moral skepticisms jan 2006

Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Moral Skepticisms This page intentionally left blank MORAL SKEPTICISMS Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 1 2006 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright Ó 2006 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1955– Moral skepticisms / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN-13 978-0-19-518772-4 ISBN 0-19-518772-5 1. Ethics. 2 . Skepticism. I. Title. BJ1031.S56 2005 171'.2—dc22 2005040674 987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper To Geoff This page intentionally left blank Preface I have always held strong moral beliefs. Growing up in Memphis, I discovered early on that other people held their moral beliefs just as strongly as I held mine, even when we disagreed. Some of these people were then and remain now my close friends. These conflicts made me wonder whether they or I (or both or neither) were justified in our respective moral beliefs. That wonder led to this book. When I first came to philosophy, I hoped to rule out moral nihilism and to prove my own moral beliefs. I thought that I succeeded in my undergraduate thesis on Kant’s ethics. That was long ago. In this book, I argue that moral nihilism cannot be ruled out by any method and that mor al beliefs can be justified only in limited ways. Some readers will find my conclusions disappointing or threatening. They still want to establish their moral beliefs thoroughly, conclusively, and objectively. At least they want to refute moral nihilism. In contrast with scientists who feel free to ignore or make fun of skeptical hypotheses like Descartes’ deceiving demon, most moral believers and theorists feel driven to fight moral nihilism. They are not satisfied by merely setting aside moral nihilism as irrelevant. That pl oy strikes them as too arbitrary. I respe ct their endeavor. Sometimes I share the urge to refute moral nihilism and moral skepticism. However, when I work through the details of moral epis- temology carefully and consider extreme positions charitably, I don’t see how to rule out moral nihilism. This inability leads to another: Many people cannot obtain the kind of justified moral belief that they long for. This is an important limit on the epistemic status of our moral beliefs. We ought to face that limit honestly. Facing our epistemic limits need not lead us to accept moral nihilism. I am not a moral nihilist. I believe that some acts are morally wrong. I even feel con- fident in specifying some of the acts that are morally wrong. None of this changes when I admit that I cannot disprove moral nihilism or when I adopt my moderate moral skepticism. Other people will still feel disappointed and threatened by my conclusions . However, this opposition should diminish when I show how our moral beliefs can be justified in modest ways. It should also help to distinguish moral epistemology from substantive ethics, because second-order beliefs about the epistemic status of moral beliefs cannot force us to give up the moral beliefs that we need to live well. So, I hope that my readers will engage in this enterprise with an open min d. I will discuss and endorse some extreme positions, but these positions should not be rejected too quickly just because they seem weird or dangerous. They and the arguments for them need to be assessed carefully and fairly so that we can all end up with an accurate view of when, how, and how much our moral beliefs can be justified. viii Preface Acknowledgments T his book benefited from the generous and insightful comments of so many people that I am bound to forget to thank many of them. I apologize in advance. The penultimate version of the manus cript was read by Russ Shafer-Landau and anothe r reviewer for Oxford University Press, both of whom provided ex- tremely helpful guidance. The previous version was discussed by a reading group at Dartmouth College, organized by Roy Sorensen and also attended by Julia Driver, Bob Fogelin, Bernie Gert, Joshua Gert, Jim Moor, Matthew Nudds, and Kathleen Wallace. Their profound challenges to my ideas are appreciated. The version before was read by Robert Audi, who straightened me out on a number of im- portant points. Parts of this book derive from earlier articles that received careful scrutiny from various readers. Published comments by Simon Blackburn and Mark Nelson were especially useful. So were conversations with (in additio n to those already listed) Alexander Bird, Paul Bloomfield, Michael Bratman, David Brink, David Copp, Jonathan Dancy, Jon Ellis, Terry Horgan, Sam Levey, Don Loeb, Ram Neta, Diana Raffman, Mike Ridge, Bruce Russell, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Jonathan Schaffer, John Skorupski, David Sosa, Christie Thomas, Mark Timmons, Bill Tolhurst and Tim Williamson. In early stages of this project, I learned a great deal from participants in a Humanities Institute and two conferences at Dartmouth College, including (in addition to many of those already listed) especially Mitch Haney, Richard Hare, Stephen Jacobson, John Konkle, Chris Kulp, Paul Mac- Namara, Peter Railton, Stefan Sencerz, Ernie Sosa, Bill Throop, John Tresan, Margaret Walker, Doug Weber, Michael Williams, Susan Wolf, and Nick Zang- will. In later stages, I was helped by audiences at Dartmouth College; the Amer- ican Philosophical Association; the Australasian Association of Philosophers; the Research School of Social Science at the Australian National University; Monash, Ohio State, Princeton, and Wayne State Universities; and the Universities of Auckland, Bristol, Cambridge, Connecticut, Edinburgh, Glasgow, North Carolina at Greensboro, Nebraska at Lincoln, Oxford, Reading, St. Andrews, and Stirling . [...]... Pyrrhonian About Moral Knowledge Academic About Justified Moral Belief About Moral Truth About Moral Truth-Aptness About Moral Knowledge Practical (about reasons for action) About Moral Reality (moral error theories) About Justified Moral Belief figure 1.2 Practical moral skepticism resembles epistemological moral skepticism insofar as both kinds of skepticism deny a role to reasons in morality However,... means, so moral epistemology depends in some ways on moral semantics Moreover, some philosophers (including Hare 1965, 1981; and Habermas 1990) try to justify moral beliefs by appealing primarily to a theory of moral language, so moral epistemology might be based on moral semantics The same might be said for moral ontology, the definition of morality, deontic logic, and moral psychology Nonetheless, moral. .. because moral epistemology is also normative in a different way, as we will see 5 6 Issues Moral Theory Substantive Ethics Particular Claims General Systems Meta-ethics Moral Linguistics Moral Metaphysics Deontic Logic Definitions of Morality Moral Psychology Moral Epistemology figure 1.1 some definitions, but it must also include some non-definitional claims about morality to count as a substantive moral. .. Chapter 1 What Is Moral Epistemology? 5 1.1 Moral Theory 5 1.2 Epistemology Applied to Morality 7 1.3 Varieties of Moral Skepticism 9 1.4 Presumptions Against Moral Skepticism 13 Chapter 2 Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt? 16 2.1 Does Knowledge Require True Belief? 16 2.2 Expressivism 17 Chapter 3 Are Any Moral Beliefs True? 3.1 Error Theories 32 3.2 Arguments Against Moral Facts 37 3.3 Is Moral Nihilism Coherent?... questions for moral epistemology and for this book This page intentionally left blank 1 What Is Moral Epistemology? he field of moral epistemology lies in the intersection between the larger T territories of moral theory and general epistemology Accordingly, this chapter will lead into moral epistemology by surveying moral theory in general and then moral skepticisms in particular 1.1 Moral Theory Any... in any less reason to be moral than non-skeptics Moral skeptics can hold substantive moral beliefs just as strongly as non-skeptics Their substantive moral beliefs can be common and plausible ones Moral skeptics can even believe that their moral beliefs are true by virtue of corresponding to an independent moral reality All that moral skeptics deny is that their or anyone’s moral beliefs are justified... epistemological moral skepticism is about reasons for belief, whereas practical moral skepticism is about reasons for action Moreover, practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action, whereas epistemological moral skeptics deny or doubt that there is ever an adequate reason for moral belief Consequently, practical moral skepticism does not imply epistemological moral. .. In general, what makes moral skepticism moral is that it concerns morality rather than other topics Moral skeptics might go on to be skeptics about the external world or about other minds or about induction or about all beliefs, but these other skepticisms are not entailed by moral skepticism alone What makes moral skeptics skeptics is that they raise doubts about common beliefs Moral skeptics then differ... against those who make positive moral claims, then it is opponents of moral skepticism who must carry the burden of proof Or, at least, moral skeptics can deny that the burden of proof is on moral skeptics Then moral skeptics may criticize any moral belief or theory without needing to offer any positive argument for moral skepticism, and their opponents need to take moral skepticism seriously enough... Sinnott-Armstrong 2004b What Is Moral Epistemology? 11 Pyrrhonian moral skeptics still might hold some substantive moral beliefs, but they do not endorse any higher-order epistemic claim about whether their own moral beliefs are justified or known In contrast, Academic moral skeptics make definite claims about the epistemic status of moral beliefs: Academic skepticism about moral knowledge is the claim . Moral Skepticisms Walter Sinnott-Armstrong OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Moral Skepticisms This page intentionally left blank MORAL SKEPTICISMS Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 1 2006 1 Oxford. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism 112 6.1. Moral Contrast Classes 112 6.2. Unqualified Judgments in Moral Epistemology 117 6.3. Relativized Moral Skepticisms 119 6.4. Academic Moral Skepticism 121 6.5. Is Moral. What Is Moral Epistemology? 5 1.1. Moral Theory 5 1.2. Epistemology Applied to Morality 7 1.3. Varieties of Moral Skepticism 9 1.4. Presumptions Against Moral Skepticism 13 Chapter 2. Are Moral