art and intention a philosophical study apr 2005

[...]... investigations undertaken in the rest of this work Chapter 2 examines some functions of intention in the making of art, a central goal being to explore a via media between Romanticist and rationa´ listic images of artistic creativity Like Paul Valery and some of the other authors who have written about the creation of art, I attempt to characterize both the spontaneous and deliberate, unintentional and intentional... such as a volition.8 As an example of this kind of analysis, we could say that if a sculptor intends to create a statue, what this means is that the artist desires or wants to create the statue and has some relevant beliefs about means to that end It may also mean that the artist believes that he or she will create the statue, or at least try to do so; in another version of such an account, what the artist... wishes and hopes, may not be aptly called intentions And as Berys Gaut has argued, Wollheim’s account also faces the objection that there are unintended yet artistically relevant features of a work of art. 16 13 Wollheim, Painting as an Art, 18 For a Wne, critical exposition of Wollheim’s theory and practice of intentionalist criticism of pictures, see JeVrey L Geller, ‘Painting, Parapraxes, and Unconscious... instead, the point is that these are functions intentions can 37 This ‘diachronic’ or dynamic aspect of intentions’ functions has been explored by Bratman in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason I shall have more to say about these Bratmanian considerations below, especially in Chapter 4 16 what are intentions? and do sometimes perform And with regard to the link between intentions and intentional action,... ‘Interpreting the Arts: The Patchwork Theory’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 51 (1993), 597–609, at 600 what are intentions? 7 Fortunately, there is an alternative to Wollheim’s proposal as well as to the various reductionist analyses of intention Instead of characterizing intention as a total motivational episode, or as a simple combination of a pair of other attitudes, intentions can be picked... speciWcally, intentionalists need not work with assumptions involving the agent’s infallible self-knowledge and control—such as the thesis that to have a mental state is necessarily to be aware of it, and the idea that one’s beliefs about one’s mental states are always veridical Nor are intentions always rational, lucid, or the product of careful deliberation For example, it is plausible to imagine that... situate my position in relation to preface xiii other proposals in the literature, and more speciWcally, rival, Wctionalist approaches and hypothetical intentionalisms I distinguish between diVerent lines of argumentation that can be given in support of a partial, actualist intentionalism, opting for an axiological approach that refers to the kind of artistic value involved in the skilful realization... intending and trying has been wrongly eVaced by this analysis Intention may plausibly be thought of (in part) as a 20 For an early evocation and denial of the possibility that intention is equivocal, see G E M Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), §1 21 On this point see Bratman, ‘What is Intention? ’, in Intentions in Communication, ed Philip R Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E Pollack (Cambridge,... intrapersonal and interpersonal co-ordination In the Wnal section of Chapter 1, I turn to a discussion of a range of competing positions with regard to the overall status of intentionalist psychology, including ‘error 3 Michael E Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge:... fulWl As developed and defended by such action theorists as Mele, Harman, Michael E Bratman, and Myles Brand, sophisticated functionalist accounts of intention suggest that the term intention plays a diverse and important role within our intentionalist discourse, and, as such, may be recognized as referring, at least in the Wrst instance, to a type of psychological item not reducible to other attitudes . important aspects of art s meaning and value are linked to the artist’s aims and activities. This page intentionally left blank ART AND INTENTION A philosophical study Paisley Livingston CLARENDON. class="bi x0 y0 w0 h1" alt="" art and intention a philosophical study Do the artist’s intentions have anything to do with the making and appreciation of works of art? In Art and Intention, Paisley. Livingston advocates is, however, a partial one, and accommodates a number of important anti-intentionalist contentions. Intentions are fallible, and works of art, like other artefacts, can be put to a