tracking reason proof consequence and truth dec 2005

[...]... all sentences A and B, (A & B) is true if and only if A is true and B is true Both of these are easily recast in Anaphorish without the truth predicate: (G') For all sentences A and B, (A v B) if and only if either A or B (B') For all sentences A and B, (A & B) if and only if A and B Tarski’s truth clauses (of which (G) and (B) are examples) are, as I’ve said, paradigmatic examples of truth- condition... the paradigm His truth clauses (of which (G) and (B) are examples) explain how the truth (and falsity) of sentences are due to the truth and falsity of their subcomponents (broadly construed)26 of sentences If this is all that’s needed, notice that the resources of Anaphorish clearly suffice, as (G') and (B') make clear Speaking of the truth and falsity of sentences in terms of the truth and falsity of... (natural) way—is the centerpiece of both assumptions and is how they knit together For truth understood via the truthmaker assumption—points outward toward the world: Truths are about the world, and how such truths are reflects how the world is And truth, so understood, also points inward as a norm governing reason: Inference is truth- preserving; that is, the mark of a valid inference is that if what it starts... version of part I and for sending me a number of very useful comments and criticisms 1 Truth and Truth Conditions 1.1 Biconditional Truth Deflationists and Metaphysical Truth Deflationists Biconditional truth deflationists typically see truth as a predicate to be directly applied to sentences or to propositions (and, for some of them, what it’s directly applied to—sentences or propositions—matters a... for example, Wittgensteinian-flavored views about understanding and inference, deflationist views about properties, and relativist and irrealist views about, well, truth The evaporation of a ‘‘substantial’’ notion of truth, that is, is often taken to be accompanied by the evaporation of other substantialist doctrines about understanding, ontology, and epistemology.1 I’m definitely not a minimalist in this... this introduction), this book will prove no exception: The reader will find a detailed and sometimes technical—discussion of contemporary work on truth, proof, and consequence But I’ve tried (here) to make clear at the outset what the stakes are—in a big-picture sort of way—for the kind of doctrines about truth and reason I’m arguing for A word here about the origins of this book During the period of... equation and two unknowns As I read this objection, it is that ‘‘‘Tachyons can travel back in time’ is true’’ is playing two roles (and it can’t) The first is that it constitutes (part of ) our knowledge and understanding of the truth predicate, and the second is that it gives the truth conditions for the sentence ‘‘Tachyons can travel back in time.’’ Here, clearly, it isn’t the semantic ascent and descent... alternatives— both real and imagined and one must nevertheless leave enough room in one’s exposition to present the new view I engage, therefore, with the rich contemporary literature on truth judiciously, especially because my aim in this book isn’t only to engage with the notion of truth, but also to engage with two notions taken to be closely related to truth: consequence and proof I am, broadly speaking,... of truth, e.g., ‘ truth as correspondence,’’ has found itself playing many roles in the hands of philosophers: as central to ontology, e.g., the commitment to objects via the ‘‘truthmaking’’ requirement on truths; as central to a theory of understanding of a language, via the grasping of ‘ truth conditions’’; as central to epistemology, as the rationale for epistemic practices that are seen as ‘‘truthseeking’’;... philosophers have for being deflationists or disquotationalists about truth. 2 Among these are animosities toward abstracta and proclivities toward physicalism Although, as my books Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science and Deflating Existential Consequence make clear, I share both these animosities and proclivities—I’m a nominalist, and my ontic commitments fall into the physicalist camp (broadly . alt="" Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequences, and Truth Jody Azzouni OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Tracking Reason This page intentionally left blank Tracking Reason Proof, Consequence, and Truth Jody. Data Azzouni, Jody. Tracking reason : proof, consequence, and truth / Jody Azzouni. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13 978-0-19-518713-7 ISBN 0-19-518713-X 1. Proof theory together. For truth understood via the truthmaker assumption—points outward toward the world: Truths are about the world, and how such truths are reflects how the world is. And truth, so understood,