the mit press real natures and familiar objects apr 2004

THE MIT PRESS Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 http://mitpress.mit.edu 0-262-05075-7 ,!7IA2G2-afahfd!:t;K;k;K;k REAL NATURES and Familiar Objects Crawford L. Elder In Real Natures and Familiar Objects Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist—that no gloss is necessary for the statement “human beings exist” to show that it is true of the world as it really is—and that we are surrounded by many of the medium- sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we are often able to determine by observation. The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load—that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Elder calls this presumption “mildly controversial” because it entails that arguments are needed for certain widely assumed positions such as “mereological universalism” (according to which the sum of randomly assembled objects constitutes an object in its own right). Elder begins by defending realism about essentialness (arguing that nature’s objects have essential properties whose status as essential is mind-independent). He then defends this view of familiar objects against causal exclusion arguments and worries about vagueness. Finally, he argues that many of the objects in which common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped by natural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection. Crawford L. Elder is Head of the Philosophy Department and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut. “This book will be essential reading for philosophers who address questions concerning the nature of folk objects, the basis for modal claims and our knowledge of such properties, causation, vagueness, and much else.” —WILLIAM R. CARTER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY “In his absorbing Real Natures and Familiar Objects, Crawford Elder advances the metaphysical debate over the existence of commonsense objects and the objects, laws, and properties posited by the special sciences. Elder writes clearly and nontechnically; his approach is utterly sensible, and his conclusions will be embraced by philosophers and nonphilosophers who feel the pull of a robust ‘realist’ picture of the world and our place in it.” —JOHN HEIL, DAVIDSON COLLEGE AND MONASH UNIVERSITY “Elder defends the much maligned ‘ordinary objects’ of common sense with rigor and detail against such opponents as reductionists and soriteans. His closing description of the ground floor of ontology would apply to the book itself — ‘splendidly, marvelously rich.’” —RICHARD GRANDY, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, RICE UNIVERSITY REAL NATURES and Familiar Objects Crawford L. Elder A BRADFORD BOOK REAL NATURES and Familiar Objects ELDER Real Natures.qxd 3/23/04 2:45 PM Page 1 Real Natures and Familiar Objects [...]... conventionalist electing the antirealist picture—is caught in a paradox What then of Sidelle’s austerely realist picture of the world? Here there are no objects, no courses of existence, no distinctions between mere alterations and outright destructions (or creations) There is only world-stuff, on the one hand, and on the other hand us and our conventions of individuation But let us ask: why are the conventions... incautiously suppose that there is in the world water, and other stuffs such as water, and thereby are required to suppose that there are in the world necessities But the connection between individuation and modal commitments obtains at the level of individual objects and samples as well In order to judge that there exist, at the same time, two individual Ks, we must believe that there exists at that time... world-stuff—apart from the world as it exists independently of us—there is only us That is, there are our conventions of individuation, and (presumably) the utterances and thoughts that implement these conventions Our making these utterances and having these thoughts create in us the impression that there are in the world objects, having certain properties essentially, but this impression is strictly... shape, the existences of the world’s objects This is of course “construction” in a transposed sense It does not require the use of hammers and saws, and we do not do it in the sweat of our brows We do it merely by thinking and talking as we do And if this sounds mysterious—how, by just thinking, can we make objects arise and last for determinate periods and then cease to exist? the answer is that the objects. .. to mere alterations, is the case only relative to us and our conventions In other words, that the existences of the world’s objects begin where they do, and end where they do, will not be independent of us and our conventions Beginnings and endings of existence, for the world’s objects, will obtain only relative to us Should this result be articulated in antirealist fashion, as the claim that we by our... genuine objects, the doctrine holds that there is an object composed of seventeen microparticles in my left elbow, forty-three microparticles at the bottom of the Marianas Trench, one microparticle in the star Sirius, and the entirety of the Navy’s latest Ohio-class submarine Neither folk theories nor learned theories about how the world works find any need or use for such randomly assembled objects —... existence involves—it may, for all the texts show, amount to no more than the occurrence of a series of such utterances and thoughts Most philosophers of generally conventionalist sympathies elect a richer picture of the world There do exist in the world objects, on the richer sort of picture, and the existences of the world’s objects have beginnings and endings But they have these only relative to our conventions... constructing activities They have only the shadow reality of a mental (or a linguistic) projection But being just that—having no existence save existence-relative-to-our-thought -and- talk— they really are entities whose existences we delimit just by thinking and talking There are in the world no “ready-made objects (Putnam 1982; cf Putnam 1981, pp 53–54) Rather the world of objects is “a kind of play,”... whether such objects really exist in the world have lately xii Introduction been motivated by worries about causal exclusion and sorites paradoxes Part II defends familiar objects against causal exclusion arguments, and offers a partial response to one species of sorites paradox Part III then takes up the task of defending positive claims as to just which of the familiar posits of common sense really... deployed in certain ways but not in others, and so on? The position this book will take is that we must learn from nature where there are real necessities, real continuings, and real unities These matters are not ours to fashion; they are fixed independently of us This is of course a frankly realist position, and controversially so No book should simply presume such a position, and this book will not Part I . rich.’” —RICHARD GRANDY, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, RICE UNIVERSITY REAL NATURES and Familiar Objects Crawford L. Elder A BRADFORD BOOK REAL NATURES and Familiar Objects ELDER Real Natures. qxd 3/23/04. 3/23/04 2:45 PM Page 1 Real Natures and Familiar Objects