Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy Avrum Stroll Columbia University Press New York Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy Twentieth-Century A N A LY T I C P H I L O S O P H Y Av r u m S t r o l l C Columbia University Press N e w Yo r k Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2000 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stroll, Avrum, 1921– Twentieth-century analytic philosophy / Avrum Stroll p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 0–231–11220–3 (alk paper) Analysis (Philosophy)—History I Title B808.5 S77 2000 146’.4’0904—dc21 99–087366 Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper Printed in the United States of America c 10 For Mary Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s Acknowledgments ix one The Solera System two Philosophical Logic 11 three Logical Positivism and the Tractatus 45 four G E Moore: A Ton of Bricks 87 five Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy: “The Stream of Life” 113 six Ryle and Austin: The Golden Age of Oxford Philosophy 146 seven W V O Quine 181 eight Direct Reference Theories 211 nine Today and Tomorrow 246 References 271 Index 281 Acknowledgments Given the span of more than a hundred years that this study covers, and the complexity of much of the material, I would have found it impossible to write this book without abundant expert assistance I therefore wish to thank Zeno Vendler, Robert Rowan, Henry Alexander, Pieranna Garavaso, A P Martinich, and John Collins for their invaluable comments Each of them read the entire manuscript and, mirabile dictu, presented me with written criticisms, as well as detailed recommendations for improvement My appreciation for the labor they expended is boundless I also owe a debt of gratitude to the editor of the Journal of Philosophy, who allowed me to include in this work part of an essay, “Proper Names, Names, and Fictive Objects,” that I published in the Journal in 1998 I owe a similar debt to an editor at MIT Press for permission to use part of a chapter from my Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example (1998) These materials appear in the last sections of chapter With those exceptions, the book contains only new writings I wrote much of the manuscript during two stays at the American Academy in Rome, and without the hospitality and generosity of the then director, Caroline Bruzelius, and the assistant director, Pina Pasquantonio, it would have taken me much longer to complete this work Finally, no expression of thanks will justice to the acute observations on the text made by my wife, Mary Her careful reading of the manuscript greatly improved its style, organization, level of argument, and content That she took so much time away from her own current research on twelfth-century papal politics is indeed an act of supererogation For her help, and, of course, for other reasons, I dedicate this book to her 288 Index infelicities, Austin on, 152, 175–76 Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, An (Russell), 48 “Intelligent Behavior” (Austin), 166 intension, 27–28 intensional isomorphism, of Carnap, 83 Introduction to Logical Theory (Strawson), 183 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Russell), 46, 58, 248 Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Anscombe), 62 inverted spectrum counterexample, 261 “Is Goodness a Quality” (Moore), 96 isomers, argument from, 241–42 isotope argument, 238–40 “Is Semantics Possible” (Putnam), 229 Jackson, Henry, 91 jade, and Twin Earth argument, 239–40, 241 James, William, 52, 248 Jaspers, Karl, 250 Jevons, W S., 147 Joergensen, Joergen, 55 Johannessen, K J., 117 “John Langshaw Austin: A Biographical Sketch” (Warnock), 161 Johnson, W.E., 147 Jugos, Bela, 55 Justice in Wartime (Russell), 247 Kant, Immanuel, 35; and analyticsynthetic distinction, 65; and Austin on nonsense, 177; early Wittgenstein seen as neo-Kantian, 32; as ruling figure, 268; as standard for evaluation, 246, 250, 251, 252; subliterature of commentaries on, 252; and Wittgenstein’s stature, 253 Kaplan, David, 9, 26, 28 Kepler, Johannes, 199 Keynes, J M., 90, 147 Kneale, W C., 147 knowledge: Austin on “I know,” 173; and certitude, 112; and egocentric predicament, 137; uses of “I know” (Wittgenstein), 133–34 “Knowledge by Description and Knowledge by Acquaintance” (Russell), 21, 51, 70 Kraft, Victor, 54 Kripke, Saul, 8; and identity, 26, 29; and intensions, 28, 218; narrow concerns of, 248; and natural kind terms, 229, 232, 236, 242, 244; and proper names, 29, 215–18, 222; and scientific philosophy, 45; and scope, 12; and symbolic logic, 9; and traditional questions, labels, proper names analogous to, 214–15 language: logical syntax of, 78; private, 138–39; Strawson on, 44; use of, 44, 123, 174; Wittgenstein on, 123, 138–39, 141; Wittgenstein on being bewitched by, 130; see also speech act theory language, philosophy of, 180, 255 Index Language, Truth, and Logic (Ayer), 55, 68, 69, 85, 94–95 language games: importance of, 268; Wittgenstein on, 113, 129, 132–34, 140 language learning: Augustine on, 132–33; and criticism of direct reference doctrine, 243–45; and Quine, 204 language-reality connection: and direct-reference theorists, 214; Russell on, 37, 40; Wittgenstein on, 58–59 Larsen, Rolf, 117 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Wittgenstein), 114 Lectures and Conversatons on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Wittgenstein), 121–22 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (Wittgenstein), 114 Lee, Seung-Chong, 225 Leibniz, Gottfried: and analytic-synthetic distinction, 65; on synonymy, 195 Leibniz’s Law, 236 Letters to C K Ogden from Ludwig Wittgenstein, 161 Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir by Paul Engelmann, 160–61 Letters to Russell, Keynes, and Moore by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 161 Lewis, C I., 201, 250 Lewis, C S., 147 Lewis, David, 8, Library of Living Philosophers, 249–50 289 Lichine, Alexis, 4–5, Liebig, Justus von, 241 linguistic argument on natural kinds, 237–38 linguistic philosophy, of Ryle and Austin, 148 Linguistics in Philosophy (Vendler), 164, 180 Linsky, Leonard, 83 Locke, John, 49, 70; and analyticsynthetic distinction, 65; as empiricist, 191; and external world, 208, 209; and positivism, 64; and reductionism, 197; and representative realism, 90; and sense-data theory, 263 logic: as ideal language (Russell), 16–20; modal, 10, 212, 219; Wittgenstein on nonsimplicity of, 89 logical atomism, 1, 8, 11, 29–44, 30; and Moore, 104; Russell’s version of, 33–44; and theory of descriptions, 43; and Wittgenstein (Tractatus), 30, 32, 57, 62, 63, 122 “Logical Atomism” (Russell), 6, 34, 133 logical geography of mental concepts, Ryle on, 156, 159 logical positivism, 1, 8, 11, 30, 53–54, 64–71, 84; and Austin, 161; and Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic, 55; and logical atomism, 44; and Moore on goodness, 94; and non-cognitive meanings, 69, 175; political aspects in dissemination of, 56; and Ryle, 150, 159; and sym- 290 logical positivism, (Continued) bolic logic, 9; and Tractatus, 32, 57; and Vienna Circle, 54 “Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European Philosophy” (Blumberg and Feigl), 56 Logical Syntax of Language, The (Carnap), 70, 150 logical truth: and behavior, 205; positivist view of, 65–66; Quine on, 193–94 Logic and Knowledge (Russell), 48 Logische Aufbau der Welt, Der (The Logical Construction of the World) (Carnap), 79–81 Logische Syntax der Sprache (Carnap), 81 logistic thesis, 11, 13–16; and ideal language, 12 Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Monk), 91, 117 Mabbott, J D., 147 MacColl, H., 147 McGuinness, Brian, 117, 118–19, 148 Maclagan, W G., 147 McTaggart, J M E., 33, 91, 95 Mahler, Gustav, 134 Malcolm, Norman, 2, 90, 112, 114, 138, 152 Malleson, Lady Constance (“Colette”), 47 Marcel, Gabriel, 250 Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 8; and direct reference approach, 211, 225; and fictive objects, 227; and identity, 26, 29; narrow concerns of, 248; and proper names, 28, Index 29, 215–19, 222; and scientific philosophy, 45; and scope, 12; and symbolic logic, Marriage and Morals (Russell), 247 Martinich, A P., 152, 180, 221 Marx, Karl, 45 Maslow, Alexander, 62 materialism, 247; eliminative, 261–63; reductive, 257–58 Mates, Benson, 83, 99, 207–8, 209 mathematical (symbolic) logic, 9; as important accomplishment, 248; movements springing from, 29–30; and old issues, 267; positivists on, 65; Wittgenstein on, 59 Mathematical Logic (Quine), 184, 187 mathematics, logistic thesis on, 11, 13–16 Matter of Minds, The (Vendler), 256 maxim of minimum mutilation, of Quine, 200 meaning: and behavior, 205; and correspondence theory of truth (Russell), 42; “Fido-Fido theory of,” 123; vs force (Austin), 177; functional argument on, 240–41; in language learning (“water” example), 243–45; noncognitive (positivists), 69, 175; Quine on, 201, 203; vs reference (Frege), 26–28; Russell on, 28, 41, 133, 217; and Russell’s theory of descriptions, 41; statement as primary vehicle of, 197; and Twin Earth argument, 230–32 (see also Twin Earth Index argument); vs use (Strawson), 44; vs use (Wittgenstein), 123 Meaning and Necessity (Carnap), 73, 81–83, 195 “Meaning and Reference” (Putnam), 229, 230 “Meaning of a Word, The” (Austin), 164 Meditations (Descartes), 36 Meinong, Alexius, 19–20, 25 “meltdown argument,” 236–38 Memoir, A (Malcolm), 114 Mendelsohn, Richard L., 74, 74–75 Mendelssohn, Felix, 134 Menger, Karl, 55 metaphysics: and analytic-synthetic distinction, 67–68; and logical atomism, 33, 34, 36, 43, 44; and logical positivism, 44, 68, 150; and Quine’s holism, 200; and Tractatus, 32, 57, 59–60, 62, 63, 68, 77, 122; and verification principle, 68; Vienna Circle’s assault on, 192 Methods of Logic (Quine), 183, 187 Metz, Rudolf, 87–88 microstructure: and functional argument, 240, 241; in Twin Earth argument, 235–36 Mill, John Stuart, 65 mind, philosophy of, 180, 255–63, 268 Mind Association, 147 mind-body relation: Carnap on, 80; Ryle on, 153–58; see also mind, philosophy of Mises, Richard von, 55 Modalities (Marcus), 211, 218 291 modal logic, 10; and direct reference theorists, 219; and theory of reference, 212 modal terms: and analyticity, 195; Carnap, 81 monism, 33 Monk, Ray, 46, 48, 91, 117, 119, 120, 160 Moore, G E (George Edward), 2, 8, 86, 87–93; on analysis, 5, 7–8, 89, 101, 105, 108; and Austin, 161, 165; and Carnap, 86; classicist training of, 161; criticisms of, 109–12; “A Defense of Common Sense,” 35, 99, 100–108, 109; end of career of, 146; and epistemology, 93, 96–100; and ethics, 94–95, 96; and idealism, 95–96, 99–100, 103–4, 105–6, 110; and “I know,” 133–34; in Library of Living Philosophers, 250; narrow concerns of, 248; and 1903 events, 93; and ordinary language, 161, 168; and perception, 49, 267; and realism, 48, 93, 95–99; reputation of, 250; and Russell, 34, 48, 86, 90, 91, 92–93, 104, 113; and Ryle, 88, 90, 147, 152; self-history of, 148; and sense-data theory, 40, 90, 93, 97–99, 101, 110–11, 263; on “truisms,” 35, 100, 102; and Wittgenstein at Cambridge, 91–92, 116, 123; Wittgenstein’s criticisms of, 109, 110, 111–12, 133–34; Wittgenstein’s influence on, 86; Wittgenstein’s opinion of, 89; Wittgenstein steadied by, 292 Moore, G E (Continued) 88; Wittgenstein’s Tractatus title suggested by, 32 Moore’s paradox, 89 Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (Stroll), 124 moral realism, 94 Morell, Lady Ottoline, 47 Morris, C W., 55 Myhill, John, 182 My Philosophical Development (Russell), 48 mystical, the, in Wittgenstein, 60, 61, 77, 115 Mysticism and Logic (Russell), 48 Naess, Arne, 55 Nagel, Thomas, 256 names, see proper names Naming of Cats, The (Eliot), 222 Naming and Necessity (Kripke), 229 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, 250 naturalism, naturalistic fallacy, 94 naturalized epistemology, of Quine, 1, 30, 63, 71, 192–93 natural kind terms, 29; and directreference theories, 211, 229–45; in Putnam’s Twin Earth argument, 231; as rigid designators, 217 natural language, see ordinary language “Nature of Truth, The” (Russell), 248 negative facts, Russell on, 38 neo-Quineans, 263 Neurath, Otto, 32, 54, 70, 150 Neurocomputational Perspective, A Index (Churchland), 261 Neurophilosophy (Churchland), 261 neutral monism, 1, 52 New, C G., 180 Newton, Sir Isaac, 3, 125, 197, 199 “Nominalism and the Substitution Quantifier” (Marcus), 218 nonbeing: and proper names, 228; Quine on, 181; and theories of meaning and reference, 212; and theory of descriptions, 18–20, 24–25, 219 number theory, as derived from logic (Russell and Whitehad), 11, 13 observation: and Carnap on science, 191; positivists on, 66, 69, 70 71, 84; and Ryle on sensations, 156–58 Oliphant, M L., 239 “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology” (Quine), 190 On Certainty (Wittgenstein), 89, 109, 111–12, 114, 130, 132, 134, 138 139–41; overall dynamic in, 143; on “Proof of an External World,” 100 On the Contrary (Churchlands), 261 “On Denoting” (Russell), 149, 248 “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (Quine), 188 “On the Logic of Quantification” (Quine), 184, 187 “On Natural Deduction” (Quine), 187 “On Referring” (Strawson), 44, 221 “On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation” (Frege), 12 Index ontological applicability principle, 168–69 ontological argument, 17–18; and theories of meaning and reference, 211–12 Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Quine), 187–88 “On What There Is” (Quine), 181, 187 ordinary (natural) language: and Austin, 148, 161, 168, 169, 172, 178 79; and fictive terms, 228–29; Frege on, 12, 59; and Moore, 161, 168; Russell and Whitehead on, 12, 14; and Ryle, 148, 168; traditional view of (Austin), 174; Wittgenstein on, 59, 129, 130–31, 168 ordinary language philosophy, 8, 180 O Sentido da Nova Lógica (Quine), 187 “Other Minds” (Austin), 148, 167, 173 other minds problem, 148 Our Knowledge of the External World (Russell), 48, 80 Outline of Philosophy, An (Russell), 48 Oxford philosophy: revivification of, 147–48; Ryle’s account of, 146–47; see also Austin, J L.; Ryle, Gilbert; other individual philosophers paradox: of analysis, 81–82; and Moore, 89; Wittgenstein to avoid, 129 particulars, in Russell’s logical atomism, 36–37, 39, 40 293 Pascal, Fania, 116, 119, 120 Paton, H J., 152 Paul, G A., 110, 263 Pauling, Linus, 46 Peano, Giuseppe: postulates of, 13–16; as unknown on Oxford scene, 147 Pears, David, 148, 161 Peirce, C S., Penrose, Roger, 256 perception: direct-indirect distinction in, 111; example-oriented approach to, 265–67; Gibson’s view on, 264–65; Russell on, 48, 111, 267; and sense-data, 97–99, 101, 110–11, 263 (see also sensedata theory); theories of, 49–50; and traditional vs new approaches, 247 “Perceptual Correlates of Massive Cortical Reorganization” (Ramachandran), 265 “Performative-Constative” (Austin), 167 performatives, 85–86; Austin on, 170, 174–77 “Performative Utterances” (Austin), 167, 173, 174 personal identity, 26 Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (Ramachandran and Blakeslee), 265 phenomenalism, 50, 53, 101 Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein), 2, 114, 124, 132, 134, 135, 138; and Concept of Mind, 159; overall dynamic in, 143; and Ryle, 150, 156 294 Index philosophical logic: Frege on identity sentences and descriptions, 25–29; logical atomism, 29–44; logic as ideal language, 16–20; logistic thesis, 13–16; and Principia Mathematica, 11–12; theory of descriptions, 20–25 (see also theory of descriptions) Philosophical Papers (Moore), 100 philosophical problems: ancient antecedents of, 3–4, 246; Putnam on, 267; and Ryle, 152; theories of meaning and reference developed for, 211–12; Wittgenstein on, 124 philosophy: as analysis, 5–6; Austin on, 161–62; current topics addressed in, 269–70; “democratization” of, 268–69; future of, 270; “heroic age” of, 268; as narrow, 249; questions as measure of, 254; questions on nature of, 2–3; recurring questions in, 3–4; Russell on, 6, 34; Ryle on, 150–51; and science, 1–2, 267, 270; and solera system, 4–5, 270 (see also solera system model); theory of descriptions as, 24; Vienna Circle on, 55; Wittgenstein on, 1, 2, 32, 54, 62–63, 64, 79, 125, 126, 130; see also analytic philosophy philosophy of action, 180 philosophy of language, 180, 255 philosophy of mind, 255–63; and cognitive sciences, 268; expansion of, 180 Philosophy of G E Moore, The, 90–91, 95, 96, 108 Philosophy of Logic (Quine), 187 “Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (Russell), 21, 30–31, 37 Philosophy and Logical Syntax (Carnap), 81 Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, The, 71 Philosophy of W V Quine (Library of Living Philosophers), 181 Philosophy of W V Quine, The (Gibson), 190 physicalistic interpretation of positivism, 70 picture theory, 58 Pinsent, David, 119 “Place of Science in a Liberal Education, The” (Russell), 247 Plato, 3, 66, 94, 214, 250, 252, 253 Platonism, Wittgenstein’s criticism of, 134–37 Plato’s Progress (Ryle), 152 “Plea for Excuses, A” (Austin), 167, 168, 169 Popper, Karl, 8, 55, 56, 250 positivism, see logical positivism “Possibilia and Possible Worlds” (Marcus), 218 pragmatism, 1, 8; at Oxford, 146; of Quine, 188, 200–201 presupposition theory, 89 “Pretending” (Austin), 167 Price, H H., 49, 98, 111, 147, 263, 267 Prichard, H A., 146, 161 primitive data, Russell on, 50–51 Principia Ethica (Moore), 5, 93, 94 Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell), 11–12, 17, 22, 42; Index and Principles of Mathematics, 93; and Quine, 185; and reconstructive methodology, 79, 80; and Ryle on science-nonsense dichotomy, 150; and Sheffer stroke, 14; and Wittgenstein, 32, 58, 59 Principles of Mathematics (Russell), 93, 146–47, 149 private language, 138–39 problems, philosophical, see philosophical problems “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” (Hempel), 85 Problems of Philosophy, The (Russell), 48 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 269–70 Profitable Speculations: Essays on Current Philosophical Themes (Rescher), 268–69 “Proof of an External World” (Moore), 100, 110 proper names, 28–29, 222–24, 227–28; and axiom of referring, 225–27, 229; and descriptions, 20–21, 23–24, 41, 212–13, 215–17, 219, 227–28; and directreference theories, 211, 213–20, 224; and fictive entities, 220–22, 227, 228–29; Frege on, 12, 216; and identity, 29; multifarious reference through, 228; Russell on, 28–29, 39–41, 58; as tags, 215, 217–18, 225 (see also tags, proper names as); in theory of descriptions, 20–25 295 propositional (sentential) calculus, 15 propositions: Ayer’s use of, 69; in philosophy of mind, 255; Russell on, 37, 38–39; Wittgenstein on, 58, 59 Ptolemy, 199 Pursuit of Truth, The (Quine), 188 Putnam, Hilary, 8, 45; and functionalism, 258–59, 261; and identity, 26, 28; logic and science in views of, 9, 45; narrow concerns of, 248; on natural kind terms, 229, 230, 232, 234–36, 242, 244; scientism of, 269; on solving philosophical problems, 267, 268, 270 qualia, 262–63 quantification theory, 15–16; and Quine, 187; and theory of descriptions, 11–12 Quenton, A M., 148 questions, Wittgenstein’s genius in, 253–54 Quine, W V O., 8, 181, 187–89; and analytic-synthetic distinction, 65–66, 70–71, 81, 190–92, 193–96, 199, 200–201; on Austin, 178; autobiographies of, 148, 181–87; behaviorism of, 201–3, 204–5; and Carnap, 182, 189–92, 196, 197; criticisms of, 204–7, 210, 252; and eliminativism, 263; on empiricism without the dogmas, 198–201; and external world problem, 207–10; future status of, 251–52; and ideal language, 63; on identity, 296 Index Quine, W V O (Continued) 26, 216; on intensions, 28; as last dominant figure, 268; in Library of Living Philosophers, 250; and logical positivists, 56; narrow concerns of, 248; naturalized epistemology of, 1, 30, 192–93; on reductionism, 196–98; and science, 2, 45, 188, 198–200, 209–10, 251–52, 268, 269; and scope, 12; and symbolic logic, 9, 180; as system builder, 188, 251; and traditional questions, 3; on two dogmas of empiricism, 70–71; Wittgenstein contrasted with, 253, 254 “Quine on Who’s Who” (Hintikka), 181 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 250 radical reductionism, Quine on dogma of, 196–98 Railton, Peter, 94 Ramachandran, V S., 265 Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 15, 24, 91, 114, 116 rationalism: and analytic-synthetic distinction, 66, 67; of Plato, 135; Vienna Circle’s assault on, 192 rational reconstruction, of Carnap, 79–80, 85 realism: direct (naive), 49, 96, 97, 101, 265–66, 267; of Moore and Russell, 48; Moore’s defense of, 93, 95–99; moral, 94; representative (causal), 49–50, 52–53, 90, 96, 97, 101, 111, 265–66, 267 “Realism and Positivism” (Schlick), 69 reconstruction, Carnapian, 79–80, 85, 191, 192 reductionism, 1; in ethics, 94; Quine on dogma of, 196–98; in reconstructive methodology, 79 reductive materialism, 257–58 reductive thesis, 70, 84; of perception, 51; Quine on, 191 reference: and behavior, 205; vs meaning (Frege), 26–28 reference theory, and modal logic, 212 referring, axiom of, 225–27, 229 “Refutation of Idealism” (Moore), 87, 93, 95 Regan, Tom, 90 Reichenbach, Hans, 56 Reid, Thomas, 89 Reidemeister, Kurt, 54 “Relation of Sense-Date to Physics, The” (Russell), 248 Remarks on Colour (Wittgenstein), 114 Representation and Reality (Putnam), 267 representative perception, theory of, 111 representative (causal) realism, 49–50, 52–53, 90, 96, 97, 101, 111, 265–66, 267 Rescher, Nicholas, 268–69 Rhees, Rush, 119, 132 Richards, Ben, 119 richness, 16 Ricoeur, Paul, 250 rigid designators: and fictive names, 220, 221; as important accomplishment, 248; Kripke on, 29, 215, 216, 217–18 Index Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism (Russell), 247 Roots of Reference, The (Quine), 187, 188 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and language learning, 204 Ruja, Harry, 48 rule following, and Austin, 163 rules, Wittgenstein on, 138–39 Russell, Bertrand, 8, 45–48; and Carnap, 71, 73, 76, 86; and direct reference approach, 211, 219; and empiricist tradition, 252; end of career of, 146; epistemological views of, 48–52; epistemological views of criticized, 52–53; and Frege, 73, 183; vs idealism, 204; and ideal language, 16–20, 32, 57; and identity, 26, 28, 29, 43, 212, 213; logical atomism of, 33–44; and logistic thesis, 13–16; on meaning, 28, 41, 133, 217; and Moore, 34, 48, 86, 90, 91, 92–93, 104, 113; on observation, 70; and perception, 48, 111, 267; philosophical approach of, 45, 268; on philosophy, 6, 34; and Principia Mathematica, 11–12 (see also Principia Mathematica); and Quine, 182, 189; reputation of, 250; and Ryle, 149–50; scientism of, 269; selfhistory of, 148; and sense-data, 40, 49, 98, 263; societal concerns of, 46, 247; Strawson’s attack on, 44; and theory of descriptions, 11–12, 20–25 (see 297 also theory of descriptions); and traditional questions, 3; and Wittgenstein, 30, 31, 38, 39, 59, 62, 92, 113, 116, 122, 142 Russell, Lord John, 46 Rutherford, Ernest, 239 Ryle, Gilbert, 2, 8, 152–58; and Austin, 151–52, 161; behaviorism of, 159–60, 205; biography of, 148–51; on Carnap, 83–84; criticisms of, 158–60; and Library of Living Philosophers, 250; and Moore, 88, 90, 147, 152; narrow concerns of, 248; and ordinary language, 148, 168; on Oxford scene, 146–48; reputation of, 251; in revivification of Oxford philosophy, 147–48; and Wittgenstein, 142, 147, 152, 156 Santayana, George, 250 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 250 Savigny, Eike von, 252 Schelling, F W J., 268 Schiller, F C S., 146 Schlick, Moritz, 1; and Carnap, 71; and Carnap on Wittgenstein, 76; on “method of verification,” 270; and scientific philosophy, 45; and status of philosophy (Ryle), 150; and verification principle, 69; in Vienna Circle, 32, 54–55, 55; and Wittgenstein, 56, 77, 116 Scholastic logic, vs Principia, 15 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 268 science: and contemporary philosophy, 1; and current philosophic topics, 270; de-emphasizing of, 298 Index science: (Continued) 86; and Frege on ordinary language, 12; holistic theories in, 197; and logical positivism, 53–54; mind as focus of, 256; as model for philosophy (Wittgenstein), 125; as probabilistic, 67; and Putnam on philosophical problems, 267; and Quine, 2, 45, 188, 198–200, 209–10, 251–52, 268, 269; and Russell, 34, 48; and Ryle, 150; and symbolic logic, 9; Wittgenstein on (Tractatus), 60; and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 123, 268 “scientific philosophy,” 3; of Russell, 45 scientism, 1, 2, 68; logical positivism as, 54; of Quine, 188, 201, 203, 207; of Quine’s followers, 251, 267; and Wittgenstein, 61, 62, 64 scope, in quantificational logic, 12 Searle, John, 8, 26, 152, 180, 221, 225, 260 Sejnowski, Terry, 261 Selected Logic Papers (Quine), 187 semantic theory, of Carnap, 81–83 sensations, Ryle on, 156–58 sense-data theory, 1, 111, 263; and Carnap, 80; of Moore, 40, 90, 93, 97 99, 101, 110–11, 263; in phenomenalism, 50, 53, 101; and Russell, 40, 49, 98, 263 Sense and Sensibilia (Austin), 165, 166, 167 “Set-Theoretical Foundations for Logic” (Quine), 187 set theory, and Principia, 14 Set Theory and Its Logic (Quine), 184, 187 Shakespeare, William, Sheffer, H M., 14, 182 Sheffer stroke, 14 sherry, solera system for making, 4, 246 shrinking-universe example, 69–70 Sidgwick, Henry, 91 Simons, Peter, Sinn vs Bedeutung: for Frege, 24, 26–27, 73, 217, 229; for Wittgenstein, 58 Skeptical Essays (Mates), 99 skepticism: from Cartesian model, 137, 140; of Hume, 67; Mates’s defense of, 207–8, 209; Moore’s attack on, 96, 99–100, 103–4, 106–7, 109–10; and Russell, 49, 51–52; in science, 67; and statements of nonexistence, 25; Wittgenstein on, 141; see also external world problem Skeptic Way, The (Mates), 207 “sketches of landscapes,” Wittgenstein’s philosophy as, 124 Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example (Stroll), 265 Skinner, Francis, 119, 132 Sluga, Hans, 6, 7, 74–75 Smart, J J C., 234 Socrates, 5; Moore compared with, 88; Wittgenstein compared with, 114, 124–25 solera system model, 4–5, 214, 246, 249, 267, 270; and Quine, 252 solipsism: from Cartesian model, 137; and Quine, 186 Index “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (Wittgenstein), 32, 114 Sowing (Woolf), 91, 92 “Speaking of Nothing” (Donnellan), 220 Speech Acts (Searle), 180, 225 speech act theory: of Austin, 85–86, 167, 173–74, 177, 180; as important accomplishment, 248, 268; Moore as source of, 89 Spinoza, Baruch, 66 Stevenson, Charles L., 95 Stonborough, Margarete Wittgenstein, 116, 119 Stout, G F., 90, 91 Strachey, Lytton, 90 Strawson, P F., 8, 44, 148, 183, 221, 225, 249 “stream of life” (Wittgenstein), 113, 129, 133 “stretches,” perception of, 266 student revolution (1960s), and Quine, 183 Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, A (Maslow), 62 substitution(al) principle, 195, 212–13 Surfaces (Stroll), 265 symbolic languages, and Wittgenstein, 64 symbolic logic, see mathematical logic Symposium on J L Austin (ed Fann), 161, 180 synonymy, Quine on, 194–95, 201–2 synthetic incompatibility, argument from, 97–98, 111 “Systematically Misleading Expressions” (Ryle), 149 299 System of Logistic, A (Quine), 187 Szabados, Béla, 120, 122 tags, proper names as (Marcus), 29, 215, 216, 217–18, 224, 225, 227; and direct reference doctrine, 228; and fictive names, 218, 220, 221; and rigid designators, 217 Tarski, Alfred, 8; on analytic propositions, 65–66; and Carnap, 71, 78, 81; and Quine, 182; and semantic conception of truth, 5, 81; and Vienna Circle, 55 tautologies, analytic sentences as, 64 teaching method: of Austin, 163–64; and Wittgenstein on need for discussion, 124 Thales, 35 theory of appearing, 111 theory construction, as aim of philosophy, theory of descriptions, 11–12, 20–25; and direct reference theory, 215, 219; and fictive names, 22, 219, 220, 221; as important accomplishment, 248; and logical atomism, 43; and meaning of proper names, 28; and meaning in statement rather than in term, 197; and nonbeing, 18–20, 24–25, 219; and ontological argument, 17–18; and proper names vs descriptions, 20–21, 23–24, 41, 212–13, 219; as Russell’s distinguishing achievement, 250; and Ryle, 149 Thost-Carnap, Hanna, 189 “Three Ways of Spilling Ink” (Austin), 7, 167 300 Thucydides, time, Augustine on, 126–30 Time of My Life, The (Quine), 181 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein), 32, 57–64, 114; and atomic sentences, 41; as Cambridge thesis, 92; early period culminates in, 115; English translation of, 160; entry numbers in, 39; and language, 36, 133; and logical positivism, 30; and metaphysics, 32, 57, 59–60, 62, 63, 68, 77, 122; on philosophy, 1–2; and Russell’s work, 30–31; Ryle on, 149; and Ryle on science-nonsense dichotomy, 150; and scientism, 2; and solipsism, 186; and Vienna Circle, 54, 57, 59–60, 61–62, 78; and von Wright on Wittgenstein, 122; see also Wittgenstein, Ludwig, early philosophy of translation, Quine on, 203 Treatise of Human Nature, A (Hume), 99 truth: Austin on, 170; and behavior, 205; correspondence theory of, 19, 42, 55; logical, 65–66, 193–94, 205; Quine on, 196; semantic conception of, 5, 8, 81; Wittgenstein on, 37 “Truth” (Austin), 164, 167 Turing, Alan, 260 Turing machine, 16, 260 Twin Earth argument, 230–32; criticisms of, 232–36, 238–42; and meltdown argument, 236–38 “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Index (Quine), 187, 190, 193, 197, 200–201, 206–7 “Two Dogmas in Retrospect” (Quine), 188, 200 “Unfair to Facts” (Austin), 167 Urey, Harold, 239 Urmson, James, 148, 161, 166, 173 vagueness and ambiguity, ideal language as curing (Russell and Whitehead), 11, 17 validity, and behavior, 205 value, Wittgenstein on, 60 Vendler, Zeno, 8, 152, 164, 180, 256 Venn, John, 147 Venus/morning star example, 26, 27–29 verifiability, and Ryle, 150 verification principle, 68–70, 84; criticisms of, 84–86; Quine on, 196; and Ryle, 159; and Tractatus, 64 Vienna Circle, 30, 32, 54–56; and analytic-synthetic distinction, 191 92; Quine attends, 189; and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 57–64, 78 View from Nowhere, The (Nagel), 256 “Visual Sense-Data” (Moore), 90, 99 Voltaire, and Russell, 46 von Wright, G H., 114, 115, 122, 141–42, 146, 250, 253 Wahreitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Der (Tarski), Index Waismann, Friedrich, 54, 56, 77, 116, 150 Wang, Hao, 182 Ward, James, 91 Warnock, G J., 148, 161, 162, 165, 166 Wasserman, Gerhard D., 120 “Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Semite? The Significance of Anti-Semitism for Wittgenstein’s Philosophy” (Szabados), 120 “water:” as homonym, 231–32 ; learning use of, 243–45; see also Twin Earth argument “Wee Teas” at Oxford, 147 Weininger, Otto, 121 Weiss, Paul, 250 Wettstein, Howard, 28 “What It Is Like to Be a Bat” (Nagel), 256 “When Should Marriage Be Dissolved” (Russell), 247 White, Morton, 65–66 Whitehead, Alfred North, 11, 13; in Library of Living Philosophers, 250; and Quine, 182 Why I Am Not a Christian (Russell), 247 Wisdom, John T., 90, 108, 146, 152 Wittgenstein (Bartley), 117 Wittgenstein, Helene (sister), 114 Wittgenstein, Hermine (sister), 31, 114, 116, 121 Wittgenstein, Karl (father), 114 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2, 8, 113–15; autobiographical fragments on, 160–61; biography of, 31–32, 114, 115–22; and Carnap, 71, 73, 76–78, 86; end of career of, 301 146; future status of, 252–55; influences on, 15; and Library of Living Philosophers, 250; with Moore at Cambridge, 91–92, 116, 123; Moore criticized by, 109, 110, 111–12, 133–34; Moore influenced by, 86; Moore’s contributions of importance to, 89; Moore’s influence on, 88; narrow concerns of, 248; and people’s theories of world, 209; on philosophy, 1, 2, 54, 79; reputation of contrasted with Ryle’s or Austin’s, 148; and Vienna Circle, 56–64, 78; writings about, 117, 120; writings of, 32, 114, 134 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, early philosophy of: on atomic sentences, 41; and ideal language, 59, 63–64; logical atomism of, 30, 32, 57, 62, 63, 122; on logical truths, 66; and ordinary language, 59; and Russell, 30, 31, 38, 39, 59, 62, 92, 113, 116, 122, 142; and scientific philosophy, 45; and solipsism, 186; on truth, 37; see also TractatusLogico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein, Ludwig, later philosophy of, 113, 115, 123–39; Cartesian model criticized, 134, 137–39; criticisms of, 141–44; as description instead of explanation, 126, 129, 132; and ideal language, 9, 56–57, 78, 113; and internal experience, 160; language games in, 113, 129, 132–34, 140; on language learning, 204, 243; and LW’s earlier 302 Index Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (Cont.) philosophy, 122–23; and method of analysis, 8; as “new method,” 78, 122, 123–25, 126, 254; On Certainty, 139–41; and ordinary language, 129, 130–31, 168; originality of, 253–54; and philosophy-science relation, 123, 268; Platonism criticized, 134–37; positive strand in, 145; and Quine, 192; range of cases used in, 130, 131–32; Russell on, 142–43; and Ryle, 142, 147, 152, 156 Wittgenstein, Paul (brother), 114 “Wittgenstein on Jews: Some Counter-Examples” (Wasserman), 120 Wittgenstein: A Life—Young Ludwig (McGuinness), 117 Wittgenstein and Moore on Certainty (Stroll), 209 Wittgenstein in Norway (ed Johannessen, Larsen, Amas), 117 “Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir” (Pascal), 119 Wittgenstein’s Place in TwentiethCentury Analytic Philosophy (Hacker), Wöhler, Friedrich, 241 Wood, Alan, 46 Woolf, Leonard, 91, 92–93 Woolf, Virginia, 90 Word and Object (Quine), 187, 200, 201 World as I Found It, The (Duffy), 117 Zettel (Wittgenstein), 114, 253 Ziff, Paul, 217, 222 Zilsel, Edgar, 55 .. .Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy Twentieth-Century A N A LY T I C P H I L O S O P H Y Av r u m S t r o l l C Columbia University Press N e w Yo r k Columbia University Press Publishers... West Sussex Copyright © 2000 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stroll, Avrum, 1921– Twentieth-century analytic philosophy / Avrum Stroll... ISBN 0–231–11220–3 (alk paper) Analysis (Philosophy) —History I Title B808.5 S77 2000 146’.4’0904—dc21 99–087366 Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and