the dispeller of disputes nagarjunas vigrahavyavartani apr 2010

[...]... your assertion does not exist in the cause: it does not exist in the great elements collectively or individually It does also not exist in the conditions which are the action of the chest, the throat, the lips, the tongue, the root of the teeth, the palate, 20 THE DISPELLER OF DISPUTES the nose, the head and so forth; it does not exist in the combination of the causes and the conditions; and it also does... doubt the authenticity of the Vaidalyaprakarana are the very same ones which should cast suspicion on the author ship of the Vigrahavy¯ vartan¯ (“text A”).20 For them, the main worry with the a ı Vaidalyaprakarana appears to be its “recourse to theories or opinions of the other schools”, and “its numerous connections with so many texts, schools, and doctrines.”21 But this is not the case with the Vigrahavy¯... that the mirage is a mirage But if he wants to use this example, then N¯g¯rjuna has to accept that the perception of the mirage exists, as well as a a whatever it is that caused the mirage, together with the perceiver of the mirage Similarly, the negation of the appearance, what the negation negates, and the negator will also have to exist In the same way in which it cannot be the case that all of these... Their argument focuses on two main issues First, they note the relatively close similarity between the Vigrahavy¯ vartan¯ and the a ı Vaidalyaprakarana, a discussion of the categories of the Ny¯ya school only a preseved in Tibetan translation.17 Since they believe the attribution of the Vaidalyaprakarana to N¯g¯rjuna “is based only in very weak grounds,” they a a similary doubt the authenticity of. .. of the authenticity based on the style and tenets of the work is not decisive by itself as any person belonging to the M¯a dhyamika school could have written in the style of the Master,” the reverse of this procedure, making a claim against the authenticity of a text based on its similarity with another one faces its own problems 19 For it cannot be a sufficient argument against the authenticity of. .. other main works are not even an issue On the a ı a a whole, the philosophical system presented is quite uniform But if even the mere fact that different works deal with different aspects of the same theory are seen as sufficient to question the authenticity of some of them, one wonders what 20 Tola andDragonetti (1995: 8).ThemajorityofmodernMadhyamaka scholars accept theVaidalyaprakarana as one of. .. existence as well as for the path leading beyond it 2 Text The Dispeller of Disputes Veneration to the Buddha! 1 If the substance of all things is not to be found anywhere, your assertion which is devoid of substance is not able to refute substance If the substance of things was not found anywhere, in the causes, in the conditions, or in the combination of the causes and the conditions, and if it... into account, the claim of self-establishment loses its basis The next seven verses (42–48) take a closer look at the role of the objects in the establishment of the epistemic instruments Establishing the epistemic instruments on the basis of the objects does not seem to be a very promising route After all, the instruments are supposed to be what provides us with knowledge of the objects The objects... negation of an existing substance In this case the negation of an existent object, not of a non-existent one, is brought about Thus the statement “there is no pot in the house” brings about the negation of an existent, not of a non-existent pot Just in this way, the statement “there is no substance of things” achieves the negation of an existent substance, not of a non-existent one In this context, the. .. have a referent and thereby exist, which the opponent denies The statement is therefore false If it is true, however, it must be meaningless, since one of its terms is lacking a referent The way out of this difficulty, where each side accuses the other of asserting something either false or meaningless, is to give up the attempt of reconciling N¯g¯rjuna’s theory of emptiness with the Ny¯ya semantics . claim. 19. For their arguments against the authenticity of the Vaidalyaprakaran . a, see Tola and Dragonetti (1995: 7–15). 8 THE DISPELLER OF DISPUTES properties which should make us doubt the authenticity. doubt the authenticity of the Vigrahavy ¯ avartan ¯ ı. 18 This is not the place to assess in detail their criticism of ascribing the Vaidalyaprakaran . a to N¯a- g¯arjuna (although in themselves they. Introduction 3 2. Text: The Dispeller of Disputes 19 3. Commentary 43 3.1. The Status of the Theory of Emptiness [1–4, 21–29] 43 3.1.1. The Madhyamaka Dilemma [1–2, 21–24] 43 3.1.2. The Sound Analogy