled banks could change their lending practice, from politically – oriented to commercially-oriented banks Nonstate-controlled listed companies are considered more transparent, more commercially-oriented and more efficient than state-controlled listed companies Therefore, after reform, nonstate-controlled listed companies had more channels to access bank loan and underinvestment problem of nonstate- controlled listed companies were reduced n ad lo yi u yj th pl n ua al n va m ll fu t n oi z z j ht vb Different with Detagiache et al (2008), Tsai et al (2014) in their study on effect of bank system reform on investment – cash flow sensitivity defines presence of foreign bank at region where company had headquartered or branches as measure of bank system reform The research found evidence that politically-oriented investments at state controlled listed companies were reduced after the reform due to more commercially – oriented operations Problem of underinvestment at non state – controlled listed companies seemed to be reduced due to an increase in bank loans The similar results of effect of banking system reform on relation of financial leverage and investment were found, meaning a reduction of distortion of investment in state controlled listed companies as well as reduction on financial constraints at non state – controlled listed companies k m gm om l.c an Lu (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te Some recent researches (Cleary et al (2007) and Firth et al (2012) shows evidence of non-linear shape for investment – cash flow relation (U-shape), meaning that there is a difference in the relation when company has positive or negative cash flow For positive cash flow companies, they are willing re 3.1.1 Investment – cash flow relation n 3.1 Hypothesis development and model specification va Research design (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 458 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi to finance many investments for growth, therefore they are more dependent on their internal cash flows Meanwhile, negative cash flow companies face investment constrain due to lack of capital If they still want to take new investment projects, they need to use external funds which has higher cost ep H1: There is a non linear investment – cash flow relation (U-shape) at Vietnamese companies w The hypothesis is tested by the following model which was developed by Fazzari et al (1988), then applied by Cleary et al (2007) and Firth (2012): n ad lo u yj th IK i,t = α0 + α1 CFK i,t + α2 CFKSQR i,t + α3 (SaleGrowthi,t−1 ) + α4 SIZEi,t + α5 LEVi,t + α6 AGEi,t + α7 BETAi,t + ei,t (1) yi Where IKi, t is investment ratio, measured by Ii, t divided by Ki, t-1 I is the investment in fixed assets in year t, measured by book value of net fixed assets at the end of year t minus book value of net fixed asset at beginning of year t, and plus depreciation in year t Kit-s is total fixed asset of firm i at the beginning of year t CFKi,t is annual cash flow ratio, measured by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of firm i in year t divided by total fixed asset of firm i at beginning of year t (Ki,t-1) CFKSQR is square of CFK is included in the model If CFKSQR significantly takes positive sign, the relation will have U-shape If it has negative sign significantly, the relation is inverse U-shape SaleGrowthi, 1-1 is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 Like Tobin’Q, SaleGrowthi, t-1 is also a common proxy to control the effect of a firm’s growth potential (Firth et al., 2012) Vietnam’s stock market is still very young and immature which is much affected by “herd effect” Fluctuation of stock price in many cases does not reflect the true potential of the company Meanwhile, companies normally increase investments to meet their increasing potential sale growth, therefore we believe SaleGrowth is more appropriate than Tobin’s Q to measure investment opportunity in Vietnam’s context SIZEi,t is firm size This variable is a proxy for the degree of financial constraint experienced by firms (Guariglia, 2008), measured by logarithm of beginning book value of total assets for firm in in year t LEVi, t-1 is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets for firm i in year t AGEi, t is the number of years since the company listed This variable is used to measure information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984) BETAi, t is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: RI, t =  + Rm, t + i, t where Ri, t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm, t is the daily market return for day t The estimation period is one year BETA reflects the relation between uncertainty and investment pl n ua al n va m ll fu t n oi z z j ht vb k m gm om l.c an Lu n va (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te It is common to have problem of “flexible budget constrain in the centrally-planned economy, which refers to the favorable policies for state-controlled organizations Due to being owned by government, these organizations are often bailed out if they are in trouble, normally in form of subsidy, tax deduction or exemption, set low input cost, set high output price, low cost financing, etc Therefore, state – owned enterprises in Vietnam normally can access bank credit much easier and re 3.1.2 Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 459 t to ng hi ep normally at lower cost than private forms, that leads to the situation of overinvestment Moreover, like China, overinvestment problem in state-controlled companies are mainly caused by politicallyoriented investments (Firth et al., 2012) because officials in these companies also have incentives to achieve social and political objectives for their promotion (Liu and Lu, 2007) Meanwhile, nonstatecontrolled companies are not favored with these privileges, so they have to rely on their own internal cash flow to finance their investment opportunities (Tsai et al., 2014) w n ad lo H2: Banking system reform mitigates overinvestment problem at state – controlled listed companies yi u yj th With the presence of foreign bank, credit market become more competitive and transparent State-owned banks may have to change its lending practices from politically-oriented to commercially-oriented, so non-state controlled companies have more chance to access bank financing, so underinvestment problem of these company could be reduced pl n ua al va H3: Banking system reform mitigates underinvestment problem at non state – controlled listed companies n We applied the following model which was developed by Tsai et al (2014) to test the hypothesises H2 and H3: m ll fu t n oi 𝐼𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + α1 CFKPOS𝐼,𝑡 + α2 CFKNEG𝐼,𝑡 + α3 CFKPOSBANK 𝐼,𝑡 + α4 CFKNEGBANK 𝐼,𝑡 + α5 BANK 𝐼,𝑡 + α6 SalesGrowthi,t−1 + α7 BANK i,t + α8 SIZEi,t + α9 LEVi,t + α10 AGEi,t + α11 BETAi,t + vi + vt + εi,t (2) z z In this model, CFK is separated into positive CFK and negative CFK by using dummy variables POS and NEG POS takes the value if CFKi,t is greater than 0, and if otherwise NEG takes the value if CFKi, t is less than 0, and if otherwise The relation between investment and cash flow will have U-shape if CFKPOS (= CFK*POS) has positive sign and CFKNEG (= CFK*NEG) has negative sign at conventional significances BANKi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise CFKPOSBANK (=CFK*POS*BANK) and CFKNEGBANK (=CFK*NEG*BANK) reflect effect of banking system reform on firm’s investment behavior when it has positive or negative cash flow Definitions of other variables are as those of the model (1) j ht vb k m gm om l.c an Lu 3.1.3 Effect of banking system reform on investment and debt relation: y te (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam re We applied the following model which was developed by Tsai et al (2014) to test the hypothesis H4: n H4: Banking system reform has a positive impact on firm’s investment – debt relation: va As many other transitional economies, bank loans are still main source of external funds in Vietnam where stock market is still young and immature To see if banking system reform have any impact on investment –debt relation, we develop following hypothesis: (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 460 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to IK i,t = β0 + β1 CFK i,t + β2 LEVi,t−1 + β3 BANK i,t + β4 BANK i,t ∗ LEVi,t−1 + β5 SaleGrowthi,t−1 + β6 SIZEi,t + vi + vt + εi,t (4) ng hi Definitions of other variables are as those of the model (1) ep 3.2 Data w We use an unbalanced panel data from the period 2009 to 2014 for non-financial companies listed on Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) Financial firms are excluded because they have different investment behavior with non-financial firms The firm’s financial data is extracted from the Stockplus database Market data is downloaded from the websites www.vietstock.com.vn Missing value observations are also excluded Outliers that may influence the results are excluded by winsorizing 1% for two tails for each variable n ad lo yi u yj th pl n ua al Empirical results 4.1 Descriptive statistics va n Table describes the research sample This sample is unbalanced panel of 3.124 observations of non-financial companies listed on HOSE and HNX in Vietnam for the period of 2009 – 2014 Each firm in the sample is classified as state – controlled listed company or nonstate-controlled company for each year by proportion of state ownership of the company in that year A shareholder or a group of shareholders is defined as controlling one if it holds 50% or more of the voting shares The number of state – controlled listed firm is about a half of nonstate controlled firms m ll fu t n oi z z Table vb State – controlled firms Non state-controlled firms Total 2009 80 190 2010 109 292 2011 150 391 2012 186 442 2013 195 448 2014 172 469 641 k m Year om l.c j ht Sample structure 270 gm 401 541 628 643 an Lu y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam n Table presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for all variables in the regression models In average, mean and median of investment ratio (IK) for the whole sample is 17% and 3% respectively State–controlled listed firms in average invest more than non-state – controlled listed firms (21% and 15% respectively) Although having higher growth potential as indicated by mean of SaleGrowth (59%), non state – controlled listed firms has lower average internal cash flows (CFK 15%) and higher negative cash flows (NEG 39%), meaning that underinvestment exists in this group va Notes: The sample includes non-financial firms listed on HOSE and HNX of Vietnam over the period of 2009 – 2014 State controlled firms are those that the government held at least 50% of voting shares The rest are nonstate –controlled firms (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 461 t to and they seem to have to rely more on external funds to finance their investment than state – controlled listed firms In average, state – controlled listed firms have higher leverage (54%), implying their higher accessibility to bank loans to non-state – controlled listed firms (49%) ng hi ep Table Variable descriptive statistic w n Full sample IK ad lo Variable NEG Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median 3124 0.17 0.03 892 0.21 0.03 2232 0.15 0.03 3124 0.17 0.04 892 0.23 0.06 2232 0.15 0.03 3124 0.37 0.00 892 0.32 0.00 2232 0.39 0.00 0.46 0.09 892 0.12 0.08 2232 0.59 0.10 TA (bil VND) 3124 pl 3124 1,641 458 892 2,173 619 2232 1,428 406 LEV 3124 0.51 0.54 892 0.57 0.61 2232 0.49 0.51 AGE 3124 4.30 4.00 892 4.30 4.00 2232 4.30 4.00 BETA 3124 0.67 0.67 892 0.67 0.69 2232 0.67 0.66 yi SaleGrowth Non state – controlled listed firms Mean u yj th CFK State-controlled listed firms Obs n ua al va n Notes: IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 TA represents for firm size, measured by total assets LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: R i, t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t m ll fu t n oi 4.2 Correlations z z Table below presents correlations among the variables The bottom left triangle reports Spearman correlations and the upper right triangle reports Pearson correlations IK has positive correlation coefficient with CFKPOS at high level of significance (1%), and negative correlation with CFKNEG but insignificant at conventional levels It suggests the U-shape curve for investment and cash flow relation Besides, IK also has negative correlation with AGE and positive correlations with SaleGrowth, LEV, and BETA at high significance j ht vb k m gm om l.c Table LEV AGE BETA 0.1038*** -0.0970*** -0.0006 -0.0056 -0.0783*** -0.0250 0.0136 0.0017 -0.0105 -0.0363** -0.0418** 0.0020 -0.0521*** 0.0066 0.0028 0.0145 -0.0175 -0.0148 -0.1341*** 0.0316 0.1461*** 0.8143*** 0.1870*** 0.0110 -0.0223 LEV 0.0410** -0.1453*** -0.1459*** 0.0368 AGE -0.2137*** -0.0617*** 0.0927*** '-0.1051*** -0.1199*** BETA 0.0626*** -0.0826*** -0.0560*** 0.0996*** 0.0387** -0.0550*** -0.0750*** Notes: IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio CFKPOS is the positive cash flows CFKNEG is the negative cash flows SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t –1 LEV is the beginning-of-period (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te -0.0096 SaleGrowth re CFKNEG SaleGrowth n CFKPOS CFKNEG va IK CFKPOS an IK Lu Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 462 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: R i,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% ep 4.3 Regression results w 4.3.1 Examining investment – cash flow relation n ad lo As explained in section above, we used the model (1) in Section which was developed by Fazzari et al (1988) and then applied by Cleary et al (2007) and Firth (2012) The Table below reports the regression results Coefficient of variable CFKSQR of the full sample is significantly positive at 0.0000298** This confirms a U-shape investment - cash flow relation Due to mean of both cash flow (CFK) and investment (IK) are equal 0.17, a 10% increase in cash flow would lead to 0.0358% increase in investment3 This number is rather small as compared with 1.12% as reported by Guariglia (2008) in his study on British companies or 1.3% as reported by Firth et al (2012) for Chinese companies There is similar relation for nonstate-controlled listed companies, but insignificantly For Vietnamese state – controlled listed companies, relation between IK and CFK is inverse U-shape curve, represented by highly significantly negative coefficient (-0.00361***) yi u yj th pl n ua al n va fu m ll For state – controlled companies, regression coefficient of investment on SaleGrowth is significantly negative at -0.00770, implying that in average these companies still invest even though their growth potential decrease This confirms overinvestment problem of this group of companies Will this problem exist after bank reform? We will further examine this problem in the section 4.3.2 below t n oi z z j ht vb For non-state-controlled companies, coefficient of SaleGrowth is also negative but insignificant So we cannot confirm overinvestment problem in this group of companies yet m k In conclusion, we found a U-shape curve for investment – cash flow relation on a full sample of Vietnam’s listed companies and inverse U-shape for state – controlled listed companies while Ushape for non-state – controlled listed companies are not confirmed yet We also confirm overinvestment problem at state – controlled listed companies gm om l.c an Lu n va y te re According to Guariglia (2008, p.1802), the number 0.0358% is calculated by 0.17*10%*0.00358/0.17 (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam o w (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam n ad lo u yj th Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 463 p yi an lu la Table n va Regression of investment on cash flow Model 1: 𝐈𝐊 𝐢,𝐭 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛂𝟏 𝐂𝐅𝐊 𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛂𝟐 𝐂𝐅𝐊𝐒𝐐𝐑 𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛂𝟑 (𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 ) + 𝛂𝟒 𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛂𝟓 𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛂𝟔 𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛂𝟕 𝐁𝐄𝐓𝐀 𝐢,𝐭 + 𝐞𝐢,𝐭 ll fu Full sample CFKSQR State controlled listed companies 0.00429*** (3.17) 0.0512*** (9.66) at nh oi 0.00358** (2.54) m CFK 0.00162* (1.76) 0.00333** (2.02) -0.00361*** (-12.48) z 0.0000298** (2.46) Non state controlled listed companies 0.163*** (13.50) 0.0000126 (0.65) z -0.00274 (-0.76) -0.0124*** (-4.42) -0.00108 (-0.61) -0.00127 (-0.70) 0.0186*** (13.40) k jm 0.000695*** (4.49) SIZE 0.0186*** (13.24) -0.00205 (-0.81) 0.00366*** (2.67) 0.00430*** (2.95) LEV -0.0508*** (-6.06) -0.0541*** (-6.39) -0.548*** (-15.67) -0.513*** (-16.75) 0.0672*** (6.81) 0.0495*** (4.91) AGE 0.00124 (1.24) 0.000582 (0.59) 0.0272*** (8.22) 0.0277*** (7.36) -0.00538*** (-5.03) -0.00487*** (-4.54) BETA -0.0403*** (-15.43) -0.0392*** (-15.80) -0.111*** (-13.93) -0.0532*** (-3.37) -0.0278*** (-7.30) -0.0241*** (-6.26) _cons 0.268*** (2.79) 0.268*** (2.79) 0.358*** (3.73) 0.264*** (3.00) 0.439*** (5.06) 0.434*** (4.98) N 2481 2481 697 697 1784 1784 No of firms 641 641 412 412 611 611 0.00110 (0.37) l.c gm 0.000706*** (4.56) ht vb L.SaleGrowth om an Lu va n te re y ac th si Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio CFKSQR is the square of CFK SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the eg cd jg hg (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation 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the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam n ad lo u yj th 464 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development p yi an lu la company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: Ri,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parentheses is z-statistic n va ll fu at nh oi m z z ht vb k jm l.c gm om an Lu va n te re y ac th si eg cd jg hg (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation 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the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 465 t to 4.3.2 Analysing effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation ng hi ep Model (2) presented in Section is used to conduct tests on effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation Table reports regression coefficients of the model for full sample, and both subsamples: state – controlled listed companies and nonstate – controlled listed companies Table w n Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation ad lo u yj th CFKPOS Full sample State-controlled listed companies Nonstate-controlled listed companies 0.0239** -0.0109 0.226*** (-0.37) (18.17) -0.0772*** -0.243*** (-4.31) (-3.34) (-9.73) CFKPOSBANK -0.0113 0.0432 -0.217*** (-0.92) (1.38) (-16.90) CFKNEGBANK 0.0934*** 0.106*** 0.239*** (3.75) (9.52) -0.226*** 0.0772*** yi (2.00) -0.0962*** CFKNEG pl n ua al (-1.10) 0.000684*** (14.79) -0.00176 -0.00163 (-0.32) (-1.06) 0.00679 0.000628 t (5.06) (-10.12) n oi L.SaleGrowth m ll -0.00599 fu BANK n va (4.16) 0.0134*** (10.36) (1.64) LEV -0.0376*** -0.533*** (-4.72) (-16.08) AGE 0.000175 0.0331*** (0.22) (12.05) BETA -0.0311*** -0.113*** (-10.55) (-12.78) 0.320*** 0.273** 0.435*** (3.27) (2.45) (4.70) 2481 697 0.0375*** vb (5.60) j ht -0.00598*** k m (-7.05) gm -0.0122*** (-3.71) om l.c 1784 Lu N (0.54) z _cons z SIZE an Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio CFKPOS (=CFK*POS) is positive cash flow CFKNEG (=CFK*NEG) is negative cash flow BANK i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise CFKPOSBANK (=CFK*POS*BANK) and CFKNEGBANK (=CFK*NEG*BANK) reflect effect of banking system reform on firm’s investment behavior when it has positive or negative cash flow SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: R i,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parenthese is z-statistic n va y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 466 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi Presence of foreign bank in the located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business has some impact on company’s investment behavior, especially non state-controlled listed companies Coefficient of BANK for this group is significantly positive at 0.0772 ( =1%), meaning that banking system reform pushes up investment in this group, because they may have better chance to access external financing (bank loans) However, this gives opposite effect on state – controlled listed companies as indicated by negative sign on the coefficient Maybe, presence of foreign banks forces domestic banks to improve their transparency, to enhance their efficiency, etc., that politically- oriented loans are more strictly controlled This leads to reduce funds to statecontrolled listed companies who are considered having privileges from domestic state owned commercial banks ep w n ad lo u yj th yi Sign and significance of regression coefficients of CFKNEG and CFKNEGBANK for full sample (0.0962*** and 0.0934***) and state-controlled listed companies (-0.0772*** and 0.106***) and nonstate-controlled listed companies (-0.243*** and 0.239***) are consistent to each other and results of the Tsai et al (2014), especially consistent with our expectations The U-curves were flatter after the reform, implying decreasing reliance on internal cash flow for investments It indicates that before banking system reform, when negative internal cash flow increased, companies of all kinds would reduce their investment However, level of reduction in nonstate-controlled listed companies is more than times of that in state -controlled listed companies After the reform, companies still increase their investment even their negative cash flows increase Again, higher level of increase in nonstate listed companies compared with state-controlled listed companies It can be explained that after the reform, companies, especially non state-controlled listed companies are easier to access external funds (bank loans) to finance their investment opportunities even in case of negative internal cash flow, which it was not easy to get before So we can say that banking system reform has significant impact on investment behavior of companies We will examine overinvestment problem at the latter part of this paper pl n ua al n va m ll fu t n oi z z j ht vb k m gm om l.c Effect of banking system reform on investment –cash flow relation by different investment opportunities an Lu To examine companies’ investment behavior, companies in each subsample is classified as high investment opportunity or low investment opportunity, measured by growth of sales If company’s sale growth in a year is higher (lower) median of sample sale growth in that year is classified as high (low) opportunity y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam n Table below presents regression results on effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation of state-controlled listed companies In this table, collum (2) and (4) are extention of collumm (1) and (3) respectively, in which BANK is included to investigate effect of banking system reform va Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation of state – controlled listed companies by different investment opportunities (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 467 t to ng hi ep Banking system reform has a significant positive effect on state-controlled listed companies, especially high investment opportunity ones The coefficients on CFKPOS, CFKNEG, are all highly significant for both column (1) and (2) CFKPOSBANK and CFKNEGBANK in column (2) are also highly significant but change sign, implying effect of banking system reform For low investment opportunity, coefficients on CFKNEG in the column (3) and (4) are significant but CFKPOS The coefficient on CFKPOSBANK and CFKNEGBANK in column (4) significantly negative at 10% and 1% level respectively These results suggest that, investment in low investment opportunity state-controlled listed companies rely on their own internal funds, possibly implying overinvestment which is reduced after the reform On possible explanation is that state-owned banks may be more market-oriented w n ad lo yi u yj th Table pl n ua al Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation of state – controlled listed companies by different investment opportunities n (1) va High investment opportunity (2) (3) fu 1.168*** 3.581*** (8.27) (54.49) CFKNEG -1.066*** -0.750*** (-11.90) (-8.92) (-48.12) (2.85) -0.0178* (-1.79) -0.309*** j ht (3.77) (-2.44) vb 0.348*** (0.40) 0.274*** z CFKNEGBANK (0.25) z -3.408*** (-3.10) m 0.478*** 0.0230 k (1.45) 0.0165 0.00300 -0.00118 (1.56) (0.43) (-0.26) SIZE 0.0158 0.0121*** 0.00399 (1.10) (2.96) (0.99) om l.c gm (11.38) L.SaleGrowth 0.00149 -0.0320** t n oi CFKPOSBANK (4) 0.000882 m ll CFKPOS BANK Low investment opportunity LEV 0.242* 0.317*** -0.0292 -0.00988 (1.73) (5.33) (-0.75) (-0.26) AGE 0.0603*** 0.0318*** 0.00166 0.00301 (3.07) (7.26) (0.52) (0.95) BETA 0.0145 0.120*** 0.0384*** 0.0462*** (0.45) (5.10) (3.33) (4.43) 4.761 -2.169** 0.0694 0.0136 (1.32) (-2.42) (0.97) (0.18) 344 344 353 353 0.00823** (2.05) an n y te re (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam va N (-0.51) Lu _cons -0.00228 (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 468 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio CFKPOS (=CFK*POS) is positive cash flow CFKNEG (=CFK*NEG) is negative cash flow BANK i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise CFKPOSBANK (=CFK*POS*BANK) and CFKNEGBANK (=CFK*NEG*BANK) reflect effect of banking system reform on firm’s investment behavior when it has positive or negative cash flow SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: Ri,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parentheses is z-statistic ep w n ad lo yi u yj th Effect of banking system reform on investment –cash flow relation of non-state – controlled listed companies by different investment opportunities pl Table presents regression results of banking system reform on investment –cash flow relation of non state – controlled listed companies by different investment opportunities Banking system reform (BANK) has significantly positive effect on both high and low investment opportunity non state-controlled listed companies For high investment opportunity group, the reform increases investment even when companies face negative cash flow However, investments of low investment opportunity non state-controlled listed companies are much reliant on internal cash flow before the reform, while after the reform, they decrease investment in whatever the internal cash flow is So, the underinvestment problem is partly alleviated n ua al n va m ll fu n oi t Table z Effect of banking system reform on investment – cash flow relation of non state – controlled listed companies by different investment opportunities z 0.0597*** 0.0603* 0.000452 (9.69) (1.92) (0.39) -0.213*** -0.914*** -0.00982** (-26.40) (-16.97) (-2.42) CFKPOSBANK -0.00831 -0.336*** (-0.26) (-32.56) 0.777*** -0.0570*** (14.15) (-6.94) 0.123*** 0.0916*** (17.40) (24.49) -0.00453*** 0.00343** 0.00652*** (-3.07) (-4.04) (2.26) (2.77) 0.00972*** 0.0238*** 0.000553 -0.0000113 (5.06) (16.83) (0.52) (-0.01) -0.00967 -0.180*** 0.0254*** -0.00776 (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te -0.00140*** re LEV (9.17) n SIZE 0.0337*** va L.SaleGrowth (32.65) an BANK 0.337*** Lu CFKNEGBANK (4) om l.c (3) gm (2) k (1) m CFKNEG Low investment opportunity j ht CFKPOS vb High investment opportunity (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 469 High investment opportunity t to (1) (2) (3) (4) (-0.77) (-22.51) (4.61) (-0.84) -0.00377*** -0.0130*** -0.0164*** -0.0227*** (-3.71) (-15.53) (-37.26) (-33.01) -0.0754*** -0.0627*** 0.0152*** 0.0298*** (-13.53) (-15.32) (6.60) (8.99) 0.402*** 0.242** 0.177*** 0.0587 (3.81) (2.06) (2.78) (1.22) 898 898 886 886 ng hi AGE ep BETA w n ad lo _cons u yj th N Low investment opportunity yi Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio CFKPOS (=CFK*POS) is positive cash flow CFKNEG (=CFK*NEG) is negative cash flow BANK i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise CFKPOSBANK (=CFK*POS*BANK) and CFKNEGBANK (=CFK*NEG*BANK) reflect effect of banking system reform on firm’s investment behavior when it has positive or negative cash flow SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: R i,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parenthese is z-statistic pl n ua al n va m ll fu n oi 4.3.3 Analysing effect of banking system reform on investment – leverage relation t Regression coefficients in Table belows shows effect of banking system reform on investment – leverage relation Coefficient of LEV and BANKLEV in both state-controlled listed companies and non state – controlled listed companies are highly significant (at 1% level) but different sign These results imply that banking system reform may have different affect on investment – leverage relation of different group of companies in Vietnam After banking system reform, investment of statecontrolled companies are more reliant on bank loans while investment of non state - controlled listed companies are more reliant on their internal cash flow Coefficient on L.LEV in the column (2) of this table is signigicantly negative but BANKLEV is significantly possitive These results not consistent with our original expectations One possible explaination is that before the banking system reform, board of managers may reduce leverage to increase ability to raise external funds for future investments, that they not have to after the reform as the findings of Lang et al (1996) The reason could be after the reform, besides domestic banks, they can access loans from foreign banks z z j ht vb k m gm om l.c an Lu va n Table CFK L LEV Full sample State-controlled listed companies Nonstate-controlled listed companies (1) (2) (3) 0.00431*** 0.0430*** 0.00156 (3.85) (5.60) (1.50) -0.0818*** -1.036*** 0.104*** (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te re Effect of banking system reform on investment – leverage relation (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 470 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development Full sample t to hi (1) (2) (3) (-9.09) (29.79) -0.0699*** -0.878*** 0.0819*** (-5.53) (-12.45) (16.07) 0.0795*** 1.177*** -0.161*** (4.16) (10.27) (-21.60) 0.000549*** -0.00192 -0.00284** (2.88) (-0.58) (-2.00) 0.00968*** -0.0668*** 0.00509*** (11.12) (-22.19) (9.30) 126.6*** 265.8*** 137.3*** (46.74) (62.44) 697 1784 ep BANKLEV w n 2481 n ua al N pl (72.68) yi u yj th Cons ad SIZE lo L.SaleGrowth Nonstate-controlled listed companies (-4.32) ng BANK State-controlled listed companies n va Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio BANKi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: Ri,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parentheses is z-statistic m ll fu n oi t Firth et al (2008) records negative relation between investment and leverage for Chinese listed companies However, this relation is weaker in low investment opppotunity companies as well as in high proportion of state ownership, meaning overinvestment in these firms Lang et al (1996) finds that managers at high growth potential companies will chose low leverage because using too much debt prevents the company from further borrowing to finance future investment opportunities z z j ht vb m k Table below reports regression results on effect of banking system reform on investment – leverage relation for both low and high growth opportunities of the both subsamples gm om l.c Table Nonstate controlled listed companies (1) (2) (3) (4) CFK 0.855*** 0.000558 -0.0755*** -0.000418 (9.10) (0.23) (-27.39) (-0.32) L.LEV -1.352*** 0.173*** 0.187*** 0.0251 (-3.79) (10.19) (12.03) (1.20) -1.083*** -0.0493** 0.167*** 0.0322*** BANK (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te Low investment opportunity re High investment opportunity n Low investment opportunity va High investment opportunity an State – controlled listed companies Lu Effect of banking system reform on investment – leverage relation for both low and high growth opportunities (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam Policies and Sustainable Economic Development | 471 State – controlled listed companies Nonstate controlled listed companies t to ng Low investment opportunity High investment opportunity Low investment opportunity (1) (2) (3) (4) hi High investment opportunity ep BANKLEV w (-2.14) (16.01) (2.84) 0.173*** -0.326*** 0.00596 (4.60) (4.42) (-17.86) (0.28) -0.144*** -0.00302 -0.00420*** -0.000997 (-10.45) (-0.75) (-2.67) (-0.54) -0.0351*** 0.00986*** -0.0203*** 0.00982*** (-3.62) (3.98) (-20.10) (7.87) 88.32*** 158.2*** 131.6*** (9.58) (80.42) (45.27) 353 898 886 n (-4.52) 1.656*** _cons yi u yj th SIZE ad lo L.SaleGro wth 177.3*** pl (7.33) 344 n ua al N n va Notes: Reported coefficients are fixed firm and year effect estimates and robust IK is investment ratio CFK is annual cash flow ratio BANKi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value for firms located in a region where foreign banks are allowed to business in year t and afterwards, and otherwise SaleGrowth is proportion of change in sales from year t–2 to year t–1 LEV is the beginning-of-period financial leverage, measured by total liabilities to total assets AGE is the number of years since the company listed BETA is the slope coefficient from the market model estimated using daily stock and market returns: Ri,t =  + Rm,t + i,t where Ri,t is the daily stock return of firm i, Rm,t is the daily market return for day t *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% Number in parentheses is z-statistic m ll fu t n oi z Coefficients of L.LEV (-1.352) and BANKLEV (1.656) in collumn (1) of Table are significant at 1% level, finding that before the reform, underinvestment exists in high investment opportunity and the problem is miltigated after the refrom Coefficient of L.LEV in column (1) suggest that before the reform, company’s board of management may choose low leverage to increase ability to raise external funds in the future as documented by Lang et al (1996) z j ht vb k m gm High investment opportunity state – controlled listed companies not have to reduce debt overhang after the reform as they have to before for financing their future investments due to more channels to get loans However, the story is not the same for low investment opportunity, that there is an significantly positive relation between investment and leverage for both before and after the reform For nonstate- controlled listed companies, they resutls are opposite with ones of state – controlled listed companies om l.c an Lu va n Conclusion (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te re Along with international integration and WTO’s roadmap, Vietnam has to open its door to foreign banks This research focus on investigating if investment behavior of Vietmamese listed companies is affected by banking system reform measured by presence of foreign banks The research also studies if banking system reform reduces pollitical-oriented investments of state-controlled listed companies, as well as miltigate underinvestment caused by financial constraint at non state – (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam 472 | Policies and Sustainable Economic Development t to ng hi controlled listed companies Using an unbalanced panel of companies listing on HOSE and HNX from 2009 and 2014, we finds evidence for U-shape relation between investment and cash flows However, state – controlled lised companies has an inverse U shape curve while we can not confirm the relation for non state-controlled listed companies ep Banking system reform measured by presence of foreign banks has signigicant impact on investment behaviour of Vietnamese companies, and not exactly the same for state controlled and non state-control listed companies Before the reform, company’s investments are much reliant on internal cash flow, but after the reform, the level of dependence is reduced because companies have more chance to get bank loans Besides, firms with different investment opportunity will have different effect w n ad lo u yj th yi We also investigate effect of banking system reform on company’s investment and leverage The results show that the relation is changed after the reform High investment opportunity statecontrolled listed companies before the reform have to reduce leverage to increase ability to raise external fund to finance their future potention investments, thing they not have to to after the reform pl n ua al n va m ll fu As a result, we conclude that banking system reform measured by presence of foreign banks has significant impact on both company’s investment and financing behaviors The impacts are not the same for different group of companies t n oi References z z j ht vb Allayannis, G., & Mozumdar, A (2004) The impact of negative cash flow and influential observations on investment– cash flow sensitivity estimates Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 901-930 k m Berger, A N., Klapper, L F., Martinez Peria, M S., & Zaidi, R (2008) Bank ownership type and banking relationships Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17, 37-62 gm Cleary, S (1999) The relationship 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the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam y te Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D (1991) Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 33-60 re Guariglia, A (2008) Internal financial constraints, external financial constraints, and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 1795-1809 n Firth, M., Malatesta, P H., Xin, Q., & Xu, L (2012) Corporate investment, government control, and financing channels: Evidence from China’s listed companies Journal of Corporate Finance, 18, 433-450 va Firth, M., Lin, C., & Wong, S M L (2008) Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 642-653 (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam (Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam(Luáºn.vÄƒn).banking.system.reform.and.investmentâ€“cash.flow.relation the.case.of.vietnam

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